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ANGOLA: A PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT

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INTRODUCTION

The IFES team, consisting of Roberto Lima Siqueira, Juan Rial, and Dennis Culkin, visited Angola from February 21-28, 1992. The aim of the team was to make a pre-election assessment for the purpose of determining the most effective forms of technical assistance to the electoral process that might be provided by IFES.

This report is based on interviews and other information collected during the visit. Due to the team's brief stay and the conditions prevailing in the country, the team did not leave the capital, Luanda. A problem throughout the visit and one reflected in this report, was the lack of preparations and precise information regarding the electoral process. The observations, conclusions, and recommendations are offered with the caveat that they are based on the best available information, which was in all cases limited.

Chapter I offers overall conclusions and recommendations concerning the electoral process, based on specific issues IFES had identified for investigation by the team. Chapter II describes the social and political conditions in Angola that are the context for the electoral process. Chapter III examines the electoral system and preparations for the country's first democratic political contest. Chapter IV looks at practical aspects of operations in Angola.

These first four chapters represent a synthesis of the team's observations and analyses. The complete individual reports, as submitted, of Roberto Lima Siqueira and Juan Rial appear as annexes. The annex section also contains practical information and translations of key documents of importance to the Angolan electoral process.

I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents conclusions and recommendations on the priority issues identified by IFES for assessment on Angola's electoral preparations. Conclusions and recommendations on other issues are also presented. Additional recommendations can be found in the individual reports contained in Appendixes C and D.

A. Election Worker Training

There is a comprehensive and urgent need for training of all officials and workers connected with the electoral process. The country has no experience with elections, and there is a desperate shortage of skilled and educated people suitable for election tasks.

The need for training is so great that this is the area in which the international community should concentrate its electoral technical assistance efforts. Support to develop Angolan human resources for the elections is the most important contribution that organizations like IFES can make to the process, overshadowing the significance of advanced equipment or election commodities.

B. Voter Education

The citizenry has no experience in elections, is very poorly educated, and lives under extremely difficult economic and social conditions. These factors mean there is a great need for civic education of voters, and also that any such education campaign must be geared to the current difficult conditions in Angola. A program of electoral technical assistance for Angola cannot simply copy the programs used in the developed world or even in the more advanced developing countries.

It is a reasonable estimate that no more than 20% of the population is literate. This fact makes electronic dissemination of voter education material essential. Television in Angola reaches approximately one million eligible voters. Radio is the most important medium, reaching most Angolans. An education campaign centered around radio should be conducted in both Portuguese and the main local languages. Maximum effort should be made to exploit the oral transmission of information, which is still a major channel of communications in Angolan society.

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A civic education campaign should be kept very simple and focus on the relationship between voter registration, voting, and the peace process. Materials should stress the importance of individual participation in the elections, as they signal the completion of the peace process which brought an end to the civil war.

C. Communication Infrastructure

The current communications infrastructure in Angola is totally inadequate to support any phase of the electoral process, even within Luanda itself. The national telephone system is limited and in very poor condition. There are no good national radio communications systems at the disposal of the election authorities.

The only reliable systems have limited capacity and belong to international organizations conducting relief and development work, or overseeing military demobilization in Angola. The best system, which connects six regional headquarters, belongs to UNAVEM, which oversees the demobilization program of the two armed forces in the country. UNAVEM has proposed placing its facilities at the disposal of international election observers. Another radio system is being developed by the UN Development Program's Special Relief Program for Angola (SRPA) with the explicit expectation of supporting the elections by providing reporting of polling results. The SRPA system will link all 18 provincial capitals with Luanda and will provide good two-way communications, including telex-over-radio (TOR) that can be used for election reporting.

The government is reportedly planning to conduct elections communications over a radio network built by a Spanish firm. To assess the ability of the available communications systems to adequately support the electoral process, more should be learned about the plans for this national system.

D. Infrastructure Constraints

As detailed in Chapter IV, the general state of the infrastructure in Luanda is very poor. Most international organizations and firms operating in Luanda are self-reliant for communications, transportation, reliable power, portable water, and all supplies. Conditions outside Luanda are, according to those familiar with the provinces, usually worse.

These conditions make logistics a key component of all electoral assistance efforts. In the short term it would be very difficult to establish an independent operation in Angola outside the logistics orbit of the United Nations, which is already operating in the country. The team recommends that IFES base its decision on opening an office in Angola on the nature of the commitment to the Angolan electoral process. If technical assistance for the upcoming elections is the primary focus of IFES activities, great efforts and large expenses associated with establishing an office in Luanda would not be justified. If IFES plans to provide long-term assistance to the Angolan electoral system, such as institution-building, development of permanent voter registration systems, and civic education, an office in Angola becomes a necessity. If a decision is made to open an IFES office, follow-up action should commence immediately so that an operation can be in place from the early stages of the election process until the September vote.

E. IFES and the UNDP

As noted in more detail in Chapter III, Angola is dependent on outside assistance for successful conduct of all aspects of the electoral process. In this context, the role of bilateral and multilateral assistance to the process will be crucial. Given the operational difficulties noted above, the UNDP will almost certainly serve as the key coordinator and facilitator for all bilateral and multilateral assistance for the elections.

The team recommends that IFES contact UN officials responsible for the election assistance program in Angola to coordinate activities. In so doing, IFES should seek to influence the selection of personnel assigned to carry out tasks financed by IFES cost-sharing. In addition, IFES should ensure that any shipment of commodities to Angola is carefully supervised to

reduce the chances of diversion. This may entail establishing at least a temporary presence in Angola.

F. Election Preparations by the Government of Angola

At the time of the team's country visit, such preparations were minimal. Adoption of an electoral law was expected shortly, and preliminary work on estimating eligible voter population had reportedly begun. But, given the size of the task, it could not be said that significant electoral preparations by the Government of Angola were evident. All parties contacted by the team expected that virtually all electoral preparations would be supported by external sources coordinated by the UNDP.

G. Potential Problems for an IFES Election Assistance Project

IFES should seek UN passports and permanent Angolan visas for all technical personnel. These would greatly facilitate travel to and from the country and also be desirable from the point of view of personal security.

Personal security is a key issue in Angola today, with conditions deteriorating in tandem with a collapsing economy and the demobilization of soldiers as part of the peace process. The unpredictable security situation must be carefully considered if IFES plans to establish a presence in Luanda for the duration of the election preparation period.

If IFES requires a clearer picture of the situation in Angola with respect to election preparations prior to making decisions on its assistance project. IFES should consider conducting another assessment of the situation, following adoption of the electoral law and initiation of electoral preparations by the government.

According to a senior UN official, the UN recently suggested to the CCPM that a joint, temporary UNITA/MPLA military police force be formed to restore basic security to main roads in the country during the election process. There is no official word on the status of this proposal, although joint FAPLA/FALA road patrols have been used in the past to pacify selected important roads temporarily.

The peace accords signed in Lisbon last year allowed for the creation of joint FAPLA/FALA military police patrols to provide security on provincial roads.

H. Voter Registration

The current plans of the Angolan Government call for using demobilized military personnel and citizens as young as 16 years of age at the voter registration stations. The IFES team believes that neither category of citizens is ideal for this sort of work, and proposes an alternative. The IFES team recommends that instead of demobilized soldiers and citizens too young to vote, teachers and university students be used to staff the registration stations. According to Government figures there are 6,500 university students and over 15,000 elementary, secondary, and university-level teachers in Angola. From this number it should be possible to draw the 8,000 registration workers called for in the Government's registration plan. These same people should be used to staff polling stations during the election. Disruption to the educational system would be less than expected due to a current reform program, and in any case would be justified given the importance of the elections in the peace process.

I. Voting Plans

Currently, the Government's plans allow each polling station to accomodate up to 1,000 voters on election day. The usual number of voter's per polling site worldwide is 500. This plan will have disastrous results at the polls. The IFES team recommends that no more than 400 voters be assigned to each polling station. In addition, it is currently proposed that voting take place over as many as three days. This would create major problems of security for the election

materials and for the logistics of supporting each polling station and its group of poll workers and international observers. The team recommends that voting be limited to one day. Given the lack of electrification available to the polling stations, a one-day limit on voting would make limiting the number of voters per station even more important, as voting would have to take place during daylight hours.

II THE ANGOLAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

After gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola suffered one of the longest, bloodiest, and most bitter civil wars in the post-colonial era. The country today bears the scars of that long struggle, from a shattered economy, to a seriously damaged infrastructure, to increasing civil violence caused by demobilized and unemployed soldiers.

At its height, the Angolan civil war engaged both superpowers and some of their principal allies. It was for long a sensitive area of disagreement in U. S. -Soviet relations. The availability of external military assistance to both sides (South African and U.S. aid for UNITA, Cuban and Soviet bloc aid for the MPLA), the physical size of the country, and the flow of oil revenues into government war chests allowed the Angolan civil war to continue at a highly destructive level long after ultimate military stalemate appeared certain.

The combination of internal exhaustion, a relaxation of the superpower rivalry, and the independence of Namibia helped bring about a compromise between the two main warring factions, the governing MPLA/PT (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola/Workers' Party) and UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola). In May 1991, with the superpowers and Portugal as observers, the Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA's leader Dr. Jonas Savimbi signed a set of peace accords known as the Bicesse accords, after the town near Lisbon where the international conference took place.

A. The Peace Process

The May 1991 peace agreement not only set the terms for a cease-fire, it also established an interim structure for de facto power sharing between the principal parties, with international supervision, and set objectives for the creation of an elected democratic national government.

In brief, the Bicesse accords set the following objectives:

(1) An immediate and total ceasefire, to include an end to hostile domestic and international propaganda between the MPLA and UNITA;
(2) The assembly and demobilization of the existing armies;
(3) Immediate opening of the political process to UNITA and other properly registered parties;

(4) Organization of voter registration and national elections for a new government, with elections to be held by November 1, 1992;

(5) Formation of a new national army, composed equally of former MPLA and UNITA soldiers, by the time of the elections.

Under the terms of the peace accords (see Appendix E for details), effective power over all matters affecting the democratization process and the ceasefire was placed in the Joint Political-Military Commission (Portuguese acronym CCPM), composed of MPLA and UNITA officials with observers from Portugal, the U. S. , and, as successors to the diplomatic undertakings of the former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation. A United Nations observer is also allowed at the proceedings of the CCPM. The May accords charge the CCPM with ensuring strict compliance with all the political understandings agreed to in Portugal.

The relative weight of the international observers is not equal. Consistent with its reduced international role and internal problems, Russia does not take a great interest in the Angolan peace process and does not wield great influence. The visit of the Russian foreign minister to Luanda during the team's country visit was the occasion for a request by the emissary from Moscow that Angola repay outstanding debts for past purchase of Soviet military equipment, as well as an announcement that the Soviet military mission to Angola would close. Notwithstanding the Russians' expressed interest in helping the new unified national army with its Soviet-made equipment, the main subjects of the foreign minister's visit underscored that disengagement is the primary theme of Russian policy in Angola.

To date, at the level of national law and policy, the mandated political reforms contained in the peace accords have been implemented. UNITA operates openly, as do other parties, and multi-party meetings have been held to define an election timetable and secure agreement to an electoral law (whose passage was expected soon after the team's departure from Luanda). In practice, as detailed below, there are still some problems with full implementation of an open and competitive political system.

On the positive side, the ceasefire between the UNITA army, known as FALA (Portuguese acronym for Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) and the MPLA army, known as

FAPLA (Portuguese acronym for Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) took effect quickly and is now an established fact. The only organized, persistent, politically-motivated violence continuing is that perpetrated by the guerrillas of FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) against FAPLA troops for the separation of the oil-rich province.

However, other indicators are less promising. Under the accords, FAPLA and FALA troops are to assemble and demobilize by the end of July at about 44 different assembly areas. Only 40,000 of the roughly 160,000 armed troops will form the new national army, with the rest being relieved of their duties. Under the accords, the new national army, to be known as the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), is to become operational by election day.

According to reports from the United Nations Angola Assistance and Verification Mission (UNAVEM), as of February 12 just 50% of the estimated total of 114,000 FAPLA troops were present in their designated assembly areas. The figure for FALA troops was 93%. The assembly and subsequent demobilization of the forces is a key aspect of the peace process, and the timetable for these activities is directly linked to the election schedule. Under current plans, demobilization of the former armies is to be completed by July 31. The demobilization process involves disarming the soldiers, providing them with a photo identity card, severance pay, civilian clothing, and transportation to their home province. Informed observers noted several problems with the demobilization process. First, there is skepticism about the ability of the two sides to support the demobilization requirements, especially the provision of severance pay, photo ID, and transportation away from the assembly areas.

Second, UNITA forces continue to be well organized and disciplined, and the widespread suspicion is that they are not surrendering all of their best weaponry. In effect, the demobilization process will leave UNITA, in the view of these observers, in a position to resume organized military operations, if desired. This could have an unpredictable impact on the atmosphere of trust and confidence needed to build a democratic political process with professional armed forces.

Third, and of more immediate concern, FAPLA is in increasing disarray, as reflected in the low rate of assembly cited above. There have been several rebellions by FAPLA soldiers seeking back pay, food, or simply revenge against officers who have abused them or diverted salaries, food, and supplies. Such rebellions, which have included civilian loss of life and property damage, have occurred recently in the towns of Luena, Menongue, and Kuito, among others. Given demobilization coincides with the beginning of the national political campaign, if present trends are to continue, the implications for security and the political process could be serious. With a provisional election date of September 19, and a political campaign to commence in August, the timing of the demobilization process could prove perilous.

The de facto disintegration of FAPLA is at the heart of the key national problem of the day - security - which will directly affect the electoral process, and thus threaten the whole process of democratization in Angola. The breakdown of civil order caused by the marauding banditry of former soldiers, faced with limited prospects of legitimate employment, is likely to increase even as the electoral process gets under way. A UN agency recently reported that "peace-time violence has replaced open warfare as an obstacle to orderly progress toward democracy and development. " The agency also noted that "overland travel in some areas has become problematic due to banditry. "

In light of the dangerous situation at the assembly areas, the UN and the Government have informally decided to extend food assistance to demobilized soldiers beyond the planned termination date of April until August. Movement of supplies to the assembly areas in many cases has been impeded, appropriately enough, by the failure of FAPLA to carry out assigned tasks.

The deteriorating security situation on the provincial roads and also in Luanda is a serious obstacle to the impact and quality of international technical assistance to the electoral process, as well as a threat to the process itself.

