

PUBLIC OPINION IN
KAZAKHSTAN
1996

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I **N T R O D U C T I O N**

This report analyzes the public opinion environment in Kazakhstan – the views of the public on political and economic developments, the performance of the government, and civic and political organizations. Findings are based on the IFES country-wide opinion survey fielded in Kazakhstan in November-December 1996. The *Executive Summary* provides an overview of the survey data and the *Interpretation and Forecast* section discusses the data in terms of the processes of political change underway and the likely implications for assistance in promoting democracy and development. The presentation of the survey results is organized thematically, reporting opinion on:

- Conditions in the Country
- Economy
- Government
- Civil Society
- Information
- Ethnic Relations

The *Appendix* includes the complete question text and the marginal results in tabular form with comparisons, where applicable, to data from an IFES-sponsored nationally representative public opinion survey fielded in July, 1995.

The current IFES-sponsored survey was fielded in Kazakhstan between November 26 and December 16, 1996. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sample of 1500 adults (18 years and older) by the Giller Institute of Almaty. Data were tabulated by QEV Analytics of Washington, DC. The analysis was written by Craig Charney, the formatted report and tables were prepared by Rakesh Sharma, and editorial assistance was provided by Elehie Natalie Skoczylas and Christopher S. Siddall. Interviewing was conducted in every *oblast* (district) of the republic on the basis of a three-stage procedure designed to ensure a random representative sample of the population. With a sample size of 1500, the margin of sampling error is $\pm 2.5\%$.

This project was made possible by funds provided by the International Foundation for Election Systems. This publication was made possible through support provided by the Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States, US Agency for International Development (USAID), under the terms of Cooperative Agreement No. CCN-0007-A-00-4081-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or IFES.

E EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The IFES survey fielded in Kazakhstan between November 26 and December 16, 1996, shows that the public is:

" ***discontented with conditions in the country***

Public discontent with economic, political, and social conditions is widespread and growing, although support for independence remains strong.

" ***fairly favorable toward a market economy and economic reform, and strongly attached to private property***

Kazakhstanis remain divided over the principle of a market economy, although the market economy has developed a predominantly positive image. Furthermore, when it comes to the concrete reform of the economy, the majority feels it is occurring too slowly, although they remain committed to an incremental approach to change. The clearest evidence of a fundamental acceptance of capitalist relations can be found in the overwhelming support for private property in land, although even here a need for social regulation is recognized.

" ***ready to offer a qualified welcome to foreign investment***

There is broad acceptance of foreign investment in Kazakhstan. However, only about half of the populace thinks it should be actively welcomed, and few believe foreign companies should be allowed to own land.

" ***supportive of democratic rights, but increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of government institutions***

Democratic rights now enjoy clear majority support in Kazakhstan, and this viewpoint has gained ground in the last year despite the country's political troubles. Support for political freedom is also linked to support for the free market. What has changed during the recent upheavals is the public's view of the political system: a plurality now says that Kazakhstan is not a democracy. Russia is considered more democratic than Kazakhstan. Discontent is widespread with the major political institutions of both central and local government. Support for democratizing electoral reform has increased but there is no clarity as to the specific sort of change desired.

" **increasingly worried about corruption**

Most of the public thinks corruption is widespread and serious – and the proportion sharing that view has grown since the last survey.

" **in favor of capitalist models of political and economic development, but ones with high degrees of state regulation**

The most attractive economic models for Kazakhstanis are Western Europe and East Asia, while the most attractive political models are the United States and Western Europe.

" **increasingly alienated from politics as practiced, though not from government in principle**

Only two-fifths of Kazakhstanis are interested in politics, a substantial drop from the previous poll. Disinterest rises with dissatisfaction with the regime, while interest increases with age and education. However, the citizens are not disenchanted with government per se: a large majority believes the government in Almaty could significantly improve their lives through its policies and actions.

" **strongly supportive of democratic rights – but convinced government does not respect them**

Kazakhstanis are fiercely committed to the right to private property, free speech, protection for minorities, freedom of religion, and criticism of government. However, they feel the government does not respect these rights, and their confidence in the militia, prosecutors, and courts is low and deteriorating. Nonetheless, they believe strongly in the need for judicial independence.

" **divided over non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – and unfamiliar with them**

Kazakhstan's public is split almost evenly on the need for NGOs and is increasingly aware of the difficulty of forming them. In general, those who support liberal positions on other economic and political questions tend to be more favorable and optimistic concerning NGOs. Quite few (under one-fifth) are aware of such groups in their communities, although up to half indicate an interest in joining one or another type of NGO. The ones with the broadest general appeal are environmental, social welfare, and educational organizations, although women's, youth, ethnic, and religious organizations all have some draw in their specific constituencies. Political parties have little appeal, as does unpaid volunteer work for NGOs.

" **favorable to multi-party democracy, but not to the existing parties**

The public in Kazakhstan supports the existence of multi-party democracy, but they are not very supportive of the existing parties. They would also grant the right to nominate candidates for office to community organizations, local governments, and the President as well as to political parties, and they say that they would be likelier to vote for an independent candidate than one backed by a party. There is no party which enjoys the identification of more than one in ten of the voters, and almost half identify with none at all.

" **feeling ill-informed about the reform process**

Most Kazakhstanis feel they do not have enough information about their country's political or economic reforms or their own rights – and the proportion who feel that way has jumped substantially since 1995.

" **suspicious of the independence of domestic state media**

The widest-reaching media in Kazakhstan are Russian Federation TV and Kazakhstanis print media and radio in Russian. All domestic media are regarded as government controlled, while uncertainty prevails about the independence of foreign news media.

" **fairly tranquil about inter-ethnic relations**

Current ethnic relations between Kazakhs, Russians, and other minorities appear fairly relaxed, and there is no expectation of dramatic change. There is a consensus about protecting the cultural legacy of Kazakhstan among all three groups. Ethnic differences in reactions to citizenship do persist, but appear largely mediated by satisfaction with the performance of government and economy rather than by pure ethnic factors.

I **N T E R P R E T A T I O N A N D F O R E C A S T**

The findings of the latest IFES survey provide a snapshot of where Kazakhstan stands after the first five years of its difficult transition from communist rule and socialist economy. Compared to the results of the 1995 IFES poll, they reveal an increase in support for the principles of reform even as public discontent with the authorities has risen. Placed in the context of political developments in Kazakhstan in the most recent period, the areas where support for the democratization and economic liberalization processes are likeliest to effect progress most quickly appear to be electoral reform, civil society, and independent media.

*** Patterns of Change in Kazakhstani Politics**

The overall level of satisfaction among Kazakhstanis with conditions in the country is both low and declining. Only one in four thinks the country is headed in the right direction, just one in six is satisfied with the situation in the country today, and a mere one in ten is content with its economic situation. The proportion satisfied with the country's situation has dropped 5 percent since the last IFES poll in July 1995.

This is not surprising, considering the dramatic economic and political circumstances the country has experienced since the previous IFES study. The early years of independence were marked by the dislocation of internal and external economic exchanges and payments which characterized many of the former socialist countries, associated with tremendous shortages of goods and hyperinflation. While inflation has abated, prices remain at far higher real levels than before the beginning of the transition, and crisis conditions have worsened in internal payments of taxes, bills, and above all, wages and salaries¹. Politically, the most recent period has been marked by the dismissal of the *Majlis* (parliament) by the courts on grounds of electoral irregularities, the election of a new one in a process also alleged to have borne the imprint of the administration, a new constitution providing for an appointed rather than elected upper house, and increasing government pressure against opposition political activity and restrictions on independent media.

Rather than declining in the face of these difficulties – as some might have expected – support for political reform has grown since the previous survey. The data on free political activity show a significant upturn in public favor between the two surveys. Even more significant is the fact that the change has been concentrated among the groups who tended to be most unfavorable to liberalization – such as older, low socio-economic status (SES), rural and small-town dwellers. This is of cardinal importance, for it means that the continuing crisis has alienated people from the

economic and political relics of the old regime – not from the reform process – and that it is the groups most skeptical of the process of liberalization which are coming to accept its importance.

Yet increased support for reform has not been associated with a high level of support for the regime. Around two-thirds of the public considers the principal political institutions – including the Cabinet, *Majlis*, and local government – to be unresponsive. While the public favors multi-party elections, none of the existing parties can claim more than 10% support, and they are held in such low repute that the majority of the public says they are actually less likely to vote for a candidate bearing a party label than for an independent. Public confidence in the judiciary, militia (police), and office of the public prosecutor is also low and dropping, probably reflecting their role in the apparatus of state repression. Further evidence of public alienation from the existing political process is evident in the survey findings which indicate a drop in interest in politics and growing cynicism about elections.

Kazakhstanis are split on the need for NGOs. However, the public has little experience or familiarity with non-governmental organizations: fewer than one-fifth are aware of such groups in their communities. This is particularly marked with respect to the media: large majorities see all the local media as heavily state-controlled.

OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

In view of the political environment revealed by the latest poll results, dramatic improvement in the performance of democratic representative and legal institutions does not seem likely to be a realistic expectation. Given the extent of public discontent revealed by the survey, one cannot assume that measures which would allow freer expression of dissent and raise public expectations are likely to be high priorities for the authorities. In fact, during the past year, there have been increasing restrictions on the independent media and free association. While one can speculate that this situation may change if revenue from new oil exploitations, now rapidly rising, restores a degree of prosperity, for the time being the reality is a sullen quiescence marked by public alienation from politics and political institutions.

It should not be assumed that repression and depression will guarantee stability. There is the possibility of a cascade of popular discontent against the state if a dissident leadership synthesizing nationalist and liberal themes can emerge and find a way to reach a mass public. History is replete with cases which suggest that a high degree of public discontent and low degree of organized channels for it through existing party and electoral processes can lead to upheaval. Such a development would have to overcome some difficult barriers, such as the lack of political information available which emerges in the survey findings. However, against such a backdrop, questionable elections could be the precipitant – one thinks of the *Sajedno* protests recently concluded in Belgrade or those of the PAN against electoral fraud in Mexico.

It thus appears that the most promising avenue for support in the immediate future would lie in the area of non-governmental organizations and media. Government has formally pledged its willingness to be supportive of NGOs in the past year and has demonstrated this willingness with much fanfare by allowing debate of a new NGO law in parliament. This suggests a degree of political opportunity for NGO development in Kazakhstan. At the same time, there is evidence in the survey that much of the public would be interested in participating in NGOs but has not had a chance to do so. Support for the development of NGO activity could therefore quite possibly have a substantial payoff. This support could perhaps be extended without too much difficulty to small, independent, and local-oriented media (radio stations like B-92 in Belgrade or community newspapers like those USAID funded in South Africa), which could try to find space by acting as NGOs while beginning to transform the informational environment. A more informed civil society and populace could be more motivated, less quiescent, and better able to participate in social change.

Possible activities which could strengthen the formal political institutions would certainly be desirable, to judge by the lack of confidence in them revealed by the survey results, but may be difficult to implement in the existing political environment. Given the severity of the problems facing the parliament, local governmental machinery, mass media, and justice system, it may be difficult to put into place meaningful programs to assist reforms in those areas. Electoral reform may be the first on which to concentrate. Such reform enjoys clear demand from the public and since without improved election processes and increased confidence in the electoral system it will be more difficult to make headway in other areas of promoting democratic participation and accountability. Judgement will have to be made in this and each other specific domain as to whether the potential gains are sufficient to warrant emphasis on these priorities at present.


C ONDITIONS IN COUNTRY

Public discontent with economic, political, and social conditions is widespread and growing, although support for independence remains strong.

* General Mood

The public in Kazakhstan is deeply discontented – even more so than a year ago – and quite pessimistic. Country-wide, more than four-fifths (82%) are dissatisfied with the situation in the country (44% somewhat and 38% very dissatisfied). This figure is up five percent since the 1995 survey, when 77% were dissatisfied (Table 1 in Appendix). Dissatisfaction runs through all demographic groups² and both major ethnicities, Kazak and Russian.

Figure A. Satisfaction with Conditions



Q

Question: Thinking about our country's situation overall, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with it? (IFES December 1996 Survey)

The country's severe economic problems remain the principal reasons for dissatisfaction mentioned by respondents in the current survey, as in last year's poll (Figure B on next page; Table 2 in Appendix).

Figure B. Principal Reasons for Dissatisfaction
 (All responses mentioned by more than 2%)

Most frequently volunteered reason for dissatisfaction (in %) (Sample size)	Total Adult Population (1500)
Economic factors	
Delay of salary/pension	18%
Reduction of finances	17%
Unemployment	11%
Bad economic situation	6%
Reduction of social welfare	4%
Bad workings of municipal services	3%
Instability	3%
Other	16%
Don*t know/No response	5%
NOT ASKED	16%
Total	99%


Question: Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are dissatisfied with the situation in Kazakhstan today? (IFES December 1996 Survey)

Among the small minority (16%) who were satisfied, the principal reasons cited were interethnic stability (4%), political stability (2%), and larger opportunities (2%). No other factor was mentioned by more than 1%.

Reflecting the overall pessimism, 48% of the people do not think the country is headed in the right direction, while only one-quarter (25%) think it is (Figure C on next page; Table 3 in Appendix). This view prevails among both sexes, all age groups, and communities of all sizes. However, a more optimistic view predominates among some groups:

- Kazakhs
- High and moderate SES individuals (self identified)
- Those who consider Kazakhstan a democracy
- Those satisfied with the direction and pace of economic reforms

Figure C. Direction of Country



To explore the public's specific concerns in more detail, the survey included a socio-political issues battery – eight questions examining public satisfaction with political, economic, and social conditions (Table 4 in Appendix). The results showed that dissatisfaction is massive – over 80% – with the social welfare system (88% dissatisfied, 57% completely), crime (85% dissatisfied, 55% completely), health care (86% dissatisfied, 54% completely), and the economic reforms (80% dissatisfied, though just 35% completely) (See Figure D on next page). The first three were also the areas which led the list of public concerns last year, and the proportions discontented were so high that little growth was possible in the numbers (Economic reform was not included as an item last year).

However, continuing political turbulence and repression during 1996 appear to have left a forceful mark on public opinion. Compared to the 1995 survey, the biggest surge in dissatisfaction was registered on the electoral system (+20%), after substantial questions of electoral malpractice had been raised concerning two successive elections. There was also a substantial increase in dissatisfaction with the protection of freedom by the government (+14%), and overall political and civil freedom (+13%). As a result, the level of dissatisfaction on these issues (ranging from 58% to 69%) is now only a little below that of the top-ranking concerns mentioned above, and comparable to that on education (68%) (See Figure D on next page).

Figure D. Socio-Political Issues


(Sample size)	Total Adult Population (1500)			Change in Dissatisfaction 95-96
	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Don't Know	
Percent satisfied/dissatisfied with the ...				
Social Welfare System	88	10	1	0
Fight Against Crime	85	13	2	+10
Quality of Health Care	86	13	1	+2
Economic Reforms	80	16	4	N/A
Protection of Freedom by the Govt.	69	26	5	+14
Educational System	68	27	4	+4
Electoral System	61	27	11	+20
Political and Civil Freedom	58	33	9	+13

Question: "As I read the following statements, please tell me to what degree are you satisfied or dissatisfied with it - you are completely satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with each of the following ..." (IFES December 1996 Survey)

* Economic Situation


Kazakhstan's citizens are virtually unanimous that the country's economy is in poor shape: 88% say the economic situation is "bad" (43% very, 45% somewhat), and just 10% say it is "good" (Table 5 in Appendix).

