

**ATTITUDES TOWARD CHANGE,
THE CURRENT SITUATION,
AND CIVIC ACTION IN UKRAINE**

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INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS**

SAMPLE: 1,500 NATIONAL WITH OVERSAMPLES IN KYIV (N=127)
AND WEST UKRAINE (N=173)

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**Attitudes toward Change, the Current Situation and Civic Action in Ukraine:
IFES Surveys, 1994 – 2000**

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I. Introduction

Between the dates of November 28 and December 5, 2000, 1500 adults from across Ukraine were interviewed for the latest national opinion survey commissioned by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). This report summarizes many of these findings, and places them in the context of previous IFES surveys conducted in Ukraine starting in 1994.

The nationally representative sample included 1,200 face-to-face interviews of adults 18 years of age and above. Oversamples of 127 in Kyiv and 173 in several oblasts in the west of Ukraine were also conducted. The sample was weighted and is representative of the adult population by age, sex, and region.

All surveys are subject to errors caused by interviewing a sample rather than the entire population. The theoretical margin of error for a sample of 1,500 is +/- 2.5 at a 95 percent confidence level.

The project director and principal analyst for this latest Ukrainian survey was Thomas Carson, Ph.D. Interviewing was completed by SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv, under the direction of Oksana Bandurovych.

This current survey relies heavily upon IFES' cumulative experience with opinion surveys in Ukraine. The questionnaire is a cumulative effort, using the information and experience gained from all previous IFES work carried out in Ukraine, with additional focus placed on emerging interests. This is the seventh national survey commissioned by IFES in Ukraine. Previous IFES project directors include: Elehie Natalie Skoczylas and Gary A. Ferguson. This present work owes much to their efforts.

The formatted report and tables were provided by Rakesh Sharma, IFES Applied Research Officer, with editorial assistance provided by Carrie Ellis, IFES Senior Program Assistant, and Nathan Van Dusen, IFES Program Assistant. Béla Lehosik assisted in the statistical analysis and preparation of presentation materials for this project. Over the years, Konstantyn Shevchenko has been the primary IFES staff person in Kyiv responsible for many of these surveys. His assistance and insight into the research findings have benefited the final results.

This survey report

- Provides findings on attitudes toward social, political, and economic change in Ukraine over the previous decade;
- Describes the public's assessment of current conditions in Ukraine concerning overall satisfaction, corruption, and confidence in institutions and leaders;
- Examines individual attitudes toward politics, political action, participation in elections, and human rights;
- Describes Ukrainians' experience with their elected and appointed officials, political parties, and non-governmental organizations;
- Provides public evaluations of the amount and quality of information available to Ukrainians about political and economic developments and the performance of media; and
- Summarizes variations in attitudes across social groups and geographical regions in Ukraine.

This publication was made possible through funding provided by the US Agency for International Development.

II. Executive Summary

The Perception of Social Change in Ukraine

Nearly all Ukrainians (85%) remark that they have observed ‘major changes that affect the lives of most people’ over the last ten years. When asked about the events of the last decade, 54% mention that the ‘decrease in the standard of living,’ is the main ‘bad thing’ that has happened in Ukraine, and 57% that ‘nothing good’ has happened in the country.

The most frequently mentioned positive event, cited by 14%, is Ukrainian independence.

Political Change in Ukraine

December 2000 data show that:

- The number who believe ‘yes, Ukraine is a democracy’ has fallen from the somewhat higher figures reached after the 1999 presidential elections.
- Of those who believe Ukraine is ‘not a democracy,’ only 23% believe it is becoming one.
- The number who believe political reforms are ‘not happening fast enough’ has risen again, though it remains below the 1999 high point.

Economic Change in Ukraine

Twenty-six percent favor a centrally planned economy and 32% favor a market economy, while 32% favor a system in-between the two.

Satisfaction with the Overall Situation in Ukraine

Dissatisfaction appears endemic to Ukrainian consciousness at this point in time. The total level of dissatisfaction has constantly stayed near or above the 90% level throughout the entire period covered by IFES surveys. The percentage of those ‘very dissatisfied’ has started to increase according to the recent findings of December 2000. The economic situation appears to be the leading factor behind these negative attitudes. On the whole, dissatisfaction has remained relatively stable over the course of the IFES surveys.

The View on Corruption

Corruption has been overwhelmingly perceived as ‘common’ and ‘serious’ throughout the period that IFES has asked these questions. The December 2000 data does not exhibit a deviation from this pattern. Trend data from IFES surveys indicates that a decline in the ‘commonness’ of corruption brings relatively small drops in the perceived seriousness of corruption. That is, even though Ukrainians might think that corruption is not as common in a particular survey, their perception of the seriousness of the problem does not change much. December 2000 findings also show that the perception of the extent of corruption varies across regions in Ukraine, but attitudes toward the seriousness of it do not vary accordingly.

Confidence in Leadership and Institutions

The December 2000 survey shows:

- Ukrainians have the highest level of confidence in the Church: 32% state they have a ‘great amount’ of confidence.

- Ukrainians report higher levels of confidence in the Prime Minister, Viktor Yushchenko, than in the President, Leonid Kuchma: 12% report ‘a great amount’ of confidence in Yushchenko versus 8% for Kuchma.
- The Supreme Rada is rated lower than President Kuchma (3% with a ‘great amount’ of confidence).
- Local government and Local Self-Government are both rated higher than national-level institutions such as the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Rada, and the Presidential Administration.
- Police receive among the lowest confidence ratings on the list.

Attitudes toward Politics

Ukrainians are convinced that they have little influence on decisions in Ukraine, and are not convinced that they can change this through the electoral process:

- 61% at least ‘somewhat disagree’ with the statement: “Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country.” Of these, 33% ‘strongly disagree’ with this statement.
- 80% at least ‘somewhat agree’ with the statement: “People like me have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine.” Of these, 52% ‘strongly agree’ with this statement.
- 76% at least ‘somewhat agree’ with the statement: “Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like me can’t understand what’s really happening.” Of these, 44% ‘strongly agree.’

Despite the fact that most Ukrainians feel alienated from their political system and their representative government, many state that they are interested in politics. Overall, 65% are at least ‘somewhat interested,’ and only 11% state they are ‘not at all interested.’ December 2000 results show that 18% are ‘very interested’ in politics, 47% are ‘somewhat interested’ in politics, 23% are ‘not too interested’ in politics, and 11% are ‘not at all interested’ in politics.

The majority of people (58%) discuss politics at least ‘sometimes.’ Of these, one out of four discuss politics often. Forty-two percent ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ discuss political issues. Interest in politics and the desire to discuss political issues increase with age, as younger respondents are less interested and less likely to discuss politics.

Attitudes toward Political Action

Respondents tended to express support for ‘bold’ versus ‘cautious’ change:

- 13% favor positions advocating the most ‘cautious’ approach to change, and 24% favor ‘moderately cautious’ action.
- 31% favor ‘moderately bold’ action, and 26% favor positions advocating the ‘most bold’ approach to change.

In the December 2000 survey, IFES asked what the respondent would do if their elected representative was ‘recalled’ and replaced with another person chosen by officials at a higher level. Results indicate that 25% would ‘do nothing, because it is none of their concern,’ 34% would ‘do nothing, because it is useless to complain,’ 5% would ‘complain, but nothing else’, 4% would ‘publicly protest,’ 6% stated that ‘such things do not happen’ in Ukraine, and 17% stated that ‘it depended upon whether there was a good reason’ for recalling the elected representative.

Attitudes toward Elections

Leading issues respondents want their elected officials to work on, according to December 2000 data, include:

Economic Issues:

- Raise the standard of living and the amount workers receive in their pay envelopes (30%)
- Economic development (16%)
- Resolve unemployment and underemployment (15%)
- Job security and creation of opportunities to work (10%)
- Better pensions (6%)
- Payment of wage and pension arrears (4%)
- Lower price level (3%)

Law and Order:

- Law and Order (8%)
- Eliminate crime and corruption (5%)

Social Services:

- Free access to public services (10%)
- Decreased fees for community services (3%)

Many stated that they 'Did not know' (18%), and a few (2%) mentioned agricultural reform.

Experience with Government Officials

Overall, 24% state they have contacted an elected official before to help solve a problem in their lives. Usually, contact was made with the chair of the village or settlement (43% of those contacting an elected official). The city chairman or mayor was contacted half as frequently (21% of those contacting elected officials). Relatively few attempts were made to contact other elected officials.

Personal meetings are the most frequent form of contact with elected officials (78% of those contacting elected officials). Letter writing was mentioned by 21%.

Most of the attempts to contact an elected official resulted in a response from the official (73%). Twelve percent received a partial response and 15% claim that they received no response from the official. In total, one out of four adult Ukrainians have attempted to contact an elected official. Of these, 73% manage to arrange a meeting. Half of those who do meet are not satisfied with the response they get, and just under half are satisfied.

Approximately one out of every six adult Ukrainians (17%) has contacted an appointed official to help resolve a problem in their life. Nearly all of these contacts were with local executive bodies (88% of 260). Fewer people have gone further to the oblast level or beyond with their problem. At the same time, 86% of respondents state that no attempt has been made by public officials to contact them and learn of their opinions.

Non-Governmental Organizations

Many NGOs enjoy relatively high levels of trust, between 40% and 50% of respondents declaring at least 'some trust' in them. At the same time, very few people are members. Trade unions have the highest reported membership, with 12% claiming they belong to a trade union. Three percent claim membership in religious organizations. No other group commands more than 1%. Of all the groups mentioned, only members of trade unions claim they pay membership fees.

The December 2000 survey also asked respondents which organizations they may join in the future. Welfare organizations received the highest mention (7%). Human rights groups were mentioned by 5% and women's organizations by 4%. Very few respondents, however, report that they go to NGOs for help in resolving their problems. According to the December 2000 data, 7% claim that they have gone to their trade unions for help and only 2% claim that they have gone to a welfare organization for help. No other organization registers over a 1% mention.

Public Information and Media

The December 2000 survey finds that the public has a greater amount of political information in comparison to previous years. In 1997, 71% stated they had either 'no information at all' or 'not very much' information about political developments in Ukraine. A year later, the June 1998 data show that 63% gave this response, followed by 54% in June 1999 before the presidential elections of that year. In December 2000, the majority (60%) now reports at least a 'fair amount' of political information.

In July 1997, 72% claimed they did not receive enough information on economic developments. This declined slightly in 1998 (70%), and declined significantly in 1999 (58%). The December 2000 data still indicate that a majority does not receive enough information about economic developments in Ukraine. Once again, however, the percentage reporting that they do not receive enough information has declined (51%). However, respondents also note that they do not have enough information regarding the privatization of public enterprises. In total, 70% replied that they are either 'not informed at all' (28%) or 'not well informed' (42%) about the government's activities concerning privatization.

Knowledge of economic developments at the local level is particularly weak, with less than 10% claiming that they are at least 'somewhat informed' about the allocation of their local community budgets. In total, 84% respond that they are 'not well informed' or 'not at all informed.' Of these, 62% give the extreme answer of 'not at all informed.' Those who are informed about the local budget were asked where they received their information: 14% saw something on television, 11% read about the local budget in the local newspapers, and 6% heard something on the radio. Others know something about the local budget because it was discussed during elections (7%). Almost an equal number received their information through unofficial sources (6%), and even fewer heard official announcements at other times than during elections (2%).

The Ukrainian public perceives that the media is in a difficult position. The December 2000 survey asked: "In your opinion, how safe is it for media in Ukraine to broadcast or print their true opinions, even if these opinions are critical of the government?" Less than 20% believe it is safe. A plurality (42%) believe it is 'somewhat dangerous' for media to print or broadcast their true opinions. Another 24% believe it is 'very dangerous' to do so.

* * * * *

The following report is organized into six sections, a conclusion, and appendices. Section I, above, provides an introduction to the report, while Section II highlights some of the most important findings from the body of the report. Following this, Section III covers the area of social, political, and economic change as perceived by Ukrainians as measured in IFES surveys starting in 1994. Section IV looks at attitudes toward the situation in Ukraine. The next section, V, consists of two parts: a) Political Action and b) Institutional Action. This section provides information on attitudes toward political efficacy and actions and experience with government officials, political parties, and non-governmental organizations. It also includes evaluations of the amount of information available concerning politics and the economy and the media by which Ukrainians obtain this information. Finally, Section VI summarizes variations in attitudes.

III. Attitudes toward Change

Perceptions of Social Change in Ukraine

The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, along with Ukrainian independence in the same year, accelerated the pace of political change as Ukrainian institutions were created to replace Soviet ones and the new country moved closer toward both Western democracy and a market economy. These are among the most apparent changes observed from outside Ukraine over the last ten years. Those within the country experienced this change on a much deeper level. Institutions, ways of living, and social relationships changed virtually overnight. When asked to assess the extent, nearly all Ukrainians (85%) remark that they have observed ‘major changes that effect the lives of most people’ over these last ten years.¹ This opinion is held almost uniformly by all age groups, men and women regardless of income, ethnicity, level of education, or place of residence. There is a notable exception to this general pattern. Ukrainians living in the western part of the country are less unified in their opinions.² Only 80%, versus 88% in the east and 85% of those in-between east and west, have observed ‘major changes.’ More than one out of ten western Ukrainians (12%) believe that change has had ‘little impact’ over the last ten years. Few Ukrainians give this response from other areas of the country.

Though most agree change has been vast, what this means varies widely. While some have benefited, most believe they have been hurt. Economic themes lead the list of changes mentioned by Ukrainians. Continuous disappointment with economic struggle seems to obscure the tremendous political changes that have occurred. When asked about change, Ukrainians do mention independence and signs of national identity, such as national flags and symbols, but economic change is mentioned more frequently. Other changes, such as a perceived rise in crime and corruption, are also on the public mind.

In the December 2000 survey, respondents were asked to list good and bad events that have occurred over the last ten years, for both the country and themselves. Answers were given in an open format, and many respondents gave multiple answers. Responses were then thematically coded. Figure 1 displays results for this series of four questions (multiple answers were allowed, and the percentages do not add to 100%). On the left are presented respondents’ list of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ things that have happened in Ukraine over the last decade. The most frequently mentioned ‘bad’ and ‘good’ things that happened in the respondents’ personal lives are listed on the right side of the table. As the figure illustrates, the majority of respondents say that nothing good has happened in Ukraine or their personal lives. At this point in time, the answers reflect an overall negative assessment of the previous ten-year period.

¹ December 2000 data “Do you believe that major changes in Ukraine have effected the lives of most people, or do you believe that the changes here have had little effect on the lives of most Ukrainians?”

² The East/West classification is used extensively in this report. For details, refer to Appendix 3, below.

Figure 1. Good And Bad Events Over the Last Decade (n=1,500)

UKRAINE	%	PERSONAL LIFE	%
<u>Good Things</u>		<u>Good Things</u>	
Nothing	57	Nothing	56
Ukrainian independence	14	Birth of children, grandchildren	16
Increase in personal freedom	10	Educational advancement	8
Creation of conditions for business	4	Wedding	7
Increased availability of material goods	4	Improved material position	4
Peace and calm	3	Employment advancement	4
Adoption of national symbolism	2	Receipt/buying of apartment/house	4
Land reform	2	Other	1
<u>Bad Things</u>		<u>Bad Things</u>	
Decrease in standard of living	54	Lowered standard of living	41
Unemployment	28	Unemployment	17
Economic crisis	13	Death of relatives	14
Rise in crime	7	Illness/Unable to afford treatment	11
Decline in social support	7	Nothing bad happened	6
Corruption	4	Loss of deposits in USSR banks	5
Decline in law and order	3	Divorce	3
Increased social stratification	3	Delays with wage payments	2

Regardless, good things have happened for both Ukraine and people's private lives. The leading positive event given by 14% is Ukrainian independence. Another 10% mention an increase in personal freedoms, such as speech and travel. Economic change, such as an improvement in business conditions (4%) and increased availability of material goods (4%), is also mentioned. Positive events in private life mostly refer to normal life events, such as weddings (7%), birth of children (16%), and buying or receiving a house or apartment (4%). Respondents also mention improved material position (4%) and educational (8%) and employment advancement (4%).

However, the 'nays' are dominant. For most, a 'decrease in the standard of living' is mentioned (54%), along with 'unemployment' (28%) and 'economic crisis' (13%). Other responses also refer to the consequences of adverse economic conditions: 'decline in social support' (7%) and 'increased social stratification' (3%). Themes relating to crime are next most frequent responses. Several (7%) mention a 'rise in crime.' Others (4%) speak of a general 'decline in law and order,' or a 'decline in cultural standards and morality' (2%). 'Corruption' is mentioned by 4%.

Specific negative political events (if they may be classified this way) include the 'collapse of the USSR' (3%) and that 'leaders from the previous regime have stayed in power' (2%).

'Lower standard of living' dominates as the most frequently given adverse event in the respondents' own lives, mentioned by 41%. 'Unemployment' follows at 17%. 'Death of relatives' (14%), 'illness and inability to afford treatment' (11%), and 'divorce' (3%) are also mentioned. Few report that they have been 'victims of crime' (<1%), although crime was frequently mentioned as a 'bad' event for the country.

Overall, three out of four respondents (76%) report that the 'total effect' of the last ten years of change has 'hurt' them and their families. Of these, nearly half (48%) choose the extreme end of the scale, indicating a strong and negative answer to this question. A sizable minority (15%) reports no significant change in its situation. An even smaller percentage has benefited (7%).

Figure 2 gives further details of the range in attitudes among different social groups regarding the effect of the last ten years of change in Ukraine. Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which they have been 'hurt' or 'benefited' from the change over the past ten years, and shown a scale where 1 = 'hurt,' 3 = their 'situation has not changed much,' and 5 = 'benefited.' Points in-between these were also indicated on the scale {2,4}. Figure 2 displays responses grouped into three categories: Hurt (1+2), Not Much Change (3), and Benefited (4+5). Specific wording of the question is given at the bottom of the figure.

Figure 2. Total Effect Last 10 years (in percent)

	Hurt	Same	Benefit	DK/NA
Total	76	15	7	1
Gender				
Male	72	19	8	1
Female	80	12	7	1
Age				
18-24	59	27	13	1
25-34	66	20	12	2
35-44	79	12	9	1
45-54	78	15	6	1
55-64	87	10	2	0
65+	84	12	3	1
Education				
<Secondary	88	10	1	0
Secondary	74	16	8	1
Higher	70	18	11	1
Ethnicity				
Ukrainian	75	17	7	1
Russian	83	10	7	0
Other	76	16	9	
Region				
Kiev	69	17	13	1
Northern	77	15	4	4
Central	86	9	4	1
Northeastern	88	10	1	1
Northwestern	69	19	12	1
Southeastern	76	10	13	
Western	60	32	7	1
Southwestern	60	22	16	2
Southern	67	22	11	1
Crimea	90	9	1	
Eastern	83	11	5	1
East	81	12	6	1
West	67	22	11	1

Question: "Over the last 10 years some people have benefited from the change, and others have been hurt. Please look at the picture on this card. The picture shows different responses to this question. 1 represents that you and your family have been hurt by changes over the last 10 years, 3 represents that your situation has not changed much, and 5 represents that you and your family have benefited by the change. Or, you can choose a point in-between these answers. Please think about the total effect on your family from changes in Ukraine over these last 10 years. Where would you place yourself on this picture?"

Expected results are clear in the table above. Most believe they have been hurt by ten years of change. However, some groups have a stronger perception of this phenomenon. Younger respondents more frequently mention that they experienced some benefit over this time: 14% of those 18 – 25 years of age and 12% of 26 – 35 year olds, compared to 8% of 36 – 45 year olds, 6% of those 46 – 55, and 3% of those over 56 years of age. Interviewers rated how well off respondents appeared to be (not displayed in the table). Only 15 respondents were rated 'High' in social economic status. Of these, 59% stated they had experienced at least some benefit from recent changes. This would be expected, and provides some validation of the interviewers' assessment of the prosperity of the respondents. Of those 'Moderately' well off in the interviewer's assessment, 16% had experienced some benefit. This compares to 7% and only 3% of those perceived as having the lowest levels of well being. Similarly, only 1% of those without a secondary education experienced some benefit, compared to 8% of those completing secondary with specialized training. Of those with education beyond the secondary level, 12% report some benefit.

Younger, wealthier, and better-educated respondents are more likely to have felt that they benefited from the last ten years. Figure 2 shows less obvious results as well. Ethnic Ukrainians are not much more likely to report some benefit compared to ethnic Russians, or those identifying themselves with other ethnic groups, and there is no significant difference between the different ethnic groups. For the total sample, 7% claim some benefit. However, ethnic Russians are much more likely to claim that they have been ‘hurt’ over the last ten years: 83%, compared to 74% of ethnic Ukrainians and 76% of those in other ethnic groups. Women are also more likely to claim they have been ‘hurt’: 80% versus 72% of males. This is true for Ukrainians in the east (81%) versus those in the west (67%). Western Ukrainians are also more likely to have benefited (11% versus 7% of easterners and only 3% of those in-between the two).³

Attitudes toward economic and political change are discussed separately below. Another social change salient in the public consciousness is a perceived rise in crime and corruption. Respondents were asked: ‘In Ukraine, has crime increased very much, increased a little, stayed the same, or decreased very much over the past few years?’ Figure 3 presents the range in responses for the total population. The most striking result is that 79% replied that crime has ‘increased very much.’ Another 12% state that crime has ‘increased a little.’ Only 28 respondents failed to give a substantial answer, replying that they ‘did not know.’ There is a consensus about the extent of crime; differences between social groups in Ukraine are secondary to this finding. (Corruption is discussed in Section IV.)

Figure 3. Change in Crime Over the Past Few Years (n=1,500)

Response	%
Increased very much	79%
Increased a little	12%
Stayed the same	4%
Decreased a little	3%
Decreased very much	*
Don't know / no answer	2%

Question wording: “Some people say that the problem of crime has gotten worse over the past few years, other people do not agree. What is your opinion? In Ukraine, has crime increased very much, increased a little, stayed the same, decreased a little, or decreased very much over the past few years?”

Political Change in Ukraine

Attitude toward politics and political institutions, as well as political behavior, has been the most consistently addressed topic in past IFES surveys in Ukraine. These questions explore the level of public support for the movement toward a democratic society. This report summarizes findings in several areas that are political in nature. Confidence in institutions is covered in Section IV. Following this, Section V covers political efficacy, approval of various political actions, human rights, and experience with government officials and political parties.

The focus of this section is on the trend in attitudes toward underlying themes of democracy. IFES has included three questions on this topic in many of its surveys. These questions are listed below. Q# refers to the variable in a merged data set [1994 – 2000] used for the trend analysis reported here. Details on this data set are provided in Appendix 2.

Q# T11. In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at the right pace?


Q# T12. Is Ukraine a democracy?

Q# T13. [If not] Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy or not?

³ Only the most significant differences between groups are presented in the tables featured in this report. For a complete set of tables for the 2000 IFES survey, or results from previous years, contact IFES.