Besides increasing criminal violence, the major challenge to the peace process at this point is the unresolved issue of de facto interim political authority. Under the peace accords, UNITA recognizes the MPLA national government as the legitimate interim authority in the entire

national territory pending democratic elections. But in practice, establishing administrative control has proved difficult in many areas. At the national level, there is a de facto pluralism of authority, consisting of the Government/MPLA, UNITA, and on certain issues the collective position of the international community as reflected by the observers to the CCPM. On a practical level, the situation varies from place to place. In Cuando Cubango province, a war-time UNITA stronghold, the Government controls only three municipalities. In Uige, only five of sixteen municipal administrations acknowledge the national government's authority. According to the UN, UNITA maintains de facto control of many municipal government and services in several provinces. In some places, parallel public service structures under UNITA control have developed along side the government system. In others, minor violence is committed to chase away national authorities who attempt to assert sovereignty. Such incidents have taken place in the provinces of Bie, Moxico, Kwanza Sul, and Cunene.

B. Social Conditions

As uneven as the peace process looks, it shines in comparison to general social conditions in Angola. In its 1991 global report, the UNDP ranked Angola 147 out of 160 countries in level of development. The damage and distortions of decades of war are apparent everywhere.

The first place such damage is evident is in national statistics, or more precisely in the lack of such statistics. No one really knows the country's population, much less its age profile or other detailed characteristics. All discussions of social statistics, many of which are crucial to planning voter education and registration and election mechanics, take place in a world of rough estimates and guesses. A consensus estimate for total population is between 8 and 12 million. No census has been taken in over a decade. Government estimates for 1991, made in late 1987, projected a population of 10,130,100. A very large number of people qualify as refugees or displaced persons.

While reliable statistics with respect to these categories are unavailable, the World Food Program in Angola is planning to assist up to 300,000 returning refugees from Zaire and Zambia and 458,000 internally displaced persons in the next six months. This gives an idea of the dimensions of the social disruption prevailing in the country today.

The educational and health levels of the population are very low and poor. Literacy was estimated at 41% in 1989. Life expectancy for Angolan males in 1990 was estimated at 42 years. Due to the extensive use of land mines by both sides in the civil war, Angola shares with Afghanistan and Cambodia a sad distinction as world leader in maimed and crippled citizens.

The effects of epidemics and poor living conditions brought about by the lack of social services is evident in Luanda, and reportedly in most major municipalities around the country. The damage to the transportation system is particularly serious. In addition to the serious security problem outlined above, there are problems with mines and sabotaged bridges. Demining operations are proceeding at a moderate pace, often slowed by rains, which tend to impede access to many roads. The team was repeatedly told of the great time and effort needed to make relatively short trips in light of all the problems mentioned.

The crumbling infrastructure further hampers a weak economy whose only bright spots are oil production and diamond mining. However, the increase in diamond smuggling robs the government of much needed revenue. A large portion of Angola's food is imported, and most is distributed by international relief operations. Angolan agricultural output is a fraction of its pre-war levels, and is complicated by population movements, crippled transport system, and a lack of inputs. Many Angolans appear to survive through the informal economy.

While difficult to measure, the informal economy appears to be the only vibrant sector in Luanda. The sprawling open-air market of Roque Santeiro on the outskirts of Luanda is reportedly the place to get just about anything. Most of the goods are either smuggled into Angola, or stolen from ships docked in the harbor.

C. Government and Politics

One of the problems aggravating the situation, according to observers who spoke with the IFES team, is the deteriorating administration of the MPLA Government. With uncertain political prospects in the planned elections, which are themselves a new experience, against the

background of a paralyzed economy, many officials reportedly are providing for themselves and their families at public expense. While the discipline of a war-time authoritarian state may have kept corruption in check as the war dragged on, political and social dynamics are now apparently driving many public officials outside the law. The nomenklatura is thus facing serious obstacles to becoming a middle class in a market economy. The arbitrary and undemocratic process by which they were selected to serve in the socialist regime adversely affects their ability to cope with an open and democratic society.

A graphic illustration of this problem was a statement made by the head of Angola's foreign investment authority (and widow of the late MPLA leader Agostinho Neto), published in the weekly newspaper supplement (Correio, February 24, 1992), that certain MPLA figures had told her it was time for her to begin appropriating funds for herself.

However, there are exceptions to this trend of corrupt administration. International relief officials noted that a number of government departments with a political impact like public utilities and social security, were exhibiting some energy and commitment in their work. It appears that the younger, more technocratic elements in the MPLA Government apparatus are behind this phenomenon, which may be an effort not only to boost the party's electoral chances but to secure acceptance of competent individuals by the international organizations that play such a large role in Angola's administration.

If some of the older generation in the MPLA structure are compelled to make personal provision for a future without power, and the younger technocrats pursue program objectives for personal and political reasons, a middle group too old to emulate the technocrats may be hoping to use the new competitive politics to build a refurbished political base.

MPLA officials say they are confident of their electoral campaign which will build on the MPLA control of all provincial governments and current programs to bring concrete social benefits to the population. These efforts include programs in public infrastructure, the establishment of a social security system, and creation of a minimum wage. The MPLA is also counting on the votes of younger Angolans, for whom there has never been any other party. An MPLA official told the IFES team that his party was in contact with social

democratic parties in Europe seeking campaign assistance.

UNITA is not spared some problems under the new system. A movement that developed a rigid and centralized system of ruling to fight a long war under very harsh conditions may not be well suited to an open political system. UNITA meant everything to its rank-and-file; it ensured their survival by feeding and protecting them, and provided guiding principles by giving a sense of purpose to their lives.

After being subjected to the discipline of a single party for sixteen years, it is not easy for the rank-and-file of UNITA to adapt to the open electoral contest and to many of the characteristics of a democratic political life. UNITA leaders fear they will lose the hold they have on their soldiers once they are exposed to urban lifestyles. A recent episode involving a captain of the FALA is a good example of this. During the team's country visit, Angola's only newspaper ran several articles about an ex-UNITA officer, turned critic of the party. He accused the leadership of UNITA of violating human rights and of holding his family hostage in a zone controlled by UNITA after his desertion from the FALA. While such stories are to be expected from the pro-government paper, they also illustrate a conflict likely to confront many UNITA members as they move from committed guerrilla fighters to participants in a democratic political system.

D. Political Parties

According to members of the international community, the main agenda of the MPLA and UNITA is to institutionalize the peace agreement and the actual division of power between the two former rivals, to the exclusion of any new opposition group. The creation of new parties is especially resisted by UNITA, which refuses to be directly involved in multi-party meetings, but still tolerates their existence. In fact, negotiations are held in two stages. The MPLA/PT first negotiates with the different parties recently created, then with UNITA.

The dominance of the MPLA/PT and UNITA, beset as they may be with problems in adjusting to democracy, might be the source of one obstacle to a truly competitive political system. It

may be tempting for the two dominant parties to, in effect, divide power, excluding the smaller and newer movements. Events to date do not seem to justify this concern. However, the MPLA/PT tends to attempt de facto alliances with the smaller parties before engaging UNITA on key disputes.

UNITA considers that although the multiparty negotiations, particularly those concluded in January 1992, were productive, they do not imply a new form of institutional arrangement that might alter the political landscape of the country put in place by the agreements of Bicesse. Jonas Savimbi, speaking on UNITA radio, the Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, said multi-party meetings cannot be considered decision-making organs on the same level as the CCPM.

While political openness seems assured by the chaos and large foreign presence in Luanda, outside the capital the situation is be less clear. The team heard reports of new, small Angolan political parties being harassed by either UNITA or the MPLA/PT in areas where one of the two largest parties held predominant influence. Such reports have also appeared in foreign press accounts on Angola. Given the primitive social conditions in the country, the lack of a media, the low literacy rate, and the near-exclusive access to state functions and perquisites enjoyed by the two large parties, it is difficult to see the Angolan political scene as truly competitive.

Among the 20 to 30 new political parties that have emerged in Angola since the cease-fire, only a few appear to have much substance. Most are offshoots of the MPLA/PT.

The most prominent of the MPLA/PT-spawned parties is the **PRD (Democratic Renewal Party)**, led by MPLA/PT dissidents who went underground after a failed coup attempt within the party apparatus in 1977. The party, led by Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, formerly of the Angolan Civic Association, and Luis da Silva dos Passos, appeals to dissident intellectuals and members of the middle class. As the party's core leaders spent years in underground exile, the group has credibility as an alternative to the MPLA/PT and is credited by foreign observers in Luanda as having the best chance of the small parties to have some impact.

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The **CNDA (Angolan National and Democratic Convergence)** is also composed of former MPLA/PT figures, but in this case not clearly divorced from the organization. The CNDA's partner in the **National Opposition Council (CON)**, the **PDA (Angolan Democratic Party)**, may also lack dissident credentials.

Yet another MPLA/PT offshoot, the **Movement of Angolan Democratic Unity for Reconstruction (MUDAR)**, led by a free-market, former MPLA/PT official, and the **PDP-ANA (Progressive Democratic Party-National Angolan Alliance)** make up the rest of the CON.

UNITA dissidents have formed the **Angolan Democratic Forum (FDA)**. UNITA has reportedly created other subsidiary parties to counter the parallel parties spun off the MPLA/PT.

Holden Roberto has returned from exile, but the political prospects of his **FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)**, one of the original Angolan guerrilla movements, remains cloudy. The FNLA's traditional base was among the Bakongo ethnic group in the north, an area of the country which is in particular disarray. Much of the FNLA was co-opted into the MPLA/PT early in the civil war.

The **Front for Democracy (FPD)**, another successor to the Angolan Civic Association, is led by intellectuals and stresses the development of Angolan civic institutions as the basis of true democracy. As with other small parties, lack of access to the media and the social situation in Angola make its influence questionable. The logo of FDP - a baobab tree - is similar to the one used by IFES. This fact will oblige this institution to be very careful if it doesn't want to be confused with this political movement. The FDP looks like a party tailored by Angolan intellectuals to suit Western tastes.

In sum, there are only two "established" parties in Angola. Others, still in formation, may consolidate in the future. These small parties have a significant presence in Luanda, but their presence outside the capital city is neither seen nor felt. This first evaluation must be confirmed in the future. As the rules of the game are not as yet defined, it will be necessary to closely monitor this process once the beginning of the electoral process is confirmed. Outside of a

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skillfully constructed alliance, the minor parties would appear to have little chance of wielding much influence in Angola. Even with such an alliance, their electoral performance is hard to predict. Given the short time until the elections, the contest will be essentially between the two large established organizations.

The two major parties themselves seem to have no clear ideological orientation, with seemingly non-controversial concepts such as national unity, peace, and economic development dominating their propaganda and discussions. Their fortunes at the presidential level will be determined by the strange match-up of UNITA's charismatic, forceful Jonas Savimbi and the MPLA/PT's reserved, colorless but well-known Eduardo dos Santos.

In the case of UNITA especially, nobody can state the positions of its leader Jonas Savimbi on a variety of central issues, and whether they coincide with the views of its younger members. Savimbi has modeled his organization as a single party, and his stands on many topics are clearly "statist". The MPLA maintains its old rhetoric, but the young renovators of the party define themselves as social-democrats. Few groups assume an identity rooted in the old Western liberal style of thought. One party affirms its Christian-Democrat affiliation but it has no relevance in the political scene.

While the political party law of 1991 forbids parties to promote racial, tribal, or regional agendas, there will inevitably be some regional and tribal component to the contest. While UNITA is most often associated with the Ovimbundu (37% of the population) of the south and center, and the MPLA/PT with the more urban and Europeanized Kimbundu of the central coast (25% of the population), both parties can claim some degree of a national political base.

It must be noted that legally the parties cannot have a tribal base. Even the discourse on "négritude" of UNITA is not grounded on tribalism but on the ideological work of the revolutionary propagandist Franz Fanon (author of The Wretched of the Earth). However, with the universal wave of particularisms and nationalisms, it can be surmised that the kind of ideological message that prizes ethnicity and "négritude" will soon reach Angola. This issue in particular should be closely monitored when evaluating the process of reformulation of the political forces.

E. Other Political Forces

There are few instruments of political education or civic organization in Angola outside the major parties. There is neither an important independent human rights organization, nor evidence of any noteworthy non-governmental organizations. Moreover, there are no independent academic or social science research centers.

There appear to be no legitimate, national, independent women's social organizations. The Organization of Angolan Women (OMA), a social arm of the MPLA/PT, was part of that party's Marxist-Leninist mobilization machinery and lacks credibility in a multi-party democratic context. Another group, the League of African Women (LIGA), is affiliated with foreign organizations, and not the product of genuine mass involvement by Angolan women.

The only independent institution with apparent potential influence in civic education is the Catholic Church. The MPLA/PT has decreed the return of Church property nationalized under the old policies, and this appears to mark an effort by the party to curry favor with an organization with a national base. Another concession to the Church appears to be the provision of air time on the only national television station for religious broadcasting on Sunday mornings, the announcement of which was aired during the team's country visit.
According to various observers who spoke with the team and reporters of the foreign media, the Catholic Church is a potentially powerful communications instrument in a largely illiterate and isolated country. About 40% of the Angolan population is Catholic, but more importantly the Church is an organized, national, and multi-ethnic entity.

The Church has not ignored the political changes in the country, publishing a manual for Catholics' involvement in politics about the time the Bicesse accords were signed in Portugal. The manual outlines a centrist position on economic and political issues, counseling against extremism, and emphasizing personal integrity and social consciousness as prerequisites for office-holders. It appears that the Catholic Church may be the single most important non-governmental entity likely to conduct some kind of civic education in connection with the elections. One demonstration of the Church's influence was a large public march in Luanda

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organized by priests in support of the peace accords last May.

Approximately 15% of Angolans (including Jonas Savimbi) are Protestants, but it is not clear if they will receive any coordinated message on the electoral process from their ministers.

F. The Media

The media in Angola are extremely limited. There is one newspaper regularly published in the country, Jornal de Angola, a daily with a weekly supplement available in Luanda and some provincial capitals on a delayed basis. While basically pro-MPLA/PT, the paper today bears little resemblance to the dull, heavy, propagandized official mouthpiece that it had been in the past. UNITA merits mention in the paper mostly for negative stories, but the smaller parties occasionally receive neutral mentions. The circulation of the paper is not known, and there are no other regular political magazines or other periodicals of interest.

