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Understanding And Interrupting Authoritarian Collaboration

Approaches To Authoritarian Collaboration
Spring | 2024
Christina Cottiero
Author
Assistant Professor, Political Science
Cassandra Emmons, IFES Democracy Data Analyst
Editor
Global Democracy Data Advisor
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Regional studies scholars were among the first to prioritize understanding authoritarian collaboration, and a growing body of research has drawn cross-regional lessons about the drivers and consequences of authoritarian collaboration. Although autocrats historically have joined fewer formal international organizations (IOs)—those with three or more member states and a permanent headquarters and staff, or regional organizations (ROs)—IOs that also have a geographical condition and delimitation for membership—than their democratic counterparts, they nonetheless engage strategically in multilateral cooperation.13Today’s autocrats collaborate through a variety of formal and informal channels at the bilateral, regional, and, increasingly, global multilateral levels.

Nature of Autocratic Collaboration: Formal and Informal, Multilateral and Bilateral

  Formal Informal
Multilateral Creating/joining regional organizations comprised of predominantly authoritarian states, e.g., the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Undermining international or regional organizations dominated by liberal states as members e.g., nominating authoritarian officials for UN human rights committee positions

Establishing private regional policing agreements to respond flexibly and secretively to regime threats

Convening forums to share ideas, diffuse authoritarian policies, and socialize authoritarian elites, e.g., South-South Human Rights Forum (China-led)

Bilateral Investment agreements, e.g., joint investments in surveillance technology

Military training agreements and joint exercises

Statements of public support

Symbolic support, e.g., diplomatic visits

There are several reasons why authoritarian regimes would cooperate through formal multilateral IOs (especially ROs). Participation in authoritarian IOs/ROs--defined here as IOs/ROs in which authoritarian governments comprise the majority of member states--has been positively linked to the longevity of authoritarian regime14 similar to the finding that collaboration in democratic-state-led IOs supports democracy’s longevity in their member states.15 By cooperating through IOs under authoritarian government control, autocrats can also pool resources; develop mechanisms for routine coordination; and speak with one voice to legitimize member state policies.16 Pooling resources within authoritarian-led IOs entails centralizing resources in the organization--whether for project lending, emergency liquidity, or collective security--to distribute to members facing threats to regime stability. IOs are also important sites of coordination where members can harmonize their policy positions. Authoritarian-led IOs are central actors in much of the work on collaborative legitimation of authoritarian regimes. They help member states frame crackdowns against civil society as efforts to counter terrorism or maintain regional stability, lending their legitimacy to "launder" member state policies.17 Authoritarian IOs are also useful for legitimating members' policies in part due to their ability to mimic practices established by liberal IOs/ROs--or IOs/ROs dominated by democratic members. As described in subsequent sections of this paper, authoritarian ROs have participated in the production of pro-regime propaganda and have become ubiquitous at elections in some autocracies, where they deploy monitors to lend a veneer of legitimacy to rigged elections. Authoritarian IOs thus help to stabilize authoritarian regimes.

Autocrats also increasingly collaborate within existing global multilateral IOs founded and dominated by coalitions of liberal states or with mixed regime membership, including those created for ostensibly liberal purposes. While in the past, autocrats often focused on defending and deflecting criticism from these democracy-led organizations, today they increasingly seek to alter official procedures as coordinated members. "Hijacking" well-established global organizations from within appeals more to autocrats than leaving or refusing to join such organizations, in part, because these IOs have the potential to lend additional legitimacy to authoritarian practices through the stamp of membership.

Collaboration among groups of authoritarian regimes does not exclusively take place in formal international organizations; coalitions of authoritarian regimes also establish private written or verbal agreements or convene informal forums. In fact, authoritarian regimes that neglect their formal ROs are often highly involved in informal regional cooperation. For example, although absolute monarchs in the Middle East establish few formal treaties, they cooperate through secret, cartel-like arrangements.18 Particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Gulf monarchs were interested in cooperating on cross-border policing and punishing citizens critical to any monarchy in the region, but publicizing their cooperation against dissidents through a formal agreement would both be controversial with domestic audiences and reveal their willingness to flout international human rights agreements.19 Because secretive informal cooperation among autocrats is difficult to track over time, the literature on informal coalitions of autocrats is limited.

