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
**THE POWER OF YOUTH:
CREATING A SUSTAINABLE
RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY**

*A VOTER EDUCATION PROGRAM
PARTNERSHIP OF:*

**The Central Election Commission
of the Russian Federation**

and

**The International Foundation
for Electoral Systems**



INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

**The Power of Youth:
Creating a Sustainable Russian Democracy**

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NEEDS ASSESSMENT

A. Overview

Since the collapse of communism, Russia has begun the challenging task of converting a centrally planned economy to a democratic capitalist system. The resulting societal dislocations associated with this transition have left many citizens longing for the security of socialism.

Adding to the unsteady course toward reform is a fundamental lack of understanding of the rights and responsibilities "citizen" in the newly introduced system of governance. For decades, citizens of the Soviet Union were economically and politically sheltered by the Soviet system. In return for work and unwavering loyalty to the system, most of their minimal needs were provided by the government. Most could simply survive; some even managed to succeed. But the price for such a system was great as basic freedoms and human rights were denied.

In the late 1980s, the system of communism ended. Thousands of people, disillusioned with the Soviet empire, took to the streets as the Iron Curtain crumbled. People the world over watched as excited, optimistic citizens spoke of their hopes and dreams of the future. Television cameras burned the image of this newly-won freedom into living rooms in every nation.

The elation was contagious. Politicians throughout the world spoke of their support for change, and money flowed from their treasuries to help institutionalize democracy. Non-governmental organizations drew plans to assist the new democracies. Meanwhile, the international business community, realizing the huge potential of the emerging markets, began investing heavily in the region.

B. The Problem

In the Russian Federation, those recent days of optimism seem decades ago, elation has been supplanted by scepticism. As elections in Russia and the successor states approach and pass, fewer citizens of the new democracy travel to the polls. Of those who vote, many desire a return to socialism and cast their ballots for old, familiar faces. Others reach further back into history and vote for leaders whose rhetoric is an affront to human dignity and who threaten the very stability of the fragile new world order.

Who are these Russian voters? Many are pensioners, who are both the least served under emerging democracies and the most organized to support socialist candidates. A survey conducted in December 1994 by Analyst Ltd. revealed that 65 percent of pensioners interviewed voted in 1993. According to the Obschestvennoe Mnenie Foundation poll following the December 1993 elections, the largest percentage of pensioners' votes went to Communist Party candidates – 18 percent – with only the Liberal Democratic Party and its appeal to Russian nationalism drawing in double digits at 15 percent.

Of course, many pro-reform voters turn out at the polls also. But each regional and local election since the 1933 State Duma elections, reveals decreasing general interest in voting. In fact, according to the Analyst Ltd. survey, nearly every age and occupation demographic breakdown reflected a greater than ten percent drop (from the 1993 percentages) in citizens who intend to vote in the 1995 State Duma elections.

Today, many regional elections cannot even draw the legal minimum of qualified voters to the polls -- 25 percent -- and the process, expensive and exhausting as it is, must be repeated over and over again.

Clearly absent at the polls are the dedicated, forward-looking, motivated voters still hoping for change, represented in Russia's youth. The Analyst Ltd. survey noted only 16 percent of students voted in 1993 -- less than one fourth of the retired citizens who cast ballots. Further analysis of the survey's cross-tabulations revealed that only 19 percent of those under 20 years old and 29 percent of those aged 20 to 29 voted in the same elections.

Today, less than six months away from the national Duma elections, the same international politicians who loudly endorsed change in the region just six years ago are somewhat silent. Foundations formerly excited about assisting the new democracies now quietly rue the future. And international business, financially exposed in what was a promising marketplace, balk at prospects for the future.

Indeed, some analysts frown upon further investment in Russia and even point to heavily-vested companies as precariously positioned. Experts who disagree with this fatalistic view still caution that what was once the most promising new market could turn out to be a significant disappointment.