Television is limited to one channel, TPA (Popular Angolan Television), with studios in Luanda. The TPA reaches 9 provinces, according to a senior MPLA/PT official. Most programs are in Portuguese, the rest are in local languages.

Radio is the most popular medium of communications in Angola. Four channels of government radio broadcast from Luanda. They offer programs in both Portuguese and Angolan languages. UNITA has a powerful radio network called VORGAN (Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel), which has a national audience and includes an FM transmitter operating in Luanda. Through their radio stations, the two major parties can reach the entire country.

The Bicesse accords guarantee total freedom of access to the media for all political parties. But in practice this has yet to happen. UNITA reportedly will not offer air time on VORGAN unless the MPLA/PT makes time available on official radio. A senior MPLA/PT official told the team that radio time would be made available to smaller parties, as it was required by law, but no specific guarantees were offered.

In the absence of other means of communication, and for the sake of a fair and competitive election, it is essential that an arrangement be made for the smaller parties to have access to radio broadcasts. Without such access, these parties do not have a chance at having an impact in the elections.

G. The need for elections

Notwithstanding all the practical difficulties examined above, national elections are vital to the peace process in Angola. The mandate contained in the peace agreement for free and fair elections is significant only because it meets the standards of the world community.

To cope with the enormous problems of reconstruction and development that face the country today, the next Angolan government will need the legitimacy conferred to it by an election process meeting, at the least, minimum standards of fairness. In addition, elections are the linchpin of the peace process, which, whatever its shortcomings, has so far produced a lasting ceasefire and a gradual demilitarization of the country.

Virtually all observers interviewed by the team during the country visit stressed the importance of holding the elections on schedule, despite the probability of major flaws and failures in the electoral process. Only one analyst noted that a few Angolans thought the election process might be the factor that triggers a complete break-down both in civil order and the peace process.

III. THE ANGOLAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

At the time of the IFES team's country visit, key aspects of the electoral process, especially the law regulating registration and the actual election process, remained unresolved. The team obtained a draft of the electoral law, whose main points are summarized below. Although the electoral law was not yet finalized, the basic legal framework of government and politics, in the form of a revised constitution and laws on political rights and activities, was already in place.

In March 1991 the constitution of 1975 was extensively revised to allow for the creation of a pluralistic, multi-party political system. Certain statist provisions are retained, including a state monopoly on mining and a Planning Ministry that will present National Plans to the legislature. Private property ownership is sanctioned.

The constitution creates a presidentialist system, in which the president is head of state and chief of government, as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president cannot dissolve the parliament, which can only request, and not compel, the delivery of information by the cabinet. The constitution guarantees fundamental political rights and freedoms. It also mandates creation of a non-political military, supported by conscription of male citizens.

The constitution is flexible in that it can be amended by the legislature alone. In addition, many fundamental structural questions, such as the number and portfolios of cabinet ministers, are determined by law and not in the constitution.

Following revision of the constitution, a series of laws were passed dealing with nationality, freedom of association and assembly, state of siege, press freedom, and political parties.

The citizenship law is important because of the difficulty of establishing nationality in some border regions, especially in the north desert near Zaire, where the Bakongo ethnic group straddles the international boundary. This issue affects voter registration in these border provinces. A law guarantees the right of civic associations to carry on their activities, while freedom of association and assembly, including public political demonstrations, is enshrined in another statute. States of siege and other situations leading to suspension of some political rights are specified in another law.

In the area of press freedom, freedom of printed expression is guaranteed. Private ownership and operation of radio stations is allowed by another law, while television broadcasting remains a state monopoly. Creation of an autonomous Council of Social Communication, which will work with the legislature to assure freedom of access and objectivity, is foreseen. The right of political parties to radio and TV broadcast time is explicitly guaranteed, with this guarantee to be regulated by provisions of the electoral law.

A political party law bans parties with an exclusively ethnic or regional basis. It also prohibits party activities that foment tribalism and racism, or threaten national territorial integrity. A party must gather 3,000 signatures, with at least 150 from fourteen of the country's eighteen provinces, to qualify for registration. There has been some pressure to lower the registration requirements, but no action has yet been taken. While there has been an explosion in the formation of small independent parties, this activity can be expected to decline after the first electoral season.

A. The Electoral Law

The team was given a draft of the electoral law during the country visit. The draft was expected to be approved by the People's Assembly, without substantial alteration, sometime in March. The main points of the draft are summarized below, with extended comment where issues remain unresolved.

- Deputies and the President will be chosen by universal, direct, secret and non-mandatory suffrage of voters registered to vote.

- The President calls the elections and sets a date for the elections.

- Judicial authority concerning the electoral process resides with the Supreme Court of Justice. The Civil Courts of the Provincial court system have authority over the voter registration process.

- All Angolans 18 years or older including those abroad are eligible to vote.

- A National Electoral Council supervises the elections. The Council is made up of two judges (one from the Supreme Court, selected by his peers on the Court, and one selected by the Supreme Court president), the Minister of Territorial Administration, five citizen "experts" designated by the President, a General Director of Elections designated by the President with the concurrence of other political forces, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a representative of the Council of Social Communication, a representative from each legally constituted political party, representatives of the CCPM (at least for the first electoral cycle, after which the CCPM mandate ends), and a representative of each Presidential candidate.

- A Council of this size could not act as an executive authority, so establishing a steering committee has been discussed. Another scheme, under which the CCPM would make the final decisions on the electoral process, and give them to the President for implementation by the Council, is also reportedly under consideration.

- The National Electoral Council will be mirrored in all eighteen provinces by Provincial Electoral Councils, made up of one judge, one representative of the provincial governor, five citizens, a Provincial Electoral Director, and representatives of each of the political parties. Presidential candidates can designate representatives for the Provincial councils. Below the Provincial councils there will be Municipal councils with a similar structure.

- Voter registration will be accomplished by brigades of five to seven registration workers, who must be at least 16 years old. Identification for registration can be done through any form of formal identification, or through the testimony of local authorities if documentation is lacking. This is an attempt to accommodate the vast number of illiterate and undocumented citizens.

- Electoral campaigns are limited to 20 days for the first round, with eight days for a second round if necessary. The campaign must end 24 hours before the voting begins.

- Polling stations may not be located in buildings where alcohol is served, but there is no prohibition on the sale of alcohol on election day.

- Dissemination of results of opinion polls during the campaign is forbidden. There is no known polling capacity in Angola at this time.

- Political activity is barred in military barracks, government buildings, workplaces during normal working hours, and religious institutions. These restrictions are portrayed as a reaction to the use of these sites for indoctrination under the one-party system.

- Radio and TV time is evenly allocated among parties, but paid advertisements for political ends are prohibited.

- Strict rules are set for financing party activities.

- Each polling station will be staffed by five election officials, one of whom must speak the local African language, and will accommodate one thousand voters. Mobile voting stations are permitted in areas with dispersed populations. Voting may take place over a period of more than one day.

- Ballots can be marked with an X or with the voter's fingerprint. A system for voters who have lost their identification cards is contemplated that will preserve the secrecy of the vote and prevent multiple voting.

- Counting of ballots takes place at the polling stations, the provincial level, and the national level. Results at the provincial level must be published within six days of the election. The National Electoral Council declares winners.

- Presidential candidates must be put forward by legally constituted parties; independent presidential candidates can run if they obtain 5,000 signatures. To be elected President a candidate must receive an absolute majority of valid votes. If no such absolute majority is won in the first round, a run-off is held among the top two vote-getters to

decide the victor.

- Under an agreement reportedly reached in inter-party discussions, there will be 223 national deputies. Three will represent Angolans abroad, 90 will be chosen by proportional representation within the provinces (5 from each province), and 130 will be chosen nationally using proportional representation (the d'Hondt system). A national legislature based on proportional representation is specifically called for in the peace accords.

- Vote counts from a polling station can be invalidated if it is ruled that irregularities affected the result at that station. A new poll must be held within seven days.

- The President and the National Assembly take office 30 days after publication of election results.

- The National Electoral Council is the ultimate arbiter of disputes on interpretation of the electoral law.

B. Election Preparations

The first and most important impression the team got during the country visit was the lack of preparations or resources for the elections scheduled for September. Given the condition of the country and the complete lack of electoral experience, the time remaining for such preparations is extremely short.

The National Electoral Council, based on the National Electoral Law not yet adopted by the legislature, had not been established. The preliminary work for the elections was centered in the Ministry of Territorial Administration, headed by Lopo de Nascimento. According to the vice minister of this department, several officials are already at work on an updated estimated census to be used in planning a voter registration campaign.

Ministry officials say that 3. 4 billion New Kwanzas (NK) (roughly $2. 4 million) have been

budgeted for the election process, with a reserve of NK 4 billion ($2. 8 million).

With adoption of the electoral law, which was expected to occur in March, the government's preparations are planned to gather momentum, with major assistance from the international community. International technical assistance, in the form of a major program overseen and organized by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in Luanda, is a key component of the Angolan electoral process. A willingness to work with foreign advisors, and even an eagerness for more international assistance than that foreseen in the ambitious package already planned, are evident among all Angolans connected with the electoral process. This observation applies to members of the MPLA-dominated government as well as UNITA, and to some small parties as well. Sovereign sensitivity about control of the national electoral process seems very low in Angola, while concern about bringing enough foreign resources to bear on the daunting problems is correspondingly - and justifiably - high.

During the team's visit, the United Nations was planning a two-sided effort to support the Angolan electoral process. The first part of the program is a program of technical assistance by the UN Development Programme, with an estimated budget of $12. 4 million. The second element is a plan by UNAVEM (UN Angola Verification Mission) to organize and support observation of the electoral process by international observers.

The UNDP project foresees technical assistance to all aspects of the electoral process, from training of election officials and electoral workers to design of a vote-counting system and development and supply of election commodities. At least 10 senior consultants will be brought to Luanda for the length of the electoral process. The UNDP hopes to act as the umbrella organization for foreign donors. Part of the UNDP election assistance project is a plan to use the national radio network being built by the SRPA (Special Relief Program for Angola) to report election results. The radio network, which plans to have stations in all 18 provinces by mid-May, could provide telex-over-radio messages to report polling results. As far as the team could learn, the official poll reporting system will be a radio network set up by a Spanish firm under contract to the central government.

Given the difficulties of operating in Angola, the short time available, and the infrastructure

already established by the UN in the country, independent activities by foreign donors outside the UN orbit will not be practical.

The UNAVEM observation mission proposal, submitted for approval to the UN headquarters, would involve the presence in Angola of 100 foreign UN observers for the duration of the electoral process beginning with voter registration. It is hoped that an additional 200 foreign observers, consisting of 100 UN Secretariat personnel and 100 observers from UN member states, could be brought in for a "surge" presence of 300 foreign observers during the last two weeks of the campaign and during the balloting. It was the feeling of UNAVEM officials in Angola that UN member states would not support a larger observation effort in Angola, especially given the UN participation in peacekeeping and democratization efforts currently underway in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. UNAVEM, as part of its mission to observe and verify the military demobilization process in Angola, has the best network of communications and transport in the country. It is expected that this network will be used to support the observation of election activities. As of mid-March, the decision of the UN with regard to the proposed UNAVEM observation program was not known.

C. Voter Registration

The first major challenge facing the Angolan electoral system will be voter registration. As noted in Chapter II, there has been no census in Angola for decades. In addition, war-time disruption has destroyed records, uprooted populations, and prevented the normal documentation of many people.

Therefore, accurate estimates of the population of eligible voters are not available. A very rough estimate of eligible voters, by province, is tabulated below. These estimates are based on UN projections of likely population in each province, adjusted for displaced persons and making an assumption about age profile of the population. The estimates are useful only to define the general dimensions of the challenge confronting election authorities.

ESTIMATE OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS IN ANGOLA

Province	Number of potential citizens (thousands)
Bengo	60
Benguela	400
Bie	400
Huambo	800/900
Huila	400
Cabinda	0/20
C.Cubango	40
Cuanza N.	200
Cuanza Sul	300
Cunene	100
Luanda	1000/1200
Lunda N.	150/180
Lunda Sul	60
Malange	350
Moxico	100
Namibe	50
Uige	400
Zaire	50
TOTAL	4860/5210

The Angolan officials responsible for early electoral planning have developed a framework for their registration effort. The plan is to deploy 1,100 registration "brigades," each consisting of seven members each, to be drawn mostly from the officer corps of the demobilized armies of the MPLA and UNITA. The officials cite several factors for using demobilized soldiers, including their availability and their educational level. Each brigade is to register, on average, 50 voters per day. Working for 80 days between April and the end of July, the brigades could theoretically register 4. 4 million voters, corresponding to the rough estimate of eligible voters tabulated above.

Considering all the factors that will hinder the registration process, the documentation of over four million Angolans in 80 days appears very unlikely. Serious problems of transport, logistics, and security, coupled with a desperate shortage of qualified personnel and lack of experience in electoral activities, present a daunting challenge to the registration process.

One aspect of preparations for the registration effort that came to the team's attention was a proposal by the British firm Thomas de la Rue to provide Angola with a turn-key registration package of equipment and materials for a price of $24 million. Serious objections to this kind of package, which on the surface appears so inappropriate for a country in Angola's condition, were raised by foreign representatives in Luanda with Angolan officials. At last word, the Angolan government was considering a package worth $12 million that included everything needed for registering voters with photo-identity cards. Among the details of the proposal that were not known was whether the package included training of Angolan personnel, a crucial and difficult aspect of any such registration program.

Foreign military observers of the demobilization process noted that there was considerable doubt about the practicality of the more modest plans to register and issue ID cards to soldiers being released from their duties. National voter registration represents an even bigger challenge.

The use of demobilized soldiers for the registration "brigades" could have negative repercussions. In a country that recently emerged from a bloody civil war, the connection of the military with the electoral process could create fear, uncertainty, or misperception among

voters facing an election for the first time. A recommendation on an alternative to the use of demobilized soldiers in the electoral process is contained in Chapter I.

The difficulty of registering the population under the current circumstances, and the short time available in which to do so, suggests that simple and reliable approaches be taken to registration. One example of such an approach is offered in Appendix C (see Electoral Registration). Under this approach, registrants would fill out two copies of a registration form. One would be used to compile the voter's list at the relevant polling station. The second one will be sent to Luanda for data processing after the election in order to generate national statistics and develop a permanent voter's registry. Regardless of the specific tactics adopted, simplicity and speed will have to be the main characteristics of any Angolan voter registration program.

