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
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MOROCCO
Direct Legislative Elections
Monitoring / Observation
Report


June 25, 1993

Thomas C. Bayer

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INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS



MOROCCO

DIRECT LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

JUNE 25, 1993

REPORT OF THE IFES MONITORING AND OBSERVATION DELEGATIONS


Prepared by

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IFES Senior Program Officer for Africa and the Near East

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This Report has been prepared by Thomas Bayer, IFES Senior Program Officer for Africa and the Near East. The Report represents the views and opinions of IFES, and reflects the observations and recommendations of the members of the IFES Morocco monitoring and observer delegations.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) is a private, nonprofit foundation established in September 1987 with a mandate to analyze, support, and strengthen the mechanics of the election process in emerging democracies and to undertake appropriate education activities which contribute toward free and fair elections.

The Foundation fulfills its objectives through programs in technical election assessment; on-site technical assistance; poll worker training; citizen education in democracy; and election day activities. IFES also serves as a clearinghouse for election-related information and experts.

IFES' program activities have expanded dramatically since the worldwide shift toward democratic pluralism and the ever-increasing demand for technical support services in the area of election administration. In the past five years, IFES has sent over 35 pre-election survey teams to five continents and provided on-site technical assistance to the election councils of Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Congo, Haiti, Guinea, Guyana, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Romania, Venezuela, and many other countries. Election related material and equipment have been shipped to countries in Africa, East-Central Europe, and Latin America.


Among IFES' significant contributions have been the undertaking of training for voter registration workers, poll workers, and other election officials in Bulgaria, Guinea, Haiti, Mali, Malawi, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, the former Soviet Union and Yemen. IFES has also used its resources to link election administrators on a regional basis through conferences and symposia on selected topics in election administration in Latin America and East-Central Europe.

IFES election observers have produced comprehensive reports on more than 20 elections on five continents, and post-election analysis reports have been completed for eleven countries in Latin America, Asia, Central Europe, and North Africa.

IFES is a vital resource center for any nation seeking expert assistance in developing a sound election process, an essential step in establishing and maintaining a democratic form of government. IFES also serves as a clearinghouse for sharing information about any technical aspect of electoral systems, including names of those expert in these systems and the materials essential to administering democratic elections.



MOROCCO






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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Kingdom of Morocco held direct elections for two-thirds of its national assembly on June 25, 1993. The final one-third were selected through indirect elections held on September 17, 1993. As a result of consultations between the governments of the Kingdom of Morocco and the United States, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems was invited to send a team to Morocco to perform a technical assessment of the June 25 electoral exercise. A 15-member international delegation was formed in response to this invitation. The principal objectives of the IFES observation mission in Morocco were to demonstrate the interest and support of the international community in the democratic process in Morocco and to gather information for inclusion in an election assessment report. This report is issued as a record of the observations made by the IFES team. It is also a presentation of a series of technical suggestions for the consideration of the Moroccan government in the organization and facilitation of future elections. This document is therefore addressed to the government and people of Morocco, as well as to the international community.

The initial phase of the mission was undertaken by a group of four campaign monitors and an IFES staff member who arrived in Rabat on June 9, 1993. Members of the monitoring team travelled around the country, gathering information on Morocco's preparations for the June 25 elections. Much information was obtained through interviews with Moroccans active in many segments of society. The team was primarily interested in information regarding the activities and climate of the electoral campaign, capacities for the general adherence to internationally accepted standards for democratic elections, and the practical logistical needs of the larger IFES observer mission that would follow.

A ten-member election observation team joined the monitoring team in Morocco on June 19. During the week leading up to election day, the IFES delegation studied the plans for the administration of voting, electoral rules and procedures, norms of administrative propriety and efficiency, political campaign methods, the degrees of political party and citizen participation, and general public awareness of the upcoming election process.

The IFES delegation was divided into six teams of two to four persons each and assigned to different observation zones. Early on June 22, the teams traveled to five of Morocco's major cities: Casablanca,

Marrakech, Rabat, Fés, and Tétouan. The sixth team was assigned to Béni Mellal. On election day, the teams visited polling stations within their assigned cities, as well as in nearby cities, towns, and villages. Thus, each team had the opportunity to observe election activities in urban and rural Morocco.

The teams observed the opening of the polls on the morning of June 25 and followed the voting process in as many locations as possible throughout the day. IFES delegates looked closely at issues of polling station organization, expertise of electoral officials, processing of candidates' and electors' complaints, the conduct of the military and police at voting sites, the role of authorized party observers, ballot security, and vote tabulation procedures. The teams remained in the field in order to follow the vote tabulation and centralization process from the polling station to the local and district levels. It is estimated that in total IFES delegates observed the voting in over 220 polling stations out of approximately 50,000, representing approximately 124,000 electors, 1.1% of Morocco's registered voting population.

The delegation reassembled in Rabat for debriefing on June 27. Each team presented a written report detailing its itinerary and findings to the IFES coordinator. Most of the delegation members departed from Morocco on June 29. The team coordinator remained in Morocco until July 4.

As this summary of the mission's activities makes clear, the IFES delegation's time and geographical reach in Morocco were limited. Delegates spoke with as broad a cross section of the Moroccan electorate as possible. Members of some groups, such as the Islamists, declined to meet with the delegation. This report attempts to present observations and conclusions of the mission that are valid and meaningful while explicitly recognizing these limitations.

The IFES delegation went to Morocco to observe the June 1993 elections, and to produce a report that would describe and qualitatively evaluate those elections. It was not the intention, nor was it within the capability, of IFES to pass qualitative judgement on Morocco's democracy. It is important, in the context of this report, to retain a distinction between elections and democracy. The holding of popular elections to choose a country's leaders is a necessary but not sufficient indication that that country is a democracy. It is necessary, in providing an analysis of these elections that goes beyond their technical and statistical realities, to place the elections within a picture of democracy in Morocco. Therefore, some perspective

must be taken by this report on the nature of that democracy.

By most standards, Morocco must be considered a limited democracy. If one of the hallmarks of a democracy is a democratically elected parliament that exercises significant legislative authority, then it is in this regard that Morocco falls short. The overwhelming share of power in the Moroccan polity is held by the King and his appointed ministers. The legislature has a voice in policy-making, but it is an undeniably weak voice.

Just as undeniably, the Moroccan government has been accused in the past, by internal and external critics, of severely limiting political participation and freedoms such as assembly, the press, association, and opinion. It must be said that the IFES delegation went to Morocco with an awareness of these judgements. The delegation was not in a position to directly evaluate the evolutions of past events, nor to fully estimate the degree to which the current political atmosphere represents a change from the past. Evidence collected by the delegation makes it possible to conclude, however, that (1) the tolerance of dissent and debate, as seen during the recent political campaign, has increased over past years; and (2) there exists a level of censorship, self-censorship, fear, intimidation, and official corruption of the election process that still must be remedied by the government before the legitimate criticisms of internal and external observers will be answered.

Turning more specifically to the election itself, the objectives of the IFES delegation can be stated, in summary, as gathering information that would enable it to answer two questions that are fundamental to any electoral event.

- (1) Were all eligible voters sufficiently educated about electoral issues and voting procedures; were they able to vote freely and secretly, without intimidation or undue hardship; and were their votes counted, tabulated and reported accurately?
- (2) Were candidates and political parties able to organize themselves, convene public assemblies, move about the country, and publish and voice their opinions without significant restrictions so that they were sufficiently able to reach the voters with their political messages and candidacies?

An unequivocally positive answer to both those questions would be sufficient to call any election "democratic." The answer that IFES can give to those questions in regard to the June 1993 elections in Morocco is equivocally positive. With due note of the limitations of the IFES delegation's perspective and objectives, the report that follows presents in detail findings and conclusions addressing the above questions which can be summarized as follows:

- In the areas of technical organization and administration, particularly in regard to the accuracy of voters' rolls and the material preparation for voting on election day, the Moroccan elections proceeded smoothly, with few observed administrative and organizational problems that would prevent a voter from casting his/her ballot secretly and without undue hardship. The system for the provision of voting cards, however, was cumbersome, offering an opportunity for fraudulent handling of the cards, and creating suspicion among members of the Moroccan electorate.
- The level of political and civic education of the electorate was apparently enhanced by the increased use of the electronic media in the campaign and the wide range of opinions expressed in the print media. However, the impact of mass media on the illiterate population and the population living in hard-to-reach rural zones was not apparent.
- There was not a truly independent body responsible for the organization and the facilitation of the elections. The elections were administered through the Ministry of the Interior, calling into question the neutrality of the administrators of the process.
- Morocco's electoral law is composed of a series of official decrees and circulars that have yet to be compiled into a single document governing the administration of elections. The creation of one concise document will facilitate training of elections workers and the resolution of disputes.
- The utilization of the multiple ballot format offers the opportunity for vote buying and undue influencing of voters. Illiterate voters do not benefit from this system. The adoption of a single ballot will significantly diminish the potential for fraud, reduce the overall cost of the electoral process, and enhance the secrecy of the vote.
- More Moroccan women are registered to vote than men. The role of women in Morocco's electoral process and in the nation's political institutions does not correspond with this statistic. Women want to play a greater role in the process. The way must be cleared for them to do so.
- Moroccans' cynicism toward the electoral process and politics in general is apparent to even the most poorly-informed observer. To begin to reverse this trend, workable checks and balances are needed between the branches of government. The legislature must be accorded greater decision-making authority and be directly accountable to their constituents.

- The overall reaction of the Moroccans to the presence of international observers was positive. However, the effect of international observers is constrained by some combination of limits on supporting resources, the number of observers, the amount of time allotted for the mission, linguistic capabilities, and knowledge of a nation's history. The impact of international observers can be complemented by the presence of domestic monitors. Civic organizations exist in Morocco that are capable of organizing and facilitating a domestic monitoring presence. The development of these groups will increase citizen participation in the electoral process, in turn increasing the confidence of the electorate in the elections.



PART I: BACKGROUND TO THE 1993 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The Kingdom of Morocco held direct elections for two-thirds of its national assembly on June 25, 1993. The final one-third were selected through indirect elections held on September 17, 1993. As a result of consultations between the governments of the Kingdom of Morocco and the United States, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was invited to send a team to Morocco to perform a technical assessment of the electoral exercise. A 15-member international delegation was formed in response to this invitation. Included on the team were nationals of Germany, Haiti, Nigeria, Togo, the United States, and Yemen. The United States Agency for International Development provided financial support for this delegation.

IFES is a private, nonprofit, non-partisan foundation established in 1987 with a mandate to monitor, support, and strengthen the mechanics of the election process in emerging democracies and to undertake any appropriate education activities which contribute toward free and fair elections. The Foundation fulfills its objectives through programs in technical election assessment, on-site technical assistance, pollworker training, citizen education in democracy, and election monitoring and observation. IFES also serves as a clearinghouse for election-related information and experts.

Through involvement in international election observation missions, IFES, along with other organizations, has established a set of practices and standards. The evolving methodology employed by IFES and others is continually adapted to improve the information-gathering techniques and analytic tools used by observer delegations. The standards by which elections are judged have similarly evolved. With the increased involvement of multinational organizations such as the United Nations, an internationally recognized set of standards for democratic elections has received increasing acceptance.

In recent years, in a small number of cases, the UN has been given the role of verifying whether or not a country's elections have been free and fair. To accomplish this task, the UN generally mounts an election monitoring operation that features a large number of observers and/or a long-term presence in

that country. In the absence of the large and long-term presence of international monitors, there is growing recognition by both the observing organizations and the observed nations that observer missions cannot judge with legitimacy the overall freedom and fairness of a particular election. When IFES mounts an observer mission that is not both large and long-term, therefore, it is careful to define for itself and for the host country the scope and limitations of the mission.

In the case of IFES' international observer mission in Morocco, five members of the delegation, the "long-term" monitors, were allowed to arrive in Morocco three weeks before the June 25 elections. Ten additional "short-term" observers spent approximately ten days in Morocco. The total of fifteen observers concentrated on six cities and their environs, and observed voting in less than 1% of the country's polling stations. Anticipating this limited temporal and geographic presence in Morocco, IFES formulated objectives for the mission that explicitly ruled out any general pronouncement on the overall freedom and fairness of the Moroccan legislative elections. Instead, the IFES mission was to focus on the technical operation of the campaign and voting process as observed by the delegation members. While not intending to extend those technical observations to an overall evaluation of the election's freedom and fairness, IFES was fully aware of its responsibility, to the Moroccans and to the mission's financial supporters, to summarize the mission's findings and offer some general conclusions about this electoral event (Appendix A).


More specifically, the IFES mission assigned itself the task of reporting its observations on three levels:

- (1) The mission would report what its members had seen while in Morocco. The direct observations of the delegation would be organized in the report to give a coherent description of the campaign activities and voting process as observed by the fifteen IFES delegates.
- (2) The delegation would make careful extrapolations of what it saw to describe, to the extent possible, the overall procedures and practices employed in the conduct of the Moroccan legislative elections.
- (3) The mission would attempt, primarily in its final report, to interpret these direct observations and evaluations in order to define, in a partial sense, the "meaning" of these elections and related

events. It is incumbent on IFES, having accepted the observation task, to present its considered opinions, mediated through the fifteen delegates and IFES' international experience, about the meaning of individual events in the larger electoral event and about the place of the electoral event within the greater context of Morocco's democratic "progress." This task is potentially the most controversial but also potentially the most useful of the three.

The collective voice that is represented in this report must be recognized for its inherent limitations and for being only one voice out of many, especially as it reaches out to draw conclusions from the events observed by the delegation. To thus recognize the report's limitations is not intended as a preemptive disclaimer of any part of the report which follows, but rather a reminder to the reader that the writers are aware that some of this elections truths can be apparently contradictory yet still be valid.

This report is divided into three parts. The first seven chapters provide background information on elections in Morocco. This material essentially reflects the information gathered by the mission's long-term monitors which was shared with the short-term observers in their pre-deployment briefing. The second part provides a description of the June 1993 elections as observed by the IFES delegation. In these seven chapters, the voices of individual observer teams, as recorded in their regional reports, are interspersed through the text of the general IFES report. The individual reports are excerpted to provide illustrations of the general points made, or to point out local anomalies. The third part of the report contains the delegation's findings, recommendations, and conclusions.



II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IFES PROGRAM

A. Initiation of the IFES Monitoring and Orientation Missions

IFES was initially contacted by USAID/Rabat in September 1992 concerning potential involvement in the training of domestic elections monitors in Morocco. The government of Morocco, however, did not approve of the development and training of a domestic elections monitoring group. In the early months of 1993, discussion turned to the provision of an international delegation to assess the legislative elections. The elections were originally scheduled for April and then rescheduled for June 1993 due to the inability of the administration to meet some of the pre-election conditions set by the political parties, such as the reverification of the electoral register and the nationwide distribution of the new voters cards. Throughout the discussions between IFES and the Moroccans, it was apparent that the Moroccan government was not interested in an organization coming to their country and telling them how they should, or should not, conduct their elections. On more than one occasion, Moroccan officials expressed to delegation organizers their desire that Morocco not be categorized with the emerging democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Initially, the Moroccan government proposed a severely limited program: international observers would be allowed to arrive in Rabat only one or two days before the election, observe the election day activity, and provide a public assessment of the process the next day. All U.S. organizations approached with this proposal declined to participate, as the time constraints imposed would not allow for the conduct of a thorough observation effort.

The conditions proposed by the Moroccans reflected their lack of understanding of the different aspects of elections monitoring and observation. IFES prepared a proposal in order to provide the Moroccans with a better idea of the design and the objectives of a technical elections assessment. In this document, IFES set out the essentials necessary for the conduct of a good mission. IFES' participation was made contingent on the government's acceptance of these conditions:

- Authorizing a four-person election monitoring team to arrive in Morocco by May 31;

- Issuing credentials to the monitors and the observer delegation's logistics coordinator, permitting them to travel freely in all areas of the country and granting them reasonable access to government officials and other individuals involved in the election process; and
- Delivering credentials to the election observers upon their arrival in Morocco, permitting travel to all areas of the country, as well as access to all election officials and election operations.

In addition, IFES clarified that this was to be a technical assessment of a fixed segment of the elections process. The delegation as a whole would not comment on the overall freedom and fairness of the election process. The findings of the IFES monitoring delegation would be contained in a public report released following the elections.

This proposal met with the approvals of the Moroccan government and USAID. The government of Morocco issued a formal invitation to IFES to send a team of international election observers to monitor the conduct of the election campaign period and election day itself. The team was originally slated to depart for Morocco on May 30, 1993. However, administrative difficulties both within USAID and the Moroccan government postponed the team's arrival until June 9, 1993.

B. Terms of Reference

Both the campaign monitoring group and the larger election observation delegation were assigned specific areas of work.

Campaign Monitors

The initial phase of the mission was undertaken by a group of four campaign monitors and an IFES staff member who arrived in Rabat on June 9, 1993. Members of the monitoring team travelled around the country, gathering information on Morocco's preparations for the June 25 elections. The four member monitoring team was assigned the following tasks:

- 1) Assess the conduct of the legislative campaign, through direct observations and through the gathering of reliable second-hand information, paying particular attention to:
 - a) appraising the ability of political parties and candidates to exercise their rights of free expression, assembly, and association;
 - b) determining the role of the mass media in the election campaign, particularly that of the government-owned or controlled press, television, and radio;
 - c) assessing the level of violence or intimidation negatively impacting the parties' and candidates' abilities to campaign freely, and on the voting public's free participation in the political process;
 - d) evaluating the adherence of the government and the competing parties to those sections of the electoral code governing campaign activities; and
 - e) analyzing the role of women in political activities;
- 2) Meet with the election commission or other government election administration bodies to evaluate their organizational capacities and to gather information on anticipated election-day problems;
- 3) Meet with leaders of political parties at the national and regional levels to discuss the campaign process and anticipated problems and issues for election day;
- 4) Gather political, geographic, demographic, and logistical information to be used for the effective deployment of the election observers; and
- 5) Meet with officials at the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission, at other foreign missions, and at the UN to discuss coordination of international observation.

Election Observers

A ten-member election observation team joined the monitoring team in Morocco on June 19. The observer delegation was requested to focus on the following issues:

- 1) The adherence of Moroccan election officials, in Rabat and at the regional and local levels, to internationally recognized standards of democratic elections and to the requirements of Moroccan election law and regulations;
- 2) Constraints on the ability of political parties and candidates to freely and effectively disseminate their programs to the electorate;
- 3) Constraints on the ability of individual voters to cast their vote without undue hardship or intimidation, in secrecy, and in an informed manner, and to have that vote counted and reported accurately;
- 4) The apparent effectiveness of the government's voter education program; and
- 5) Areas of possible improvement in the electoral process for future elections.