Responses over time to these questions are presented in Figure 4. T11 (Speed of reforms) was asked in every survey starting in 1997. Respondents were asked about the speed at which political reforms were occurring in Ukraine. They could choose from the following options: (1) too quickly, (2) at the right pace, or (3) too slowly. Many stated that ‘reforms are not happening,’ and this response was also included (4). Figure 4 provides the average response over time for this question. The responses are assumed to form a scale, where 1 = resistance to reform (they are happening too quickly), and 4 = a type of impatience (they are not happening). As the line moves higher, responses indicate an increased sense that reforms are not happening quickly enough. The left-hand margin provides the scale for interpreting the trend line for T11.

Figure 4. Attitudes toward Democracy and Political Reforms in Ukraine, Trend Analysis



The trend for T11 indicates that, on average, most people believe that reforms are happening ‘too slowly’ [the line is continually above 2.5 (at the right pace)]. There is a brief decline in the trend line recorded in June 1998. At this point, fewer people held the opinion that political reform should move quicker, and the line reflects a downward movement toward slower paces of reform. A year later, the line bends back up and the trend after this time indicates a high number of those who state that political reform is ‘not happening fast enough.’

Respondents were asked ‘Is Ukraine a democracy?’ This is an easy question on the surface, and respondents replied ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or gave some other answer. (The meaning of democracy to the respondent is discussed below.) T12 displays the trend as a percentage of those replying ‘yes,’ that Ukraine is a democracy. The right-hand margin displays a scale of percent points to interpret the figure. As the line moves higher, the percentage of those who claim that Ukraine is a democracy increases. T12 is a relatively steady line (except for January 2000) where approximately 20% state that Ukraine is a democracy. The line is steady, decreasing just before the 1999 presidential elections. The IFES survey in January 2000 indicates that, after the November 1999 elections, there was an increase in the perception that Ukraine is a democracy, with the number of ‘yes’ responses rising to 31%. This effect seems to have worn off, and the line has dropped back down.

Respondents who replied that Ukraine ‘is not a democracy’ were then asked: ‘Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy or not?’ T13 displays the trend in the percentage of respondents that replied ‘yes, it is moving toward a democracy.’ The right-hand margin provides the percentage scale (Y2 axis) to interpret the figure.

All three trend lines are related and together present a clear picture. Events occurring between June 1999 and the new IFES survey in December 2000 are quite important. The June 1999 IFES survey finds that:

- 17% believe that Ukraine is a democracy.
- Of those who believe Ukraine is ‘not a democracy,’ only 24% believe Ukraine is becoming one.
- However, the opinion on average is that ‘political reforms are not happening fast enough.’

By January 2000, just after the presidential elections:

- More people now report ‘yes, Ukraine is a democracy’ (31%).
- Of those who believe Ukraine is ‘not a democracy,’ 35% now believe it is becoming one.
- Though the opinion remains that ‘political reforms are not happening fast enough,’ there is a slight decrease in the number that holds this opinion.

By December 2000, new data indicates that:

- The number who believes ‘yes,’ Ukraine is a democracy has fallen again to 22%.
- Of those who believe Ukraine is ‘not a democracy,’ now only 23% believe it is becoming one.
- The number that believes political reforms are ‘not happening fast enough’ picks up again, though remains below the 1999 high point.

The picture indicates a decline in the opinion among many that Ukraine is a democracy, and a corresponding decline in the opinion that it is becoming a democracy. Following the presidential election of 1999, more Ukrainians seemed to be optimistic about democracy in Ukraine. However, this upward push in opinions fell afterwards, and the number believing that political reform is not happening fast enough was again on the rise.

The Meaning of Democracy

In the West, we often assume that we share an understanding of the concept of democracy with the rest of the world. However, this understanding of democracy is often different from what citizens of the former Eastern Bloc might consider democracy. A new film recently released in Hungary portrays two villagers talking about democracy, and distinguishing what they once knew as ‘people’s democracy’ and today’s version as ‘democracy democracy.’ There is often confusion in these societies as to what the difference is between past and present usage.

The December 2000 survey followed up on this and asked respondents what they meant by the term. Respondents answered the question in their own words, and responses were thematically coded. Multiple responses were allowed and these results are presented in Figures 5, 6, and 7 on the following pages. Six main thematic categories may be formed from the responses. According to these categories, democracy is:

- Human rights (55%: free speech, opinion, press, political choice, religion)
- Legally defined (18%: rule of law, equality of all in front of the law, justice)
- Politically defined (13%: power of the people, public access to power, transparency in government)
- Economically defined (16%: material prosperity, social welfare)
- National Sovereignty (2%)
- Other miscellaneous definitions mentioned by few (1%)

Others stated that they did not know (23%) or did not answer the question (3%).

Democracy means different things to different people. Men were more likely to mention human rights in their definitions than women (62% versus 49%). Women are more likely to respond that they do not know (29% versus 15%). The use of a ‘human rights’ definition declines steadily with age, from 73% of the youngest age group to 37% of the oldest. ‘Do not know’ responses increase with age, from 16% up to 33% and decrease with level of education, from 40% of the lowest educational group to 10% of the highest. One out of four (24%) respondents in eastern Ukraine states that they ‘do not know.’ This compares to 19% in the west. These differences can be discerned in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Meaning of Democracy (in percent, n=1500)

	Human Rights	Legal	Political	Economic	Sovereignty	Other	DK	NA
Total	55	18	13	16	2	1	23	3
Gender								
Male	62	20	13	15	2	2	15	4
Female	49	16	13	16	2	1	29	2
Age								
18-24	73	22	12	16	3	1	16	1
25-34	66	20	14	13	1	0	19	4
35-44	55	15	16	15	1	2	23	1
45-54	51	20	15	17	2	2	18	5
55-64	51	20	9	15	4	3	26	2
65+	37	14	10	18	2	1	33	5
Education								
<Secondary	28	11	5	19	3	1	40	5
Secondary	62	18	12	16	2	1	21	3
Higher	59	26	23	13	1	2	10	2
Ethnicity								
Ukrainian	56	18	13	15	2	1	23	3
Russian	55	22	10	18	1	2	22	3
Other	44	10	21	15	1	2	25	2
Region								
Kiev	68	20	23	18	1	1	14	4
Northern	60	6	11	10		2	29	1
Central	45	17	9	12	2	2	32	1
Northeastern	53	30	5	13	1	2	19	7
Northwestern	52	17	11	12	5	1	26	3
Southeastern	55	26	21	19	1	1	19	5
Western	70	14	20	16	10	1	10	2
Southwestern	63	7	21	10	1		27	2
Southern	57	16	11	16		1	20	3
Crimea	43	14	12	11	2		35	
Eastern	47	22	7	25	0	2	24	5
East	52	20	10	17	1	2	24	3
West	61	14	18	14	5	1	19	2

In general, the use of economic definitions (16%) does not vary much throughout Ukrainian society, though it is slightly higher in the east than in the west. Political and legal definitions show a clear increase with education. A small minority equates democracy to national sovereignty (2%).

The table above provides some clue as to what is on the mind of the respondent when thinking about democracy. Figures 6 and 7 provide a partial answer to another question: what is the definition of democracy that the respondent is using when deciding whether Ukraine is or is not a democracy?

Figure 6. Assessment of Ukrainian Democracy by Definition of Democracy (row %, n=1,500)

DEFINITIONS GIVEN FOR MEANING OF DEMOCRACY (number of respondents who gave this definition)	IS UKRAINE A DEMOCRACY?			
	Yes	No	Other	DK
	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %
Human Rights (n=820)	34	55	2	10
Legal (n=273)	11	78	2	9
Political (n=193)	19	67	4	9
Economic (n=237)	10	76	1	12
Sovereignty (n=32)	78	16	3	1
DK (n=342)	13	48	1	38
NA (n=47)	9	64		28

Figure 6 illustrates how the definition of democracy is related to the respondent's opinion of whether or not Ukraine is a democracy. The definitions of democracy that were illustrated in the previous figure (Figure 5) are listed vertically along the left-hand margin of this table. Arranged horizontally along the top of the table are responses to the question: 'Is Ukraine a democracy?' Possible answers include 'yes,' 'no,' another response besides these, and 'do not know.' The percentages listed in Figure 6 indicate the opinions of respondents on Ukrainian democracy based on their definition of democracy. We will look at the row with the 'Human Rights' definition as an example. In total, 820 people gave a 'Human Rights' response when asked about the meaning of democracy. Of these 820 respondents (34%) believe that Ukraine is a democracy, 55% do not, 2% give another answer besides yes or no, and 10% 'do not know.' There are only a few respondents, 32, who define democracy as national sovereignty. Almost all of them think that Ukraine is a democracy 78%.

Of more interest is the range of opinion for those most critical of Ukrainian democracy. These are the respondents who do not think their country has a democratic political system. A majority of respondents who gave a legal definition for democracy do not believe that Ukraine meets that definition (78%). If we probe further into the legal definitions of democracy, we see other interesting patterns. Of the respondents who gave a legal definition for the meaning of democracy, 34 defined democracy in terms of 'justice.' None of them believe Ukraine is a democracy. Nearly all (83%) who define democracy as 'rule of law' state that Ukraine is not a democracy. Respondents who use a legal definition of democracy are the least likely to state that Ukraine is a democracy. As noted in Figure 5, respondents offering legal definitions generally have the highest levels of education as well.

Those who use economic definitions of democracy are also highly critical. On average, 76% of those using an economic definition do not think Ukraine is a democracy. Table 5 indicates that people from all education groups use economic definitions of democracy, those with lower levels slightly more so. Those who use a political definition are less likely to say Ukraine is not a democracy, followed by those using human rights as criteria for democracy.

The next figure, Figure 7, presents the same information in a different format. In this table, the focus is first on whether the respondent believes Ukraine is a democracy or not. For example, 886 respondents do not believe Ukraine is a democracy. Of these 886 respondents, 51% define democracy as human rights, 24% give a legal definition, and 15% give a political definition. (Note: The percentages in each column may add to more than 100% because respondents could give multiple meanings of democracy).

Figure 7. Definition of Democracy by Assessment of Ukrainian Democracy (column %, n=1,500)

DEFINITIONS GIVEN FOR MEANING OF DEMOCRACY	IS UKRAINE A DEMOCRACY (number of respondents who gave this answer)			
	Yes (n=326)	No (n=886)	Other (n=33)	DK (n=246)
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
Human Rights	85	51	53	31
Legal	9	24	19	9
Political	11	15	24	7
Economic	8	20	9	11
Sovereignty	8	1	3	1
Other	1	1	11	1
DK	14	18	15	51
NA	1	3		5

This table identifies several important findings:

- 51% of those who ‘do not know’ whether Ukraine is a democracy, also could not define the concept, again replying ‘do not know.’ Another 5% just did not answer the question.
- 18% of those who state that Ukraine is not a democracy, replied they ‘do not know’ when asked to define what democracy is. Another 3% did not answer the question.
- 14% of those who state that Ukraine is a democracy, replied they ‘do not know’ when asked to define the concept. Another 1% did not answer the question.

Future in Europe

In the December 2000 survey, respondents were asked their agreement with the following statement: ‘Ukraine’s best hopes for the future lie with joining Europe and the European Union.’ Agreement indicates support toward joining Europe; disagreement indicates lack of support. Answers to this question are reproduced in Figure 8. Results, overall, indicate that a slight majority favor future union with Europe (53% agree versus 26% who disagree). A large group (20%) is uncertain and those respondents indicate that they ‘do not know.’ Support for union with Europe is relatively soft. Most ‘supporters’ at best ‘somewhat agree’ with future union. Also, the large ‘do not know’ group is more similar in social-demographic characteristics to those who ‘disagree,’ and less resembles those who favor integration with Europe. The ‘do not know’ trend generally increases with age, decreases with a rise in social economic status, education, and size of the respondent’s community. Agreement declines with age: 65% of 18 – 25 year olds agree, 66% of 26 – 35 year olds, 63% of 36 – 45 year olds, 54% of 46 – 55 year olds and 35% of those over 56. Education and socio-economic status (SES) show similar patterns; as either one increases, so does agreement with the question. Of the 15 respondents classified as high SES by interviewers, all but one (‘don’t know’) agrees with European union. The difference between the moderate SES respondents (69%) and the low SES group (41%) is 28 percentage points (not displayed in table). The difference in levels of agreement between the highest and lowest educated respondents is 26 percentage points.

Figure 8. Membership in European Union (in percent, n=1500)

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK	NA
Total	20	33	16	10	20	1
Gender						
Male	25	34	16	10	14	1
Female	16	33	17	9	25	1
Age						
18-24	28	38	15	3	16	1
25-34	26	40	15	3	15	
35-44	27	34	17	7	15	1
45-54	16	39	14	12	17	1
55-64	13	25	24	15	22	0
65+	10	23	15	16	34	2
Education						
<Secondary	8	28	13	13	37	2
Secondary	22	35	17	8	18	1
Higher	27	33	19	12	8	1
Ethnicity						
Ukrainian	20	35	16	8	21	1
Russian	21	28	21	14	16	1
Other	21	34	13	12	19	1
Region						
Kiev	27	37	12	9	15	
Northern	17	28	14	6	35	1
Central	15	32	18	12	23	1
Northeastern	13	35	20	5	25	2
Northwestern	17	55	8	7	13	1
Southeastern	22	30	23	12	13	
Western	26	42	15	2	16	
Southwestern	39	36	5	6	14	1
Southern	20	23	18	16	21	2
Crimea	27	33	21	6	12	
Eastern	16	29	17	16	22	0
East	17	30	20	12	20	1
West	26	41	10	5	19	1

Regional distribution provides perhaps the most interesting set of findings. The highest levels of agreement with European union are in Kyiv (64%), the Northwestern Region (72%), the Western Region (68%), the Southwestern Region (75%) and Crimea (60%). Other regions exhibit between 15% - 20% lower levels of agreement. The strongest level of disagreement is found in the Southern region, where 16% strongly disagree, for a total level of disagreement of 34%. Overall, Ukrainians in the west are relatively pro-union with Europe (67% agreement versus 47% in the east and 45% in the intermediate areas).

Economic Change in Ukraine

The topic of economic change is perhaps foremost in the minds of Ukrainians. Figure 1 provides ample evidence to indicate that Ukrainians think the economic situation is terrible and of great concern. The December 2000 IFES survey asked respondents:

“Compared to ten years ago, do you think the percentage of poor people in Ukraine has increased, decreased, or stayed the same?”

Nearly everyone (95%) has the same opinion – the percentage of poor people in Ukraine has increased. There is little variation in this response by age, SES, ethnicity, education, or region. In the east of Ukraine, 96% give this answer. Only in the Northwestern Region does the percentage drop below 90% (89%).

More variation is seen in responses to the next question:

“Over the next ten years, do you think the percentage of poor people in Ukraine will increase, decrease, or stay the same?”

In total, 64% believe the percentage of poor people will ‘increase,’ 13% believe it will ‘stay the same,’ and 11% believe it will ‘decrease.’ The remaining 12% ‘don’t know.’ The percent that is optimistic (that there will be less poor) varies across social groups. Generally, the younger the respondent, the more optimistic the response: 14% of 18 – 25 year olds, 8% of 26 – 35 year olds, 11% of 36 – 45 year olds and 46 – 55 year olds, and 10% of those older than 55. Men are more optimistic about this than women (12% versus 9%). Optimism increases with SES and education, as expected. Those in the west are much more likely to be optimistic: 16% versus 8% in the east, and 7% in the intermediate areas.

IFES has asked a series of questions beginning in 1996 to assess support for a market economy in Ukraine. The following questions assess attitudes toward market economies:

Q# T5. When it comes to our economic future, should our country develop a market economy as quickly as possible, with steady but small reforms, or should we not pursue a free market economy at all?


Q# T6. Here you see a picture with a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely, centrally planned by the state. Where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?

Q# T8. In your opinion will be economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?

T6 assesses public support for a market economy in Ukraine. T5 assesses public perception of the rate of reform. T8 is included as a reference. Support for a market economy is affected by perceptions of current economic conditions, and optimism (or lack of it) about the future. This line may be disregarded for the present discussion. The ‘Do Not Know’ and ‘No Answer’ responses are omitted from these analyses because the averages (or means) are used.

The trend data for these questions is presented in Figure 9. The variables that reflect answers to these questions have all been recoded so that high values reflect support for a market economy. T5 uses the right-hand margin (Y2) axis and a high value means that reforms should happen ‘as soon as possible.’ T6 uses the left-hand margin (Y1) axis. The original question is recoded so that 5 = market economy, 3 = a point in-between market and centrally planned and 1 = a centrally controlled economy.

Figure 9. Support for Market Economy in Ukraine, Trend Analysis



The easiest way to interpret the figure is to look first at the horizontal line across the middle of the chart (running between the 3 value on the left-hand axis and 0 on the right-hand axis). This is the break-even point. This corresponds exactly to the midpoint for T6, the variable measuring whether Ukraine should opt for a market economy or central planning. The T6 trend line shows that support for a market economy was almost at the midpoint before the June 1998 survey (2.76), but then fell to a low in the June 1998 survey. Since then, support has slowly risen to the current high point (3.06). This is significant because it means that, for the first time in IFES surveys, more Ukrainians fall on the side of a market economy than a centrally planned economy. However, this support is fragile. In the present survey, 32% of respondents opted for a market economy while 26% opted for a centrally planned economy. A further 32% pick a point between these two options.

The trend for T6 parallels that for T5, the pace of economic reforms. Again, the horizontal line represents the midpoint for the T5 variable. A point on the horizontal line means that Ukraine should move toward a market economy with 'small but steady reforms.' A point above the horizontal line indicates support for faster movement toward a market economy, and a point below indicates support for a centrally planned economy. The May 1996 survey shows an average score above the zero line. The desire for a quicker rate of reform dropped steadily from 1996 to the June 1998 survey. After this point, the trend has again picked up, as more people believe that Ukraine 'should develop a market economy as quickly as possible.'


T8 provides a reference line for understanding these trends. T8 measures expectations about the economy in one year and is scored so that 0 = the economy will be the same, +1 = the economy will be better in one year and -1 means the economy will be worse. The variable reflecting the answers to this question uses the right-hand (Y2) axis. Any point above the 0 reference line means that more people believe the economy will be better. Points below the line mean more people believe the economy will be worse. The T8 trend line shows that most people have little optimism that the economy will be better in one year. Over time, the trend line moves toward the zero reference line, but there are several reversals on the way. The June 1999 IFES results indicate a low point, with the trend line exhibiting improvement prior to this period. Shortly after the 1999 Presidential election, optimism about the economy improves. The December 2000 survey, however, indicates that this optimism has fallen again. In the December 2000 survey, only 13% believe that the economy will be better in one year, while 35% believe that it will remain the same and 41% think it will get worse. Though optimism about the future of the economy has fallen and many people believe that there will be increased levels of poor people in Ukraine, support for a market economy remains on an upward trend for the present. Figure 10 presents two more trends on economic questions. The question wording is given below:

Q# T7. In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at the right pace?

Q# T10. In your opinion, how important are foreign investments to the economic recovery of our country?

T7 measures opinions on the pace of economic reforms in Ukraine. A high value indicates that reforms are happening 'too quickly' as far as the respondent is concerned. The scale for this variable is provided on the left-hand margin. T10 assess support for foreign investment. A high value on this variable indicates high levels of support for foreign investment.

Figure 10. Trend in Economic Attitudes Over Time




Over time, respondents increasingly perceive that economic reforms are not happening fast enough. There is a steady upward movement in this series. This corresponds with the T5 series in Figure 9 that shows an upward trend in the desire to move toward a market economy as ‘quickly as possible.’

The T10 series shows steady, albeit weak, support for foreign investment. In the December 2000 survey, 52% of respondents think that foreign investment is important for Ukraine’s economic recovery (20% very important, 32% somewhat important); 35% think that it is not important (18% not important at all, 17% somewhat unimportant); and 13% don’t know. The scale for T10, which represents support of foreign investment, has been reversed so that 4 = ‘very important’ and the ‘Do not know, Missing Answer’ category is deleted to calculate the mean (2.62). IFES did not include T10 in the June 1998 survey. The trend line implies that support for foreign investment fell between July 1997 and June 1999. This coincides with a deep economic crisis in Ukraine in August and September 1998 that was caused in part by the fall of the Russian economy and in part by mounting foreign debt. The Ukrainian government was unable to repay its bond obligations on time, and the Ukrainian currency (*hryvna*) lost value overnight. This situation did not stabilize until the winter of 1999. Coinciding with these events, there has been a steady trend upward in levels of support for foreign investment since June 1999.

Institutions Trusted to Resolve Economic Difficulties

In every IFES survey in Ukraine, respondents have been asked to name the institution they think is most likely to solve the economic problems facing Ukraine. Figure 11 presents data for this question over the last six surveys. For each year, the bars indicate the percentage of those who mentioned an institution as the one ‘most likely’ to ‘resolve the economic problems.’

Figure 11. Institution Most Likely to Solve Economic Problems (in percent)



Question: "Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the judiciary, and your local government. Which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year?"

The pattern that emerges here is an interaction between the expectation that the Executive Branch will fix the economy and the sense that 'none' of them will, or that the respondent 'does not know' or does not answer the question. Except for the May 1996 and January 2000 surveys, only about 20% believe that the Supreme Rada is most likely to solve Ukraine's economic problems.

As is clear in these analyses, many Ukrainians have been uncomfortable over the years about the movement toward a market economy. Studies in many countries that once had a controlled economy have shown that this is a common phenomenon. It is less well known just what people have in mind when they think of capitalism. This analyst has heard the opinion expressed by some Eastern Europeans that, 'what they told us about Communism was all lies, and what they told us about Capitalism was all true.' This was meant to be (partially) favorable toward capitalism. However, in this analyst's experience, many young entrepreneurs seem to hold a vision of capitalism and the market economy that better describes Mercantilism or the days of Robber Barons, rather than a modern market economy. That is, in their view, everything is permitted in Capitalism if it makes money, including degrading work conditions and consumer fraud. These practices are not widely accepted in Western economies.

Two questions were included in the December 2000 IFES survey as a partial gauge of what people believe a market economy is. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Q66. In the free market economy, buyers need to rely on themselves and not expect the government to protect them in transactions.

Q67. A little bit of cheating is a normal part of all business activity.

A majority (53%) agrees with Q66. Of these, 27% 'strongly agrees.' The opinion that one cannot expect the government to protect the consumer in a free market economy is common across all social groups in Ukraine. There is an east/west divide, with 47% agreeing in the east versus 59% in the west and 52% in the intermediate areas. The pattern for the second question is the mirror image; most (52%) disagree. Of these, 27% 'strongly disagree.' Women disagree more than men (55% versus 48%). In the east, 59% disagree, compared to 51% in the west and 42% in-between the two. These questions were exploratory in nature, and interpretation is difficult. Qualitative methods are more appropriate for gaining a better understanding of Ukrainians' view of the market economy. However, the majority of Ukrainians are against cheating in business.