C. A Solution

Factors creating disarray in Russia are many. Attainable economic reforms must be pursued, but political leadership for reform at all levels is often disappointing. In many cases, candidates for public office who offer no clear vision or leadership are numerous. And voters, confused by the new democratic process and disappointed in their choices, turn to simple messages or familiar faces -- or do not vote at all.

No single solution can address the myriad of problems. But the driving force is democracy, the force that selects real leaders who choose viable policies, and is reflected in the people. To deliver this driving force, the voters of Russia must be taught their rights and responsibilities as citizens of a democracy. And, as elections approach, the process of voting must be demystified, defined, even simplified -- especially for Russia's youth.

Without a definition of the democratic process, the downward trend of active citizens could continue and eventually threaten the existence of Russian democracy. To help create a sustainable democracy, Russia's youth must be a primary target for voter education.

In the midst of the disappointing trends noted by social scientists, there is a ray of hope. While nearly every demographic analysis of the Analyst Ltd. survey reveals a decreasing intention to vote in 1995, one demographic shows a slight but heartening increase -- youth. Seven percent more students and two percent more of those under age 20 will go to the polls.

The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, in partnership with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, proposes a strategic public education program to reach out to young people. With the input and assistance of the Russian and international business community, the following strategy can help redirect Russia toward a stable democracy that truly serves the people.

Project Background

A. Strategy

According to focus group research conducted by IFES/Moscow, much of the basis for young voter apathy in Russia is due to a lack of information. Some young people are frustrated by the systemic change in the former Soviet Union, and are disheartened by the options they have at the ballot box. Most youth do not feel their vote counts. Many are completely unfamiliar with the newly-adopted federal electoral laws that seek to guarantee free and fair elections.

Many positive changes have taken place in the electoral process. The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation has become the professional agency necessary to administer the democratic process. New laws which guarantee voters' rights and the administration of free and fair presidential elections have been enacted. Furthermore, legislation concerning the upcoming Duma elections, and referenda are currently under consideration.

The Committee's evolution and the new electoral laws are untold success stories of democratic reform in Russia. And, unlike many more divisive stages of reform, every branch of the government – the Yeltsin Administration, the Duma, the Federation Council, and the Judiciary -- can share in the credit for its success.

B. How to Reach Russia's Youth?

To accomplish the goal of educating Russia's young voters on their rights and responsibilities in a democratic election, the CEC and IFES Moscow have developed a nonpartisan mass communication strategy to tell this story. The strategy is based upon internationally accepted theories of political socialization.

According to most international political scientists, political socialization, defined as the development of an individual's political opinions, occurs in four distinct life stages: family, school, peers, and community.

In a child's formative years (ages 1 - 7), the *family* has the strongest affect on political socialization. Basic values are instilled, as kitchen table conversation moves a child to understand politics from their most trusted life allies -- their family. The affect of this stage endures for a lifetime; scientific research reveals that more than 50% of adults retain the political beliefs of their parents.

Most political scientists agree it is during primary and secondary *school* years (ages 5 - 18) that children gain the most political knowledge. In primary school, they learn national anthems and pledges, respect for national symbols, and elected positions. In high school, children are taught further about the political process and learn more about how the government operates. Those who attend university are exposed to a higher intellectual level of political instruction, however earlier school years provide the framework for adult political decision-making.

As every parent knows, young adults (ages 15 - 25) become increasingly independent of the family and school, and begin to make decisions based upon *peer* group pressure. Conversations

separate from adult influences are the basis for the most volatile stage of political socialization. Political science research underlines the obvious; it is during this stage that political idealism, cynicism, frustration, and apathy is developed.

Concurrently, it is also during this stage when youth reach voting age in a democratic society. In a new democracy, this stage presents the most effective and immediate window-of-opportunity to affect the nation's direction; for first time, impressionable voters are completely within this cohort.

Finally, with age comes responsibility. During the *community* stage of political socialization (25 onward) a person begins a career, is married, has children, retires, and becomes a grandparent. What the political system provides for job, family, and community security is of primary concern, and political decisions are made accordingly.