C. Project Implementation

Campaign Monitoring

The monitoring group was divided into two teams to carry out its tasks. One team travelled north to Khamisset, Fès, Chefchaoune, Ouezzane and Tétouan. The second visited Casablanca and Marrakech. The entire group participated in different portions of the information gathering process in Rabat. Pertinent information was obtained through interviews with Moroccans active in many segments of society. Particular attention was paid to representatives of the administration, leaders of political parties and civic organizations, businesspeople, and traditional leaders. The team was primarily interested in information regarding the activities and climate of the electoral campaign, capacities for the general

adherence to internationally accepted standards for democratic elections, and the practical logistical needs of the larger IFES observer mission that would follow.

The information amassed by the monitoring group was to be used in two ways: (1) as a primary component in the briefing of the election observers; and (2) as the framework for the IFES report on the Moroccan election.

Election Observation

The observers were aware that their role was not to supervise the elections nor to interfere in Moroccan affairs. The Moroccans did not issue formal guidelines for the conduct of international observers, thus, the delegation was to observe the elections in accordance with internationally recognized standards for the monitoring of electoral processes.

The delegation, in its observing and its reporting, was instructed to rely primarily on first-hand observations, and to document its observations carefully. The mission delegates agreed with the importance of distinguishing verifiable facts from hearsay and objective from subjective judgements. Mission delegates were instructed to avoid relationships with political parties or groups that would threaten the neutrality of the greater mission. The overall reaction of Moroccan administration officials and political party representatives to the mission's presence was positive. From this it appears that the IFES delegation successfully maintained a neutral approach to the process.

The full fifteen-member observation delegation was provided background information covering the following issues:

- 1) The electoral law and regulations;
- 2) Monitors' meetings with elections officials from the Ministry of Interior;
- 3) Monitors' meetings with national and regional political party leaders, activists, organizers, and candidates;
- 4) Information on potential problem areas and indicators of the level of election preparation to look for in the field;

5) Political analyses from in-country resources, including NGOs and international organizations.

The IFES delegation was divided into six teams of two to four persons each and assigned to different observation zones. Early on June 22, the teams traveled to five of Morocco's major cities: Casablanca, Marrakech, Rabat, Fés, and Tétouan. The sixth team was assigned to Béni Mellal.

Arriving in their respective observation areas three days before the election, the delegates focused on the level of local organization by both the political parties and the administration. Each team was able to view campaign activities during the final two days of political campaigning. During their pre-election surveys, the teams identified the location of polling stations and planned their election day observation routes. Throughout the day of June 25, the teams visited polling stations within their assigned cities, as well as in nearby cities, towns, and villages. Thus, each team had the opportunity to observe election activities in urban and rural Morocco.

The teams observed the opening of the polls on the morning of June 25 and followed the voting process in as many locations as possible throughout the day. IFES delegates looked closely at issues of polling station organization, expertise of electoral officials, processing of candidates' and electors' complaints, the conduct of the military and police at voting sites, the role of authorized party observers, ballot security, and vote tabulation procedures. The teams remained in the field in order to follow the vote tabulation and centralization process from the polling station to the local and district levels. It is estimated that in total IFES delegates observed the voting in over 220 polling stations out of approximately 50,000, representing approximately 124,000 electors, 1.1% of Morocco's registered voting population.

By noon on June 27, the delegation had reassembled in Rabat for debriefing. Each team presented a written report detailing its itinerary and findings to the IFES coordinator. Most of the delegation members departed from Morocco on June 29. The team coordinator remained in Morocco until July 4.

III. POPULATION, MILITARY, and MEDIA

A. Population and Education

Mid-1991 census figures place the population of Morocco at 26,345,000 inhabitants. The principal population centers, are Rabat-Salé (population 1,484,000); Casablanca (3,798,000); Fés (1,007,000); Marrakech (1,501,000); Meknes (741,000); and Tangier (553,000).

Morocco's population is 99.5% Sunni Muslim, 0.3% Christian, and 0.2% Jewish. Four languages are spoken throughout the nation: Arabic, Berber, French, and Spanish. Morocco's highlands are dominated by the Berber-speaking peoples. The majority of the population is Arabic-speaking, located in the urban areas and lowlands.

Education is an increasing priority for the Moroccan government. The estimated (1990) literacy rate for the nation is 46%; 60.5% for the male population and 31.7% for the female population. Participation in the education system from the primary level to the university level is rising steadily. Five new universities were established in 1989 and a new American-style university is under construction in Ifrane.

B. The Military and Security Forces

There are several organizations mandated to maintain public order. The *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST), *Sureté Nationale*, auxiliary forces, and the judicial police are under Ministry of Interior supervision. The *Gendarmerie Royale* is a branch of the armed forces that reports directly to the Palace.

The members of the military and of the organizations listed above, plus any other groups whose agents are armed and responsible for regulating public activity, e.g., Fish and Wildlife, are not eligible to vote in legislative or communal elections. These individuals did vote in the 1992 referendum. Their position in Moroccan society requires that they remain above partisan and personal politics. They may vote in non-partisan elections, such as a referendum. The families of military and security personnel are allowed to register and vote in all elections. The precise enlistment figures in these organizations and in the

armed forces is not public knowledge.

C. The Media

Radio, television, newspapers, and magazines play a key role in any election. The Moroccan constitution guarantees to the population the "freedom of opinion, of expression in all its forms, and of public gathering." Mission participants and Moroccans both noted that the press enjoys more freedoms now than in the recent past. Legal limits can be placed on the exercise of these freedoms. Moroccan law and tradition dictate that three topics will not be discussed: the monarchy, Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam. Most media exercise self-censorship in these areas. The government controls the licensing of newspapers and journals through a registration procedure. In addition, the government has the power, under Article 55 of the Press Code, to censor newspapers, usually accomplished through the issuance of advisories, ordering the papers not to report on specific items or events.

The television broadcasting station, Radiodiffusion Télévision Marocaine (RTM), is government-owned. This station broadcasts to 84% of the Moroccan territory for an average of 12 hours per day. TV programming is in Arabic and French. There is also a private station, 2-M International, established in 1989, which draws a primarily urban audience due to the high cost of subscription to the service. A SECODIP survey reports 89% urban TV ownership and growing.

RTM operates nine provincial radio stations broadcasting in Arabic, Berber, French, Spanish, and English. There are an estimated 17,000,000 radio sets in Morocco, serving 23,000,000 listeners. The provincial stations are responsible for three hours of independent daily programming in addition to material transmitted from Rabat.

Radio Méditerranée (Medi-1), a privately owned Moroccan and SOFIRAD French consortium, operates out of Tangier and reaches 7 million listeners representing 44% of the urban population, as well as a large regional audience.

Fourteen newspapers are printed daily, nine in Arabic and five in French. Estimated combined circulation is 500,000 copies. Five of the dailies are pro-government; the remaining dailies are supported by political parties:

Pro-government:	"Al Anbaa" "Le Matin du Sahara" "Maroc Soir" "La Mañana" "Assahra"
Istiqlal:	"L'Opinion" "Al Alam"
USFP:	"Al Ittihad al Ichtiraki" "Libération"
UC:	"Rissalat Al Oumma"
RNI:	"Al Mithaq" "Al Maghrib"
PPS:	"Al Bayane" "Bayane Al Youm"
MP:	"Al Haraka"
OADP:	"Anoual"

The relationships of the newspapers to political parties was apparent to the team members. There are no independent newspapers. The primary source of information for most of these papers, except for the opposition press, is the Maghreb Arabe Presse (MAP), the official government news agency. MAP has regional and international bureaux compiling news worldwide.

Weekly and monthly magazines of Moroccan origin are available at the numerous newsstands in Morocco's larger cities. These deal with economic, religious, and social subject matter and are either government or political party aligned. Foreign newspapers and periodicals are also available in the cities. It was reported to the delegation that occasionally an issue of a foreign paper or magazine will not appear on the newsstands due to the presence of an article(s) perceived as unfavorable to the government.

The IFES delegation discerned a significant difference between electronic media and print journalism. The content of television and radio broadcasts was more restricted than that of the newspapers and magazines sponsored by the political parties. For example, newspaper opinion pages sometimes featured sharp criticism of the government and even individuals within the administration. The television and radio programs monitored by the team did not feature this facet of public expression.

IV. MOROCCO'S GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

A. The Monarchy and the Ministries

In the 1992 Constitution, Morocco is declared to be a democratic, and constitutional monarchy.¹ The Constitution provides for a pluralistic system in which King Hassan II possesses the ultimate authority in all decisions concerning the Kingdom's administration. The King presides over the Council of Ministers, serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, appoints judges and civil servants, and signs and ratifies treaties. The King has the traditional role of *Amir al Mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful).

The 1962 Constitution provided for succession by primogeniture. The 1972 Constitution added that the King can designate another son as successor.² The Prime Minister is appointed by the King. The Cabinet ministers are appointed by the King on the Prime Minister's recommendation.³ Also appointed are the administrators of the rural and urban units composing the Kingdom's seven Economic Regions: Center, North West, Tensift, South, North-Central, South-Central, and East. Each Economic Region is responsible for the implementation of the regional facets of the King's economic development policies.

The Economic Regions are composed of groups of provinces. The leadership of the regions rotates on an annual basis between the governors and *préfets* of each respective region. These Economic Regions should not be confused with the *wilayas* and administrative provinces/prefectures.

B. Provincial and Local Administration

IFES team members requested clarification of the organization of Morocco's administration and

¹ *The Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, 1992. Art.1.*

² Blaustein, Albert P., and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds. *Constitution of Morocco*. (Constitutions of the World, series). Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1979, Article 1.

³ *The Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, 1992. Art.24.*

government. When asked, administrators offered varying breakdowns of Morocco's governing structure (Appendix B).

A *wilaya* is a group of provinces -*iqlim*-, and prefectures -*'amala*-. The *wali* oversees the activities of the governors-*'amel*- and prefects -*'amel iqlim*- within his *wilaya*. At the same time, a *wali* is the governor or *préfet* of one of the provinces/prefectures within the *wilaya*. The recent redivision of administrative zones increased the number of provinces and prefectures from 39 to 60, including five *wilayas* ("super *préfectures*"). The administrators at those levels report directly to the Minister of Interior. Provinces are rural departments, whereas prefectures are urban. Each province or prefecture has a council of between 11 (a population of less than 300,000) to 31 (a population of 2 to 3 million) members. Members of these assemblies are elected through the Communal (Municipal) Councils.

Provinces are divided into districts or *cercles* (circles), each headed by an appointed *super-caïd* or a *chef de cercle*. *Cercles* are divided into *caïdats*, which are divided into a number of communes based on population density. A *caïd* rules a rural *caïdat* while a pasha -*bacha*- rules an urban *caïdat*. The *caïd* at one time possessed limited judicial authority. Today's *caïd* does not retain that authority. However, the *caïd* is the individual responsible for the issuing of different licenses and permits, the approval of agricultural loans, investigating local crime, and mediating local disputes. *Caïds* are assisted by *khalifas*.

On the urban level, prefectures are divided into *circonscriptions* (constituencies), which are in turn divided into *arrondissements* or *muqata'at*. Below the *caïds* and pashas, the *khalifa* may oversee sections of urban and rural zones; the less powerful *cheikhs* are in charge of tribal or clan groups; and *muqaddams* are the leaders of a small village, several villages, or an urban neighborhood. Neither the *cheikhs* nor the *muqaddams* are full-time employees within Morocco's legally prescribed administrative structure.

In rural and urban areas, a *cheikh* is in charge of a number of *muqaddam*, and is responsible for the transmission of the *caïd*'s orders. The Moroccan citizen's primary contact with the administration is through his or her interaction with their local *muqaddam*. These are the individuals who control the application process for the national identity card, administer certificates of poverty entitling citizens to government medical care, and assess land taxes. This control over these important administrative functions places the *cheikhs* and *muqaddams* in the position of being able to exert considerable influence

over the local electorate. Through interviews and the reading of the local press, the delegates became aware of situations where voters feared that the "wrong" vote would result in their or their communities' future inability to obtain various administrative documents, administrative services, financial assistance, or infrastructure improvements. In addition, electors maintained that they were voting only to insure that a mark would be placed next to their name indicating that they had participated in the election as the King had requested in his June 23 speech.

C. The Parliament

Morocco's 1970 Constitution established a unicameral parliament, in the form of a Chamber of Representatives -*Majlis al-Nuwab*-. Two-thirds of the members of the Chamber (parliament) are elected by direct universal suffrage. The remaining third is elected by an electoral college of communal councilors and by electoral colleges composed of representatives elected from professional and labor representatives within the chambers of agriculture, commerce and industry, crafts, and laborers. Each college elects a portion of the 111 seats.

Seats	Elected By
69	Communal Councils
15	Chamber of Agriculture
10	Chamber of Commerce & Industry
7	Chamber of Craftspeople
10	Chamber of Labor Unions

The indirect election took place on September 17, 1993. The Parliament is slated to be seated in early October 1993.

The Parliament's 222 direct election districts were drawn up with political parties' consultation, and submitted to the National Electoral Commission and its technical committee on which political parties were represented. The Commission certified the final district boundaries and populations. The president

and officers of the Chamber of Representatives are elected every three years. Traditionally, the respective representation of the various political parties in Parliament is reflected in its leadership. Parliament does not assume a pro-active role in policy making. Appendix C outlines the additional powers accorded to the Parliament in the 1992 Constitution.

D. The Judiciary.

Morocco has a dual legal system: a secular system based in part on French legal tradition, and a parallel Islamic system which adjudicates family matters and inheritance law for Moroccan Muslims. Moroccan Jews traditionally were allowed to establish rabbinical courts to decide matters of personal status and succession. Some cases are still decided under Jewish law.⁴ The secular system includes a court of original jurisdiction, appellate courts, and a Supreme Court. Anyone accused of a political or security offense is tried in the secular courts.

The Constitution establishes a judiciary branch independent of the legislature and the executive. Magistrates are appointed by Royal Decree. The King presides over the Supreme Council of Magistracy on which sit the Minister of Justice, the First President of the Supreme Court, the District Attorney of the King to the Supreme Court, the President of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court, and two representatives from the Appeals Courts, from the judges of the regional courts, and from the judges of the *Sadad* courts.⁵ A High Court of Justice exists for the handling of crimes and felonies committed by members of government during their tenure. Its members are elected by the Parliament and the president is selected by the King.

⁴ Salacuse, Jeswald W. *An Introduction to Law in French-Speaking Africa, II: North Africa*. Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie, 1975, 210 et seq.

⁵ Blaustein, *Constitution*, note 92, Article 76.

E. Election Administration Structure

The Electoral Codes

While waiting for the government to issue their credentials, the IFES monitors worked to collect all of the official documents pertaining to electoral and political organization. The administration delayed providing necessary documents to the delegation for four or five days (Appendix D). Gradually, Ministry of Interior officials began to deliver a series of *dahirs*, laws, decrees, codes, and circulars that together constituted the bulk of the Kingdom's electoral law. By the time that the observation mission arrived in country, the monitors had collected the necessary documentation, but their full analysis was delayed due to the piecemeal delivery. Several of the more important documents were available to the delegates in French, Arabic, and English.

Analysis of Morocco's electoral law is made more challenging in light of the number of documents cross-referenced throughout each of the different portions of the law. The lack of a single, easily readable electoral law is an important organizational shortcoming. The following list of documents covers the basic texts relied upon for electoral organization, as well as the cross-referenced documents.

Dahirs and Laws

Decree N° 2-57-1465 of 15 *Rajab* 1377 (5 février 1958) modified by the *Dahir* 10-66 of 27 *Jumada II* 1386 (12 October, 1966).

Dahir N° 1-58-250 of 21 *Safar* 1378 (6 September, 1958): the Moroccan Nationality Code.

N° 1-58-377 of 3 *Jumada I* 1378 (15 November, 1958) relating to public gatherings.

N° 1-58-378 of 3 *Jumada I* 1378 (15 November, 1958).

Dahir N° 1-77-177 of 20 *Jumada I* 1397 (9 May 1977).

Law N° 12-92 relating to the establishment and the review of general electoral lists promulgated by *Dahir* N° 1-92-90 of 9 *Dhoul-Hijja* 1412 (11 June, 1992) relating to the organization of the communal councils.

Law N° 17-92 promulgated by *Dahir* N° 1-92-141 of 26 *Safar* 1413 (26 August, 1992).

Law N° 1-93-91 of 6 *Dhoul-Kii'da* 1413 (28 April, 1993).

Decrees

Decree-law N° 2-92-719 of 30 *Rabia' I* 1413 (28 September, 1992).

Decree N° 2-93-3 of 7 *Dhoul-Kii'da* 1413 (19 April, 1993).

Decree N° 2-93-256 of 18 *Dhoul-Kii'da* 1413 (10 May, 1993).

Codes and Circulars

Circular N° 56 of 2 *Rabia I* 1413, (sic), (30 September 1992) relating to electoral campaign, organization of voting stations and results proclamation.

Based on the information contained in the documents listed above, the delegation identified three areas lacking adequate guidelines: code of conduct for the press during the electoral period, regulations governing international elections observers, and the rights and the responsibilities of the party- or candidate-appointed poll watchers.

Electoral Commission

Election commissions have existed in Morocco for over ten years. In preparation to the communal and parliamentary elections of 1992, representatives of political parties were allowed to participate in the National Commission for the Supervision of the Elections (NEC).⁶ Even though the NEC was supposed to supervise the conduct of the elections, the Ministry of Interior administered them, over the protests of the parties. While the government did not accede to the opposition's two main demands, its inclusion in the NEC was seen as success. The government and the parties agreed on a series of administrative measures for election day, but not on the changing of the electoral system from majority (single-member plurality system) to proportional representation, and on lowering the voting age from 20 to 18. Both measures would favor the smaller parties.

⁶ *Commission nationale chargée de superviser les opérations électorales*

The NEC is composed of three Supreme Court justices, the Minister of Interior and Information⁷, the Minister of Justice, the Secretary General of the Parliament, and representatives from nine political parties. The King is the presiding officer of the Commission. The Commission is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the registration lists, the distribution of electoral cards, and the supervision of the electoral campaign and the election day proceedings. The administrative approval on all decrees and official circulars having to do with the elections is the responsibility of the NEC.

Despite the reinvigorated NEC and the provision of equal time in the media to all opposition parties, the October 1992 elections were marred by fraud. The King acknowledged the existence of fraud, denouncing the practice of vote buying and called for the legislative elections to be conducted in an honest manner.