Figure E. Current Economic Situation




Just how difficult the economic situation has become can be glimpsed from the fact that 82% of the people agree that it is "very hard" for their families "to have enough money to buy food each month." This includes 94% of pensioners, 92% of those who identify themselves as being of low SES and 91% of single parents – but the situation is so severe that it also includes 48% of those who say they are of high social status and 69% of married couples without children. It also provides a measure of the continuing pressure facing ordinary Kazakhstanis: last year the proportion who said it was very hard to buy enough food last year was 74%, eight points lower.

Figure F. Percentage Having Difficulty Buying Enough Food for Family




With the deepening of the economic crisis, expectations for the near future are dim: 43% of Kazakhstanis expect the economic situation will be worse in six months, 38% think it will be the same, and just 10% say it will be better (Table 6 in Appendix). The corresponding figures in the last survey, which asked about conditions one year ahead, were 35% worse, 32% the same, and 23% better. These views prevail among every demographic group and people of every political viewpoint.

Figure G. Future Economic Situation



Prospects for the long term also look poor to Kazakhstanis. Some 57% say the lives of today's young people will be worse than those of their parents, against 21% who think they will be better, while 12% think they will be the same (Table 7 in Appendix). The view that the young will have worse lives is shared by all age and educational groups, while the only political groups who think they will improve are the small, contented minority who think the country is headed in the right direction, that its situation is satisfactory or has improved since independence, that the pace of economic reform is about right, or that the economy will be better in six months.


Figure H. Quality of Life of Young People



* Crime

Another area of public pessimism concerns crime. The sharp rise in criminal activity over the past several years remains a major concern of the citizens, as we have seen, and they expect little change although further deterioration is not expected. The proportion expecting the situation to remain the same has increased (from 39% in 1995 to 52% today). The proportion who think things will get worse has remained roughly at the same level (28% in 1995, 24% in 1996; see Table 8 in Appendix). The proportion expecting law and order to improve also dropped down to 16% (-7%).

Figure I. Law and Order




* Life Since Independence

Given these realities, it will be of little surprise to the reader that since the independence of Kazakhstan from the former Soviet Union in 1991, living standards are perceived by most (79%) as having deteriorated. A mere 8% say they have improved, and just 12% say they have stayed the same (Table 9 in Appendix). The worsening situation in the past year can be seen by comparing the results for 1995, when a somewhat smaller 67% said things had gotten worse.

Notwithstanding the many problems facing the country, a majority of Kazakhstan's citizens (53%) think the country's declaration of independence in 1991 was "a good thing," while only 40% say it was a "bad thing" (Table 10 in Appendix). Their endorsement of independence is less than emphatic; only 17% say it was a "very good thing," while 36% say it was "somewhat good." Given

the rampant dissatisfaction with the situation of the country, the economic conditions, and the general direction of the country, it is surprising to find this degree of support. Similar data for Slovakia, for instance, show that the public there regrets independence from the Czech Republic by a two-to-one margin.³

Figure J. Effects of Declaration of Independence



Not surprisingly, support for independence divides along lines of ethnicity: Kazakhs are favorable by 75% to 20%, while Russians say it was a bad thing by 56% to 35%. However, there is also a class difference: those of high SES (self-ID) say independence was a good thing, 74% to 24%, while among those of low SES the view that it was a bad thing predominates by a narrow 49% to 43% margin. Pensioners, particularly hard hit by payments delays and price increases over the past several years and nostalgic for the security and prestige the Soviet Union provided, by a wide margin appear to be hostile to independence (52% say it was a bad thing compared to 35% who say it was a good thing).

Nonetheless, the fact that in these circumstances a majority continues to believe independence was a good thing is interesting, and suggests that more than material factors are at work in the judgment. Some of these factors – including support for economic liberalization, political democratization, the free flow of information, and ethnic relations – will be examined in the sections which follow.

E

CONOMY


REFORMS, PRIVATIZATION, AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Kazakhstanis remain divided over the principle of a market economy, although the market economy has developed a predominantly positive image. Furthermore, when it comes to the concrete reform of the economy, the majority feels it is occurring too slowly, although they remain committed to an incremental approach to change. The clearest evidence of a fundamental acceptance of capitalist relations can be found in the overwhelming support for private property in land, although even here a need for social regulation is recognized.

* State Control of the Economy

When forced to choose between the polar alternatives of state control or the free market, Kazakhstanis are almost evenly split: 48% opt for a "return to an economy basically controlled by the state," while 45% want to "develop an economy with limited state control" (Figure K on next page; Table 11 in Appendix). Considering that the introduction of the market economy began little more than five years ago, and the aforementioned difficulties which the population has experienced during the transition, this is a fairly favorable result for the free-market alternative. That becomes more evident if we compare these figures to the results of the 1996 IFES survey in the Ukraine, another former Soviet country experiencing economic difficulties, where the citizens preferred state control to limited government control, 47% to 35%. Moreover, given the sympathy of many Kazakhstanis for a market economy with significant state intervention (see "Models of Development," p. 36), the harsh choice between full or limited state control offered by this question probably under-rates support among them for a market system. A capitalist model with significant state regulation on the East Asian or Western European model would probably win a clear majority over a command economy of the socialist type.

Figure K. Preferred Economic System



The attitudes of specific social and economic groups in Kazakhstan towards limited state control tends to correspond to whether they figure among potential winners or losers from the reforms, conforming to the general picture in post-communist countries. Thus, men are almost evenly split, (48% for limited state control, 47% for a return to a command economy), as are women (48% for state control, 43% for limiting it). Those younger than 45 are in favor of limited state control (50% to 43% for command economy) and those older favor a command economy (57% to 42%). The university-educated favor less state control (62% to 34%), those with high school or less education prefer state control (51% to 41%). Urbanites – residents of cities of 50,000 or larger – prefer less state control (51% to 41%), while those in smaller towns or rural areas want to return to full state control (52% to 42%). In short, those who have the social position, background, flexibility, and location to profit from the opportunities offered by the market economy are most positive towards it. In terms of attitudes, those who are optimistic about conditions in the country are the most positive towards the reforms: people who say the country is headed in the right direction prefer limited state control by 62% to 32%, as do those satisfied with the country's situation (55% to 37%).

The survey data for 1996 hint at a possible rise in support for liberal economic reforms: the proportion in favor of "an economy free of any state control" in 1995 was 37%, while that in favor of "an economy with limited state control" in 1996 was 46%. It is not possible to directly compare the proportions who favored less state control in 1995 and 1996 due to the differences in question

wording and response options. However, there was no commensurate decline among those who support a return to a command economy -- as many in 1996 as in 1995 support returning to "an economy basically controlled by the state."

* **Meaning of a Market Economy**

The positive views of many Kazakhstanis on the meaning of a free or market economy may help explain its attraction to them. When asked an open-ended question on this subject, their responses were largely favorable: 50% responded with positive associations, while just 11% mentioned negative associations (see Figure L next page). The strongest positive themes were prosperity and employment, each mentioned by 14%, followed by freedom (11%), and social order (7%). The negatives mentioned by more than 1% were high prices (4%), unemployment (2%), and social disorder (2%). However, there were also 29% who did not respond to this question or offered a meaningless response: these probably include many of those who remain unsure what a market economy can offer them (Table 12 in Appendix).

Figure L. Meaning of Free or Market Economy

(Sample Size)	(1500)
Prosperity	
Good financial situation	5%
High level of production	4%
Large variety of goods	3%
Abundance of goods	2%
Employment	
Possibility of work	9%
To work and get food	3%
To work for one*s own profession	2%
Freedom	
Freedom of economics	11%
Social order	
Stability	4%
Order/responsibility	3%
Other positives	4%
SUBTOTAL	50%
Negatives	
High prices	4%
Unemployment	2%
Social Disorder	2%
Other negatives	3%
SUBTOTAL	11%
Other	10%
Don't Know/No Response/Incorrect Response	29%
Total	100%
Question text: What does it mean to you to live in a free or market economy? I mean, how do you think it differs from what was in the past? (Open-Ended Response) (IFES December 1996 survey)	

*** Pace of Economic Reform**

Yet if market reform is attractive in principle to many citizens of Kazakhstan, they do not feel that they are getting there quickly enough. A 51% majority says that economic reforms are being made "too slowly," while just 19% says they are occurring "too rapidly," and a mere 9% says they are happening "at the right speed" (Table 13 in Appendix). At the same time, they are not calling for movement at a breakneck pace: 49% call for "small but steady reforms," while only 27% call for movement "as rapidly as possible." Just 12% said that the country should not pursue a free economy (Table 14 in Appendix). Moreover, on these points there is a striking consensus. Even among those who prefer a state-controlled economy, 53% believe reforms are going too slowly.



This suggests that many of those who do not want to go all the way to a *laissez-faire* system still do not believe that market-related changes have gone far enough, and should not be regarded as die-hard opponents of further reform.

* Private Property in Land

An even clearer consensus has emerged in favor of private property in land, as the era of collective farming gives way to one more favorable to individual rights. Kazakhstanis agree that “citizens should have the right to own land as private property” by a huge 84% to 12% majority (and 58% completely agree). Some 74% agree that “citizens should have the right to buy and sell land,” while just 23% disagree. However, they do not regard property rights as absolute, and agree with some state regulation of land use. Thus 85% hold that “the use of land, even land held in private hands, should be regulated by law; while just 11% disagree (Table 15 in Appendix). The views of rural residents are virtually identical to those of the public at large on all these issues.


F OREIGN INVESTMENT

There is broad acceptance of foreign investment in Kazakhstan. However, only about half of the populace thinks it should be actively welcomed, and few believe foreign companies should be allowed to own land.

The Kazakhstani populace is fairly open to the idea of foreign investment: 75% believe it should be welcomed or allowed, while just 17% say it should be prohibited. This is similar to the proportion willing to accept it last year (78%, with 13% in favor of prohibition). However, their enthusiasm is a tempered one: while 47% would “welcome” investment, 28% believe it should be allowed, but not encouraged. Moreover, of the former group, most (40%) say they would “welcome investment with some limitations,” while merely 7% would “welcome investments to any extent” (Table 16 in Appendix).

Reflecting their common root in economic liberalism, attitudes towards foreign investment are closely linked to attitudes towards state control of the economy. Of those who prefer an economy with little state control, 63% would “welcome” foreign investment, while among those who prefer a return to state control, only 35% express similar views.

Chart M. Privatization & Foreign Investment



Given this situation, it is no surprise that the groups among whom a welcoming attitude to foreign

investment predominates are much the same as those who oppose state control:

- men
- younger than 45
- in urban areas with over 50,000 residents
- high and moderate-high in SES (observed)
- better-educated (university or technical school)
- optimistic about the country's direction or its current situation

However, the enthusiasm of Kazakhstanis for foreign investment has cooled noticeably since the 1995 survey. In that poll, 63% of the public said they would welcome it, while in the latest one only 47% said the same. The decline in the degree of support was pretty general across most social and ideological groups. The one group in which it was particularly concentrated, however was Kazakhs (-22%), who had been more favorable to foreign investment than Russians in the first poll and were less favorable than them in the second. This may suggest that the bloom is off the rose of foreign investment for the ethnic Kazak population; many no longer expect their economic salvation to come from abroad.

The qualified nature of the welcome accorded foreign investment in Kazakhstan also comes through in the 1996 data on another question: land ownership by foreign companies. This is opposed by 75% of the public, and would be allowed by only 20% – virtually the same result as a year before (74% against, 21% in favor) (See Table 17 in Appendix). This consensus includes those who welcome foreign investment (64% against selling land to foreigners to 33% for selling land to foreigners).

Thus, while Kazakhstanis remain divided on the stark choice in principle between minimal state intervention and a state-controlled economy, they find much about the free market attractive. Moreover, the majority does not believe that the economic reforms in their country have gone far or fast enough in this direction, although they prefer gradual to sudden change. They have broken with communist dogma most clearly in the area of land, where they strongly support individual ownership, though here, too, their stance is tempered by a desire for state regulation of land use. They are also prepared to accord a cautious welcome to foreign investment.


Democratic rights now enjoy clear majority support in Kazakhstan, and this viewpoint has gained ground in the last year despite the country's political troubles. Support for political freedom is also linked to support for the free market. What has changed during the recent upheavals is the public's view of the political system: a plurality now says that Kazakhstan is not a democracy. Russia is considered more democratic than Kazakhstan. Discontent is widespread with the major political institutions of both central and local government. Support for democratizing electoral reform has increased but there is no clarity as to the specific sort of change desired.

* Attitudes Towards Democracy

Despite the difficult circumstances they are living through, Kazakhstani are not turning away from democracy; indeed, the latest survey findings show broad and growing support among them for democratic norms even as the country's political and economic crises have deepened. They reject by 58% to 39% the proposition that "in order to establish order and discipline, it is necessary to limit the political and civic rights of the people" (See Figure N on next page; Table 18 in Appendix). These sentiments hold virtually across the board in Kazakhstan. (The only exceptions are two relatively small groups nostalgic for the old order: pensioners and those who believe in a system of no political parties or a single party). Similarly, the viewpoint that "it is necessary to have a dictatorship" in order to impose order and discipline is rejected by a slightly larger margin of 60% to 36%.

Figure N. Limiting Rights

Question: Now I will read to you two statements, please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with each statement: "In order to establish order and discipline, it is necessary to limit the political and civic rights of the people." (IFES December 1996 Survey)



It is particularly noteworthy that opposition to anti-democratic measures has increased over the past year, notwithstanding the turbulence which Kazakhstan has experienced. In 1995, the public was evenly split on limiting rights, 45% against, 44% in favor; since then the proportion against has risen 13% while that in favor has dropped by 5%. As in 1995, the public continues to reject the proposition that "to establish order and discipline" it is "necessary to have a dictatorship" (in 1996, 60% disagree with the proposition and 36% agree; in 1995, 57% disagreed to 37% who agreed with the proposition). The effect of political instability and repression during 1995-96 appears to have been to build support for democracy rather than to erode it, just as economic crisis appears to have increased rather than decreased support for a market economy.

Indeed, the data also point to a linkage between support for political and economic liberalism, albeit an imperfect one. Some 51% of those who oppose limiting civil and political rights also favor minimal state intervention in the economy over state control, although a sizable 43% of them do support state control. Conversely, those who favor limiting political freedom also prefer state control of the economy by a more decisive 56% to 40%.

Given this link, it is understandable that those most strongly opposed to limiting political rights are largely those who opposed state control of the economy: the young, better educated, high SES, and urban populations, as well as those satisfied with the country's situation. Change on limiting rights has been concentrated in the groups taking illiberal positions on this issue in the previous

survey : those over 45, the better educated, those in rural areas and smaller cities, and men (enough among them to wipe out what was substantial gender gap in the previous poll). However, the change has been independent of ethnicity: opposition to limits on democratic rights has grown by equal percentages among Kazakhs and Russians.

