





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PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

APRIL 2005

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FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS

Bridging Theory and Practice

IFES Public Opinion Series

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PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE AFTER THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION' APRIL 2005

IFES



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INTRODUCTION

This report details findings of a just-completed survey conducted in Ukraine. IFES' public opinion research in Ukraine is a vital contribution to the more than 50 survey and focus group projects IFES has conducted in more than 20 countries around the world. This research in Ukraine, as well as IFES public opinion research in other countries, seeks to provide relevant and reliable information on local opinions and attitudes to government officials, development professionals, political actors, academics, and other interested in democratic and political developments. The particular focus of this survey is to evaluate the post-election environment in Ukraine and better understand Ukrainian perceptions of the 'Orange Revolution' and the direction that Ukrainian society is now headed.

Since establishing an on-site presence in Kyiv in 1994, IFES has conducted 13 nationwide surveys of public opinion as well as 3 focus group projects. These studies have established a record of public opinion upon which to evaluate Ukraine's progress towards developing a more democratic society. This record has helped shape donor assistance programs, as well as IFES' technical assistance efforts, which are aimed at developing sustainable democratic electoral processes that meet the needs of an inclusive democratic state bound by the rule of law.

Researchers at IFES' Applied Research Center were the principal analysts for this report, and IFES Senior Program Officer Michael Svetlik and IFES Program Assistant Susan Smith provided programmatic support. Interviewing and data processing was completed by TNS-Ukraine.

The questionnaire was developed by IFES staff in collaboration with USAID and relies heavily upon IFES' cumulative experience with opinion research in Ukraine. The questionnaire incorporates information and experience garnered from all previous IFES research and technical assistance programs in Ukraine. Previous surveys have been conducted under the direction of Elehie Natalie Skoczylas, Gary A. Ferguson, and Thomas Carson.

This report contains an analysis of:

- Key indicators of democratic development including confidence in government and judicial institutions.
- Updated trend data on political efficacy and interest in politics collected by IFES since 1994.
- Perceptions of the election process with a major focus on the canceled November elections and the subsequent re-holding of the second round elections in December.
- Attitudes toward the mass demonstrations following the November elections.
- The post-election environment and citizens' expectations for Ukraine's future.
- Variations in attitudes across social and political groups and geographic regions.

This report is comprised of an Executive Summary and seven analytical chapters. The Executive Summary provides technical details of the survey implementation and highlights key survey finding. Chapter I of the report details voting behaviors in each round of the 2004 presidential elections including perceived fairness and the occurrence of irregularities. Chapter II analyses evaluations of the role of the Central Election Commission and a comparison of the perceptions of the November and December elections as well as the larger electoral environment. Chapter III examines Ukrainians' support for the demonstrations, belief about who benefited from these protests, and views toward the change in the balance of power between the President and Parliament as a result of the December constitutional amendments. Chapter

IV documents the sea change in public opinion among citizens when evaluating Ukraine's political situation and the influence citizens can have through voting and examines attitudes towards involvement in political affairs. Chapter V evaluates Ukrainians' expectations on several key issues in the next two years, as well as the issues perceived to be most important for the administration to address. Chapter VI looks at the level of confidence in various institutions and groups, including the trend in confidence levels in several of these institutions. Chapter VII provides an overview of public opinion analyzing schisms in Ukrainian society as a result of the events surrounding the presidential elections.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The findings in this report are based on data from an IFES survey conducted to gauge Ukrainian public opinion on important sociopolitical issues following the 2004 presidential elections and the 'Orange Revolution.' For this survey, a total of 1,265 interviews were conducted throughout Ukraine between February 15 and 28, 2005. These interviews comprised a national sample of 1,200 interviews as well as 65 over-sample interviews conducted in Kyiv city. Together, they constitute a weighted sample of 1,265 interviews that is nationally representative by region, rural/urban distribution, gender, and age. The margin of error for a sample of this size is plus/minus 2.75%. Interviews for the survey were conducted in either Ukrainian or Russian. This survey is IFES' 13th in Ukraine since 1994, and data from previous surveys is used throughout this report to highlight trends on important issues.

Voting in the 2004 Presidential Elections

- Nearly all Ukrainians (92%) report at least a moderate interest in the elections. Even among the most apathetic segment of the population, 18-25 year olds, 88% say that they were very or somewhat interested in the presidential elections.
- More believe the first round of elections on October 31 (44% vs. 33%) and the invalidated second round on November 21 (54% vs. 26%) were unfair than think these two elections were mostly or completely fair. The situation is reversed for the valid second round held December 26. A majority of Ukrainians (57%) believe that this election was completely or mostly fair.
- Among those who voted for Yuschenko in the December 26 election, few believe that either the first round of elections (20%) or the invalid second round (10%) were fair, but the vast majority believe that the December 26 election was fair (87%). A majority of Yanukovych voters, on the other hand, believe that the first round (63%) and invalid second round (60%) were fair, while only 13% believe that the December 26 election was fair.

Election Authorities and Electoral Processes

- Many changes occurred in the mechanisms of election administration following the invalid November election and the second round December election, and public perceptions of the quality of election administration and the role of observers and the media changed substantially. In most cases, perceptions are more positive regarding conditions in December than November.
- Regarding the CEC, a large majority of respondents (62%) agree with the replacement of the CEC after the November 21 election, and 53% believe the new CEC is performing better than the previous one. However, many doubt that the CEC is nonpartisan. While 52% believe the new CEC is nonpartisan, 48% believe it favors some groups over others. Yuschenko supporters are more likely to feel that the CEC is nonpartisan (82%), while only 8% of those who report voting for Yanukovych express this opinion.
- Although the majority are optimistic that the Parliamentary elections in March 2006 will be free and fair (55%), and few believe they will be unfair (16%), many remain uncertain. Nearly 30% report that they do not know whether these elections will be free and fair. The vast majority report that they are either very likely (61%) or somewhat likely (26%) to vote in the March 2006 elections.

- Partisan differences influence respondents' opinions about the fairness of the voting and their likelihood of voting. Those who voted for Yushchenko in the December 26 round of elections are more likely than those who voted for Yanukovich to believe that the March 2006 elections will be at least somewhat free and fair (73% vs. 32%). Those who voted for Yushchenko also report in greater proportion (68%) that they are very likely to vote in the 2006 elections than those who voted for Yanukovich (57%).
- Yushchenko supporters were more likely than those who voted for Yanukovich to strongly agree that the December election was competently administered (43% vs. 11%), while Yanukovich supporters were more likely than Yushchenko voters to agree strongly (32% vs. 7%) or somewhat (37% vs. 22%) that the November 21 election was competently administered.
- The vast majority of those who voted in Ukraine report that they felt safe voting for whomever they chose in both the November and December elections, but an even larger proportion report feeling safe voting for whomever they wished in December than in November (88% vs. 78%). Those who voted for Yanukovich were more likely than Yushchenko supporters to strongly agree that they felt safe when voting during the November election (54% vs. 37%).
- The majority of citizens felt informed before each election, and this belief increased from 60% in November to 79% in December. Those who supported Yanukovich in the December vote were more likely to report feeling informed in November (36% vs. 16%), whereas Yushchenko supporters were more likely to feel informed in December (40% vs. 25%).
- Less than half the population (43%) believed that the media were thorough in coverage of all parties and candidates in the November elections, and less than one third (32%) believed the media objectively covered all parties and candidates. In contrast, in December, 72% feel coverage was thorough and 64% believe it was objective.
- When looking back at November, on average 46% believe that observers created a positive effect on the elections. More think observers had a positive impact on the December elections (68%).

Opinions About the 'Orange Revolution'

- Solid majorities believe 1) the use of demonstrations was a legitimate exercise of democratic rights by those who organized and participated in them (70%), 2) the demonstrations raised valid concerns about the fairness of the November 21 election (65%), and 3) the demonstrations played a role in furthering Ukrainian democracy (62%). Yushchenko supporters are much more likely to agree with these statements than those who voted for Yanukovich in the December election.
- While the majority of Ukrainians support the demonstrations and believe they helped further Ukrainian democracy, a minority of nearly three in 10 (28%) believe the only purpose of the demonstrations was to create chaos. This opinion is held most often by those who voted for Yanukovich in the December election.

- Respondents' perceptions about who is responsible for organizing the demonstrations differ based on their political leanings. Those who voted for Yanukovych are more likely to believe that supporters of Yuschenko (80% vs. 64%) and "outside forces" (43% vs. 14%) were responsible for organizing the demonstrations than those who cast their December ballot for Yuschenko. On the other hand, people who voted for Yuschenko in the December election are more likely to believe that the demonstrations were a grassroots movement organized by ordinary Ukrainian citizens (73% vs. 18%).
- Nearly half (46%) believe the government's response to the demonstrations was generally correct, although the majority of these agree with the government's response only somewhat. A sizable minority of roughly three in ten (33%) disagrees with the government's response.
- Fifty-three percent believe that the invalidation of the November 21 election results and the staging of another second round on December 26 represented a victory for Ukrainian democracy that will benefit all citizens. However, nearly a third (30%) believe the invalidation of the November results only benefits some groups in Ukrainian society. Parties or people who support Yuschenko (55%) or Tymoshenko (12%) are most often singled out as the main benefactors of the re-staging of the second round.

Change in Attitudes Towards Politics

- The events surrounding the 2004 presidential elections mark a sea change in the public's interest in matters of politics and government. In only a few months, interest in politics among the adult population has increased by more than 10 percentage points. This just completed post-election survey finds that after the elections, nearly three-quarters (72%) say they have at least a moderate level of interest. Shortly prior to the elections, 59% said they were interested in politics.
- Currently, more Ukrainians say "no official corruption" is a key component of democracy than did before the elections (50% vs. 37%).
- More people say Ukraine is a democracy now than did before the elections (30% vs. 23%). A sizable proportion (43%) of those who do not say Ukraine is a democracy believes Ukraine is moving towards becoming one.
- There is a partisan divide in opinions about whether or not Ukraine is a democracy. In this post-election survey, those who live in oblasts where the vote for Yuschenko was especially high are more likely to say Ukraine is a democracy than those who live in oblasts with a strong preference for Yanukovych (77% vs. 28%). The pre-election survey showed completely opposite results. In October, those who live in areas that ended up having strong support for Yuschenko were much *less* likely to say that Ukraine was a democracy than oblasts with a strong preference for Yanukovych (14% vs. 34%).
- A majority of Ukrainians (73%) say they have not made efforts to ensure their rights or interests as a citizen are respected, and roughly as many say the events that took place in November and December have made them more likely to make efforts in the future to ensure that their rights as a citizen are respected (25%) as say the events have made them less likely (27%).