IV. Attitudes toward the Current Situation


Satisfaction with the Overall Situation in Ukraine

Results from the December 2000 IFES document the overwhelming sense of dissatisfaction Ukrainians have with the way things are going in their country. December 2000 results show that 59% are ‘generally dissatisfied’ with the situation in Ukraine and another 33% are ‘somewhat dissatisfied.’ Combined, this gives an overall level of dissatisfaction that includes 9 out of 10 adults. Another 3% did not answer the question or ‘do not know.’ That leaves approximately 5% of adults reporting some level of satisfaction.

Because there are so few respondents who express this sentiment, it is interesting to note who the ‘satisfied’ respondents are. There is a slight tendency for younger respondents to report higher levels of satisfaction. The significant difference, however, is in the material well being of the respondent. Of those evaluated as moderate in SES, 10% report some satisfaction with the current situation. (There are too few cases classified as high SES; however, several of them are also satisfied.) Those in the west report higher levels of satisfaction as well (9% compared to 4% in the east and less than one percent in the intermediate areas.)

Almost everyone else is dissatisfied. Thinking back to Figure 1, the economic situation is the leading factor behind the negative attitudes. Figure 12, below, displays trends in satisfaction levels over time. An interpretation of this data suggests that dissatisfaction has become ingrained in the Ukrainian consciousness at this point in time. The total level of dissatisfaction has constantly stayed near and above the 90% level throughout the period covered by IFES surveys. There has been a gradual downward trend in the lowest level of satisfaction, beginning in July 1997 and bottoming out after the 1999 presidential election, but the percentage of those ‘very dissatisfied’ has started back up.

Figure 12. Dissatisfaction in Ukraine Over Time (in percent)



Total dissatisfaction remains relatively stable. The fall in percentage of those most dissatisfied mainly results in a corresponding increase in the percentage of those ‘somewhat dissatisfied,’ and vice versa. Over time, a majority (between 59% - 75%) stays ‘very dissatisfied,’ and approximately 25% - 35% express moderate levels of dissatisfaction. The small percentage of satisfied respondents fluctuates only slightly.

The View on Corruption

Figure 1, at the beginning of this document, provided some context for public dissatisfaction. To repeat, the main categories of ‘bad events’ happening in Ukraine over the previous decade include adverse economic change, crime, corruption, and decline in law and order. The effects of economic change have been discussed above. Crime was also discussed separately in the first section. Corruption is discussed next.

The opinion that corruption is a common and serious problem is a consensus across Ukraine and throughout time. The percentage of those saying that corruption is a common problem has stayed high in all IFES surveys: 87%


(1994), 84% (1996), 89% (1997), and 88% (1999). The December 2000 survey shows that 93% of adult Ukrainians claim that corruption is common in their society. Most of them (75%) believe it is ‘very common.’ Moving to the seriousness of corruption, high percentages have also thought of corruption as a serious problem: 89% in 1994, 88% in 1996, and 90% in 1997 and 1999. This year held the trend, with 96% believing that corruption is a serious problem (81% claim it is ‘very serious’).

These opinions do not vary much by age, gender, or education. While better-educated respondents are more likely to choose the extreme ‘very’ option and worse educated respondents are more likely to choose ‘somewhat,’ the net effect is similar. The most important variation appears to be regional rather than demographic. Respondents in the west are slightly less likely to state that corruption is *common*: 89% versus 95% in the east and 94% in the intermediate areas. The degree is less as well, with nearly 80% of respondents in the east and intermediate areas claiming that it is ‘very common,’ compared to only 66% in the west. Regardless, there is little variation in the perceived *severity* of the problem.

The numbers in the previous paragraph indicate that, since 1994, Ukrainians have constantly seen corruption as an extremely common and serious problem. The variations over time in these perceptions have never contradicted this thesis. Perceptions regarding the extent of corruption reached a relative low in the May 1996 survey, and, in the December 2000 survey, perceptions of the extent of corruption rose alongside an increased estimation of the seriousness of the problem. Historically, the perception that the problem is serious occurs more with rises in the perception that it is common. Declines in the ‘commonness’ of corruption bring relatively small drops in the perceived seriousness. This implies that a large decline in the extent of corruption (as perceived) may have relatively little effect on the perceived seriousness. This conclusion is mirrored in the December 2000 findings, discussed above, in that the perception of the extent of corruption varies across regions in Ukraine, but attitudes toward the seriousness of it do not.

Figure 13 displays answers to two questions asked several times by IFES. The white bar on the left hand side shows the percentage who believe that Ukrainians ‘accept corruption as a fact of life.’ The figure suggests that fewer Ukrainians over time are accepting corruption as a fact of life. The June 1999 survey found that 62% believe Ukrainians accepted the corruption of officials as a way of life. This had dropped after the 1999 presidential election, but rose again slightly in the December 2000 survey. Reflecting on the numbers reported a couple of paragraphs above, one can interpret that the rise in the perceived frequency and seriousness of corruption reported for December 2000 corresponds with an increase in the perception that Ukrainians accept this as a way of life.

Figure 13. Acceptance of Corruption and its Impact



Q. Do you think the citizens of Ukraine accept official corruption as a fact of life?

Q. [If Yes] And to what extent does this contribute to the problem of official (state) corruption? (Very much, Somewhat, Not very much, Not at all)

The gray bar on the right hand side of the figure represents the average response to the follow-on question listed below the chart. If the respondents answered that Ukrainians accept corruption as a fact of life, they were then asked how much this contributed to the problem of official corruption. The average response is given on a scale of 1 to 4. The higher the score, the more respondents believe that acceptance of corruption contributes to the problem of

official corruption. In every year, most people agreed that accepting corruption contributes to the problem (all means are above 3 and approach the maximum value of 4, 'a great deal'). The bar for the December 2000 survey indicates that there was a drop in this value from previous years to 3.26. It is difficult to interpret the drop in level. However, this value still means that most people who believe that Ukrainians accept corruption as a fact of life think that this attitude contributes to official corruption in Ukraine.

The Severity and Occurrence of Corrupt Acts

To ascertain the actions that Ukrainians consider corrupt, the December 2000 survey asked the following two questions about a series of supposedly 'corrupt' actions. The list of corrupt actions follows the two questions.

Q. Please tell me, for each of the following actions, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified. (A high value means the action can never be justified, maximum = 3)

Q. For each action, tell me if this activity occurs often here in Ukraine . . . Does it happen very often, sometimes, not very often, or never at all? (A high value means the action happens very often, maximum = 4)

- A. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to
- B. Cheating on tax if you had the chance
- C. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties
- D. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party
- E. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly
- F. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries
- G. High officials helping their associates in private business
- H. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

Of the actions listed, A, B and D are corrupt actions that anyone has the capacity to perform. Action C could be carried out by a wide range of people, including police officers, teachers, and government officials. E through H could be carried out by relatively higher-ranking public officials. Figure 14 presents the results for the two questions. 'Do not know' and "No answer" responses are not reported.

Figure 14. Occurrence of, and Justification for, Corrupt Actions (in percent, n=1500)

	How often does this action happen?		How often is it justified?		
	Often/ Sometimes	Not Very Often/Not At All	Always	Sometimes	Never
A. Claiming govt. benefits which you are not entitled to	78	12	6	27	60
B. Cheating on tax if you had the chance	87	6	8	38	48
C. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties	91	3	4	12	79
D. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party	71	12	3	9	80
E. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve business quickly	84	4	4	13	74
F. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries	86	18	3	5	86
G. High officials helping their associates in private business	88	3	4	16	72
H. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials	91	4	3	4	89

Given the view of most respondents that corruption is common in Ukraine, it is not surprising that more than 70% think that each of these corrupt actions takes place often or sometimes. Actually, for every action except for D, a majority of respondents say that it occurs ‘very often.’ But it is interesting to note that respondents say that actions C and E-H (all actions that would be undertaken by public officials) are ‘never’ justified to a greater extent than actions A and B (actions that any common citizen could initiate). It seems that Ukrainians are more tolerant of corrupt acts initiated by ordinary citizens than by public officials.

In the respondents’ opinion, actions E, F, G, and H are ‘less justified’ than actions ordinary citizens may undertake. This would be expected and understandable given that ‘benefiting from privatization,’ or ‘using public funds for personal use’ involve much higher sums of money and the consequences are more detrimental than other activities. Figure 14 implies that these two activities are the most serious of the items on the list. These two actions are ‘never’ thought of as justified by the highest percentage of respondents, and both are thought to be actions that occur with some of the highest rates of frequency.

To summarize the chart, we can see that actions A and B are the most permitted or justifiable actions. Most people believe that they cannot be justified, but they are more lenient toward them than they are toward corrupt acts committed by officials. Action D, accepting money to vote for a politician, is the one act ordinary citizens might do that few people could justify. Another interesting point is that action G (High officials helping their associates in private business) is thought to occur frequently, but is more justifiable than other actions such as taking a bribe.

Figure 14 implies that cheating on taxes occurs frequently and is somewhat justified in people’s opinions. These two opinions provide some basis for this behavior becoming normalized in everyday life. Over time, IFES has asked respondents to assess the extent that people rely on the ‘shadow economy,’ or unofficial market for goods and services. In many ways, this question mirrors the response to cheating on taxes. The December 2000 data show that 64% of respondents believe that people rely on the informal economy at least ‘a fair amount.’ Another 20% state that they ‘do not know.’ The trend in their response to this question has not varied much over time.

Confidence in Leadership and Institutions

IFES has asked respondents to rate the level of confidence they have in social institutions starting with its first survey in Ukraine in 1994. The December 2000 survey includes the following results. Two measures are given for rating confidence. The top score ('a great deal' of confidence) generally captures a low percentage in Ukraine because confidence levels are low, overall. The mean, or average score, is also used because it takes into account most of the respondents, excluding those who do not answer the question or 'do not know.' The mean score is used here as the standard to evaluate confidence across different institutions.

- Ukrainians have the highest level of confidence in the Church: 34% state they have a 'great amount' of confidence. The church also has the highest mean level of confidence [2.90].⁴
- Ukrainians report higher levels of confidence in Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko than President Leonid Kuchma: 12% report 'a great amount' of confidence in Yushchenko versus 8% for Kuchma and a mean of 2.28 versus 1.99.
- The Supreme Rada is rated lower than President Kuchma (3% with a 'great amount' of confidence, resulting in a mean of 1.91).
- Local government and Local Self-Government both rate higher levels of confidence than national levels: 6% and 4% 'a great amount,' respectively, and means of 2.08 and 2.06. While 4% do have 'a great amount' of confidence in the Council of Ministers, its overall confidence rating is lower, a mean of 1.98. The Presidential Administration has an average confidence rating of 1.90, and only 3% express 'a great deal' of confidence in this institution.
- The police forces also receive one of the lowest confidence ratings of those on the list: 5% reporting 'a great amount' of confidence and a mean of 1.87.

The complete results for this question are presented in Figure 15.

⁴ The mean is calculated as the average of 'none [1],' 'not very much [2],' 'fair amount [3],' and 'great amount [4].' The 'don't know' and no answer responses are eliminated. A high mean value indicates a high level of confidence.

Figure 15. Confidence in Institutions
Sorted in Descending Order by Mean Level of Confidence (n=1,500)

Institution	None	Not very much	Fair amount	Great amount	Don't Know	No answer	Mean Score
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Church	15.0	11.0	30.0	31.7	11.1	1.2	2.90
Military	12.0	11.8	42.5	23.6	9.4	0.7	2.87
State Security	17.1	16.9	33.2	12.5	19.5	0.8	2.52
Constitutional Court	18.0	22.4	28.6	11.0	19.1	0.9	2.41
Council for Security/Defense	18.0	19.6	33.2	7.9	20.5	0.8	2.39
Viktor Yushchenko	27.3	21.1	29.0	11.9	9.6	1.2	2.28
Public Prosecutors	28.8	28.0	24.6	6.7	11.5	0.5	2.10
Local Government	27.8	35.1	24.9	5.2	6.3	0.7	2.08
Local Self-Government	30.2	29.9	23.4	6.2	9.8	0.4	2.06
Courts	27.6	31.4	24.5	4.0	11.8	0.7	2.06
Leonid Kuchma	37.2	27.5	21.2	7.5	5.5	1.1	1.99
Council of Ministers	31.2	35.2	21.7	3.8	7.4	0.7	1.98
National Bank	32.4	24.7	19.6	5.3	17.3	0.8	1.97
Supreme Rada	32.9	39.4	18.0	3.3	5.9	0.5	1.91
Presidential Administration	33.4	33.8	19.1	2.8	10.1	0.8	1.90
Police	39.6	31.5	15.5	5.9	7.1	0.5	1.87

Figures 16-18 illustrate the trend over time in mean levels of confidence for these institutions. Not all institutions were included in each survey, and there are gaps in the trend. The gaps are indicated by an 'X.' The trend in confidence (mean level) is shown for President Kuchma and his administration in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Confidence Ratings, Trend Data, Part 1

Survey	President Kuchma	Executive Branch	Presidential Administration
May 1996	X	2.03	X
July 1997	2.02	1.93	1.85
June 1999	2.04	2.02	1.91
January 2000	2.54	2.47	2.30
December 2000	1.99	X	1.91

President Kuchma's confidence rating rose steadily until the 1999 Presidential Elections and reached a high point in January 2000. Since that time, his confidence rating has dropped to the lowest recorded level in any of the IFES surveys. The Executive Branch and Presidential Administration follow the same basic trend. The confidence rating for the Executive Branch and the Supreme Rada (given below) decreased between the May 1996 IFES survey and the next one in June 1997. Trends for appointed and representative government are listed in Figure 17.

Figure 17. Confidence Ratings, Trend Data, Part II

Survey	Supreme Rada	Council of Ministers	Local Government
May 1996	1.98	X	1.88
July 1997	1.74	1.72	1.85
June 1999	1.91	1.88	1.91
January 2000	1.95	2.28	2.12
December 2000	1.91	1.98	2.08

Confidence in the Supreme Rada declined after the May 1996 survey, but has generally been higher since July 1997. Where available, parallel trends are shown for the other governmental institutions. December 2000 results indicate an across-the-board decline in confidence in governmental institutions. Table 18 shows the mean trends for judicial institutions.

Figure 18. Confidence Ratings, Trend Data, Part III

Survey	Constitutional Court	Courts	Public Prosecutors	Police
January 1994	X	2.23	2.21	1.97
May 1996	X	2.08	2.06	1.79
July 1997	1.99	2.05	2.06	1.82
June 1999	2.38	2.24	2.24	1.88
January 2000	2.63	2.26	2.28	1.99
December 2000	2.41	2.06	2.10	1.87

Legal Protection from the State

In the December 2000 survey, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: ‘I trust the justice system to protect me from unjust treatment of the state.’ Responses to this question are presented in Figure 19. Only the most striking or significant differences are presented here.

Disagreement with this statement indicates that the respondent does not expect the legal system to protect individuals (in this case, the respondent) from unjust treatment. Overall, 76% disagree with this statement (combining the two categories, ‘somewhat’ and ‘strongly’ disagree). Disagreement increases with age, then declines among the oldest respondents. Among 18 – 25 year-olds, 72% hold this opinion, compared to 81% of those 26 – 45 and 46 – 55. Disagreement falls to 70% among the oldest (56 and above).

A similar pattern is observed among the different SES groups. Though there are too few for a reliable measure, only 64% of the highest observed SES group disagree that the legal system serves to protect individuals. Disagreement increases among the moderate SES respondents (75%) and the lower than moderate group (81%). Disagreement falls again among the lowest SES group (73%).

The perception that individuals may not be legally protected from unjust treatment by the state is held more by better-educated, urban respondents. With one exception (respondents from cities with populations between 20,00 – 49,999 [85%]), disagreement is higher in the largest cities and decreases as the size of the city shrinks. (Results not shown here.) Disagreement increases with education, starting at 68% among those with the lowest level of education, rising to 77% among those with secondary level diplomas, climbing slightly higher (79%) for those with specialized training, and reaching 79% among the most highly educated respondents.

Figure 19 also indicates that ethnic Russians and those from other ethnic backgrounds are much less convinced than ethnic Ukrainians that the legal system will protect them. Among Russians, 80% {235} disagree as do 82% {72} of other ethnic groups. Fewer ethnic Ukrainians hold this view (75% {836}). Most of the ‘other’ ethnic groups (51% {45}) ‘strongly disagree’ with the statement. The difference between those in the west and those in the east is also presented: 71% {327} disagree in the west versus 79% {545} in the east and 77% {360} in the intermediate area.

Figure 19. Protection from Unjust Treatment of the State (n=1,500)

	NA	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Total	0	4	11	36	40	8
<u>Gender</u>						
Male		4	11	34	43	7
Female	0	4	11	37	38	9
<u>Age</u>						
18-24		5	18	41	32	4
25-34		5	9	41	40	5
35-44		4	8	33	48	6
45-54		2	11	32	49	6
55-64	0	4	10	36	38	11
65+	1	4	14	33	33	16
<u>Education</u>						
<Secondary	1	3	12	29	40	16
Secondary		5	11	39	39	6
Higher		3	10	33	46	7
<u>Ethnicity</u>						
Ukrainian	0	5	12	36	39	9
Russian		3	10	37	43	6
Other	1	2	7	29	52	9
<u>Region</u>						
Kyiv		3	8	31	50	7
Northern		11	12	30	34	13
Central			5	46	36	13
Northeastern		6	15	28	47	5
Northwestern	1	2	19	46	27	4
Southeastern		3	7	33	51	6
Western	1	1	22	37	32	8
Southwestern		8	12	33	39	8
Southern	1	9	11	30	40	10
Crimea			14	37	43	6
Eastern		4	7	38	44	7
East	0	4	9	36	43	9
West	0	5	17	36	35	7

V. Civic Action, Participation and Sources of Information

A. Individual Action

These next pages cover attitudes toward voting, interest in political issues and willingness to discuss politics (Political Attitudes), approval of various politically motivated behaviors (Political Action), and motivation to participate in the upcoming elections for Supreme Rada in 2002.

Attitudes toward Politics

Results from the December 2000 survey reflect a generally negative view of politics in Ukraine. Ukrainians are convinced that they have little influence on decisions in Ukraine, and are not convinced that they can change this through the electoral process. Overall, results indicate that:

- 62% at least ‘somewhat disagree’ with the statement: “Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country.” Of these, 33% {492} ‘strongly disagree’ with this statement.
- 80% at least ‘somewhat agree’ with the statement: “People like me have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine.” Of these, 52% {784} ‘strongly agree’ with this statement.
- 76% at least ‘somewhat agree’ with the statement: “Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like me can’t understand what’s really happening.” Of these, 44% {659} ‘strongly agree.’

Most Ukrainians feel alienated by the complexity and insularity of their political system. At the same time, many state they are interested in politics. Overall, 65% are at least ‘somewhat interested,’ and only 11% state they are ‘not at all interested.’ The picture presented in these data is of a public that is concerned enough about political events to maintain a high level of interest, but does not feel it has the means to act upon this interest. Added to this is a very low level of belief that Ukrainians can change or influence what is happening in the political life of their country.

Figure 20 presents data on these variables over time. All questions are assumed to provide an underlying scale that measures the extent that participants agree with the statement. For trend questions T14, T15, and T16, the highest value [5] indicates the highest level of agreement with the question (‘strongly agree’).⁵ For trend question T1, the highest value [4] indicates a high level of interest in politics (‘very interested’). The question wording and labels for Figure 20 are given below:

Q# T1. How interested are you in matters of politics and government? [4 = very interested]

Q# T14. Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country. [5 = completely agree]

Q# T15. Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can’t understand what’s really happening. [5 = completely agree]

Q# T16. People like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine. [5 = completely agree]

⁵ T14, T15, and T16 use a five-point scale in order to integrate data from previous surveys that allowed a middle category ‘neither agree or disagree,’ that is scored = 3.




Figure 20 presents the trend in mean or average response to these four questions. The left-hand margin (Y1) provides a four-point scale for T1, Interest in Politics. A high value on this scale indicates high levels of interest. The right-hand margin provides a five-point scale for questions T14, T15, and T16. High values on this scale indicate high levels of agreement with the statement.

Public perceptions that ordinary citizens have ‘no influence’ on the way things are run in Ukraine (T16) and that politics is too complicated (T15) show a steady increase over time. At the same time, the perception that “voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making” shows a decline in December 2000, reversing a steady increase over previous surveys. These all indicate alienation—that people feel a distance between them and their leaders.

The parallel trend for Interest in Politics (T1) is seemingly inconsistent with the other data for this category. June 1998 and June 1999 surveys indicate that interest in politics was declining. This trend reversed by January 2000 and December 2000 data, which indicates that interest has increased, even though Ukrainians feel they have little influence.

December 2000 results show that:

- 18% {267} are ‘very interested’ in politics
- 47% {706} are ‘somewhat interested’ in politics
- 23% {344} are ‘not too interested’ in politics
- 11% {166} are ‘not at all interested’ in politics.

Overall, 65% are at least ‘somewhat interested,’ compared to 34% who are not. IFES also included two additional questions relevant to this:

Q. When you meet your friends, do you talk about politics?

Q. When you yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives, or colleagues to share your views?

Most respondents (58%) discuss politics at least ‘sometimes.’ Of these, one out of four discuss politics often. Forty-two percent ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ discuss political issues. Interest in politics and the desire to discuss political issues increases with age, with younger respondents exhibiting less interest and less willingness to discuss politics.

Respondents are unlikely to try to persuade others when they hold strong opinions. Overall, 30% state they ‘never’ persuade others, and another 17% state they ‘rarely’ do. Only 16% ‘often’ persuade others when they hold a strong view. The perception that one might try to persuade others increases steadily with education. Twenty-one percent of respondents with a higher education claim that they persuade others, compared to 17% of those with specialized training. This percentage decreases further among those with lower levels of education. Those in the youngest age group (18 – 24) are also more likely to attempt persuading others in their own self-assessment. Twenty-two percent of the youngest respondents gave this response, compared to 16% of those 36 – 45 years of age. The percentages are lower than this for other age groups.

Two other questions from the December 2000 survey are relevant here. Respondents were given a 10-point scale on which to indicate their position between two contrasting statements:

Q. One should be cautious about making major changes in life . . . You will never achieve much unless you act boldly.

Q. Ideas that have stood the test of time are generally best . . . new ideas are generally better than old ones.

Results from these two questions give reason for concern for those promoting social change in Ukraine. On one hand, there is support for ‘bold’ versus ‘cautious’ change:

- 13% favor positions advocating the most ‘cautious’ approach to change [1 & 2 on the scale].
- 24% moderately favor ‘cautious’ action [points 3 – 5 on the scale].
- 31% moderately favor ‘bold’ action [points 6 – 8].
- 26% favor positions advocating the most ‘bold’ approach to change [9 & 10 on the scale].