Figure O. Opposition to Limiting Democratic Rights, By Social Group

Highest	Lowest	Fastest Growth
Young	Older	Older
Better Educated	Less Educated	Better Educated
High SES (Observed)	Low SES (Observed)	[Can't Compare]*
Urban	Rural	Small-Medium Urban
Russians	Kazakhs	Both Equal
		Men

*SES was tabulated differently in the 1995 and 1996 surveys, precluding direct comparisons.

In addition to the questions on limiting rights, the extent to which the meaning of democracy has become linked to rights in the Kazakhstani public's mind also emerges clearly in the results of an open-ended question on the what democracy means to them (Table 19 in Appendix). Almost half (47%) mentioned rights and freedoms in response, while only one in six (16%) cited economic benefits. The first group included those who mentioned observing rights and civic freedoms – each one-fifth of the people – as well as those who referred to having a constitution (4%) and the equality of all (2%). The second group included those who referred to working and getting paid for it (5%), a higher quality of life (5%), confidence in the future (3%), and social protection (3%).

What this means is that democracy appears to be valued for the personal freedoms and rights it provides, not for material benefits (which have been scant in the case of Kazakhstan in any event). However, the fact that more than one in four (28%) of the people cannot say what democracy means to them indicates that there is still a sizable portion of the society which needs education in democracy (see Figure P next page).


Figure P. Meaning of Democracy

(Sample Size)		(1500)
Rights and Freedoms		
Observance of Rights		21%
Freedom of Citizens		20%
Constitution		4%
Equality of All Citizens		2%
Freedom to leave the country		1%
Economic Benefits		
To work and get paid		5%
High quality of life		5%
Confidence in the future		3%
Social protection		3%
Other		7%
Don't Know/No Response	Incorrect Response	28%
Total		99%
Question text: What does it mean to you to live in a democracy? (Open-Ended Response) (IFES December 1996 survey)		

*** Is Kazakhstan a Democracy?**

By a margin of 44% to 35%, Kazakhstanis say that their country is “primarily not a democracy.” This is one of the most important shifts revealed by 1996 survey, since the year before the people had responded to a similarly worded question by saying that Kazakhstan was a democracy by 42% to 33% (See Figure Q on next page; Table 20 in Appendix). The intervening sixteen months, of course, have been marked by the dismissal on the *Majlis* on grounds of electoral malpractice, the installation of another one also of contested legitimacy and widespread repression of opposition political activity. This finding fits neatly with the above-mentioned increase in public worry about the protection of rights and liberties over the same period, but it reveals a qualitative shift in the nature of their concern. For a plurality of Kazakhstanis, anti-democratic practices have reached a level which casts doubt on the democratic nature of the regime itself. This perception is underlined when those who say Kazakhstan is undemocratic are asked where it is going: they respond that it is not “moving toward becoming a democracy” by almost two to one (58% to 30% among those who say Kazakhstan is not a democracy) (See Table 21 in Appendix).

Figure Q. Is Kazakhstan a Democracy?



Opinions about whether Kazakhstan is a democracy shifted most among the small ethnic minorities (Uzbek, German and other non-Russian groups), where the proportion which thinks the country is not a democracy increased by 22% from 1995. Ethnic Kazakhs and Russians who feel that Kazakhstan is not a democracy also increased by 8 and 9 percent respectively from 1995. The change also occurred principally among men (+15%) and those who live in communities of under 50,000 (+12%) and rural areas (+17%). These data would seem to correspond to a situation where the brunt of absence of democracy is felt particularly by smaller groups and in smaller communities.

At present, variations in response to the question of democracy in Kazakhstan appear to be driven by ethnic background and satisfaction with one's circumstances under the current regime. Thus the groups in which a plurality says that Kazakhstan is a democracy are:

- Kazakhs
- those who consider their ethnicity more important than their citizenship
- those satisfied with the country's direction or current situation
- those who say conditions have improved since independence

When asked whether the citizens of Kazakhstan could "substantively influence the course of development in the country" by participating in an election, Kazakhstanis said they could not by a 51% to 42% majority (Table 22 in Appendix). Very similar findings were produced by a question


on a related theme: by 57% to 38%, Kazakhstanis disagreed with the claim that voting gives people like them “a chance to influence decisions” in their country (Table 23 in Appendix).

There were close links between popular views on the existence of democracy in Kazakhstan and attitudes towards the impact of elections. Those who said Kazakhstan is not a democracy also said that elections do not promote citizen influence by almost two to one (63% to 33%), while those who thought it is a democracy believe elections make a difference by a roughly similar margin (58% to 33%). Not surprisingly, the groups who say elections provide a channel for citizen influence are also much the same as those who think the country is democratic: Kazakhs, high SES people, and those satisfied with the country’s circumstances or direction. The data suggest that a sizable and growing proportion of the population appears to have been alienated from the political system by the course of political events in the country. While not a complete solution, genuine electoral reform to ensure legitimate elections would appear a necessary condition to reverse this situation.

*** Which is More Democratic: Kazakhstan or Russia?**

Indeed, while few Kazakhstanis see Russia as the model they would prefer (see Table 34 in Appendix), a growing plurality sees Russia – despite all its political difficulties – as “more democratic” than Kazakhstan (Table 35 in Appendix). This is the view of 36% of the people, while just 8% consider Kazakhstan more democratic (One third say “both are equally democratic,” while 11% volunteer that neither are). A comparison with the results of the 1995 survey shows that the opinion that Russia is more democratic has gained ground: the proportion of those who say Russia is more democratic has grown by 12% (from 24%), while the share who think Kazakhstan is more democratic is down 8 points on the previous figure (16%) (see Figure R next page). This may well reflect the impact on public opinion of the highly publicized Russian election, which for all its flaws was a real and decisive contest for power. In fact, in the 1996 survey, in not a single category of respondents – including the most nationalistic, the most satisfied with the regime, and those who considered Kazakhstan a democracy – was the proportion who thought Kazakhstan more democratic larger than the proportion who thought Russia was. This is further evidence of the public’s critical view of their country’s political system.

Figure R. More Democratic: Kazakhstan or Russia?




* Satisfaction with Kazakhstan's Political Institutions

The public's dissatisfaction extends to every level of government in Kazakhstan. When asked whether they are "responsive ... to the needs and concerns of the people," the response is negative from three-fifths or more of Kazakhstanis regarding the Cabinet (61% unresponsive, 28% responsive), the *Majlis* (60% unresponsive, 28% responsive), and local government (62% unresponsive, 32% responsive) (see Figure S next page; Table 24 in Appendix). There is almost no difference in the responses to the three questions among different social and political groups; people respond to all three levels of government with the same discontent. The only exceptions are (in all three cases) the small groups who are self-identified as high SES, satisfied with the situation in the country or the direction or pace of economic reforms, believe conditions have improved since independence, or think the economy will improve in six months.


Figure S. Responsiveness of Governments

Question: Thinking of the various central and local governments, in your opinion, how responsive is each to the needs and concerns of the people. Are they very responsive, somewhat responsive, not very responsive or not responsive at all?



Further questions provide more evidence of the public's alienation from those elected to represent it in parliament. Although Kazakhstan uses a single-member district majority electoral system, which tends to focus much more attention on individual candidates than party list or proportional representation systems, only 24% of Kazakhstani citizens knew the name of their deputies in the *Majlis* (Table 25 in Appendix). Moreover, only 14% thought their deputies represented them well, while 56% thought they represented them poorly, and 30% were unable to provide any response at all (Figure T next page; Table 26 in Appendix). Variations in satisfaction with representation followed the same pattern as in the question on the responsiveness of the *Majlis* as a whole, except that the average proportion satisfied is 10-15% lower across the board. (This is the opposite of the pattern which prevails in the United States, where surveys have shown over a number of years that although a large proportion of the public is dissatisfied with the Congress as a whole, a much larger share are content with the performance of their local representatives.) It thus appears that the image of representatives in the *Majlis* has suffered in the wake of the dissolution of one legislature after a court ruling declared its election invalid and the installation of another in a vote also allegedly tainted with irregularities.

Figure T. Knowledge and Assessment of Deputy




Other reasons for public discontent with government emerged in more detailed questions on attitudes to local government. When asked to compare the power of local officials with their power before independence, a big 64% majority said they had more, just 13% less, and 19% volunteered "the same" (Table 27 in Appendix). Furthermore, two-thirds (66%) said "the same people" were running things in their community as before independence, while just 26% said they had changed (Table 28 in Appendix). There was virtually no variation in these perceptions between social or ideological groups, including ethnic Kazakhs and Russians: the sense that the same people have become more powerful, but are unresponsive, suggests an image of officialdom as arrogant and unaccountable.

*** Political Reform**

In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that there is a groundswell of public support for electoral reform. By 41% to 26%, Kazakhstanis say the country's election laws are "in need of reform," suggesting a prevailing mood in favor of reform, although the "don't know" number 33% (Table 29 in Appendix). These new figures represent a change from the July 1995 results, before the court ruling and new election, when by 20% to 27% Kazakhstanis said the election laws did not need reform. (This runs in parallel with the above-noted increase in concern with the need for electoral reform, p. 8) Moreover, the degree of consensus is striking: there is a clear plurality in

favor of electoral reform in all age and educational groups and almost every ideological group. The only exceptions – and even they are almost equally split – are the small groups who say conditions are better since independence (37% see no need for reform, 34% favor it) or are satisfied with the pace (41% to 27%) or direction (38% to 38%) of economic reform.

Figure U. Electoral Law Reform



But while they want to democratize their system further, Kazakhstanis do not have detailed preferences concerning the specific kind of electoral reform they want (see Figure V next page; Table 30 in Appendix). Of those who say they believe the country's election laws are in need of reform, 35% gave no response at all. Almost all the others gave responses emphasizing the need for fairer elections and more democracy without particular institutional changes in mind: the most popular were "real elections" and "democracy and glasnost" (17% each), followed by more information about candidates and a more precise Constitution (7% each).

Figure V. Desired Electoral Reforms

(Sample Size)	(630)
Real election	17%
Democracy, glasnost	17%
Information about candidates	7%
More precise constitution	7%
To guide services	5%
Accountability, honesty	5%
Other	8%
Don't Know/No Response	35%
Total	101%
Question: What sort of reform would you like to see (Open-Ended question asked only of those in favor of electoral reform) (IFES December 1996 survey)	

The expressed desire for electoral reforms and the broad spectrum of specific reform measures offered by the public suggest that there is an opportunity for the dissemination of information about reform measures and the fostering of debate on this issue.

However, there was one type of political reform which Kazakhstanis were clear that they did not want to see: full-time positions for deputies to the *Majlis*. By a crushing 76% to 14% majority, they indicated that the Deputy's job "should be a part-time job with the Deputies living part of the year in their districts." Support for this view is similar to that in last year's survey, and held up across the board among all population sub-groups (Table 31 in Appendix).



CORRUPTION

Most of the public thinks corruption is widespread and serious – and the proportion sharing that view has grown since the last survey.

Official corruption is seen as common in Kazakhstan by a large and growing majority of the people. In the 1996 IFES poll, 87% of respondents said that corruption was “common” – and 53% said it was “very common” – while just 5% said it was “rare.” The proportion who consider it common is up 10% from the 1995 poll, when it was 77%, while the proportion who consider it very common has jumped 14% from the earlier figure of 39%. There is a very clear consensus on the problem: a huge majority of every social and political group shares this perception, with little variation among them (Table 32 in Appendix).

The same holds for perceptions of the seriousness of the corruption problem. Fully 91% of the country thinks official corruption is a “serious” problem, and 61% say it is “very serious.” These figures, too, have grown in the past year: the proportion who consider the problem serious is up 9%, those saying it is very serious has risen by 11% (Table 33 in Appendix). On this point, there is virtually no difference in the views of the various demographic and ideological groups. In particular, there are no statistically significant differences between the views of ethnic Kazakhs and Russians on corruption, despite the differences in their overall appreciation of the effects of independence.

Figure W. Frequency and Severity of Corruption



M ODELS FOR DEVELOPMENT

The most attractive economic models for Kazakhstans are Western Europe and East Asia, while the most attractive political models are the United States and Western Europe.

*** Economic and Political Models for Kazakhstan**

The Kazakhstani public tends to think of different sets of countries as models for the development of their own, depending on whether economics or politics is the subject (Figure X next page).

From an economic viewpoint, the most attractive models are the countries of Western Europe, mentioned by 34% of respondents (of whom the largest part, 23%, single out Germany), and Asia, mentioned by 22% (of which the most popular is Japan, cited by 13%). The features common to these models, which together are preferred by a majority of Kazakhstans, are capitalist systems with fairly high degrees of state regulation (in redistribution in Europe, in production in Asia). In contrast, the less regulatory models of North America are preferred by 14%, with the total overwhelmingly dominated by those seeing the US as their model (13%). There was little attraction to other countries of the former Soviet Union: only 2% of the public sees Russia as a model for economic development, while Uzbekistan, the only Central Asian republic to receive a mention, was cited by just 2% as well. Some 19% say they don't know which country "could be a model for Kazakhstan's economic development." However, little doubt was expressed as to the relevance of comparisons to other countries: just 4% said no country could be a model or that their country should seek its own way of development. Overall, the finding which stands out from the data is the preference expressed by almost two-thirds of the public for the market-driven models of development of Europe, Asia, and North America (Table 34 in Appendix).

Politically speaking, however, the preferred models are largely Western: 30% of the public sees North American countries as their political model (most – 27% – mentioning the United States), and 23% citing Western European models (of whom 10% referred to Germany). Only a few mention Asian countries (4%) or countries of the former Soviet Union (3% mention Russia, 2% Uzbekistan). No country is seen as a model by 3%, while 28% could not suggest a model, 9% more than on the economic question. Nonetheless, the preferences which emerge are consistent with the above findings equating democracy with the protection of rights and freedoms, since it is in the developed, stable democracies of North America and Europe that these receive the greatest respect, and the greater space for individual rights is one of the sharpest distinctions between these countries and the fast-growth economies of the East.

Figure X. Economic and Political Models

(Sample Size)	(1500)	
Percent seeing each country as a model for development	Economic	Political
Western Europe		
Germany	23%	10%
Other countries	11%	13%
Asia		
Japan	13%	0%
China	3%	2%
Turkey	3%	0%
South Korea	2%	1%
Central, Southeast Asia	1%	1%
North America		
United States	13%	27%
Canada	1%	3%
Former Soviet Union		
Russia	2%	3%
Uzbekistan	2%	2%
Other countries	4%	3%
No country/Own way of development	4%	3%
Don't Know/No Response	19%	28%
Total	101%*	102%*
<p>Questions: Which foreign country, if any, do you think could be a model for Kazakhstan's economic development? Which foreign country, if any, do you think could be a model for Kazakhstan's political development? (Open-Ended Responses) (IFES December 1996 survey)</p>		

*Rounding factor

In sum, the survey shows that Kazakhstanis are strongly committed to democratic personal rights but have come over the past year and a half to believe in growing numbers that their country is not a democracy. Even Russia, for all its problems, is considered more democratic. They are also deeply dissatisfied with the performance of government at every level. This translates into a strong desire for reform of the country's electoral process to produce fairer elections and a more genuine democracy, although not yet into specific demands for change. Government corruption is also perceived to be a widespread and serious problem by most Kazakhstanis. The models they look to are Western Europe and East Asia in terms of economics, and North America and Western Europe in terms of politics.