- Yuschenko voters are more likely than those who voted for Yanukovych to be energized by the recent events and say the events surrounding the presidential elections have increased the likelihood of their actively ensuring that their rights as a citizen are respected (36% vs. 10%).
- A slim majority of Ukrainians (53%) expect that elected officials will be more responsive to the needs of their constituents in the future than they have been in the past. Less than a third (29%) believe elected officials will now be less responsive. Yuschenko voters are much more likely than those who voted for Yanukovych to believe the government will be more responsive (76% vs. 20%).
- Only 30% say that people like them can influence decisions made by the government. But the events surrounding the elections have increased Ukrainians' faith in the power of voting. A majority of Ukrainians (53%) now say that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making in the country. In October, the same number of people said voting can make a difference as disagreed with this notion (47% vs. 47%).
- The percentage of young people who say that voting gives people like them a chance to influence decision-making in the country has increased from 42% before the elections to 59%.
- Among Yuschenko supporters, there has been a dramatic increase in their belief in the power of voting. Ukrainians who live in oblasts where support for Yuschenko is high are more likely to believe in the efficacy of voting than those who live in oblasts where Yanukovych made a strong showing in the December election (75% vs. 33%). Before the elections, Yuschenko-strong and Yanukovych-strong areas were nearly equally likely to think they could make a difference through voting (50% vs. 51%).

Expectations for the Future

- When asked whether the results of the December 26 election placed Ukraine on a path toward stability and prosperity or on a path toward instability and chaos, a plurality of citizens (43%) say Ukraine is now headed for stability. Twelve percent of Ukrainians believe that the country is headed toward instability.
- The vast majority of Yuschenko voters are optimistic that the December election placed Ukraine on a path toward stability, and survey respondents' most often cited trust in authorities (32%) as the reason for their optimism. By contrast, more Yanukovych voters say that these elections will lead to instability rather than stability (29% vs. 7%), and the majority of Yanukovych voters are uncertain about the direction in which Ukraine is headed. Among those who think Ukraine is on a path toward instability, the most common responses cited are distrust of new authorities (19%), poor economic situation (16%), and the belief that new authorities will create instability (13%).
- Opinions about the current economic situation are somewhat more positive, but the data still indicates a majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the country's economic situation. Most Ukrainians (57%) describe the country's current economic situation as bad or very bad, while few (9%) describe it as good or very good. In the 2003 survey, 86% described the economy as bad.

- Majorities expect to see at least some improvements in relations with Western countries (70%), the economy (65%), the fight against corruption (63%), respect for human rights (59%), and political stability (54%) over the next two years. Residents of “Strong Yanukovich” oblasts are less likely to be optimistic about these issues than residents of “Strong Yuschenko” oblasts.
- Ukrainians feel that issues related to the country’s economy are the most important issues facing Ukraine. Unemployment, low wages, social payments, and general economic problems were mentioned most often when citizens were asked to name the most important issues facing Ukraine today.
- Economic concerns, corruption, and improved healthcare dominated the agenda respondents wished the Yuschenko administration to tackle in the next year.

Opinions About Public Institutions

- Institutions that played key roles in the events following the invalid November 21 election have seen their public standing receive a significant boost since the elections. More Ukrainians say that they now have more positive impressions of the *Verkhovna Rada*, the judicial system, the media, and nongovernmental organizations than they did at the beginning of the presidential election process in October. Those who voted for Viktor Yuschenko in the December 26 election are much more likely to have developed more positive impressions of these institutions than those who voted for Viktor Yanukovich.
- Forty percent of Ukrainians now have a more positive impression of the media than they did at the start of the election process, whereas 11% have more negative impressions, and 38% have not changed their impression of the media.
- Thirty-six percent of Ukrainians believe that it is safe or very safe for the media to report the news objectively, even if the news is critical of those in power. Twenty-seven percent of Ukrainians believe that it is very or somewhat dangerous for the media to report the news objectively, and 16% believe it is neither totally safe nor totally dangerous for the media to report the news objectively. The percent saying that it is dangerous for the media to report news objectively has changed from 68% in IFES’ 2003 survey to 27% in this year’s survey, while the percentage saying it is safe has increased from 20% to 36%.
- The increased safety of the media is further emphasized by the fact that 28% of Ukrainians believe that it is now safer for the media to report news objectively since the December 26 election, while 8% believe it is more dangerous. Thirty-seven percent say that there has been no change in the safety of the media since the election. A plurality of Yuschenko supporters (42%) believe that media safety has improved, while a majority of Yanukovich supporters (51%) say there has been no change in the safety of the media.
- Since the beginning of the election process, impressions of the *Verkhovna Rada* have improved for 42% of Ukrainians. Thirty-three percent say that they have not changed their impressions of the *Rada*, and 15% say their impressions of the *Rada* have gotten worse.
- Similar to impressions of the media and of the *Verkhovna Rada*, impressions of the judicial system have improved for slightly more than four in ten Ukrainians (41%).

Sixteen percent have a worse impression of the judicial system, and 29% say that they have not changed their impression of the judicial system since the beginning of the election process. Most Ukrainians strongly or somewhat agree (57%) that the judiciary acted properly and according to the constitution during the electoral crisis in November and December. Nineteen percent agree that the judiciary made decisions beyond its role at this time. Nine percent do not agree with either statement. Not surprisingly, those who voted for Yanukovych on December 26 are more likely to say the judiciary made decisions beyond its role (47%) than those who voted for Yushchenko (4%). A majority of those who voted for Yushchenko believe that the judiciary acted properly (84%).

- While more Ukrainians say that they have a more positive than negative impression of nongovernmental organizations or NGOs (29% vs. 7%), more than a quarter of Ukrainians (27%) do not have an opinion on this question. The large number of Don't Knows reflects the fact that many Ukrainians are not aware of what NGOs are (24% in IFES' 2003 survey). Thirty-seven percent of Ukrainians say that their opinions of NGOs have not changed since the start of the election process.
- When asked how necessary NGOs are in Ukraine, 49% of respondents say that they are either essential or very necessary, while 23% say they are not very necessary or at all necessary. Respondents' opinions about the necessity of NGOs are impacted by partisan affiliation as 62% of Yushchenko supporter believe NGOs are necessary while 15% say they are not necessary. By contract, Yanukovych supporters are nearly evenly split with 35% saying NGOs are necessary and 33% saying they are not necessary. Differences between Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters are also observed when respondents are asked how likely they would be to volunteer for NGOs in the future. Twenty-nine percent of Yushchenko supporters are likely to volunteer for NGOs compared to 17% of Yanukovych supporters.
- Confidence in the *Verkhovna Rada* has increased two-fold—from 27% in IFES' 2003 survey to 54% in this survey. A majority of residents of oblasts with a strong Yushchenko vote in the December election (defined as higher than 77%) express confidence in the *Rada* (71%), while a majority of residents in oblasts with a strong Yanukovych vote in December (defined as higher than 74%) express little or no confidence in the *Rada* (63%).
- A majority of Ukrainians express confidence in President Yushchenko and specific members of this government. Sixty-five percent of Ukrainians say they have confidence in President Yushchenko, while a quarter (25%) say they have little or no confidence in him. Among those who voted for Yanukovych, just 17% say they have confidence in the President. A majority of Ukrainians say they have confidence in Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (57%), while 32% say they have little or no confidence in her. A similar 57% say they have confidence in the new Cabinet of Ministers appointed by President Yushchenko.
- There is little confidence in Viktor Yanukovych, particularly among those who voted for President Yushchenko in the December election. A majority (60%) say they have little or no confidence in Yanukovych, while 27% say that they do have confidence in him. Yanukovych's base of support is in eastern Ukraine, where 72% say they have confidence in him.

-
- Confidence in former President Kuchma has plummeted from its already low level of 22% in IFES' 2003 survey to 6% in this year's survey. Eighty-six percent of Ukrainians say they have little or no confidence in Kuchma (up from 70% in 2003).
 - More than six in 10 Ukrainians (65%) have confidence in the military, up from 56% in the 2003 survey and a low of 48% in IFES' 2002 survey.
 - A plurality of Ukrainians expresses confidence in both their city or village councils and the mayor of their local self-government (46% each).
 - Fifty-eight percent of Ukrainians say they have confidence in people from other regions of Ukraine, while 17% say they have little or no confidence in those from other regions.

I. VOTING IN THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Interest in, and Reported Turnout for, the 2004 Presidential Elections

Even before the events of last November and December, Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections promised to be a critical event that would determine the future orientation of Ukrainian politics and, indeed, the Ukrainian state. The two main contenders for the presidency—Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich—presented sharply different visions of the direction they would take Ukraine if elected president. These competing visions reflected a societal divide between Ukrainians who wanted Ukraine to look to Western Europe for its future and those who would reinvigorate the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Because of the high stakes, observers expected the 2004 elections to generate great interest among Ukrainians. Such high interest was found by IFES' post-election survey in Ukraine.


The survey data shows that a majority of Ukrainians (59%) were very interested in the 2004 presidential elections, and another 33% say that they were somewhat interested. Thus, in total nine in 10 Ukrainians were interested in the presidential elections. This high level of interest in the elections was sustained through all major sub-groups in Ukrainian society. Even among the most apathetic segment of the population, 18-25 year olds, 88% say that they were very or somewhat interested in the presidential elections.

Given this high level of interest, it is not surprising that the vast majority of Ukrainian adults say that they took part in each of the rounds of the 2004 presidential elections. In fact, more respondents say they took part in each of the rounds of the presidential elections than the officially reported turnout figures can account for. In general, participation reported in the survey is overstated by between 10 and 14 percentage points: October first round—87% survey, 74% actual; November second round (invalid)—91% survey, 81% actual; December second round (valid)—91% survey, 77% actual. This overstatement of electoral participation is not surprising since post-election surveys generally show higher rates of participation than the actual turnout. There is also a historical precedent for this in IFES' surveys in Ukraine. For example, in IFES' 2003 survey, 82% reported participating in the 2002 parliamentary elections whereas the actual turnout for the election was 69%.

Among those who report not having voted in any rounds of the presidential elections, the most often cited reason was because they were away from their home district on election day. Some people could not participate because illness prevented them from visiting the polling stations. For the first round of the election, 1.7% of respondents say they did not vote because they were not on the voters' list or because there was a problem with their passports. For the December 26 election, this percentage was 1.2%. Around one percent of respondents did not vote in any round because they did not support any candidate.