As indicated, more favor ‘bold’ versus ‘cautious’ action (55% versus 37%), and, of these, more than one out of five favor the boldest approach to change. As expected, a higher percentage of young respondents favor ‘bold’ over ‘cautious’ change (48% of 18 – 25 year olds, 33% of 26 – 35 year olds, 27% 36 – 45, 28% 46 – 55, and 21% of those 55 and older). There is not a clear difference between those in the west of Ukraine versus those in the east, though those in the ‘intermediate’ area are the least likely to favor ‘bold’ action (22%). It is interesting that ethnic Russians are more supportive of a ‘bold’ approach to change, 31%, versus 24% of ethnic Ukrainians and 29% of respondents from ‘other’ ethnic groups. A ‘bold’ approach to change is more popular with the better educated as well, with 31% of those with advanced levels favoring this approach in comparison to 26% of those in the lowest educational group.

Concern arises in relation to responses to the second question: the desired direction for this change. These data indicate that:

- 21% strongly favor ‘old ideas’ [1 & 2 on the scale].
- 36% moderately favor ‘old ideas’ [points 3, 4, 5 on the scale].
- 25% moderately favor ‘new ideas’ [points 6, 7, 8 on the scale].
- 11% strongly favor ‘new ideas’ [9 & 10].

While ‘bold’ approaches to change are seen as favorable to ‘cautious’ approaches, ‘old ideas’ are clearly preferred to ‘new ideas’ (57% versus 36%). Of these, one out of four strongly favor ‘old ideas.’ Younger respondents strongly favor newer ideas: from 17% of 18 – 25 year olds and 16% of 26 – 35 year olds down to 9% and 10% of the older respondents. Neither material wealth nor SES provides a clear pattern for these responses; nor does level of

education. In the east, 11% favor ‘newer ideas,’ versus 15% in the west and only 5% in-between east and west. Crossing the two responses provides the following groups:

Figure 21. Crosstab of Bold/Cautious Action with Old/New Ideas (n=1,500)

	Old	Moderate Old	Moderate New	New	Total
Cautious	[1] 8%	[1] 3%	[2] 1%	[2] 2%	14%
Moderate Cautious	[1] 5%	[1] 16%	[2] 4%	[2] <1%	26%
Moderate Bold	[3] 2%	[3] 13%	[4] 15%	[4] 2%	33%
Bold	[3] 8%	[3] 6%	[4] 6%	[4] 8%	28%
Total	23%	38%	27%	12%	100%*

*‘Do not know’ and no answer responses are dropped from this analysis.

Category [1] (32%): Respondents who favor ‘old’ rather than ‘new ideas,’ and ‘cautious’ rather than ‘bold’ action

Category [2] (11%): Respondents who favor ‘new’ rather than ‘old’ ideas,’ and ‘cautious’ rather than ‘bold’ action

Category [3] (29%): Respondents who favor ‘old’ rather than ‘new’ ideas,’ and ‘bold’ rather than cautious’ action

Category [4] (31%): Respondents who favor ‘new’ rather than ‘old’ ideas,’ and ‘bold’ rather than ‘cautious’ action

It will be interesting to follow this as Ukraine prepares for the upcoming elections for the Supreme Rada in 2002.

Political Action

Respondents were asked for their approval of a list of political actions that ‘people sometimes take to make their own views publicly known and to influence others.’ For each action, the respondent was to indicate their approval, disapproval, or mixed approval. Table 22 (A & B) gives the overall means and frequencies for each action.⁶

⁶ The means are calculated: ‘Approve’ = 3, ‘Approve Somewhat’ = 2, ‘Disapprove’ = 1. ‘Do not know’ and no answer responses are eliminated for the average.

Figure 22A. Attitudes toward Civic Actions
 (Means sorted in descending order, n=1,500)

	GENDER			AGE						EDUCATION		
	Total	male	female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	<secondary	secondary	Higher
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Writing	2.50	2.43	2.56	2.36	2.50	2.45	2.46	2.60	2.59	2.56	2.48	2.51
Petition	2.47	2.43	2.50	2.43	2.49	2.45	2.43	2.55	2.47	2.50	2.46	2.48
Meeting	2.33	2.32	2.34	2.25	2.30	2.26	2.34	2.41	2.45	2.40	2.33	2.27
Contacting	2.29	2.24	2.33	2.18	2.25	2.22	2.31	2.36	2.40	2.35	2.27	2.28
Protest	2.23	2.26	2.20	2.20	2.18	2.16	2.28	2.32	2.26	2.24	2.24	2.18
Joining group	2.12	2.15	2.08	2.20	2.20	2.05	2.14	2.09	2.02	1.98	2.14	2.15
Boycott	1.85	1.93	1.78	1.92	1.79	1.87	1.85	1.91	1.78	1.85	1.84	1.87
Strike	1.62	1.67	1.59	1.60	1.62	1.62	1.64	1.69	1.58	1.66	1.63	1.57
Refusing taxes	1.52	1.53	1.50	1.56	1.45	1.59	1.55	1.53	1.44	1.51	1.52	1.51
Blocking traffic	1.40	1.44	1.37	1.44	1.37	1.43	1.40	1.43	1.38	1.44	1.41	1.36
Occupying	1.20	1.26	1.15	1.24	1.16	1.26	1.22	1.18	1.17	1.22	1.23	1.11

Table 22A presents the average (mean) level of approval for each activity, ranked in descending order. There is a high level of approval for writing letters to officials, circulating petitions, attending public meetings, and contacting officials. More people ‘approve’ of these actions than ‘disapprove’ (mean > 2). These may be termed relatively passive activities in comparison to others on the list. Table 22A shows that women approve of these activities at higher levels than men. Older respondents approve more of these activities than younger respondents. For these four ‘passive’ activities, respondents with the lowest and highest levels of education are more approving than those with intermediate levels (including specialized training). Table 22B presents the same information, but includes only the percent that ‘approve’ of these activities. [The middle category, ‘approve somewhat’ is included when calculating the mean (22A) but left out of the percentage (22B).]

The remaining seven activities are much more active in nature. Fewer people ‘approve’ of these actions. ‘Protest’ is approved by 44%, in total, with a rating of 2.2 (this compares to 2.5 for ‘writing letters’). ‘Occupying a building or property in protest’ is approved by only 5%, with a rating of 1.2.

The response by age is different than what might be expected in Western democracies. In general, the youngest respondents are less likely to ‘approve’ of ‘strikes’ than those 25 – 24 years of age. Those 35 – 44 years of age exhibit higher approval levels for many of the active political acts than either the 25 – 34 year olds or the youngest respondents. Respondents 45 – 54 years of age are the most approving of ‘contacting a politician,’ ‘protesting,’ ‘boycotts,’ or ‘strikes’ compared to respondents in any other age group. This is not what one sees when looking at survey data from Western democracies.

Figure 22B. Attitudes toward Civic Actions
 (% ‘Approval,’ n=1,500)

	Total	male	female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	<secondary	secondary	higher
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Writing	60	56	62	55	56	59	57	67	64	61	59	61
Petition	57	55	58	52	57	57	57	61	55	54	56	60
Meeting	48	48	49	45	46	46	47	53	52	48	50	43
Contacting	47	45	48	42	43	45	48	51	51	47	46	49
Protest	42	45	40	40	38	41	44	47	43	41	43	40
Joining group	33	35	31	38	37	31	34	30	28	23	36	33
Boycott	24	28	22	27	21	28	25	26	21	22	25	24
Strike	15	16	15	14	17	15	15	18	12	14	16	14
Refusing taxes	12	13	11	14	8	17	12	12	9	11	12	14
Blocking traffic	10	12	9	11	9	13	11	10	7	9	11	9
Occupying	5	7	3	6	4	7	5	3	3	4	6	3

The December 2000 survey included the question: 'If the elected mayor or village/settlement chair in your settlement was recalled and another person appointed by a high official to replace him or her, what would your reaction be?' Answers were open in format and responses were thematically coded.

The question presents a scenario that has actually occurred in Ukraine. In several communities the elected representative has been replaced by another person more acceptable to higher-level officials. This action moves clearly against the intent of democratic governance, and the responses provide some indication of respondents' desire to protect their right to choose their representatives.

December 2000 data shows that:

- 25% would 'do nothing, because it is none of your concern.'
- 34% would 'do nothing, because it is useless to complain.'
- 5% would 'complain, but nothing else.'
- 4% would 'publicly protest.'
- 6% stated that 'such things do not happen' in Ukraine.
- 17% stated that 'it depended upon whether there was a good reason' for recalling the elected representative.

The general response given by most people (approximately 58%) regardless of age was that they would 'do nothing,' either because it was not their concern or because they perceived the effort as useless. Overt political actions, approved more by older than younger respondents, do not seem to apply to this scenario.

Electoral Action

Most people expect to vote in the 2002 elections for Supreme Rada (75%). Of these, 46% are 'very likely' to vote. Twenty percent state they are less likely to vote, and, of these, 9% are 'very unlikely.' Another 6% either 'do not know' or did not answer the question. The least likely to vote, in their own assessment, are those 26 – 35 years of age (24%), followed by the youngest respondents (22%).

At this point in time, respondents believe the following parties best represent their views and interests:

- No one (30%)
- The Communist Party of Ukraine (P. Symonenko) (18%)
- 'Do not know' (15%)
- People's Rukh of Ukraine (G. Udovenko) (5%)
- People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (V. Pustovitenko) (4%)
- Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) (V. Medvedcuk) (4%)
- Socialist Party of Ukraine (A. Moros) (4%)

A full set of responses to this question is available through IFES.

The December 2000 survey also asked respondents to list the issues that they expect their elected officials to work on once they are elected. December results reflect the greatest concerns of respondents. The question was asked in an open format, and respondents could mention several issues. Responses were then thematically coded:

Economic Issues:

- Raise the standard of living and the amount workers receive in their pay envelopes (30%)
- Economic development (16%)
- Resolve unemployment and underemployment (15%)
- Job security and creation of opportunities to work (10%)
- Better pensions (6%)
- Payment of wage and pension arrears (4%)

- Lower price level (3%)

Law and Order:

- Law and Order (8%)
- Eliminate crime and corruption (5%)

Social Services:

- Free access to public services (10%)
- Decreased fees for community services (3%)

Many stated they ‘Did not know’ (18%). ‘Agricultural reform’ was mentioned by 33 persons (2%).

Overall, most Ukrainians do not think that the upcoming 2002 elections will be fair. In total, 50% believe it is ‘somewhat unlikely’ that these elections will be fair, and an additional 21% believe it is ‘very unlikely’ that they will be fair. This means that a total of 71% believe these elections will not be fair. Only 2% believe it is ‘very likely’ that they will be fair.

Support for Human Rights

IFES has asked respondents to rate the importance of human rights in nearly all of the surveys carried out in Ukraine. The list of rights included in the survey follows:

- One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting
- Honest elections are held regularly
- The rights of minority ethnic groups are protected
- All can freely practice the religion of one’s choice
- All can form associations or unions without any government involvement

IFES surveys ask respondents to rate the importance of each right, whether it is ‘very important,’ ‘somewhat important,’ ‘not very important,’ or ‘not at all important.’ This response forms a scale and can be reordered so that a high value on this scale (4) indicates a high degree of importance attributed to that right.

**Figure 23. Importance of Human Right, % ‘Most Important’
 Trend Data: 1996-2000**

	December 2000 (n=1500)	January 2000 (n=1484)	June 1999 (n=1484)	July 1997 (n=1484)	May 1996 (n=1544)
	%	%	%	%	%
Private property	65	61	55	77	69
Honest elections	54	59	50	64	60
Freedom of religion	54	56	46	60	57
Minority rights	41	43	36	39	47
Free speech	37	39	35	58	50
Choice of parties	36	45	39	38	30
Freedom of association	25	25	23	23	29
Freedom to form parties	21	23	23	22	27

Figure 23 provides some figures illustrating the importance attached to these rights over time. The table lists the percentage of respondents over the course of the IFES surveys who say that a particular right is ‘very important.’ The rights are then sorted and listed in descending order based upon their score in the December 2000 survey. Figure 23 shows that ‘Private property’ is listed as ‘very important’ more often than any other item. December 2000 data shows that 65% of respondents gave this right the highest rating. Next, ‘Honest elections’ and ‘Freedom of religion’ are both ‘very important’ to 54%. These are followed by ‘Minority rights’ (41%), ‘Free speech’ (37%),

'Choice of parties' (36%), 'Freedom of association' (25%) and 'Freedom to form parties' (21%). This pattern has remained stable over time, with the following exceptions:

- The right to a 'Choice of parties' was rated higher in the past. The January 2000 and June 1999 surveys would have placed this right fourth on the list, rather than sixth. Fewer respondents are now rating this right as 'very important.'
- The right to 'Free speech' was rated higher in the July 1997 and May 1996 surveys. For both, 'Free speech' would have placed fourth, rather than fifth.

Figure 24 presents averages for each right as rated by different groups in society. Over time, women have consistently placed more importance on 'Freedom of religion' than men. Men have placed greater importance on all of the other rights on the list. This general pattern was different in the recent December 2000 data. For the first time in this series, women placed more importance on 'Minority rights,' 'Private property' and 'Free speech' than did men. The importance of all rights increases with the level of education of the respondent.

The importance of rights generally follows a curvilinear pattern with age. The youngest age group (18 – 24) places less importance on rights than those 25 – 34. Ratings fall after this group to a low with the oldest respondents. Those 25 – 34 have generally placed a high value on 'Freedom of association' and 'Freedom to form parties.' In recent surveys, the 18 – 24 age group has placed high levels of importance on 'Private property.'

Figure 24. Importance of Human Rights, Means (Trend Data: 1996-2000)

	Gender			Age						Education		
	Total	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	<Secondary	Secondary	Higher
May 1996												
Private property	3.68	3.70	3.66	3.76	3.75	3.72	3.68	3.64	3.53	3.57	3.72	3.81
Honest elections	3.52	3.55	3.49	3.42	3.57	3.52	3.54	3.48	3.53	3.48	3.50	3.71
Freedom religion	3.47	3.44	3.50	3.37	3.48	3.50	3.56	3.47	3.43	3.53	3.43	3.52
Minority rights	3.37	3.41	3.35	3.37	3.41	3.33	3.42	3.31	3.39	3.35	3.36	3.52
Free speech	3.37	3.47	3.29	3.36	3.44	3.39	3.39	3.25	3.34	3.30	3.40	3.44
Freedom association	2.93	3.04	2.84	2.96	2.95	3.00	2.95	2.90	2.79	2.85	2.94	3.14
Choice of parties	2.90	2.99	2.83	3.01	3.01	3.02	2.91	2.68	2.70	2.66	2.94	3.42
Free to form parties	2.84	2.95	2.74	2.91	2.92	3.01	2.79	2.58	2.71	2.67	2.88	3.14
June 1998												
Private property	3.74	3.79	3.70	3.76	3.75	3.82	3.75	3.68	3.66	3.70	3.77	3.74
Honest elections	3.54	3.58	3.50	3.46	3.45	3.55	3.54	3.65	3.55	3.52	3.52	3.67
Freedom religion	3.46	3.43	3.48	3.38	3.48	3.40	3.49	3.50	3.49	3.51	3.43	3.43
Free speech	3.45	3.56	3.36	3.53	3.37	3.54	3.40	3.53	3.37	3.45	3.45	3.47
Minority rights	3.08	3.09	3.08	2.94	2.95	2.99	3.21	3.29	3.15	3.15	3.03	3.13
Choice of parties	3.02	3.09	2.95	3.10	2.87	3.14	3.06	3.06	2.90	2.95	3.02	3.22
Freedom association	2.67	2.75	2.60	2.75	2.65	2.71	2.70	2.67	2.54	2.54	2.72	2.77
Free to form parties	2.58	2.75	2.44	2.75	2.48	2.59	2.64	2.70	2.40	2.44	2.61	2.84
June 1999												
Private property	3.51	3.54	3.47	3.62	3.54	3.53	3.53	3.46	3.36	3.43	3.53	3.65
Honest elections	3.43	3.45	3.41	3.48	3.42	3.43	3.46	3.40	3.39	3.40	3.42	3.54
Freedom religion	3.34	3.32	3.35	3.32	3.35	3.28	3.33	3.36	3.37	3.34	3.32	3.41
Choice of parties	3.19	3.25	3.15	3.18	3.23	3.21	3.15	3.20	3.18	3.13	3.21	3.33
Minority rights	3.19	3.20	3.18	3.19	3.21	3.13	3.25	3.12	3.23	3.14	3.19	3.31
Free speech	3.07	3.13	3.01	3.00	3.13	3.15	3.11	3.08	2.87	3.01	3.10	3.13
Freedom association	2.72	2.81	2.65	2.84	2.91	2.77	2.59	2.56	2.60	2.60	2.75	2.97
Free to form parties	2.67	2.74	2.62	2.79	2.71	2.77	2.67	2.59	2.50	2.57	2.70	2.89
December 1999												
Private property	3.59	3.61	3.57	3.57	3.66	3.68	3.62	3.59	3.37	3.49	3.63	3.69
Honest elections	3.55	3.58	3.53	3.47	3.59	3.60	3.57	3.57	3.49	3.50	3.56	3.66
Freedom religion	3.44	3.41	3.47	3.39	3.42	3.47	3.45	3.45	3.48	3.45	3.43	3.49
Choice of parties	3.32	3.36	3.29	3.28	3.36	3.44	3.32	3.33	3.19	3.21	3.34	3.58
Minority rights	3.28	3.28	3.28	3.23	3.31	3.31	3.32	3.31	3.15	3.21	3.29	3.42
Free speech	3.13	3.18	3.09	3.12	3.20	3.15	3.16	3.13	2.98	3.04	3.15	3.27
Freedom association	2.70	2.74	2.66	2.82	2.73	2.69	2.69	2.75	2.52	2.58	2.71	2.97
Free to form parties	2.67	2.73	2.62	2.84	2.68	2.76	2.64	2.73	2.40	2.53	2.68	3.05
December 2000												
Private property	3.58	3.54	3.62	3.66	3.58	3.71	3.61	3.51	3.42	3.36	3.61	3.71
Honest elections	3.43	3.43	3.43	3.52	3.28	3.43	3.46	3.45	3.49	3.41	3.41	3.53
Freedom religion	3.39	3.33	3.44	3.37	3.38	3.39	3.44	3.41	3.34	3.29	3.40	3.44
Minority rights	3.19	3.16	3.22	3.19	3.11	3.21	3.21	3.24	3.21	3.06	3.17	3.39
Free speech	3.08	3.06	3.10	3.40	3.00	3.15	3.01	3.02	3.00	2.94	3.07	3.25
Choice of parties	3.01	3.03	3.00	2.94	3.02	3.14	3.12	2.89	2.89	2.81	3.02	3.18
Freedom association	2.72	2.77	2.68	2.87	2.70	2.79	2.74	2.57	2.66	2.43	2.75	2.89
Free to form parties	2.61	2.66	2.56	2.64	2.61	2.63	2.73	2.53	2.47	2.31	2.64	2.76

B. Institutional Action

This area covers the experience people have in contacting their political leaders, Ukrainians' involvement and attitudes toward political parties and non-governmental organizations, and political information and the media.

Government

The December 2000 survey included a series of questions about citizen contact with government officials. Respondents were asked:

Q. Have you ever contacted your elected officials before to solve a problem in your life?

Q. Have you ever contacted an appointed official before?

Respondents who had contacted an official, elected or appointed, were then asked different questions about the level of official they contacted, how they had contacted that official, and the response they received from the official.

Figure 25 summarizes the process of contacting elected and appointed officials. One side of the table lays out the views of respondents who tried to contact elected officials. The right side of the table contains responses about appointed officials. Respondents were not asked as many follow-up questions about appointed officials as they were about elected officials.

Figure 25. Contact with Elected and Appointed Officials (n=1,500)

Elected Officials		Appointed Officials	
24% contacted an Elected Official		17% contacted an Appointed Official	
Specific Official Contacted (n=352)		Specific Official Contacted (n=260)	
Village/Settlement Chairman	43%	Local Executive Bodies	88%
City Chairman (Mayor)	21%	Oblast-level Executive Bodies	12%
City Rada Deputy	12%	Central Executive Bodies	2%
Village/Settlement Rada Deputy	7%		
People's Deputy of Ukraine	7%		
Rayon Rada Deputy	6%		
Other officials	9%		
Form of Contact (n=352)			
Personal Meeting	78%		
Letter	21%		
Through Someone Else	3%		
Telephone	3%		
'Did Elected Official Respond?' (n=352)			
Yes	73%		
Partially	12%		
No	15%		
'Were You Satisfied With Response?' (n=298)			
Completely Satisfied	20%		
Somewhat Satisfied	29%		
Somewhat Dissatisfied	15%		
Completely Dissatisfied	35%		

Overall, 24% state they have contacted an elected official before to help solve a problem in their lives. Usually, contact was made with the chair of the village or settlement (43% of those contacting an elected official). The city chairman or mayor was contacted half as frequently, by 21% of those contacting elected officials. Relatively few attempts were made to contact other elected officials.

Personal meetings are the most frequent form of contact with elected officials (78% of those contacting elected officials). Letter writing was mentioned by 21%. Other types of contact are rarely used, such as approaching an elected official through someone else or calling that official on the telephone. Because personal meetings are used,

most of the attempts resulted in a response from the official (73%). Another 12% state that they had a partial response, while 15% claim they received no response from that official.

The contact and response portion of the process seems to proceed well enough. Only a minority (one out of four) of adult Ukrainians has attempted to contact an elected official, but most of them have arranged personal meetings with that official. This contact is usually with the village or settlement chair and, to a lesser extent, the city chair or mayor. At this point, the process appears to derail. Of those who received a response {298}, 50% were dissatisfied with the response they received. Most of them (35% of the 298 receiving a response) were 'completely dissatisfied.' A nearly equal amount reports satisfaction with the response they received (49% of 298). Of these, 20% were 'completely satisfied.'

Approximately one out of every six adult Ukrainians (17% of 260) has contacted an appointed official to help resolve a problem in their lives. Nearly all of these contacts were with local executive bodies (88% of 260). Fewer people have gone further to the oblast level or beyond with their problem.

Respondents to the survey were also asked whether government officials ever take steps to ask their opinion on important issues. The text of the question was as follows:

Q. Here is a list of some ways that city or village government officials can ask your opinion on issues or about problems that concern you. Which of these have happened to you?

Among the choices given were questionnaires, attending a public hearing, or participation in an advisory group. Eighty-six percent of respondents had never been approached by government officials for their opinions and small minorities were asked to attend public meetings (6%), complete a questionnaire (4%), or participate in advisory groups (2%). These figures suggest that the process goes in one direction.

Political Parties

Figure 26 presents data on attitudes toward political parties over time. Many IFES surveys have included three questions on this topic:

Q# T17. Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy?

Q# T18. How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in elections? [4 = very important]

Q# T19. Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine?

T17 and T19 represent the percentage in each year that answered 'yes' to these questions. The right-hand margin provides the scale needed to interpret these lines. T18 uses a four-point scale, in which a high value indicates that a multi-party system is 'very important' to the respondent. The average (mean) is taken, and 'do not know' and did not answer responses are eliminated from the analysis. The horizontal line between 2.5 on the left and 50% on the right provides a reference line. Any point above this line indicates either increased importance for two political parties or that more than 50% agree with statements that generally view political parties in a favorable light.