Only two-fifths of Kazakhstanis are interested in politics, a substantial drop from the previous poll. Disinterest rises with dissatisfaction with the regime, while interest increases with age and education. However, the citizens are not disenchanting with government per se: a large majority believes the government in Almaty could significantly improve their lives through its policies and actions.

*** Public interest in Government and Politics**

The majority of Kazakhstan's citizens say they are not interested in politics (61%), while just 39% say they are interested (and just 10% very interested) (See Table 36 in Appendix). This represents a 12-point drop in interest from the 1995 survey, which found that 51% were interested and 47% not interested. The decline in interest has been concentrated among urbanites (-25% in cities above 200,000), Russians (-19%), and those with university degrees (-16%) – who figure among the groups where support for liberal reform is highest or growing fastest.

In other words, even as public desire for change in the country's political institutions and socio-economic situation has grown, public interest in politics has waned – further evidence of the public's growing alienation from the political system. The linkage between discontent and disinterest is clear: of those satisfied with the country's situation, 50% are interested in politics and 49% are not, while of those dissatisfied, 62% are *not* interested in politics, while only 37% are (see Figure Y next page). Likewise, of those satisfied with the direction of economic reforms, 56% are interested in politics, 45% disinterested, while of those dissatisfied, 63% are not interested and a mere 37% are. Most of the other factors associated with political interest are also correlates of satisfaction with the regime, such as higher SES, Kazak ethnicity, and belief that conditions have improved since independence or that economic reform has proceeded at the right pace.

Figure Y. Interest in Politics




Aside from regime satisfaction, the strongest variables affecting political interest are traditional social ones: education and age. Interest in politics rises sharply with education: among those with high school or less, the uninterested predominate over the interested by 72% to 27%; among those with university or more, political interest prevails over disinterest, 56% to 45%. And as in most societies, interest in politics increases as individuals proceed along the life cycle, with the proportion describing themselves as “interested” rising from 33% among the 18-25 age group to 46% in the 66-plus age group.

*** Can Government Make a Difference?**

It is important to note, however, that public disinterest in politics does *not* stem from the view that government cannot make a difference for the better. When asked whether the national government in Almaty could “significantly improve the lives of our citizens through its policies and actions,” Kazakhstanis replied by 66% to 24% – or more than two to one – that it could (Figure Z next page; Table 37 in Appendix). There is little difference among all the social and ideological groups polled on this point. All have a substantial majority who believe that government can make a difference, including both those interested and uninterested in politics. What this means is that the sense of disempowerment and disinterest which the citizens of Kazakhstan feel does not concern government in general, but rather the government under which they now live.

Figure Z. Can Government Improve Lives of Citizens?




P ERSONAL FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS

Kazakhstanis are fiercely committed to the right to private property, free speech, protection for minorities, freedom of religion, and criticism of government. However, they feel the government does not respect these rights, and their confidence in the militia, office of the public prosecutor, and courts is low and deteriorating. Nonetheless, they believe strongly in the need for judicial independence.

*** Importance of Rights and Freedoms**

There is an exceptionally broad consensus in Kazakhstan on the importance of the fundamental freedoms of democracy. When asked about the significance of five basic rights, virtually unanimous accord was expressed on the protection of private property in law (99% termed it “important,” 1% “not very important”), and the right to express “opinions without fear of punishment (96% said it was important, 2% not very important). Percentages this high are extremely rare in public opinion research anywhere, and they are strong indications of the attachment of Kazakhstanis to the right to own property and freedom of speech. The three other rights received only slightly less support: massive majorities in the 80%-90% range said it was important to protect the rights of minority ethnic groups, allow the free practice of religion, and to have the right to publicly criticize the government (Table 38 in Appendix).

Figure AA. Importance of Rights



The right to private property

This represents perhaps the most decisive rejection of the legacy of communism in Kazakhstan. Support for this right runs not only wide but deep: 78% of Kazakhstanis say it is “very important” that “the private property of individuals is protected by law.” In every social and political group polled, at least 70% take this view.

Freedom of speech

Given the history of Soviet-era repression and heavy-handed action by the new government during more recent times, it is not surprising that the right to voice opinions without fear is highly prized in Kazakhstan. Here, too, support is very intense, with 76% declaring the right “very important,” an opinion shared across the board by at least 70% of all the demographic and social groups in the survey.

Minority rights

Since independence, ethnic tensions have surfaced at times between the Kazak group (a plurality of the country’s population) and the other national minorities who settled in or were sent to Kazakhstan in the Russian or Soviet periods, including Russians (over a third of the population), and much smaller numbers of Ukrainians, Tatars, Uzbeks, and Germans (each ranging from 3%-5% of the population) (See Table 69 in Appendix). In this situation, where no one has a majority, it is understandable that 90% of the public thinks it important that “the rights of minority ethnic groups are protected” (including 57% who think it very important), while just 8% say it is not important. Even among the Kazakhs, 87% say it is important to protect minorities, and 47% very important; the corresponding figures for Russians are 92% and 63%, and for the other ethnicities 93% and 64% respectively.

Freedom of religion

Like other Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has seen something of an Islamic revival since independence, as well as something of a renewal of the Orthodox Church. Islam is practiced largely among Kazakhs, and Muslims make up 47% of the population, while Orthodoxy is practiced by Russians and Ukrainians, but Orthodox adherents represent only 44% of the population. These newly acquired freedoms are dear to the population at large: 88% say it is important that “people can freely practice their religion,” and 60% say it is very important, while just 11% say it is not important.

Right to criticize the government

This right, too, receives wide support: 83% say it is important, and 53% very important, while just 15% say it is not important. While the level of support specifically for public criticism of government is slightly below that for freedom of expression in general, it is still rated as very important by half or more of every demographic and ideological group polled. Even among those who favor a system with no parties or a single political party, the proportions saying it is very important are 57% and 54% respectively.

*** Government*s Respect for Rights**

Yet while Kazakhstanis are profoundly committed to their human rights, we have already seen that they are increasingly concerned about the protection they receive (page 24). This concern was underscored by the results when they were asked outright how much “government authorities respect the rights of individuals in Kazakhstan”: 60% say either “not at all” (18%) or only “a little” (42%), while only 37% said the authorities did act to respect the rights of citizens (29% “somewhat,” 8% “a great deal”) (See Table 39 in Appendix). Russians took a dimmer view of the situation than Kazakhs: They said the authorities did not respect civic rights by 68% to 28%, Kazakhs by a narrower 52% to 46% margin.

The only groups where a plurality said government did respect the rights of citizens were:


- High SES people (observed or self identified)
- Those satisfied with the country*s direction or situation
- Those who say Kazakhstan is a democracy
- Those who believe conditions are better or the same since independence
- Those satisfied with the direction or pace of economic reforms

*** Confidence in Justice System**

The reasons for the dissatisfaction of the citizens with those charged to protect their rights became clearer when they were asked about their attitudes towards several of the institutions of the justice system. They were asked how much confidence they had in each “to treat people with fairness and justice.” The results showed solid majorities discontented with the militia, public prosecutor’s office, and courts, and a plurality dissatisfied with the Committee of National Security. Fewer than 5% had a great deal of confidence in any of them. Moreover, in the wake of the repeated crackdowns on attempts to manifest political opposition and the deteriorating relations between government and the people over the intervening sixteen months, the new data show that the proportions unhappy with each institution were up significantly since the 1995 survey (Table

40 in Appendix). They also reveal next to no variation between different social or political groups in their assessment of them, including among Kazakhs and Russians.

Figure AB. Confidence in Justice Institutions



The militia: Popular discontent with the behavior of the militia is widespread – 82% of the citizens say they have no confidence or not very much confidence that it will treat people with fairness and justice, while only 12% had a fair amount or a great deal. Some 41% said they had none at all. The proportion with no or not very much confidence is up 14% since 1995, when it was 68%.

The public prosecutor's office: Two thirds of the public – 65% say they have no or not very much confidence in the fairness of the public prosecutor's office. They do rate slightly higher than the militia: only 19% say they have no confidence at all in the prosecutors. While 26%

have a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in them, this figure is down 15% from the 1995 figure, while the proportion with little or no confidence is up 13%.

The courts: The results here are similar to those for the prosecutor's office: 66% have little or no confidence (19% none at all), while 27% have some or a great deal of confidence in their fairness and justice. The proportion with little or no confidence has risen 15% from the 1995 figure of 51%.

The Committee of National Security: Some 39% of the public expressed little or no confidence in the fairness of this institution (with 14% having none at all), while 29% said they had a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in it. This apparently more favorable reaction is due largely to the fact that relatively few have an opinion about this secretive successor to the KGB (32% responded “don’t know”). Furthermore, its stature has declined like that of the other organs of justice: the proportion lacking confidence is up 11% and that with confidence is down 10% since the last IFES poll.

* **Judicial Independence**

While they are not happy with the performance of the courts in the defense of human rights, Kazakhstanis are solidly committed to the ideal of judicial independence. When asked to which branch of government the courts should be assigned, only 6% said “the executive” and just 19% “the legislature,” while 63% said they should be “completely independent of the other two branches of government” (Table 41 in Appendix). This view in favor of judicial independence was shared across all demographic and political lines.

N ON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Kazakhstan's public is split almost evenly on the need for NGO's, and is increasingly aware of the difficulty of forming them. In general, those who support liberal positions on other economic and political questions tend to be more favorable and optimistic concerning NGOs. Quite few (under one-fifth) are aware of such groups in their communities, although up to half indicate an interest in joining one or another type of NGO. The ones with the broadest general appeals are environmental, social welfare, and educational organizations, although women's, youth, ethnic, and religious organizations all have some draw in their specific constituencies. Political parties have little appeal, as does unpaid volunteer work for NGOs.

*** Importance of NGOs**

Kazakhstanis are split on the importance of non-governmental organizations: a narrow plurality of 45% says they are "essential" or "necessary," while 41% believe they are "not very necessary" or "not necessary at all." Some 14% say they do not know whether NGOs are necessary or not or give no response (Table 42 in Appendix). Thus, while the people of Kazakhstan have clearly grasped the importance of free elections and civil rights for democracy, it appears that there is substantially less awareness among them of the potential role of NGOs in civil society.

Belief in the importance of NGOs is closely associated with economic and political liberalism in general. Thus, those who favor limited state control of the economy say non-governmental groups are essential or necessary by 53% to 37%, while those who want a return to state control split almost evenly (45% say NGOs are unnecessary, 39% say that they are necessary). Similarly, support for NGOs increases with support for multi-party politics: those who favor a system with two or more parties hold that NGOs are necessary or essential, 51% to 39%, while those who prefer a one- or no-party system also think NGOs are unnecessary by 47% to 37%.

However, while the difference is as expected, the significant proportions of those who support economic or political liberalism but do not consider the NGOs to be important is surprising. So is the sizable proportion of each group who say they "don't know" whether NGOs are necessary (15% of those opposed to state control of the economy and 10% of those who favor multi-party democracy). This may well reflect the unfamiliarity with much of the public with NGOs.

Given the connection between support for NGOs and liberalism, it is not surprising that the groups in which a plurality considers NGOs to be needed are largely the same as those who take other liberal positions:

- Younger people (those under 45)
- Urban residents (in cities larger than 50,000)
- Higher SES individuals (self ID)
- The better educated (university or technical school)

Conversely, the group in which a plurality thinks NGOs unnecessary are the less educated (high school or below), a group which is also hostile to other liberal propositions.

* Environment and Formation of NGOs

Kazakhstanis are increasingly aware of the difficulty of forming NGOs: In the 1995 poll, 52% said citizens "have the possibility" to form NGOs, 25% that they do not, and 23% were not sure. In 1996, they split 42% to 42% on the possibility of forming NGOs, with 16% unsure (Table 43 in Appendix). This lack of consensus may reflect the countervailing pressures exerted on the one hand by favorable publicity in the Majlis for legislation authorizing NGOs and efforts by the international community to promote the concept of NGOs, and on the other by the government's repeated crackdown on unofficial organizations critical of it.

Those who believe it is feasible to form NGOs tend to be the same groups who consider them necessary: younger citizens, urbanites, upper-SES groups, and the better-educated. In addition, they tend to be drawn from those more satisfied with the regime: Kazakhs, those who believe the country is going in the right direction or are satisfied with its situation, those who say conditions have improved since independence or who are satisfied with the direction and pace of economic reforms.

However, on this, as on the preceding question, it is important to recognize that state control of society has remained so pervasive in Kazakhstan, and the non-governmental sector so underdeveloped, that few Kazakhstanis have direct experience with NGOs in their areas. Only 19% say they "know of any such groups which exist in" their communities, while 74% do not (Table 44 in Appendix). There are no dramatic differences in awareness of NGOs by group, although the better educated, people outside the two large cities, Kazakhs, and those satisfied with the country's situation are somewhat likelier to know of NGOs near them. However, those living in areas where they are unaware of NGO activity seem to be in a poor position to gauge their feasibility. Those who do not know of NGOs in their area say they think it is impossible to form

such groups by a 45% to 41% plurality, while those who do know of such groups believe it is possible to do so, 51% to 37%.


* **NGOS with Broadest Appeal**

The potential types of NGO which appeal most to the Kazakhstani public are environmental, social welfare, and educational organizations; in all three cases, more than 40% of the public say they would consider joining (Figure AC next page; Table 45 in Appendix). The most popular group is an “environmental protection organization,” which would appeal to 53% of the citizens; next comes “an organization which helps people who are in need,” which 47% would consider joining, and “an education organization,” which could interest 45%.

After these groups come those with specifically targeted constituencies: women’s, youth, ethnic, and religious organizations. These appeal largely (but not quite exclusively) to members of the relevant group whose interests they claim to further. Women’s organizations are attractive to 35% of all Kazakhstanis (56% of women, but also 13% of men). Youth groups are attractive to 32% of the public (but 67% of 18-25 year olds, 41% of 26-35 year olds, and 59% of singles without children). Ethnic organizations appeal to 31% of the public (33% of Kazakhs, 27% of Russians, 34% of the smaller minorities). Religious organizations appeal to 20% of the public at large (but 26% of believers, 29% of the Orthodox, and 37% of Muslims).

Political parties bring up the rear among types of organizations, reflecting citizen discontent with parties and elections in Kazakhstan: only 16% of the public said they would consider joining a political party. Not surprisingly, they tend to be drawn from the groups who say they are more interested in politics and more satisfied with the country’s situation, including men, Kazakhs, upper SES individuals, and rural dwellers.

Figure AC. NGOs Most Likely to Join



While broad interest was expressed in joining NGOs, few Kazakhstani expressed interest in doing volunteer work for them. Only 21% said they would give their “time to work for a non-governmental organization without receiving any pay,” while 57% said they would not and 16% replied “it depends on the type of organization” (Table 46 in Appendix). Given the interest they expressed in joining NGOs, this suggestion may have carried with it an unfortunate resemblance to the payless communist working Saturdays imposed under the old regime (not to mention the payless regular work weeks all too many have experienced under the new one), explaining what might seem an apparent contradiction. It may also reflect their lack of experience with voluntary organizations as well as the current economic hardships faced by Kazakhstani.