While there was near universal interest in the 2004 presidential elections and close to three-quarters or more of eligible Ukrainians participated, there is far less uniformity in Ukrainians' opinions about the fairness of the three rounds of the election. In particular, respondents' perceptions of the election process are markedly different for the first and invalid second round of the presidential election as compared to the valid December second round (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Fairness of 2004 Presidential Elections (in %)




"In your opinion, how free and fair were each of the rounds of the presidential election?" (n=1265)

A larger percentage of Ukrainians believe that the October first round and the invalid November second round were unfair than believe that these two elections were mostly or completely fair. The situation is reversed for the valid December second round in that a majority of Ukrainians believe that this election was completely or mostly fair. It should be noted that a majority of Ukrainians believe the invalid second round of the election was not fair while 10% fewer believe the first round was not fair.

Analysis of the survey data reveals that the partisan affiliation of respondents is the key factor driving attitudes about the fairness of the election process. Those who backed Yanukovich in the December second round have much more positive assessments of the fairness of the first and invalid second rounds of the election than those who voted for Yushenko, while those who backed Yushenko have much more positive opinions of the valid second round of the election (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 Differences in Opinions About the Fairness of the Election



In your opinion, how free and fair were each of the rounds of the presidential election? (n=1265)

Figure 1.2 shows that among Yuschenko voters in the December 26 election, few believe that either the first round of the election (20%) or the invalid second round (10%) were fair, but the vast majority believe that the December 26 election was fair (87%). On the other hand, a majority of Yanukovych voters believe that the first round (63%) and invalid second round (60%) were fair, while only 13% believe that the December 26 election was fair. This split in opinions is replicated on many other issues addressed in this survey and points to the sociopolitical schism that currently exists in Ukraine.

These differences in attitudes carry over to the oblast level. The vast majority of residents of oblasts that strongly supported Yanukovych in the December 26 election¹ believe that the first and invalid rounds were fair, while believing the opposite for the December 26 election. This pattern is reversed for residents of oblasts that strongly supported Yuschenko on December 26.

Irregularities During the Election Process

After the first round of the election on October 31, election observers raised concerns that quite a few people who went to vote were turned away from the polls because of problems with the voting lists at polling stations.² In IFES' survey, few respondents who voted in the first round election (1%) report that their names were not on the voting lists when they went to vote. In the vast majority of these cases, election officials corrected the error on the spot and allowed these voters to vote.

There were considerably more instances of voter intimidation during the election process. In total, 1.9% of Ukrainians say that they were personally threatened to convince them to vote a certain way in the elections, and 5.4% say that they know of someone who was threatened to induce them to vote a specific way. Among those who were directly threatened or who knew of someone who was threatened, the most often cited threat was the loss of their job (70%). Few reported that they were threatened with failing grades (4%) or bodily harm (2%).

Some Ukrainians also report that they themselves were offered rewards if they voted a specific way in the election (4.5%) or that they know of someone who was offered rewards if they voted for a specific candidate (12.5%). Eighteen percent of the residents of the northern region know of someone who was offered a reward, while this percentage is 16% for residents of Kyiv. By contrast, only 4% of residents of the northeastern region say they know of someone who was offered a reward.

¹ Oblasts were divided into four categories based on their level of support for either candidate in the December 26 election: Strong Yanukovych, Moderate Yanukovych, Moderate Yuschenko, and Strong Yuschenko. Assignment to one of these four categories was based on the standard deviation of the actual percentage of oblast-level votes for Yanukovych in the December 26 election. For each oblast represented in the sample, if the percentage of votes Yanukovych received was more than two standard deviations above his national percentage, that oblast was put in the Strong Yanukovych category. The effective percentage of the vote needed in an oblast to move it into this category was 74.11% or higher for Yanukovych. In a given oblast, if Yanukovych received a percentage of the vote smaller than 74.11% but still received more votes than Yuschenko, this oblast was placed in the Moderate Yanukovych category. If Yanukovych received fewer than 18.49% percent of votes in an oblast, the oblast was placed in the Strong Yuschenko category. If Yanukovych received more than 18.49% of the vote in an oblast but still had fewer votes than Yuschenko, the oblast was placed in the Moderate Yuschenko category.

² *Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions*, International Election Observation Mission OSCE/ODIRH, November 1, 2004.


II. ELECTION AUTHORITIES AND ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Public perceptions of the quality of election administration and the role of observers and the media changed are substantially following the invalidated November elections. In most cases, opinions are more positive about the process, observers, and the media when looking at the December elections than the November elections.

Performance of the CEC

A large majority of respondents agree with the replacement of the Central Election Commission (CEC) after the November 21 election (62%), although two in 10 do not (22%). A slim majority (53%) believe the new CEC is performing better than the previous one. Fewer people (18%) rate the performance of the new CEC the same as that of its predecessor, and 11% believe it is doing a worse job. Nearly one in five report that they do not know how to rate the performance of the new CEC.

Figure 2.1 Opinion on Appointment of New CEC



"Do you agree or disagree with the move to appoint a new CEC after the November 21 election?" (n=1265)

When asked specifically about whether they thought the new CEC was partisan, respondents are roughly split. While 52% believe the new CEC is nonpartisan, 48% believe it favors some groups over others. Of those who believe the CEC is partisan, 24% report that the CEC favors Yuschenko, and 4% believe it favors Tymoshenko. A large majority (71%) of those who believe the CEC is partisan do not or cannot tie this to favoritism of a specific individual.

Respondents' evaluation of the CEC is linked to their perceptions of partisanship. Nearly all (90%) who say the new CEC performed better than the old CEC think the new CEC is nonpartisan. By contrast, most of those who say the new CEC's performance was inferior to that of the old CEC (96%) or who say the performance of the two CECs was equal (83%) believe that the new CEC is partisan.

Not surprisingly, there is a strong partisan component to respondents' evaluations of the CEC's replacement. Those who voted for Yuschenko in the December 26 election are nearly unanimous in their support for the replacement of the CEC (93%) while Yanukovich voters are

more split. A slim majority of Yanukovich voters disagree (53%) with the replacement of the CEC, 13% agree, and a quarter (26%) are not sure how to judge the CEC's replacement.

This same pattern is observed in respondents' evaluations of the new CEC itself. The vast majority of Yuschenko voters believe the new CEC performed better than its predecessor (87%), while Yanukovich voters are divided about whether the new CEC has done a worse job (34%) or has performed equally (34%). Twenty-six percent do not know how to evaluate the new CEC's performance against that of the old one.

Likewise, December voting preferences influence respondents' opinions about the CEC. Most (82%) of those who report voting for Yuschenko feel that the new CEC is nonpartisan, while only 8% of those who report voting for Yanukovich express this opinion.

Comparing Perceptions of the Electoral Environment in the November and December Elections

With regard to election administration, media coverage of the election, the performance of election observers, and perceptions about voter safety and education, Ukrainians expressed more satisfaction with these issues when thinking about the December 26 elections than when considering the November 21 elections invalidated by the Supreme Court.

Specifically, when asked to reflect on the November elections, slightly more respondents *disagree* that the elections were competently administered than believe they were administered competently (46% vs. 41%). By contrast, a clear majority of 68% think the December elections were competently administered while two in 10 (22%) disagree.

Likewise, while more respondents think their votes in the invalid November second round were kept confidential than believe confidentiality was breached (48% vs. 37%), public opinion is even more decisive when it comes to the December second round. A large majority of seven in 10 (69%) think their votes were kept confidential by election authorities in December, and only two in 10 have doubts that confidentiality was preserved (18%).

However, while a plurality believe that the November election was competently administered and that their votes were kept confidential, only three in 10 (30%) believe the November election results accurately reflected the way people voted. Nearly twice as many people (57%) think the November second round did not reflect the true vote of the country. In contrast, a solid majority (62%) have confidence that the December elections were an accurate reflection of the way people voted—a quarter (25%) disagree.

Public belief in the thoroughness and objectivity of media coverage of the campaign also increased considerably between November and December. Less than half the population (43%) believe that the media were thorough in their coverage of all parties and candidates in the November elections, while only one third (32%) believe media coverage was objective. In contrast, 72% of respondents feel media coverage before the December elections was thorough and 64% believe it was objective.

The Ukrainian public also rates the performance of election observers of all types (domestic, international, and those from political parties) as better in the December elections than in the invalid November second round. Fewer than half of respondents believe that domestic (46%), international (47%) or political party (44%) observers had a positive effect in the November elections. This proportion increases to nearly seven in 10 when respondents evaluate the


performance of domestic (68%), international (67%) and political party (66%) observers in the December 26 election.

The vast majority of those who voted in Ukraine report that they felt safe voting for whomever they desired in both the November and December elections but report increased security (from 78% vs. 88%) in the December election as compared to the November election. The majority of voters also report they felt informed prior to each election, and this belief increased from 60% in November to 79% in December.


Lastly, when asked whether they felt the electoral system provides sufficient means to challenge electoral violations, a minority of three in 10 (32%) agree this was the case in the November election while nearly twice as many (62%) say they felt the system provided sufficient means to challenge violations during the December election.

The partisan difference in respondents' perceptions of the November and December elections is stark, with Yanukovich supporters rating each aspect of the November election higher than Yushchenko voters. Respondents' evaluations of the December election are the reverse. When evaluating each aspect of the December election, Yushchenko voters voice more support than Yanukovich voters. To illustrate this point, Figure 2.2a and 2.2b below presents the average score for Yushchenko and Yanukovich voters along each dimension. The scale is normed such that 1 is strong disagreement with the item and 4 is strong agreement with the item.

Figure 2.2a Mean of Opinions of Yushchenko Voters on Nov. 21 and Dec. 26 Elections



"Please think back to the Nov. 21 (Dec. 26) second-round presidential election that was later cancelled by the Supreme Court. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about this particular election." (n=691)

Figure 2.2b Mean of Opinions of Yanukovych Voters on Nov. 21 and Dec. 26 Elections

"Please think back to the Nov. 21 (Dec. 26) second-round presidential election that was later cancelled by the Supreme Court. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about this particular election." (n=374)

Those who voted for Yanukovych are more likely than Yuschenko supporters to say the November election was administered competently (74% vs. 32%), votes were kept confidential (82% vs. 43%), and the official results reflected the way people voted (82% vs. 10%). The partisan split in respondents' evaluations of the December election falls the other way, with Yuschenko voters more likely to believe the December election was administered competently (95% vs. 43%), votes were kept confidential (89% vs. 62%), and the official results reflected the way people voted (96% vs. 24%).