**Figure 26. Attitudes toward Political Parties
 Trend Analysis, 1994 – 2000**




Figure 26 presents a mixed picture of the role of political parties in Ukraine. In July 1997, slightly more than half (58%) stated, 'yes,' political parties are important for democracy. This declined in June 1998 and has increased steadily since then, reaching 62% in December 2000. This is good news. On the other hand, the overall importance of having 'at least two parties' competing in an election has declined in the December 2000 survey. At the same time, only 30% believe that there are clear differences between the different parties or political blocs.

The December 2000 data shows that:

- 62% believe that political parties are 'necessary' for democracy, 18% do not.
- 64% believe that political parties are at least 'fairly important' for democracy and of these 21% say they are 'very important.'
- 51% state there are 'not clear differences' between the parties or blocs.

At the same time, very few people are members of parties (2%). The December survey asked what reasons would be 'important enough' for the respondent to join a political party. The question used an open format, and respondents could mention more than one answer. Responses were then thematically coded.

Many respondents claim they would have 'no reason' to join a party (32%). Others claimed they 'did not know' what would be an important enough reason to join (35%).

The most important reasons that would motivate someone to join a political party include:

- To help ordinary people (5%), and
- If the party had real activities and achieved positive results (8%).

No other reason emerged with more than a 3% response rate. This implies that political parties are not held in high esteem by respondents, though many do believe they are important for democracy.

Attitudes toward Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Ukrainians do not demonstrate strong support for NGOs. On one hand, the perception that NGOs are necessary for democracy has increased over time. Nevertheless, almost no one belongs to an NGO, volunteers time, or indicates that they are likely to join one in the future. Very few people rely on NGOs for help in resolving their problems.

Figure 27 provides trend data for two questions that have been generally asked on IFES surveys in Ukraine; one asking whether NGOs are necessary, and the other asking whether the respondent would volunteer for an NGO. The latter question was not asked in 1996.

**Figure 27. Attitudes toward NGOs
 Trend Data (1996 – 2000) (in percent)**

		May 1996 (n=1484)	July 1997 (n=1484)	June 1999 (n=1484)	December 2000 (n=1500)
How necessary are these non-governmental organizations, or NGOs – essential, very necessary, not very necessary, not at all necessary, or not at all necessary?	Essential	18	9	12	13
	Very Necessary	35	25	12	22
	Not Very Necessary	14	36	41	34
	Not at All Necessary	12	13	11	9
	DK/NA	21	17	24	22
Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without being paid?	Definitely, Yes		22	5	8
	Probably, Yes		38	20	31
	Probably, No		15	14	12
	Definitely, No		13	41	39
	Depends		6	14	-
	DK/NA		6	6	9

The top half of the table presents data from May 1996 to December 2000 for the first of these questions. In May 1996, 26% stated that NGOs were not necessary ('not at all' and 'not very' necessary combined). One year later, the July 1997 survey shows that 49% held this view. By June 1999, a majority stated that NGOs are not necessary. December 2000 data indicates that this attitude may have softened: only 43% now believe they are not necessary.

However, as indicated by the bottom half of the table, attitudes have not softened toward volunteering time to an NGO. In July 1997, 28% stated that they would probably or definitely not volunteer for an NGO. In June 1999, the data shows that 55% would probably or definitely not volunteer for an NGO (41% would definitely not volunteer). December 2000 data indicates that this figure has held steady. Fifty-one percent would probably or definitely not volunteer for NGOs (39% definitely not). Two factors may be at play here. As indicated by responses to the economic questions, Ukrainians are preoccupied with their economic situations and may not have the time to give to these organizations. Second, they may not have seen any positive results emanating from NGO activities over the past few years and do not feel it worthwhile to volunteer for them.

In the December 2000 survey, respondents were given a list of different types of non-governmental organizations and asked, "How much trust do you have in the activities of these groups?"

Many of these groups enjoy relatively high levels of trust, between 40% and 50% of respondents reporting at least 'some trust' in them. Veteran's groups (63%), welfare groups (61%), groups benefiting veterans of the Afghan war (60%), and groups working for victims of the Chernobyl disaster (55%) elicit some of the highest levels of trust from respondents. Religious (57%) and environmental groups (51%) also elicit majority support.


At the same time, very few people are members. Trade unions have the highest mention, with 12% of respondents claiming that they belong to one. Religious organizations have 3% claiming membership. No other group has more than 1%. Of these, only members of trade unions claim that they pay membership fees.

The December 2000 survey also asked which organizations respondents might join in the future. Welfare organizations received the highest mention (7%). Human rights groups were mentioned by 5% and women's organizations by 4%.

Perhaps the most striking finding is that no one goes to NGOs for help in resolving their problems. According to the December 2000 data, 7% claim that they have gone to their trade unions for help, only 2% claim that they have gone to a welfare organization for help, and no other organization registers over a 1% mention. Again, this may be a function of the lack of results Ukrainians perceive NGOs to have achieved.

Figure 28 presents the trend over time in the percentage of respondents that belong to NGOs.

Figure 28. Religious and NGO Membership Trend Analysis (1996-2000)



Question: "Please look again at the list of organizations. Which, if any, do you belong to?"

The top line shows the trend in the percentage identifying with a church or religious group over time. The bottom two lines show the percent that belong to any organization from the list of non-governmental organizations shown to the respondent. Those who belong to trade unions or collective farms (an option in the January 1994 survey) are given as State Organizations. All others are grouped together as NGOs. As evident, there has been nearly no improvement over time in NGO membership according to the IFES surveys. Approximately 6% claim membership in any of the organizations on the list. This increased to 9% in the December 2000 survey. That list, however, includes recreation groups, welfare associations, and many other groups that are not considered NGOs in the Western sense of the term. If these were segregated, there would be almost nothing to show.

Public Information and Media

The December 2000 IFES survey did not focus on media issues to the same extent as media surveys covering only this topic. Different questions relevant to the democratization of public information and the development of free independent and professional media were only touched upon here due to restrictions of space and time. However, the survey does provide some useful basic information.

The survey shows that, overall, 53% of the adult population in Ukraine relies on newspapers for information about political and economic events in the country, while 45% rely on radio and most (86%) rely on television. Respondents were asked to list all sources, therefore the sum is greater than 100 percent. Respondents were then asked about their 'main source' of information. Most (73%) list television, followed by newspapers (16%), then radio (10%). Few people mention other sources (<1%).

Respondents were also asked to assess the amount of information available to them about political and economic events in Ukraine. Findings from the December 2000 survey show that a majority has either a 'fair amount' of information about political developments (48%) or a 'great deal' (12%), resulting in a total of 60%. This is not true for economic developments in Ukraine. A majority states that they have little information (43% 'not very much' and 8% none at all) about economic developments. Economic events are of great concern to Ukrainians, but a majority believes it does not receive enough information about them.

Figure 29 provides results from trend data on the two questions regarding political and economic information available to the public. The top part of the table concerns political information, the bottom economic developments.

**Figure 29. Information on Political and Economic Developments
 Trend Data (1997 – 2000) (in percent)**

		July 1997 (n=1484)	June 1998 (n=1484)	June 1999 (n=1484)	December 2000 (n=1500)
How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?	Great Deal	3	5	5	12
	Fair Amount	21	25	36	48
	Not Very Much	56	52	47	32
	None At All	15	12	7	6
	DK/NA	5	6	4	2
How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?	Great Deal	3	2	4	7
	Fair Amount	21	22	32	39
	Not Very Much	57	55	51	43
	None At All	15	15	7	8
	DK/NA	5	5	5	3

The top part of the table indicates that the December 2000 findings on the amount of political information exhibit an improvement over previous years. In 1997, 71% stated that they had either ‘no information at all’ or ‘not very much’ about political developments in Ukraine. A year later, the June 1998 data show that 64% gave this response, followed by 54% in June 1999 before the presidential elections of that year. By December 2000, the majority (60%) now reports they have at least a ‘fair amount’ of political information.

The bottom part of the table also suggests an improvement, over time, in the percentage of respondents who report that they receive at least ‘a fair amount’ of information about economic developments. In July 1997, 72% claimed that they did not receive enough information. This declined slightly in 1998 (70%) and then declined significantly in 1999 (58%). The December 2000 data still indicate that a majority of respondents do not receive enough information about economic developments in Ukraine. Once again, however, the percentage reporting that they do not receive enough has declined (51%).

The December 2000 survey further asked respondents: “In the last few years the government has begun the process to sell state owned enterprises such as energy and coal. How well informed are you about the government’s efforts at privatization?” In total, 70% replied that they were either ‘not informed at all’ (28%) or ‘not well informed’ (42%) about the government’s privatization activities. This finding reinforces the public’s perception that there is a lack of information about economic developments in the country.

There is still far to go. Media sources do not seem to take on the responsibility of a ‘fourth institution’ or public watchdog role that bestows upon them the duty of protecting the public interest. The distance between relaying news and investigating and reporting it is seen most clearly in matters related to economics and finance. This is clearly the case when public funds are involved. People do not believe that they have much information regarding the privatization of public enterprises. They also do not trust that privatization was conducted in a way that will benefit most Ukrainians. Rather, most respondents believe that a select few close to power benefit directly from these reforms. This also seems to be true for public finances closer to home. The December 2000 survey asked: “How well informed are you about the budget here in your community and how the funds are spent?” Less than 10% claim that they are at least ‘somewhat informed’ about this process. In total, 89% say they are either ‘not well informed’ or ‘not at all informed.’ Of these, 67% give the extreme answer of ‘not at all informed.’

Those who are informed about the public budget were asked where they received their information. Of the total sample, 11% read about the local budget in the local newspapers, another 14% saw something on television, and 6% heard something on the radio. Others know something about the local budget because it was discussed during the elections (7%). Almost an equal number know about it through unofficial sources (6%) and even fewer heard official announcements at other times than during elections (2%).

These questions are concerned with the quantity (amount of coverage) of information on political and economic events in Ukraine. Further questions concerned the quality of coverage. Respondents were asked to name the specific media (television or radio station, or publication) they relied on the most for information about political and

economic events in Ukraine. Once they had identified the specific media, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed with the following statements:

- Q. [Media mentioned] is dependable when it comes to political and economic news.
- Q. Information we get from [Media mentioned] on important national issues, such as the privatization of major industries in Ukraine, is reliable.
- Q. [Media mentioned] gives us news regarding the activities of all the political parties.

Respondents were directed to answer these questions only in reference to their 'main source' of information about political and economic developments. For each question, the respondent could 'agree,' 'disagree,' or 'partially agree.' Responses are coded so that Agree = 3, Partially Agree = 2, and Disagree = 1. The means for each media are presented below by category (print, radio, or television). The average for each category is given as well. Time and space restrictions allowed questions for only one media source per respondent. For this reason, the number of persons (cases) varies for each media source. Data for these questions are presented in Figure 30.

**Figure 30. Media Performance
December 2000 Data (n=1500)**

Q18.1 MAIN SOURCE: NEWSPAPER	DEPENDABLE		RELIABLE		COVERS	
	Mean	#	Mean	#	Mean	#
Vechernie vesti	2.62	3	2.23	3	2.62	4
Vysokyi zamok	2.56	8	2.29	8	2.35	8
Holos Ukrainy	2.00	2	2.00	2	1.00	2
Express	2.49	7	2.26	7	2.10	7
Kievskie vedomosti	2.48	2	2.61	2	1.89	2
Komsomol's"kaya pravda v Ukraine	2.41	7	2.21	7	1.54	7
Rabochaya gazeta Ukrainy	3.00	1	2.00	1	2.00	1
Segodnia	2.00	1	1.23	1	2.00	1
Sil"s"ki visti	2.66	12	2.27	11	2.35	12
Trud Ukraine	3.00	1	3.00	1	3.00	1
Ukraine moloda	2.65	5	2.49	5	2.65	5
Uriadovi courier	2.84	4	2.59	4	2.27	4
Facty i commentarii	2.26	77	2.10	70	2.08	75
Argumenty i facty Ukraine	2.36	3	2.36	3	2.36	3
Bisness	3.00	1	3.00	1	3.00	1
Local newspapers	2.20	6	1.94	4	1.90	4
Other	2.48	82	2.25	80	2.27	80
Average for newspaper	2.42	222	2.21	211	2.17	218
Q18.2 MAIN SOURCE: RADIO	Mean	#	Mean	#	Mean	#
Ukrainian radio 1-st channel	2.31	92	2.13	87	2.10	85
Ukrainian radio "Promin"	2.68	10	2.51	10	2.57	10
Dovira-Nika-FM	2.00	1	2.00	1	2.00	1
Nashe radio	2.00	1	1.00	1	2.00	1
Russkoie radio	2.53	4	1.00	2	3.00	2
Chit FM	2.00	1	1.00	1	2.00	0
Radio Lux FM	2.00	1	1.74	1	1.26	1
Radio Svoboda	3.00	5	2.28	5	2.59	5
Gala-radio	3.00	1	1.00	1	2.00	1
Local radio-channel	2.12	11	1.79	7	2.17	8
Other	2.09	11	2.09	11	2.40	11
Average for radio	2.33	139	2.10	129	2.19	125
Q18.3 MAIN SOURCE: TV	Mean	#	Mean	#	Mean	#
UT-1	2.36	98	2.21	94	2.24	91
UT-2,1+1	2.37	330	2.25	315	2.14	323
Inter	2.25	454	2.07	434	2.02	430
ICTV	2.03	2	1.31	1	1.52	1
Novyi channel	1.84	4	1.81	4	1.79	4
STB	2.28	14	1.96	14	1.85	13
NTV	2.18	19	2.35	17	1.95	18
RTR	2.66	12	2.40	9	2.11	12
Local TV-channel	2.63	12	2.43	12	2.39	10
Other	2.45	59	2.20	53	2.22	56
Average for TV	2.32	1003	2.16	953	2.09	959

All categories of media averaged higher scores for dependable coverage of general events than reliable coverage of main issues. All media scored lowest on coverage of all political parties.

Newspapers were chosen as a main source of information by 224 respondents. Between 220 and 211 of them gave substantive evaluations on the performance of their selected print media. The remaining few responded 'do not know' or did not answer when asked. Overall, print media was rated highest for its dependable coverage. Print media averaged 2.42 on a scale of 1 – 3.

144 respondents chose radio stations as their main source of information. Between 139 and 125 provided evaluations of the radio stations they selected. Radio, on average, scored higher than other media for its coverage of all political parties among those who rely on it.

1020 respondents chose television stations as their main source of information. Between 953 and 1003 respondents provided evaluations of their chosen TV station.

Comparison of performance across different categories of media is complicated by the fact that different people evaluated different media. Valid performance evaluations across different media and types of media would require that the same people evaluate all. These data can only suggest a pattern, and that pattern would need to be replicated in a more extensive media study. The pattern suggested in these findings is that print media is rated higher than radio or television for its 'dependable' and 'reliable' coverage. Radio is rated higher for its coverage of all political parties. Television, relied on by most of the people, is rated lower by its viewers than print by its readers for all three performance attributes. TV is rated higher for reliable coverage and coverage of all political parties than is radio by its listeners.

Internet

An additional piece of information gathered in the December 2000 survey is relevant here. Respondents were asked about the extent and type of their internet usage. The data shows that 7% of the total adults sampled claim to use the internet. Another 24% 'do not know what the internet is,' and another 1% did not answer the question. The rest (69%) have 'never used it.' Almost 90% of internet users primarily use the internet at work or school.

These data highlight the amount of work remaining to be done with the media. One pressing need is the development of investigative skills and a sense of responsibility within the media for informing the public about what it needs to know not what others want them to know. There are many obstacles to this in Ukraine. Ownership of media is one concern, and the relationships between ownership of media and the political system is another. The Ukrainian public perceives that the media is in a difficult position. The December 2000 survey asked: "In your opinion, how safe is it for the media in Ukraine to broadcast or print their true opinions, even if these opinions are critical of the government?" Less than 20% believe that it is safe for the media to pursue the truth. A plurality (42%) believe it is 'somewhat dangerous' for the media to print or broadcast their true opinions. Another 24% believe it is 'very dangerous' to do so.

VI. Variations in Attitudes

Over Time and People

The findings discussed above were based on visual inspection of trends, and are generalized for the total sample representing the adult population of Ukraine, 18 years of age and above. Statistical multi-variate regression provides a more systematic summary of patterns in the data because the technique allows us to examine the simultaneous influence of different factors, such as education, age, socio-economic status, and region.

Regression analysis may be used for different reasons. Frequently, methods of statistical regression are used to model causal relationships that an analyst may expect to appear in the data. Regression allows one to test the influence of a variable A on the target variable B. This approach, however, is not used here, and causation is not implied, because the nature of the data does not support it. Regression is used here as a way to summarize the (linear) effect of a variable on a target variable and to isolate effects caused by simultaneous factors, or multi-variate influences, on the variable of interest.⁷ Results from regression analyses, summarized here, indicate that specific factors have a statistically significant effect on the pattern of response of particular variables or attitudes. These results are given here so that they may provide additional insight. It should be noted that this report cannot explain these effects and that these explanations are based on psychological and historical processes beyond the scope of the report.

All variables in the trend data set have been recoded so that an increase in the value corresponds with an increase in the phenomena measured by the variable. For example, increased values for the confidence variables indicate increased levels of confidence. Similarly, an increase in the value of a variable such as interest in politics indicates increases in levels of interest. The scale underlying some variables is not evident. In these cases, the variable is recoded to indicate an increase in what this analyst assumes the interest is behind asking the question in the first place. For example, respondents are asked to choose a point indicating preference between a market economy and a planned economy. The interest here is in the support for a market economy, and the variable is recoded so that a high value indicates increased levels of support. Several variables are recoded as dichotomies to facilitate analyses. This is usually done for questions that ask for a 'yes' or 'no' response from respondents. Please note that recoding does not necessarily change the question. It is done, in this case, to orient the variables in similar directions so that (meta) interpretation of them is easier.

In summary, there is a slight upward trend over time to most of the attitudes measured in the IFES surveys. Compared with past surveys, later surveys show slightly higher levels in attitudes that political reforms are not happening fast enough, that Ukraine is becoming a democracy, and that it should adopt a market economy. A similar increase appears in the general satisfaction Ukrainians feel with their personal situations (or at least that levels of dissatisfaction are declining) and in confidence levels for all institutions except the Supreme Rada (which shows no change over time). Interest in politics and the belief that voting gives influence also increases slightly over time. The perception that there is adequate political and economic information shows slight increase as well.

There are also declines over time, however, in the preference for economic reforms and estimations of the actual rate of economic reform. People believe that these are happening too quickly. There is also an increase over time in the commonness and seriousness of corruption, and the perception that it is accepted. At the same time, there is a decline in the belief that this acceptance contributes to the problem of corruption.

Support for the importance of elections, the rights of minorities, private property, freedom to form political parties, freedom of religion, and freedom of association shows a decline over time. Fewer believe that NGOs are either necessary or indicate that they would volunteer their time for one.

⁷ The base model includes characteristics about the individual (age, education and socio-economic status) plus the environment that the individual is located in physically (city size) and temporally (time of the survey). Dichotomous coding is used for categoric variables. Additional models test the additive effects of other factors.

Females differ from males in their sentiments on the pace of economic reform and their level of support for a market economy. When the effects of other factors are accounted for, women exhibit higher levels of confidence in the military, courts, public prosecutors, and the police than men. Overall, 25% of women versus 22% of men are confident in the police, 38% versus 25% are confident in the public prosecutors, 37% of women versus 24% of men are confident in the courts, and 70% versus 67% are confident in the military in the combined data set.

Women also are less likely to be interested in politics or to believe that voting gives them influence and are more likely to believe politics is too complicated and that people like them have little influence. Women are less likely than men to believe that choice of political parties, honest elections, minority rights, and freedom to form parties are important. Freedom of religion is more important to women than men. Women also tend to believe that there is not enough political and economic information available to them. This difference is quite significant: 13% of women versus 7% of men claim there is 'no' information available about political issues and 15% of women versus 8% of men claim there is 'no' economic information available to them, in the combined data set.

As SES rises, the perception that political reform is too slow decreases and the sense that Ukraine is a democracy (or moving toward one) increases. The higher the SES, the higher the sense that economic reforms are moving too slowly and that the President can resolve Ukraine's economic problems. Satisfaction and confidence in all institutions rises as SES increases. Political efficacy and the perception that politics is too complicated decreases in the same manner. Support for most human rights increases. Respondents with a higher SES tend to believe that NGOs are necessary and are more likely to volunteer time for one. High levels of SES are also associated with the belief that there is enough political and economic information.

Education follows a similar pattern to SES, with the following exceptions. The higher the education, the more likely the respondent is to believe that Ukraine is not a democracy. Level of education is also negatively associated with confidence in the Constitutional Court, the State Security, public prosecutors, and the police.

As age increases, so does the perception that political reforms are not happening fast enough and that Ukraine is not a democracy (or is not becoming one). Older respondents are less supportive of a market economy, less optimistic about the future of the economy, and less satisfied with the general situation in Ukraine. Older respondents are also more likely to think that corruption is common and that people accept it. Confidence in the Supreme Rada, the Executive Branch, local government, the military, and the courts increases with age, while confidence in the National Bank decreases. As age increases, so does interest in politics, and older respondents are more likely to believe elections, minority rights, and religion are important, while less likely to think private property and freedom of association are.

As the size of city where the respondent lives increases, the belief that Ukraine is a democracy (or moving toward one) decreases. Those in larger cities are less optimistic about the future of the economy or that the President will resolve economic troubles. They are more likely to believe that economic reforms are not happening fast enough and more supportive of a market economy. Those in larger cities are less satisfied with the situation in Ukraine and less likely to think corruption is common or to think that people accept corruption as a way of life. Confidence in nearly all institutions decreases as the size of the city the respondent lives in increases. Residents of larger cities are more interested in politics and less likely to think politics is too complicated or that they have no influence. They tend to believe there is adequate information about politics, but are more likely to think that voting does not give influence. The larger the city, the more likely the respondent is to believe that elections are important and that the right to form political parties free from the state and freedom of association are important. They are also more likely to believe that NGOs are necessary.

Ethnic Russians are not likely to be optimistic about the future of the economy compared to ethnic Ukrainians. They are also less satisfied and less confident in all social institutions and place a higher value on minority rights than ethnic Ukrainians.

Respondents who identify with 'other' ethnic groups are less likely than ethnic Ukrainians to think that Ukraine is a democracy and more likely to think that the actual pace of economic reforms is moving too quickly. They tend to believe that corruption is serious and that people accept it. Identifying with an 'other' ethnic group is associated with

increased confidence in the Supreme Rada, but decreased confidence in all other legal institutions. They have a tendency toward less interest in politics and a sense that voting does not give them influence. Those identifying with 'other' ethnic groups place more importance on honest elections and the rights of minorities than ethnic Ukrainians.

Both ethnic Russians and ethnic 'others' are less likely to state that they have been discriminated against because of their ethnicity than ethnic Ukrainians.