It is during these four distinct stages of political socialization when citizens acquire knowledge of politics and consequently make decisions and pursue a course of action. Therefore, a sensible, comprehensive voter education effort should apply creative strategies designed to reach out to the electorate within this framework. During Russia's vital electoral years of 1995 and 1996, it is especially important to reach out to young people -- first time voters who are in the peer stage of political socialization.

However, Russia's youth are arguably among the nation's most disinterested citizens. Unfocused, traditional outreach has failed to motivate them. Announcements in the media, lacking strategic design to reach young people, have fallen on deaf ears. It is clear that in order to reach this most frustrated but most promising group of voters, a strategy must be developed to penetrate the discontent -- a strategy that speaks to them in their own language.

C. Speaking Their Language

For decades, the United States faced a similar problem to the one suffered by the emerging democracy of the Russian Federation--young voter apathy. Every year since America's young people earned the right to vote in 1971 showed a decrease in the numbers of youth who went to the polls. In an attempt to remedy that problem, recording industry leaders, in partnership with Music Television (MTV), formed Rock the Vote. The organization sought to use popular music and culture to encourage youth action on election day.

After several years of attempting to affect young voter apathy, the nonpartisan group met with great success in 1992. During the months leading up to the presidential elections, Rock the Vote registered nearly 600,000 young voters--a distinct success by any measure. In the year Bill Clinton was elected president, it was evident that young people played a significant role at the polls, and that Rock the Vote made a distinct difference.

The young people of Russia are notably different from their peers in the United States. However, one common trait exists -- a love for popular music. Using the successful tactics of Rock the Vote to organize a similar effort in Russia could operate to change the dangerous trend of young voter apathy. Without such fundamental change, true democracy in Russia could be a fleeting phenomenon.

Implementation of a youth voter education program in Russia contains unique complications and challenges. Among them:

1. All Citizens of the Russian Federation over the age of 18 years are universally registered to vote. A voter registration drive would be superfluous.
2. Unlike the United States, the concept of democracy is not yet taught in all public schools. Consequently, the 18-25 year-old generation does not understand the rights and responsibilities of citizenship under a democracy.
3. National toll-free telephone numbers are unavailable and telephones themselves are only in 10-15% of homes.
4. Television air time is at a premium and, in light of the recent murder of the Director of Ostankino Television, an unstable commodity. Free "social advertising" is a new and not yet widely accepted practice.
5. Very few Russian television outlets reach a national audience. In fact, only three Moscow-based networks portend to be national, and two of them are often blocked by local programming in some regions.

In response to these and many other culturally-unique qualities of Russia and its youth, the CEC and IFES/Moscow have developed a program comparable to Rock the Vote, yet distinctly unique, which addresses these challenges. Despite its similarity to the US Rock the Vote project, the Russian project must take on an original name to underline its homegrown nature. Following consultations with politicians, marketing experts, popular culture stars and youth leaders, the partnership has named this national program "Vkluchis" -- Russian vernacular which loosely translates as "plugged in" or "participate."

Project Description

A. The Weekly Television Program

Simply encouraging Russian youth to vote would be futile without addressing basic questions. Why should I vote? What can one vote really accomplish? What issues are important to me? What do the candidates believe about these issues? How do I vote? Where do I vote? Survey research after the 1993 elections revealed these and many other factors as the stumbling blocks that kept Russian youth away from the polls.

The lack of such basic information hobbles the standard public service announcement campaign. To address this challenge, "Vklouchis" will produce a weekly television discussion program that will mix the three basic elements of Rock the Vote including youth, politics, and modern music to educate the young people of Russia.

A young, live audience will fill the fifty seats in a well designed studio. An equally youthful, experienced television host will interview two to three guest politicians for the first ten minutes, focusing all participants on how the guests stand on youth issues. Following this initial exchange, the host will introduce the members of a Russian rock band on-stage, who will play their new release or a current favorite. Following this musical interlude, the host will take the microphone into the audience and encourage a lively question-and-answer session until the close of the thirty minute program.