Authoritarian regimes also collaborate bilaterally on a variety of issues relevant for boosting regime security. Authoritarian regimes are more connected than ever before through formal agreements regulating bilateral investment, trade, bureaucratic exchanges, weapons sales, cross-border policing, and aid flows. China's Belt and Road Initiative, most notably, has created a web of bilateral investment and aid agreements with authoritarian regimes across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.20 Bilateral ties incentivize well-resourced, powerful authoritarian states to support the longevity of weaker authoritarian regimes.21

Lastly, authoritarian regimes support each other through informal bilateral cooperation. This includes making supportive statements about their counterparts' policies and sending their leaders on high-level visits. Visits from foreign leaders – and particularly leaders of powerful countries-- communicate foreign leaders' respect, confidence in their counterpart's grasp on power, and commitment to maintaining strong relations.22 Demonstrations of solidarity, whether through speeches or visits, may help autocrats deter their opponents from mounting challenges to their regime.23

How Authoritarian Collaboration Sustains Authoritarian Rule: Threats and Responses

Authoritarian collaboration has and continues to evolve in response to common threats to autocratic rule. Such threats to an authoritarian leader include pro-democracy groups (particularly when involved in transnational networks) and domestic opponents, stigmatization and illegitimacy of authoritarian norms, aid or loan conditionalities from "traditional" lenders (e.g., the World Bank or International Monetary Fund), and security-related threats (e.g., from insurgents or coup leaders). Authoritarians have been collaborating with one another to enhance regime stability in response to such threats (see Table 2).


 

Threats to Authoritarianism Autocrats' Collaborative Responses Examples
Pro-democracy groups and domestic opponents Information Exchanges

Collaborative Repression

Sharing effective tactics (e.g., peer-to-peer trainings or copying laws restricting NGOs) Collaborative surveillance (e.g., routinely sharing information on whereabouts of activists or opponents)

Coercing the return of "blacklisted individuals" Cross-border policing and harassment of exiles, migrants

Stigmatization and illegitimacy of authoritarian norms (as promoted by dominant liberal actors) Collective Legitimation

Mock Compliance

Illiberal norm promotion (e.g., unlimited sovereignty)
Supportive statements (e.g., speeches praising a fellow autocrat’s security crackdowns)

Inviting low-quality election monitors to flood the information space (e.g., Collective Security Treaty Organization election observers downplaying fraud)

Political conditionalities from "traditional" donors and lenders (e.g., World Bank) Diversifying Financial Partnerships

Seeking autocratic investment partners; Channeling aid through authoritarian-state led IOs (e.g., Arab Monetary Fund)

 

Security threats Military Interventions

Security Sector Assistance

Pro-regime interventions
Military equipment provision

Technology and weapons transfers
Military training and joint exercises

 

References

Text

13. For comparisons of joining rates in formal and informal IOs by autocracies or democracies, see Roger, C., Rowen, S. (2023) "The New Terrain of Global Governance: Mapping Membership in Informal International Organizations" Journal of Conflict Resolution 67(6): 1248-1269.

14. Cottiero & Haggard (2023, n. 6); Debre (2020, 2022, n. 11); Obydenkova, A. V., & Libman, A. (2019) Authoritarian Regionalism in the World of International Organizations: Global Perspective and Eurasia Enigma, Oxford University Press.

15. Pevehouse, J. (2002b) "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization" International Organization 56(3): 515-549; Poast, P., & Urpelainen, J. (2015) "How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting Consolidation?" World Politics 67(1): 72-113.

16. Cottiero & Haggard (2023, n. 6).

17. Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(1): 3-32.

18. Carlson & Koremenos (2021, n. 5) rely on indirect evidence of secret collusion, using comparative events reported in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA).

19. Carlson & Koremenos (2021, n. 5).

20. Notably, aid and other forms of financing from China does not appear to target autocracies more than democracies. See Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2015). "Rogue Aid? An Empirical Analysis of China's Aid Allocation." Canadian Journal of Economics, 84(3): 988-1023; Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. J. (2018). "Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa." International Studies Quarterly, 62(1): 182-194.

21. Tansey, O., Koehler, K., & Schmotz, A. (2017). "Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival." Comparative Political Studies, 50(9): 1221-1254.

22. McManus, R. W. (2018). "Making It Personal: The Tole of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence." The Journal of Politics, 80(3): 982-995.

23. Malis, M., & Smith, A. (2021). "State Visits and Leader Survival." American Journal of Political Science, 65(1): 241-256.