Yanukovych voters are much more likely to think media coverage was thorough (65%) and objective (54%) during the November election than are Yuschenko voters (30%, thorough; 21% objective). The opposite is true for respondents' evaluations of the media in December. Yuschenko voters are more likely to think media coverage was thorough (54% vs. 21%) and objective (83% vs. 39%) than are those who voted for Yanukovych in the December election.

Following the familiar pattern, Yanukovych voters believe that domestic (65% vs. 37%), international (55% vs. 43%) and political party (59% vs. 38) observers had a positive effect on the November election more often than do Yuschenko voters. On the other hand, Yuschenko voters are about twice as likely as Yanukovych supporters to believe that domestic (88% vs. 44%), international (88% vs. 39%) and political party (86% vs. 40%) observers had a positive effect on the December election.


While majorities of both Yanukovych and Yuschenko voters said they felt safe voting in the November election and felt informed about the electoral process, Yanukovych voters are even more likely than Yuschenko voters to say they felt safe (90% vs. 72%) and informed (78% vs. 52%). Opinions switch when evaluating the December election. Solid majorities of both political camps say they felt safe and informed when they voted in December, but larger majorities of Yuschenko voters say they felt safe (94% vs. 79%) and informed (90 vs. 68%) than do Yanukovych supporters.

Confidence in Future Elections

The vast majority of respondents report that they are somewhat (26%) or very likely (61%) to vote in the upcoming Parliamentary elections. Although the majority are optimistic that the March 2006 Parliamentary elections will be free and fair, many remain uncertain. Over half (55%) believe the elections will be at least somewhat free and fair, and few believe they will be unfair (16%). Nearly 30% report that they are not sure whether or not the upcoming Parliamentary elections will be fair.

In addition, it appears that belief about the fairness of elections influences future voting behavior. Almost all (89%) who think the upcoming elections will be free and fair say they are very likely to vote in those elections. By contrast, a smaller majority of six in 10 of those who think the elections will be somewhat (58%) or not very free and fair (56%) are very likely to vote and a minority of four in 10 who say the elections will not at all be free and fair (38%) are very likely to vote.

Figure 2.3 Divided Opinions on Fairness of March 2006 Parliamentary Election



"How free and fair do you expect the March 2006 elections to be?"

The partisan divide between Yuschenko and Yanukovych voters continues to be seen in perceptions of the fairness of upcoming elections and the likelihood respondents will take part in them. Roughly seven in 10 (73%) of those who voted for Yuschenko in December think the upcoming elections will be largely free and fair and are very likely to go to the polls on election day (68%). In contrast, a minority of three in 10 (32%) Yanukovych voters believe the Parliamentary elections will be at least somewhat free and fair, and only a slight majority (57%) say they are very likely to vote in the March Parliamentary elections.


III. OPINIONS ABOUT THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION'

Support for the Demonstrations

Solid majorities believe 1) the use of demonstrations was a legitimate exercise of democratic rights by those who organized and participated in the demonstrations (70%), 2) the demonstrations raised valid concerns about the fairness of the November 21 election (65%), and 3) the demonstrations played a role in furthering Ukrainian democracy (62%). Roughly four in 10 hold these views strongly.

Support for the demonstrations is high among the general public, yet this support is not uniformly held across all segments of society. Not surprisingly, supporters of Yuschenko are much more likely to think the demonstrations were a legitimate exercise of democratic rights (91% vs. 38%), raised valid concerns (90% vs. 25%), and furthered democracy (89% vs. 20%) than those who voted for Yanukovych in the December elections.


Figure 3.1 Do you agree that the demonstrations...



Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with these statements: (n=1265)

"The use of demonstrations was a legitimate exercise of democratic rights by those organizing and participating in the demonstrations."; "The demonstrations raised valid concerns about the fairness of the Nov. 21 second round of the presidential elections."; "The demonstrations have played a role in furthering democracy in Ukraine."

While the data show that the majority of Ukrainians were behind the demonstrations and believe the demonstrations helped further Ukrainian democracy, a minority of nearly three in 10 (28%) believe the only purpose of the demonstrations was to create chaos. This opinion is held most often by those who voted for Yanukovych in the December election. A solid majority of Yanukovych voters (64%) say the aim of the demonstrations was to create chaos, while only a handful of those who voted for Yuschenko believe this to be true (9%).

Figure 3.2 Those who Believe the Purpose of the Demonstrations was to Create Chaos

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with these statements: (n=1265)
 "The only purpose of the demonstrations was to create chaos in the country."

Who is Responsible for the Demonstrations?

The majority of Ukrainians believe that the political parties that support Viktor Yushchenko (69%) or ordinary Ukrainian citizens (51%) were the primary actors responsible for the demonstrations. Two in 10 also point to the role of domestic NGOs (22%) and the media (22%). Nearly a quarter (23%) believe "outside forces" played a major role in organizing the demonstrations that followed the November 21 election.

Respondents' perceptions about who is responsible for organizing the demonstrations differ based on their political leanings. Those who voted for Yanukovych are more likely to believe that supporters of Yushchenko (80% vs. 64%) and "outside forces" (43% vs. 14%) were responsible for organizing the demonstrations than those who cast their December ballot for Yushchenko. On the other hand, people who voted for Yushchenko in the December elections are more likely to believe that the demonstrations were a grassroots movement organized by ordinary Ukrainian citizens (73% vs. 18%).

**Figure 3.3 Were these organizations responsible for demonstrations?
 (% of yes answers by voting choice)**

	Voted for Yanukovych	Voted for Yushchenko
Political parties that support Viktor Yushchenko	80%	64%
Ordinary Ukrainian citizens	18%	73%
Outside forces	43%	14%
NGOs in the country	23%	22%
The media	17%	23%
The courts	15%	13%
All of the above	7%	8%
Other	3%	2%

"On this card, we have listed several different groups. Which of these groups do you think played primary roles in the organization of the demonstrations after the Nov. 21 election?" [Multiple responses accepted] (n=1265)

Likewise, perceptions about who was behind the demonstrations differ based on whether or not respondents took part in the demonstrations themselves and, if they did, which side they chose. Those who say they demonstrated in favor of *retaining* the November election results are more likely to say “outside forces” were responsible for organizing the demonstrations (49%) than those who say they demonstrated *against* the November election results (22%) and those who did not demonstrate on either side (21%).


By contrast, those who demonstrated *against* the November election results are more likely to say that ordinary Ukrainians were responsible than those who demonstrated in favor of *retaining* the election results (77% vs. 25%). Those who said they did not participate in the demonstrations fall between these two groups (49%).

Perceptions of Government and Court Responses to Demonstrations

Nearly half of respondents (46%) believe the government’s response to the demonstrations was generally correct, although the majority of these agree with the government’s response only somewhat. A sizable minority of roughly three in 10 (33%) disagree with the government’s response.

When it comes to evaluating specific actions, a majority of six in 10 (60%) think the Supreme Court was justified in its decision to invalidate (or cancel) the November 21 election and hold another election in December. Six in 10 (62%) are also behind the court’s decision to legitimize the December 26 election results.

Figure 3.4 Was the decision by Supreme Court justified?




Respondents’ opinions of the actions taken by the government and the courts differ greatly according to their political affiliation. Supporters of Viktor Yanukovych are more likely to disagree with the government’s response (50%) than those who voted for Yuschenko in the December election (31%). Likewise, a solid majority of seven in 10 Yuschenko voters strongly support the Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate the November election (72%) and to legitimize the results of the December election (70%). Very few Yanukovych voters voice even moderate approval for these actions. Instead, the majority of Yanukovych voters say they

somewhat or strongly disagree (73%) with the decision to invalidate the November results and legitimize the December results (65%).

Groups that Benefited from New Elections

Fifty-three percent believe that the invalidation of the November election results and the staging of a December election represented a victory for Ukrainian democracy that will benefit all citizens. However, nearly a third (30%) are skeptical and believe the invalidation of the November results benefits particular groups in Ukrainian society. Specifically, these respondents singled out parties or people who support Yushchenko (55%) or Tymoshenko (12%) as the main benefactors of the re-staging of the second round of elections.

Figure 3.5 Invalidation of November election and holding new elections in December benefited...



Please tell me which of the following two statements you agree with: "The cancellation of the Nov. 21 election and the holding of another election on Dec. 26 represents a victory for democracy that will benefit all Ukrainian citizens" OR "The cancellation of the Nov. 21 election and the holding of another election on Dec. 26 benefits only some groups in Ukrainian society." (n=1265)


Shift in Balance of Power

The majority of Ukrainians (64%) say they are aware that the changes made to the election law weeks before the December election included an amendment giving greater power to Parliament and reducing the power of the president.

Roughly half (49%) say they support the increase in the power of Parliament and the decrease in presidential powers which occurred when an amendment made the *Verkhovna Rada* responsible for electing the prime minister (who was previously appointed by the president). Three in 10 respondents say they have doubts about this new arrangement (19%) or are against the decrease in presidential powers (9%). Nearly a quarter (25%) are not sure what to make of this transfer of power.

The plurality of people either believe this shift in power is likely to lead to greater cooperation (34%) or do not know what to think about this shift in power (37%). Three in 10 think it will result in the same amount of cooperation (20%) or less cooperation between the president and Parliament (9%).

Figure 3.6 Belief that greater cooperation will result from shift in power between Parliament and President according to level of support for power shift



The constitutional amendment that was passed by the Verkhovna Rada would place greater powers in the hand of the Prime Minister and take some powers away from the president. It would also make the Verkhovna Rada responsible for electing the prime ministers, instead of the prime minister being appointed by the president. Do you support this increase in the powers of parliament and the decrease in the powers of the president? (n=1265)


Respondents' fear that the amendment will lead to decreased cooperation is part of what underscores their uneasiness about it. The bulk of those who strongly (70%) or somewhat support the change (45%) believe the amendment will lead to greater cooperation. By contrast, those who do not support the amendment are more likely to think it will lead to less rather than more cooperation between the president and Parliament (38% vs. 12%).