Each television show will cover new and different issues and involve new and different players in the political process. However, each episode will clearly invite young people to join the national young voter organization, providing an address on-screen.

Such a project presents another difficult set of challenges involving clearance, guest booking, logistics and others. However, without a repeated, wholly educational component of the young voter outreach program, effects would be marginal at best. These challenges must be overcome, and the program will help educate Russia's youth and draw them into the electoral process for the Duma and Presidential elections.

B. Public Service Announcements

Much like the public service announcement (PSA) campaigns initiated by Rock the Vote in the United States, the Russian organization plans to produce and air two types of 15- and 30- second PSAs, featuring famous musical artists as well as youth on the street. However, while Russian rock is quickly becoming popular, international bands still often dominate popularity charts.

This presents a challenge: how to involve international artists without presenting a dangerous "outsider" message?

"Vklouchis" hopes to solve this problem by pairing both Russian and international stars in the same spots while featuring the Russian to deliver the message. For example, at a popular music concert, a film crew would focus on a guest Russian artist, keeping the non-Russians prominent yet secondary. Following the event, the international group and guest Russian artists could proceed to a temporary studio where the film crew could capture the Russian artists delivering the message flanked by the internationally famous band members.

Regardless of the level of international involvement in the PSA project, the talent concentration will be largely Russian. In addition to musicians, other leaders from the world of literature, film, dance, and other cultural sectors will be asked to participate and a similar pairing strategy would be pursued. Radio and print PSAs will also be produced to complement the television outreach.

In this way, a series of uniquely Russian PSAs could encourage youth voting with some important help from the international music and film industry, without labeling the project as borne and bred by other nations.

The PSAs would air beginning in early November through the December Duma elections, and, like the weekly program, youth would be encouraged to get involved by joining the national organization. The address would be provided at the close of the commercial. As the Presidential elections approach, a similar schedule will be followed.

C. The Grassroot NGO Network

Unlike Rock the Vote/US, a Russian youth organization cannot count on toll-free telephone numbers and voter registration to make a difference. All activity, from television to radio to print to special events, would be designed to encourage membership in "Vklouchis." Members would be invited to nonpartisan voter activities during the Duma and Presidential campaign cycle and would be provided with nonpartisan educational materials.

The real focus of work for the group would begin four to five weeks prior to the election day. As the elections approach, the hundreds of thousands of members of "Vklouchis" would be selected from a current database. All would be mailed a letter encouraging them to go to the polls and providing them with the telephone number of the local election commission for poll location information.

In addition, major urban centers of membership including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Krasnodar, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, and other areas, would begin an aggressive telephone contact campaign. Volunteers would work evenings reaching youth group members via telephone, encouraging them to vote, and informing them of their polling place.

Like all work during elections, it is the last several weeks that make the difference for turnout at the polls. Through a concerted mass communications program reaching out to youth, the group can ensure young voters to go to the polls for the Duma and Presidential elections -- and vote -- in record numbers.

D. Message Development

To ensure a creative mass communications tactic is effective, the message delivered must resonate with the target audience. In our experience, we have determined some basic ideas that must be communicated to the citizens of Russia:

1. Our election reform efforts since 1993 have produced a system that can work for an involved citizenry.
2. Without popular input, democracy will not serve our people.
3. With our democracy comes rights -- and responsibilities.

4. Our voting process is simple and a few minutes of involvement can help solve complex problems.

These messages must be supported with significant new survey data and refined through focus group research. This research, evaluated by the creative subcommittees of the Steering Committee, will help determine messages employed in the project.

Initially, a wide-ranging national poll of the citizenry will be conducted, with a significant over sampling of Russia's youth. Following this sociological examination, focus group research involving young citizens, 18-25 years old, will be conducted to determine messages for use in the mass communications tactics including television and radio products, newspaper and magazine advertisements, and collateral materials.

Enabled by this scientific information, we can successfully target activity to increase voter turnout at the polls, and concentrate on motivating Russia's youth.