On June 10, IFES monitors met with Mr. Mohammed Mikou, Secretary General of both the NEC and Morocco's Advisory Council on Human Rights. Mr. Mikou was appointed to his position by the government. He praised the government's administration and sponsorship of the election. The tone of Mr. Mikou's presentation was intended to leave the monitors with no doubts that the upcoming elections would be open, free and fair, and that the government would have it no other way. The delegation also noted that Mr. Mikou's travels outside of Morocco during the pre-election period were unusual considering his important role in the operations of the NEC.

The NEC met on over thirty occasions between the 1992 October municipal elections and the June 1993 election in order to establish the modalities of the legislative election. A consensus among the participants was reached on the issues that would govern the conduct of the elections. These issues covered:

- Definition of roles within the commission;
- Establishment of standards of competence for candidates;
- Division of labor between national and provincial electoral commissions.

Following the establishment of the procedures for the process, the brunt of the electoral preparations was

⁷ Minister Driss Basri, who has held both portfolios since 1985.

borne by the Provincial Election Commissions (PEC).⁸ The PECs reported to the NEC. The National Commission continued to meet twice a week to hear plaintiff's appeals of PEC decisions.

The National and Provincial Commissions are mandated to assure that elections are open, fair, and free. They do not, however, usurp legislative or judicial powers from government or the courts. The Commissions worked with the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Information, as well as with the political parties and the magistrates, to arrive at consensus solutions to procedural problems.

In response to opposition demands following the 1992 municipal elections, the number of PECs was increased from sixty to 120. On the average, two commissions were established in each prefecture/province. Composing the commissions were one local judge or magistrate who presided, a member of the local administration, a member of the local security forces, and representatives of each political party. The governor, *préfet*, or *wali* was also a member, usually represented by his secretary general who was responsible for election administration.

The Provincial Commissions supervised the actual revision of the voters registration lists. They were also responsible for the training of the poll workers and the processing of information requests and varied complaints registered by voters and candidates. A 300-station nation-wide computer network increased the efficiency and the responsiveness of the commissions. In the event that a particular problem could not be resolved by the PEC, it was referred to the National Commission. The NEC's decisions are binding.

IFES monitors and observers met with the PECs in each area observed. This allowed the delegation to assess the level of preparedness in each province or prefecture. During interviews with PEC presidents from Rabat, Tétouan, Fès, Larache, Casablanca, and Marrakech, it was clear that each saw his role as the institutional safeguard against irregularities. Whether the PEC presidents possessed enforcement authority or not, without exception they perceived their role as that of a fair judge.

A unique feature of this system requires that all Provincial Election Commission presidents come from

⁸ *Commission provinciale chargée des opérations électorales*

areas other than the district in which they serve. For example, the presidents in Marrakech-Médina were from Rabat and Ouerzazate respectively, while the PEC president of Marrakech-Menara was from Agadir. Presumably, this strategy was designed to preclude corruption through familiarity.

Electoral Districts

Moroccan parliamentary districts are redrawn before each election based on the most recent census data. The Ministry of Interior staff at the prefecture levels propose new boundary lines for consideration and final approval is accorded by the Provincial and National Election Commissions. No specific complaints regarding legislative districts were noted by the observer team.

Parliamentary districts (*circonscriptions*) have an average of 90,000 inhabitants. Some districts have smaller populations. For example, Figuig is a vast province with a low population density. Although there are only 53,393 registered voters in the province, Figuig's land area requires that it be divided into two electoral districts of 28,722 and 24,671 voters respectively. By contrast, the prefecture of Ain Chock Hay Hassani is divided into three electoral districts with a total of 226,098 registered voters.

V. POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties in Morocco share a common genealogy, having their roots in the pre-independence period and the time of the nationalist *Istiqlal* (Independence) party, formed in 1943. Most of the parties presenting candidates in 1993 emerged after 1956. A series of ideological shifts and varying relationships with Sultan Mohammed V and subsequently with his son, King Hassan II, fueled the evolution of Morocco's political landscape.

Today, there are thirteen political parties. The majority of these organized themselves into loose coalitions prior to the 1992 constitutional referendum. Although parties are referred to in the press and in literature as either pro-government or opposition, it is important to remember that these parties are virtually unanimous in their declared support for the monarchy and the role of the Palace in Morocco's affairs. The pro-government parties are those having held ministerial portfolios in the recent past. The team did not encounter an organized party or parties pushing for a total transformation of the structure of the government.

However, delegation members did meet with political party members who voiced the need for a change in the Palace's role. Merely proposing this sort of change was not without its consequences in modern Morocco. Nubir Amaoui, a trade union leader and erstwhile member of the USFP leadership was condemned on January 28, 1992 to two years in prison for insulting statements toward the government that were published in the Spanish press. Mr. Amaoui was released in September 1993, a few days before the indirect elections.

In May of 1992, five opposition parties allied to form the Democratic Bloc (*Koutla*) in an attempt to better coordinate their efforts for the upcoming municipal and legislative elections. The participating parties were:

1. Independence Party--*Istiqlal* (PI). Founded in 1943, *Istiqlal* led the movement for independence. In the immediate post-independence period, the strong relationship between the nationalist movement and the monarchy lent stability to Morocco. Gradually, the nationalists and the monarchy began to compete for political power. The party split in 1959 and was relieved of its

governmental portfolios in 1963. Most succinctly described as a nationalist party, it has maintained an ambivalent relationship with the throne, gradually adopting a reformist attitude. Istiqlal tends to be conservative on social and religious issues.

2. National Union of Popular Forces--*Union nationale des Forces populaires* (UNFP). Formed in 1959 by members of Istiqlal's radical wing, led by Mehdi Ben Barka. The UNFP became a coalition of leftist nationalists, trade unionists and resistance fighters. It was weakened by factionalism, repression, and the mysterious disappearance of its founder in 1965. Most of its supporters shifted to the USFP.
3. Socialist Union of Popular Forces--*Union socialiste des Forces populaires* (USFP). Organized in 1974 by a UNFP break-away group. The majority of the political prisoners released in 1980 were USFP members. USFP was a leader in the formation of a national front of opposition parties.
4. Party of Progress and Socialism--*Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme* (PPS). Formed in 1968 to replace the banned Moroccan Communist Party, legally recognized in 1974. PPS criticized economic liberalization measures prescribed by the IMF, but has since changed its stance, espousing left-center politics.
5. Organization for Democratic and Popular Action--*Organisation pour l'Action démocratique et Populaire* (OADP). Established in 1983 by former members of the USFP and the PPS.

The opening of the political campaign on June 12, 1993 coincided with the official announcement of the establishment of an alliance between the USFP and Istiqlal (*L'Union USFP-PI*). The parties presented a common political platform and common candidates in order to increase their coverage across Morocco (220 of 222 constituencies) and to maximize their campaign resources. The strategy was designed to improve the chances that the opposition would gain a significant number of legislative seats.

Five parties constituted the conservative pro-government majority:

1. National Assembly of Independents--*Rassemblement national des Indépendants* (RNI). Originated as a parliamentary group in 1977. Branded as the "King's Party" by left wing spokesmen, internal disagreements and disagreements with the Palace resulted in its designation as the "official" opposition. It has now returned to a posture of solid support for the government. Its leader Mr. Osman, is the King's brother-in-law.
2. Constitutional Union--*Union Constitutionnelle* (UC). Created by Maati Bouabid in 1983 during his tenure as Prime Minister. A moderate party considered to enjoy royal support. It emphasizes economic self-sufficiency.
3. Popular Movement--*Mouvement populaire* (MP). Berber-based monarchist party organized in 1957.
4. National Democratic Party--*Parti national démocratique* (PND). Founded in 1981 by 59 former RNI deputies in the Chamber of Representatives. During its first congress, its founder denounced the RNI for not providing an effective counterweight to the old parties, and reaffirmed its support for the monarchy.
5. National Popular Movement--*Mouvement National Populaire* (MNP). Recently formed splinter group of the MP.

Before the 1993 election, the five groups failed to agree on a common strategy. The *Entente nationale* was formed only by the UC, the PND, and the MP.

Three additional parties participated in the legislative election:

1. Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement--*Mouvement populaire démocratique et Constitutionnel* (MPDC). Splinter of the MP, circa 1977.
2. Party of Action--*Parti de l'Action* (PA). Organized in 1974 by a group of Berber intellectuals.

3. Democratic Party of Independence--*Parti démocratique et de l'Indépendance* (PDI). First participated in 1984 legislative elections.

In addition, there were a number of candidates running as independents, *Sans Appartenance Politique* (SAP), or *la muntami*. The status of the SAPs in light of the electoral laws remained a contentious issue. In a 1984 speech, the King announced that independent candidates would no longer be allowed to participate in Morocco's elections. The opposition declared the participation of SAPs as illegal and unconstitutional.⁹ The print media speculated that the government feared that a strong coalition of parties could obtain a majority of seats in the assembly. In order to prevent any centralization of power on either side, independents were allowed to run in 1993. Four of the SAPs were recently retired ministers. Minister of Interior Driss Basri explained to the monitoring team that any independent candidates who successfully obtained a seat in the assembly would be expected to affiliate with a party when the parliament is seated.

Independent candidates' participation was perceived as especially problematic within the context of the legislative elections. The legislature, being a national body, was to be composed of individuals affiliated with national political groups. In the case of the municipal elections, a businessperson's interest in his or her community's economic well-being could be considered as a sufficient qualification to stand as a candidate.

A member of the delegation contributed this report on discussions with a party official.

Regional Report: Casablanca

The team met with Mohamed Kemmou, a local official of Hay Hassani on June 24. As a U.C. member, M. Kemmou appears certain to win in September's indirect elections to parliament.¹⁰ He says that regardless of a politician's party, he feels comfortable

⁹ Article 3 of the Constitution is referenced in this argument, "Political parties, unions, district councils, and trade chambers shall participate in the organization and representation of the citizens."

¹⁰ Mr. Kemmou was victorious in the September 17 indirect election. The opposition is contesting the result of this race, alleging that the Governor of the prefecture was personally involved in setting up the election in favor of Mr. Kemmou, who received 133 votes. As proof, the USFP said that it conducted an informal parallel

with the other parliamentarians whom he knows from politics and business. According to Mr. Kemmou, there is no difference between parties, even his own and its close associates RNI and MP. The differences are between personalities. All parties accept the monarchy. He reminded the team of the King's televised appearance on June 23, in which the Monarch asked all people to vote, even if they were fed up with the electoral process, even if they are frustrated with rumors of corruption and vote buying, even if they were angry that politicians and party representatives visited the neighborhood only to ask for votes.

Another local official informed the team that he was unappreciative of the foreign presence for Morocco's elections. He mentioned the distinction between *mulahidh* and *muraqib*. The former means to watch only, the latter term implies surveillance. I told him we were involved in watching only and that we'd make recommendations later. In the official's words, "Morocco isn't Angola or Cambodia. We have a history of elections."

Continuing, he admitted that Morocco is not a democracy. "We can't become democratic overnight. We can't be democratic because the parties are not democratic, the society is not democratic. Still, we have open press, freedom of speech. Our population is 60% illiterate. We can't afford to be a democracy. These people don't know whom to vote for. Democracy will occur, but over time."

The official was critical of the political parties, especially RNI and USFP. He emphasized that, "In last few months, during the run-up to the elections, parties have revised platforms and moved to the center of the spectrum. Actually, there is no distinction between parties because even the communist/socialist groups are moderate, resembling social democratic parties of Europe. For example, the RNI is not a party. It is a group of non-affiliated representatives from the previous parliament who agreed to get together under the RNI umbrella. In Moroccan history, the parties were moving towards socialist politics. Only one man--the King--resisted this and moved the country towards capitalism. He was successful and now the parties have decided to follow his example."

count--receiving 60-odd uncast Kemmou ballots from voters leaving the polling station--yet USFP received only 29 votes.

VI. ELECTIONS IN MOROCCO

Morocco became a protectorate of France in 1912, and was recognized as independent in 1956. At the time of independence, the nationalist Istiqlal party was the leading political force. The party mounted efforts to reduce the power of the monarchy, opting for a constitutional monarchy. However, tensions within the party, coupled with the popularity of Sultan Mohamed V, prevented the movement from being successful. The Sultan's son, King Hassan II, has strengthened the standing of the monarchy since he assumed power on his father's death in 1961. Formally, Morocco is classified as a constitutional monarchy. In effect, the real exercise of political power remains in the hands of the King, members of the royal family, palace officials, and individual advisers, bolstered by the reorganized army, the *Forces Armees Royales*. Since the turbulent seventies, the King has gradually extended his support base by reviving the parliamentary system, preserving the interests of traditional supporters and newer groups within the bourgeoisie. In addition, he has delegated administrative responsibilities to local authorities.

A national referendum on a new constitution was held in July 1970. Officially, the document received a 98% vote of approval. This result was regarded with considerable suspicion, given the widespread opposition to the referendum voiced by political parties, student organizations, and labor unions. The new text called for a partial resumption of parliamentary government, a strengthening of royal powers, and a limited role for political parties. In August 1970, elections were held for a single-chamber, 240 seat legislature. Ninety members were elected by direct suffrage, ninety by local councils and sixty by an electoral college. Within the elected body, 158 ran under Istiqlal, 60 were members of the Popular Movement, and 22 were from opposition parties.

Following a failed assassination attempt against the King in 1971, a new constitution was drafted and approved by referendum in March 1972. The parties refused to enter the government because the King refused to schedule legislative elections. A second assassination attempt failed in August 1972. The elections were delayed again. Finally, elections to communal and municipal councils were held in November 1976. Provincial and prefectorial assembly elections took place in January 1977. Later that year the leading parties agreed to participate in a national unity cabinet. In May of 1980, a constitutional amendment extending the term of the Chamber from four to six years was approved by referendum, thus

postponing new elections until 1983.

Economic pressures increased with the implementation of IMF-mandated austerity measures. These pressures, coupled with declining phosphates revenues and subsequent cuts in education spending, led to violent riots in Casablanca in June 1981. The 1983 legislative poll was postponed by the King, pending the results of a Western Sahara referendum. The election was finally held in September 1984 with officially 67.3% of the registered electorate participating. The center-right coalition (UC, RNI, MP, PND) of former Prime Minister Mohammed Karim Lamrani captured a majority of the direct and indirectly elected seats.

Domestic opposition leaders and human rights organizations continued to charge the government with rights abuses and repression of dissent, notably in 1985 and 1986. Improvements in the economy calmed the situation and attention was once again focused on the Western Sahara question. A December 1989 referendum approved the King's proposal to postpone the planned general elections for two years in order to allow time for a solution to the Saharan conflict.

In mid-1992 there were increasing indications that the constitutional referendum was indefinitely on hold. After a wave of human rights violations accusations was leveled at the government by international organizations and governments, and in published books, the government announced a September referendum, followed by local elections in October 1992. The electoral system was modified as electoral commissions were formed and granted oversight authority and the capacity to process complaints. Despite the opposition's objections, the overall organization and facilitation of the elections remained the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. A revision of the electoral list was conducted during the months of July and August.

In May 1992, five opposition parties allied to form the Democratic Bloc (*Koutla*) in an attempt to better coordinate their efforts for the upcoming municipal and legislative elections. The participating parties were: Istiqlal, OADP, PPS, UNFP, and USFP.

A new constitution was drafted and put before the people for their approval in September 1992. The revisions to the Constitution slightly expanded the roles and responsibilities of the Prime Minister and

Parliament, but left King Hassan II clearly in charge.

The *Koutla* did not present a united front for the referendum vote. The PPS urged its supporters to participate rather than joining the other four parties in boycotting the referendum. Despite the non-participation of four-fifths of the *Koutla*, official results showed a 97.27% national participation rate, of which 99.96% voted for approval of the new constitution. The balloting system did not respect the individuality nor the secrecy of the vote. Voters were required to cast either a "yes" or a "no" vote and retain their unused ballot. There were widespread reports of government officials stopping citizens as they exited the polling stations, demanding to see their unused ballots to determine who might be voting "no." The election results were widely challenged by the opposition and questioned by the international community.

After boycotting the referendum, the USFP and the Istiqlal participated in the October local elections. This pro-participation stance confused the electorate, to the benefit of the government-aligned parties. The *Rassemblement national des Independants*, *Union constitutionnelle*, *Mouvement populaire* and the *Mouvement populaire national* won almost 60% of the 22,282 municipal council seats.

The parliamentary elections were delayed by disputes over the electoral list, the voter's cards, and the composition of electors' lists for the indirect elections that determine one third of the 333 seats. The date for the general elections was set for April, and finally June 25, 1993.

The IFES monitoring team discovered a high expectation that these legislative elections would be subjected to the same degree of reported pre-decision as were the referendum and, to a lesser extent, the municipal elections. However, during meetings with representatives of the opposition, the Moroccan administration, the diplomatic corps, and local and international press, delegation members were repeatedly told that, when compared to 1984 and 1992, Morocco's electoral process was improving in significant and noticeable ways. The delegation acknowledges that the degree of fraud and blatant pressuring of voters and candidates may have been less than in the past. However, there is a danger in confusing superficial change and fundamental change. Impediments remain to open participation in Morocco's political process by aspiring candidates, political parties, and civic organizations.

VII. THE 1992 CONSTITUTION

Elements of the 1992 Constitution impacted the current electoral process. The Constitution prohibits a one-party system in Morocco. Islam is recognized as the official state religion. Freedom of worship is guaranteed. The freedoms of speech and of the press are also guaranteed.

King Hassan II, as Head of State, appoints the Prime Minister, who is Head of Government. On the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the King appoints the Cabinet members. The King has the power to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives by Royal Decree. The Chamber of Representatives has the ability to censure the government, but has never exercised this power. Since the dissolution of parliament at the end of its term in July 1992, the King has ruled by decree. The newly elected parliament is scheduled to be seated in October 1993.

The Constitution guarantees citizens "the freedom of association, and the freedom to belong to any union or political group of their choice." The formation of new organizations is subject to government approval. Workers are accorded the right to strike. In the past, union activity perceived as counter-productive to Morocco has been prohibited by business management in ignorance of this constitutional protection.

"All Moroccan citizens are equal before the law." The government does not discriminate based on ethnicity. However, the range of rights enjoyed by women in family law is less than that of men. The Constitution calls for the establishment of an Economic and Social Council. This is a consultative body designed to provide guidance to the government and the parliament in "all matters of economic and social nature."

A Constitutional Council is created that decides on the validity of the election of members of the Parliament and of the referendum operations. Four members of the council are appointed by the King. Four members are appointed by the President of the Chamber of Representatives. The Constitutional Council also reviews all laws and Chamber operations for conformity with the Constitution. Decisions of the Council are not to be questioned by public authorities nor by the administrative and judicial

sectors.