IV. CHANGE IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICS

Interest in Politics

For the past few years, interest in politics has remained relatively constant with roughly six in 10 expressing at least a moderate level of interest. However, the events surrounding the 2004 presidential elections marked a sea change in the public's interest in matters of politics in government. In only a few months, interest in politics among the adult population has increased by more than 10 percentage points. In the October pre-election survey, 59% of the adult Ukrainian population said that they were very or somewhat interested in politics. This just completed survey finds that, after the elections, nearly three-quarters (72%) say they have at least a moderate level of interest (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Interest in Politics from 1999 to 2005



"How interested are you in matters of politics and government -- are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?" (n=1265)

This increase of public interest in politics is driven by an increase among Yuschenko supporters. Oblasts where the Yuschenko vote was particularly strong are more interested in matters of politics and government than oblasts where Yanukovych made a strong showing (81% vs. 68%). In October, the distribution of interest in politics was the same (59% in Yuschenko-strong oblasts vs. 61% in Yanukovych-strong oblasts)

Unlike previous surveys, which have shown that women are less interested in politics than men, this post-election survey shows women and men express similar levels of interest. However, interest in politics continues to differ by age with 18 to 25 year-olds (59%) being the least likely to be interested in politics. And as found in previous surveys, interest in politics continues to increase with education. Eighty percent of those with at least some university education say they are interested in politics as compared to 73% of those with specialized or technical secondary education and 66% of those who have less than a secondary school education.


Meaning of Democracy

The events surrounding the 2004 presidential elections increased Ukrainians' interest in politics—those who say they followed the events surrounding the presidential election process

are more likely to be interested in politics in general. But have the events surrounding the elections also had an influence on ordinary Ukrainians' thoughts about democracy?

In the October pre-election survey, respondents were presented with a list of 12 attributes—some of which are traditionally considered key to democratic polities and others that are not guaranteed in a democracy. Respondents were asked to select from this list the five characteristics they thought most represent the meaning of democracy. The percentage mentioning each attribute in the pre- and post- election surveys is presented in the figure below (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Meaning of Democracy



"Listed on this card are several statements. Please pick any statement or statements that you think accurately define what it means for a country to be a democracy. You can choose up to five responses." (n=1265)

The protection of human rights, a key component of a democracy, remains one of the most often cited responses (61%). However, other attributes traditionally attributed to democracies are not cited as frequently, and the percentage of people who hold them to be one of the five most important characteristics of democracy has decreased since the October survey—freedom of speech (28% vs. 36%), freedom to vote (26% vs. 35%), and freedom of religion (16% vs. 29%).


The economic anxiety felt by many Ukrainians continues to be reflected in the data in that secure employment and the state's care of retirees are often cited as defining characteristics of democracy. Notably, many more cite no official corruption as a key component of democracy than did before the elections (50% vs. 37%).

Democracy in Ukraine

There is healthy optimism about democracy in Ukraine, but at the same time respondents realize that democracy is not made overnight. As seen in Figure 4.3, more people say Ukraine is a democracy now than did before the election (30% vs. 23%). In fact, the percentage of people that believe Ukraine is a democracy is on par with the historical high of 31% found in the

January 2000 survey, conducted directly after the 1999 presidential elections. Nevertheless, a plurality still contend that Ukraine is not a democracy (40%). Sixteen percent volunteer that Ukraine is somewhere in between—they are not willing to declare Ukraine a democracy but neither do they want to say that Ukraine is not a democracy.

Figure 4.3 Belief that Ukraine is a Democracy



"Is Ukraine a democracy?" (n=1265). Note: the volunteered response of "both a democracy and not a democracy" was only given in the February 2005 survey, and as noted above, 16% of respondents report this opinion.

Three-quarters of those who say that Ukraine is both democratic and undemocratic (75%) believe that Ukraine is moving towards becoming a democracy. Four in 10 of those who say Ukraine is not a democracy (43%) concur that Ukraine is at least moving towards democracy.

Respondents' attitudes about whether Ukraine is a democracy vary markedly by partisan affiliation. Residents of areas where Yuschenko performed particularly well in the December elections are more likely to say Ukraine is a democracy than those who live in places where Yanukovych had a very strong showing (48% vs. 10%). And among those who say Ukraine is not a democracy or both democratic and undemocratic, more of those who live in oblasts that strongly favor Yuschenko say Ukraine is on the path toward democracy than those who live in oblasts with a strong preference for Yanukovych (77% vs. 28%).

The pre-election survey showed completely opposite results as seen in Figure 4.4 below (next page). In October, those who live in areas that ended up strongly supporting Yuschenko in the December elections were much *less* likely to say that Ukraine was a democracy than those living in oblasts with a strong preference Yanukovych (14% vs. 34%).

Figure 4.4 Region and Belief that Ukraine is a Democracy

Region	Oct. 2004	Feb. 2005	% change
Western	14%	47%	-33%
Central	20%	52%	-32%
Eastern	34%	7%	27%
Northwestern	17%	42%	-25%
Southwestern	35%	59%	-24%
Crimea	34%	15%	19%
Northern	16%	29%	-13%
Southern	28%	20%	8%
Northeastern	12%	19%	-7%
Kyiv	30%	36%	-6%
Southeastern	23%	28%	-5%

An economic rationale for evaluating Ukraine as a democracy is evident in the responses of those who cited economic-related criteria as attributes that define a democracy. Those who say that the state should support all who cannot work (26%) or say retirees should be looked after by the state (26%) are less likely to say Ukraine is a democracy. On the other hand, those who cite the freedom to vote (41%) and freedom of speech (35%) as key democratic attributes are more likely to say Ukraine is a democracy.

Actions to Ensure Rights are Respected

A majority of Ukrainians (73%) say they have not made efforts to ensure their rights or interests as citizens are respected. Among the various activities that one could engage in to accomplish these goals, attending a protest or demonstration (7%), meeting with a public official (5%), writing a letter to a public official (4%) and attending a public meeting (4%) are mentioned most often, with roughly one in 20 citizens reporting having done each of these activities. Somewhat fewer say they have signed a petition (2%), contacted their deputy to the *Verkhovna Rada* (1%), or joined an NGO (1%).

Roughly as many say the events that took place in November and December have made them more likely to make efforts in the future to ensure that their rights as citizens are respected (25%) as say the events have made them less likely (27%). Likewise, a quarter (26%) say the events have not changed the likelihood of their taking part in activities to ensure their rights as citizens are respected. A quarter also say the events of November and December have made it more likely that they will contact local elected offices to address community needs (25%).

Yuschenko voters are more likely than those who voted for Yanukovich in the December election to say the events surrounding the presidential elections has increased the likelihood of their actively ensuring that their rights as citizens are respected (36% vs. 10%).

We asked Ukrainians to list ways, besides voting, that citizens can ensure their rights as citizens are respected. Because the recent mass demonstrations are fresh in the public's mind, it is not surprising that a third (32%) mentioned demonstrations as a means to ensure that rights are respected. Besides demonstrating, top mentioned methods include protecting rights through the media (23%), contacting a deputy to the *Verkhovna Rada* (23%), filing a public complaint (18%), and meeting with an official (17%). However, 35% say either that there is nothing they can do to

help ensure their rights are respected (12%) or that they do not know what they can do (23%) (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6 Ways Citizens Can Ensure Rights are Respected

Method of ensuring respect of rights	Percent of respondents indicating this method
Demonstrations	32%
Press or media	23%
Contact a Deputy to the <i>Verkhovna Rada</i>	23%
Public complaints	18%
Meeting with an official	17%
Rebellion	13%
Letter to an official	12%
Becoming a member of a political party	5%
Joining an NGO	5%
Bribes	2%
Other	1%
There is no way	12%
Don't know	23%

Besides voting, what other ways can citizens ensure that their rights as a citizen are respected? (n=1265)


The ability to imagine how citizens might protect their rights varies by age, political leaning, and level of education. Those who are over 55 (43%) and Yanukovych voters (42%) are more often unable to name even one way citizens can act to protect their rights than are young adults who are aged 18 to 25 (28%) and Yuschenko voters (28%). Likewise, Ukrainians with less than a secondary education (51%) are more often unable to name ways to ensure rights than are those with a secondary education (34%). Those with some university education are the least likely to be unable to name a way to protect rights (26%).

Younger Ukrainians, Yuschenko voters, and the better educated are more likely to mention demonstrations as a means citizens can use to protect their rights. Better educated Ukrainians are also more likely to mention the media as a tool. Meeting with an official is cited more often by those who voted for Yuschenko in the December election.

Fewer than one in five Ukrainians (16%) say that they have taken part in one of these activities in the past. Further, while two in 10 (21%) say the events of the past few months have made it more likely that they will engage in one of the above activities, more Ukrainians (31%) say the events have decreased the likelihood they will participate. Likewise slightly more say that the events surrounding the elections have made them less likely to contact a public official than say they are now more likely (29% vs. 25%).

Those who voted for Yuschenko say they are now more likely to engage in an act to ensure their rights (30% vs. 10%) or contact a local official (36% vs. 10%) than those who voted for Yanukovych (Figure 4.7).


Figure 4.7 Increased Likelihood of Taking Political Action



Have the events of past November and December made it more likely, less likely, or not changed the likelihood that you will take these actions [ways citizens can ensure that their rights as a citizen are respected] in the future? (n=1265). Have the events of past November and December made it more likely, less likely, or not changed the likelihood that you will contact your local elected officials such as your (city's/village's) mayor or a member of your local council in the future to address needs in your community? (n=1265).

Attitudes Towards Involvement in Political Affairs

A minority of Ukrainians (14%) strongly or somewhat believe that greater involvement in political affairs by Ukrainian citizens in the future will lead to chaos and instability in the country. However, Yanukovych voters are more likely to hold this opinion than are Yuschenko voters (27% vs. 15%) (Figure 4.8 next page).


Figure 4.8 Involvement in Political Affairs Will Lead to Chaos

Greater involvement in political affairs by Ukrainian citizens in the future will lead to chaos and instability in the country. (n=1265)

Anticipated Responsiveness of Elected Officials

A slim majority of Ukrainians expect that elected officials will be more responsive to the needs of their constituents in the future than they have been in the past (53%). Fewer than a third believe the government will now be less responsive (29%).

Yushchenko voters are much more likely than those who voted for Yanukovich to believe the government will be more responsive (76% vs. 20%). By contrast a majority of Yanukovich voters (58%) disagree that elected officials will now be more responsive to their needs (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9 Elected Officials Will Be More Responsive

"Elected officials in Ukraine will be more responsive to the needs of their constituents in the future than they have been in the past." (n=1265)

Similarly, those who disagree that the government will be more responsive are more likely to be unable to name even one thing they can do to try and ensure that their rights and interests as citizens are respected. Forty-six percent of those who disagree that the government will be


more responsive cannot name at least one action to take compared to 25% of those who think elected officials will be more responsive.