Regional Variations

Appendix 3 explains the regional categories created by SOCIS-Gallup to classify the geography of Ukraine. This section discusses differences in patterns of response between the different regions. These differences persist even after the respondent's age, level of education, SES, the size of settlement they reside in, and the time of the survey is accounted for. These differences seem to describe distinctive characteristics of the regions that should be considered.

SOCIS-Gallup divides Ukraine into 11 regions:

1. Kyiv
2. Northern
3. Central
4. Northeastern
5. Northwestern
6. Southeastern
7. Western
8. Southwestern
9. Southern
10. Crimea
11. Eastern

Regions tend to form blocks that resemble each other in the extra effects living in that region seems to have on patterns of responses. The Southern and Eastern regions and Crimea show tendencies toward a lack of confidence in social institutions when the other effects (i.e. the base model) are accounted for. They have a tendency toward attaching lesser importance to human rights and political parties, and have lower political efficacy – the belief that they have influence in political matters. Respondents from these regions are more likely to hold the view that the elections will not be honest. Crimea is different from the other two in that respondents there have an extra sense they are isolated from political and economic information, while the Eastern and Southern Regions (political information, only) do not. In Crimea, 14% state they have at least 'a fair amount' of information about politics. In the Southeast and East regions, 46% and 43%, respectively, give this response. Respondents from the Eastern and Southern Regions are more likely than the national average to say that they have information about their rights under the Constitution. The Eastern Region differs from the other two in that there is a tendency there to think political reforms are not happening fast enough. In the Southern Region, there is a tendency for support for the Supreme Rada, which is not found in the other two. Corruption has special emphasis for respondents in Crimea.

The Western and Southwestern Regions resemble each other in their sense of optimism about the national economy in one year and the importance of foreign investment. Both also show a tendency toward satisfaction with the current situation in Ukraine and toward confidence in many social institutions. Respondents in both regions have tendencies toward the belief that there is enough information about politics and the economy. On the negative side, respondents in these regions predict that the elections for Supreme Rada will not be honest. Both perceive that there are clear differences between parties. Being in the Southwest seems to increase the perception that several human rights are important, which is not true for the West. The Southwest also has a significantly lower tendency in thinking corruption is common.

Kyiv, the Northern and Central Regions have more similarities than differences. Those living in these areas exhibit higher levels of confidence in social institutions and economic optimism. Kyiv and the Northern Region also view

the President in a positive light, indicating that he will resolve economic troubles and place increased importance of foreign investment. Both tend to express satisfaction with the current situation, yet seem concerned that acceptance of corruption by Ukrainians helps to further exacerbate that very problem. Respondents in Kyiv and the Central Region are less likely to say that politics is too complicated or that they have no influence on political outcomes. In the Central Region, there is a decrease in the perception that political parties are important. Respondents from the Northern Region differ from those in the other two on the issues of political and economic information. Higher percentages of people in Kyiv and the North regions report at least 'a fair amount' of information about politics and economics compared to the Central region: 44% in Kyiv and 42% in the North versus 33% in the Central region for the amount of political information. For economic information, 37% of respondents in Kyiv report at least 'a fair amount' of information, compared to 36% for the North and only 27% for the Central region. The difference is greater for knowledge of rights under the Constitution: 30% in Kyiv versus 22% in the North and only 17% in the Central region report they have at least 'some' information. Perceived access to information in Kyiv and the North regions are consistently higher than the Central region. The difference between Kyiv and the North is that most of positive increase in amount of information observed in Kyiv is carried by other factors such as increased levels of education and SES found there. The increased levels of information reported in the North remain, statistically, even after these other factors are accounted for.

The Northeastern, Northwestern, and Southeastern Regions appear more unique. Northeastern Residents tend to have greater confidence in many social institutions, place less importance on foreign investment, and are less likely to believe that corruption is a serious problem. There is also a diminished interest in politics, a decrease in the view that individuals have influence on politics, and a lower perception of the importance of NGOs. At the same time, there is an increased sense that all human rights (except private property) are important.

Northwestern residents have little additional confidence in social institutions, with the exception of their confidence in President Kuchma, which is higher than the national average. There is a tendency in this region toward satisfaction with the current situation, optimism about the future of the economy, and the sense that the President will resolve Ukraine's economic troubles. There is less of a perception that corruption is a serious problem.

Southeastern residents exhibit less confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers and the Police and tend to believe that voting does not give citizens influence. They do not find politics too complicated to understand, and, corresponding to this, they have an increased sense that there is enough information about politics and the economy. There is also less importance placed on protection of private property and freedom of religion.

Ukraine may also be divided into three regions: east, west, and an intermediate area between the two. This classification is covered in more detail below, Appendix 3. Classifying regions into these categories divides the trend data set into 52% east, 30% west, and 18% intermediate.

Most of the IFES variables have a clear dimension or scale underlying them. This was discussed above. Taking the mean or average indicates how far a group or set of groups is on that scale. An Analysis of Variation (ANOVA) was then run on all trend variables to assess the statistical difference between these three regions – the differences between means for each region on each variable. Overall, the analyses show that these distinctions are very useful in summarizing distinctive differences between respondents. In many cases, the intermediate area is not statistically different from the east. In fewer cases, this area is not statistically different from the west. This supports the classification that this area is in-between the east and west.

The geography of mean responses tends to follow expected patterns. Full details are not provided here, but the following summary captures the essential points of the analysis. Modified variable labels are used below to simplify the discussion. This may be hard to follow for people who are unfamiliar with the structure of the IFES questionnaires. Appendix 2 provides some help in this regard.

The patterns fall into several scenarios:

Case I. There is no significant difference in attitudes between respondents in the west, east, and intermediate areas. The variables falling into this category include: Actual pace of economic reforms, Accepting corruption contributes

to the problem, Accepting corruption as a way of life, Politics too complicated, Importance of Honest Elections, Importance of Free Speech, Possibility to Form NGOs, NGOs are necessary and Volunteer for a NGO.

Case II. The average in the West is greater than the average in the East, which is greater than the average in the Intermediate areas. This includes the variables: Pace toward a market economy, Market versus planned economy, Knowledge about rights under the constitution, Two political parties are important for democracy, the Amount of information available about politics, and the Amount of information available about economics.

Case III. The average in the West is greater than the average in the Intermediate areas, and together these are greater than the average in the East. In this category are: Movement toward democracy, Type of economy preferred, National economic conditions in one year, Confidence in the Executive Branch, Confidence in the Presidential Administration, Confidence in Leonid Kuchma, and Confidence in the courts.

Case IV. The Intermediate average is greater than the West average, which is greater than the East average. Only Confidence in the State Security falls into this category.

Case V. The Intermediate average is greater than the East average, which is greater than the West average, but differences between East and West are not significant. This includes the variables: Voting gives no influence, Corruption is common, Importance of minority rights, and Importance of private property.

Case VI. The West average is greater than either the East or the Intermediate, but differences between some pairs are not significant. The remaining variables in the trend data set are in this category.

To summarize, respondents in the west are more supportive of a market economy, more likely to believe that at least two parties are necessary for democracy, and more likely to believe that there is enough information available about politics and the economy.

Respondents in the intermediate areas are more confident in the State Security Service, more certain that corruption is common and that voting gives no influence, and stress the importance of minority and property rights.

Respondents in the east are more supportive of a market economy and the pace toward this than those in the intermediate areas. They are also likely to believe that information is available about politics and the economy than those in the intermediate area.

VII. Conclusion

This report began by summarizing Ukrainians' experience of change in their country since its independence in 1991. The December 2000 data indicates that all but a small minority (perhaps 15% of the sample) claim that these changes have been significant. An even smaller minority (perhaps 7%) reports that it has actually benefited from these changes. The rest believe that they have been hurt by a decade of vast social, economic, and political change, and a majority state that nothing 'good' has happened in the country, or in their private lives, over this time.

Is Ukraine going in the wrong direction?

Economic problems seem to obscure the important and beneficial developments that Ukrainians have witnessed in their lives. Independence and statehood is viewed an important accomplishment for many. Still others see hope in further movement toward the European Community and the world market. A majority (53%) favors eventual integration into Europe, and those who favor a market-type economy outnumber those who do not (32% versus 26%, and 32% choosing a point in-between the two). A slim majority also believes that foreign investment is important to achieving these ends (52%).

However, Ukrainians do not believe that their country is a democracy, regardless of how they conceptualize this term. Many do not think that their country is even moving toward democracy, and a majority thinks that political reforms in general are occurring 'too slowly.' Ukrainians are very concerned about crime, and most (79%) believe it has increased 'very much' over the last decade. Corrupt behavior carried out by officials is considered a serious and widespread problem according to nearly all respondents.

Most Ukrainians would say that the country is going in the wrong direction and would support change. What sort of change, however, do they envision?

Data from public opinion polls are sophisticated measures of public mood, but they only supplement a more in-depth understanding of a country undergoing rapid change. This report has aimed to pull out and summarize basic trends from public opinion data collected by the International Foundation for Election Systems over these last seven years in Ukraine. These data provide some basis for hope and show that many in Ukraine are supportive of the changes they endure, even as they feel threatened by them. Unfortunately, this support appears shallow. Unanticipated events could easily turn support for change away from the West and toward a more reactionary alternative.

Dissatisfaction with the overall situation in Ukraine runs deep. The continual perception of personal hardship and deprivation will undoubtedly motivate a solution. In the search for such a solution, many Ukrainians turn to their president as the most likely candidate for resolving the country's economic problems – the main obstacle to their pursuit of a better life. Recent events, however, may bring increased pressure to bear on President Kuchma, though the result of these developments remains to be seen.

Several concerns emerge from the analyses presented here. For one, there is much support for old ideas and former political solutions. In the December 2000 data, nearly one third of the sample might be described as passive supporters of the previous social order. A further one third (29%) might be considered active supporters. The numbers are rough estimations, but the tendencies are clearly there. Several groups in Ukraine are 'at risk' of rejecting proactive and pro-western political and economic reforms. Consistent with this trend, the Communist Party of Ukraine has the highest level of support of any individual political party.

Ethnic Russians, approximately 20% of the sample, consistently report low levels of confidence in social institutions, lack faith that national elections will be held in a fair and honest manner, and are quite concerned about the level of corruption they see around them. They appear to feel out of touch with the current political order in Ukraine and are the most likely catalysts for reactionary measures.

There are also clear differences in Ukraine between the three major divisions of the country. Those from the west are more supportive of a market economy, more confident in social institutions and more convinced that President Kuchma will resolve their economic troubles. Ukrainians in the east are not as convinced of this. Those in the

intermediate areas can go in different directions depending on the issue. They appear more supportive of the current administration and social institutions and are more pro-market than those from the east, yet they seem to feel more powerless than either those in the west or those in the east. It seems as if those in the intermediate areas perceive themselves as minorities. It may be important to understand this group better.

Results from Crimea indicate that this region has low levels of confidence in institutions, low levels of political efficacy, and they believe that they lack political and economic information. This combination is not good for a region located on the periphery of the country.

Women appear to be reacting to the crime and corruption around them with increased support for institutions that enforce law and order in society: the military, police, courts, and public prosecutors. They do not appear to be at the forefront of political change, nor are they as involved with non-governmental organizations as men. At the same time, many women express a great need for more information about political and economic events in their country.

With perhaps two-thirds of the adult population supporting 'old ideas,' who remains to enact social change? Moreover, what group has the political will to accomplish this? The finding that over 59% of the adult population would do nothing if higher political officials chose to replace their elected representative with an appointed alternative is telling.

Within the donor community, much hope and attention is directed toward non-governmental organizations. The data yields a mixed review of this approach. Ukrainians show no tendency to support such organizations en masse. While the population is fairly evenly split in its opinion about the necessity of these groups and between 40% and 50% report at least 'some trust' in them, very few people suggest they might join and very few people currently turn toward NGOs to solve their problems. It is hard to see broad-based support for this sector emerging in the short run to mobilize for political change in the short run. At the same time, Ukrainians have the highest level of confidence in the church as an institution. There is a dramatically increasing trend over time in the number of Ukrainians that identify themselves as participating or belonging to a church.

Ukrainians expect their representatives and leaders to solve the country's problems. The data suggests that reform and the drive to resolve these problems may have to come from above if anyone expects dramatic steps to be taken in the immediate future.

Situated at the border of Europe, right next to countries slated for EU membership, Ukrainians can see how well their neighbors' living conditions have improved in a relatively short period of time. It must be hard to accept that a country as rich in resources as Ukraine cannot find a better life for its people. In terms of general catalysts for reform, economic development is probably the most significant. The survey data indicate a correlation between higher economic well being and confidence in institutions, political efficacy and support for democratic and market reforms. It also makes for a better life.

Appendix 1. December 2000 Data⁸

The December 2000 survey was conducted between November 27 and December 5, 2000. Interviews averaged 61 minutes and ranged between 22 and 150 minutes. Respondents were given a choice of language for the interview. Of 1500 total interviews, 573 (38%) were carried out in Ukrainian and 927 (62%) in Russian.

Interviewers rated respondents' level of cooperation. Less than 10% were rated as 'uncooperative.' Slightly under half (41%) 'cooperated, but gave little detail' in their responses, and another 38% were 'cooperative, and gave much detail.' Finally, 13% were rated as 'very cooperative' by the interviewers.

The sample represents the adult population of Ukraine aged 18 years and older. A random route method was used to select starting points for interviewing. After the initial start, an agreed upon interval was used by all interviewers to select the following households. Selection of respondents within the household was done using the random selection method of closest birthday. The data uses post-stratification weighting to achieve a representative sample of adult Ukrainians by age, gender, and settlement type according to statistics from the 1990 census.

Table App.1.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Gender				
Male	562	37.5	680	45.3
Female	938	62.5	820	54.7
Age				
18 – 25	173	11.5	203	13.6
26 – 35	219	14.6	285	19.0
36 – 45	262	17.5	265	17.6
46 – 55	250	16.7	268	17.9
56+	596	39.7	478	31.9
Education				
Primary and incomplete secondary	316	21.1	291	19.4
Secondary	419	27.9	422	28.1
Secondary + specialized training	424	28.3	458	30.6
University incomplete	49	3.3	57	3.8
University complete	285	19.0	267	17.8
Advanced study	5	0.3	4	0.2
Settlement Type				
City 500,000+	418	27.9	362	24.2
City 200,000 – 499,999	235	15.7	268	17.9
City 50,000 – 199,999	100	6.7	107	7.1
City 20,000 – 49,999	113	7.5	127	8.5
< 20,000	61	4.1	54	3.6
CTS	107	7.1	115	7.7
Rural	466	31.1	465	31.0

⁸ This methodological section is based upon the report provided by SOCIS-Gallup.

Table App. 1.1. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample (Continued)

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Region				
Kyiv	192	12.8	81	5.4
North	110	7.3	137	9.1
Center	148	9.9	185	12.3
North East	107	7.1	134	8.9
East	188	12.5	235	15.7
South East	140	9.3	174	11.6
North West	143	9.5	108	7.2
West	206	13.7	156	10.4
South West	86	5.7	64	4.3
South	120	8.0	150	10.0
Crimea	60	4.0	75	5.0

Table App. 1.2. Details of the Fieldwork

1. Region	2. Dates of fieldwork	3. # sampling points (city +village)	4. # interviewers	5. Completed interviews	6. Uncompleted Interviews	7. # contacts (5+6)
Kyiv	27.11- 3.12	1	19	192	360	552
North	29.11-4.12	8	10	110	126	236
Center	29.11-3.12	11	15	148	138	286
North-East	29.11-3.12	6	13	107	762	869
East	28.11-2.12	11	19	188	356	544
South-East	28.11-4.12	8	15	140	150	290
North-West	29.11-4.12	13	12	143	168	311
West	29.11-4.12	15	17	206	170	376
South-West	29.11-3.12	7	7	86	90	176
South	29.11-5.12	8	14	120	509	629
Crimea	28.11-3.12	5	6	60	68	128
TOTAL	27.11-5.12	93	147	1500	2897	4397

Main reasons for refusal to participate included: shortage of time, no confidence in public surveys, and did not wish to open the door to unknown people.

The Social Context of the Fieldwork. Difficult weather delayed the start of fieldwork in 6 oblasts and caused power shortages and loss of gas and heat for nearly 2000 settlements. Transportation was difficult due to ice, which delayed food supplies from reaching many settlements. In the opinion of the interviewers, all of these problems negatively affected the emotional state of the respondents. Settlements lost power in the evenings.

During fieldwork, A. Moros, the leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, released an audiocassette, which served as evidence to implicate President Kuchma in the murder of the journalist Georgiy Gongadze. This was actively debated and received a wide hearing among the population. This may have aggravated an already low level of trust in officials in Kyiv.

Section 1: Perceptions of Social Change

Q1. Do you believe that major changes in Ukraine over the last 10 years have effected the lives of most people, or do you believe that the changes here have had little effect on the lives of most Ukrainians?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Major changes have effected the lives of most people	85%
Changes have had little impact on the lives of most Ukrainians	7%
Had effect on some, others not [VOLUNTEERED]	7%
Don't Know	1%
No Answer	★
Total	100%

Q2. In your opinion what good things have happened in the country since 1990?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Ukrainian independence	14%
Increase in personal freedom	10%
Increased availability of material goods	4%
Creation of conditions for business, private property	4%
Peace and calm	3%
Adoption of national symbol (flag, hymn)	2%
Land reform	2%
Religious freedom	2%
Adoption of Ukrainian Constitution, new laws	2%
Nothing good [VOLUNTEERED]	57%
Other	4%
Don't Know	7%
No Answer	★

Q3. In your opinion what bad things have happened in the country since 1990?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Decrease in the standard of living	54%
Unemployment	28%
Economic crisis	13%
Rise in crime	7%
Decline in social support (medical, education)	7%
Corruption	4%
Decline in law and order	3%
Increased social stratification	3%
Loss of money deposits in USSR Savings Bank	3%
General social decline	3%
Collapse of USSR	3%
Decline in cultural standards and morality	3%
Other	4%
Don't know	11%

Q4. In your opinion what good things have happened to your household since 1990?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Birth of grandchildren	16%
Educational advancement	8%
Wedding	7%
Improved material position	4%
Advancement (getting a new/better job)	4%
Receiving/buying/building an apartment or house	4%
Other	1%
Nothing good [VOLUNTEERED]	56%
Don't Know	8%

Q5. And what bad things have happened to your household since 1990?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Lower standard of living (personal reference)	37%
Unemployment	17%
Death of relatives	14%
Illness/unable to afford treatment	11%
Loss of deposits in USSR Savings Bank	5%
Lower standard of living (in general)	4%
Divorce	3%
Delays with wages/pension payments	2%
Underemployment (decrease in work/lower level of job)	2%
Other	1%
Nothing bad happened	6%
Don't Know	12%

- Q6. Over the last 10 years some people have benefited from the change, and others have been hurt. Please look at the picture on this card. The picture shows different responses to this question. 1 represents that you and your family have been hurt by changes over the last 10 years, 3 represents that your situation has not changed much, and 5 represents that you and your family have benefited by the change. Or, you can choose a point in-between these answers. Please think about the total effect on your family from changes in Ukraine over these last 10 years. Where would you place yourself on this picture?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
1 (Hurt)	48%
2	29%
3 (Situation has not changed much)	15%
4	6%
5 (Benefited)	1%
Don't Know	1%
No answer	★
Total	100%

- Q7. Compared to ten years ago, do you think that the percentage of poor people in Ukraine has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Increased	95%
Decreased	2%
Stayed about the same	2%
Don't Know	1%
No Answer	★
Total	100%

- Q8. Over the next ten years, do you think the percentage of poor people in Ukraine will increase, decrease, or stay about the same?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Increase	64%
Decrease	11%
Stay about the same	13%
Don't Know	12%
No Answer	★
Total	100%

Q9. Some people say that the problem of crime has gotten worse over the past few years, other people do not agree. What is your opinion? In Ukraine, has crime increased very much, increased a little, stayed the same, decreased a little, or decreased very much over the past few years?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Increased very much	79%
Increased a little	12%
Stayed the same	4%
Decreased a little	3%
Decreased very much	★
Don't know	2%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q10. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement. I trust the justice system to protect me from unjust treatment of the state. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	4%
Somewhat agree	11%
Somewhat disagree	36%
Strongly disagree	40%
Don't know	8%
No answer	★
Total	99% ✓

For Q. 11 and Q. 12: Now I want to ask you some questions about your outlook on life. Please look at these cards. On them you see two contrasting statements. Using the scale shown in the picture, could you tell me where you would place your own view? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between.

Q11. One should be cautious about making major changes in life . . . You will never achieve much unless you act boldly.

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
1 (Completely agree with cautious)	8%
2	5%
3	7%
4	8%
5	10%
6	8%
7	10%
8	14%
9	8%
10 (Completely agree with bold)	18%
Don't know	5%
No answer	★
Total	101% ✓

Q12. Ideas that have stood the test of time are generally best . . . New ideas are generally better than old ones.

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
1 (Completely agree with "old ideas")	13%
2	9%
3	11%
4	9%
5	16%
6	9%
7	8%
8	8%
9	4%
10 (Completely agree with "new ideas")	7%
Don't know	6%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Section 2: Information Available in Society

Q13. How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Great deal	3%	5%	5%	7%	12%
Fair amount	21%	25%	36%	31%	48%
Not very much	56%	52%	47%	47%	32%
None at all	15%	12%	7%	10%	6%
Don't know	5%	6%	4%	4%	2%
No answer	★	★	★	1%	★
Total	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%

Q14. How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Great deal	2%	2%	5%	5%	7%
Fair amount	15%	22%	32%	25%	39%
Not very much	55%	55%	51%	51%	43%
None at all	22%	15%	8%	14%	8%
Don't know	7%	5%	5%	4%	3%
No answer	★	★	★	1%	★
Total	101% ✓	99% ✓	100%	100%	100%

Q15. In the last few years the government has begun the process to sell state owned enterprises such as energy and coal. How well informed are you about the government's efforts at privatization?