P OLITICAL PARTIES

The public in Kazakhstan supports the existence of multi-party democracy, but they are not very supportive of the existing parties. They would also grant the right to nominate candidates for office to community organizations, local governments, and the President as well as to political parties, and they say that they would be likelier to vote for an independent candidate than one backed by a party. There is no party which enjoys the identification of more than one in ten of the voters, and almost half identify with none at all.


*** Political Party System**

Multi-party politics enjoys the support of a clear majority of the Kazakhstani public: 63% say “the ideal number of political parties to have” would be two, several, or many, while only 29% say one or none (23% one, 6% none) (See Table 47 in Appendix). This is a big margin, and it reflects the broad consensus which has emerged in Kazakhstan around the democratic selection of government officials. The multi-party option is preferred in every social group by roughly similar margins, and even predominates in every ideological group as well. The only group to deviate substantially from the national norm is those who prefer state control of the economy, but even they prefer a multi-party system to a single- or no-party system, albeit by the narrower margin of 50% to 42%. In contrast among those who want less state control, multi-partyism is preferred by 76% to 18%.

Equally important, support for multi-party politics has grown since the 1995 IFES survey, despite (or perhaps because of) the disqualification of the sitting *Majlis* on grounds of electoral irregularities and the election of another allegedly under heavy government influence. Support for a multi-party system has increased slightly since 1995 (from 55% to 63% in 1996), but support for a single-party or no-party system has not changed (single party – 23% in 1995 and in 1996; no party – 7% in 1995, 6% in 1996). These findings are consistent with those reported above on the growth of support for democratic rights and freedoms over the same period.

Much the same pattern emerged in responses to a question about the importance of having “at least two political parties competing in an election.” Some 61% of the people said it was important (with 27% saying very important), while 31% said it was not important (Figure AD next page; Table 48 in Appendix). Again, similar views prevailed across all demographic and political categories tabulated, with a substantially narrower margin for multi-partyism (50% for multiple parties to 42% against) only among those favoring state control of the economy.

Figure AD. Importance and Ideal Number of Parties



However, it is worth noting that public support for multi-party elections, though broad, is neither as broad or as deep as that for other basic democratic rights in Kazakhstan. While freedom of speech, worship, etc., received endorsement from four-fifths or more of the public, only about three-fifths are committed to a multi-party system. There is also a difference in the intensity of commitment a majority rated each of the five civic rights discussed above as “very important” while only a little more than one-quarter says the same of multi-party elections.

*** Role of Political Parties**

Some 84% of Kazakhstan’s citizens think political parties “should have the right to nominate candidates for the *Mujlis* (Supreme Council),” but they are by no means the only or even the most widely supported type of organization to fulfill that role. Roughly the same acceptance as a nominating body was accorded to local community organizations; 86% of the people would give them the right to nominate for the *Majlis*. Nomination by local governments were accepted by 75% of the public, and nominations by the President by 60% (Table 49 in Appendix). There are almost no significant variations in support on these questions between social or political groups. Support for nominations by all four has increased somewhat since the 1995 survey, modestly in the case of political parties and community organizations (+9% and +7% respectively), somewhat more so in the case of local governments and the President (+25% and +12% each).

Although most of the public believes there should be more than one party (63%) and that parties should have the right to nominate candidates for office (84%), a candidate affiliated with a political party appears to be at a disadvantage. When asked which type of candidate they would be likelier to support "if an election were held tomorrow," either one "who was affiliated with a political party or who was not affiliated with a political party," 54% of Kazakhstanis said they would be likelier to support an independent, while just 26% said they would be more likely to vote for a party-backed candidate (Table 50 in Appendix). The only good news, from the viewpoint of the parties, is that the latter figure is up slightly from the 1995 survey, when it was an even lower 19%. In other words, in Kazakhstan today, the public says that a party label is a minus, not a plus, for a politician aspiring to office.

* Support for Political Parties

Identification with all political parties in post-communist Kazakhstan is weak almost half the public (44%) does not or cannot name a party which "best represents the views and interests of people like" them. Just as the economy has become disarticulate, with the circuits of exchange and payment severely disrupted during the transition from socialism, with the breakdown of the one-party system and the country's uncertain progress towards democracy, the ties of support and reward which bind those represented and their new representatives have not developed beyond an extremely tenuous stage. Some 20 parties or movements share the political scene, but the only one whose identifiers run into the double digits is the Communist Party at 10%. Just three others have 5% or more: the Movement Nevada Semipalatinsk (9%), the Party of People's Unity of Kazakhstan (5%), and the Slavic Movement IAD (5%). Seven parties and movements are in the 2% to 4% range: AZAT (4%), AZAMAT, Zhekoksan, and the People's Cooperative Party (3% each), and AIASH, the Organizations of Cossacks, and the Renaissance Party (all at 2%). Nine other parties have 1 % each. This low appeal of political parties is comparable to that recorded in the 1995 survey (see Table 51 in Appendix), however the rank order of parties has changed (The Communist Party has gone slightly ahead of the others) (see Table 51 in Appendix). In short, the Kazakhstani party system is extremely dispersed and underdeveloped; none of the parties have established the sort of coherence, organization, roots, or record which would permit the development of substantial party identification.

There are differences between social and demographic groups in partisan involvement but these are fairly modest. More men (62%) identify with a party than women (51%), and residents of rural areas are likelier to do so (62%) than residents of cities over 500,000 (49%).

Partisan identification is higher among Kazakhs than Russians (61% to 52%), high-SES rather than low-SES individuals (68% to 55%), and among the university educated compared to those with high school or less (62% to 52%). Unsurprisingly, those interested in politics are slightly more likely to identify with political parties than those who are not interested (63% of those interested in politics also identify with parties, compared to 52% of those who are not interested in politics). However, what is striking is not how great these differences are but how modest: between 40% and 60% of most social groups do not identify with the existing parties.

The only party for which there are enough identifiers to allow analysis of its base is the Communist Party. Its supporters are disproportionately over 45, low in SES, and out of work. They are likelier than the general public to support a one-party state and state control of the economy. In short, the party appears to be a refuge for relatively small groups who are nostalgic for the old regime.

So to sum up: There has been a decline in interest in politics in the past year – but this would appear to be due to the devaluation of political life by the actions of the political leadership, not because of a loss of faith in what competent political leadership and policy could do for the country. Moreover, Kazakhstanis highly value personal freedoms and rights, but have little confidence that the government protects these rights. The public lacks confidence in the basic organs of the justice system – militia, courts, and prosecutors. They are not very familiar with NGOs from their own experience, and are divided over how necessary they are in a democracy, but those more committed to multi-partyism and market economics tend to favor an active civil society as well. While most of the public supports multi-party politics in principle, political parties are in disrepute among the Kazakhstani public, and the welter of groups competing for the votes of the public have been unable in the circumstances of the transition period to develop more than minuscule followings.

I **N F O R M A T I O N**

A V A I L A B I L I T Y O F I N F O R M A T I O N

Most Kazakhstanis feel they do not have enough information about their country's political or economic reforms or their own rights — and the proportion who feel that way has jumped substantially since 1995.

*** Adequacy of Information**

The public of Kazakhstan feels poorly informed about public life. When asked how much information they felt they had “about the economic reforms underway in Kazakhstan,” 84% said they had “not very much” or “nothing,” while only 15% said they had a “great deal” or a “fair amount” of information (Table 52 in Appendix). This pattern held across almost all social and political groups tabulated. Similarly, when asked how much information they felt they had about “political developments,” 82% of Kazakhstanis said “absolutely nothing” or “not very much” and just 16% said “a great deal” or “a fair amount” (Table 53 in Appendix). Finally, asked how much information they felt they had about their “rights with regard to the authorities,” 76% replied “none at all” or “not very much,” as opposed to 22% who felt they had “some” or “a great deal” (Table 54 in Appendix). In other words, Kazakhstanis are hungry for information.

Sources of information from outside the country do little to satisfy this need. The proportion of those who say they have “not very much” or “nothing at all” in the way of information about economic reform is 83% of regular viewers of Russian TV and 84% among those who never watch it (although the proportion who say they know “nothing at all” is just 18% among regular viewers and rises to 40% among non-viewers). Similarly, the proportion who say they know little or nothing about economic reform is 72% among the small group of regular viewers of other international TV programs and 85% among those who never watch — though once again, the group who say they know nothing about the reform is 6% among regular viewers and 25% among those who never watch. These findings have to be interpreted with caution because of the small number of viewers of these programs identified in this survey.

What is particularly striking about these figures is that the proportion who feel they do not have enough information has nearly doubled since the 1995 poll. Then, 47% said they did not have enough information about economic reform; the corresponding figure in the later survey is 37 points higher. Likewise, the proportion who said they did not have enough information about political developments jumped 39%, from a previous level of 43%.

It is difficult to say why this large increase occurred on the basis of the data in the survey, but it is not hard to imagine why as the economic and political crises prevailing in Kazakhstan have deepened. The country's situation is a confusing one, with promises of economic reform yet a standstill on action since the Russian treaty⁴ last March and continued deterioration of living standards. Similarly there is talk of political reform yet the persistence of doubt about elections and repression of independent initiatives remains. At the same time, various media have become unavailable – some Russian Federation TV channels were taken off the air and certain newspapers have closed – and human rights reports indicate that informal and self-censorship has been tightened. Access to the media may also have become more difficult due to the economic crisis, with blackouts cutting access to the electronic media frequently and print outlets becoming less affordable for those hardest hit by unemployment, non-payment of wages, and rising prices. In these circumstances, an increase in the proportion of the public which feels ill informed is an eminently logical development.

M A S S M E D I A


The widest-reaching media in Kazakhstan are Russian Federation TV and Kazakhstani print media and radio in Russian. All domestic media are regarded as government controlled, while uncertainty prevails about the independence of foreign news media.

* Media Usage

In Kazakhstan, there is a wide gamut of media sources of information available. TV, radio, and print news sources are all available, as well as more informal media like leaflets and pamphlets. The outlets include Russian Federation sources, Kazakhstani sources in Russian, Kazakhstani sources in Kazak, and international news media.

TV is the most powerful means of communication in Kazakhstan. Top of the list is Russian Federation TV, which 58% of Kazakhstanis use regularly "to learn more about events." It is followed by Kazakhstani TV programs in Russian, regularly used by 30%, and Kazakhstani TV programs in Kazak, which 20% regularly watch (Table 55 in Appendix).

Figure AE. Regular Sources of Information



Next in reach are the print media. Kazakhstani newspaper and magazine articles in Russian are regularly used to follow events by 29%. Other print news sources have much lower regular readership: 13% for Kazakhstani papers in Kazak, 10% for Russian Federation papers.

The most widely used radio programs are the Kazakhstani broadcasts in Russian, to which 21% of the citizens listen regularly to follow the news, closely followed by Russian Federation radio, listened to regularly by 18%. Kazakhstani radio in Kazak lags well behind, with a regular listenership of 10%.

The international media have a very small audience in Kazakhstan. International TV is regularly seen by 4% and sometimes seen by only 10% more. Corresponding figures for international magazines and newspapers are 2% and 6% and for international radio 3% and 5%.

Other media have a very limited reach. Speeches and public meetings reach only 5% of the citizens regularly and 13% occasionally. Leaflets are used by only 1% regularly and 7% sometimes, while the respective figures for posters are 1% and 5%.

Variations in media use follow fairly predictable lines. Kazak-language media are used almost exclusively by Kazakhs and by upper SES people. Russian-language media saturate most social categories fairly equally, except that print media and radio programs in Russian reach widely in the cities but far fewer in the countryside.


*** Government Control of Mass Media**

Although it uses the domestic media, the Kazakhstani public has a clear awareness that the media are under state control (Figure AF next page; Table 56 in Appendix). Around 60-70% of the public says all the major domestic media are "somewhat controlled" or "completely controlled" by the government: national TV (68% controlled, 20% "somewhat free" or "completely free"), radio (61% to 17%), newspapers (68% to 19%), and magazines (58% to 18%). These perceptions are widely shared across demographic and political groups (even, for example, among those who consider Kazakhstan a democracy).

The people of Kazakhstan are also uncertain about the independence of international news media. When they were asked how free international radio stations, newspapers, and magazines are, the most frequent response was "don't know" – 39%, 37%, and 40% respectively (along with 31% for international TV). Of those who did have an opinion, the prevailing view was that they were free of government control, but not by a large margin (40% to 29% for international TV, 36% to 25%

for radio, 38% to 25% for newspapers, and 36% to 25% for magazines). Presumably there is a minority who fears that the coverage of these news sources is biased due to the control of *foreign* governments, just as local media are run by their own – a fear heightened perhaps because this question did not differentiate between Russian Federation and other foreign news media.

Figure AF. Government Control of Media



Thus, the public feels ill-served by the information available to them. This appears to be reflected in their media usage patterns: their most important source of information is a foreign news medium – Russian Federation TV. This concern is underscored by their views of the domestic media, which are uniformly seen as state controlled. International media do not figure much as an alternative, and there is some uncertainty in Kazakhstan as to just how independent they really are.

E THNIC RELATIONS


Current ethnic relations between Kazakhs, Russians, and other minorities appear fairly relaxed, and there is no expectation of dramatic change. There is a consensus about protecting the cultural legacy of Kazakhstan among all three groups. Ethnic differences in reactions to citizenship do persist, but appear largely mediated by satisfaction with the performance of government and economy rather than by pure ethnic factors.

* Inter-ethnic Relations

The current state of relations between Kazakhs, Russians, and other groups in Kazakhstan does not appear very tense. Some 75% of the public says that “current relations among ethnic groups in Kazakhstan” are “good”, while just 23% say they are “bad” (Table 57 in Appendix). They are not overwhelmingly enthusiastic – 57% say relations are “somewhat good,” while 18% say they are “very good.” But while majorities in all groups share a positive view of ethnic relations, there are some significant differences between them. Kazakhs say relations are good by 90% to 7%. Among the other nationalities around one-third disagree: thus Russians say relations are good by 61% to 35%, other minorities by 67% to 31%.

Figure AG. Ethnic Relations

Question: How would you describe relations among ethnic groups in Kazakhstan: very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?
(IFES December 1996 Survey; Sample Sizes: Total 1500, Kazakhs 631, Russians 578)



Expectations are for the situation between groups to remain fairly stable. Some 45% predict that current relations will “stay the same for 3-5 years” or “be maintained for a very long time,” while 8% said they would change for the better in 3-5 years, and just 13% thought they would change for the worse in that time (Table 58 in Appendix). Once more, Kazakhs are more confident of stability in the situation, but the differences between their views and those of Russians and other groups are relatively small. There is, however, a note of uncertainty: 30% of all respondents said relations between ethnic groups were “too difficult to predict.”

There is also a broad consensus in favor of the protection of Kazakhstan’s culture. Asked if “the people of Kazakhstan have a culture and a way of life which deserves to be protected against foreign influences,” 81% of Kazakhstanis agreed – a figure up 13% from 1995 – and 53% agreed strongly (Table 59 in Appendix). The agreement on this point across ethnic lines is striking: 86% of Kazakhs agree, but so do 78% of Russians (and 50% of the Russians agree strongly).


