Defining Key Concepts

This section presents a practical typology for defining and understanding two core concepts: democratic backsliding and democratic resilience.
 

“Democratic backsliding” has been broadly defined as the “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.”  This hollowing out of democratic institutions, processes, practices, and/or norms can take distinct paths across time and place. Labeling any deterioration “backsliding” with no further elaboration risks likening scenarios that are very dissimilar in style, origins, and intent. This paper takes a more nuanced approach to understanding backsliding as one of three types: democratic erosion, democratic breakdown, and autocratic deepening. Understanding the distinctions between these forms of backsliding can inform program design based on evidence of effectiveness in similar contexts. It is important to underscore that a country’s backsliding status is not static; countries can and do move between them — either in the direction of further autocratization as antidemocratic practices become entrenched or by “bouncing back” on the democratization path, for example, following a pivotal election.

In democratic erosion contexts, established democratic practices that ensure orderly transfers of power, accountability to the public, and related democratic values are targeted in a slow, often piecemeal, fashion. Tactics of erosion can include changes to judicial appointment procedures that ultimately weaken judicial autonomy, exerting undue pressure on civil society organizations (CSOs), or spreading misinformation about political opponents. This style of democratic backsliding is often the most difficult to identify as a true threat because it can be veiled as routine adjustments to the status quo that reflect the “will of the electorate” or other such (notably democratic) justifications. However, when not heeded, these signs of trouble can give way to entrenched antidemocratic norms — and possibly pave the way for a broader democratic breakdown. Such losses have been observed, for example, in Hungary (2010–2018),  Ghana (since 2017),  Brazil (2018–2022),  and Israel (since 2022).  

Democratic breakdowns differ from erosion in several important respects. Because breakdowns tend to be rapid, multidimensional, and brazen, they are often more obvious to the casual observer. Similar tactics may be used as observed in democratic erosion but with a broader scope and/or swifter implementation, such as shutting down independent media outlets, banning the activities of CSOs or, cutting off their funding streams, or deregistering opposition political parties. There may also be more severe, sudden changes, such as dissolving an entire branch of government or purging sitting officials. Breakdowns of this magnitude have been observed in Tanzania (since 2015),  Poland (since 2016),  Turkey (since 2017), Hungary (since 2018),  El Salvador (since 2021),  and Tunisia (since 2021). 

Finally, autocratic deepening may be observed either following long-term democratic erosion that has transformed a once-democratic regime into an autocratic one or after an acute democratic breakdown. Unlike the two previous contexts, autocratic deepening is specific to settings that would already be considered autocratic, as incumbents develop their own strategies to stay in power while further narrowing options for democratic resurgence. Such efforts may include, for example, the use of military courts to try civilians, large-scale imprisonment of journalists, or repression of the opposition in the diaspora. Drastic cases of deepening have taken place in Venezuela (especially since 2013),  Cambodia (since 2018),  Nicaragua (especially since 2018),  Belarus (since 2020),  Myanmar (since 2021),  and Sudan (since 2021).   

In each of these cases, autocratic or would-be-autocratic leaders take specific actions that target the pillars of accountability central to a democratic system. Accountability, as used here, implies that bearers of political power assume an affirmative responsibility for their actions and must justify or answer for them — or risk being sanctioned. Political accountability centers on relationships between holders of power and other democratic actors, including other branches of government (horizontal accountability); citizens, often represented by political parties (vertical accountability); and media and civil society (diagonal accountability).  

Table 1 presents a non-exhaustive list of actions that are characteristic of each type of backsliding based on the accountability pillars they often target. These examples are non-exclusive; some actions that undemocratic leaders take could be indicative of democratic erosion or breakdown, for example, or democratic breakdown or autocratic deepening. Context and local expertise can help donors and practitioners evaluate a situation, identify the threat level, and guide program design and decision-making. 
 

Governance is an intricate, multifaceted system with integral (and sometimes mutually reinforcing) components. Drawing insights from the study of other complex systems, such as environmental ecosystems and information technology infrastructure, a system is considered resilient “if it continues to carry out its mission in the face of adversity.”  Taking this definition as our starting point, we define “democratic resilience” as the ability to maintain democratic governance functions and principles, despite attempts by illiberal actors to damage or diminish vertical, horizontal, or diagonal accountability mechanisms that are core to democracy. Democracy’s stress tests can include those listed in Table 1, but they are not limited to those examples.

Democracy itself is a system that requires continuous care and maintenance; it is not an endpoint. Fostering democratic resilience is, thus, an ongoing process. It requires democratic systems and actors to build and sustain capacities to respond to and recover from crises, possibly by transforming themselves or innovating in permanent ways. Appropriate preparation, combined with learning, reduces the need for ad hoc interventions by democracy actors. Similar resilience cycles are used in other sectors but have been underutilized for the democracy and governance space. IFES applies these three parts of the resilience cycle depicted in Figure 1 to democracy support as follows:

Preparation. A resilient system is equipped to lessen the impact of a democratic backsliding episode by anticipating that such threats will inevitably materialize, and defenses will be tested. With appropriate long-term thinking, a democratic system can be designed to weather such shocks and enable resilience among the individuals who work within it. For instance, many democracies have built checks and balances across branches of government or chains of command into their constitutions to prevent system weaknesses. In other contexts, this is akin to avoiding single points of failure; if one defensive mechanism fails, another safety net is in place. An important element of preparation is identifying new and emerging threats. Even in non-crisis times, democratic actors should stay vigilant to detect attacks against accountability mechanisms, such as the proposal of anti-democratic laws, significant cuts in the budgets of independent agencies, changes in nomination procedures that might undermine the autonomy of independent institutions, or government deployment of surveillance against opposition actors without judicial review.

Response. When built-in checkpoints fail, it is imperative to respond to present threats. Resilient responses can take several forms: armoring against or withstanding the shock; absorbing fallout by activating relevant procedures; or adapting flexibly to the situation. To withstand attacks on an independent institution, for example, trusted democratic champions can sensitize their communities to the threat with information campaigns, rallying collective pushback against antidemocratic efforts to capture or control those bodies. Democratic systems can also absorb shocks such as corruption by applying a range of available sanctions — whether disciplinary, administrative, civil, or criminal. Where those options are unavailable or unsuccessful, democratic actors can find innovative ways to respond by adapting protocols, such as by establishing new information-sharing mechanisms to understand, monitor, uncover, and expose evolving cybersecurity threats. 

Recovery and transformation. Sometimes, crises have clear endpoints; in other cases, democratic backsliding is prolonged but there are opportunities to win back some of the democratic ground that has been lost. During this phase, democratic systems should reflect on weaknesses exposed by the backslide to recover and, where necessary, innovate to transform points of failure for future resilience. Weaknesses in autonomy and accountability structures exploited during the backslide need to be addressed — even when they might also advantage the governing position of ascendant pro-democracy actors. Even mechanisms that functioned as envisioned may need adjustment, considering recent experience. Legal and procedural reforms should include new rules, norms, or practices that reflect the lessons learned from the response phase. These newly transformed institutions become the intentional design in preparation for future shocks.