	11-12/00
	(1500)
Well informed	4%
Somewhat informed	23%
Not well informed	42%
Not informed at all	28%
Don't know	3%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q16. What media are your main sources of information about political and economic events in Ukraine? MARK ALL

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Newspaper	53%
Radio	45%
Television	86%
Other	3%
Don't know	3%
No answer	★

Q17. Of all these you mentioned, which one do you rely on the most for political and economic news?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1446)</u>
Newspaper	16%
Radio	10%
Television	73%
Other	★
Don't know	3%
No answer	★
Total	102% ✓

Q18A. And, which newspaper is the most important to you? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED NEWSPAPER IN Q17]

	11-12/00
	<u>(224)</u>
Vechernie vesty	2%
Vysokyi zamok	4%
Holos Ukrainy	1%
Express	3%
Kievskie vedomosti	1%
Komsomol's'kaya Pravda	3%
Molod' Ukrainy	★
Rabochaya gazeta	★
Segodnia	1%
Sil's'ki visti	5%
Trud Ukraine	★
Ukraine moloda	2%
Uriadovyi courier	2%
Facty i commentarii	34%
Argumenty i facty Ukraine	1%
Bisness	★
Local newspapers	3%
Other	37%
Total	99% ✓

Q18B. And, which radio station is the most important to you? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED RADIO IN Q17]

	11-12/00
	<u>(144)</u>
Ukrainian radio 1-st channel	66%
Ukrainian radio "Promin"	7%
Dovira-Nika-FM	1%
Nashe radio	1%
Ruskoie radio	4%
Chit FM	1%
Radio Lux FM	1%
Radio Svoboda	4%
Gala-radio	★
Local radio channel	8%
Other	9%
Total	102% ✓

Q18C. And, which television station is the most important to you? [ASKED OF THOSE WHO SELECTED TELEVISION IN Q17]

	11-12/00
	<u>(1020)</u>
UT-1	10%
UT-2, 1+1	33%
Inter	45%
ICTV	★
Novyi channel	1%
STB	1%
NTV	2%
RTR	1%
Local TV channel	1%
Other	6%
Total	100%

For Q 19: You said that you rely the most on [MEDIA MENTIONED IN Q18]. Thinking of [MEDIA MENTIONED IN Q18]. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Q19A. [MEDIA MENTIONED IN Q18] is dependable when it comes to political and economic news. Do you . . .

	11-12/00
	<u>(1389)</u>
Agree	38%
Disagree	5%
Agree somewhat/disagree somewhat	55%
Don't know	2%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q19B. Information we get from [MEDIA MENTIONED IN Q18] on important national issues, such as the privatization of major industries in Ukraine, is reliable. Do you . . .

	11-12/00
	<u>(1389)</u>
Agree	27%
Disagree	12%
Agree somewhat/disagree somewhat	54%
Don't know	7%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q19C. [MEDIA MENTIONED IN Q18] gives us news regarding the activities of all the political parties.

	11-12/00
	<u>(1389)</u>
Agree	29%
Disagree	18%
Agree somewhat/disagree somewhat	47%
Don't know	6%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q20. In your opinion, how safe is it for media in Ukraine to broadcast or print their true opinions, even if these opinions are critical of the government? Is it very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat dangerous, or very dangerous?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Very safe	3%
Somewhat safe	17%
Somewhat dangerous	42%
Very dangerous	24%
I don't care about this [VOLUNTEERED]	6%
Don't know	8%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q21. What about in your personal conversations. When you meet your friends, do you talk about politics – often, sometimes, rarely or never?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Often	24%
Sometimes	34%
Rarely	27%
Never	15%
Don't know	★
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q22. When you yourself, hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or colleagues to share your views? IF YES, does it happen often, from time to time, or rarely?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
No, never	30%
Yes, often	16%
Yes, from time to time	31%
Yes, rarely	16%
Don't know	4%
No answer	★
Total	97% ✓

Section 3: Government

Q23. Here is a list of some ways that city or village government officials can ask your opinion on issues or about problems that concern you. Which of these have happened to you? [MULTIPLE CHOICE ALLOWED]

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
City or village government officials have never asked me my opinion	86%
City or village government officials sent or gave me a questionnaire to complete	4%
I was asked to attend a public hearing	6%
I was asked to participate in an advisory group	2%
Other	1%
Don't know	5%
No answer	2%

Q24. Have you ever contacted your elected officials before to help solve a problem in your life? [IF RESPONDENT HAS CONTACTED ELECTED OFFICIALS MORE THAN ONCE BEFORE, ASK RESPONDENT TO THINK OF THE LAST TIME RESPONDENT CONTACTED HIS/HER ELECTED OFFICIAL.]

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	24%
No	75%
Don't know	★
No answer	2%
Total	101% ✓

Q25A. Why haven't you ever contacted your elected officials before?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Not necessary	22%
Don't believe they will help/hopeless	25%
Effort/cost greater than benefit	15%
Work out my problems unassisted	8%
Other	2%
Don't know	6%
No answer	2%
Not asked	25%

Q25B. [IF YES, CONTINUE, OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q29] What level of elected official did you contact?

	11-12/00
	<u>(352)</u>
Village/settlement chairman	43%
City chairman (mayor)	21%
Village/settlement rada deputy	7%
City rada deputy	12%
City-rayon rada deputy	4%
Rayon rada deputy	6%
Oblast rada deputy	3%
People's Deputy of Ukraine	7%
Other national leader	★
President of Ukraine	1%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q26. How did you attempt to contact this official?

	11-12/00
	<u>(352)</u>
Wrote a letter	21%
Telephone call	3%
Personal meeting	78%
Through someone else	3%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q27. Did your official respond to you?

	11-12/00
	<u>(352)</u>
Yes	73%
No	15%
Partially	12%
Don't know	★
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q28. [IF 'YES' OR 'PARTIALLY' IN Q27] How satisfied were you with the response of your elected official?

	11-12/00
	<u>(298)</u>
Completely dissatisfied	35%
Somewhat dissatisfied	15%
Somewhat satisfied	29%
Completely satisfied	20%
Don't know	1%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q29. Have you ever contacted an appointed official before?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	17%
No	81%
Don't know	1%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q30. [IF Q29 = YES] Which level of appointed official did you contact?

	11-12/00
	(260)
Officials working for local executive bodies	88%
Officials working for oblast level executive bodies (including governor)	12%
Officials working for central executive bodies (including Cabinet of Ministers, Ministries, State Committees and Departments, and Administration of the President of Ukraine)	2%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q31. Considering officials, overall. If you had a serious problem, which of these, if any, would first try to contact regarding this? [ONE CHOICE ALLOWED]

	11-12/00
	(1500)
<u>ELECTED OFFICIALS</u>	
Village/settlement chairman	14%
City chairman (mayor)	10%
Village/settlement rada deputy	2%
City-rayon rada deputy	3%
City rada deputy	2%
Rayon rada deputy	2%
Oblast rada deputy	1%
People's Deputy of Ukraine	5%
Other national leader	★
President of Ukraine	3%
<u>APPOINTED OFFICIALS</u>	
Officials working for local executive bodies	7%
Officials working for oblast level executive bodies (including governor)	2%
Officials working for central executive bodies (including Cabinet of Ministers, Ministries, State Committees and Departments, and Administration of the President of Ukraine)	1%
No one	36%
Other	4%
Don't know	9%
No answer	★
Total	101% ✓

Q32. Why would you contact this official first?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Trust this official/level	18%
Official/level has more power	9%
Their responsibility	7%
This is the level to start with	6%
Official/level closer to people	5%
This is the required place to go	4%
Previous experience (self and others)	3%
Other	★
Don't know	4%
No answer	★

Think now about your city or village.

Q33. How well informed are you about the budget here in your [city or village] and how the funds are spent? Are you well informed, somewhat informed, not well informed, not at all informed?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Well informed	2%
Somewhat informed	7%
Not well informed	22%
Not informed at all	67%
Don't know	2%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q34. How do you get information about the budget?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
I do not receive information about the budget	56%
From newspapers in my city or village	11%
From radio in my city or village	6%
From TV in my city or village	14%
From public speeches (after the elections)	2%
From other people besides officials	6%
I only hear about this during elections	7%
Other	2%
Don't know	3%
No answer	1%

Q35. In your opinion, who should decide how the budget is used?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Village/settlement chairman; mayor	19%
Village/settlement/city-rayon/ or city rada	40%
Rayon rada	8%
Oblast level	10%
National level	3%
Other	2%
Don't know	18%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q36. If the [elected mayor] OR [village/settlement chairman] in your settlement was recalled and another person appointed by a high official to replace him or her, what would your reaction be?
 Would you . . .

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Do nothing, because it is none of your concern	25%
Do nothing, because it is useless to complain	34%
Complain, but nothing else	5%
Publicly protest	4%
Such things do not happen [VOLUNTEERED]	6%
It depends if there was good reason for it [VOLUNTEERED]	17%
Don't know	9%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Here on this card is a list of possible answers for the next questions. I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them using the answers on your list.

Q37A. The Supreme Rada

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
A great deal	2%	3%	4%	3%
Fair amount	14%	18%	18%	18%
Not very much	36%	39%	36%	40%
None at all	43%	32%	31%	33%
Don't know	5%	7%	10%	6%
No answer	★	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q37B. Cabinet of Ministers

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	2%	2%	7%	4%
Fair amount	14%	18%	30%	22%
Not very much	36%	38%	30%	35%
None at all	43%	31%	20%	31%
Don't know	5%	10%	12%	7%
No answer	★	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q37C. Presidential Administration

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	2%	2%	9%	3%
Fair amount	19%	19%	28%	19%
Not very much	31%	34%	28%	34%
None at all	37%	32%	20%	33%
Don't know	10%	11%	14%	10%
No answer	★	2%	2%	1%
Total	99% ✓	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q37D. Council for National Security and Defense of Ukraine

	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	8%
Fair amount	33%
Not very much	20%
None at all	18%
Don't know	21%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q37E. Local government bodies

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	3%	3%	6%	5%
Fair amount	14%	22%	24%	25%
Not very much	31%	34%	31%	35%
None at all	48%	33%	26%	28%
Don't know	4%	7%	11%	6%
No answer	★	2%	2%	1%
Total	100%	101% ✓	100%	100%

Q37F. Local self-government bodies

	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	6%
Fair amount	23%
Not very much	30%
None at all	28%
Don't know	10%
No answer	★
Total	97% ✓

Q37G. National Bank of Ukraine

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	5%	4%	7%	5%
Fair amount	19%	24%	23%	20%
Not very much	24%	24%	20%	25%
None at all	33%	26%	17%	32%
Don't know	18%	20%	31%	17%
No answer	1%	2%	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q37H. Ukraine's military forces

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	21%	17%	28%	24%
Fair amount	35%	42%	40%	43%
Not very much	22%	15%	9%	12%
None at all	14%	12%	7%	12%
Don't know	8%	12%	14%	9%
No answer	★	1%	2%	1%
Total	100%	99% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q37I. Constitutional Court

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	8%	15%	11%
Fair amount	27%	28%	29%
Not very much	20%	17%	22%
None at all	16%	12%	18%
Don't know	26%	26%	19%
No answer	2%	2%	1%
Total	99% ✓	100%	100%

Q37J. State Security Service

	7/97 (1200)	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	11%	12%	16%	13%
Fair amount	25%	32%	32%	33%
Not very much	24%	17%	15%	17%
None at all	22%	17%	12%	17%
Don't know	18%	21%	23%	20%
No answer	1%	2%	2%	1%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q37K. Leonid Kuchma

	6/99 (1200)	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	2%	20%	8%
Fair amount	13%	29%	21%
Not very much	32%	19%	28%
None at all	32%	21%	37%
Don't know	20%	9%	6%
No answer	2%	2%	1%
Total	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q37L. Viktor Yushchenko

	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	12%
Fair amount	29%
Not very much	21%
None at all	27%
Don't know	10%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q37M. Church

	1-2/00 (1200)	11-12/00 (1500)
A great deal	34%	32%
Fair amount	30%	30%
Not very much	9%	11%
None at all	9%	15%
Don't know	17%	11%
No answer	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%

And how much confidence do you have in each of the following branches of the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions?

Q38A. The courts

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
A great deal	4%	7%	8%	6%
Fair amount	24%	28%	26%	23%
Not very much	37%	27%	26%	30%
None at all	28%	22%	21%	30%
Don't know	7%	14%	16%	10%
No answer	★	1%	2%	
Total	100%	99% ✓	99% ✓	99% ✓

Q38B. Public prosecutors

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
A great deal	5%	6%	8%	7%
Fair amount	24%	31%	28%	25%
Not very much	34%	25%	25%	28%
None at all	28%	22%	21%	29%
Don't know	8%	15%	16%	12%
No answer	★	1%	2%	1%
Total	99% ✓	100%	100%	102% ✓

Q38C. The police

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
A great deal	4%	4%	7%	6%
Fair amount	17%	18%	19%	16%
Not very much	32%	31%	27%	32%
None at all	42%	36%	34%	40%
Don't know	5%	10%	11%	7%
No answer	★	1%	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	102% ✓

Section 4: Support for Civic Organizations

On this card you see a list of some rights many people believe are important. How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in Ukraine? Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all.

Q39A. One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Very important	38%	39%	46%	36%
Somewhat important	28%	38%	36%	32%
Not very important	17%	12%	9%	18%
Not at all important	10%	4%	3%	8%
Don't know	6%	5%	6%	5%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	99% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q39B. Honest elections are held regularly

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Very important	65%	50%	59%	54%
Somewhat important	22%	34%	29%	29%
Not very important	7%	6%	4%	6%
Not at all important	3%	2%	2%	4%
Don't know	3%	6%	6%	5%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	101% ✓	99% ✓	101% ✓	99% ✓

Q39C. The rights of minority ethnic groups are protected

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Very important	39%	36%	44%	41%
Somewhat important	29%	39%	30%	33%
Not very important	16%	11%	13%	13%
Not at all important	8%	4%	3%	5%
Don't know	7%	9%	9%	7%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q39D. The private property of individuals is protected by law

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very important	77%	55%	62%	65%
Somewhat important	16%	32%	25%	24%
Not very important	2%	5%	4%	5%
Not at all important	2%	2%	2%	2%
Don't know	3%	6%	7%	3%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q39E. Citizens have the right to form political parties

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very important	22%	22%	24%	21%
Somewhat important	24%	28%	26%	28%
Not very important	29%	30%	26%	30%
Not at all important	16%	11%	13%	14%
Don't know	8%	7%	11%	7%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q39F. The right to publicly criticize the government is protected

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very important	58%	35%	39%	37%
Somewhat important	26%	32%	28%	34%
Not very important	9%	18%	14%	15%
Not at all important	3%	6%	7%	7%
Don't know	4%	8%	10%	6%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	101% ✓	100%	99% ✓	100%

Q39G. All can freely practice the religion of one's choice

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very important	60%	46%	56%	54%
Somewhat important	26%	38%	28%	29%
Not very important	9%	9%	8%	9%
Not at all important	3%	2%	3%	4%
Don't know	2%	3%	4%	3%
No answer	★	1%	1%	★
Total	100%	100%	100%	99% ✓

Q39H. All can form associations or unions without any government involvement

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very important	23%	23%	25%	25%
Somewhat important	27%	28%	21%	27%
Not very important	26%	26%	24%	25%
Not at all important	14%	11%	13%	12%
Don't know	10%	11%	16%	11%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q40. In your opinion, do citizens of Ukraine have the possibility to unite into groups or form associations without the participation of government or not?

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	60%	55%	51%	59%
No	17%	10%	18%	22%
Depends	6%	16%	6%	--
Other	★	★	★	1%
Don't know	16%	17%	23%	18%
No answer	★	2%	1%	1%
Total	99% ✓	100%	99% ✓	101% ✓

Q41. How necessary are these non-governmental organizations, or NGOs-- essential, very necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Essential	9%	12%	8%	13%
Very necessary	23%	11%	13%	22%
Not very necessary	33%	39%	26%	34%
Not at all necessary	12%	11%	16%	9%
Depends	8%	3%	9%	--
Don't know	14%	21%	26%	22%
No answer	1%	2%	2%	1%
Total	100%	99% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q42. Do you believe that non-governmental public organizations, NGOs, can deliver some social services more effectively than state organizations?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	37%
No	26%
Don't know	37%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q43. What reasons do you have for this opinion?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Have no resources	8%
They work more effectively, with enthusiasm	8%
Less corrupt/more independent	8%
Lack of faith in NGOs	7%
Closer to the people	5%
Positive personal experience with NGOs	5%
Have no power	5%
General lack of belief in positive change	3%
Other	1%
Don't know	50%
No answer	4%

Q44. Today, some non-governmental public organizations, NGOs, are making contracts with governments to deliver public services in some cities and villages. These arrangements are called Social Partnerships. Do you know of any social partnerships of this type?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	9%
No	82%
Don't know	9%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q45. Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without being paid – definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, or definitely no?

	7/97	6/99	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Definitely yes	15%	5%	8%
Probably yes	26%	20%	31%
Probably no	10%	14%	12%
Definitely no	9%	41%	39%
Depends	4%	14%	★
Don't know	4%	5%	9%
No answer	32%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Q46. Please look at this list of voluntary organizations and activities. On the bottom are some possible answers for the first question. How much trust do you have in the activities of these groups. Do you have much trust, some trust, little trust, or no trust at all in the activities of...

Q46A-1. Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	25%
Some trust	36%
Little trust	25%
No trust at all	8%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q46A-2. Religious or church organizations

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	23%
Some trust	34%
Little trust	20%
No trust at all	14%
Don't know	9%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q46A-3. Education, arts, music or cultural activities

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	16%
Some trust	34%
Little trust	22%
No trust at all	7%
Don't know	20%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q46A-4. Trade unions

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	10%
Some trust	25%
Little trust	31%
No trust at all	21%
Don't know	12%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q46A-5. Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	14%
Some trust	23%
Little trust	28%
No trust at all	17%
Don't know	17%
No answer	2%
Total	101% ✓

Q46A-6. Human rights

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	18%
Some trust	28%
Little trust	26%
No trust at all	14%
Don't know	13%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q46A-7. Conservation of the environment

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	19%
Some trust	33%
Little trust	26%
No trust at all	10%
Don't know	13%
No answer	1%
Total	102% ✓

Q46A-8. Professional associations

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	12%
Some trust	27%
Little trust	25%
No trust at all	12%
Don't know	24%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q46A-9. Children and youth associations

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	16%
Some trust	32%
Little trust	22%
No trust at all	6%
Don't know	23%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q46A-10. Sports or recreation

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	17%
Some trust	30%
Little trust	20%
No trust at all	8%
Don't know	24%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q46A-11. Women's groups

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	17%
Some trust	29%
Little trust	21%
No trust at all	7%
Don't know	25%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q46A-12. Health organizations

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	15%
Some trust	25%
Little trust	27%
No trust at all	16%
Don't know	16%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q46A-13. Recreation (union of hunting, fishing)

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	14%
Some trust	22%
Little trust	19%
No trust at all	10%
Don't know	34%
No answer	2%
Total	101% ✓

Q46A-14. NGO for Chernobyl disaster

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	20%
Some trust	35%
Little trust	20%
No trust at all	7%
Don't know	16%
No answer	1%
Total	99% ✓

Q46A-15. Veterans associations

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	26%
Some trust	37%
Little trust	17%
No trust at all	6%
Don't know	14%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q46A-16. Veterans of Afghan war

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Much trust	25%
Some trust	35%
Little trust	16%
No trust at all	6%
Don't know	16%
No answer	2%
Total	100%

Q46B. Please look again at the list of organizations. Which, if any, do you belong to?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	1%
Religious or church organizations	3%
Education, arts, music or cultural activities	1%
Trade unions	12%
Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing	★
Human rights	★
Conservation of the environment	★
Professional organizations	1%
Children's or youth association	★
Sports or recreation	1%
Women's organization	★
Health organization	★
Recreation (Union of hunting, fishing)	1%
NGO for Chernobyl disaster	1%
Veterans associations	1%
Veterans of Afghan war	★
Other	★
None	79%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q46C. Which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	★
Religious or church organizations	1%
Education, arts, music or cultural activities	1%
Trade unions	1%
Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing	★
Human rights	★
Conservation of the environment	★
Professional organizations	1%
Children's or youth association	★
Sports or recreation	★
Women's organization	★
Health organization	★
Recreation (Union of hunting, fishing)	★
NGO for Chernobyl disaster	★
Veterans associations	★
Veterans of Afghan war	★
Other	★
None	95%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q46D. Which of these organizations do you or have you paid membership fees to?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	1%
Religious or church organizations	2%
Education, arts, music or cultural activities	★
Trade unions	22%
Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing	★
Human rights	★
Conservation of the environment	1%
Professional organizations	1%
Children's or youth association	1%
Sports or recreation	★
Women's organization	★
Health organization	1%
Recreation (Union of hunting, fishing)	1%
NGO for Chernobyl disaster	★
Veterans associations	★
Veterans of Afghan war	★
Other	1%
None	74%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q46E. Which of these that you are not involved in would you be the most willing to volunteer time for if you were able to?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	7%
Religious or church organizations	3%
Education, arts, music or cultural activities	2%
Trade unions	2%
Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing	3%
Human rights	5%
Conservation of the environment	2%
Professional organizations	1%
Children's or youth association	2%
Sports or recreation	2%
Women's organization	4%
Health organization	3%
Recreation (Union of hunting, fishing)	1%
NGO for Chernobyl disaster	1%
Veterans associations	1%
Veterans of Afghan war	1%
Other	1%
None	67%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q46F. Which of these, if any, have you gone to before to help you solve a problem?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people	2%
Religious or church organizations	1%
Education, arts, music or cultural activities	★
Trade unions	7%
Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing	1%
Human rights	1%
Conservation of the environment	★
Professional organizations	★
Children's or youth association	★
Sports or recreation	★
Women's organization	★
Health organization	★
Recreation (Union of hunting, fishing)	★
NGO for Chernobyl disaster	1%
Veterans associations	1%
Veterans of Afghan war	★
Other	★
None	85%
Don't know	★
No answer	★

Q46G. [IF THEY MENTION A NGO CATEGORY, CONTINUE] Was the organization capable of solving your problem?

	11-12/00
	<u>(228)</u>
Yes	73%
No	24%
Don't know	2%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q47. Are you a member of any political party?

	6/99	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	1%	2%
No	98%	96%
Don't know	1%	★
No answer	★	2%
Total	100%	100%

Q48. [IF Q47 = NO] What reason would be important enough for you to join a political party?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Have no reason	32%
Real activities, positive results	8%
To help ordinary people	5%
To improve personal material condition	2%
If party represents my outlook and opinions	2%
Worthy leadership	2%
Realistic and positive program	2%
Other	3%
Do not know	35%
No answer	8%
Total	99% ✓

Q49. Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not?⁹

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes, necessary for democracy	58%	46%	56%	56%	62%
No, not necessary for democracy	28%	40%	29%	32%	18%
Other	--	--	--	--	3%
Don't know	14%	13%	15%	11%	16%
No answer	★	1%	1%	★	1%
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓	99% ✓	100%

Q50. How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election — not at all important, not very important, fairly important, or very important?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very important	26%	23%	21%	34%	21%
Somewhat important	31%	35%	40%	34%	44%
Not very important	15%	16%	16%	13%	18%
Not at all important	13%	14%	9%	8%	9%
Don't know	14%	11%	12%	10%	9%
No answer	1%	★	2%	1%	1%
Total	100%	99% ✓	100%	100%	102% ✓

⁹ For surveys conducted between July 1997 and February 2000, respondents were given the following options as a response: Necessary, Strongly; Necessary, Not Strongly; Not Necessary, Not Strongly; and Not Necessary, Strongly. Necessary, Strongly and Necessary, Not Strongly have been combined and included under the response "yes, necessary for democracy." Similarly, Not Necessary, Not Strongly and Not Necessary, Strongly have been combined and included under the response "no, not necessary for democracy."