Perceived Influence of Voting

A majority of six in 10 (61%) say they disagree that people like them can have an influence on decisions made by the government—half as many (30%) say they strongly or somewhat agree that ordinary Ukrainians can impact decision-making. However, these numbers look very different when evaluating the influence citizens can have through voting.

The pre-election survey conducted in October documented a marked increase in respondents' belief that voting can make a difference. Since IFES began charting public opinion on this question in 1999, a majority have disagreed that voting gives people a chance to influence decision-making. In contrast, the October 2004 pre-election survey found that as many agreed that voting can make a difference as disagreed with this notion. In the latest survey, it appears the events surrounding the presidential election have invigorated people's belief in elections. For the first time, a majority of Ukrainians (53%) say that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making in the country. A sizable minority of four in 10 (40%) still disagree that voting makes a difference (Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10 Influence of Voting across 1999 to 2004



Agree/ Disagree: "Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country." (n=1265)

In addition, there is no longer a consistent pattern between age and the belief that voting makes a difference. In the pre-election survey, we noted that those aged 18 to 25 were less likely to agree that they can influence decision-making through voting than were people older than 45. This is no longer the case. In fact, the percentage of young people who say that voting gives people like them a chance to influence decision-making in the country has increased from 42 percent before the elections to 59 percent.

Belief in the power of voting has risen dramatically among Yuschenko voters. Ukrainians who live in oblasts where support for Yuschenko is high are more likely to believe in the efficacy of voting than are those who live in areas that supported Yanukovych in the December election (75% vs. 33%). Before the elections, residents of Yuschenko-strong and Yanukovych-strong areas were equally likely to think they can make a difference through voting (50% vs. 51%).

Men, women and Ukrainians of all educational levels are equally likely to believe that people like them can influence decision-making through voting.


V. EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Ukraine's Path After the Election

When asked whether the results of the December 26 election have placed Ukraine on a path toward stability and prosperity or toward instability and chaos, a plurality of Ukrainians (43%) respond that that Ukraine is now headed for stability. In contrast, 12% of Ukrainians believe that the country is headed toward instability. While a substantial number of Ukrainians are optimistic about Ukraine's future direction, slightly more are uncertain about the direction Ukraine is headed. A substantial number of Ukrainians (16%) think that the results of the election have put Ukraine on a course toward neither stability nor instability. A further 29% are uncertain what the election results mean for Ukraine's future and reply "Don't know." Thus, 45% of Ukrainians are uncertain whether the elections place Ukraine on a path toward stability or instability.

As with other issues addressed in the survey, partisan affiliation colors respondents' opinions on this issue, with Yuschenko voters much more likely to be optimistic about Ukraine's future direction than Yanukovych voters (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Ukraine's Direction After Presidential Elections



"Do you think the results of the Dec. 26 election have placed Ukraine on the right track toward stability and prosperity in the future, or do you think that the results have placed Ukraine on a path toward instability and chaos in the future?"

The differences between Yuschenko and Yanukovych voters' views are readily apparent in the chart above. The vast majority of Yuschenko voters are optimistic that the elections have placed Ukraine on a path toward stability. While more Yanukovych voters say that the elections will lead to instability rather than stability (29% vs. 7%), the majority of Yanukovych voters are uncertain about the direction in which Ukraine is headed. This uncertainty may provide an opportunity for the Yuschenko administration to utilize positive developments to convince skeptical Ukrainians of the positive changes initiated by the 2004 presidential elections.

A regional analysis of opinions on this question indicates that only in oblasts with a strong Yanukovych vote are a majority of residents of the opinion that the 2004 presidential elections have put Ukraine on a path toward instability. In all other oblasts, even those in which Yanukovych gained a moderate victory in the December 26 election, more people say that Ukraine is on a path toward stability than instability.

Those respondents who think that Ukraine is on a path toward stability or instability were asked what reason they have for their response. Among those who think that Ukraine is on a path toward stability, the most common reasons given were:

- Trust new authorities (32%)
- Because there is new government (16%)
- Fight against corruption (12%)
- New authorities will provide stability (10%)
- Economy will improve under new government (9%)
- Democratization (5%)

Among those who think Ukraine is on path toward instability, the most common responses were:

- Distrust new authorities (19%)
- Bad economic situation (16%)
- New authorities create instability (13%)
- Dishonest election (7%)
- Divisions in country (6%)
- Authorities have not done anything (5%)

In both cases, the majority of respondents cite the new authorities and some aspect of their work as the reason why they are either optimistic or pessimistic about Ukraine's future stability. This focus confirms the importance of the Yuschenko administration's performance in allaying concerns about political stability and economic prosperity in Ukraine.

Expectations About Key Areas and Issues

Ukrainians are generally optimistic that the results of the 2004 elections will lead to improvements in several key areas. While the degree of optimism differs depending on the issue, more Ukrainians in each case are optimistic rather than pessimistic on each of these issues (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2 Expectations for the Future (in %)

	Great/Slight improvement	No change	Great/Slight decline
Relations with Western countries	70	6	3
Economic situation in the country	64	18	9
Fight against corruption	65	23	6
Respect for human rights	59	24	8
Political stability in the country	54	25	12
Unity of Ukrainian citizens	48	29	11
Relations with Russia	42	28	20

"Elections lead to expectations about the future for people in any country. Based on the results of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, what changes do you expect in the following areas over the next two years?" (n=1265)

For most issues, a majority of Ukrainians expect that there will be either great or slight improvements over the next two years. Few Ukrainians expect a decline on most of these issues, but many Ukrainians also say that they do not expect much change.

As would be expected, residents of “Strong Yanukovych” oblasts are less likely to be optimistic about these issues than are residents of “Strong Yuschenko” oblasts. In the case of corruption, residents of “Strong Yuschenko” oblasts are much more likely to say that there will be positive change in the fight against corruption (89%) than are residents of “Strong Yanukovych” oblasts (34%). A plurality of the latter group (39%) believes that corruption will remain unchanged over the next two years (only 14% think it will decline).

There are differing opinions about the prospects of improved relations with Russia and Western countries. While most Ukrainians (70%) expect Ukraine’s relations with Western countries to improve, only a plurality (42%) believe this will occur in Ukraine’s relations with Russia. Twenty-eight percent of Ukrainians expect relations with Russia to remain unchanged, and 20% expect them to get worse. A plurality of those in “Strong Yanukovych” oblasts (43%) expect Ukraine’s relations with Russia to get worse, 28% expect them to remain unchanged and 21% say they will get better. Among those in “Strong Yuschenko” oblasts, 47% expect Russian-Ukrainian relations to get better and 32% expect them to remain the same. In the case of relations with Western countries, a majority of both “Strong Yanukovych” and “Strong Yuschenko” respondents believe that Ukraine’s relations with Western countries will improve.


More than six in 10 Ukrainians also expect an improvement in the economic situation in the country, while a majority expects respect for human rights and political stability to improve.

While the majority of “Strong Yuschenko” respondents are of the opinion that the unity of Ukrainian citizens will improve over the next two years (67%), “Strong Yanukovych” respondents are not as optimistic. In fact, 33% of these respondents think the unity of Ukrainians will decline and 36% think there will be no change, while only 16% think that unity will improve.

Economic Concerns Are Most Important Issues Facing the Country

The fact that the majority of Ukrainians expect an improvement in the economic situation over the next two years could stem from the fact that economic concerns dominate the Ukrainian psyche. In IFES’ 2002 and 2003 surveys in Ukraine, 86% of Ukrainians described the economic situation as either somewhat or very bad, while fewer than 10% described it as somewhat good.

In this survey, a majority of Ukrainians (57%) describe the current economic situation in the country as bad or very bad, and 9% describe it as good or very good. Only a quarter (26%) describe the economic situation as neither good nor bad. Over the past three years, there has been little increase in positive assessments of the economic situation. This trend helps explain the fact that concerns about the economic situation in the country are felt by Ukrainians to be the most important issues facing Ukraine (Figure 5.3 next page).


Figure 5.3 Important Issues Facing Ukraine

"Now let's talk about the current situation in Ukraine. What do you think are the most important issues facing Ukraine?" (n=1265)

Figure 5.3 lists the issues most often mentioned by respondents as being important issues facing Ukraine. Most tend to be economic in nature, with unemployment, low wages and social payments, and general economic problems mentioned most often. Corruption, an issue very much related to Ukraine economy, is also mentioned by one in five Ukrainians. Another set of issues that receives relatively frequent mention relate to social services such as education and health care. Few Ukrainians mention political problems, such as the division in the country. Economic issues receive frequent mention from those who supported both Yanukovich and Yuschenko in the presidential elections. This suggests that in the long run, the resolution of economic issues by the Yuschenko government will be *the* key indicator by which Ukrainians will decide whether his government is effective in the long run.

The importance of economic concerns is illustrated by responses to another question that provided respondents a list of initiatives and asked them to choose three the Yuschenko administration should most urgently address in the next year. Economic concerns, corruption, and improved health care dominated the agenda desired for the Yuschenko administration (Figure 5.4 next page).

**Figure 5.4 Focus Areas for Yuschenko Administration
(in % mentioning each area)**



"Listed on this card are several important issues. Please look at this list and tell me the three issues which the president and his administration should address in the next year?"

Seventy percent of Ukrainians would like the Yuschenko administration to address unemployment, and a majority would also like the administration to fight corruption. The quality of health care and an increase in pension payments is mentioned by more than four in 10 Ukrainians. Other services such as municipal services and education, as well as relations with Russian and western countries, are also listed by a significant share of Ukrainians.

Improving pensions, the quality of health care, and relations with Russia receive more frequent mention the greater the age of the respondent, while improving education quality is mentioned more often the lower the age of the respondent. Young respondents (18-35) are more likely to want Ukraine to improve relations with Western countries (15%) than are those 56 and over (4%). More than 60% in each age group would like the Yuschenko administration to focus on reducing unemployment.

Those who voted for Yuschenko in the December 26 election are more likely to say that Ukraine should improve relations with the West than are those who supported Yanukovich (15% vs. 4%), while those who supported Yanukovich are more likely to want to improve relations with Russia than are those who supported Yuschenko (43% vs. 8%). While majorities in both camps think that Ukraine's relations with both Russian and the West will improve over the next few years, when asked to prioritize, each camp chooses the geopolitical orientation that led them to support their particular candidate.

