Trust and Remuneration for Elected Representatives

The rise of the Aragalaya (“The Struggle” in Sinhala) protest movement in Sri Lanka, triggered by the government’s defaulting on its debts in April 2022, highlighted the public’s belief that some of its elected officials are untrustworthy and corrupt. Demand for reforms is high; a supermajority of survey respondents in Sri Lanka in 2023 agreed that enforcing anti-corruption mechanisms equally across political parties (76 percent) and having an impartial judiciary (79 percent) and strong institutions with politically neutral or independent structures (72 percent) would increase their confidence in elected officials. Similar dissatisfaction with elected representatives and demand for reform and accountability can be observed in many countries that have been reeling from overall dissatisfaction with and, in some places, abandonment of, democracy.

In hopes of building more resilient democracies that are bolstered by democratic trust, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) undertook this research project. It compares the formal and informal remuneration that elected officials receive in Ecuador, Nepal, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka. This comparative research identifies 16 categories of benefits given to and restrictions placed on elected officials. These serve as a menu of options for others. The research also uncovers two ongoing challenges in rebuilding trust in elected officials via remuneration reform: constituents’ perceptions that officials receive more financial compensation than they actually do, and officials’ receipt of informal benefits. This research leads us to make five recommendations to countries considering remuneration reform or reflecting on their current practices:

1. Ensure reasonable remuneration that is responsive to economic and other pressures.
2. Keep the public informed about remuneration practices and, importantly, any changes to them.
3. Require asset and income disclosure to increase transparency around officials’ earnings.
4. Limit benefits extended to officials’ family members and prohibit nepotism.
5. Limit unnecessary international travel and manage perceptions of abuse.

Countries that strive to incorporate these reforms into their legal frameworks or common practices may help build a virtuous cycle of remuneration for and earned trust in elected officials. Improved trust may ultimately contribute to stronger, more resilient democracies.

The authors would like to thank Maurico Dorfler, Radhika Regmi, and Katherine Ellena for research support in Ecuador, Nepal, and New Zealand, respectively. Additionally, we’d like to thank Elías Gálvez-Arango for data analytics support and Nicolas Gucciardo for legal analysis support. Thanks to Dissanayake Dasanayaka, Mauricio Dorfler, Richard Nash, Radhika Regmi, and Erica Shein for constructive feedback during peer review.