One of the Special Provisions to the Constitution indicates that in the current absence of a Constitutional Council, all of its powers are to be exercised by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. As a result, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court was responsible for certifying the results of the 1993 legislative election.

The Constitution establishes an independent judiciary. Magistrates are appointed by Royal Decree. The King presides over the Supreme Council of Magistracy on which sit representatives of the first degree courts, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. A High Court of Justice is established for the handling of crimes and felonies committed by members of government during their tenure. Its members are elected by the parliament and the president is selected by the King.

The Constitution may not be amended without the King's approval. The King also has the right to directly submit issues for referendum. Neither the monarchy nor issues relating to Islam are subject to constitutional revision.



Part II: THE 1993 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

VIII. VOTERS REGISTRATION

A. The Voters' Registration System

The computerization of the voters' registration was a major improvement in Morocco's electoral process. The compilation of the electoral list ended on March 31, 1993.¹¹ Individuals having a 20th birthday between the closing of the list and the election were to be allowed to vote. An Administrative Commission was formed in each voting district for the purpose of overseeing the list compilation, verification, and final editing. The political parties and the administration were represented on these commissions. A four-day period was announced by the Ministry of Interior for the revision of the list. This was the time for individuals who were improperly registered to make the adjustments necessary to allow them to participate in the elections. All adjustments to the lists were noted and presented to a Judgement Commission that was responsible for approving the alterations. The decisions of the Judgement Commissions were made public in the same place where the initial adjustments to the list were made. The public had four days to respond to the Commissions' determinations on the changes in the list.¹²

Through this process of manual verification and the new computer cross-checking capability, it was possible to delete multiple registrations and make corrections for displaced electors. The printouts of the lists were available for the scrutiny of the political parties and candidates. The printouts themselves were easy to handle and much clearer to interpret than hand-written lists. Team members observed several examples of the efficiency of the system, especially in the case of voters who had changed their residence since the previous round of elections and wished to change their registration as well. The transfer was

¹¹ Law N° 1-93-91 of 6 Kaâda 1413 (28 April, 1993). Art. 1. During a meeting with Ministry of Interior officials on June 16, they reported that the list was to be closed on May 24, 1993.

¹² Ibid. Art. 3, 4.

easily made and the name was removed from the list at the voter's former residence.

In Tétouan and other locations, it was confirmed that voters, candidates, and political parties had access to the list. The verification and addition/removal of names continued until just before the elections. The lists were published to the communal and constituency level. The final modifications to the voters list were published by the president of the Administrative Commission five days before the June 25 election.

It was the opinion of some of the observers that the registration system is designed to be an administrative bottleneck and a weapon of control of the government. Complaints were registered by a variety of political parties concerning the organization of the initial voter's census in 1992. Concern that the individuals responsible for the actual registration were partisan, and did not register voters who they thought would vote against their respective party, was also reported.

B. Problems with Voters' Registration

Voters Cards

The majority of registration-related difficulties were connected with the design and distribution of the voters cards. A demand made of the government by the opposition following the municipal elections was the preparation and distribution of new voters cards (Appendix E). The cards were filled in by hand following the final approval of the electoral list by the administration and the political parties. The cards were easy to tell apart, the old ones being white, while the cards distributed for the legislative election were green. An important change in the new cards was the addition of a serial number that included the code of the préfecture or the province, the code of the commune, the number of the electoral district, and the number of the elector on the voting list. The cards were signed by the local authority and the voter. The bottom edge of the card was divided into four squares. When the voter voted on June 25, square number 1 was removed by one of the poll workers by cutting it out with scissors after the voter cast his or her ballot .

IFES team members were presented with photocopies of duplicate cards confiscated by political party members in Rabat-Salé. From the copies, it is difficult to discern the legitimacy of this particular claim

of card duplication. Some individuals said that they were indeed registered twice. This fact points out a potential weakness of any computerized system in a society where names and addresses can be legally indicated in a variety of ways. In the cases observed, where addresses on the cards were almost identical, the difference was in the recording of the voter's name. The issuance of the two cards indicates that the voter is probably on the list twice. The IFES team was informed by representatives of the Ministry of Interior that 60,000 double registrations were removed from the lists. Technical errors, however, are still possible.

Each voter was responsible for collecting his or her individual card from a location announced publicly by the local authorities. The space next to the voter's name on the electoral list was initialed once the card was picked up. Electors who did not pick up their cards before election day could report directly to their assigned polling station, present identification, and obtain their cards on the spot.

Card Distribution

A problem noted by the IFES delegation, and which lent itself to error and/or intentional abuse, was the system that was used, primarily in urban zones, for the distribution of the unclaimed cards. Voters in many areas were apathetic about picking up their voter cards at *arrondissements* or *caldats* after registering. As a result, a local administrator often had a large supply of non-distributed voters cards on hand on election day. Administrators did note a last-minute push by voters to claim their cards the day before elections, following the King's speech on June 23 encouraging the population to "participate massively." Official procedure called for unclaimed cards to be sorted during the evening of the 24th, and distributed early in the morning of June 25 to the voting bureaus to be available for the voters.

School buildings housed multiple voting stations in the densely-populated urban areas. In these situations, instead of distributing the appropriate cards to each individual station, the full complement of unclaimed cards for all of the stations located in the facility were available at a central location. The accounting procedures for these cards varied from place to place. Frequently, the cards were kept by administration officials in an alcove or foyer, out of the direct sight of the general public. Party officials or representatives were rarely present in these areas. This procedure lent itself to improper distribution, bulk last-minute card sales, or accusations of card sales. IFES team members were approached by a

number of individuals who had reported to their polling station only to be told that their card was missing, or had already been collected.





IX. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

A. The Candidate Registration System

Prime Minister Mohammed Karim-Lamrani issued Decree 2-93-256, inviting the prospective candidates to announce their intentions to run in the election between June 3 and noon on June 11, fourteen days before the day of the election. Three copies of the necessary paperwork were to be submitted at the headquarters of the province or of the prefecture where the candidate wished to stand. The paperwork was to be presented by each candidate in person.

Candidates received a temporary receipt upon filing their application. In addition, each candidate applying to run paid a registration fee of 2,000 dirhams. This fee was to be reimbursed to candidates obtaining over 5% of the vote in their particular district.

Four days after the initial registration, prospective candidates received an official receipt for--or a rejection of--their application. Accepted candidates were registered in the order that they deposited their registration forms and fee. Some observers noted that some candidatures were rejected without reasons given. The candidate's number and color of ballot were indicated on the receipt. A candidate could withdraw his or her candidacy up to ten days before the election, receiving a refund of the 2,000 dirhams.

B. Candidate Demographics

Two thousand forty-two candidates competed for 222 of the 333 seats in the legislature. The breakdown by political affiliation is indicated in Figure 2. Candidates must be registered voters of at least 23 years of age. Ineligible to stand as candidates are non-registered voters, anyone with a criminal conviction in the past 10 years, and active members of the civil service, the military, or the forces of order. Active members of the civil service, the military, or the forces of order can run for office in a district other than that in which they served, provided that they ceased to exercise their duties a minimum of six months before the election. To run for election in the district in which they served in one of the capacities

<i>Party</i>	<i>Candidates</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>
UC	210	2	208
RNI	217	1	216
PI	113	1	112
MP	183	1	182
USFP	108	2	107
PND	202	4	198
MNP	200	1	199
PPS	216	6	210
OADP	169	7	162
PDI	137	3	134
PA	120	2	118
SAP	167	3	164
Total:	2,042	33	2,009

enumerated above, prospective candidates must have ceased to exercise their duties at least two years before the election.¹³

C. Female Candidates

For the first time in Morocco's history, thirty-three female candidates were candidates for the election.

¹³ Dahir No. 1-77-177, Articles 8-10.

Two of these women were victorious in their districts, an historic moment for Moroccan democracy: Istiqlal candidate in Fès (El Gilded-Dar Dbibagh), Latifa Bennani Smirès; and the USFP candidate in Casablanca (Derb Soltan-El Fida), Badia' Sqalli.

Reaction to women in politics was mixed. Many party leaders promoted women's rights publicly and vigorously, but the current social climate does not promote an effective role for women in politics for women. To gain a role as decision-makers, they have to fight their way in, depending upon existing laws, support from the government, and an invitation to take part in the processes. According to a number of female politicians and activists, the most likely way for women to make strides in Moroccan society is through political parties. The King's acknowledgement of the need for an expanded role for women in Morocco's government had a positive impact on women's access to the political system.

IFES delegates met with most of the thirty-three female candidates before, during, or after the election. Some acknowledged that it indeed was becoming easier to get involved in politics. Several women interviewed felt that more female candidates should have run, and noted the continued male-domination of the leadership of all of the political parties. Politically and socially active women will be focusing on these and other issues of participation between now and the next cycle of elections.

D. Problems with Candidate Registration

The monitoring team arrived in Morocco for the final 48 hours of candidate registration. The delegation was contacted by political party representatives and prospective candidates seeking to lodge complaints against a perceived bias of the candidate registration procedures. Ministry of Interior officials countered these complaints, maintaining that many individuals and parties did not seek to properly inform themselves about conditions for running for office. The officials insisted that many candidates waited until the last minute to correct formwork errors and resubmit applications, thus surpassing the legal time deadlines. Officials maintained that the only candidates rejected were those who were not qualified or who did not fulfill set application requirements. Administration officials explained that some would-be candidates were turned down. Most of those rejected were linked with outlawed fundamentalist Islamic groups or were found to have connections with the illegal drug trade.

Regional Report: Tétouan

Given the various reports of illicit trade of narcotics in this region, the team availed itself of all opportunities to confirm whether there were candidates who financed their campaigns with "narco-funds". Nobody was willing to confirm this, but it is worthy of note that this view was not denied. The best response offered from various quarters was that there was no obvious evidence of such. However, a former high-ranking government official confirmed that there existed visible evidence of narco-traffickers sponsoring candidates as a way to gain political influence.

He disclosed that this was more widespread in Tangier, in fact he informed that one of the city's candidates was sponsored by people identified with drug trade. He indicate that the government took steps to restrict the participation of those perceived to have drug barons sponsoring their electoral campaigns.

IFES delegates visited the administrative headquarters of Rabat prefecture. There, officials reported that some applicants did miss the time deadline. The doors of the prefecture were closed precisely at noon, Friday, June 11. Those remaining in line at that time were processed.

The monitors observed the procedure for the initial registration of several candidates. Some applications were not complete, lacking required information or official stamps. Registration officials explained to the IFES representatives that every application that was in order was accepted. On occasion, prospective candidates refused to take back their incorrect applications, demanding that they first be issued a "provisional" receipt acknowledging that they had tried to apply. Delegates met with perspective candidates who explained that they were not informed that corrections were needed on their documentation until two or three hours before the closing of registration on June 11. Delegates who followed up these stories with a visit to the electoral officials in question were assured that no misunderstanding had occurred. Those cases, and related newspaper stories claiming the same sort of activity in other parts of the country, explain the demand for "provisional" receipts.

During a working session with officials of the Ministry of Interior on June 15, the monitors asked for some clarifications of the registration process. A potential candidate whose application is rejected may make two appeals: one to the PEC and the second to the local court. When the individual files an appeal before the PEC, he or she receives a receipt acknowledging the claim. The Commission has four days

to respond to the appeal. At the time there was only one appeal pending. Monitors found out later that the rejection was upheld.

The registration provides a mechanism for the regulation of party activity and party formation. There were inconsistencies noted in the processing of independent candidates. Complaints were received from Rabat and Fès concerning independent candidates who met all of the legal criteria, but were not allowed to run. Candidates and party organizers explained that Moroccans who eventually win a seat in the parliament have been carefully screened by the Ministry of Interior in order to determine that they will pose no difficulties to the King.

X. THE CAMPAIGN

A. Campaign Practices

The political campaign commenced following the close of the candidates' registration period, extending from midnight on June 12 through midnight on June 24.

According to international and domestic sources, freedom of peaceful assembly and association is significantly restricted in Morocco. The constitutional guarantees of assembly and association are limited by three decrees of 1935, 1939, and 1958 permitting the government to suppress even peaceful demonstrations and mass gatherings.

Under the 1958 decree, persons wanting to form an organization must apply to the Ministry of Interior and wait for approval before holding any meetings. The government may withhold approval to prevent any suspicious groups from forming legal organizations. This power may be employed by the Ministry of Interior to control participation in the political process.

Other issues were raised by the candidates interviewed by the IFES monitors. First, there was an element of self-censorship in the political climate. Publicly, political speeches and editorials were addressed to abstract issues of economic recovery, fairness, and jobs. Privately, the talk turned to government corruption, administrative control, and lack of freedom. Secondly, unofficial groups or individual candidates had a difficult time getting their message across. The opposition and loyalist parties were perceived to be hostile to new parties or groups entering the political game. There was no independent newspaper speaking for the non-affiliated candidates in the daily press. Thus, according to many interviewed by IFES, there was greater freedom of pre-election expression for the established players than for outsiders and newcomers.

Ministry of Interior personnel were present at many meetings and rallies. The presence of government overseers might be characterized at best as passive, and at worst, as a subtle reminder that everything is monitored with consequences for those who stray from acceptable limits of conduct.

Throughout the campaign, political parties assembled, distributed literature, and held campaign rallies. On a one-on-one basis, opposition leaders expressed a recognition that the freedoms they were currently enjoying were clearly a departure from the past. There was a fear that perhaps after the election these freedoms would be withdrawn. In almost every case, opposition candidates expressed pleasure at having international observers on hand and reported that they would not feel free to speak, assemble, or distribute materials had observers not been present.

Posting of political propaganda was restricted to official areas--a numbered series of one-meter square boxes painted on walls in cities, towns and villages with numbers corresponding to candidates. It was against the law to put posters elsewhere. Although several cars plastered with posters were seen in Rabat and Casablanca, no political banners were noted in either area.

Regional Report: Casablanca

We noticed a great deal of door-to-door campaigning. In the generally lower-income areas of Hay Moulay Rachid and Mabrouka we saw and/or met four candidates in the streets with their entourages.

Leafletting was a common activity. Leading up to the election, streets throughout Casablanca were littered with handbills. Handbills were placed under the windshield wipers of parked automobiles. Groups of exuberant political "volunteers" are seen in many areas. Children were frequently seen collecting and distributing campaign literature. We heard some of the kids singing: "*waraqa, waraqa intikhaabiya*" (paper, paper campaign paper)!

On June 22 we paid a visit to the campaign headquarters of Constitutional Union candidate Maati Bouabid, in the *quartier populaire* (low-income neighborhood) of Hay Hassani. Located in a run-down building, the headquarters was filled with people, primarily young males. Most of the individuals present wore orange T-shirts, signifying their support for the UC party (*al-ittihad al-dustouri*).

The office director was a young woman, a government worker employed in the Anfa district. We were surprised to find a government employee in charge of a political candidate's office and wondered if this did not constitute a conflict of interest. The woman, who did not wish to give her name, was matter-of-fact and even proud to suggest that "we are a government party" (*hizb hukumi*). I asked her if she would get a job with Mr. Bouabid if he were elected. She said no, she'd stay in Anfa.

We spoke to the young people. One young woman and two older women were present but it wasn't clear if they were campaign workers or just looking for assistance. They

did wear orange *jellabas*. Those present called themselves "volunteers" and explained they were not paid for their work. The exact nature of their normal jobs outside of the office was not clear; most likely they distributed handbills and walked around with the candidate when he did his door to door campaigning. Our driver, from a popular neighborhood nearby, and campaign workers from other parties claimed that government parties do pay their workers. The men at headquarters were pessimistic, they all maintained that they were unemployed. One said that "all men (in Morocco) are unemployed" and that "women have the jobs because they take less money (pay) for their work and don't ask for their rights (i.e., benefits)."

Regional Report: Fès

In Fès, the campaign was in full swing. Some supporters would rip down the posters of other candidates but otherwise things appeared to be peaceful. The campaign was conducted with a lot of enthusiasm, public meetings, and door to door distribution of the various campaign flyers. The newspapers did report on violence during the campaign but I never heard of this from anyone I met. One of the candidates showed me a letter from the PEC requesting that the candidates conduct a peaceful and morally upright campaign in Fès.

B. Campaign Financing

Campaign expenses by the political parties were limited to a maximum of 100,000 Dirhams per candidate. Each party and each candidate was required to maintain a balance sheet indicating available funding, sources, and expenses. Reports of campaign expenditures are published in the *Bulletin officiel* as a matter of public record. Political fundraising is prohibited by law.

The government of Morocco restricts funds to registered parties. The global level of funding to be distributed is determined before each election by the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Finance. These funds are earmarked for the financing of the design and reproduction of election publicity, the cost of the organization of public meetings, and the payment for campaign-related services and materials.

The funds are distributed to the parties based on four criteria. Before the end of the candidate registration period, all registered parties receive equal portions of 20% of the total fund. An additional 30% of the total fund is distributed between the different parties, based on the number of candidates fielded by each one. Twenty-five percent of the total fund is provided based on the number of votes obtained by each

party in all districts. In the event that a party's candidate receives less than five percent of the vote in any one district, then those votes are not included in the total votes for that particular party. The remaining 25% is distributed to the parties according to the number of seats won by each.

C. Media Access During the Campaign

Political parties or independent candidates were allotted a total of thirty minutes of airtime for the entire municipal campaign, and sixty minutes for the legislative campaign. Political broadcasts did not require pre-approval but were expected to meet specific criteria governing political publicity. The Minister of Information was responsible for formalizing these criteria before the commencement of the political campaign period. The criteria received public dissemination via the electronic and the print media.

The mass media were active participants in the pre-electoral period. Election-related programs and public-service announcements were aired each night during the two-week campaign. Government-run television made an effort to educate voters on the process of choosing candidates. One short commercial showed a young woman seeking advice from her parents about voting. The parents explained the steps of the voting process to her, attempting to diminish their daughter's primary concern, that voting will take too much time. They emphasize that there are many *makatib al-taswit* (voting stations) in each electoral district to reduce waiting time in line.

Channel 1 had a programmed rotation several times each day for the introduction of candidates and discussion of parties and their platforms. These programs, *Hiwaar maftuuh*, "Open Debate," and another entitled *al-Intikhabaat al-Tashri'iya 1993*, "Legislative Elections 1993," did not encourage free expression. During "Open Debate," one journalist would commence by posing a question of one of three candidates on stage. The program would develop into a discussion between the journalist and that one candidate. The two others would simply sit and watch, occasionally contributing a comment directed more to the journalist and not to the opposing candidate. The program lasted forty-five minutes, with each candidate receiving about fifteen minutes of air time minus the lengthy questioning time. "Legislative Elections 1993," featured a reporter (often a woman) who asked the leaders of particular parties to explain their platforms and the difference between theirs and the other parties. On this program, there were no competing candidates. This program was sometimes presented with a second

format, without a reporter/moderator. One candidate, or one party official, would present his or her platform and general views on Moroccan economics and politics.