D. Election Calendar and Tasks to be Accomplished

While at least some planning has taken place with respect to the mechanics of voter registration, Angolan election officials have yet to begin the dual tasks of voter civic education and election polling.

Registration is scheduled to be completed by July 31. The election is set for September 29-30, allowing time for a run-off if necessary before the rainy season arrives in November. This schedule is very tight, considering the practical problems certain to be encountered at all stages of the electoral process. Any disruption in the demobilization process, or any security crisis arising from the success of the demobilization process in discharging soldiers into the civilian economy, will affect the election schedule.

Given the multiplication of logistical impediments beginning with the rains, it is vital that delays not push the election and second round beyond the beginning of October.

For illustration, the major tasks to be defined and accomplished in the Angolan electoral process are summarized in the next two pages.

TASK I: March 1 - May 30, 1992.

(1) Selection and creation of the electoral authorities and institutions at different levels (National Electoral Council, etc.)

(2) Selection and training of the people in charge of voter registration. Their training must encompass all voting procedures as they will also be the poll workers at the polling stations.

(3) Logistical and geographic planning of voter registration.

TASK II: March 15 - April 30, 1992.

Civic education campaign to promote voter registration. This campaign must be intense, using images and exploiting the important oral tradition existing in the country. It must make use of TV and radio but also appeal to the traditional chiefs. The campaign must be in Portuguese as well as the local languages. The main themes to be conveyed by the messages are **REGISTER FOR PEACE** and **VOTE FOR PEACE**. It should be remembered when designing the campaign material that the rate of illiteracy is very high in Angola. Probably no more than 20% of the potential voters can read.

TASK III: May 15 - July 30, 1992.

(1) Campaign of voter registration.

(2) Computerization of the voter registry while the process of voter registration is still taking place. As this sub-task will not be completed in time for this first election, voters will have to vote at the same place they registered.

TASK IV: June 1st - July 30, 1992.

(1) Plan location of polling stations (may correspond to the plan of voter registration sites.)

(2) Plan transportation of voting materials.

(3) Preparation of voting materials and supplies for each polling station.

(4) Plan to designate poll workers (presumably the same workers enrolled as registrars).

(5) Plan to designate the international election observers.

TASK V: August 1 - September 5, 1992.

(1) Announcement of candidacies. August 1st - September 5, 1992.

(2) Printing of ballots.

TASK VI: August 1 - September 29, 1992.

(1) Campaign of civic education for the election.

(2) Training of poll workers.

(3) Transportation of voting materials.

(4) Plan communications; testing of communications equipment.

(5) Reception, lodging and transportation of international observers to observation stations.

TASK VII: September 29-30, 1992

Election day.

Counting of votes at the polling stations.

TASK VIII: Before October 20, 1992.

If necessary, run-off and counting of votes.

TASK IX: After the Election.

(1) Institution-building for the National Electoral Council and its subordinate institutions. (2) Follow up on the process of permanent voter registration.

IV. AVAILABILITY OF GENERAL FACILITIES AND ACCOMMODATIONS IN ANGOLA

After three decades of civil war, centuries of uneven development under colonial rule, and ravaged by economic problems and increasing civil disorder, Angola is an extremely difficult environment for any sort of electoral assistance effort. This chapter describes what is known of the specific challenges facing any foreign personnel participating in an electoral assistance program in Angola. Most of the concrete information concerns the capital city of Luanda, where it is assumed most training and other assistance activities will take place.

The first challenge confronting foreign personnel in Angola is personal health. The country's public health system, always limited at best, is in a state of general collapse. To give an idea of the perilous public health situation in Luanda, whose population has grown four-fold since independence without any accommodating expansion of the basic infrastructure, it may be best to quote from the U. S. government's report on conditions there, prepared by the staff of the U. S. Liaison Office.

> "Community health in Angola is very, very poor, well below U. S. standards. . . . Many of those who have poured into the city live in ramshackle huts or shacks lacking sewage, water, and electricity. Luanda is afflicted with virtually every disease known to mankind. Hepatitis, measles, typhoid fever, polio, malaria, leprosy, amoebic infestations, cholera, yellow fever, filaria, tetanus, meningitis, trypanosomiasis, rabies, tuberculosis, syphilis, and two varieties of AIDS, plus a variety of other illnesses hold sway over the population. The local blood supply is contaminated by AIDS and hepatitis. Luanda's garbage collection system is always poor and often collapses . . . . City water is badly contaminated by raw sewage, human wastes, and other contaminants and has to be boiled and filtered. "

A. Medical Care

Given the health hazards, a priority concern is the availability of medical care. Team members were advised that foreign personnel should seek care in local hospitals under no circumstances other than dire emergencies. For all practical purposes, medical care is provided by evacuation

of affected personnel to Namibia, South Africa, or Europe. Arrangements can be made with Namibia- or South Africa-based aviation firms for medical evacuation. The international medical emergency organization SOS has a Johannesburg office that may be the best commercially available med-evac option for personnel in Angola.

There are a few locally based clinics run by foreign business concerns which offer acceptable medical care. However, access to these clinics is strictly limited. The best solution would be to arrange access to one of these facilities for treatment in cases of dire emergency, either through direct contact with the company involved or through the UNDP, which has itself made arrangements for care at the facility run by the French oil company ELF.

Aside from such arrangements as may be made for emergency medical evacuation or treatment, it is important that any foreign personnel working in Angola take all reasonable precautions to avoid the many health hazards. Only persons in good health should be stationed in Angola. They should exercise great care in eating and drinking, and make provision to avoid dependence on local supplies of water and basic medicines.

B. Housing

Housing is basically unavailable in Luanda. The options are very limited, and costs associated with each option are very high. There are four hotels suitable for foreigners. Room rates for these hotels are in the range of $150/night. Meals taken in hotels are also very expensive, and can average $60+/day (breakfasts are included in room rates). Dining at the small but increasing number of private restaurants (see Appendix B) can lower meal costs. Availability of rooms is very limited. It usually requires a commitment of several weeks or months to secure a room.

Apartments or houses may be available, though finding them will probably require considerable time and they will be extremely expensive. An apartment of low quality, which might have some utilities but almost certainly would lack phone service or reliable electricity, might be rented for a rate of $2-3,000/month, according to international organizations with experience in Luanda. One foreign embassy was recently offered a 4-bedroom house for a rate of

$30,000/month. If substantial amounts of money are offered it might be possible to expand the list of choices for apartments or houses, but this remains speculative.

Angolans often rent state-subsidized apartments to which they have access to other Angolans for higher prices. Because this is against the law and the quality of such apartments is usually very poor, this approach is not practical for foreign personnel. One option for securing housing might be to renovate a residence. But, given the very high cost of doing such work in Luanda and the extensive improvements that would likely be needed (to include addition of electrical generator and water storage tank), this also appears to be impractical as a short-term option. Some international personnel in Luanda find housing in the residential compounds maintained by foreign companies such as Swedish and Brazilian civil construction firms. However, space in these compounds is very limited. One medium-term option might be to add a pre-fabricated residential unit to one of these compounds, where utility hook-ups are already available. Such pre-fabricated units can be flown in, and several South African firms reportedly offer such units (see Appendix B).

C. Office/Support

The lack of suitable office space in Luanda parallels the desperate shortage of adequate housing. It is repeatedly declared by Angolan and international personnel in Luanda that the international electoral assistance program will have office space in the new headquarters of the Angolan National Electoral Council, to be located in the renovated foreign ministry building downtown. However, at the time of the country visit this renovation was incomplete, and it is not clear whether or how the UNDP will be able to accommodate foreign elections assistance personnel.

According to embassy and UN sources, some rental office space is available in Luanda. Rates of $40-70/square meter were reported for currently available space. A key consideration in addition to cost would be the availability of utilities such as reliable power and water supplies. As with rental housing, considerable time and expense would be required to find and prepare rental office space for occupancy.

Given the frequent and increasingly brazen property crimes taking place in Angola, one cost that needs to be included in any kind of rental office space or independent housing compound is that of security. The UNDP facility in Luanda hires local security guards for $600/month. The limited effectiveness of this service has been demonstrated by daytime thefts of equipment from the UNDP headquarters.

Phone service in Angola is very limited and unreliable. Embassies, international organizations, and companies with substantial operations in Luanda use hand-held VHF radio nets in place of phones for most communication. Any new net would likely have to be in the UHF range, as the VHF is becoming saturated by the large number of local users. Communications outside Luanda are very primitive, with no reliable phone service. International organizations use radio networks that are now being expanded to support relief efforts and the electoral process (see Chapter II). For reliable international communications, a satellite phone is required.

International courier service, via DHL, is available in Luanda. The cost is $300 per year, plus $20/package, with reliable four-day service to the U. S.

Listed below are illustrative costs (in U. S. dollars) of hiring local staff. They are based on information obtained from foreign embassies and international organizations.

Bilingual secretary, $1,200 - 4,000/month. Salary range indicates variation in capabilities. While there are some locally available personnel with good language skills and general capabilities, their scarcity and cost will surely increase as the programs of both international organizations and private companies in Angola continue to expand.

Simultaneous interpreters (Portuguese/English), $115 - 210/day.

Administrative assistants, $1,500 - 1,800/month.

Accountants, $800 - 1,500/month.

Drivers, $600 - 700/month.

(Note: The above costs do not reflect the extreme shortage of educated, experienced, and capable personnel.)

The UN estimates that the cost of training national personnel as part of the elections assistance program will be $160-250/person, per day, in Luanda and $129/person, per day in the provinces. This estimate covers per diem and certain costs such as transportation. Special considerations such as shelter and security may not be included.

D. Transportation

As noted in Chapter I, transportation in Angola is very precarious. Only air transport operations contracted to the UN or private entities offer a rapid and safe means of travel. Domestic flights of the national airline (TAAG) are unreliable and usually delayed. TAAG has flights from Luanda to the larger provincial capitals.

International flights are available on several foreign carriers as well as TAAG. Commencing in April, regular service to Luanda by South African Airways should greatly increase international travel options, as well as simplify other activities such as medical travel and air cargo shipments.

Within Luanda, private vehicles offer the only suitable means of transportation. Public transportation is minimal and sub-standard. Roads are poor and traffic in the downtown area can be dense. A car with driver can be leased for $125/day or less.

Importing one's own private vehicle costs less than leasing, but caution should be exercised. In the week prior to the IFES team's country visit, virtually all of the available Suzuki Samurai 4-wheel drive vehicles were stolen. They sell for $30,000 each to diamond smuggling operations in Lunda Norte province. During the week of the team's country visit, the thieves' attention turned to Land Rovers, including several belonging to the Red Cross that were taken at gun-point from the Red Cross headquarters near the Foreign Ministry and MPLA headquarters.

The security problems associated with driving outside Luanda, as noted in Chapter I, are serious. Barring an unexpected improvement in the security situation outside Luanda, independent road travel is not a practical option. Security measures undertaken with UN assistance for the electoral process might modify this generalization with respect to travel to principal provincial centers such as Huambo, Benguela, Lobito, and Malanje.

APPENDICES

Appendix A
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED DURING COUNTRY VISIT

Friday, February 21, 1992.

EC Delegation offices, Rua Rainha Jinga, 3:00 p. m. :
Carla Montesi, Counselor, Delegation of the Commission of the European Community
Donald G. Keene, Regional Legal Advisor/Southern Africa U. S. Agency for International Development

Hotel Turismo, 5:30 PM:
Horacio Boneo, United Nations Secretariat

Monday, February 24, 1992
U. S. Liaison Office, BPC Bldg. , 10:30 p. m. :
Bert Moore, Administrative officer, U. S. Liaison Office
Ricardo Cardiga, U. S. Liaison Office

U. S. Liaison Office, Miramar, 2:45 p. m. :
Major Javier Garza, Jr. , U. S. Liaison Office military staff United States Army

UNDP Offices, Luanda, 4:30 p. m. :
Frederic Spielberg, Public Information Officer, UNDP/Luanda
Nabor Riquelme, Communications Manager, UNDP/SRPA

Tuesday, February 25, 1992

U. S. Liaison Office, Miramar, 10:00 a. m. :
Jeff Millington, Director, U. S. Liaison Office

UNDP offices, Luanda, 11:00 a. m. :
Paolo Baldan, UNDP elections assistance office
Giuseppi Lubatti, Counselor, UN World Food Program

Hotel Turismo, 5:00 p. m. :
Abel Chivukuvuku, UNITA representative to the Joint Political - Military Commission

Wednesday, February 26, 1992
UNDP offices, Luanda, 10:30 p. m. :
Thomas Theisohn, Program Officer, UNDP
Michel Michaan, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP
Paulette Nichols, UNICEF/Angola

Thursday, February 27, 1992
U. S. Liaison Office, Miramar, 11:30 a. m. :
Hugo Anson, Senior Political Advisor, UNAVEM

Hotel Presidente, 6:30 p. m. :
Filomeno Vieira Lopes, Secretary General, Front for Democracy
Ingles Pinto, Front for Democracy
Helmut Schuenicke, Hanns Seidel Foundation Representative for Angola

Friday, February 28, 1992
Hotel Presidente, 8:00 a. m. :
Claude St-Pierre, Director, CARE-International/Angola

MPLA headquarters, Luanda, 9:45 a. m. :
Marcolino Moco, Secretary General, MPLA

Foreign Ministry, Luanda, 10:40 a. m. :
Joao Baptista Kussumwa, Vice Minister of Territorial Administration

Appendix B

PRACTICAL INFORMATION/CONTACTS

Restaurants

At the time of our visit, four privately-owned restaurants were operating in Luanda outside the hotels where foreigners usually stay. All are located in central Luanda. Their addresses and phones (if any) are unknown, but their location is well known to any Angolan driver and many resident foreign personnel. One advantage of using these restaurants is price. Lunch at these establishments usually costs less than $10/person, and the quality is acceptable. It is likely that more restaurants will open soon. The current list consists of:

Sao Joao
Xiadinho
Monte Cristo
Veneza

The UNDP headquarters has a nice restaurant on the roof that serves lunch at reasonable prices. Access should be easy for anyone working with UN personnel. On Fridays they have an especially good menu of African specialties.

Supplies/air freight

Two South African air freight operations were identified by foreign embassies as offering comprehensive cargo and supply service to Luanda. They are listed below.