While Yuschenko supporters are more likely than Yanukovich supporters to think that one of the Yuschenko administration's priorities should be to fight corruption (61% vs. 39%), Yanukovich supporters are more likely to stress increasing pension payments (50% vs. 39%).

VI. OPINIONS ABOUT PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS


Increase in Positive Impressions of Key Institutions and Groups

The 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine were a watershed event that changed the political dynamics in the country and pushed to the fore political actors who are far more liberal in outlook than those they replaced. This report has already described the increased optimism generated by these changes. Data from this post-election survey also suggest that a significant part of the Ukrainian public has a more positive impression of institutions and groups that played key roles during the events that followed the November 21 election.

The four institutions and groups are the *Verkhovna Rada*, the judicial system, the media, and nongovernmental organizations. The *Rada* played a key role during the November-December crisis by passing constitutional reforms that allowed the repeat staging of the second-round election on December 26 and the replacement of the CEC that had organized the October first-round and November second-round election with a new CEC that was less partisan. The judicial system also played a key role as the Supreme Court invalidated the results of the November 21 election, which allowed this election to be held again. Most of the media had been tightly controlled by the state and had slanted its coverage immensely to the benefit of Viktor Yanukovich before the November 21 election. After the start of the demonstrations, the media took on a more independent role and presented coverage of the demonstrations as well as of both candidates leading up to the December 26 election. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played a key role in mobilizing support for the demonstrations.

Figure 6.1 shows that more Ukrainians now have a more positive impression of each of these organizations than they did at the start of the election process in October.

Figure 6.1 Change in Impressions of Key Institutions and Groups



"Has your impression of [institution] changed since the beginning of the presidential election process in October? [If yes] Do you have a more positive or more negative impression of [institution]?" (n=1265)

For each of the institutions listed in Figure 6.1, many more Ukrainians say they have developed more positive impressions of the institution than those who say they have developed more negative impressions. Since all these institutions helped make it possible for the second round of the presidential elections to be held again, it should not be surprising that Yanukovich supporters tend to have developed more negative rather than more positive impressions of these institutions, and vice versa for Yuschenko supporters. Yanukovich supporters are especially likely to have developed negative impressions of the judicial system (42% vs. 6% positive) and the *Rada* (36% vs. 14% positive).

In the case of the *Rada*, the judicial system, and the media, a plurality of Ukrainians have developed a more positive impression since the start of the presidential election process. However, fewer people have developed more positive impressions of NGOs. This may be because fewer Ukrainians know about NGOs, as the high number of "Don't Know" responses for NGOs (27%) suggests. In addition, in previous IFES surveys in Ukraine, between 20% and 25% of Ukrainians have stated that they do not know what NGOs are.


On another question about NGOs, 49% of Ukrainians say that NGOs are essential or necessary for Ukraine, while 23% say that they are not very or at all necessary. Twenty-seven percent do not give a response. Most of those who do not give a response on this issue also do not give a response when asked whether their impressions of NGOs have changed since the beginning of the election process. Among those who do give a definitive response to this question, 60% say that NGOs are essential or necessary, while 21% say they are not necessary.

Nearly a quarter of Ukrainians (23%) say they are very or somewhat likely to volunteer without pay for NGOs in the future. Among those whose impressions of NGOs have become more positive since the elections, 46% say they are likely to volunteer for NGOs while 41% say they are unlikely to volunteer for them.

Perception of Media Safety Has Increased Significantly

The emergence of a free media, particularly the televised media, in the midst of the crisis following the November 21 election is a hopeful sign for the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine. A significant reason why the Ukrainian media may have been reluctant to challenge state censorship under former President Kuchma's regime was because of the perception that the safety of journalists was imperiled if they broadcast or published information that was critical of the government. This perception was shared by the Ukrainian public, as was seen in three of the IFES' four surveys in Ukraine between 2000 and 2003. In them, a majority of Ukrainians said it was dangerous for the media to report news objectively if the news was critical of those in power.

In this survey, opinions have shifted considerably, with a plurality (36%) now saying that it is very safe or somewhat safe for the media to report the news objectively, while 27% think that it is dangerous. Sixteen percent of Ukrainians say that it is neither totally safe nor totally dangerous to report the news objectively. In the 2003 survey, 68% of Ukrainians felt it was dangerous for the media to report the news objectively. Forty-nine percent of those who voted for President Yuschenko in December say that it is safe for the media to report the news objectively. This compares to 29% among Yanukovich voters. Differences between Yuschenko and Yanukovich voters are also evident when respondents are asked whether it has become safer for the media to objectively report events since December 26 (Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2 Change in Safety of Media since December Election

"Do you think the safety of the media in reporting events objectively has improved since the Dec. 26 election, has it become worse, or has it not changed at all?"


A plurality of Ukrainians (37%) believe that there has been no change in the safety of the media since the December election. More than a quarter of Ukrainians (28%) believe that the safety of the media has improved, while only 8% think that the safety of the media has gotten worse. Among Yuschenko voters, a plurality believe that the safety of the media has improved since December, while among Yanukovich voters, a majority believe that there has been no change in the safety of the media. Even though a plurality believes that it is now safer for journalists to report the news objectively, 25% of these respondents still believe that it is somewhat or very dangerous to report the news objectively if it is critical of the government.

Role Played by the Judicial System

Most Ukrainians (57%) believe that the judiciary played a proper role in making key decisions during the crisis that followed the November 21 election. Nineteen percent of Ukrainians believe that the judiciary made decisions that exceeded its responsibilities under the Ukrainian constitution. It is not surprising that Yuschenko and Yanukovich supporters profess completely different opinions on this question—84% of Yuschenko supporters say that the judiciary played an appropriate role (17% of Yanukovich supporters agree) and 47% of Yanukovich voters believe that the judiciary exceeded its role under the constitution (4% of Yuschenko supporters agree).

Increase in Confidence Levels in Various Institutions

Consistent with the significant increase in positive impressions of the *Verkhovna Rada*, confidence in this institution has risen from previous IFES surveys. This improved standing is especially clear in the case of the *Rada* as it has gone from an institution in which few Ukrainians had a great deal or fair amount of confidence (in previous IFES surveys) to one in which a majority profess confidence in this year's survey. This year's survey also indicates a high level of confidence in President Yuschenko and members of his cabinet (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 Confidence in Select Institutions and Groups

"I am now going to ask you about several government institutions and leaders, as well as other groups in society. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them." (n=1265)

The chart above indicates that there is a high level of confidence in the present administration, as a majority profess confidence in President Yuschenko, Prime Minister Tymoschenko, and the cabinet. Not surprisingly, those who voted for Yuschenko are much more likely to have confidence in him than are those who voted for Yanukovich (97% vs. 17%). More Ukrainians express confidence in Yuschenko than not in all regions of the country except Crimea and the Eastern region (78% and 57%, respectively, do not have confidence in him).

There is little confidence expressed in Yanukovich with less than three in 10 Ukrainians professing confidence in him. Only in the Eastern region of the country and in Crimea do a majority of people express confidence in Yanukovich (72% and 52%, respectively). In all other regions of the country, far more Ukrainians say they have little or no confidence in Yanukovich than the percent who say they have confidence in him.

Only 6% of Ukrainians express confidence in former President Kuchma, while 86% say they have little or no confidence in him.

Given the polarized nature of Ukrainian society, at least on sociopolitical issues, observed in the data, it is heartening to note that a majority of Ukrainians (58%) say that they have confidence in people from other regions of the country. A relatively small 17% say they have little or no confidence in people from other regions, and a quarter either do not reply or say they do not know if they trust people in other regions.

The level of confidence in the *Verkhovna Rada* has undergone a large increase since the 2003 survey. In that survey, only 27% expressed confidence in the *Rada* compared to 54% in this year's survey. Confidence in the *Rada* is especially high among those who voted for Yuschenko on December 26 (73%), while a majority of those who voted for Yanukovich express little or no confidence in the *Rada* (63%). The *Rada's* role in November and December 2004 seems to be a factor in public confidence in this institution.

A plurality of Ukrainians expresses confidence in their city/village councils and their mayors. Two regions' opinions on these institutions are particularly notable. Residents of the Western region (consisting of Lviv and Ternopil) are much more likely than residents of other regions to express confidence in their local authorities (68% in their mayors, 67% in their city/village councils). In contrast, residents of Crimea exhibit the lowest level of confidence (19% in their mayors, 9% in their city/village councils).

VII. SOCIO-POLITICAL CLEAVAGES FOLLOWING THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION'

The events surrounding the presidential elections mark a defining moment in Ukrainian history and Ukrainian public opinion. Throughout the report, we see a major shift in how the public views Ukraine's political scene before and after the elections. What is more, the report documents that the events surrounding the 'Orange Revolution' and the prospects for Ukraine after the revolution are viewed very differently by those who voted for Viktor Yuschenko and those who voted for Viktor Yanukovich. And in fact, politics in Ukraine today is often talked about in terms of those who supported the 'Orange Revolution,' Viktor Yuschenko and look to the West for Ukraine's future, and those who are more invested in the previous government, supported Viktor Yanukovich, and see Russia as a major partner in shaping Ukraine's future.

In effort to bring greater analytical precision to these categories, and to examine how the events surrounding the 'Orange Revolution' have led to changes and cleavages in Ukrainian public opinion, advanced statistical analysis was performed to see how opinions differ between those who supported the revolution and expect it to have a positive impact on Ukraine's future (the "Revolutionary Enthusiasts"), those who opposed the 'Orange Revolution' and believe that Ukraine is now on the wrong track (the Revolutionary Opponents), and those who stand somewhere in the middle of these two camps (the "Revolutionary Agnostics").

Revolutionary Enthusiasts are defined by their strong support of the demonstrations and their belief that recent events have put Ukraine on the right track. Solid majorities of this group strongly believe the invalidation of the November election and the re-staging of the second round in December represents a victory for democracy that will benefit all Ukrainian citizens (65%), completely agree that the demonstrations played a role in furthering democracy in Ukraine (73%), completely agree the demonstration were a legitimate exercise of democratic rights (75%), completely agree that the demonstrations raised valid concerns about the fairness of the November 21 election (75%), and completely disagree that the only purpose of the demonstrations was to create chaos in the country (81%). In light of the new political situation in Ukraine, the Revolutionary Enthusiasts somewhat (63%) or strongly agree (20%) that elected officials will be more responsive to the needs of their constituents than they have in the past and strongly agree that the results of the December election have placed Ukraine on the right track toward stability and prosperity (77%).