*** Ethnic and National Identity**

However, this does not mean that perceptions of ethnic difference have disappeared. Asked which is more important to them, their ethnicity or their citizenship, Kazakhs chose ethnicity over citizenship, 35% to 23%, while Russians chose citizenship over ethnicity, 26% to 15%. Significantly, however, large parts of both groups – 39% of Kazakhs and 56% of Russians – said that both were equally important or did not care about either.

There are also ethnic differences in response to Kazakhstani citizenship itself. Asked their feelings about it, 47% of the respondents said “proud” or “content” and 22% “not content” or “ashamed,” while 27% were indifferent (Table 61 in Appendix). Among Kazakhs, 72% said they were proud or content, just 12% ashamed or not content, while among Russians, 30% were discontented or ashamed, while just 28% were proud or content (see Figure AH next page). More generally, responses of proud or content to this question tended to be linked to factors also associated with contentment with the state of the country: high SES, belief that the country is headed in the right direction, that it is a democracy, and satisfaction with the pace and direction of economic reforms. In other words, ethnicity was less a primordial factor shaping reactions to citizenship than a prism through which the fruits of independence were viewed and citizenship evaluated accordingly.

Figure AH. Feelings about Kazakhstani Citizenship

Question: What are your feelings about being a citizen of Kazakhstan — proud, content, indifferent, not content, or ashamed? (IFES December 1996 Survey; Sample Sizes: Total 1500, Kazakhs 631, Russians 578)



The trend data on this question reinforce this impression. The proportion of Kazakhstanis who describe themselves as proud or content dropped 19 points, from 66% to 47%, between the 1995 and 1996 IFES surveys. By social group, the biggest declines were recorded among pensioners (-33%), as well as Russians (-23%) and other minorities (-28%) and those who think Kazakhstan is not a democracy (-20%) – all among the groups most unhappy with recent developments in the country. However, the changes appear to correspond to the unhappiness with the economic and political situation felt by old people on fixed incomes and political liberals, rather than a simple process of ethnic polarization.

*** The Dimensions of Politics in Kazakhstan**

When the IFES survey results on ethnicity are considered alongside those on political and economic reform, sub-groups of the public can be placed along two major axes: liberalism and nationalism. These axes can be defined in terms of several of the questions asked in this survey, which were formulated to tap some of the aspects of these concepts as they are understood in political thought. Each of these are largely independent of the other, so the groups which are strongly committed to one are not necessarily supportive of the other. But it is these dimensions which can explain the way the members of different social groups generally line up on most of the major issues facing the country. They can also be used to explain the different degrees of satisfaction with the government which prevail in each as well as the pluralistic cross-pressures which militate against the unity of the discontented majority.

Liberalism: This axis is the dimension of support for reform of the economic and political systems inherited from the old communist regime. The more liberal groups are those more favorable to free markets and democratic rights (support for each is associated with support for the other)⁵. The groups which are most favorable to liberal reform tend to be those most confident about their prospects in an environment which will be more competitive, offer less security, and demand more flexibility: the young, the better-educated, upper SES people, men, and city dwellers. Conversely, those more attached to the old ways are the most hostile to liberalizing reform: the older, the less educated, low SES people, women, and residents of rural areas and smaller towns.

Nationalism: This axis is the dimension of support for Kazakhstan as a locus of identity⁶. The most nationalist groups tend to be those who identify themselves most strongly as beneficiaries of the country's independence or with its national character: Kazakhs are the most obvious of these, but they also include the high SES group, men, and rural people. (This is also an indication of the relative independence of liberalism and nationalism: the high SES group and men tend to be high on liberalism, the rural people low on that dimension, while there is little direct relationship between Kazak ethnicity and liberalism one way or the other). On the other hand, those lowest on nationalism include those less inclined to identify with symbols of national or state power: Russians, but also low SES people, women, and urbanites. Again, these groups display a mirror-image display of the varying relationships between liberalism and nationalism.

Satisfaction with the state of affairs in the country is a function of these two dimensions: those most satisfied are those highest on both nationalism and liberalism (although the direction of causality is unclear). Thus high SES people and men score consistently highest on measures of satisfaction (the direction the country is going in, the state of the country, the pace and direction of economic reforms, etc.), and the young, better-educated, and Kazak speakers tend to rank above average on these measures. Conversely, the most consistently dissatisfied are low SES people and women, the older, and less well-educated. Russian-speakers, too, tend to be less satisfied than average.

What this means is that Kazakhstan is a complex, pluralistic society in which much of the public is subject to a variety of cross-cutting pressures, based on social status, gender, age, education, as well as ethnicity. The society is not a highly polarized one, in which the different cleavages all reinforce each other. Rather, they tend to fragment it, which may help explain the limited extent to which any political party has been able to claim to represent parts of it, and the difficulty which the opposition to the government has had in mobilizing the public behind it. Kazakhstan is far from being an ethnically charged polity on the brink of explosion.

Thus, for the moment, at least, the demons of ethnic nationalism do not seem to be raging in Kazakhstan. All groups see inter-ethnic relations as fairly good and emphasize the importance of protecting local cultures. Cleavages do exist in feelings about Kazakhstani citizenship itself, though these reflect more perceptions of regime performance than the purely ethnic factors in and of themselves. Numerous other lines of division besides ethnicity run through the society, making it a complex and fractious society, but one in which ethnic polarization is limited.

M ETHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The survey was designed and sponsored by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). The areas of analyses and the text of questions were developed by David Jodice, Christopher S. Siddall, IFES Deputy Director of Development and New Initiatives, IFES Project Manager in Almaty Anthony Bowyer, and Elehie N. Skoczylas, Senior Research Analyst for IFES.

The Giller Institute of Almaty, Kazakhstan was contracted for the translation and formatting of the questionnaire, selection of the sample, the conduct of fieldwork and data processing. All aspects of fieldwork were managed by the Giller Institute.

Between November 26 and December 16, 1996, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a sample of 1500 adults (18 years and older) representative of the national adult population. The sample design used a stratified, multi-stage random approach and the allocation of interviews was carried out according to population distribution. All *oblasts* of the country were included and within each *oblast*, the allocation of interviews followed the rural/urban population distribution. Due to severe weather conditions at the time of fieldwork, transportation was paralyzed in some areas and required substitutions, which always were done within the *oblast* and retained the urban/rural distribution; therefore, the substitutions did not alter the representativeness of the sample (a total 73 substitutions were required – 21 in the Aktiubinski *oblast*, 20 in the Akmolinski *oblast*, 12 in the Semipalatinski *oblast*, 9 in the Zheskazganki *oblast*, and 11 in the Almatinski *oblast*). For the purposes of analysis, the country was divided into six regions:

Capital – Almaty city and Almaty *oblast*

South – Zhambylskaya, Southern *oblast*, Kzyl-Ordinskaya

Central – Zhezhkazganskaya, Karagandinskaya

Eastern – Eastern *oblast*, Pavlodarskaya, Semipalatinskaya, Taldykorganskaya

North – Akmolinskaya, Kokshetauskaya, Kustanayskaya, Northern *oblast*, Turgayskaya

West – Aktubinskaya, Atyrauskaya, Western *oblast*, Mangistauskaya

Interviews were conducted at the home of respondents and respondents were assured that their answers would remain fully confidential. The language of interview – Russian or Kazak – was selected by each respondent. A total 115 interviewers were used for fieldwork (34 men and 81 women; 43 of the interviewers spoke Kazak).

Tabulations and the preparation of data books were conducted by the Washington-based firm QEV

Analytics. The margin of error for the sample is +/-2.5 percentage points for the total sample; sampling error is larger for population subgroups. In addition to sampling error, practical difficulties of conducting a survey may introduce other sources of error in the results.

¹Of course, not all the country's economic problems appeared after independence; some simply moved more sharply into public view with the relaxation of Soviet-era censorship. Moreover, there have been some gains as well – for instance, in the availability of goods at higher prices – which have benefitted all to some extent and have been particularly important to a minority, helping to produce a more differentiated society.

²Throughout this report references will be made to demographic, social, political, and ideological groups. “Social” and “demographic” groups are interchangeable terms which refer to groups divided along demographic characteristics such as age, education, gender, and ethnicity. “Political” and “ideological” groups are interchangeable terms which refer to groups divided along their views towards political issues, e.g. multi-party systems, desired economic system, receptivity to foreign investment, etc.

³*Actualne Problemy Slovenska*; unpublished report by Fokus Group, Bratislava, may 1994.

⁴Kazakhstan belongs to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the successor organization to the Soviet Union, and in March 1996 signed a four-nation cooperation accord which brings Kazakhstan into a somewhat closer relationship with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.

⁵Questions which tapped the dimension of liberalism included Q.13 (state control of the economy), Q. 14 (direction of economic reform), Q.15 (speed of economic reform), Q.49 (ideal number of parties), Q.50 (importance of multi-party competition), Q.54 (limit freedom, have dictatorship), and those on foreign investment and NGOs. In the IFES tabulations of the data, attitudes in favor of reform on any one of these questions tended to be associated with pro-reform sentiments on the others, as has been noted in several of the sections above.

⁶Questions which tapped the dimension of nationalism included Q.17 (desirability of independence), Q.22 (feelings about Kazakh citizenship), Q.23 (ethnic relations now), and Q.7 (ethnicity vs. citizenship). Cross-tabulation showed that attitudes on each of these questions was associated with those on the others, so that a person who thought independence had produced good effects was likelier to have positive feelings about Kazakhstan's citizenship, for example.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. SITUATION OF COUNTRY

Q-5. Thinking about our country's situation overall, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with it?

Question text in 1995 — “Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Kazakhstan today — would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Very satisfied	2%	3%
2. Somewhat satisfied	19%	13%
3. Somewhat dissatisfied	45%	44%
4. Very dissatisfied	32%	38%
5. Don't Know/No Response	2%	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

TABLE 2. REASONS FOR SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION

Q-6. Please tell me why you said you are (satisfied/dissatisfied) with our country's situation today?
(Open-End Response).

Date of Fieldwork		December 1996	
(Sample Size)		(1500)	
<u>REASONS SATISFIED</u>		<u>REASONS DISSATISFIED</u>	
Interethnic stability	4%	Delay of salary/pension	18%
Political stability	2%	Reduction of financial condition	17%
Large opportunity for businessmen	2%	Unemployment	11%
Development of market economy	1%	Bad economic situation	6%
Observance of civil rights	1%	Reduction of social guarantees	4%
Sufficient quantity of food	1%	Bad workings of municipal services	3%
Abundance of goods	j	Instability	3%
Other	1%	Bureaucratism, personal politics	2%
Don't Know/No response	2%	Crime, disorder	2%
NOT ASKED	82%	Paid education and low level of education	1%
		Disintegration of government	1%
		Interethnic relations	1%
		Satisfied about nothing	5%
		Other	4%
		Don't know/No response	5%
		NOT ASKED	16%
<i>Total</i>	98%U	<i>Total</i>	99%U

TABLE 3. DIRECTION OF COUNTRY

Q-1. Do you think our country is headed today in the right direction or the wrong direction?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Right Direction	25%
2. Wrong Direction	48%
3. Headed nowhere at all (volunteered)	18%
4. Don't Know/No Response	8%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 4. SOCIO-POLITICAL BAROMETER

Q-32. As I read the following statements, please tell me to what degree are you satisfied or dissatisfied with it? Are you completely satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or completely dissatisfied with it?
Question text from 1995 — “Please tell me whether you are completely satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with each of the following.”

For each topic, the text of the statement follows each year if the text was different

Date of Fieldwork (Sample size)	July 1995 (1500) December 1996 (1500)					
	<i>Cmpltly Stsfd</i>	<i>Smwht Stsfd</i>	<i>Smwht Dsstsfd</i>	<i>Cmpltly Dsstsfd</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Economic Reforms 1995 (Not asked)	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996 (The direction of economic reforms)	4%	12%	45%	35%	4%	100%
2. Social Welfare 1995 (The social welfare protections of the people)	2%	8%	33%	53%	4%	100%
1996 (The social welfare system)	3%	7%	31%	57%	1%	99% U
3. The level of political and civil freedoms 1995	6%	31%	28%	17%	18%	100%
1996	6%	27%	34%	24%	9%	100%
4. Human Rights 1995 (Observation of human rights)	5%	29%	32%	23%	12%	101% U
1996 (Protection of personal freedoms and liberties by the government)*	5%*	21%*	36%*	33%*	5%*	100%
5. The fight against crime 1995	4%	17%	30%	45%	3%	99% U
1996	3%	10%	30%	55%	2%	100%
6. The quality of health care 1995	2%	13%	28%	56%	2%	101% U
1996	3%	10%	32%	54%	1%	100%
7. Our electoral system 1995	7%	34%	21%	20%	18%	100%
1996	5%	22%	28%	33%	11%	99% U
8. Educational System 1995 (Our education, science and culture)	4%	25%	31%	33%	7%	100%
1996 (The quality of our educational system)*	6%*	21%*	29%*	39%*	4%*	99% U

TABLE 5. CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q-7. How would you describe the current economic situation in our country — is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Very good	1%
2. Somewhat good	9%
3. Somewhat bad	45%
4. Very bad	43%
5. Don't Know/No Response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 6. ECONOMIC SITUATION IN NEXT 6 MONTHS

Q-8. In your opinion, how will the economic situation change in the next 6 months — it will be better than it is now, will be the same as it is now, or will be worse than now?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Better than now	10%
2. Same as now	38%
3. Worse than now	43%
4. Don't Know/ No Response	8%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 7. QUALITY OF LIFE OF YOUNG PEOPLE COMPARED TO PARENTS

Q-9. How will the quality of lives of young people today compare with the quality of lives their parents had? Will their lives be better than their parents, the same as their parents, or worse than their parents?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Better than parents	21%
2. Same as parents	12%
3. Worse than parents	57%
4. Don't Know/No Response	10%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 8. LAW AND ORDER

Q-26. What do you think — will law and order in Kazakhstan improve, get worse or stay about the same over the next year?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Improve	23%	16%
2. Get worse	28%	24%
3. Stay about the same	39%	52%
4. Don't Know	9%	9%
<i>Total</i>	99% U	101% U

TABLE 9. QUALITY OF LIFE SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Q-18. Since Kazakhstan became independent of the Soviet Union, has our life here improved, stayed about the same or become worse?

Question text in 1995 — “Thinking about the country overall — has life in Kazakhstan improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse since achieving independence?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Improved	8%*	8%
2. Stayed about the same	22%*	12%
3. Worsened	67%*	79%
4. Don't Know/No Response	4%*	1%
<i>Total</i>	101% U	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 10. EFFECT OF KAZAKHSTAN'S INDEPENDENCE ON ITS PEOPLE

Q-17 In your opinion, was the declaration of independence of Kazakhstan a very good thing, a somewhat good thing, a somewhat bad thing or a very bad thing for the people of Kazakhstan?

Question text in 1995 — “Was the declaration of Independence of Kazakhstan a good thing or a bad thing for Kazakhstan?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Very good	-	17%
2. Somewhat good	31%*	36%
3. Somewhat bad	21%*	26%
4. Very bad	-	14%
5. Neither (Volunteered in 1995)	36%*	-
5. Don't Know/No Response	13%*	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%	101% U

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 11. ATTITUDES ON PRIVATIZATION

Q-13 When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop an economy with limited state control, or should we return to an economy basically controlled by the state?