In light of Morocco's 56% illiteracy rate and the lack of television in most non-urban households, there is reason to question the impact of print media and television on the illiterate majority of Moroccan voters. A number of complaints regarding the limited amount of pre-election radio programming were made to team members. According to several sources, total radio coverage of the election process was less than that of television. The rural and low-income segments of society gathered the greatest portion of their information about the coming elections, the candidates, and the parties from public meetings and the door-to-door canvassing conducted by most of the candidates.

A Ministry of Interior official directive concerning the electoral campaign (No 56, 2 *Rabia I* 1413, 30 Septembre 1992) states in Section I-B:

"The press should abstain from publishing any report, declaration or allegation that are unfounded, unverified, and all types of articles or publications with a slanderous nature, insulting, libelous or defamatory (Chapter IV of the *Dahir* constituting press code)...."Political parties and candidates must abstain from making known to international public opinion all facts, information, documents, liable to have a detrimental nature to national dignity. They should prohibit themselves all contact with chanceries of a nature that will give rise to doubts, or aims to influence the normal progress of the electoral process (Article 17 of the *Dahir* regulating the right of association)." (Text in French in Appendix M).

As mentioned earlier, no criticism, even inferential, of the King is tolerated. The parties and candidates contesting the legislative elections are all "pro-monarchist" in the sense that they are required to accept the monarchy's unquestioned legitimacy to rule in order that they be allowed to participate.

There was, at the same time, a new openness that was exhibited in this campaign. The print media has become famous in Morocco for its criticism of "government" (i.e., parliamentary not monarchical) rule. There are daily accusations of vote buying (a tradition in Moroccan parliamentary elections) and intimidation. An article in the USFP's paper *Al-Itihad Al-Ishtiraki* on June 23, 1993 (p.4) focused on the illicit activities of two candidates, "Yellow" (MP) and "Blue" (RNI), in the Da'ira of Dar al-Khalifa

in 'Amala Ibn M'sik Sidi Othman, buying votes and distributing voting cards.

The newspapers were vocal in printing accusations of violence and fraud before, during, and after the campaign. After the elections, the opposition press continued to follow up on the complaints filed by candidates and political parties before the courts. The government-aligned newspapers did not report on any specific claims of fraud following the election.

Numerous international press organizations covered the elections. Some, such as the French, the Spanish, the British, and the American, were in Rabat during the final days of the political campaign. Minister of Interior and Information Basri and the Moroccan government considered the press corps as the international arbiters of Morocco's elections. Considerable column inches were devoted to the reproduction of articles discussing the election that appeared in the foreign press.

D. Candidates' and Party Leaders' Views on the Campaign

Monitors met with national and local party leaders, inquiring as to their impressions and expectations for the campaign and for the upcoming elections. Programming adequate time with the candidates was difficult as the campaign was taking place at the same time. Delegation members attended party press conferences and rallies in order to gain an appreciation for the level of organization as well as the level of popular interest in these political events.

The monitors attended a June 12 USFP/Istiqlal press conference in Rabat signaling the opening of the political campaign. The featured speakers were two prominent leaders of the *Koutla*, Mohamed Boucetta, Secretary General of Istiqlal, and Abderrahmane Youssoufi, Secretary General of USFP. During their presentations, each expressed guarded optimism about the pending electoral exercise. The attitudes expressed by these men were typical of those expressed by other candidates and political party leaders in the days before the election. Mr. Boucetta and Mr. Youssoufi intended to hold the government to its promise of transparent and open elections. They saw their active participation in the process, and that of their respective parties, as an acid-test of the government's intentions. During the press conference, the two party leaders observed that the government was asking the political parties to trust them. The expectations of the electorate and the political parties were raised by the statements emerging from the

administration and the Palace. Many opposition and majority party leaders operated under the assumption that if the government of Morocco truly intended to have honest elections it would avoid interfering in them. Any interference by the government would merely serve to discredit it. In subsequent interviews, many well-meaning Moroccans took the government's stated intentions at face value, repeating the King's words and insisting that the elections would be fair, open, and "transparent."

Regional Report: Marrakech

Mr. Boucetta's campaign was based on every expectation that the government was indeed conducting a fair election. The campaign was thoroughly organized, broken down into precincts with leaders assigned to distribute literature; facilitate get-out-the-vote activities; make sure that voter cards were distributed; check that the poll watchers were assigned, trained, and provided with written instructions on their election day responsibilities and where to report voting infractions and results on election day.

Istiqlal's organization was not the general rule in Marrakech. While there was broad involvement, with an average of seven party observers in the 30 polling stations that I observed, none was as organized as Istiqlal. There was broad sharing of information and instruction on how to carry out their roles as observers and in some cases a great deal of courage was displayed in asserting rights to information.

In an encounter with an election commission chairman in Marrakech-Medina, I asked if there were any protests lodged against the lists of potential pollworkers. The election code requires the opposition to concur with the appointment of the presidents of the voting bureau. The chairman confirmed that in several cases it was difficult to appoint a president because the opposition parties continued rejecting nominees. The process required weeks, but a consensus was reached. When asked about the lengthy selection process, an opposition party representative explained that his party did not trust the ability of the individuals named on the list to be impartial.

Overall, the observers assigned to Marrakech acknowledged that the proactive role assumed by the political parties was positive. The team noted that in Marrakech there is a good deal of knowledge on how to run elections. This familiarity with the electoral process and knowledge of procedures was a direct result of well-organized training sessions organized by the political parties for their supporters.

Regional Report: Béni Mellal

June 24 - 14:00: Met with one of the Istiqlal organizers for the city of Béni Mellal. When I told him that I was struck by the lack of evidence in the streets--posters, rallies, etc.--at the time that a political campaign was nearing its climax, he responded that the authorities had been limiting the size and number of political gatherings staged by the

parties. Istiqlal/USFP had only been allowed one meeting in the city of Béni Mellal during the entire campaign. Furthermore, the meeting was held inside, at the local cinema, since open meetings were prohibited.

Responding to my question concerning the incidence of fraud, he acknowledged that there had been numerous incidents, especially in the countryside. He singled out the areas around El Ksiba, Kasbat Tadla and Ouad M'barak, explaining that typically in these cases, the local *caïd* and his auxiliaries, the muquaddim and the sheikh, pressured individuals to vote for the establishment parties (i.e., against Istiqlal/USFP, and PPS). In the villages people depended on the local administrators for a wide range of official dispensations and favors and these administrators used this as leverage.

Regarding the presence of party representatives on election day, he predicted that we would see an observer for Istiqlal/USFP at nearly every voting bureau. As for voter turnout, he estimated 60% in the countryside, 50% in the cities, suggesting that most of the voting would take place between 8:00 - 12:00 and 16:00 - 18:00. He concluded our interview by stating that regardless of the elections, he did not anticipate any change in the political scene.

June 24 - 15:00. Met with one of the political organizers for the Constitutional Union in Béni Mellal and a member of the municipal council. Asked about the relative strengths of the various parties in the province, he answered that this was dependent on the region; in the mountains, the Berber party (MP), was dominant, in the city of Béni Mellal, his own party (UC) was strongest.

I asked him to comment on the campaign and the lack of visible signs in the city that one was indeed taking place. He responded that the streets were quiet because the people already knew for whom they were going to vote. That was why there were so few posters up on the walls and why things would be so quiet on the night before the election and on election day. He offered no complaints about the progress of the campaign. "The people know what they want," and "The people are free to express themselves and choose whomever they want," became the twin refrains for the remainder of the meeting.

June 24 - 22:00. Met with a member of the PND leadership and member of the provincial government. His remarks echoed those of the UC representative: "Everyone has the right to express himself freely." As far as campaign violations were concerned, he observed that the complaints were only among the different parties, not against the administration. PND had not submitted a single complaint to the PEC.

Regional Report: Fès

Both the government and the parties were working hard in preparation for election day. Frequent meetings were taking place: electoral commission, training sessions for the polling station presidents, party meetings, and public rallies. The parties canvassed door to door and organized small parades and car caravans to distribute publicity in the streets. The Istiqlal, RNI, and USFP parties (and perhaps other parties as well) gave training to

poll watchers. The degree of participation and long hours of preparation by both the parties and the government in Fès were commendable.

Regional Report: Rabat

June 16. Meeting with Mr. Mohand Laesner, General Secretary of the *Mouvement Populaire* (MP). Regarding the campaign, Mr. Laesner had no specific issues to raise. The MP planned to conduct 600 political meetings around the nation during the campaign period. Eleven of those meetings were to be large scale rallies where Mr. Laesner would participate. The MP was taking part in a press conference/meeting with the other two member organizations of the *Entente Nationale*, the PND and the UC. At the close of the meeting, Mr. Laesner indicated that one of his future interests was the re-visitation of Morocco's electoral law. He agreed that the creation of a single document governing Morocco's electoral processes would aid in simplifying the exercise. In addition, there were changes to be made in the law to better tailor it to Morocco today.

E. The Campaign Period, Problems and Issues

The presence of the observers and monitors during the political campaign proved to be a critical introduction in the terrain of the Moroccan political scene for the members of the delegation. The mission benefited from the monitors' longer-term stay as they were able to give the observers arriving the week before the election a first-person account of the situation in the countryside. Each party opened its campaign with a press conference in Rabat, or a series of press conferences in several key cities. The level of preparation of many of the parties was impressive, with plans for nation-wide "whistle-stop" tours by party leaders, door-to-door campaigning in urban neighborhoods, leafletting, street parades, and rallies featuring party songs, popular music, speeches, and refreshments.

The monitors observed as many of these events as they could. In considering campaign activities, team members looked at who was participating, how many people were participating, where the event was taking place, the message of the rally or press conference, and the mood of the gathering.

Regional Report: Casablanca

We met in al-Hay al-Hassani with one of the candidates, Mohamed Karam. Mr. Karam is an active member of the *Organisation Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme* (OMDH) and is politically affiliated with the USFP. Three of the members of the monitoring team met

Mr. Karam in Rabat on June 11. He explained to us that he was running against Maati Bouabid, a former prime minister and head of the government-supportive Union Constitutionnelle. Mr. Karam was running on the USFP-Istiqlal alliance ticket. This situation made al-Hay al-Hassani an excellent district to watch. The Moroccan government has traditionally assumed a proactive role in seeing that former prime ministers win their parliamentary seats. In addition, al-Hay al-Hassani is representative of the variety of social strata present in urban Morocco.

During pre-electoral monitoring, the team encountered a number of Moroccans who maintained that it was quite likely that the King would tolerate, and indeed welcome, the election of a relatively large number of candidates from the USFP-Istiqlal alliance. In doing so, the parties would be in a position to share in the responsibility for the difficult choices facing the government with respect to the foreign debt, the stagnant economy, and unemployment; not to mention the ongoing conflict with the UN about a referendum in the Western Sahara. Those Moroccans who predicted that the King would tolerate the election of many USFP-Istiqlal candidates also argued that he would not tolerate the defeat of a man like Maati Bouabid.

In view of the odds, Mr. Karam stated that, "I can win if international observers watch my district." He was very keen on an IFES observer presence in his district. He felt, as did several other candidates contacted by the IFES delegation, that only an international presence could prevent the government from tampering with the results.

Taieb Cherkaoui, the head of the district electoral commission, in the prefecture of Ain Chok al-Hay al-Hassani (*'Amalat 'Ain Choq al-Hay al-Hassani*) told the IFES monitors that there were 88,752 registered voters in the district. These voters were to report to one of the 190 voting stations in al-Hay al-Hassani, concentrated in 17 schools.

Mr. Karam had organized 200 pollwatchers to cover the district. These individuals were not paid. Observers did note that on election day the USFP-Istiqlal observers were familiar with the electoral laws. Frequently, the observers for the government-allied parties were unaware of the mechanics of the election process. Unlike the USFP representatives encountered in the polling stations around al-Hay al-Hassani, those of the UC were not party activists. In two incidents, pollwatchers could not remember which party or candidate they represented.

Regional Report: Béni Mellal

Tuesday, June 22. Departed Rabat for Béni Mellal at 08:00. Along the route to Kasba Tadla, stopped at Tlat Louloud. It was souk day. Campaigning was centered around the cafes lining the roads. Saw some people in the souk wearing party-colored clothing.

Province of Khourigba. Next stop was Bir Mizoui--13:00. Saw flyers being tossed in air and a crowd of 150-200. Left the car to follow the crowd. Suddenly the crowd of mostly young men turned and began running towards us. Dust was flying and large rocks were thrown by apparently two opposing parties. Groups of men ducked between the buildings and continued

throwing rocks. We ran to the car and tried to drive away. Our car was hit by rocks. We parked some distance from the confusion to watch. We learned that supposedly the yellow party, now in power, gave money (100-200 DH) to rose party loyalists to lure them away. A supporter of the blue party who told us this said that similar incidents had occurred before and the day before a woman had been hit by a rock in the head. We waited until things calmed, turned around and drove back to get another look and take pictures. Doubling back through side streets we saw riot police.

Arrived in Béni Mellal around 14:15 pm. Saw little political activity--flyers tossed from cars. Went to souk--witnessed no political activity. Drove around town and vicinity to learn layout.

The Casablanca observation team received a handwritten declaration from Mohammed El Khadari, the muqaddam of the 25th *arrondissement* in the muqata'a (constituency) 32, California. In the statement, he explains that he had received direct pressure from the *caïd* of the constituency to campaign in favor of the UC candidate, Said El Aroui, or face a stay in prison. Copies of the original document and an article from the newspaper *Libération* are found in Appendix F. A brief English translation follows:

Casablanca 22 June 1993

To the Brother (al-akh) al-'Iraqi:¹⁴

I, the undersigned, the muqaddam of da'irat (*arrondissement*) 25 in muqata'a (constituency) 32, California, Mr. Mohamed ben Abdallah El Khadari...., attest that the *caïd* of the muqata'a mentioned above, named Cherkaoui Miloud, put pressure on me to engage in a campaign in favor of the candidate (of the Constitutional Union), Said El Aroui. And he threatened me with imprisonment if I did not do this.

On Monday 21 June, 1993, at nine in the morning, the *caïd* Cherkaoui Miloud gathered all of the muqaddams (in his muqata'a) and ordered them to undertake a campaign on behalf of the UC candidate (El Aroui). And on (the previous day) Sunday 20 June 1993, the *caïd* ordered me to bring to him Mrs. Fatima Bent Kharbouch of Bouskoura, the owner of (the land of the village of) Douar Kharbouch so that she could make contact with the above-mentioned *caïd* and engage in a campaign on behalf of Said El Aroui. She (Mrs. Kharbouch) refused everything.

On Monday, 21 June 1993, the head (of the communal council) of *arrondissement* 9 in California and the *caïd* of the muqata'a of California 32, offered me a thousand dirhams. I refused this and left the muqata'a after the two men threatened me with imprisonment.

¹⁴ This may be an official of the USFP to whom Mr. El Khadari is appealing for sanctuary.

Signed,

Muhammad ben Abdallah El Khadari

F. The Role of Women

The role of women in political activities roughly mirrors that of their role in Moroccan society at large. Women are active in almost all segments of Moroccan life, but in smaller numbers than men (even though the population ratio of men and women in Morocco is 50/50). The situation for women in the larger cities is radically different from that of women in the smaller cities and the countryside. The professional urban woman is able to pursue a broader scope of careers. They are more cosmopolitan and less traditional in appearance and attitude than other Moroccan women.

The Moroccan constitution and criminal code stipulate that all citizens are equal. However, the *Moudouwana*, the code of personal status, based in part on religious laws, gives men prerogatives over women. For instance, Article 35 accords to the husband the right to access his wife's property and finances without her consent. His wife is denied reciprocal access to his property or finances. The *Moudouwana* is currently under revision as women's role in Moroccan society is redefined.

Existing women's organizations did not play an organized role in the campaign, but individual women belonging to the organizations as well as political parties were active. The IFES delegation was impressed with the caliber of women involved in the political process, either directly or behind the scenes. The role of Morocco's women voters was very significant. In some areas observed, women composed 68% of the electorate.

In an interview with Ms. Zahia Dadi-Essakali, RNI candidate in Youssoufia, a low-income neighborhood in Rabat, she explained the drawback of the typical practice of the creation of a women's commission within a political party. "The end result of these women's commissions, and even the youth commissions, is that they serve to marginalize the groups that they are supposedly established to serve." Ms. Dadi-Essakali noted that nationwide, it was her impression that the political campaigns mounted by the female candidates were the "cleanest." Overall, she was happy that the number of female candidates

was increasing with each election. She stressed, "The only way to expand women's role in Moroccan society, and to improve their working and living conditions, is for more women to become involved in politics and civic organizations with the capacity to pressure for change."

Ms. Latifa Jebabdi, OADP candidate in the Rabat neighborhood of Yacoub El Mansour, downplayed the increase in the number of female candidates. "Women should be involved at all levels of the political process, on the executive councils of the political parties, in the polling stations, at the municipal level, etc." She called attention to the disparate relationship between the number of female candidates and the percentage of Morocco's female population. When asked if the institution of a voting card with a photo would pose a problem for women who did not want their pictures taken, Ms. Jebabdi stated that was not a problem, but an excuse to prevent the adoption of improved systems of voter identification. Ms. Jebabdi was proud to be a member of the party to present the greatest number (8) of female candidates. However, the politics in Morocco continued to be male-dominated and controlled from above. Her pre-election prediction was that two female candidates would be "allowed" to win their constituencies.

The delegation observed that on election day in Fès there were women who coordinated the compilation of voting statistics at the voting centers for the Ministry of Interior. In some polling stations observed, women served as vice presidents. In contrast, a local administrator in Chefchaoune indicated that no women worked during the election because; "(Election) work is too difficult for women." A similar attitude was noted by observers in other regions around the country.

In the majority of districts observed by the IFES team, more women were registered to vote than men. The election statistics maintained by the Ministry of Interior show that more women vote than men. Some administrators and interviewees offered an explanation for this, pointing out that women hold more hope in the political system than men. Others say that the women are easily intimidated and lacking power, vote out of fear. An additional explanation suggested that women do not have jobs outside the house so it is simply easier for them to vote.

Observers in Marrakech noted an increased participation by female voters after noon on election day. Informal tallies taken in the morning showed 30-42% of the voters were female versus 70-90% in the afternoon.

In Fès, the male pollworkers counting the ballots attributed the stuffing of more than one ballot into an envelope as the act of an ignorant/illiterate woman. IFES delegates spoke with a woman who reported that she voted solely out of her fear that if she were not to participate in the election, she would not obtain some necessary administrative papers without the evidence of a used voter card. Her solution to this technical need for participation in the election? She placed all of the ballots into one envelope and cast her "vote."