Roligh Air Freight
Oasis International
9 Church Road Capetown 7951
(27) 21-888776, 21-885659
Contact: Tony Lean

Trading Importers & Exporters
POB 13
Judith's Paarl 2046
614-6137   fax 614-8015

These and other companies can arrange everything from bringing in containerized modular housing units to delivering weekly supplies.   As noted elsewhere, South African Airways will begin regular service to Luanda in April 1992.   This should make air connections with the rest of the world less complicated.

Useful contacts
The following names will be useful contacts for anyone living and working in Luanda.

Jeffrey Millington
Director, U. S. Liaison Office
Residence: Suite 2602, Hotel Presidente, Meridien
(deputy director is Tony Newton)

Bert Moore
Administrative officer, U. S. Liaison Office
BPC building
39 02 42, Ext. 157
(deputy is Ricardo Cardiga)

Major Javier Garza, Jr.
(U. S. L. O. , contact for military, CCPM affairs)

Fred Spielberg
Public information officer, UNDP
197 Rua Major Kanhangulo
33 11 81/88/93/96

(Other good UN contacts are Paolo Baldan, elections assistance; and Michel Michaan, administrative; Paulette Nichols, general)

Claude St. Pierre
Director, CARE-International, Angola
330 Alameda Manuel Van Dunem
34 51 96

Hugo Anson
Senior political advisor, UNAVEM
(office) 46 91 59
(home)   39 17 88

Contact for local bilingual staff
Joao Sandri Lemos (name given by Ricardo Cardiga/U. S. L. O.)
35 42 31 and 36 28 84

Appendix C

ORIGINAL REPORT OF ROBERTO LIMA SIQUEIRA
(Translation from Portuguese by Dennis J. Culkin)

The legislation that will regulate the process is not yet approved. It is said that the election will take place in September, 1992.

In a meeting with Counselor Dr. Sebastiao Neves, of the Brazilian Embassy in Luanda, the team was informed of a conference that took place under the auspices of the Minister of Territorial Administration, Mr. Lopo do Nascimento, Coordinator of the Electoral Process. The subjects broached at the conference, which was attended by Mrs. Margaret Anstee, recently named United Nations delegate charged with supervision of the electoral and peace processes in Angola, were the following:

1. Current legislative situation of the electoral process, including its financing and organization.

2. Whatever the legislative situation, it was learned that the consultations with UNITA and the new political parties concerning the preparation of an electoral law were virtually concluded. The law is to be submitted to the National Assembly in March, 1992.

3. After approval of the electoral law there will be the designation of the members of the National Electoral Commission, which will be the independent executive body responsible for the entire electoral process. The Commission will be comprised of members of the new parties, which today number about 25; the Government; UNITA; and international observers.

4. At the conference it was learned that the new law foresees that voter registration will be accomplished between April and July by designated Electoral Committees in each of the 18 provinces of the country.

5. These Electoral Committees will be made up of demobilized military personnel and by provincial leaders of the political parties.

6. Voter registration is to be the responsibility of 1,100 brigades, each with 7 members, drawn from both Government and UNITA demobilized soldiers, with each brigade trying to register a minimum of 50 citizens a day.

7. It is foreseen that the election campaign will take place in August, and the Presidential and Legislative elections in September.

8. Minister Lopo do Nascimento called attention to a recently signed agreement between the Government and the UNDP for the provision of UN technical assistance needed to organize and fulfill the election process.

9. The Minister said that the Angolan Government, assisted by the UNDP, had already prepared a NK 3. 4 billion (New Kwanzas) budget with a reserve of NK 4 billion, in addition to the US $10 million needed to cover the costs of the electoral process. Lastly, the Minister asked those present to solicit financial support for the elections, through the United Nations, from their governments. The U. S. representative said that his government was seeking an allocation of US $4. 5 million for the process from the U. S. Congress. The representatives of the European Community countries, Sweden and Canada also showed interest in the electoral process and announced that their governments would be studying forms of financial and technical assistance.

Optimistic calculations expect that during the period between April and July, approximately 4. 5 million voters will be registered. This figure is based on the assumption that if the brigades work five days a week for four months - i. e. , 80 days - registering 50 voters a day, they will have registered in the end, at least, 4. 4 million citizens. Voter registration of those 18 years or older, of both genders, literate or not, is to include provision, at the same time, of a registration certificate (electoral identification card), bearing the voter's photograph. If a citizen lacks all identification documents, testimony from a local authority, for instance, a priest, pastor, or local administrator, will suffice. Registration papers will be filled out by members of the brigade.

It needs to be emphasized that even the Government recognizes the problems that might hamper development of the process, such as mine removal from secondary roads, and the precarious state of transportation and communications. Besides UNAVEM (which has the best communications system in the country), UNDP/SRPA also has a system capable of linking some provinces via radio, with plans to expand the system so that by mid-May all provincial capitals and a few of the most important cities in the country will be accessible by radio. The person responsible for this service is Mr. Nabor Riquelme, Communications Manager of UNDP/SRPA, who was in Nicaragua during that country's presidential elections.

Angola had, as of December 1991, 31, mostly Soviet-made helicopters in operation. It is impossible to say how many will be available by September 1992. There is a shortage of spare parts for helicopters and vehicles in the country.

The election timetable could be endangered by excessive optimism among its creators. In a country that does not have electrical power available 24 hours a day, that does not possess regular telephone service, nor any other reliable means of communication, where you cannot rely on the transportation system in any season of the year, one cannot expect to erect, in the time foreseen, such an ambitious electoral plan. This is especially the case if the plan in question involves registration, an election, verification and final tallying of results without a very well planned strategy, developed and executed with a minimum of precautions and provisions to assure its accomplishment and soundness.

The following technical suggestions take into consideration the precarious state of affairs in the Angola elections. Unfortunately, the team did not possess any knowledge of the legislation that will regulate the process once it is approved.

ELECTORAL REGISTRATION FORMS (see Appendix F for samples)

Registration forms should be prepared in two copies, on parchment-like paper, with the first being made from paper of 18/20 kilos intended for data processing. The second copy, on thicker paper (24 kilos) will be used for the formation of the Voters' Registry. This form

contains personal data of the registrant, which may be used for statistical analysis, especially considering that the country does not possess recent census data (available data is more than 20 years old).

The Registration Form will contain the following data:

I   Name of province

II   Name of city, to include the village, hamlet, or rural farm of residence of the registrant

III   The code of the province and city

IV   Labels, a pair of which will be pre-printed by computer, containing the identical following information:

      (a) The name of the province and its code

      (b) The name of the city and its code

      (c) The number of the electoral registration

      (d) The number of the electoral section where the voter must vote

V   Voter's name

VI   Voter's father's name

VII   Voter's mother's name

VIII   Voter's residence

IX   Voter's date of birth

X   Voter's sex

XI   Voter's marital status

XII   Voter's education level

XIII   The document presented for registration

XIV   Date of voter's application

XV   Voter's signature, or fingerprint

XVI   The date and signature of the registration brigade

The registrant's profession or other personal data that can serve as a source of statistics can be added to the form. Only on the second copy will a photograph of the registrant be attached.

After the form is filled out and its data confirmed by interview, the form will be signed by the voter or, with illiterate registrants, marked with a fingerprint, and signed by a member of the brigade.

Next, a member of the brigade will fill in the Electoral Identification card, authenticating it and adding the voter's signature to it.

Finally, the respective labels will be attached to both copies and to the Electoral Identification card, with the card being folded in half, placed in a plastic pouch for protection, and delivered to the voter.

The member of the brigade will separate the two copies of the form, collecting them in different folders. The first copy will be sent to the National Electoral Commission for data processing. The second copy, which will make up the voters' registry, will be sent to the polling station reception table on election day for identification of the voter who, by some misfortune, loses his Electoral Identification card, and for notation, on the reverse side, that the voter's vote has been cast, or for any other observation that is necessary. At the time of voting, the voter and the president of the polling station reception table will sign the space corresponding to the election.

Such procedures are valid for the verification of authenticated participation, assuring more honesty in the process.

ELECTORAL IDENTIFICATION

The voter identification card is made from a card that can contain a water-mark. It will contain the following voter information:

I	Voter's photograph
II	Voter's registration number (unique in the country)
III	Voter's polling station number
IV	Voter's date of birth
V	Voter's name
VI	Voter's
VII	Voter's city and province of residence
VIII	Signature of voter and chief of the brigade that registered voter

Each polling station will accommodate up to 400 voters. This number should be reduced in view of the high rate of illiteracy and the time constraints. A larger number of voters per station will generate large lines, which could cause chaos during the voting.

If the legislation contains a provision that the voter can vote at any polling station in the country, this fact will disrupt not just the election but its verification, making impossible the prevention of criminal acts aimed at creating fraud in the process. Hypothetically, one station could receive 1,000 votes and another 20. Would one have received 1,000 voters and another 20, or were ballots taken from one box and put into another? Control over the process becomes almost impossible.

VOTING RECEIPT

The voting receipt will contain:

I	Voter's registration number
II	Date of voting
III	Signature of the president of the polling station

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This receipt will be filled in and delivered to the voter soon after he votes. The voter should keep it in the plastic pouch with the Electoral Identification Card.

VOTING STATION TALLY SHEET

Appendix F contains a sample tally sheet. Besides the enclosed samples, other ones should be developed once the electoral law becomes known, such as:

(a) Examiners' Table Tally Sheet
(b) Municipal Final Tally Sheet
(c) Provincial Final Tally Sheet
(d) National Electoral Commission Final Totalization Sheet
(e) Ballot Box Records for the Presidential and Legislative Elections

The final version can only be developed after the electoral legislation is made public.

One should not lose sight of the necessity of alerting the Angolans to the principle of the campaign to educate the eligible population, which should be launched with the urgency that the case requires.

Besides the voter education campaign for the population, there must be specific training given to the brigades who will register the public, to the poll workers, and to the examiners and those responsible for totalling the results.

Considering the non-existent publishing sector in the country, it is necessary to have all the publications made in another country. As this may create a complicating factor, it is advisable that there be a detailed discussion of the entire process with the local authorities and a designation of a clearly authorized person, who can go to the location of the printing activity, for resolution of last minute details. Brazil, which is eight hours flying time from Luanda has facilities to execute the task with the urgency that the subject requires.

In analyzing the problem of data processing, both with regard to registration and totalization

of results, Luanda does not have the organization nor the technical personnel to do the data processing. Belo Horizonte, Brazil has firms with the capacity for processing the registration data.

It was the team's intention to present a project that offered the ability to process the data derived from the form, for the simultaneous creation of the Electoral Registry and Voting List by computer. This alternative was discarded from the beginning because of time constraints. If registration continues until July 31, there will remain only a part of the month of August for the shipment of the documents, their digitization, discussion, adjustments and processing. The reason part of August is given as the time frame is because the documents will have to arrive first in Luanda. As registration ends on July 31, and given transportation problems in Angola are considerable, it is foreseen that these documents will only arrive in Luanda in mid-August. Hence, only a few days will remain for the task to be completed. This led to the suggestion that the second copy of the Electoral Registration form be used for the Voting List. The processing of the first copy could be done after the election, without risk of rendering infeasible the realization of the task in the time allotted.

For the totalization of the results, a Luanda processing center with data consolidated in AT 386 computers could be created. The system of totalization could be developed outside Angola, after definition and analysis of a strategy to be employed for the collection of the ballot box tally sheets in the various polling stations, municipalities and provinces. Due to the scarcity, or non-existence of capable personnel and data processing equipment in the country's interior, it is advisable that the totalization function be entirely centered in Luanda, under the direct observation of the National Electoral Commission and the observers of the UN.

Another topic to be carefully planned is the observation of the elections by UN observers during the election period. As the country does not have means of transportation and communication, it will be necessary that the UN take care of these, in addition to personal security and precautions against disease. It will be advisable that all observers carry UN passports and have access to radio communications, not only between provinces but principally with the capital Luanda.

One still notes a certain isolation of UNITA with regard to the participation of its demobilized soldiers in the formation of the brigades, which is the Government's plan. The problem needs to be better studied so that the UN observers feel assured about the fulfillment of their tasks during the elections. Thus, with quick brush strokes, the team can paint what it was possible for us to verify "on the spot" and, consequently, the provisions that can be made for serving the citizens during the preparation, realization and authentication of the process with the complete security and fairness that the subject merits and requires.

Roberto Lima Siqueira
Belo Horizonte, MG
March 4, 1992

Appendix D
Original Report by Juan Rial

ANGOLA: PEACE THROUGH ELECTIONS
The Angolan Problem
Report on the conditions in Angola as of March 7, 1992

General Evaluation

Angola was for 16 years the site of an intense, internationally-backed civil war during the Cold War era. As a result of war, Angola is ravaged, the state disorganized and civil society in chaos. Despite the royalties produced by oil, the economy is on the brink of paralysis. Already, just recently, the Russians asked for payment of the debt incurred in the past with the Soviet Union by the Angolan government. However, the Russians have not been recognized as the sole successors of the superpower by the Angolans, who use this fact as an excuse for not fulfilling the payment of those obligations.

The two main rival groups were the governing MPLA/PT (Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola/Partido dos Trabalhadores) [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola/Workers' Party] and its military organization the FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares Angolanas) [Popular Armed Forces of Angola], on the one hand, and the rebelling UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and its military organization, the FALA (Forças Armadas Populares Angolanas) [Angolan Popular Armed Forces], on the other. Other participants in the civil war were the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertaçao de Angola) [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] of Holden Roberto - dissolved at the beginning of the '80s - and the FLEC (Frente de Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda) [Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda] in the enclave of the same name.

The international participants were the armed forces of South Africa, who backed UNITA, and the armed forces of Cuba, who supported the government.

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The Soviet Union provided weapons, services and logistic support to the government and the Cuban Fuerza Internacionalista [Internationalist Force]. The United States of America and China did the same for UNITA. The European countries with interests in the oil fields - France in particular - provided discreet backing to the government. Zaire also intervened in the conflict, as it had a long-standing border dispute with the Angolan government. Many skirmishes took place as a result of this feud until the agreement of 1978 between Agostinho Neto and Mobuto settled the quarrel.

The peace agreements created another scenario - a scheme of triple authority. Today, it is very difficult to know who really governs the country. Although the authority of the Angolan government is formally recognized by UNITA, this acknowledgement has been very difficult to implement. In the province of Cuando Cubango only three Municipios [municipalities] have a governmental authority in place. In Uige, the number of government representatives is five in sixteen. In Moxico, more than half the territory is presumably not controlled by the government.