Question text in 1995 — “When thinking about our economic future, some people say that Kazakhstan should strive to develop an economy with limited government control. Others say we should return to an economy fully controlled by the state. Which of these views is closer to your own?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Limited state control	37%*	45%
2. Return to a state-controlled economy	51%*	48%
3. Neither (Volunteered)	8%*	NA
4. Don't Know/No Response	5%*	7%
<i>Total</i>	101%	101% U

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 12. MEANING OF FREE MARKET ECONOMY

Q-16. What does it mean to you to live in a free or market economy? I mean, how do you think it will differ from what was in the past? (**Open-End Response**).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
<u>POSITIVE RESPONSES</u>	
Freedom of economics	11%
Possibility of work	9%
Good financial situation	5%
Stability	4%
High level of production	4%
Large variety of goods	3%
To work and to get food	3%
Order/responsibility	3%
Abundance of goods	2%
To work for own profession	2%
Absence of monopoly	1%
Reasonable taxation	1%
Flexible prices	1%
Freedom of movement	1%
POSITIVE SUBTOTAL	50%
<u>NEGATIVE RESPONSES</u>	
High prices	4%
Unemployment	2%
Social disorder	2%
Uncertainty of the future	1%
Speculation, acquisition	1%
Economics controlled	1%
NEGATIVE SUBTOTAL	11%
Other	10%
Response is not correct	7%
Don't Know/No Response	22%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 13. PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS

Q-15. In your opinion, are the economic reforms in Kazakhstan being made too rapidly, at about the necessary speed, or too slowly?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Too rapidly	12%	19%
2. About the necessary speed	12%	9%
3. Too slowly	52%	51%
4. Other (Volunteered)	14%	10%
5. Don't Know/No Response	10%	11%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

TABLE 14. PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS AND TYPE OF ECONOMY

Q-14. When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a free economy with small but steady reforms, should we get to a free economy as quickly as possible, or should we not pursue a free economy at all?

Question text in 1995 — “When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a free economy with steady but smaller reforms, or should we get to a free economy as quickly as possible?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Small, but steady reforms	61%*	49%
2. As rapidly as possible	27%*	27%
3. Not pursue free economy (1996 only)	NA	12%
4. Other (Volunteered; 1996 only)	NA	3%
5. Don't Know/No Response	12%*	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 15. PRIVATE PROPERTY

Q-10. As I read each of the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with it:

- a. Citizens should have the right to own land as private property
- b. Citizens should have the right to buy and sell land
- c. The use of land, even land held in private hands, should be regulated by law

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1500)					
	<i>Strongly Agree</i>	<i>Agree Somewhat</i>	<i>Disagree Somewhat</i>	<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
Citizens should have the right to own land as private property	58%	26%	7%	5%	3%	99% U
Citizens should have the right to buy and sell land	49%	25%	12%	11%	3%	100%
The use of land, even land held in private hands, should be regulated by law	56%	29%	6%	5%	4%	100%

TABLE 16. ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT

- Q-12. Considering the investments made by foreign companies in Kazakhstan, should we welcome investments to any extent; welcome investments with some limitations; allow, but do not encourage investments; or prohibit investments?

Question text in 1995 — “Consider the investments made by foreign companies in Kazakhstan: should we welcome these investments, welcome investments with some limitations; to limit them; or prohibit completely?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Welcome investments to any extent	16%	7%
2. Welcome investment with some limitations	47%	40%
3. Allow, but do not encourage investments	15%*	28%
4. Prohibit investments	13%	17%
5. Don't Know/No Response	10%	8%
<i>Total</i>	101% U	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 17. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LAND

- Q-11. Should foreign companies be allowed to purchase and own land in Kazakhstan, or not?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Yes	21%	20%
2. No	74%	75%
3. Don't Know/No Response	6%	5%
<i>Total</i>	101% U	100%

TABLE 18. ORDER AND DEMOCRACY

Q-54. Now I will read to you two statements, please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with each one.

a. "In order to establish order and discipline, it is necessary to limit the political and civic rights of the people."

b. "In order to establish order and discipline in society, it is necessary to have a dictatorship"

Question text from 1995 — "In order to establish order and discipline in society, is it necessary to have a dictatorship?"

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995 December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1500) (1500)					
	Completely Agree	Agree Somewhat	Disagree Somewhat	Completely Disagree	Don't Know	Total
a. Limit political and civil rights						
1995	14%	30%	32%	13%	11%	100%
1996	15%	24%	34%	24%	3%	101% U
b. Necessary to have a dictatorship						
1995	15%	22%	27%	30%	8%	102% U
1996	17%	19%	25%	35%	4%	100%

TABLE 19. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY

Q-36. What does it mean to you to live in a democracy? (Open-End Response).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
Observance of rights	21%
Freedom of citizens	20%
To work and to get paid	5%
High quality of life	5%
Constitution	4%
Confidence in future	3%
Social Protection	3%
Equality of all citizens	2%
Good social guarantees	1%
Order/trust government	1%
Free to leave the country	1%
Peace, harmony	1%
Other	4%
Response is not correct	3%
Don't Know/No Response	25%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 20. IS KAZAKHSTAN A DEMOCRACY

Q-33. Would you say that Kazakhstan is primarily a democracy or is primarily not a democracy?

Question text for 1995 — “Would you say the Kazakhstan is a democracy, or is it not a democracy?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Democracy	42%*	35%
2. Not a democracy	33%*	44%
3. Don't Know/No Response	25%*	20%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 21. MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Q-34. (Ask those who see it as “not a democracy”): Is Kazakhstan moving toward becoming a democracy or not?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Yes	14%
2. No	26%
3. Not Asked	56%
4. Don't Know/No Response	5%
<i>Total</i>	101% U

TABLE 22. INFLUENCE OF CITIZENS THROUGH ELECTIONS

Q-41. In your opinion, by participating in an election, can citizens of Kazakhstan substantively influence the course of development in the country?

Question text for 1995 — “Can the people of Kazakhstan actually change the situation in the country by participating in elections, or is this not possible?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Yes	42%*	42%
2. No	46%*	51%
3. Don't Know/No Response	12%*	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 23. INFLUENCE OF VOTING

Q-46. Please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with the following statement:

"Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decisions made in our country."

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Completely agree	12%
2. Agree somewhat	26%
3. Disagree somewhat	30%
4. Completely disagree	27%
5. Don't Know/No Response	4%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 24. RESPONSIVENESS OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Q-45. Thinking of the various central and local governments, in your opinion, how responsive is each to the needs and concerns of the people. Are they very responsive, somewhat responsive, not very responsive or not responsive at all?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1500)					
Levels of Government	<i>Very Responsive</i>	<i>Somewhat Responsive</i>	<i>Not Very Responsive</i>	<i>Not At All Responsive</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Cabinet of Ministers	6%	22%	34%	25%	13%	100%
2. Majlis	4%	24%	37%	23%	13%	101% U
3. Local Governments	6%	26%	36%	26%	6%	100%
4. Others	1%	2%	6%	4%	87%	100%

TABLE 25. KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE

Q-42. Do you happen to know the name of the Deputy to the Majlis who represents this area or not?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Yes	24%
2. No	70%
3. Don't Remember/No Response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 26. REPRESENTATIVE REPRESENTS VIEWS OF CONSTITUENTS

Q-43. Would you say that your Deputy represents your opinions and interests before the government in Almaty very well, somewhat well, somewhat poorly or very poorly?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Very well	3%
2. Somewhat well	11%
3. Somewhat poorly	30%
4. Very poorly	26%
5. Don't Know/No Response	30%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 27. POWER OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

Q-28. In your opinion, do local officials have more power or less power now compared with before independence?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. More power	64%
2. Less power	13%
3. About the same (Volunteered)	19%
4. Don't Know/No Response	5%
<i>Total</i>	101% U

TABLE 28. COMPOSITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Q-29. Does it seem to you that the people who run things in your community (local organ of power) are pretty much the same people who were running things even before independence, or are your local officials not the same people?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Same people	66%
2. Not same people	26%
3. Don't Know/No Response	7%
<i>Total</i>	99% U

TABLE 29. ELECTORAL LAWS IN NEED OF REFORM

Q-39. Thinking about the election laws of our country, does it seem to you that they are in need of reform or are not in need of reform?

Question text for 1995 — "What is your overall opinion of the election laws of Kazakhstan — does it seem to you that they are in need of reform or not in need of reform?"

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Need reform	27%*	41%
2. Not need reform	20%*	26%
3. Don't Know/No Response	53%*	33%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any data analysis

TABLE 30. REFORMS NEEDED

Q-40. (If in need of reform): What sort of reform would you like to see? (Open-End Response).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
Real election	7%
Democracy, glasnost	7%
Information about candidates	3%
More precise Constitution	3%
Other	3%
To guide services	2%
Accountability, honesty	2%
Equal conditions for all candidates	1%
Not asked	58%
Don't know/No response	15%
<i>Total</i>	101% U

TABLE 31. DOMICILE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Q-44. Should the job of Deputy of the Majlis in Almaty be a full-time job with the Deputies living in Almaty or should it be a part-time job with the Deputies living part of the year in their districts?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Full-time job	15%	14%
2. Part-time job	73%	76%
3. Don't Know/No Response	12%	10%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

TABLE 32. FREQUENCY OF CORRUPTION

Q-30. How common is official corruption in Kazakhstan? Is it very common, somewhat common, somewhat rare or very rare?

Question text for 1995 — “How common is the problem of official corruption — is it very common, fairly common, fairly rare (uncommon), or very rare (uncommon)?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995*	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Very common	39%	53%
2. Somewhat common	38%	34%
3. Somewhat rare	5%	4%
4. Very rare	3%	1%
5. No corruption (Volunteered)	-	1%
6. Don't Know/No Response	15%	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

TABLE 33. SEVERITY OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Q-31. Would you say that the problem of official corruption is very serious, somewhat serious, not too serious or not serious at all?

Question text for 1995 — “And how serious is the problem of official corruption, meaning how much does it matter — is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Very serious	50%	61%
2. Somewhat serious	32%	30%
3. Not too serious	4%	3%
4. Not serious at all	1%	1%
5. None (Volunteered)	NA	j
6. Refused (Volunteered)	NA	j
7. Don't Know/No Response	13%	5%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

TABLE 34 MODELS FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Q-37. Which foreign country, if any, do you think could be a model for Kazakhstan's *economic* development?

Q-38. Which foreign country, if any, do you think could be a model for Kazakhstan's *political* development?

Question text for 1995 — "Which foreign country, if any, do you think could be a model for Kazakhstan's development?"

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995*	December 1996	
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)	
		Economic Model	Political Model
United States	11%*	13%	27%
Germany	18%*	23%	10%
Japan	6%*	13%	-
Russia	8%*	2%	3%
Canada	-*	1%	3%
China	4%*	3%	2%
Uzbekistan	3%*	2%	2%
Other Countries of Western Europe	9%*	11%	13%
Central, Southeast Asia	-*	1%	1%
South Korea	-*	2%	1%
Turkey	9%*	3%	-
Other countries	18%*	3%	2%
Other	-*	1%	1%
No country	6%*	2%	2%
Own way of development	-*	2%	1%
Don't Know/No Response	22%*	19%	28%
<i>Total</i>	114%	101% U	102% U

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 35. COMPARING KAZAKHSTANI DEMOCRACY

Q-35. Which country is more democratic in your view, Kazakhstan or Russia?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	1500
1. Kazakhstan	16%	8%
2. Russia	24%	36%
3. Both are equally democratic (volunteered)	19%	33%
4. Neither (volunteered)	27%	11%
5. Don't Know	14%	12%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

TABLE 36. INTEREST IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Q-19. How interested are you in matters of politics and government of the country? Are you very interested, interested somewhat, not too interested or not interested at all?

Question text in 1995 — “To begin with, how interested are you in matters of politics and government: are you very interested, fairly interested, not too interested, or not interested at all?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Very interested	10%	10%
2. Somewhat interested	41%	29%
3. Not too interested	27%	42%
4. Not interested at all	20%	19%
5. Don't Know/No Response	1%	j
<i>Total</i>	99%U	100%

TABLE 37. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IMPROVES LIVES OF CITIZENS

Q-20. In your opinion, is there a possibility or is there not a possibility for the national government in Almaty to improve significantly the lives of our citizens through its policies and actions?

Question text in 1995 — “Do you believe that the officials in Almaty — whoever they may be — are capable of making any real improvements in you circumstances, or not?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Possible	52%*	66%
2. Not possible	40%*	24%
3. Don't Know/No Response	8%*	10%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 38. POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Q-55. Is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not important at all that ...

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1500)					
	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Not Important	Don't Know	Total
1. The rights of minority ethnic groups are protected	57%	33%	6%	2%	2%	100%
2. The private property of individuals is protected by law	78%	21%	1%	j	1%	101%U
3. People have the right to publicly criticize the government	53%	30%	11%	4%	2%	100%
4. People can freely practice their religion	60%	28%	8%	3%	2%	101%U
5. People have the right to express their opinions without fear of punishment	76%	20%	2%	j	1%	99%U

TABLE 39. RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Q-25. In your opinion, do government authorities respect the rights of individuals in Kazakhstan a great deal, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Question text for 1995 — “How much respect is there for individual civic rights now in Kazakhstan: a lot, some, a little, none at all?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Great deal	10%*	8%
2. Somewhat	37%*	29%
3. A little	31%*	42%
4. Not at all	12%*	18%
5. Don't Know/No Response	11%*	3%
<i>Total</i>	101% U	100%

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 40. CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Q-52. I am now going to ask you about several organs of the justice system. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to treat people with fairness and justice. Do (insert organization or government element) treat people with a great deal of fairness and justice, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

Question text for 1995 — “I am now going to ask you about several institutions in the justice system. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to treat people with fairness and justice: a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all.”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995 December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1500) (1500)					
	<i>A Great Deal</i>	<i>A Fair Amount</i>	<i>Not Very Much</i>	<i>None At All</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. The courts						
1995	9%	34%	30%	21%	7%	101% U
1996	4%	23%	47%	19%	7%	100%
2. The public prosecutor's office						
1995	8%	33%	31%	21%	8%	101% U
1996	3%	23%	46%	19%	10%	101% U
3. The militia						
1995	6%	20%	32%	36%	6%	100%
1996	1%	11%	41%	41%	5%	99% U
4. Committee of National Security						
1995	13%	35%	16%	12%	25%	101% U
1996	3%	26%	25%	14%	32%	100%

TABLE 41. POSITION OF COURTS

Q-53. Should our country's courts be assigned to the executive branch, the legislative branch or should the courts be completely independent of the other two branches of government?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Executive	6%
2. Legislative	19%
3. Completely Independent	63%
4. Don't Know/No Response	12%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 42. NECESSITY OF NGOs

Q-57. How necessary are such organizations — essential, necessary, not very necessary or not necessary at all?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Essential	8%
2. Necessary	37%
3. Not very necessary	27%
4. Not necessary at all	14%
5. Don't Know/No Response	14%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 43. CIVIL SOCIETY

Q-56. In your opinion, do the citizens of Kazakhstan have the possibility to unite into groups or form organizations without the participation of the government?