XI. ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS

A. Staffing and Training

Morocco's 11,500,000 registered voters were served by approximately 50,000 polling stations established throughout the Kingdom. Polling station locations were determined by the governor. The names and the locations of the polling stations were publicized at least ten days before the election. At the same time, each candidate received a list of the polling stations in his or her respective district.

Each of the 22,282 districts were the location for several polls. In urban areas, polling stations were located to serve between 250-400 voters each. In the rural areas, some stations were responsible for more voters based on the distribution of the population and the availability of administrative support. According to the Ministry of Interior's Supervisor of Electoral Operations, Mr. Benkiran, no voter would be required to travel an inordinate distance in order to cast his or her vote.

Within each district are one or more centralizing stations. Approximately 8,000 centralizing stations were established throughout the country, their locations selected by the governors. These stations served as polling stations during the election. Following the vote count at each individual polling station, the results from a number of stations are forwarded to the centralizing station. During a meeting with the IFES delegation on June 21, Mr. Benkiran specified that each centralizing station was responsible for an average of fifteen polling stations.¹⁵ In the field, observers found centralizing stations which were responsible for more than fifteen polling stations. For instance, in the district of Skhirat-Temara, the centralizing station located next to the Municipal Council building was responsible for the compilation of the results of 100 polling stations. In addition, the site was not a polling station during the day.

Each of the polling stations was staffed with six individuals. At any moment during election day, a

¹⁵ The delegation never received final figures on the total number of polling stations, nor the total number of centralizing stations. Calculating based on the information provided by Ministry of Interior officials, 8,000 centralizing stations times 10 polling stations (average of 15) yields 80,000 polling stations--far above the 50,000 polling stations that officials reported were to be established for the election.

minimum of three of the six were required to be present in the polling station. The voting bureau presidents were frequently found to be middle to high level civil servants. Each president was paid 200 dirhams for his efforts. The remaining pollworkers were unpaid. Meals for the pollworkers were provided by the administration.

President

Three names per polling station are submitted by the governor to the Provincial Electoral Commission 72 hours before the election. The Commission must, at the latest, issue its selection of the president and his or her alternate for each polling station by the day before the election. The individual named as the alternate assumes the role of vice president.

Secretary and Three Assessors

The governor submits the names of the four youngest and the four oldest literate voters registered in each polling station to the Provincial Electoral Commission before the election. The Commission selects the four members of the polling station from this list. These four individuals are informed by the administration to present themselves at their respective polling stations early on election day morning.

If the pollworkers do not report in time for the poll station opening at 08:00, the president is authorized to select replacements for those missing from the electors present at the poll at the time of opening. The youngest of the four pollworkers is assigned to be the secretary for the day.¹⁶ This is a change from the past elections when the polling station president selected the pollworkers from among the crowd in front of the polling station on the morning of the election.

Scrutineers

Each candidate had the option of designating scrutineers to represent the candidate during the vote count. The names of the designated individuals were to be provided to the polling station president at least one hour before the end of the voting period. The poll president can appoint scrutineers from those registered voters present in and around the poll before closing who are not candidates and who are literate.

The scrutineers named by the candidates participate with those named by the polling station president in the counting of the votes and the recording of the results. A polling station that serves less than 200 voters can conduct the count without the appointment of scrutineers.

The IFES monitors were concerned that, with the short time available between the listing of possible pollworkers and their selection, there would not be adequate training of the pollworkers in their respective roles and responsibilities. Team members raised the issue of poll worker training with Minister Basri.

¹⁶ Circulaire N° 56 du 2 Rebia I 1413 (30 September 1992). Art. 2.

He reminded the group that Morocco had already experienced over 40 different elections since independence. Training needs were minimized due to the presence of Moroccans with experience in electoral administration from previous elections. Training was provided only to the presidents. They in turn were responsible for delegating authority to the rest of the staff of the polling station.

It was evident to the IFES observers that many of the pollworkers, especially the polling center presidents, knew their jobs. The presence of candidate representatives and international observers on election day, however, was new to many of these "experienced" administrators, resulting in needless misunderstandings between delegated candidate representatives, observers, and the presidents.

The government did organize to provide basic instruction to the poll workers. The quality of this training depended on the commitment of the individual provincial and prefecture administrations. This training was often administered to each of the four oldest and four youngest assessors named on the list sent to the PEC for final pollworker selection. This was done to alleviate the need for a hurried training program in the 72 hours before the election.

Regional Report: Marrakech

Where there was pre-election training of election officials, elections were conducted more smoothly. An example of this took place in Marrakech-Médina where all 100 polling station presidents were convened for a training session. IFES observers were invited to attend the training session. The training consisted of detailed instructions based on the election code and a simulation of a polling center. It was interesting to note that there were no women present among the session participants.

On election day, our observations bore out that training made a difference in performance of election officials. Procedures were clearly articulated to all officials present on the day of elections before the polls opened in those areas where there was pre-election training. A question and answer period ensued as the officials clarified their individual roles. This was followed by the sealing of the ballot box and the opening of the polling station.

Regional Report: Casablanca

On June 23 two of the Casablanca team went to Moulay Rachid and environs to find where the *Makatib al-Taswiit* (voting stations) were to be located. We found many. They were already marked, and were indeed well marked. This is one of the positive

aspects of centralized government control of the elections--notice was available days in advance of the elections as to where the voters should go on election day.

In most polling stations on election day there were five pollworkers present. In a few places there were four or six. The sixth person either sat with the other five, or in the middle of the room close to the ballot box, doing nothing except counting the number of persons dropping envelopes into the box.

In almost all of the offices we visited, the two eldest pollworkers performed no other task than sitting close to the ballot papers, guarding them. They fulfilled a similar role during the counting process that evening. The rest of the work connected with the voting and counting process was carried out by the president, his female secretary and the two youngest members.

No polling office had posters or lists of candidates or electoral instructions (other than the one specifying the secrecy of voting) hung on the walls of the office. Posters were usually stuck on the external walls of the building containing the polling offices; lists of the candidates were kept on the president's table or drawer.

What was noticeable was the absence of female pollworkers. All the women we saw were employed as secretaries for the presidents with the exception of one female polling station president.

In all areas observed by the IFES team, the system generally worked as prescribed by law. Not everyone understood the rules; however, documentation of laws, procedures, rules, and codes were required to be distributed to each polling station. The majority of procedural difficulties that arose on election day were handled through the development of consensus between pollworkers and candidate representatives, often without consulting the official election guidelines.

B. Distribution of Materials

The observers reported very few late openings of polling stations on election day due to the absence of election materials. Based on the stations visited by the team, the pre-election distribution of polling station materials was well handled. The creation of the PECs improved the provincial distribution mechanism over past elections.

C. Role of the Political Parties and the Candidates

Each candidate had the right to place one delegate in each polling station where the candidate was running for election. A list of all delegates and their alternates was required to be presented to the governor 48 hours before the election for approval. The governor could reject delegates on the basis of "their morality, their previous history, their conduct, or their reputation."¹⁷ From this list, a second was prepared for each polling station president indicating the names of the pollwatchers representing each of the candidates. Women played a greater role as pollwatchers than as pollworkers.

The pollwatcher's role was to observe all aspects of the electoral process up to the transmission of the provisional results to the centralizing station. The polling center president was responsible for providing seating for the pollwatchers, positioned where they could see all areas of the polling station and observe all activity. If any activity was observed by one or more pollwatchers that was not in accordance with the electoral law, or that affected their candidate in a detrimental fashion, the pollwatcher(s) could have the incident recorded by the secretary in the polling station minutes. Any complaint that was not solved within the polling station among those present was referred to the PEC. Each poll watcher had the right to an official copy of the polling station minutes. These copies were legal documents, and could be used in the filing of a complaint. The lack of post-election access to copies of the minutes was the primary problem reported by the pollwatchers.

Regional Report: Rabat

MP General Secretary Mohand Laesner expressed interest in IFES' mission, especially from a technical perspective. During our June 16 meeting, we discussed how the MP was reaching its supporters before the election through a program of adult education. Part of the training was an actual voting simulation in order to familiarize the population with the proper voting process as it is explained in the series of laws governing the elections. Mr. Laesner agreed that as the process is arranged, there is a chance that the pollworkers in the less well-organized provinces and prefectures will not receive proper training. Nominating the pollworkers earlier would reduce this risk. The MP plans to undertake an informal parallel vote count using its party delegates.

¹⁷ Circulaire N° 56 du 2 Rebia I 1413 (30 September 1992). Sec. II.C.

Not all candidates fielded representatives. This was attributed to lack of resources, especially on the part of the independent candidates, as well as lack of an organizational structure to effect a representation at all stations. Many of the poll watchers were inexperienced and acknowledged that they had received no formal training. IFES delegates in Fès and Marrakech reported that there was some official pollwatcher training conducted by RNI, Istiqlal, and USFP. Delegates reported encountering pollwatchers who were better trained than the pollworkers and who were offering clarification on technical operating points to the presidents.

The pollwatchers wore no identification indicating their name, or that of the candidate whom they represented. Pollwatchers for the government parties were promised, and some received, 100 Dirhams for their vigilance. When asked, some could not even remember which candidate they represented. Others were critical of the candidate they were supposedly representing.

To the extent that this act of pollwatching should be analyzed contextually, bearing in mind the Moroccan reality, it is disturbing that there could be complicity on the part of pollwatchers to perpetrate an anomaly, particularly if there were material compensation guaranteed to such poll watcher. Some pollwatchers did render a useful service, not only to their candidates but also to the process, especially in ensuring "transparency."

XII. ELECTION DAY

A. Deployment and Mode of Operation for the IFES Delegation

Six teams of two to three members each were deployed to Moroccan cities on June 22. The cities selected by the monitoring team were Fès, Tétouan, Rabat, Béni Mellal, Marrakech, and Casablanca. Teams began to return to Rabat as the counting was completed in their areas, convening for debriefing on the 27th and the 28th of June.

Most teams were able to visit their assigned cities and the surrounding countryside before the election. Each team was in daily contact with the IFES office at a hotel in Rabat. Each team was responsible for selecting its election day route, keeping in mind the objective of visiting a cross-section of voting stations in a limited amount of time.

Each team was provided with copies of a standard election survey sheet to be filled in at each polling station. The sheets were collected by the team leaders and used for the preparation of the team reports. The surveys were saved for post-election reference. The observers were encouraged to take photos when possible.

Each of the teams was offered the services of a "guide" from the Ministry of Interior or the local administrative headquarters. In some cases, the teams felt that they were not in a position to refuse this offer. Having a guide saved time when attempting to locate polling stations in some of the rural areas or in the crowded urban neighborhoods. However, team members were wary of allowing the presence of the guides to compromise the neutrality of the observation. This concern was understood by the guides, and they did not enter the polling areas with the observers.

Each observer was supplied with an official accreditation from the Ministry of Interior (Appendix D). This document informed administrators and election workers around the country of the IFES mission and asked that the observer be granted access to all aspects of the elections process. More often than not, observers presenting themselves at a polling station were required to wait for a Ministry official or

member of the security forces to make a call on the radio or telephone for a second verification. Observers were refused access to voting stations and counting centers in a very limited number of instances.

B. Opening of the polls and the Voting Process

The polls were mandated to open officially at 08:00 on June 25. Before opening, the polling station was arranged by the pollworkers under the direction of the president of the polling station. Immediately before opening, the ballot box was displayed before the assembled pollworkers and pollwatchers who verified that there was nothing in the box. The box was then locked with two padlocks. The president retained one of the keys. The second was entrusted to the eldest pollworker. The pollworkers and party delegates took their places and the voting began.

Following are the steps for casting a ballot as indicated by the documents constituting the electoral law:

1. Each polling station was marked with a large white banner with the name and number of the polling stations present at that particular location. In the urban zones, ten or more polling stations were located in the larger school facilities.
2. Voters presented themselves at the door of the polling station that corresponded with the numbers found on their voting card.
3. Entering the polling station, the polling station secretary looked at the voter's voting card to check that the numbers on the card indeed corresponded with those of the polling station. If the voter was in the right place, the secretary returned the card to the voter. The voter continued to the table where the ballots were stacked.
4. The voter selected one of each of the ballots and one envelope and went into the voting booth (Appendix L).
5. Hidden from public view, the voter selected one ballot and placed it into the envelope.
6. Exiting the voting booth, the voter presented the voting card and a piece of identification with a photograph to the president of the poll. The president verified that the voter was on the voting roll. If the voter was on the list, but was unable to produce a second piece of identification with a photo, then the president applied indelible ink on the voter's finger. The president clipped the first numbered segment off of the voting card.

If a voter was on the list, but could not produce a voting card, the voter's identity could be vouched for by two witnesses known to the staff of the voting station. This was noted on the polling minutes.

7. Identity verified and card clipped, the voter was free to place the envelope in the box. At the same time, the pollworkers struck the name of the voter from both of the voting lists supplied to the polling station.
8. The voter exited the polling station.

Regional Report: Casablanca

The reception we received at the several different stations varied from outright rejection to warm, welcoming reception. This variation was even found within a given voting district between polling stations. Every district had state security present: police, national security police, and *mukhabarat* (secret police).

Generally, the process was very smooth without any real problems. Well organized, decentralized, appropriate number of workers (role of vice-president or President's Assistant was very important -- she was frequently the one who ended up at the centralizing station to deliver the voting station's results). People are respectful of other's right to privacy while voting

I did not notice a conscientious effort to inform voters how to vote, i.e., giving verbal instructions -- place one ballot in the envelope and discard or keep the remaining ballots, was generally missing from the *makatib*.

Our presence seemed to make the election officials even more careful and attentive to the process. They took pains to show me how they checked names on the voters' lists with the voting IDs and how, in a minority of cases, officials checked national ID against a voting ID. In at least two cases, my presence seemed also to embolden candidates representatives. One was increasingly challenging the capacity of more and more voters, seemingly taking advantage of the fact that the president was understaffed by one assessor and the lines were growing longer and the men (especially) and women in line growing increasingly impatient. This particular delegate appeared to be making more trouble than necessary. Things were running very efficiently and fairly; if people are on the list and have voting card, isn't this enough? Even if parties exercise their right to challenge certain questionable voters, that should not mean that they force the process to a halt by challenging every single voter.

Regional Report: Marrakech

On election day in Marrakech, the Ministry of Interior posted soldiers, police and plain

clothes "monitors" outside every polling place I visited. They were generally unobtrusive, but their presence was noted by every person I talked to.

The former Minister of Education, Taib Chkili, was the PPS candidate in Marrakech. In those areas covered by his legislative district, the cloth curtain on each voting booth was the color of his political party (gray). In adjacent legislative districts and throughout Marrakech, the cloth was navy blue. No party used navy blue as a color, two used gray. This was noted vigorously by the other candidates' pollwatchers present in these polling stations as an irregularity.

As indicated earlier in this report, the distribution of voters cards was one of the major administrative problems encountered leading up to and during election day. The following observers' report from Marrakech describes one incident witnessed by the IFES team.

Regional Report: Marrakech

On election day in the prefecture of Marrakech-Ménara, some anomalies in the distribution of voters cards were noted by the observers. Open debate about the control of voting cards was witnessed at other polling stations in the Marrakech area as well.

At 17:30, the observers returned to the polling station in Ménara district where they had witnessed the opening of the polls that morning. The station was one of nine polling places located in a school. The team learned that approximately 6000 voters cards had been distributed from a central distribution point at the school entrance. This was seen as unusual as in the other polling places visited by the team, they had found an average of 25-35 cards that had been distributed over the course of the election day.

The party poll watchers present complained to the observers about the "influencing" manner of card distribution. They alleged that a representative of the PPS, who was not an accredited poll watcher, was seated at the table where the cards were being distributed. The PPS candidate in the district was the former Minister of Education, Mr. Taib Chkili.

The IFES delegates asked the party representatives and poll watchers who were voicing these complaints if they were prepared to file a formal complaint in the minutes of the polling stations as well as with the local electoral officials. It was explained to the team that it was useless to file such a complaint as nothing would result from it.

The Moroccan poll watchers encouraged the international observers to enter the office where the cards were being distributed for visual proof that the administration was influencing the election. The leader of the Marrakech observation team requested, and

was granted, permission to enter the room. One party poll watcher tried to follow the observer and was physically thrown out of the building and hit several times. Entering the office, the observer found the individual in charge of voter card distribution in the process of telephoning the district administrative headquarters and demanding that guards be sent to eject the party poll watchers from the premises.

A Ministry of Interior official arrived after a brief time. He gathered the party poll watchers and spoke to them in a professional and kind manner. The official advised the poll watchers to file formal complaints and not to disrupt the election process.

The official left the premises and the IFES team members approached the poll watchers and encouraged them to utilize the established system. The observers made the point once again that the system can never function if no one follows through with formal procedures, requiring a response on the part of the administration.

It is not clear whether there was undue influence exerted on the voters who collected their cards on election day. However, it was clear from this station that there was a breakdown in the system of voter card distribution prior to the election. At the end of election day less than a thousand cards were left.

At regular intervals throughout the polling day, polling station presidents were asked to report the number of voters who had voted. These totals were broken down by gender and reported to the préfecture/provincial level and then to Rabat. The participation rate throughout the day was communicated to the public over the radio. Turnout by noon in some areas was approximately 25%, and up to 35-40% by 17:00. The polls were to remain open until 18:00.

Regional Report: Casablanca

Not many voters exercised their right to vote. The percentage of voters who actually voted was low as compared to the number of registered voters. The turnout varied from one area to the other and the absence of eligible electors we think was intentional, especially among young men. We noted many of them around the streets in the area all day long, and yet the majority of voters in the polling stations were either females or old men.

We noted that voters in the middle and upper class areas were well aware of the voting process. However, the low-income and lower middle class neighborhoods were not aware of the voting process. Due to this fact, considerable time was spent by the pollworkers in assisting voters.

Regional Report: Rabat

The interiors of many polling stations became darker after 18:00. Inside the voting booths it was difficult for the voters to distinguish between the ballot colors. Several voters were observed choosing the ballot they wanted while outside the voting booth, then entering it only to put their chosen ballot in the voting envelope.

Late in the afternoon, an official announcement was issued by the Ministry of Interior that the polls would remain open nationwide until 20:00. The opportunity for a two hour extension was provided for in the electoral law in the event of inclement weather or another unexpected occurrence. It was evident to the observers that this extension was due to the need to increase total voter turnout.