E. Steering Committee

A volunteer Steering Committee will be formed to assure that the activity of "VKloochis" reflects the unique creative sense of Russia's youth and addresses their equally unique electoral dilemmas. Young representatives of the journalism community, involving television, radio, newspaper, and magazine staff, will form the Committee in concert with emissaries from the Creative Committee consisting of musicians, artists, fashion designers and writers.

To assure the Steering Committee stays in touch with the economic sector of Russia, young business leaders will also join the Committee. Technical and legal accuracy of the program will be secured through participation of representatives from IFES and the Central Election Commission. The latter will also provide insight into the day-to-day management challenges of the organization and the perspectives of Russia's official structures.

Sub-committees of the Steering Committee will be formed to provide creative project consultation. For example, the staff of the weekly television program will consult with a TV Program Subcommittee and the creators of public service announcements will benefit from the critique of a PSA Subcommittee. When publications are created for voter information, they will be reviewed by a Publications Subcommittee.

The Steering Committee will provide creative recommendations to the organization, but will not have financial authority. To streamline decision-making, the committee will have a maximum of fifteen members. Considering the voluntary nature of the body, the Committee will meet as often as necessary, with frequency of meetings increasing as the elections approach and activity heightens.

Benefits of Corporate Sponsorship

Domestic and international private companies can realize valuable direct and indirect benefits from providing financial support to "Vklouchis." This is reflected in the following:

1. The youth of Russia are quickly emerging as one of the most lucrative marketing demographics and yet are still one of the most elusive sectors of society. "Vklouchis" will provide sponsors with unique access to this valuable market through high-profile affiliation with the only national youth organization that will speak directly to them.
2. Only a stable and sustainable Russian democracy will secure a healthy market for business. Corporations already seeded in the region can fertilize their investments; those looking toward future investment can help provide the governmental stability business requires.
3. Many private companies find that standing aside as the democratic process deteriorates is no longer an acceptable business position, but partisan involvement in Russia's electoral process is most certainly precarious. The vast majority of leaders of most political factions in Russia see young non-partisan voter outreach as an essential component of the process – sponsorship of effective activity is a win-win position.
4. Corporations desiring to contribute to non-partisan, measurable, organized and active electoral activity are left very few choices. The proven effective non-partisan tactics and experienced leadership of "Vklouchis" will combine to provide a measurable effect: moving a finite number of young citizens to vote, driven by a precise database of interested youth. Value added by corporate foundation donations or marketing budget commitments will directly affect the outcome of the 1995 Duma elections and virtually all democratic activity in Russia for many years to come.

In ensuring that sponsorship gains significant attention in the US media, an aggressive media outreach program will be coordinated by "Vklouchis." A Washington DC-based public relations agency will be retained to assure that companies which invest in the project are recognized in the US and international business press, and local and national US media.

Private companies may financially support the organization in many ways. In general, funds can be dedicated to the following specific activities to allow for individual and significant funder recognition:

1. **Weekly Television Program:** logo or company name listed at the close of program, positive earned media coverage;
2. **Public Service Announcements:** positive earned media coverage;
3. **Grassroots Organizations:** logo or company name on collateral materials and publications, positive media coverage.

Institutional Background

As a partnership of the Central Election Commission and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and at the request of the CEC, "Vkluchis" will work through the IFES offices in Washington and Moscow.

A. Central Election Commission

The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation is a permanent body established under the Federal Law "On the Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights of the Citizens of the Russian Federation." There are fifteen members, five each appointed by the upper and lower houses of Parliament and the Presidential Administration. Its leadership is elected from among its membership according to secret ballot. The current Chairman, Nikolai Ryabov, and Vice-Chairman, Alexander Ivanchenko are serving their second leadership terms. Both presided over the historic 1993 elections and constitutional referendum. The CEC is a politically and regionally diverse institution, whose members serve four-year terms. The current CEC was seated in March 1995. In Russia, the CEC is responsible for all facets of management of federal elections.

B. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems is a private, non-profit foundation dedicated to providing assistance in monitoring, supporting, and strengthening the mechanics of the election process in emerging and established democracies. Since its creation in 1987, IFES has worked in over 72 countries around the world providing unique support and experience in the areas of technical election assessment, on-site technical assistance, poll worker training, citizen education in democracy, and election day activities. It operates with the understanding that each nation requires an electoral system tailor-made to its unique culture and environment and recognizes that there is no single model of democracy. IFES utilizes international experts who reflect the diversity of electoral systems around the globe in order to assist requesting nations to strengthen their election processes.

In 1989, as the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* took hold in the Soviet Union, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) initiated a constructive dialogue with Soviet election authorities and other officials through exchanges of expertise. Today, IFES works with Central Election Commissions of the successor states to promote honest, impartial, and efficient election administration in Russia through professional and independent election commissions according to electoral laws. IFES also works through official structures and non-governmental organizations to encourage greater understanding of, and confidence and participation in post-Soviet electoral systems. Through its Moscow Office, IFES provides assistance in the areas of legal, institutional, and procedural reform as well as voter education and public information. These initiatives have had significant impacts at a legal, institutional, and practical level.

C. Project Team

Richard W. Soudriette, President

Formerly Country Director for the Peace Corps in Dominican Republic and Paraguay, Mr. Soudriette has 16 years of experience in public administration, election organization, and international development and has led IFES since 1988. He has also served as Staff Director for Congressman James M. Inhofe and Chief of Staff to the Mayor of the City of Tulsa. Mr. Soudriette is fluent in Spanish and French and has a working knowledge of German. His extensive field experience includes Central and South America, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.

Jeffrey Fischer, Chief of Staff

Previously served as a consultant through MicroVote Corporation. Areas of expertise have included electronic voting systems and project management in election systems. Member of the Kansas Board of Election Commissioners and the Missouri Campaign Finance Review Board. From 1984 - 1991, Mr. Fischer owned Diversified Information Services, a data management company providing services for clients in government, industry, and education. He has served as an on-site project manager in Haiti and Guyana and has extensive experience in the field throughout South America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa, and the former Soviet Union.

Juliana G. Pilon, Director of Programs, Europe & Asia

Formerly Vice President of the National Forum Foundation and Senior Policy Analyst for the Heritage Foundation, Dr. Pilon is a recognized authority on issues of nationalism, human rights, and foreign policy. She currently teaches at Johns Hopkins University and American University and has held post-doctoral fellowships at Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, and at the Institute of Humane Studies. She is the author of over 180 articles, reviews, monographs, and books, is a frequent commentator on news programs. She speaks Romanian, Hungarian, and French and her field experience includes work in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Catherine Barnes, Senior Program Officer, Europe & Asia

Serving as the Washington-based Project Manager for Russia Programs at IFES, Ms. Barnes has designed and initiated democratic institution building programs - ranging from campaigns and elections to youth activism and women in politics - in 11 of the 15 countries formerly comprising the Soviet Union. She is frequently a guest lecturer at the Foreign Service Training Institute, has authored several articles on political developments in Russia, and has provided pro bono consulting services to private firms and public foundations working in the former Soviet Union. Her field experience includes Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Michal Caputo, IFES On-Site Project Director, Russia

Formerly Vice President of Corporate and International Communications for the Widmeyer Group, a Washington, DC public relations firm, Mr. Caputo has also served as Communications Consultant for the Close-Up Foundation, the nation's largest civic education group; Director of Public Relations for the National Alliance of Business; and Assistant Director at the US House of Representatives Radio and Television Correspondents' Gallery. International experience includes work in the Asia and the Pacific Rim, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union.

Nadia Seryakova, IFES On-Site Project Assistant, Russia

Formerly manager of her own entertainment group, Ms. Seryakova has utilized her organizational and leadership skills, as well as her contacts throughout the Russian Federation, to strengthen and support the participation of young people and women in politics and business both through indigenous groups and networks and on behalf of international donors.