The de facto dual power set up by the agreements becomes a triple power on the question on who controls the military forces. The peace agreements of Bicesse establish that the CCPM (Comissao Conjunta Politico-Militar) [Joint Political and Military Committee] guarantees the peace agreements and is in charge of military questions. The CCPM is composed of members of the government and of UNITA, as well as of observers from Portugal, the US, the former Soviet Union and the UN. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a representative of Russia has assumed the place of the former superpower. The impact of the Russian representative in the decisions of the CCPM is negligible. Power rests in the hands of the Angolans, the Portuguese (who represent the interests of the European Community) and the US members.

Although the agreements explicitly state that the CCPM does not replace the government, the fact is a certain number of key political decisions are in the hands of this committee. The CCPM consists of three sub-committees: a Political Committee, a Ceasefire Committee (also in charge of the verification of the demobilization process) and a Committee for the Formation

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of the Angolan Armed Forces. To this must be added the presence of the international contingent of observers of the UN (UNAVEM II). Therefore, the division of power can be summarized as follows: an administrative authority at the "national" level, another authority in the areas controlled by UNITA, another in charge of the control of the new military force, and a significant role for the international community in the CCPM, through the UN and UNAVEM II.

The CNE (Conselho Nacional Eleitoral) [National Electoral Council] will be an ad hoc autonomous institution in charge of the organization of the election. It will be formally subordinated to the CCPM but will depend for its action on the goodwill of the government, UNITA and UNAVEM II.

These institutional arrangements, coupled with a bankrupt economy, render very difficult any attempt to inaugurate a democratic regime. A return to the period prior to the peace accords is impossible. There are not enough resources to sustain another civil war, and fortunately, none of the protagonists has shown a firm will to return to the past.

Despite the increase in "private" violence, fostered in many cases by members of UNITA, or by government armed forces, Angolans seem destined to a future of peace. This position is echoed by members of the younger generations. They neither want to fight, nor do they believe in the totalitarian rhetoric of both sides. They want to survive and, if possible, to be happy. This attitude is especially common among youth living in urban centers, where freedom of expression and movement are practiced.

The urban centers are overpopulated, as the countryside has become inhabitable. Agricultural production is almost nonexistent. The country must import its food. An significant portion of the population works in the informal economy. A minimum wage of US $12/mo. has recently been established. The availability and prices of products for everyday consumption varies regionally. Shortages are common. In Saurimo, provincial capital of Lunda Sul, for instance, the price of an egg is between US $25-30/egg. A delivery by truck of sixty gallons of contaminated water to a musseke, a habitat in a shanty town, may cost US $2. 00.

Angola is a state encompassing several "nations". As with Native-Americans, the term is synonymous with an ethnic group's identity. The nation most relevant numerically is the Ovimbundu, which comprises about 37% of the total Angolan population. The Ovimbundu nation is based in the central and southwest regions of the country. It is where UNITA recruits a significant number of its rank-and-file. It must be underscored that UNITA is the only political formation that explicitly uses ethnicity as a political banner: "contra os kinbundos e os mulatos" [against kinbundos and mulatoes]. In the future, the party may become divided between those defending this idea of "négritude" and those proposing a greater integration with the West and its ideological conceptions. The most Europeanized group during the colonial period was the Kinbumdos or Bundu, who live near Luanda and account for 25% of the Angolan population.

The Bakongos, who represent 15% of the total population, occupy the northwest region of the country, near the frontier with Zaire and the enclave of Cabinda. In the more isolated northeast can be found the Lunda-Chokwe, representing 8% of the population. An important number of them still live in the kimbos or villages under the authority of the sovas or traditional chiefs. In the southeast, the Nganguela amount to 6% of the national population. The nomadic Ovambo, who constitute about 2% of the population, can be found in the desert region of the province of Namibia: they usually also travel to the country of the same name. The Haneca\Humbe or Nyadjek represent 3% of the population. The rest of the Angolan people are comprised of whites of European descent and mulattoes.

The destruction of socialism and the eruption of informal economic activities, the kandonga or informal commerce, practiced in informal markets such as Roque Santeiro favor the exercise of basic freedoms in the important urban centers. The destruction of the family structure by war or internal migration has also helped this process and curiously contributed to the depoliticization of the citizenry. The very harshness of life in the mussekes (unplanned neighborhoods with no running water or sewage but with access to the erratic supply of electricity) also favors this situation. However, in the provinces, the basic freedoms are often suppressed not through a systematic plan but as a result of a situation of general insecurity. The sovas still control the traditional communities of the hinterland, but their weight at the national level is decreasing.

The MPLA has gone through several important internal changes: formerly influential leaders, such as onetime Ambassador in the UN, Pedro Manual Paçavira, or the members of the Van Dunem family, have lost all power to influence decisions.

Military officers such as the General Antonio dos Santos França "N'dalu", the representative of MPLA in the CCPM, or Col. Higino still have influence in their respective areas. As for Minister of Territorial Administration, Lopo do Nascimento, and General Secretary, Marcelino Moco, they seem to be leading the movement that is calling for change within the party.

Among the UNITA people, there is also a generation of new leaders such as Abel Chivukuvuku, representative of UNITA in the CCPM and Fatima M. Roque, who operates as the person in charge of economic and financial issues in the shadow cabinet of this organization.

The members of other political and religious organizations to closely watch are Joaquim Pinto de Andrade; Holden Roberto, recently returned from exile in Virginia; Jorge Chicoti; and Filomeno Vieira Lopes. Alexandre Cardinal Nascimento, the head of the Catholic Church, is another figure who deserves to be closely observed. After obtaining the return of confiscated church properties, expect him to play a major role in the election and post-election periods as negotiator and intermediary.

No other social movement seems to be of relevance to this period in Angolan history. In this domain, the situation contrasts with the one prevailing in Latin America at the beginning of the transition to democracy. There exists no human rights organization. As for the women's groups such as the OMA (Organizaçao de Mulheres Angolanas) [Organization of Angolan Women] and the LIGA (Liga de Mulheres de Africa) [League of African Women], they are either part of the MPLA as is the case of the former, or created to satisfy the demands of international networks and not a direct product of the mobilization efforts by Angolan women as is the case with the latter. The team found neither private academic centers of social research nor noteworthy NGOs.

Contrary to what used to be the case, the Angolan situation is now given very low priority in the international decision-making circles. Civil war in Yugoslavia and the agreements in Cambodia had a direct impact on this shift in opinion.

Nonetheless, it must be noted that the regional context is far from favorable to an orderly transition process. Zaire is on the brink of explosion as the corrupt regime of Mobutu is nearing its end. Zambia is not a stable country. Namibia and Botswana are only buffer states between Angola and South Africa: the latter's efforts to end apartheid will have repercussions in Angola. The enclave of Cabinda presents a very special set of problems, as it is surrounded by Zaire and Congo. Without firm international support, the whole Angola situation may well deteriorate even further.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the real contenders for hegemony in Angola are the US on one hand and the Europeans - EC members or not - on the other. The latter have the advantage of not having been identified with either rival during the civil war, which is not the case of the US-supported UNITA. Among other things, this "conflict of hegemony" among central powers may be settled with the presidential election.

The election will take place in September. Applying only rational criteria, and considering the difficulties mentioned in this IFES report, they should be postponed. The rainy season begins in November. A fact which complicates the election from a logistics perspective since it means having them in 1993 instead - a politically unacceptable alternative. Internationally, the mandate of UNAVEM II ends in September. In all probability, the international community will not continue financing Angola at the same level for a long time. However, for domestic as well as international reasons, they ought to take place on the date scheduled. This means that Angola will have elections in 1992. The international community as much as Angolans must strive for them to be free and fair despite the obvious constraints. Angola ranks 147 out of 160 in the Human Development Report of 1991 published by the UNDP. It is just closing one of the bloodiest chapters in its history and finds itself in a state of disarray. In this context, free elections and the survival of a democratically elected government will constitute a new and important experience on how to settle political disputes through peaceful negotiations.

The Problem of Social Order

The main problem Angola faces in its political transition is maintaining peace and order. The first obstacle to such a process is demobilization. The Peace Accords agreed on a timetable for the demobilization of troops on both sides to take place.

These goals will be very difficult to meet. The February 2, 1992 Report of UNAVEM II depicts a very complex situation. From a total of 144,000 soldiers who should have been present in the zones of concentration for the demobilization process, UNAVEM could only account for 90,000, 64-percent of the total expected. FAPLA has only presented 53-percent of the men promised and FALA 94-percent. The figure of 90,000 soldiers is itself questionable, as only 73,000 were physically present in the zones of concentration during the count. Commanders were not able to explain in many cases why some of the troops were absent. A few, especially in the more densely populated zones, adduced that the men absent during the roll call had been authorized to go out of the zones of concentration in search of food. It is also reported that in many cases the officers cannot control their personnel and that discipline is poor, not to say nonexistent in many of the zones of concentration. The problem of demobilization is closely linked to the problem of private violence. Incidents of such violence increased after the war and continue to do so. Should the difficulties to obtain food, money, and a new occupation met by the demobilized soldiers persist, they could adversely affect the process of democratization of the country.

FALA is having less difficulty in reaching the goals of the plan of demobilization, as its soldiers feel that they belong to the band that won the Cold War. They also have fewer personnel to demobilize. A significant number of UNITA soldiers will enter the new armed forces on an equal basis with the fighters of FAPLA.

The creation of the new professional Armed Forces is generating a division between former comrades-at-arms on both sides. This institution will have forty thousand men, provided in equal parts by FALA and FAPLA. This force in the creation stages is to be led by two generals, one from FALA and one from FAPLA, under the supervision of international authorities.

This dual command is trying to organize a professional corps that will, in all probability, become a factor of power in Angolan politics. It will be the sole organized force in the country.

Before it becomes a purposive instrument of power, it is our suggestion that a militarized police force be created to counterbalance the Angolan Armed Forces, as the latter will possess in the future virtual monopoly over organized force. There is not much time left for this task as the first instructors have graduated from the military academy of Huambó. The construction of a school of NCOs and training center for enlisted men in Benguela has begun. Having a militarized police force would control demobilized soldiers from both sides and deter and protect against acts of violence.

Problems associated with Voter Registration

The Minister of Territorial Administration and, particularly, the Vice-Minister, have insisted on assigning the task of electoral registration to demobilized soldiers. Although it might partially ease the problem of security associated with demobilization, from the perspective of the electoral process it might be a costly mistake. The ability of soldiers to handle registration tasks is questionable, even though the Vice-Minister adduces that all soldiers have at least seven years of basic schooling. However, the team's major objection stems from the fact that given their record and because of guilt by association, they are not appropriate for promoting democracy. They have absorbed a philosophy of violence and authoritarianism and could well introduce a note of uncertainty and fear in the perceptions of would-be voters.

It is our recommendation that teachers and students be used for the task of voter registration and later as members of the poll stations during the election. The team knows that the cost of this option means paralyzing the schools for a significant length of time. However, as an important reform of the education area is under way, the cost could well be less severe.

In 1990-91, there were 6600 students registered in the fourteen pre-university schools of the country and 6500 at the University. According to the figures provided by the Departamento

de Força de Trabalho e Salarios [Department of the Working Force and Wages] to the Ministro do Plano [Minister of Planning], there are 14,761 elementary teachers, 1,251 secondary teachers, 258 teachers of technical education, and 41 university professors. The Angolan government therefore has sixteen thousand teachers and professors and sixty five hundred university students. They would constitute a more appropriate personnel than former soldiers for the tasks of voter registration and staffing of the poll stations during the election.

A second point to be taken into account is how the lack of infrastructure will hinder the electoral process. The roads and bridges that existed before the civil war were destroyed during the struggle. The country is sown with land mines - some speak of 12 million land mines, almost one explosive per inhabitant. The security and logistics problems this situation poses will multiply if the process of demobilization fails.

If the process of demobilization does not take place as planned and if the calendar is not respected, banditry coupled with the existing problems of infrastructure will result in a situation where the guarantees of the electoral process probably will only be present in the urban centers.

The team's calculations indicate that the maximum number of potential voters who can be registered is 5,000,000 persons. If 3,000,000 can be registered and 2,000,000 go to the polls, the electoral process should be considered a success.

The following is the team's estimate of potential registration per province. The team took into account U. N. population projections per province, the existing population densities in each area, the flux of refugees returning from Zaire and Zambia (about 250,000), the internally displaced persons (about 800,000) and the possible age structure of the population. Obviously, the estimate is a crude one.

It must be noted that the Vice Minister of Territorial Administration uses higher figures as he estimates the population of Luanda at 3,000,000 inhabitants and the total national population at 12,000,000. The team thinks that the figures used by SRPA (Special Relief Program for Angola) are more accurate.

The Constitution

The revised Constitution has been significantly changed from the original one of 1975. It is adapted to the new realities of an epoch where democracy is considered the only viable institutional arrangement. Thus, Article 4 of the Constitution establishes the possibility of the existence of a multi-party system and effectively does away with the notion of a single party system. Certain statist forms are maintained, such as the ones found in Article 12 (mining activities in the hands of the state).

However, the norm that prohibited private ownership of the land has been changed to one that recognizes it. The Ministerio de Plano [Ministry of Planning] is maintained; its main task is to present a Plano Nacional [National Plan] to the Legislative Assembly.

Presidentialism is the form of government in Angola. Although Article 46 states that there must be a Prime Minister and a Cabinet of Ministers, the Constitution establishes the President as the Chief of State, the Chief of Government, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Therefore, the President has no right to dissolve the legislature, and the parliament can only request information from the members of the Cabinet.

The rest of the articles of the Constitution refer to the existence of the Judiciary - where the institution of the assessores populares [popular advisors] is maintained - and to the regulation of local government in the provinces. Basic political and human freedoms and rights are also consecrated in this Constitution. Norms referring to national defense such as the ones that determine that the armed forces of Angola must be apolitical and which establish an obligatory draft of male citizens are also covered by the Constitution.

The Constitution allows decisions regarding many aspects of the way in which the political regime works to be made by law. Therefore, if changes are needed, a Constitutional reform will not be necessary.

For instance, the process of nominating Ministers and determining their very number is a matter regulated by law and not by the Constitution. This Constitution is highly flexible. It

can be reformed by the Assembleia do Povo [Assembly of the People] without any further formality.