C. Security and Surveillance

Moroccan election surveillance and security was extensive and well organized. Ministry of Interior functionaries were present at all levels of the process, backed by uniformed and plainclothes police. This presence had positive and negative elections implications. On the positive side: the polling stations were peaceful. Their organization frequently was the responsibility of a local middle-level bureaucrat (*muqaddam*), supported by local police. Security was coordinated at polling stations and centralizing stations, relieving polling station presidents of most of the crowd control responsibilities. The majority of polling stations observed by the IFES delegation were generally well organized.

On the negative side, these same support functionaries sometimes usurped powers vested by law in the polling station presidents. Given police support, they could easily subvert the vote reporting process which passes through their hands if they had wanted to. There were no checks and balances prescribed for these functionaries in any laws or regulations shown to the delegation.

Regional Report: Rabat

When the muqaddam decided to evict me from watching the vote count, he sent in an armed policeman to escort me out and the polling station president said nothing, although he had previously granted permission for me to enter the station to observe. I had

provided him with a copy of my authorization from the Ministry of Interior earlier in the day.

Regional Report: Marrakech

A candidate representative indicated to one of our team members that none of the voters were being asked for their photo IDs. One of our team members was escorted out of the polling station after he inquired as to how many voters had been voting without exhibiting their ID card.

Regional Report: Tétouan

The issue of security of polling stations should be addressed in another manner. Although there was no way to confirm to what extent the presence of armed uniformed policemen could have violated the human rights of voters, this presence could have a psychological effect on voters. The Governor of Tétouan shared with us his philosophical view of his administration, which may be pervasive in the country: "*Il faut la sécurité avant la liberté.*"

Regional Report: Béni Mellal

On our arrival at Fikh Ben Salah, we were initially refused entrance to the polling station #14. Someone was sent to contact the *caïd* and obtain permission. The *caïd* sent word that he was aware of our presence and that we should be allowed to visit wherever we wanted.

Departing the polling area, we were stopped and guided to a nearby building. There we were interviewed by local police and copies were made of our authorization from the Ministry of Interior. The police were interested in who we were and why we were in Béni Mellal. Our driver was questioned and his permit and identification numbers recorded. We were asked where we had been and where we were going.

Regional Report: Fès

Many polling stations had armed guards (green army uniforms and khaki national security uniforms) at the entrances and in the back. The green uniformed men were sometimes armed with sticks and the khaki men with guns in holsters. I never saw any of these armed or unarmed security forces inside of the polling stations.

Regional Report: Casablanca

Several security police (plain clothes) were encountered. Some just watched us, others approached us and facilitated our visit, and others followed us very closely, placing the Moroccans around us on guard and on their best behavior. Some of these police, including a certain uniformed policeman stationed at the polling station where we began and ended the day, were intimidating to us.

This particular officer made it plain that we were not needed in Morocco to observe as America has its own corruption and improprieties in elections. "Morocco isn't Mauritania or Libya. We have honest and efficient elections." If I didn't believe him, he was going to make sure others echoed the same thing. This officer followed us from the first station to the next voting district. When I asked questions from the form, he entered the room and orchestrated the responses: "Everything's fine, isn't it?! No problems, are there? (a statement, not a question) The process is running smoothly, isn't it?"

On our way out of the polling place, another policeman stopped our driver and asked him who we were. Other places, when security people were writing down our names, they asked for our driver's and we tried to change the subject so as not to place the driver in a difficult situation after our departure. At an outdoor market/voting station, one security officer was standing right next to me as I asked questions of the president and the party delegates. He demanded to know what I was writing.

A plainclothes agent, unknowingly standing within earshot of our team members, ordered some uniformed police to go to rooms 86-88 to "check us out." He was embarrassed to discover that he had issued the order in front of an Arabic-speaking delegate. In the last polling station visited before the close of the polls, one security officer dominated the conversation. As we asked questions of the president and party delegates, he simply chimed in his response.

Two polling station presidents flatly refused to allow me to enter or to ask questions, in spite of my authorization from the Ministry of Interior. Both required additional information from the *caïd*. The security man called the *caïd* on the radio. On leaving the polling station we were surprised to be met by the *caïd* himself at the entrance of the polling station. He insisted on having our names and nationalities. This occurred at the polling station of voting district 17 in the commune of Anfa in the province Casa-Anfa.

D. Poll Closing and Vote Counting

When the polls closed at 8:00 pm, the counting began. The actual counting of the ballots required an average of one hour. A second hour was used to fill out all the polling station minutes. Three copies were prepared for official reporting purposes. Each candidate had the right to obtain a copy of the minutes, filled out by the voting station secretary. All of the copies of the minutes were signed by all polling officials present.

Regional Report: Marrakech

Steps taken in the counting of the votes:

1. Unlock ballot box.
2. Remove first envelope, pull the ballot out of the box, opened it, identified the ballot out loud, and handed it to a scrutineer. The scrutineer repeated who the vote was for. The ballot was placed on a table in front of scrutineers in the view of the party/candidate representatives.
3. Remove second envelope. Envelope was empty. The president displayed the empty envelope to all present. (This process was repeated through the count.)
4. An envelope containing more than one ballot was found. It was placed in another pile without counting. (This process was repeated through the count.)
5. At intervals, the president verified the count with the pollworkers, scrutineers, and candidate representatives.
6. Once a ballot was counted, the empty envelope was thrown on the floor except for the ones that were empty or that contained more than one ballot.
7. President continually verified that all present could see the count. He kept asking, "All agree?"
8. At the end of the count, the box was tipped up side down and all agreed that the process of counting ballots was over.
9. The process was serious and civil.

The tally began and everyone agreed on the final count. All participants and observers were helpful and open. There were some concerns about the high number of empty envelopes. This polling place registered 25% empty envelopes. Television and radio reports indicated that the incidence of empty envelopes and null ballots was 13% nationally.

Results: 700 registered / 274 voted (39%) / 68 empty / 206 good ballots. PPS 88; MP 55; OADP 6; RNI 27; USFP/Istiqlal 30.

Regional Report: Fès

The door of the polling station was closed at 7:58. At 8:01 someone knocked on the door asking to vote. They were refused entry by the both president and the poll watchers. The door was shut and barred. The tables were rearranged for the count and I was allowed to observe very closely and with full vision of all events. The same polling officials and poll watchers present at the morning opening were present at the closing. The Istiqlal poll watcher was designated by the polling center president as the head scrutineer. This individual maintained one of the three tally sheets. The others were filled out by the polling center vice president and one of the elder pollworkers.

The ballot box was unlocked and the number of envelopes was counted. It matched the number of voters who had reported to the poll during the day. The president began opening the envelopes, under the scrutiny of the poll watchers. An envelope was opened, the ballot removed, and the name of the candidate represented by the ballot was called out. If the ballot was null, the president announced this as well. The president showed the ballot to the surrounding crowd, or in the case of an empty envelope, shook or blew into the envelope to show that it was empty. The ballots were arranged into piles according to candidate.

The counting was finished after thirty minutes. Only one vote was contested. A voter had introduced two ballots of the same color into one envelope. The law was consulted and the issue was discussed among those present. It was agreed to count the two ballots as one single vote for that candidate. When the count was finished, the vice president and the administrative coordinator from the Ministry of Interior (who had checked by the room three times within thirty minutes to see if the count was complete) indicated the results from that polling station on a form and drove off to the *arrondissement* headquarters to report the provisional results. The remainder of the poll workers and watchers remained to fill out multiple copies of the polling station minutes. My presence was noted in the comments section of the forms. All of the poll workers and the official scrutineer read and signed the minutes. Each of the poll watchers present received copies.

A coordinator from Istiqlal came by to pick up the poll watcher's copy of the minutes with the final results. Both the government and at least one of the political parties was working to maintain a parallel tabulation of the overall result for the district.

Regional Report: Rabat

In the commune of Youssoufiya I was prevented from observing the vote count at polling station 22/1 by an armed guard sent in by the *muqaddam* in charge of the centralizing station. The polling station president had agreed to my presence during the count. Forced to remain outside of the polling station, I elected to watch the counting through the windows of 15 of the 18 polling stations located at this particular girl's school in the médina.

From this vantage point, I noted a different setup and process for counting in each room. Though haphazard, overall procedures were careful and fair. At the end of each count, the president rushed in with the results to the centralizing *muqaddam's* office, then returned to the classroom for the lengthy process of filling out the polling station minutes in multiple copies. Access was also denied me to the process of the *muqaddam's* telephoning provisional results from the centralizing station to the *caïd*, and when the filling of the minutes was underway in the classrooms, I was asked to leave the premises.

I waited outside of the school for one and a half hours. A line of taxicabs was parked outside of the polling area. Two ballot boxes were brought out of the school and each

was placed into one of the waiting taxis. I attempted to follow the two taxis, but was ordered not to follow them by an armed police officer. The two taxis, instead of proceeding down the street toward the *arrondissement* and préfecture headquarters as required by law, turned into a courtyard next to the school. The courtyard doors were closed behind them. No more ballot boxes emerged from the school for the next half hour. During this time, about 60 party observers departed with a roll of paper in hand. Gendarmes asked me to vacate the premises at 23:30.

The adjoining courtyard doors were ajar. Driving by, the two taxis could be seen still parked inside. There were several people sitting around the taxis. I continued to the *arrondissement* headquarters, where the *caïd* was sitting with the *muqaddam*. The two men were studying sheafs of vote tally sheets as the *caïd* made and answered phone calls. I inquired as to the location of the Youssoufia 22 polling station minutes, ballot boxes, and voter lists. I also asked why observation of counting and reporting had not been allowed at the 18 stations. The *caïd* disclaimed all involvement with the election process, continuing to say that he had not prevented any observation, that the tally sheets were solely for his informal use, and that further questions and requests for information were to be posed to the wali. Continuing to the prefecture headquarters, I was turned away at the door by an armed gendarme.

Regional Report: Béni Mellal

Oued M'Barek--17:30. We learned from the polling station president that voting hours had been extended to 20:00 by order of the Governor. We decided that it would be more interesting to observe the closing at a rural polling station that we had visited at 09:00. We drove about 40 minutes from Béni Mellal to reach the village of Khenazin on the outskirts of Kasba Tedla. Arriving at dusk, just before 20:00, the polling station members seemed surprised and rather pleased that we had returned. They readily agreed that we should stay and watch the closing there. The site was a one-room schoolhouse, and the proceedings were conducted by the light of a single butane gas torch.

The doors and windows of the polling station had been locked as the ballot count began, but the crowd of curious men and children pressed against the windows, eventually opening them in order to hear, and then, as the process proceeded, entering the room through the windows. The counting went quickly with the president effectively mediating disputed ballots. All the members of the polling station seemed experienced. The count was made and the Istiqlal observer recounted the ballots. Not surprisingly, considering the number of ballots, he arrived at a different total than the president. The president was able to maintain his authority, settling the dispute and proceeding to fill out the polling station minutes. The Istiqlal/USFP candidate was the winner at the station.

Regional Report: Casablanca

At the closing, I chose to witness the counting in the polling station #52 that was also a centralizing bureau in the commune of Bouchentouf, voting district Al Ahbass, in the prefecture of Derb Soltan Al Fida.

At the closing, the president ordered that the polling station doors and windows be closed. The operations proceeded according the steps outlined in the electoral instructions.

The count took approximately 20 minutes. Following the count, master copies of the poll minutes and the tabulation sheet were prepared. Copies were made and each poll watcher received one. Upon reception of the documents, the poll watchers signed a document stating that they had received a copy of the minutes.

The final voting results in this voting bureau were recorded at 11:00 pm.

E. Null and Blank Ballots

The official results released by the Ministry of Interior reported the incidence of null and blank ballots at 13% (Appendix G). Of the 7,153,211 votes cast, 930,993 were determined to be null. Compared against the results of elections worldwide, this percentage of null and blank ballots is high. Tangier led the nation with the greatest percentage of null and blank ballots, 49.49%. The majority of these uncounted votes were disqualified due to the presence of multiple ballots (for different candidates) in a single envelope or, more commonly, empty envelopes.

Among the Moroccans and the international observers, there was considerable discussion of the meaning of these empty envelopes and of the envelopes containing ballots of every one of the candidates running in a particular polling station. Official statistics recorded by the polling center presidents and tabulated at the regional and national levels did not differentiate between empty envelopes and envelopes containing more than one ballot. Most of the members of the IFES team reported that in the polling stations where they witnessed the counting of the ballots, empty envelopes outnumbered envelopes containing more than one ballot. Following the election, political party representatives acknowledged that their poll watchers had noted the predominance of empty envelopes.

It is impossible to know for sure whether these ballots were cast empty by mistake, or if some electors placed all of the ballots into the envelope out of confusion or embarrassment. Were some of these cast in protest of the government, the election process, the political parties, and/or the candidates? Insufficient evidence was available to answer these questions conclusively.

Regional Report: Casablanca

The population's lack of interest in the elections was reflected in the low percentage of actual voters as compared with the number of registered voters. The same could be said for the high percentage of the void votes. Votes were voided for different reasons; the majority of the voided votes that we observed were empty envelopes deposited into the ballot boxes. In some cases, the envelopes contained a piece of a cigarette carton or a scrap of paper inside the envelope instead of a ballot. We think that those voters intended to send a certain message by this behavior, and we believe that their message should be well received and understood in light of the administration's eager encouragement of people to vote. The latter were just not interested, and we believe that anyone who has observed the election can understand well the reason for people's lack of interest.

F. Vote Centralization

Polling Station

After counting was completed in a polling station, the count was recorded in the polling station minutes (Appendix H). Three copies of the minutes were delivered a centralization station where the polling station minutes (PSM) were collated and three copies of the centralization station minutes (CSM) were prepared and signed by all of the polling station presidents and candidate representatives.¹⁸ (Additional copies were required to be made available to each of the candidate representatives present.)

Centralizing Station

One CSM, with one of the three PSMs from each polling station attached, was delivered to the local

¹⁸ The candidates have the right to appoint a representative to the centralizing station. Observers noted that this delegate was occasionally the actual candidate. The procedure for the appointment of these representatives is the same as for the polling station-level delegates.

administrative archives. To these particular copies of the PSMs were attached the contested ballots and supplementary documentation from each polling station. The second CSM was placed in an envelope with one of the two remaining copies of the PSMs from each of the polling stations. The envelope was sealed and signed by each of the polling station presidents and delivered to the provincial court of first instance. The third and final copy of the CSM was placed in an envelope with the final remaining copy each polling station's PSM. This envelope was sealed, signed, and delivered directly to the office of the local administrative authority. This individual signed the envelope, acknowledging that it passed by his office. The local authority took possession of the envelope and delivered it to the administrative headquarters of the province/prefecture where it was opened in the presence of the members of the provincial/prefectorial commission of results.¹⁹

Prefectorial and Provincial Level

The commission of results had the responsibility to proclaim the results in each of the constituencies within the province/préfecture. These results were recorded in the minutes of the commission of results (CRM). Four copies of the minutes were prepared, compiling the data included in the CSMs within the province/prefecture. All of the copies produced by the commission were signed by each of the commission members. The first copy of the CRM went to the candidates or to the candidates' representatives. The second was delivered to the wali or to the governor with one of the copies of the CSMs from each centralizing station plus the copies of the PSMs attached to each CSM. These will be stored in the archives of the prefecture or province. The third copy was transported to the provincial court of first instance sealed in an envelope signed by the commission members. The fourth copy, also sealed in a signed envelope, was delivered by the president of the prefectoral commission of results to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Morocco, located in Rabat.

National Level

At the national level, the results were reported as they were released by the commission of results. The

¹⁹ The commission of results was composed as follows: the president of the court of first instance or his delegate, who presided over the commission; two registered, literate, voters designated by the governor; and a representative of the governor who served as the secretary of the commission. The candidates or their appointed representatives had the right to observe the activities of the commission.

election night reports from the Ministry of Interior and the studios of the RTM continued into the early morning of June 26.

It is interesting to note that the law does not require that the actual counting forms be preserved or turned in at any level. One IFES observer found several counting forms discarded on polling station floors the day after the election. Following the count all ballots are burned except for the contested ballots. Lacking the used ballots and the counting sheets, the polling station minutes exist as the sole remaining evidence. This places a great importance on the presence of the candidates' representatives at as many polling stations as possible. They must obtain official copies of the minutes signed by the pollworkers and other party delegates. All of the minutes delivered to the various administrative levels, plus those that are provided to the candidates representatives, have equal legal weight.

Regional Report: Marrakech

At 22:25 all the presidents from this large polling station boarded a bus for the centralization station. We followed them on the ten-minute drive to the station. They took us into a courtyard where there were over one hundred presidents waiting to process their results.

We were invited inside to observe by the president of the centralization station. Inside, the counting table was on one side of the room, the observers on the other, with administration officials keeping track, and the polling station presidents in front of the counting table. I asked the four candidate representatives present if they were satisfied with the procedures and receiving all of the information that they needed. Each said that the system had been accessible to them.

Regional Report: Fès

All of the voting station presidents from each school were transported together to the centralizing station. This particular centralizing station was responsible for the compilation of the results of thirty polling stations. A steady flow of people came and went (presidents, vice presidents, and poll watchers) to observe the recording of the results of their respective stations on the centralizing tally sheet. Presidents came with their ballot boxes and, it seemed, with all of the sealed envelopes containing the polling station minutes (including the one for the tribunal). We went unnoticed by most of the crowd for about an hour until there was a lull between stations reporting in. At that time the decision was made to commence preparation of the centralizing station minutes, noting our presence on the document. After approximately three hours, at 01:30, the centralization station's task was complete. Copies of the minutes were signed and

distributed to the poll watchers. Other copies were sent to their administrative destinations.

Regional Report: Casablanca

Each president of the 74 polling stations served by the centralizing bureau arrived in the company of candidate representatives, carrying their station's results and related documents sealed in two envelopes. One envelope was unsealed by the president of the centralizing station. The president noted the results on a large counting form while surrounded by assistants and representatives of the candidates. Next, the envelope was resealed. The polling station president was asked to sign a document attesting of the validity of the information recorded on the centralizing station counting form. The president of the polling station was required to remain on the premises in possession of the other two copies of the polling station minutes to be delivered to the prefecture and to the court of first instance.

The counting process continued late into the night without delays. Necessary measures were taken by the authorities to maintain order in the work area. The centralizing area was illuminated and the crowd of young men and women recruited to assist in the tabulation were kept at a distance by police officers. After tabulation began, a photocopy machine was delivered to facilitate the reproduction of copies of the reporting and counting forms for the poll watchers and the candidates themselves. A telephone system and electric calculator were available for the tabulation process. Food and beverages were provided for all of the workers and officials.