Alexander Ivanchenko, CEC Vice-Chairman

Serves as the Vice-Chairman of the Central Election Commission of Russia. Originally appointed to this position by the President of Russia in 1993, he was reappointed by the Parliament in 1995 and re-elected to his leadership post by the membership of the commission. He is credited with steering vital election legislation through the new, democratic, and intricate legislative process. A doctoral graduate of Moscow Law School, Mr. Ivanchenko formerly served as a senior advisor to the Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidential Administration, and the Political Analysis Department at the Parliamentary Center.

Implementation Timeline

Begin Grassroots Organization Outreach	3 May 1995
Assemble Steering Committee	14 May 1995
Initiate Resource Development	17 May 1995
Complete Weekly Television Program Pilot	10 June 1995
Conduct Survey Research	11 June 1995
Complete Focus Group Research	17 July 1995
Produce Collateral Materials	7 August 1995
Complete Educational Booklet	14 August 1995
Distribute Booklet/Collateral Materials	28 August 1995
Launch Weekly Television Program	4 September 1995
Produce PSAs	2 October 1995
Re-produce Collateral Materials	16 October 1995
Initiate PSA Airing Cycle	1 November 1995
Deliver Voter Contact Mailing	10 November 1995
Activate Phone Banks	20 November 1995
Evaluate Program	3 January 1996
Re-Launch Weekly Television Program	4 March 1996
Produce PSAs	8 April 1996
Re-Produce Collateral Materials	22 April 1996
Initiate PSA Airing Cycle	22 April 1996
Deliver Voter Contact Mailing	29 April 1996
Activate Phone Books	10 May 1996

Budget

A. PILOT TELEVISION PROGRAM

On-Site Activities

Salaries	\$ 21,000.00
Consulting & Contracts	\$ 75,500.00
Airfare/Visas/Fees	\$ 18,500.00
Per Diem	\$ 12,250.00
IFES Office Equipment	\$ 5,750.00
Other Direct Costs	<u>\$ 600,000.00</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	\$ 733,000.00

Home Office Support

Salaries	\$ 15,460.00
Other Direct Costs	<u>\$ 42,000.00</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	\$ 57,460.00

General and Administrative

(.35 on program activities & .0875 on equipment)	<u>\$ 275,152.00</u>
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Total Program Costs: Television Series \$1,065,612.00

B. PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENTS

On-Site Activities

Salaries	\$ 18,000.00
Consulting and Contracts	\$ 65,000.00
Airfare/Visas/Fees	\$ 22,275.00
Per Diem	\$ 16,500.00
IFES Office Equipment	\$ 3,500.00
Other Direct Costs	<u>\$ 200,000.00</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	\$ 325,275.00

Home Office Support

Salaries	\$ 18,000.00
Other Direct Costs	<u>\$ 200,000.00</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	\$ 218,000.00

General and Administrative

(.35 on program activities & .0875 on equipment)	<u>\$ 189,227.00</u>
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Total Program Costs: Public Service Announcements \$ 732,502.00

C. GRASSROOTS NETWORK

On-site Activities

Salaries	\$ 22,176.00
Consulting/Contracts/Sub-Grants	\$ 150,775.00
Airfare/Visas/Travel Fees	\$ 14,250.00
Per Diem	\$ 10,800.00
Office Equipment	\$ 5,200.00
Other Direct Costs	<u>\$ 180,100.00</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	\$ 383,301.00

Home Office Support

Salaries	\$ 28,780.00
Other Direct Costs	<u>\$ 45,040.00</u>
<i>Subtotal</i>	\$ 73,820.00

General and Administrative Costs

(.35 on program activities & 0.875 on equipment)	<u>\$ 158,627.00</u>
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Total Project Costs: Grassroots NGO Network \$ 615,748.00

+ D. TOTAL PROJECT COSTS (TV/PSA/NGO) \$2,413,862.00



ID #:

Country Russia

Year

Language

English

Copyright(IFES/Other) Intended Audience(Adult/~~YA~~)

Election type N/A

Material type Adult Voter Information

Notes An educational program to reach out to the young people in Russia