After the reform of the Constitution in March 1991, a series of laws were passed in May of the same year to implement the process of transition to democracy. One of them regulates citizenship, an important point from the perspective of the electoral process and the process of voter registration. In the north, in particular, among the members of the Bakongo ethnic group, who share a border with Zaire, it is not easy to establish the citizenship of many of the people living in the area. The nomadic people of Namibia also present problems of citizenship that should be taken into account when planning the voter registration campaign.
A law of associations seeks to guarantee the freedom of the different institutions created by civilians to perform different tasks and achieve diverse goals. Another law guarantees the right and freedom of assembly and the right to participate in public demonstrations. Another one regulates the measures to be taken in situations of internal aggression and/or of serious perturbations of public order, it legislates on the use of the state of siege.

A law of the press guarantees freedom of speech in the newspapers. A special law permits the private exploitation of radio stations, whereas television is still considered a state monopoly. A transitory article in that law signals that an autonomous Council of Social Communication will be formed, to jointly supervise and defend with the parliament the objectivity of information and the use of the freedom of speech. It is explicitly stated that the parties will have access to the use of TV and radio time and that this right is regulated by a special law - the electoral law.

The law of political parties was also promulgated on May 11, 1991. Parties cannot be grounded exclusively on a local or regional basis. They cannot foment tribalism, racism or regionalism. They cannot incite any form of discrimination that jeopardizes national unity or endangers the territorial integrity of the state. The creation of a new political party must be requested by three thousand citizens of voting age (18 years old). There must be at least one hundred and fifty petitioners in fourteen of the eighteen provinces of the country for this request to be considered. Although during the process of an explosion of pluralism, characteristic of a situation of transition of this type, many voices have demanded the reduction of the number

of citizens required to register a new party, no agreement has been reached on this matter. As has happened in many other similar processes, it can be surmised that this overabundance of parties will disappear after the first election. However, as the current situation in the world shows, it is very difficult to make predictions on this subject in times of particularism.

After examining the corpus of existing laws and the Constitution, it can be affirmed without doubt that the main barriers to the installation of a democratic regime are not of a legal nature - they are substantially political. Their roots can be found in the problems inherited by a country torn by a 16-year civil war during which it experienced destruction of not only the economy but also the basic networks of solidarity in society and the institutional arrangements born of them.

The Electoral Law

The electoral law, the basic legal tool to guarantee a process of peace through elections, has been a hotly contested matter. Its promulgation will take place during March 1992, after agreements among the political interests involved. What the team has are drafts of the said law, subject to all kinds of variations. The one it will comment on is dated February 21, 1992.

The main points of this draft of the electoral law are:

● Representatives and the President will be elected directly by the voters, following the principle of universal and secret suffrage. The exercise of the vote is not mandatory, it is considered a civic obligation.

● Voters must be registered in order to exercise their right to vote.

● The President must convoke the elections and fix the date of the Election Day.

● The jurisdictional authority for the electoral processes is the Supreme Court of Justice. The authority competent to register voters is the Civil Court of each Provincial Supreme Court.

● All persons eighteen years of age or older are considered electors. Angolans residing abroad may participate in the elections.

● A Conselho Nacional Eleitoral [National Electoral Council] is created in order to organize the elections. This Council consists of:
- one (1) Supreme Court Judge, elected by all the Members of the Supreme Court. This Supreme Court Judge will be the President of the National Electoral Council.
- one (1) Judge designed by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice.
- The Ministro de Administraçao do Territorio [Minister of Territorial Administration] In the first draft, the Vice Minister was also included.
- five (5) citizens "especialistas" [experts].
The project does not determine what kind of expertise those citizens must have, although the team presumes it should be in electoral matters. These citizens must have impeccable moral credentials and are designated by the President of the Republic.
- A General Director of Elections, designated by the President of the Republic with the consensus of the other political forces.
- A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- A representative of the Conselho de Comunicaçao Social [Council of Social Communication] - an institution that does not yet exist.
- A representative of each political party or party alliance legally constituted. This may well total 25 persons.
- Representatives of the CCPM, who will have a voice but not the right to vote on decisions. Presumably, the Council will be integrated by one or more representatives of the countries that guarantee the agreements of Bicesse, as well as by members of UNITA and of the government.
- Presidential candidates can also have a representative on the Council.

A Council such as the one described above is not and cannot be an executive authority. The possibility of creating a steering committee to direct and organize the process has been discussed. An alternative decision-making process is being actually considered that would leave the last word in this process in the hands of the CCPM, which would then transmit its resolutions to the President, who would order the National Electoral Council to implement

those determinations.

Apparently, the different parties would be in agreement regarding the Electoral Director. It is rumored that the nominee would be Ambassador D'Almeida, a diplomat with years of experience abroad,and current ambassador of Angola to Ethiopia.

The draft of the electoral law anticipates a structure of 18 Provincial Electoral Councils. They will consist of a Judge, a representative of the local Governor, five citizens, a Provincial Electoral Director, a representative of each of the political parties or of the alliances of parties permitted by law. As was the case with the National Council, at this level of the electoral organization the presidential candidates also have the right to designate a representative. At a lower level, the draft examined by the team also foresaw the creation of Gabinetes Municipais Eleitorais [County Electoral Councils] with a similar composition.

● The register of voters will have a permanent character. In order to proceed to the voter registration, brigades of five to seven members will be constituted.

The team recommends that the term "brigade" be removed from the vocabulary because of its military connotations. The idea that the registration of voters is in the hands of some kind of military organization can raise fears of possible levies and result in actual registration figures falling below expected levels. On the other hand, it is stated that the members of the registration brigades must be 16 years of age or older: This means that those who will be registering voters are themselves not of age to vote. To this inconsistency must be added the fact that the team cannot anticipate a process of voter registration free of violent incidents. Therefore, the team recommends that this task be left to people who have already come of age.

● The draft of the law also contemplates the problems of vast groups who lack so called bilhete de identidade [national ID] because they live either in regions where the government does not exert its authority or in zones that have not been touched by the modernization process. In that case, any form of ID - be it a driving license, a military ID or the affidavit of a religious or traditional authority - will be accepted as proof of identity.

● Candidates have the right to keep their salaries - be they from the public administration or from the private sector - during the 45 days prior to the election.

● The duration of the electoral campaign is twenty days; it must end 24 hours before voting begins. The sale of alcoholic beverages is not prohibited during Election Day. Although the voting Assembleias cannot be located in buildings where alcohol is sold, the consumption of alcoholic beverages is not forbidden on the day of the election. The duration of the campaign of an eventual second electoral round is only eight days. The limitation of the duration of electoral campaigns in a country that faces great problems in financing them is a very intelligent measure that should be retained when the definitive law is passed.

● The dissemination of the results of public opinion polls during the electoral campaign is forbidden. Obviously, for this election, this does not constitute a serious problem, as there are neither public opinion polls nor pollsters in Angola.

● Political activism in the course of the electoral campaign is absolutely prohibited in military barracks, government buildings, the workplace during the hours of work, or religious institutions (this step is specifically taken to counter the practice of using those places as indoctrination centers under the one-party system.)

● The use of radio and TV time for political propaganda is granted on an equal footing to all parties. The law forbids the use of commercial advertisements for political ends during the campaign.

● Strict norms are set to govern the financing of the parties.

● The poll takes place in the Assembleias de Voto [polling stations]. Each polling station will serve 1,000 voters. This figure is really high from a technical point of view. The highest acceptable number of voters per polling station in the world is 400 voters. The practical consequences of a higher number of voters per polling station are long lines and an exceedingly long time waiting to exercise the right to vote. Considering that this is the first free election in the history of the country, there will be many administrative blunders and mishaps, the team

recommends that the number of voters per polling station not exceed 300.

● There will be five election officials in each Assembleia. One of them, at least, must speak the local tongue of the region. The law allows the constitution of mobile election centers in regions where the voters are dispersed. The law permits that the election take place in more than one day, which explains why so many election officials are necessary. In the draft the team consulted the number of days was not stated. But, the team was told officially that they would be three. This creates logistic and security problems. Places to deposit the voting materials, the urns and the votes would become necessary. Lodgings would have to be provided for the keepers of the urns, for the election officials and, eventually, for the observers. The team thinks it would be wiser to limit the election to just one day.

● The ballot can be marked with an X to indicate the voter's choice. Those who cannot do it are allowed to mark the ballot in the place of the candidate of their choice with their fingerprint. Each ballot should have two marks: one for the choice of a presidential candidate and one for the list of deputados [Congressmen].

For those who lost their cartao eleitoral [electoral ID] a form of vote that preserves the secrecy of the vote and bars the possibility of a double vote is contemplated.

● The apuramento [counting of the ballots] will be done by the election officials of the Assembleia de voto. Totals are counted first at the provincial level and then at the national level. Despite the fact that no deadline is fixed to finish all these operations, it is stated that the results of the election at the provincial level should be published six days after the closing of the polls. The National Electoral Council adjudicates and proclaims the results and the names of the winners of the electoral contest.

● The presidential mandate is for five years; the term of a Congressman is of four years. The discordance between terms of office may provoke problems of governance in the future, as the form of government is presidential.

• In order to be elected President, a candidate must obtain the absolute majority of the valid votes, included in the valid votes are null and blank votes. If no candidate obtains that number of votes on the election day, the electoral contest will be disputed between the two candidates with the most votes in a second electoral run-off. The rationale behind this second run-off is that it will enable candidates who lack the necessary majorities to establish alliances with other political forces. Political parties can propose presidential candidacies but the law also allows for independent presidential candidacies. The latter must be endorsed by five thousand citizens.

• The issue of the number of congressmen has been widely discussed. At the very beginning, the government proposed that the Congress be composed of 9 representatives per province, irrespective of the number of citizens living in each province. This would give the almost empty province of Namibia 20 times the representation of Luanda. UNITA opposed this idea, as did some of the smaller parties. According to the Estoril protocol, which forms part of the peace agreements, Congress should be composed of a National Assembly chosen at the national level by the system of proportional vote.

An agreement recently achieved indicates that Congress will have 223 deputados [representatives]. Three of them will represent Angolans living abroad (two (2) will represent Angolans living in Africa and one (1) Angolans living in Europe). Ninety representatives will be chosen in provincial counties. Five will be elected for each province.
The remaining one hundred and thirty will be elected using the whole Angolan territory as a unique county: in that case, the votes will be translated into elective office using the D'Hondt system.

• If the result is invalidated in one Assembleia de voto, the new election must take place seven days after the invalidation occurs. The nullification of the vote is only possible if the procedural irregularities are deemed to affect the result.

• The date of the Presidential and parliamentary assumption of office is thirty days after the publication of the results.

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● When there are doubts regarding the interpretation of the law, the National Electoral Council is the ultimate interpretive authority of the country.

Except for the aforementioned problems, this draft constitutes an acceptable project of law to begin working with to organize a first election. A complementary law regulating the rights and obligations of international observers to the election will also be passed shortly.

Appendix E

PROVISIONS OF THE ANGOLAN PEACE ACCORDS IMPORTANT
TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The following passages are drawn from the text of the peace accords for Angola signed in Portugal on May 1, 1991, by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Dr. Jonas Savimbi. The passages reproduced here bear directly on the plans for an electoral process that were part of the agreement to end the civil war.

CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

Definition and General Principles

1. The ceasefire consists of the cessation of hostilities between the Government of the PRA and UNITA with a view to attaining peace throughout the national territory.

2. The ceasefire must be total and definitive throughout the national territory.

3. The ceasefire must guarantee the free circulation of persons and goods throughout the national territory.

4. Overall supervision of the ceasefire will be the responsibility of the Government of the PRA and UNITA acting within the framework of the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) created pursuant to Appendix I of the document entitled "Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola. " The United Nations will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the Government of the PRA.

5. The ceasefire includes the cessation of all hostile propaganda between the Government of the PRA and UNITA at both the domestic and international levels.

6. After its entry into force, the ceasefire will obligate the Government of the PRA and UNITA to refrain from acquiring lethal material. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics informed the Government of the PRA that they will support implementation

of the ceasefire by ceasing to supply lethal material to any Angolan party and encouraging other countries to act in a similar fashion.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN ANGOLA

1. UNITA acknowledges recognition of the Angolan state, of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and of the Angolan government until the general elections are held.

2. At the moment the ceasefire enters into force, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities in accordance with the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy.

3. The Angolan government will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning the proposed changes in the Constitution. The Angolan government will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process.

4. Free and fair elections for a new government will take place following voter registration conducted under the supervision of international elections observers, who will remain in Angola until they certify that the elections were free and fair and that the results have been officially announced. At the time of the signature of the ceasefire, the parties will determine the period within which free and fair elections must be held. The exact date of the said elections will be established through consultation will political forces in Angola.

5. Respect for human rights and basic freedoms, including the right of free association.

6. The process of creating the National Army will begin with the entry into force of the ceasefire and will be concluded on the date of the elections, under terms to be agreed or between the Government of the PRA and UNITA. The neutrality of the National Army in the electoral process will be guaranteed by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM, with the support of the international monitoring group.

7. Declaration and entry into force of the ceasefire throughout Angolan territory, in accordance with the agreement to be concluded on this subject between the Government of the PRA and UNITA.

CONCEPTS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUES STILL PENDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND UNITA

1.   At the moment the ceasefire enters into force, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities in accordance with the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy.   At the time of the signature of the ceasefire, the parties will determine the period within which they must hold free and fair elections.   The exact date of said elections will be established through consultation with all political forces in Angola.

2.   The Angolan government will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning proposed changes in the Constitution.   The Angolan government will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process.

3.   The ceasefire agreement will oblige the parties to cease receiving lethal material.   The United States, the USSR, and all other countries will support the implementation of the ceasefire and will refrain from furnishing lethal material to any of the Angolan parties.

4.   Overall political supervision of the ceasefire process will be the responsibility of the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of the CCPM.   Verification of the ceasefire will be the responsibility of the international monitoring group.   The United Nations will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the Government of Angola.   The governments that are to send monitors will be chosen by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of the CCPM.

5.   The process of creating the National Army will begin with the entry into force of the ceasefire and will be concluded on the date of the elections.   The neutrality of the National Army in the electoral process will be guaranteed by the Angolan parties, acting within the

framework of the CCPM, with the support of the international monitoring group. The Angolan parties reserve for later negotiations the discussions on the foreign assistance that my be necessary in order to form the National Army.

6. Free and fair elections for the new government will take place under the supervision of international elections observers, who will remain in Angola until they certify that the elections were free and fair and that the results have been officially announced.