The Revolutionary Opponents are their polar opposites. This group is set apart by their opposition to the demonstrations and their unease with the direction in which the country is now heading. Majorities or pluralities of Revolutionary Opponents strongly believe the invalidation of the November election and the re-staging of the second round in December benefited only some groups rather than all citizens (46%), completely disagree that the demonstrations played a role in furthering democracy in Ukraine (58%), completely disagree the demonstrations were a legitimate exercise of democratic rights (47%), completely disagree they raised valid concerns about the fairness of the November election (54%), and fully believe that the only purpose of the demonstrations was to create chaos in the country (45%). Most of the rest of the Revolutionary Opponents hold these opinions to a moderate extent. When evaluating what lies in store for Ukraine in the future, most strongly (34%) or somewhat (34%) disagree that elected officials will now be more responsive. Further, they either think that the results of the December election placed Ukraine on a path of instability and chaos (34%) or are not sure whether Ukraine is headed towards stability or instability (38%).

The Revolutionary Agnostics hold the middle ground and have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. On most questions, they evaluate the demonstrations somewhat positively or somewhat

negatively but rarely hold extreme positions. Large portions of them say they “don’t know” how to evaluate the demonstrations and the path that Ukraine is now on. The plurality of the Revolutionary Agnostics are unsure whether the re-staging of the elections benefited only some groups or all citizens (35%) while most of the rest either strongly (21%) or somewhat (22%) agree that only some groups benefit. They either “don’t know” (40%) or somewhat agree (39%) the demonstrations played a role in furthering democracy and somewhat agree (47%) the demonstrations were a legitimate exercise of democratic rights, although a sizable minority is unsure about this as well (23%). They also either “don’t know” (31%) or somewhat agree (38%) that the demonstrations raised valid concerns. The Revolutionary Agnostics are divided about whether the only purpose of the demonstrations was to create chaos—the plurality say they don’t know (32%) yet roughly two in 10 completely disagree (23%), somewhat disagree (19%) or somewhat agree (18%) with this statement. When it comes to evaluating how things in Ukraine will change after the elections, the Agnostics are divided about whether elected officials will be more responsive to the needs of their constituents than they have in the past—32% don’t have an opinion, 29% somewhat agree, and 28% somewhat disagree—and about whether Ukraine is now headed towards stability or instability—47% don’t know and 26% do not expect much to change and say Ukraine is headed neither towards stability nor instability.

Figure 7.1 shows the relative size of each of these three groups. According to this analysis, almost half of Ukrainians are “Revolutionary Enthusiasts” (48%), 29% are “Revolutionary Agnostics,” while nearly a quarter (23%) are “Revolutionary Opponents.”

Figure 7.1 Breakdown of Ukrainian Population, by Attitudes Toward ‘Orange Revolution’



In an effort to gain a greater appreciation of the types of people who fall into the three categories, Figure 7.2 below shows the demographic profile of each group. There are no differences based on gender or education. Male and female and better and lesser educated people are equally likely to fall into each category. In terms of ethnicity, the Revolutionary Enthusiasts tend to mainly identify as ethnic Ukrainians, and while a slim majority of the Revolutionary Opponents are ethnic Ukrainians as well, the majority of the country’s ethnic Russians fall into this group. The Revolutionary Agnostics, on the other hand, are an ethnically diverse group roughly representing Ukraine’s ethnic balance. Pensioners and older people are over-represented among the opponents while somewhat more students fall into the group of Agnostics than are in the general population.

In terms of geography, the rural/urban cleavage important in many countries doesn't play an important role in this context. More Revolutionary Enthusiasts come from rural areas while residents of large cities are overrepresented among the Agnostics, yet all three groups contain a mix of people from villages, towns and cities. More importantly, Revolutionary Enthusiasts are nearly unanimous in their support for Yuschenko and live mainly in oblasts with moderate or strong support for Yuschenko and in the Western portion of Ukraine. Revolutionary Agnostics tend to live in oblasts with moderate support for both candidates, are nearly equally split in their vote for Yuschenko and Yanukovych, and a plurality of them live in the East. Revolutionary Opponents tend to live in oblasts with strong or moderate support for Yanukovych, report having voted for Yanukovych, and live nearly exclusively in the East.

Figure 7.2 Demographic Profile of Revolutionary Enthusiasts, Agnostics, and Opponents

	Revolutionary Enthusiasts (48%)	Revolutionary Agnostics (29%)	Revolutionary Opponents (23%)	Total
Occupation				
%Students	4	8	3	5
%Pensioners	29	32	38	32
%Unemployed	10	10	6	9
%Employed	51	49	45	49
Ethnicity				
%Ukrainian	88	76	56	77
%Russian	9	21	40	20
Religiosity				
%Ukrainian Orthodox	31	20	21	25
%Russian Orthodox	18	20	28	21
%No Religious Preference	13	25	29	20
Economic Situation				
%Barely/don't meet basic needs	46	52	59	51
%Meet basic needs	41	39	35	39
%Have enough to save	13	9	6	10
Age				
%18-25	15	17	10	15
%26-35	5	23	15	17
%36-55	41	31	37	37
%56+	30	30	37	31
Residential Type				
%large city	35	52	42	42
%medium city	10	16	20	14
%small town/settlement	14	11	13	13
%village	41	21	25	31
Geography				
%strong Yanukovych oblasts	4	21	55	21
%moderate Yanukovych oblasts	18	35	36	27
%moderate Yuschenko oblasts	41	34	8	32
%strong Yuschenko oblasts	36	10	2	21
%Western Ukraine	37	12	2	22
%Northern Ukraine	15	17	3	13
%Central Ukraine	17	12	2	12
%Southern Ukraine	8	14	10	10
%Eastern Ukraine	15	42	80	38
% Kyiv city Ukraine	8	3	2	5
Political Preference				
%Vote Yuschenko-Dec	90	35	4	55
%Vote Yanukovych-Dec	1	37	80	30

Differences in each of these three groups' attitudes toward the 'Orange Revolution' are reflected in their opinions on a whole range of issues covered in this survey:

- The Enthusiasts are much more likely to profess a strong likelihood of participating in the 2006 parliamentary elections (71%) than are either the Opponents (49%) or the Agnostics (53%). The Enthusiasts are also much more likely to think that the 2006 elections will be free and fair (75%) than are the Agnostics (47%) or the Opponents (24%).
- These groups' outlook on the 2004 presidential elections also affects their belief that they can influence decision-making in the country. Enthusiasts are much more likely to agree that voting gives people like them influence over decision-making (78%) than are either the Agnostics (37%) or the Opponents (21%). A majority of both of these latter groups disagree that they can influence decision-making by voting. Speaking more generally about citizens' ability to have a say in political matters, Enthusiasts are also more likely to agree that people like them can have influence (46%) than are the Agnostics (18%) or the Opponents (12%). However, even 45% of Enthusiasts disagree that they can have general influence on decision-making, indicating that elections are still the vehicle through which many Ukrainians feel they can effect change.
- Enthusiasts tend to feel energized by the recent events while there is a danger that many Opponents will withdraw from some aspects of civic life. The plurality of Revolutionary Enthusiasts say the events surrounding the Presidential election have made them more likely to make efforts to make sure their rights as citizens are respected (39%) and more likely to contact local elected officials to address needs in their community (39%). By contrast, roughly half of Opponents say they are now less likely to take action to ensure their rights are respected (46%) and are less likely to contact a local official to address community needs (51%).
- The Revolutionary Enthusiasts also differ from the Opponents and Agnostics in that they expect a change in the behaviors of elected officials because of the events surrounding the presidential elections while the other two groups are much less optimistic. Eighty-three percent of Enthusiasts expect elected officials to be more responsive to their constituents in the future, compared to only 15% of Opponents (69% of this group disagrees). Among Agnostics, 36% do not think elected officials will become more responsive while 32% believe that they will.
- Members of the three groups also differ in the way they look at democracy and in the meanings they attach to democracy in Ukraine. The Enthusiasts are more likely than the other two groups to stress that democracy means the protection of freedoms and rights and no corruption. The Opponents are much more likely than the other two groups to stress economic prosperity as a meaning of democracy. The Agnostics generally take the middle position on these issues.
- It is also not surprising that these groups have different opinions about whether Ukraine is a democracy. A plurality of Enthusiasts think that Ukraine is a democracy (46%), while this figure is 20% among Agnostics and only 9% among Opponents. Sixty-nine percent of the Revolutionary Opponents believe that Ukraine is not a democracy, compared to 40% of Agnostics and even fewer Enthusiasts (25%). Among those who do not think Ukraine is currently a democracy, 86% of Enthusiasts believe that Ukraine is becoming a democracy

and a plurality of Agnostics (48%) share this opinion. However, a majority of Revolutionary Opponents (60%) do not believe Ukraine is becoming a democracy.

- One issue all three groups tend to agree on is that economic concerns are the most important issues facing Ukraine. Slightly more than 30% in each group believes that unemployment is a major issue facing Ukraine, and 26% in each group cites low wages and social payments. A significant number also cite general economic problems and inflation. Thus, it is not surprising that more than two in three in each group believe that reducing unemployment should be a primary focus of the Yuschenko administration. Addressing the economic problems facing the country in an effective manner could be one way in which the present administration could manage to heal the rifts that currently divide Ukrainians.
- Beyond their common assessment of economic problems, Enthusiasts and Agnostics differ about the issues they would like the Yuschenko administration to address in the near future. Enthusiasts are much more likely to stress reducing corruption (62%) than are the Opponents (38%). At least in part because they tend to be older, the Revolutionary Opponents are more likely to focus on an increase in pension payments than are Enthusiasts (53% vs. 39%). The Opponents are also more likely to want the Yuschenko administration to improve relations with Russia (45%) than are the Enthusiasts (7%). The Agnostics take the middle ground between the other two groups on these issues.
- The key difference between the Agnostics and the other two groups is that the Agnostics are generally much more likely not to have an opinion on many of the issues covered in the survey than are either of the other two groups. This may be primarily because members of this group tend to be less interested in politics than the other two groups (57% Agnostics vs. 83% Enthusiasts and 68% Opponents) and thus may not be informed enough about the issues to comment on them. They are also less likely to take extreme views, whether positive or negative, on most of the issues, in contrast to members of the other two groups. This may mean that the Agnostics are a swing constituency that will play a key role in deciding Ukraine's political future.