Q51. Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes, clear differences	31%	41%	40%	30%
No, not clear differences	49%	39%	37%	51%
Other	--	--	--	1%
Don't know	19%	19%	21%	16%
No answer	★	1%	1%	1%
Total	99% ✓	100%	99% ✓	99% ✓

Q52. Please look at this list of kinds of actions that people sometimes take to make their own views publicly known and to influence others. For each, please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of this activity, in general:

Q52A. Signing a petition

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Approve	57%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	28%
Disapprove	11%
Don't know	3%
No answer	★
Total	99% ✓

Q52B. Joining in a boycott

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Approve	24%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	31%
Disapprove	39%
Don't know	5%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q52C. Attending a protest demonstration or rally

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Approve	42%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	33%
Disapprove	20%
Don't know	4%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q52D. Attending a public meeting

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	48%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	29%
Disapprove	17%
Don't know	5%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q52E. Joining in an unofficial strike

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	15%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	28%
Disapprove	50%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q52F. Blocking traffic

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	10%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	19%
Disapprove	67%
Don't know	4%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q52G. Writing to a newspaper

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	60%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	25%
Disapprove	12%
Don't know	3%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q52H. Contacting a politician

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	47%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	27%
Disapprove	20%
Don't know	5%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q52I. Refusing to pay rent, rates, or taxes

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	12%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	25%
Disapprove	57%
Don't know	5%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q52J. Occupying a building or property in protest

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	5%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	10%
Disapprove	80%
Don't know	5%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q52K. Joining a group involved publicly active on an issue you believe in

11-12/00

(1500)

Approve	33%
Somewhat approve/somewhat disapprove	32%
Disapprove	23%
Don't know	12%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Section 5: General Social and Political Attitudes

Here is a list with possible answers for the next questions. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Q53. Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country.

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	7%	5%	11%	17%	13%
Somewhat agree	21%	20%	24%	23%	21%
Somewhat disagree	17%	26%	29%	25%	29%
Strongly disagree	50%	33%	29%	27%	33%
Neither agree nor disagree	2%	9%	2%	1%	--
Don't know	4%	6%	5%	6%	4%
No answer	★	1%	★	1%	★
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q54. Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening.

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	34%	36%	44%
Somewhat agree	29%	34%	32%
Somewhat disagree	19%	15%	14%
Strongly disagree	11%	8%	6%
Neither agree nor disagree	1%	1%	--
Don't know	4%	5%	4%
No answer	1%	1%	1%
Total	99% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q55. People like you have little or no influence on the way things are run in Ukraine.

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	44%	46%	52%
Somewhat agree	27%	27%	28%
Somewhat disagree	14%	15%	11%
Strongly disagree	9%	6%	5%
Neither agree nor disagree	1%	★	--
Don't know	4%	4%	3%
No answer	1%	1%	1%
Total	100%	99% ✓	100%

Q56. How interested are you in matters of politics and government -- are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very interested	16%	14%	13%	15%	18%
Somewhat interested	39%	36%	30%	35%	47%
Not too interested	23%	23%	35%	30%	23%
Not at all interested	20%	25%	21%	18%	11%
Don't know	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%
No answer	★	★	★	★	★
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q57. In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at the right pace?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Too quickly	7%	13%	5%	6%	6%
Too slowly	56%	45%	43%	38%	52%
At the right pace	9%	8%	6%	9%	5%
Reforms not happening	★	★	26%	21%	20%
Reforms are late	--	--	--	3%	--
Don't know	27%	31%	19%	22%	16%
No answer	1%	4%	2%	1%	1%
Total	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%	100%

Q58. Is Ukraine a democracy?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	20%	19%	17%	31%	22%
No	52%	55%	58%	50%	59%
Other	8%	9%	10%	6%	2%
Don't know	20%	15%	14%	12%	16%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	★	1%
Total	101% ✓	99% ✓	100%	99% ✓	100%

Q59. [IF Q58 = NO, OTHER, DON'T KNOW, NO ANSWER] Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy or not?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Moving toward becoming a democracy	24%	22%	20%	35%	23%
Not moving toward becoming a democracy	37%	36%	38%	38%	51%
Don't know	19%	22%	25%	26%	25%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓	100%	100%

Q60. What does the term democracy mean to you?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Freedom of opinion	24%
Freedom (no specific mentions)	11%
Material prosperity (without mention of social welfare)	11%
Human rights	10%
Rule of law	9%
Power of the people	9%
Equality in all before the law	7%
Social welfare	5%
Free elections, free political choice	4%
Freedom of press	4%
Public access to power/ability to influence	3%
Freedom of religion	2%
Justice	2%
National sovereignty	2%
Other	3%
Don't know	23%
No answer	3%

Q61. How likely is it that you will vote in the 2002 elections for the Supreme Rada? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely that you will vote in the next elections?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Very likely	46%
Somewhat likely	29%
Somewhat unlikely	10%
Very unlikely	9%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q62. Which political party do you think best represents your views and interests?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Agrarian Party of Ukraine (M.Hladii)	★
Communist Party of Ukraine (P.Symonenko)	18%
People's Rukh of Ukraine (G.Udovenko)	5%
People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (V.Pustovoitenko)	5%
Party of Greens (V.Kononov)	3%
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (N.Vitrenko)	2%
Selyanska Party of Ukraine (A.Tkachenko)	1%
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) (V.Medvedchuk, G.Surkis)	4%
Socialist Party of Ukraine (A.Moros)	4%
Ukrainian People's Rukh (Yu.Kostenko)	1%
Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (A.Kinakh)	1%
Party "Democratic Union" (A.Volkov)	1%
All-Ukrainian Association "Batkyivstchyna" (Yu.Timoshenko)	1%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (Ya.Stetsko)	★
Political Party "Young Ukraine"	1%
Party "Reforms and Order" (V. Pinzenyk)	2%
Labour Ukraine (S. Tigipko)	2%
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (V.Zhuravsky)	1%
Other	1%
No one	31%
Don't know	15%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q63. What are the most important issues to you that you expect your elected officials to work on when they are elected?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Raise in standard of living	30%
Economic development	16%
Resolve unemployment/ underemployment	15%
Job security/creation of work	10%
Free access to public service (medical, education)	10%
Law and order	8%
Better pensions	6%
Eliminate crime and corruption	5%
Payment of wage and pension arrears	4%
Decreased fees for community services	3%
Lowering of prices	3%
Agricultural reform	2%
Other	4%
Don't know	18%
No answer	3%

Q64. How likely is it that the 2002 elections for Supreme Rada will be free and fair: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not likely at all?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Very likely	2%
Somewhat likely	15%
Somewhat unlikely	50%
Very unlikely	21%
Don't know	11%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Please tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following questions.

Q65. If I were wrongly accused of a crime, I am sure that our judicial system would acquit me.

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	4%
Somewhat agree	17%
Somewhat disagree	33%
Strongly disagree	34%
Don't know	12%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q66. In the free market economy, buyers need to rely on themselves and not expect the government to protect them in transactions.

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	27%
Somewhat agree	26%
Somewhat disagree	22%
Strongly disagree	18%
Don't know	7%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q67. A little bit of cheating is a normal part of all business activity.

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	18%
Somewhat agree	22%
Somewhat disagree	25%
Strongly disagree	27%
Don't know	8%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q68. In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption?

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very common	67%	62%	62%	75%
Somewhat common	22%	26%	26%	18%
Not very common	2%	2%	2%	2%
Not common at all	★	★	★	★
Don't know	8%	8%	9%	5%
No answer	★	1%	1%	1%
Total	99% ✓	99% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q69. And how serious is the problem of official corruption -- is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Very serious	72%	69%	67%	81%
Somewhat serious	18%	21%	23%	15%
Not too serious	1%	2%	1%	1%
Not serious at all	1%	★	★	★
Don't know	8%	7%	8%	3%
No answer	★	1%	1%	★
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q70. Do you think the citizens of Ukraine accept official corruption as a fact of life?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Yes	62%	56%	58%
No	13%	22%	25%
Don't know	22%	21%	16%
No answer	2%	2%	1%
Total	99% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q71. And to what extent does this contribute to the problem of state (official) corruption: Very much, somewhat, not very much, not at all?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(876)</u>
Very much	37%	63%	55%
Somewhat	13%	16%	20%
Not very much	4%	7%	7%
Not at all	3%	4%	12%
Don't know	5%	9%	5%
No answer	38%	★	★
Total	100%	99% ✓	99% ✓

Q72A. Next, I will read you a list of actions people sometimes do. Please tell me for each, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified. These answers are listed on your card.

Q72A-1. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	6%
Sometimes be justified	27%
Never be justified	60%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72A-2. Cheating on tax if you had the chance

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	8%
Sometimes be justified	38%
Never be justified	48%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q72A-3. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	4%
Sometimes be justified	12%
Never be justified	79%
Don't know	4%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72A-4. Accepting money to voter for a politician or political party

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	3%
Sometimes be justified	9%
Never be justified	80%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	99% ✓

Q72A-5. Officials taking money for entrepreneurs for approving businesses quickly

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	4%
Sometimes be justified	13%
Never be justified	74%
Don't know	8%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72A-6. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	3%
Sometimes be justified	5%
Never be justified	86%
Don't know	5%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72A-7. High officials helping their associates in private business

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	4%
Sometimes be justified	16%
Never be justified	72%
Don't know	7%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72A-8. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Always be justified	3%
Sometimes be justified	4%
Never be justified	89%
Don't know	3%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72B. Now, I will read the list to you again. For each, tell me if this activity occurs often here in Ukraine. Please use the answers listed on your card. Does [READ FROM LIST] happen very often, sometimes, not very often, or never at all.

Q72B-1. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	50%
Sometimes	27%
Not very often	9%
Never at all	3%
Don't know	10%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72B-2. Cheating on tax if you had the chance

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	63%
Sometimes	24%
Not very often	5%
Never at all	2%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q72B-3. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	77%
Sometimes	14%
Not very often	3%
Never at all	1%
Don't know	4%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72B-4. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	46%
Sometimes	26%
Not very often	10%
Never at all	2%
Don't know	17%
No answer	1%
Total	102% ✓

Q72B-5. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	64%
Sometimes	20%
Not very often	4%
Never at all	1%
Don't know	11%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q72B-6. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	71%
Sometimes	15%
Not very often	3%
Never at all	★
Don't know	10%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q72B-7. High officials helping their associates in private business

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	72%
Sometimes	16%
Not very often	2%
Never at all	★
Don't know	8%
No answer	1%
Total	99% ✓

Q72B-8. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Happen very often	78%
Sometimes	13%
Not very often	3%
Never at all	★
Don't know	5%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q73. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
Generally satisfied	★	★	★	★	1%
Somewhat satisfied	2%	3%	2%	5%	4%
Somewhat dissatisfied	21%	28%	29%	36%	33%
Generally dissatisfied	75%	68%	65%	56%	59%
Don't know	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%
No answer	★	★	★	★	1%
Total	100%	100%	98% ✓	99% ✓	100%

Q74. Here you see a picture with a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state. Where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>
1 (Pure market economy)	11%	9%	9%	9%	14%
2	14%	10%	11%	19%	18%
3	22%	23%	26%	33%	32%
4	12%	12%	15%	12%	13%
5 (Centrally planned)	22%	26%	22%	14%	14%
Don't know	14%	18%	16%	13%	10%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	1%	★
Total	99% ✓	100%	100%	101% ✓	101%

Q75. In your opinion will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Better than now	12%	10%	7%	16%	13%
Remain the same	34%	38%	35%	35%	35%
Get worse	45%	40%	44%	36%	41%
Don't know	8%	11%	14%	13%	12%
No answer	★	★	★	★	★
Total	99% ✓	99% ✓	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q76. Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the judiciary, and your local government. Which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems FACING UKRAINE in the next year?

	7/97	5/98	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Executive branch	19%	17%	26%	--	23%
--Presidency	--	--	--	30%	--
--Cabinet of Ministers	--	--	--	12%	--
Supreme Rada	18%	21%	19%	5%	19%
Judiciary	13%	5%	3%	1%	4%
Local government	2%	16%	11%	4%	8%
All				15%	--
None	24%	23%	18%	18%	25%
Don't know	22%	17%	22%	13%	20%
No answer	2%	★	★	1%	★
Total	100%	99% ✓	99% ✓	99% ✓	99% ✓

Q77. In your opinion, how important are foreign investments to the economic recovery of our country? Are foreign investments very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not important at all to the economic recovery of Ukraine?

	7/97	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00
	(1200)	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)
Very important	26%	18%	17%	20%
Somewhat important	29%	25%	28%	32%
Somewhat unimportant	12%	17%	17%	17%
Not important at all	18%	23%	23%	18%
Don't know	15%	16%	16%	13%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	1%
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q78. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Ukraine's best hopes for the future lie with joining to Europe and the European Union. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?

	11-12/00
	<u>(1500)</u>
Strongly agree	20%
Somewhat agree	33%
Somewhat disagree	16%
Strongly disagree	10%
Don't know	20%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Section 6: Respondent Background

We have only a few more questions about yourself that we need to better understand your answers.

Q79. Sex of Respondent

Male	45%
Female	55%
Total	100%

Q80. Age

18-25	14%
26-35	19%
36-45	18%
46-55	18%
56+	32%
Total	101% ✓

Q81. What is the highest level of education you received?

Primary	6%
Incomplete secondary	13%
Secondary complete	28%
Secondary + specialized vocational training	31%
University degree incomplete	4%
University degree completed	18%
Advance degree (beyond university degree)	★
No answer	100%

Q82. What is your employment situation?

Employed Full-time at One Job	34%
Employed Part-time at One Job	7%
Employed at More than One Part-time Job	1%
Student	3%
Pensioner	33%
Not Employed	15%
Homemaker	6%
Other	1%
Don't know	★
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q83. What is your field of employment?

"Intellectual" Worker-Teacher, Journalist, Writer	3%
Executive or Professional at Senior-level (Government or Private)	5%
Executive or Professional at Mid-level (Government or Private)	7%
Skilled Laborer	17%
Unskilled Laborer	5%
Soldier, in Military Service	1%
Farmer	1%
Other	3%
Don't know	58%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q84a. Occupation-State Sector

Industrial productions	23%
Construction	6%
Transportation, Communications	13%
Culture and "Nauka"	13%
Trade and Services	11%
Agriculture	6%
Security Defense	7%
Other	20%
Total	99% ✓

Q84b. Occupation-Private Sector

Industrial productions	17%
Construction	9%
Transportation, Communications	12%
Culture and "Nauka"	1%
Trade and Services	42%
Agriculture	12%
Security Defense	1%
Other	7%
Total	101% ✓

Q85. Are you currently owed any back wages or pension payments from your employer or the government?

Yes	21%
No	68%
Don't know	2%
No answer	9%
Total	100%

Q86. [IF Q85 = YES] For how long a period are you owed back payments?

One Month or Less	28%
Two Months	26%
Three Months	14%
Four Months	4%
Five Months	3%
Six Months	5%
More than Six Months	18%
Don't know	2%
No answer	2%
Total	102% ✓

Q87. What is your marital status?

Married	61%
Single/Never Married	14%
Divorced/Separated	9%
Widowed	15%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q88. How many people are in your family, who live with you and keep one household (including you)?

1	15%
2	27%
3	25%
4	19%
5	10%
6	4%
7	1%
8	★
9+	★
Total	101% ✓

Q89. What is your nationality? Please pick the appropriate category from this list.

Ukrainian	75%
Russian	20%
Ukrainian and Russian	1%
Crimean Tatar	★
Polish	1%
Hungarian	★
Bulgarian	★
Gipsy	★
Jewish	★
Byelorussian	1%
Moldovan	1%
Other	1%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q90A. What is the main language you speak in your home?

Ukrainian	46%
Russian	40%
Ukrainian and Russian, both	13%
Other	1%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q90B. Do you support the principle that in the future, Ukraine should be mainly Ukrainian speaking?

Yes	44%
No	40%
Somewhat support/somewhat against	15%
Don't know	1%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q90C. In your opinion, should the Ukrainian government now spend tax money to provide opportunities for secondary education both in Russian and Ukrainian?

Yes	65%
No	15%
Somewhat yes/somewhat no	14%
Don't know	6%
No answer	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q91. With which church or religious group do you identify yourself?

Ukrainian Orthodox	36%
Other Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalna)	2%
Russian Orthodox	7%
Orthodox Christianity	17%
Roman Catholic	1%
Greek Catholic	6%
Protestant	1%
Muslim	1%
Jewish	★
Other	3%
None	25%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q92. How often do you attend religious services?

Daily	★
Multiple times weekly	2%
Weekly	5%
A few times a month	8%
A few times each year	25%
Once a year or less	11%
Depends	13%
Don't attend	34%
Don't know	1%
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q93. Which number best describes the current financial situation of you and your family living there with you?

Very poor, we do not have enough money for our most basic needs	24%
Poor, we barely have enough money to buy food, we rarely buy clothes	29%
Modest, we have enough to eat, we occasionally buy clothes, but we have nothing left over to save	36%
Moderate, we have some savings	10%
Above average, we have savings, and can afford a lot	
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Q94. In your opinion, how much do most people in Ukraine rely on the shadow economy for their livelihood?

A great deal	30%
A fair amount	34%
Not very much	11%
Not at all	5%
Don't know	20%
No answer	★
Total	100%

Q95. Have you ever used the INTERNET before? [IF YES] How often and where do you use INTERNET?

Don't know what it is	24%
Never used it	69%
Sometimes use it at work/school	4%
Sometimes use it at home	★
Often use it at work/school	2%
Often use it at home	★
No answer	1%
Total	100%

Appendix 2. The 1994 – 2000 Trend Data Set

IFES has conducted national surveys of public opinion in Ukraine since 1994. This report seeks to integrate as much of the data as possible in order to maintain and clarify the trend in responses over time. To do so, we examined repeating core questions for their similarities and differences from survey to survey:

1. January 1994
2. May 1996
3. July 1997
4. June 1998
5. June 1999
6. January 2000
7. December 2000

Table App.2.1 maps the IFES December 2000 variables to the Trend Data Set.

Table App. 2.1. Variable Map: IFES December 2000 and Trend Data Set

Trend Data Variable Label	Var. Name	December 2000 Variable Label	Var. Name
Church	Church	Religion	Q91
NGO Membership	NGO	Constructed From NGO List	Q46
Interest In Politics	T1	Interest In Politics	Q56
Foreign Investment	T10	Importance Foreign Invest	Q77
Pace Political Reforms	T11	Speed Reforms	Q57
Ukraine Democracy	T12	Ukraine Democracy	Q58
Becoming Democracy	T13	Movement to Democracy	Q59
Vote Efficacy	T14	Voting Gives Influence	Q53
Understand Politics	T15	Politics Too Complicated	Q54
Influence Politics	T16	No Influence	Q55
Parties Necessary	T17	Parties Necessary	Q49
Importance of Two Parties	T18	Two Parties Important	Q50
Clear Differences	T19	Parties Different	Q51
Satisfaction	T2	Satisfaction w/ Situation	Q73
Form NGOs	T22	Possibility of Association	Q40
NGO Necessary	T23	Ngos NECESSARY	Q41
Volunteer	T24	Volunteer NGO	Q45
Choice Parties	T25	Importance: Choice of Parties	Q39A
Honest Elections	T26	Importance: Honest Elections	Q39B
Minority Rights	T27	Importance: Minority Rights	Q39C
Private Property	T28	Importance: Private Property	Q39D
Right to Form Parties	T29	Importance: Free to Form Parties	Q39E
Right to Criticize	T30	Importance: Free Speech	Q39F
Freedom of Religion	T31	Importance: Freedom Religion	Q39G
Form Associations	T32	Importance: Freedom Association	Q39H
Supreme Rada	T33	Confidence: Supreme Rada	Q37A
Cabinet of Ministers	T34_exe	Confidence: Council of Ministers	Q37B
Presidential Administration	T35	Confidence: Presidential Administration	Q37C
Local Government	T36	Confidence: Local Government	Q37E
Central Bank	T37	Confidence: National Bank	Q37G
Military	T38	Confidence: Military	Q37H
Judicial Branch	T39	Confidence: Constitutional Court	Q37I
State Security Service	T40	Confidence: State Security	Q37J
President Kuchma	T41	Confidence: Leonid Kuchma	Q37K

Table App. 2.1. Variable Map: IFES December 2000 and Trend Data Set (continued)

Trend Data Variable Label	Var. Name	December 2000 Variable Label	Var. Name
Courts	T42	Confidence: Courts	Q38A
Public Prosecutors	T43	Confidence: Public Prosecutors	Q38B
Militia	T44	Confidence: Police	Q38C
Common	T45	Corruption Common	Q68
Serious	T46	Corruption Serious	Q69
Fact of Life	T47	Accept Corruption	Q70
Contribute to Problem	T48	Contribute to Corruption	Q71
Amount Political Info	T49	Information on Politics	Q13
Amount Economic Info	T50	Information on Economics	Q14
Shadow Economy	T52	Shadow Economy	Q94
Ideal Economy	T6	Market Vs. Central Plan	Q74
Economy One Year	T8	National Economy One Year	Q75
Resolve Econ Problems	T9	Resolve Economy	Q76

Appendix 3. Regional Classifications

Regional classifications are provided by SOGIS-Gallup based upon their own research. The following classifications are used in this report:

1. The NORTHERN Region: Kyivs'ka Zhytomyrs'ka and Chernigivs'ka oblasts;
2. The CENTRAL Region: Vinnits'ka, Kirovograds'ka, Poltavs'ka and Cherkas'ka oblasts;
3. The NORTHWESTERN Region: Volyns'ka, Rivens'ka and Khmel'nits'ka oblasts;
4. The SOUTHWESTERN Region: Zakarpats'ka and Chernivets'ka oblasts;
5. The WESTERN Region: Lvivs'ka, Ivano-Frankivs'ka and Ternopil'ska oblasts;
6. The NORTHEASTERN Region: Kharkivs'ka and Sums'ka oblasts;
7. The EASTERN Region: Dnipropetrivs'ka and Zaporiz'ka oblasts;
8. The SOUTHEASTERN Region: Donets'ka and Lugans'ka oblasts;
9. The SOUTHERN Region: Odes'ka, Mykolajivs'ka and Khersons'ka oblasts; and
10. Autonomous Republic of the Crimea.

These regions are also grouped into broader classifications as follows: 1) west Ukraine, 2) east Ukraine and 3) an intermediate area in-between the east and west. Regrouping the SOGIS regions provides the following:

Table App. 3.1. Regional Classifications

Region	West	East	Intermediate	Total
Kyiv	538			538
Northern	487		436	923
Central			1254	1254
Northeastern		737	131	868
Northwestern	694			694
Southeastern		1198		1198
Western	994			994
Southwestern	396			396
Southern		979		979
Crimea		778		778
Eastern		1559		1559
Total	3109	5251	1821	10181

The counts provided above reflect the total number of cases in the complete merged data set, 1994 – 2000, in each regional classification. This three-way classification is kept through many of the descriptive analyses. However, it became clear that data from respondents in the 'intermediate' area followed the same pattern as those in the east. In regression analyses, the three-way classification is further reduced to a two-way classification, and the 'intermediate' areas are grouped into the east.

These regions are displayed on the map on the following page.