THE PROTOCOL OF ESTORIL

The government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA, meeting in Estoril, Portugal, with the Portuguese government as mediator and in the presence of observers from the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have reached the following agreements and understandings regarding political and military matters:

- I. Elections
- II. The Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM)

- III. Principles relating to the issue of internal security during the period between the entry into force of the ceasefire and the holding of elections.
- IV. Political rights to be exercised by UNITA following the ceasefire.
- V. Administrative structures
- VI. Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)

ELECTIONS

1. Elections will take place in Angola to choose the President of the Republic and the National Assembly. The question of whether or not these elections will be held simultaneously will be decided through consultations among all Angolan political forces.

2.   The President will be elected by direct and secret suffrage, through a majority system, with recourse to a second round, if necessary.

3.   The National Assembly will be elected by direct and secret suffrage, through a system of proportional representation at the national level.

4.   The elections will be preceded by an official election campaign period, the duration of which will be determined following a process of consultations involving all Angolan political forces.   A technical opinion from a specialized international body such as the United Nations, for example, will be obtained on the question of the desirable duration of the election campaign in Angola.   That opinion, however, will not be considered binding by any of the parties.

5.   All Angolan citizens of adult age may vote, participate in the election campaign, and stand for election without any discrimination or intimidation.   The definition of what is to be understood as "adult age" will be dealt with in the election law, to be drafted following the ceasefire, after a process of consultations between the Government of the PRA and all Angolan political forces.

6.   The voting will be secret, and special provisions will be made for those cannot read or write.   These provisions will be included in the election law, to be drafted following the ceasefire, after a process of consultations between the Government of the PRA and all Angolan political forces.

7.   All political parties and interested persons will have the opportunity to organize and to participate in the elections process on an equal footing, regardless of their political positions.

8.   Total freedom of expression, association, and access to the media will be guaranteed.

9.   The parties have accepted the tripartite proposal by the delegation of Portugal in its capacity of mediator, and the United States, the Soviet Union as observers, to the effect that September 1, through November 30, 1992, will be the period within which free and fair elections should be held in Angola, the ceasefire being signed in May 1991.   The parties have

reached an understanding that the following tripartite declaration is to be taken into consideration in the discussion of the precise date for the holding of elections:

"Taking into consideration the logistical difficulties in organizing the elections process, specifically the desirability that the elections be held during the dry season, and the need to reduce the high costs that the international community will have to bear in monitoring the ceasefire, the delegations of Portugal, the United States, and the Soviet Union heartily recommend that the elections be held during the first part of the suggested period, preferably between September 1 and October 1 of 1992. "

JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMISSION

1.   According to the document entitled "Concepts for Resolving the Issues still Pending Between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA," and Appendix I to the "Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola," the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) has its mission the overall political supervision of the ceasefire process.   It will have the duty to see that the Peace Accords ar applied, thereby guaranteeing strict compliance with all political and military understandings, and to make the final decision on possible violations of those accords.

2.   The CCPM will have the authority necessary to approve all rules relating to its own functioning, particularly its own internal regulations.   Its decisions will be made by consensus between the Government of the PRA and UNITA, after hearing the opinion of the observers.

Sole Paragraph: The CCPM does not seek to replace the Government of the PRA.

3.   In light of the foregoing, the CCPM, with headquarters in Luanda, should structure itself so as to:

    3. 1.   Guarantee the conditions of peace for the holding of free, fair, multi-party, and internationally verifiable elections;

3. 2. Ensure the fulfillment of all the political understandings resulting from the Peace Accords relating to the electoral process;

3. 3. Supervise the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement within the framework of the CVMF (Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission) and cooperate with the representatives of the United Nations;

3. 4. Inform itself about possible threats to the territorial integrity of the country;

3. 5. Discuss, within the sphere of its authority, questions relating to Angolan exiles.

4. The CCPM is to be constituted at the time of the signature of the Ceasefire Agreement.

5. The CCPM shall be composed of representatives of the Government of the PRA and of UNITA, as members, and by representatives of Portugal, the United States, and the Soviet Union, as observers.

The United Nations may be represented, in the capacity of invited guest.

5. 1. Members and observers shall be supported by assistants and technical advisors for the areas assigned to them, namely:
    (a) Joint Ceasefire Verification and Monitoring Commission (CVMF);
    (b) Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA);
    (c) The Political Commission.

Sole Paragraph: In the case of the members of the CCPM, the assistants and technical advisors will have to be Angolans.

6. The meetings of the CCPM shall be presided over, alternately in accordance with the principle of rotation, by the Government of the PRA and by UNITA, without prejudice to the

principle of consensus in the decision-making process.

7.   It shall be the responsibility of the CCPM to draft its internal regulations, as well as to determine its own budget.

8.   The mandate of the CCPM ends on the date the elected government takes office.

PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE ISSUE OF INTERNAL SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS

1.   All Angolans shall have the right to conduct and participate in political activities without intimidation, in accordance with the revised Constitution and pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy, and the provisions of the Peace Accords.

2. 1   The neutrality of the police, whose functions and activities are the responsibility of the Government of the PRA, shall be the object of verification and monitoring by teams of monitors composed of two members designated by the Government of the PRA, two members designated by UNITA, and one expert in police affairs to be designated by and subordinate to the United Nations Command structure.

2. 2   Within the sphere of their authority, the monitoring teams shall have as their specific mandate the duty to visit police facilities, examine their activities, and investigate possible violations of political rights committed by the police.   These teams may move freely throughout the entire territory of Angola.

2. 3   The monitoring teams are subordinate to the CCPM, and must submit reports of their activities to that body.

2. 4   In principle, there will three monitoring teams for each Angolan province.   The CCPM may modify the number of monitoring teams in accordance with the needs of each province.

3. 1 Consonant with the invitation from the Government, UNITA will participate in the police force that is responsible for maintaining public order.

3. 2   To that end, shortly after entry into force of the ceasefire, and as a means of strengthening trust between the parties, the availability of vacancies in the ranks of the police force to be filled by personnel designated by UNITA will be guaranteed, and those personnel will be given appropriate training.

4.   UNITA will be responsible for the personal safety of its highest-ranking leaders.   The Government of the PRA will grant police status to the members of UNITA in charge of guaranteeing that safety.

POLITICAL RIGHTS TO BE EXERCISED BY UNITA FOLLOWING THE CEASEFIRE

1.   According to the provisions contained in the document entitled "Concepts for Resolving the Issues Still Pending Between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA," and in the document on "Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola," at the time of entry into force of the ceasefire, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities, according to the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy, particularly including the following rights:

    (a) Freedom of expression;

    (b) The right to present, publish, and freely debate its political program;

    (c) The right to recruit and enroll members;

    (d) The right to hold meetings and demonstrations;

    (e) The right of access to the government media;

    (f) The right to free movement and personal safety of its members;

    (g) The right to present candidates in the elections;

    (h) The right to open headquarters and representative offices anywhere in Angola.

2.   Without prejudice to the stipulation of the previous paragraph, which permit UNITA to exercise those rights immediately, UNITA must, after entry into force of the ceasefire, satisfy the formal requirements for its registration as a political party pursuant to the "Political Parties Law" of the People's Republic of Angola.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

1.   Both parties accept the principle of the extension of the Central Administration to those areas of Angola that are presently beyond the range of its authority.

2.   Both parties recognize that such extension must not be made abruptly or endanger the free circulation of persons and goods, the activities of the political forces, and the execution of the tasks related to the electoral process.

3.   Both parties agree to leave for a later date the study of the actual implementation of such extension, which will be carried out within the framework of the CCPM by competent teams composed of representatives of the Government of the PRA and UNITA.   Those teams may have recourse to international technical advisors.

Appendix F

Sample Registration and Vote Tallying Forms

(Devised by Roberto Lima Siqueira)

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

FORMULÁRIO PARA ALISTAMENTO ELEITORAL

PROVÍNCIA DE

CIDADE DE

CÓDIGO DA PROVÍNCIA

CÓDIGO DA CIDADE

COLE AQUI A ETIQUETA
COM O NÚMERO DO TÍTULO
DE ELEITOR

PREENCHA COM ATENÇÃO, USANDO LETRA DE FORMA LEGÍVEL
NÃO RASURE, NEM EMENDE.
SÓ COLE A ETIQUETA E A FOTOGRAFIA, DEPOIS DE CONFERIDO
E ASSINADO PELO MEMBRO DA BRIGADA E PELO ELEITOR

NOME DO ALISTANDO

NOME DO PAI

NOME DA MÃE

RESIDÊNCIA

DATA DE NASCIMENTO
DIA MÊS ANO

SEXO — MASCULINO 1 — FEMININO 2

ESTADO CIVIL — CASADO 1 — SOLTEIRO 2 — VIÚVO 3 — OUTRO 4

GRAU DE INSTRUÇÃO
- ANALFABETO 1
- PRIMÁRIA 2
- SECUNDÁRIA 3
- SUPERIOR 4

DOCUMENTO APRESENTADO
- CARTÃO DE IDENTIDADE 1
- CERTIDÃO DE NASCIMENTO 2
- CERTIDÃO DE CASAMENTO 3
- DECLARAÇÃO P/FINS ELEITORAIS 4

DATA: EM _____/_____ DE 1992

ASSINATURA: _____

IMPRESSÃO DIGITAL

DECLARO QUE OS DADOS ACIMA TRANSCRITOS REPRESENTAM A VERDADE RETRATADA NO
DOCUMENTO APRESENTADO. EM___/___DE 1992. ASSINATURA:_____

(1a. VIA — DESTINADA AO PROCESSAMENTO)

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

FORMULÁRIO PARA ALISTAMENTO ELEITORAL

PROVÍNCIA DE	CIDADE DE

CÓDIGO DA PROVÍNCIA ⬚⬚⬚

CÓDIGO DA CIDADE ⬚⬚⬚⬚

COLE AQUI A ETIQUETA
COM O NÚMERO DO TÍTULO
DE ELEITOR

COLE AQUI
A FOTOGRAFIA

PREENCHA COM ATENÇÃO, USANDO LETRA DE FORMA LEGÍVEL
NÃO RASURE, NEM EMENDE.
SÓ COLE A ETIQUETA E A FOTOGRAFIA, DEPOIS DE CONFERIDO
E ASSINADO PELO MEMBRO DA BRIGADA E PELO ELEITOR

NOME DO ALISTANDO

NOME DO PAI

NOME DA MÃE

RESIDÊNCIA

DATA DE NASCIMENTO
DIA MÊS ANO

SEXO — MASCULINO [1] FEMININO [2]

ESTADO CIVIL — CASADO [1] SOLTEIRO [2] VIÚVO [3] OUTRO [4]

GRAU DE INSTRUÇÃO
- ANALFABETO [1]
- PRIMÁRIA [2]
- SECUNDÁRIA [3]
- SUPERIOR [4]

DOCUMENTO APRESENTADO
- CARTÃO DE IDENTIDADE [1]
- CERTIDÃO DE NASCIMENTO [2]
- CERTIDÃO DE CASAMENTO [3]
- DECLARAÇÃO P/FINS ELEITORAIS [4]

DATA: EM _____/_____ DE 1992

ASSINATURA: _____

IMPRESSÃO DIGITAL

DECLARO QUE OS DADOS ACIMA TRANSCRITOS REPRESENTAM A VERDADE RETRATADA NO
DOCUMENTO APRESENTADO. EM____/___DE 1992. ASSINATURA:_____

(2a. VIA — DESTINADA AO CADERNO DE VOTAÇÃO)

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┌─────────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┐
│ REPÚBLICA  POPULAR  DE  ANGOLA      │ PAI _____    │
│     IDENTIDADE   ELEITORAL          │                                 │
│  ┌──────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐  │ MÃE _____    │
│  │ COLE AQUI O  │  │   COLE      │  │                                 │
│  │   NÚMERO     │  │             │  │ CIDADE _____    │
│  └──────────────┘  │   AQUI      │  │                                 │
│                    │    A        │  │ PROVÍNCIA _____    │
│  SECÃO Nº._____ │             │  │                                 │
│  DATA NASC. __/__/___ FOTOGRAFIA  │  │ ASS._____    │
│  NOME _____           │  │ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   │
│  _____            │  │    ASS. CHEFE DA BRIGADA        │
└─────────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────┘
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(IDENTIDADE ELEITORAL)

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┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│  REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA    │
│   COMPROVANTE DE VOTACÃO        │
│                                 │
│  O  ELEITOR  DE                 │
│                                 │
│  NÚMERO_____              │
│                                 │
│  VOTOU EM __/__/__              │
│  _____          │
│     PRESIDENTE DA MESA          │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
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(COMPROVANTE DE VOTACÃO)

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA
ATA DA MESA RECEPTORA DE VOTOS
ELEIÇÕES DE ___ DE SETEMBRO DE 1992

SECÃO No. ☐☐☐☐☐ CIDADE _____

PROVÍNCIA DE _____

1. AOS ___ DIAS DO MÊS DE SETEMBRO DE 1992, REUNIU-SE A MESA RECEPTORA DE VOTOS DA SECÃO SUPRA INDICADA.

2. ESTA SECÃO POSSUI ☐☐☐ ELEITORES. COMPARECE-RAM ☐☐☐ .DEIXARAM DE COMPARECER ☐☐☐ ELEITORES.

3. DURANTE OS TRABALHOS OS ELEITORES QUE COMPARECERAM E VOTARAM FIRMARAM (OU MARCARAM COM SUA IMPRESSÃO DIGITAL) O VERSO DO CADER-NO DE VOTACÃO.

4. COMPARECERAM OS SEGUINTES MEMBROS DA MESA RECEPTORA

_____/_____

_____/_____

_____/_____

5. COMPARECERAM OS FISCAIS DOS SEGUINTES PARTIDOS:-

_____(PARTIDO_____)

_____(PARTIDO_____)

_____(PARTIDO_____)

_____(PARTIDO_____)

_____(PARTIDO_____)

6. HOUVE IMPUGNACÕES ?_____ QUANTAS ?_____

FORMULADAS POR QUAL PARTIDO ?_____ QUAL FOI A DECISÃO DA

MESA RECEPTORA DE VOTOS ?_____

_____

(UTILIZE O VERSO, OU OUTRA FOLHA, SE NECESSÁRIO)

7. OS TRABALHOS SE DESENROLARAM NORMALMENTE ?_____

SE NÃO, QUAL FOI O INCIDENTE ? DESCREVÊ-LO_____

_____