Question text in 1995: "In your opinion, do citizens of Kazakhstan have the possibility to unite into groups or unions, without the participation of the government in order to better their living conditions?"

Date of Fieldwork		December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Possible	52%*	42%
2. Not Possible	25%*	42%
3. Don't Know/No Response	23%*	16%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%

*Difference in question wording dictates caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 44. NGOs IN COMMUNITY

Q-60. Do you know of any such groups which exist in your community?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Yes	19%
2. No	74%
3. Don't Know/No Response	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 45. TYPES OF NGOs

Q-59. Which of these types of non-governmental organizations (**Show Card**) would you consider joining? (**Circle all that apply**).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996			
(Sample Size)	(1500)			
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total
1. An education organization	45%	49%	6%	100%
2. A religious organization	20%	73%	7%	100%
3. An organization which helps people who are in need	47%	47%	6%	100%
4. A women's organization	35%	59%	5%	99% U
5. A youth organization	32%	62%	5%	99% U
6. An environmental protection organization	53%	42%	6%	101% U
7. An ethnic organization	31%	61%	8%	100%
8. A political party	16%	77%	8%	101% U
9. Any other organization	9%	54%	37%	100%

TABLE 46. JOINING NGOs

Q-58. Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without receiving any pay?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Yes, absolutely	21%
2. No	57%
3. It depends on the type of organization (Volunteered)	16%
4. Don't Know/No Response	6%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 47. IDEAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Q-49. What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties to have for Kazakhstan — none, one, two, several or many?

Question text for 1995 — “What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties to have — none, one, two, several, or as many as we have today?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. None	7%	6%
2. One	23%	23%
3. Two	7%	11%
4. Several	34%	40%
5. Many	14%	12%
6. Don't Know/No Response	14%	8%
<i>Total</i>	99% U	100%

TABLE 48. IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION AMONG PARTIES

Q-50. How important do you think it is for Kazakhstan to have at least two political parties competing in an election — very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Very important	27%
2. Fairly important	34%
3. Not very important	17%
4. Not at all important	14%
5. Don't Know/No Response	8%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 49. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

Q-47. Should the following organizations have the right to nominate candidates for the legislature?
(Read list, circle all that are mentioned)

Question text for 1995 — “Which of the following organizations should have the right to nominate candidates for Supreme Council:”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
a. Political Parties		
Yes	75%	84%
No	13%	11%
Don't Know	13%	5%
b. Community Organizations		
Yes	79%	86%
No	11%	10%
Don't Know	10%	4%
c. Local Governments		
Yes	50%	75%
No	33%	20%
Don't Know	17%	5%
d. President		
Yes	48%	60%
No	34%	32%
Don't Know	18%	8%
e. Other		
Yes	NA	13%
No	NA	4%
Don't Know	NA	83%

TABLE 50. IMPORTANCE OF PARTY AFFILIATION

Q-48. If an election were held tomorrow, would you be more likely to support a candidate for the legislature who was affiliated with a political party or who was not affiliated with a political party?

Question text for 1995 — “Would you be more likely or less likely to support a candidate for the Supreme Council who was affiliated with a political party?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. With a party	19%	26%
2. Independent	58%	54%
3. Other (volunteered)	-	8%
4. Don't Know/No Response	23%	12%
Total	100%	100%

TABLE 51. PARTY PREFERENCE

Q-51. Which **ONE** of the political parties or social movements listed on this card (**Show Card**) *best* represents the views and interests of people like you? (**Interviewer: Circle ONE Response Only, First Mention**).

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. AZAMAT	-	3%
2. AZAT	4%	4%
3. ALASH	2%	2%
4. The Democratic Committee on Human Rights	6%	j
5. The Movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk	9%	9%
6. Zheltoksan	3%	3%
7. Communist Party	8%	10%
8. Peoples Cooperative Party	j	1%
9. Peoples Congress of Kazakhstan	2%	3%
10. Organizations of Cossacks	2%	2%
11. Party of Democratic Order	2%	1%
12. Party of Peoples Unity of Kazakhstan	7%	5%
13. Renaissance Party of Kazakhstan	2%	2%
14. Tabigat Party of Social Fairness	1%	1%
15. Republican Party	1%	1%
16. Russian Commune	2%	1%
17. Russian Union	1%	1%
18. Slavic Movement LAD	3%	5%
19. Social Democratic Party	1%	1%
20. Socialist Party	1%	1%
21. Other	j	1%
22. None	39%	23%
23. Don't Know/No Response	15%	21%
<i>Total</i>	111%*	101%U

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 52. INFORMATION ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORMS

Q-3a. How much information do you feel you have about the *economic* reforms underway in Kazakhstan? Do you have — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or absolutely nothing?

Question text in 1995 -- “How much information do you feel you have about the so-called free market reforms underway in Kazakhstan — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. A great deal	14%*	2%
2. A fair amount	29%*	13%
3. Not very much	34%*	62%
4. Absolutely nothing	13%*	22%
5. Don't Know/No Response	10%	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	101% U

*Differences in question wording dictate caution in any trend analysis

TABLE 53. INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Q-3b. And, how much information do you feel you have about *political* developments underway in Kazakhstan? Is it — a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or absolutely nothing?

Question text in 1995: How much information do you feel you have about the political developments of the Republic — a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. A great deal	16%	2%
2. A fair amount	34%	14%
3. Not very much	32%	56%
4. Absolutely nothing	11%	26%
5. Don't Know/No Response	8%	3%
<i>Total</i>	101% U	101% U

TABLE 54. INFORMATION ABOUT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Q-27. How much information do you feel you have about your rights with regard to the authorities? Do you have a great deal, some, not very much or none at all?

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. A great deal	16%	2%
2. A fair amount	34%	20%
3. Not very much	32%	50%
4. None at all	11%	26%
5. Don't Know/No Response	8%	2%
<i>Total</i>	101% U	100%

TABLE 55. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Q-2. I am now going to read you a list of sources of information you might use to learn more about events in Kazakhstan. As I read each one, please tell me if you use it regularly, sometimes, rarely or never.

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996				
(Sample Size)	(1500)				
Sources of Information	Regularly	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Don't Know
1. Kazakhstan TV programs in Kazak	20%	15%	11%	53%	1%
2. Kazakhstan TV programs in Russian	30%	32%	20%	17%	1%
3. Russian Federation TV programs	58%	22%	11%	9%	j
4. Other international TV programs	4%	10%	11%	67%	8%
5. Kazakhstan radio programs in Kazak	9%	9%	10%	70%	2%
6. Kazakhstan radio programs in Russian	20%	21%	18%	40%	1%
7. Russian Federation radio programs	18%	20%	17%	43%	2%
8. Other international radio programs	3%	5%	10%	76%	7%
9. Kazakhstan newspaper & magazine articles in Kazak	13%	11%	9%	65%	2%
10. Kazakhstan newspaper & magazine articles in Russian	29%	25%	20%	25%	1%
11. Russian Federation newspaper & magazine articles	10%	24%	23%	41%	1%
12. Other international newspaper &	2%	6%	11%	75%	6%
13. Leaflets	1%	6%	10%	77%	5%
14. Posters	1%	4%	9%	79%	6%
15. Speeches or other public meetings	5%	13%	15%	62%	5%
16. Friends, family or neighbors	45%	30%	12%	10%	2%

TABLE 56. NEWS MEDIA INDEPENDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Q-4. I am now going to read you a list of sources of news which are generally available. As I read each one, please tell me if you consider it to be completely free of government control, somewhat free, somewhat controlled by the government, or completely controlled by the government.

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996					
(Sample Size)	(1500)					
Source of News	<i>Cmpltly Free</i>	<i>Smwht Free</i>	<i>Smwht Controlled</i>	<i>Cmpltly Controlled</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Domestic TV	6%	14%	44%	24%	13%	101% U
2. International TV	14%	26%	20%	9%	31%	100%
3. Domestic Radio	4%	13%	39%	22%	22%	100%
4. International Radio	14%	22%	17%	8%	39%	100%
5. Domestic Newspaper	5%	14%	44%	24%	13%	100%
6. International Newspaper	14%	24%	17%	8%	37%	100%
7. Domestic Magazine	4%	14%	36%	19%	26%	99% U
8. International Magazine	15%	21%	16%	9%	40%	101% U

TABLE 57. RELATIONS AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS

Q-23. How would you describe current relations among ethnic groups in Kazakhstan: very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Very good	18%
2. Somewhat good	57%
3. Somewhat bad	19%
4. Very bad	4%
5. Don't Know/No Response	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 58. PROSPECTS FOR RELATIONS AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS

Q-24. In your opinion, will current relations among ethnic groups in Kazakhstan be maintained for a very long time, stay the same for 3-5 years, change for the better in 3-5 years, change for the worse in 3-5 years, or are relations between ethnic groups too difficult to predict?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Maintained for a very long time	25%
2. Stay the same for 3-5 years	20%
3. Change for the better in 3-5 years	8%
4. Change for the worse in 3-5 years	13%
5. Relations between ethnic groups too difficult to predict	30%
6. Don't Know	5%
<i>Total</i>	101% U

TABLE 59. ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CULTURE

Q-21. Please tell me whether you completely agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or completely disagree with the following statements:

- a. "It is very hard for my family to have enough money to buy food each month."
 b. "The people of Kazakhstan have a culture and a way of life which deserves to be protected against foreign influences."

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
a. "It is very hard for my family to have enough money to buy food each month."		
Completely Agree	52%	63%
Agree Somewhat	22%	19%
Disagree Somewhat	19%	13%
Completely Disagree	5%	5%
Don't Know	2%	j
b. "The people of Kazakhstan have a culture and a way of life which deserve to be protected against foreign influences."		
Completely Agree	48%	53%
Agree Somewhat	20%	28%
Disagree Somewhat	19%	12%
Completely Disagree	6%	3%
Don't Know	7%	4%

TABLE 60. IMPORTANCE OF ETHNICITY

D-7. Which is of more importance to you, your ethnicity or your citizenship?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Ethnicity	24%
2. Citizenship	26%
3. Equally important (volunteered)	37%
4. Does not care about either (volunteered)	10%
9. Don't Know/No Response	3%
<i>Total</i>	100%

TABLE 61. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING A KAZAKHSTANI

Q-22. What are your feelings about being a citizen of Kazakhstan — proud, content, indifferent, not content, or ashamed?

Question text in 1995 — “What are your feelings about saying you are a citizen of Kazakhstan: proud, content, indifferent, not content, ashamed?”

Date of Fieldwork	July 1995	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)	(1500)
1. Proud	24%	22%
2. Content	42%	25%
3. Indifferent	27%	27%
4. Not content	3%	16%
5. Ashamed	1%	6%
6. Don't Know/No Response	3%	3%
<i>Total</i>	100%	99% U

Demographics

TABLE 62. SEX

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Male	48%
2. Female	53%
Total	101% U

TABLE 63. EMPLOYMENT

D-1. What is your current employment situation? Are you ...

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Self-employed	6%
2. Employed full-time at one job	37%
3. Employed part-time at one job	8%
4. Employed at two or more part-time jobs	2%
5. A housekeeper/housewife	11%
6. A student/apprentice	3%
7. A pensioner or invalid	19%
8. Not employed	15%
9. No Response	j
Total	101%

TABLE 64. OCCUPATION

D-2. What is your occupation?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
Manager	4%
Specialist (Professional)	22%
Office Worker	29%
Skilled Worker	25%
Unskilled Worker	5%
Businessman	7%
Collective Farmer	3%
Farmer	2%
Other	4%
Total	101%U

TABLE 65. MARITAL STATUS

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Married	69%
2. Single and never married	14%
3. Divorced	8%
4. Widowed	9%
5. Refused	1%
6. No Response	j
Total	101%U

TABLE 66. DEPENDENTS

D-4. Do you have any children?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Yes	82%
2. No	18%
Total	100%

TABLE 67. NUMBER OF CHILDREN

D-5a. (If has children): How many children do you have?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
None	18%
One	20%
Two	31%
Three	16%
Four	6%
Five	3%
More than 5	5%
Total	100%

TABLE 68. CHILDREN LIVING AT HOME

D-5b. (If has children): How many of your children live with you?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1230)
No child	17%
One	26%
Two	23%
Three	10%
Four	4%
Five	1%
More than 5	19%
Total	100%

TABLE 69. ETHNIC HERITAGE

D-6. What is your main ethnic heritage?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Kazak	42%
2. Russian	39%
3. Ukrainian	5%
4. Uzbek	3%
5. Tatar	4%
6. Korean	1%
7. German	3%
8. Other	4%
Total	101% U

TABLE 70. IMPORTANCE OF ETHNICITY

D-7. Which is of more importance to you, your ethnicity or your citizenship?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Ethnicity	24%
2. Citizenship	26%
3. Equally important (volunteered)	37%
4. Does not care about either (volunteered)	10%
9. Don't Know/No Response	3%
Total	100%

TABLE 71. LANGUAGE

D-8. What language do you speak at home? (Record below and code).

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Russian	52%
2. Kazak	25%
3. Other	2%
4. Kazak and Russian	15%
5. Kazak and Other	j
6. Russian and Other	3%
7. Other Combinations	1%
8. No Response	j
Total	99%U

TABLE 72. BELIEF IN GOD

D-9. Do you believe in God?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Yes	69%
2. No	25%
3. Don't Know/No Response	6%
Total	100%

TABLE 73. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

D-10. Are you a member of a religion? [If Yes] Which one?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996		
(Sample Size)	(1500)		
Member of Religion	Religious Affiliation		
Yes	32%	1. Islam	18%
No	64%	2. Orthodox	13%
Don't Know	4%	3. Other Christian	1%
		4. Judaism	j
		5. Buddhism	j
		6. Other	1%
		7. Not member	66%
		9. Don't Know/No Response	j
Total	100%	Total	99%U

TABLE 74. AGE

D-12. What is your age?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
18 - 25	15%
26 - 35	23%
36 - 45	26%
46 - 55	16%
56 - 65	12%
66+	9%
<i>Total</i>	101%

TABLE 75. EDUCATION

D-13. What is the highest level of education you have received?

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. Elementary or less	2%
2. Some secondary , less than 10 years	10%
3. Completed secondary technical school, 7-8 years	6%
4. Completed high school, 10-11 years	20%
5. Professional, technical school, 10-11 years	9%
6. Specialized technical education	23%
7. Some university	6%
8. University or higher	24%
9. Post-graduate education	j
10. No Response	j
Total	100%

TABLE 76. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

D-14. Would you describe the financial position of your family as ...

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. high	1%
2. moderate/high	4%
3. moderate	45%
4. moderate/low	30%
5. low	20%
6. Don't Know/No Response	j
Total	100%

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TABLE 77. LANGUAGE OF INTERVIEW

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
Russian	83%
Kazak	17%
Total	100%

TABLE 78. SES BY OBSERVATION

Date of Fieldwork	December 1996
(Sample Size)	(1500)
1. high	1%
2. moderate/high	27%
4. moderate/low	52%
5. low	13%
6. Not discernable	7%
Total	100%