From what we have seen, the ballot counting was the only transparent act in the election. It was also the only process in which all present, members of the polling stations and the delegates, have actively participated. This participation was replicated at the polling station and the centralization station levels. Although we were unable to attend the final tabulation at the prefecture, we felt that there could be no manipulation of the results.

Regional Report: Béni Mellal

We agreed to follow the president of the polling station back to the centralization bureau at Kasbah Tadla. We returned to our car to proceed, but we were unable to depart. People approached our car warning us that disgruntled supporters of an opposing party were prepared to ambush vehicles departing in either direction from Khenazin. There were rumors of violence in neighboring villages. We sat and waited for thirty minutes. The president of the polling station waited as well. Finally, we pulled away from the school accompanied by a caravan of three cars and a truck. Our vehicle followed the others at a short distance. We rode slowly, in tense silence, down the dark winding road to Kasba Tadla.

We arrived safely at Kasbat Tadla. Crowds were gathered in the streets presumably awaiting results. Somehow, we became separated from the president of the polling

station who we followed from Khenazin. We tried to find the centralization station ourselves. We went to the police post that served as Kasba Tadla'a centralization station and presented our papers to the guard in stationed outside. He disappeared inside. We waited. The assistant mayor appeared and suggested that we return to the provincial offices in Béni Mellal to obtain the results. The official's tone indicated that this was more than a suggestion and we felt it prudent to depart. On the road to Béni Mellal, we saw crowds gathered at other centralizing stations awaiting results.

Regional Report--Casablanca

Six candidates were on the ballot in al-Hay al-Hassani: Karam, Muhammad, USFP-Istiqlal; Bouabid, Maati Muhammad, UC; Bin A'dada, Jamal al-Din, MNP; Bil'Akkaf, al-'Arbi, PPS; Habashi, 'Abd al-Haqq, OADP; al-Hasnawi, al-'Amiri Mustafa, RNI.

According to administration officials, Mr. Bouabid had defeated Mr. Karam here in the 1984 parliamentary elections. Mr. Karam continues to contend that he won this earlier contest.

An IFES observer was present in voting station 103 at the I'dadiyya al-Hana' School in al-Hay al-Hassani when the votes were counted in the evening of June 25, 1993. Team members had visited this station earlier in the day. Voting was proceeding smoothly. The vote count began after voting ended at 20:00. It took place in the presence of three party observers (MNP, UC, and USFP). The USFP observer continually reminded the president and staff of the voting station of the steps of the counting process.

The three poll watchers and the IFES observer maintained parallel tallies of votes. At 21:35, after the counting was completed, the IFES observer was approached by a crowd of poll watchers from other voting stations within the same complex. They asked the IFES observer for assistance as the presidents of their respective voting stations were not providing them with the copies of the polling station minutes to which they are legally entitled by Moroccan law (*Circulaire* N° 147, Sec. VI.1).

The poll watchers commented, "*Le caméra ouverte, ça passe très bien. Tout ça c'est une comédie pour les médias étrangers.*" In the midst of this discussion, the administration representative overseeing the operations at the school appeared and assured the poll watchers and the IFES observer that everything was fine. A short time later, each of the observers at the al-Hana' school received their copies of the voting station minutes. The poll watchers returned to thank the IFES delegate. According to them, the international observer presence obligated the government to release the results to all of the political party representatives--at least in that school.

This point was made not only by the USFP observers, but even by a young man who was an observer for the UC. He explained that he had been promised a job if he observed the election for the UC. Continuing, he said that no one really took the election seriously

and that it was assumed that the government would falsify the results.

The minutes for voting station 103 were finally signed at 22:00, over an hour after the votes had been counted. Following are the results as recorded by the IFES observer and as recorded in the voting station minutes:

USFP	120
void	87
UC	38
MNP	15
PPS	15
OADP	10
RNI	9

Total 294 out of 449 registered, 65% voting rate, 30% void votes.

On the morning of June 27, 1993, Mohamed Karam presented the IFES observers with copies of eighteen completed polling station minutes from voting stations in al-Hay al-Hassani. The figures for station 103 observed by IFES have already been indicated above. The USFP-provided results for the other seventeen polling stations are included in Appendix I. Where possible, figures were compared between the tallies compiled by candidate poll watchers and the figures offered by Mr. Karam. Only the figures recorded in the voting station minutes have legal status in Moroccan courts.

In addition to the IFES observer's count and the figures from the minutes of the eighteen voting stations delivered by Mohamed Karam, IFES observers received the following figures from a member of the diplomatic corps stationed in Casablanca. Members of the diplomatic corps circulated around Rabat and Casablanca on election day. This individual observed the vote count in voting station #4 in the Ibn Hamdis Bennis School, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani:

USFP	129
void	100
UC	48
MNP	13
OADP	4
RNI	9
PPS	7

Total 310 out of 489 registered, 63% voting rate, 32% void vote.

The western diplomat was told by a USFP observer that the local authorities had withheld the real voting station minutes from most of Mr. Karam's observers in order to have adequate time to prepare a second set of minutes for distribution. The western diplomat cited one case described by a USFP observer in which the votes won by Mr. Karam were attributed to Mr. Bouabid, and vice versa. The IFES team found no hard proof of this practice. However, during their pre-election meetings, team members were told by a variety of sources that "vote swapping" was common in past elections.

The figures provided by the western diplomat, like those in the eighteen sets of results obtained by the delegation from USFP, suggest that Mr. Karam was victorious in al-Hay al-Hassani, with Mr. Bouabid generally coming in third place--after Mr. Karam and the void votes. This pattern repeated itself in the vote tallies on special parallel tally sheets distributed by the USFP-Istiqlal alliance to their poll watchers. Photocopies of the USFP observers' tallies for three other voting stations in al-Hay al-Hassani (numbers 9, 99, and 100), all conform to the same pattern, showing Mr. Karam with three to five times as many votes as Mr. Bouabid.

The trend revealed in the minutes and the figures obtained by IFES observers, not to mention within the records of the USFP poll watchers (for which no independent sources exist), suggests that Mr. Karam winning the June 25 election in al-Hay al-Hassani. In light of this, there is reason to be suspicious of the government's contention that Mr. Bouabid won this election. Of course, none of this constitutes irrefutable proof of fraud. The IFES observers had direct access to only 10% of the results from the district's voting stations.

Complaints about the lack of access to voting station minutes were passed on to the team by Fatima Belmoudden, the USFP-Istiqlal candidate in Moulay Rachid, located in the Casablanca prefecture of Ben Msik - Sidi Uthmane. She claimed that election administrators refused to give most of her observers their copies of the minutes and had falsified the election results in her district. Copies of the minutes from her district were not provided to the IFES team.

Regional Report: Tétouan

On arrival at the Provincial Headquarters, where the team witnessed the presence of various committee members and party representatives, it was observed that even before the results were transmitted to the commission of results, some government officials have received phone calls announcing results to them. There was an instance in which the team was with the Governor and he received phone calls, on two occasions presumably from the same person, related to vote tabulation. While this may be normal in the context of Morocco, it is remarkable that the Governor commented that he had done his own addition, knew what the total number would be, and did not accept the number that was relayed to him, as it did not correspond with his total. He requested the officials to recalculate the totals.

It must be pointed out that the team was unaware of who was calling the Governor and what the specifics of their conversation were, thus making any conclusion of this conversation subjective and probably erroneous. It is, however, pertinent, to explain that the phone conversation was on tabulation of results. Since, at this juncture, there had not been provincial tabulation nor announcement, there are doubts as to what extent the government should be involved in running the elections as opposed to an independent body.

XIII. POST-ELECTION DAY ACTIVITIES

Mission delegates remained in their deployment zones to witness the vote counting and the centralization of the results. Observers were encouraged to take their time returning to Rabat, and to stop in communities on the way home to investigate the outcome of the elections. The majority of the election results were known by mid-day on June 26. Complete election results appeared in the newspapers on June 28. Even after the full team was reconvened in Rabat, they continued to follow the reactions to the election results. Newspapers affiliated with the National Accord, the Democratic Union, and the non-affiliated parties all reported incidents of fraud, voter influencing, violence, and corruption. Although these reported incidents did not directly affect a majority of the 222 political races, they are indicative of Morocco's need for an improved electoral system.

During the electoral night, Ministry of Interior officials commented repeatedly on the nationwide calm that had existed throughout election day. According to officials, "No incidents blocked the electoral process." During the afternoon and evening of June 26, IFES observers returning to Rabat passed through the town of Bouznika. There they discovered that there had been public demonstrations against the handling of the election between USFP candidate Ahmed Zaïdi, the local-favorite, and the RNI's Abdelkamel Rerhraye. Mr. Rerhraye was declared the winner early in the morning of June 26, much to the astonishment of those who had participated in the vote count at the local level. Street demonstrations ensued. The presence of a large number of anti-riot police in Bouznika, as well as six vehicles transporting soldiers back to Rabat, were noted. The June 27 newspapers were the first to provide eyewitness allegations of irregularities in several districts around Morocco.

Regional Report: Béni Mellal

June 26--09:30. Met with Mohammed El Hassan Aresmouk, PPS candidate for Béni Mellal. He asserted that until June 23, the campaign in the city had been running smoothly. In the last day or two before the elections, however, there had been a lot of officially sanctioned propaganda on behalf of the PND candidates. He alleged a deliberate "falsification of the electoral results" for the benefit of the PND, so that by 10:00 - 11:00 on Friday morning, everyone knew that the PND were going to win in city. Particular complaints: PPS observers were expelled from voting bureau, in some cases because they were not members of the local community. The PPS candidates did

not see any polling station minutes until 1:00-2:00 am in the morning (Saturday). Furthermore, as we spoke, the results of three of seven races had not yet been announced (Béni Mellal, El Ksiba, and Bni Moussa-Oulad Ayad). Overall, M. Aresmouk had with him a tally of preliminary results as they had been announced thus far. According to him, the USFP/Istiqlal candidate won in Kasba Tadla, the PND took seats in Sidi Aissa and Souk Sebt, and the PDI won in Fkih Ben Salah. He also had with him some national results (220/222 seats) noting that the two outstanding seats were from Béni Mellal. His figures showed a combined 91 seats for USFP/Istiqlal candidates, plus seven additional seats for PPS and OADP candidates. Asked whether this represented a victory for the opposition, M. Aresmouk responded: "It's a small advance but no great victory."

Regional Report: Casablanca. Follow-up.

Since submitting their reports to IFES on July 6, delegation members obtained additional information concerning the election in al-Hay al-Hassani in Casablanca. On July 3, 1993, the USFP newspaper *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* (The Socialist Union) published the results of the election in al-Hay al-Hassani as recorded by its observers in all 190 polling stations in the district.

To what extent do the figures published in *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* correspond to those in the nineteen sets of results collected immediately following the election? (Appendix I) If these sets of figures match, then the probability that the figures in *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* are accurate increases.

This is indeed the case. The figures published in *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* are identical to those recorded earlier--with three exceptions: voting stations 61, 105, and 106. In station 61, *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* attributes 92 votes to the UC candidate, Mr. Bouabid, whereas the voting station minutes record that he only obtained 29. This could be a typographical error, especially since it involves the USFP newspaper giving the opposing UC candidate 63 more votes than those recorded in the minutes. Similarly, in station 106, *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* gives Mr. Karam only 11 votes whereas the minutes show 111 votes. As for voting station 105, the discrepancies do not concern the USFP-Istiqlal and UC candidates, but the candidates of some of the smaller parties. The newspaper attributes 6 votes to the OADP candidate whereas the minutes from election night give him 16; 8 votes to the PPS candidate whereas the minutes give him 12; and 7 votes to the RNI candidate versus the 11 votes recorded in the minutes. One could assume that this USFP-Istiqlal poll watcher was somewhat careless in recording the votes of these smaller parties because he or she was focusing primarily on the votes for the two leading candidates. The results for the minor candidates were not given for several voting stations in the list published in *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* because the newspaper was verifying their accuracy with representatives of the smaller parties.

Given the correspondence between the figures recorded by the USFP-Istiqlal poll watchers and those collected by the IFES observers and the western diplomat, we find it plausible that the results published in *al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki* are accurate--especially with respect to the votes received by Mr. Karam and Mr. Bouabid. The newspaper vote totals

show Mr. Karam winning 18,528 votes as opposed to Mr. Bouabid's 7,241 votes. The official results announced by the government give 29,799 votes to Bouabid and 11,160 to Karam. The disparity of these results, leads one to consider the possibility that the government falsified the election results for the district, declaring Mr. Bouabid to be the winner.

Unfortunately, comparable data are lacking for some of the other contested districts where voting station minutes were not turned over to observers, notably Bouznika (between Rabat and Casablanca), Tabriket-Salé, Tiflet (on the main road from Rabat to Khemisset and Meknes), Ben Ahmed (east of Settat), and Moulay Rachid in Casablanca. But the evidence from al-Hay al-Hassani, as well as published accounts of the elections in these other areas strongly suggest that where authorities refused to hand over copies of the minutes to the candidates' poll watchers, the official results announced by the Ministry of the Interior can be questioned.

Two hundred and ten challenges to election results were officially filed. Of Morocco's 222 constituencies, 132 were the sites of appeals (Appendix J). These appeals were supposed to have been filed within the mandated six-day period provided for the examination of the minutes from all levels of the electoral process. Currently, the Constitutional Court has nullified the results in Tamellalt, Taliouine, and Bouznika. By-elections will be scheduled for these districts within the next six months. The over one hundred remaining appeals are anticipated to be heard by the Court by mid-October 1993.

The Ministry of Interior, at the request of IFES, provided a detailed set of direct election results divided by economic region, province/prefecture, and district. A summary table of that information is included in Appendix G. In addition, Ministry officials included a synopsis of the official appeals of election results registered by candidates across the country.

The indirect elections for the remaining 111 seats in the legislature were held on September 17, 1993. Results of those elections are found in Appendix K. According to the Moroccan and the international press, the opposition parties are strongly contesting the results of these elections.

PART III: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

XIV. GENERAL FINDINGS

A. An Improved Electoral Process

The IFES delegation heard from many Moroccans that the June elections represented a significant step forward from past elections, even those which took place in 1992. The IFES delegation was not able to conduct a comparative study of 1992 and 1993 elections, but it did collect testimony that indicated that an incremental improvement in the electoral process had been achieved.

Political parties and individual candidates conducted energetic campaigns. Political campaign issues were discussed with more openness than in the past. However, the delegation noted that important topics of social and political significance were rarely focused on, and when they were, it was in private and off the record.

The print media was allowed more latitude in its reporting of the electoral period. This was especially true in the newspapers supporting the *Koutla* and the non-affiliated parties. Election coverage in the government daily, *le Matin du Sahara* lacked substance in its reporting--relying on articles appearing in the foreign press that cast the electoral process in a positive light, and ignoring the events of the post-election period.

Electronic media time was evenly distributed between the parties. As stated elsewhere in this report, the content of some of the presentations did not allow for the level of spontaneity and degree of debate that is the strength of television and radio during political campaigns. Television and radio were underutilized as training and education tools targeted at illiterate Moroccans by both the government and the political parties.

This was the first Moroccan election to which a team of international observers was invited by the government of the Kingdom of Morocco. IFES' presence, and the cooperation extended to the mission

by the Ministry of Interior, are indicators of an evolving openness in Moroccan politics and dialogue.

The observers encountered Moroccans speaking their minds to each other and even to foreigners. This openness was not without its limits. Moroccans complained to IFES monitors and observers that they were inhibited from speaking frankly for fear of being overheard by Ministry of Interior officials. This atmosphere of fear prevented team members from meeting with representatives of some special interest groups. Most Moroccans who were contacted by, or contacted, the delegation, asked to receive no attribution. A number of interviews were conducted while walking or in cafes, away from buildings and potential eavesdroppers.

Although assured by high-level representatives of the Ministry of Interior that there would be no problems, IFES delegates continue to be concerned about the potential for retribution against some of the individual who met with delegation members, or against the Moroccans employed by the mission as drivers, translators, and guides.

B. An Efficient Electoral Process

On an administrative and organizational level, the IFES delegation was generally impressed by the June elections. The observed problems in this area have been noted earlier in this report. Suggestions for procedural improvements are enumerated in Part II of this report.

The computerization of the voters lists served to alleviate many problems on election day. The ability to make simultaneous, or immediate, corrections and additions to the list at the local and the national level in an organized fashion was impressive.

In the majority of polling stations visited by the IFES delegation, there were no major technical operational irregularities. Voting material, including voter registers, tally sheets, ballot boxes and indelible ink, were properly handled. The secrecy of the ballot was maintained--inside the polling station. Voters leaving the station in possession of their unused ballots were at risk of having that secrecy violated.

Ballot papers were available in sufficient quantity for all the parties. Most of the polling stations opened on time, and all were requested to extend the voting period for an additional two hours as allowed by law. The polling stations opened and closed in the presence of the polling officials and multiple party and candidate representatives. Most of the polling officials, as well as the candidate representatives, exhibited adequate knowledge of the voting procedure and related formalities according to the electoral laws.

The election process, like the campaign period before, was generally conducted in a calm and orderly fashion, free of overt fraud, intimidation, or harassment. Exceptional incidents observed by the IFES delegation were described in preceding chapters. The discrepancies which arose on election day were generally approached and rectified in a consensual manner by members of the polling station staff in the presence of representatives of the competing parties. In most cases, voting results from a district's many polling stations were well tabulated.

The delegation noted inconsistencies in granting access by all candidates or party representatives to the polling station, centralizing station, and commission of results minutes as stated in the law. In many areas, candidates and party representatives were provided with copies of the polling station minutes (PSM). In other areas, they were not. In the most extreme cases, this access continued to be denied for several days following the elections, or was never fully granted.

Members of the delegation observed that the centralizing stations did not improve the efficiency of the vote tabulation process in all cases. Rather, they were often bottlenecks that slowed the reporting process. While the election results were funneling through the centralizing stations, informal counts were compiled and phoned into the *caïdat*, *arrondissement*, or commune, creating confusion and lending credence to the impression of many Moroccans that election results in Morocco are sometimes determined long before the official count is complete. The utility of the centralizing stations is more apparent in rural areas, or areas where the polling stations are spread out and transportation and communication resources are limited.

C. Level of Voters' Interest

Many Moroccans shared their attitude with the IFES team that parliament exists to create the illusion of democratic participation, and that in reality, all power remains in the hands of the King. Taking this perspective, even if the June elections had been completely honest in terms of electoral processes, they would have still have been fraudulent in the sense that they had nothing to do with the real distribution of power in Morocco.

This attitude is one of several possible reasons for the widespread indifference among the population to the June elections. This indifference was noted in the press and by candidates and observers alike. One IFES observer found citizens who were completely unaware of the upcoming elections.

Regional Report: Tétouan

In Tangier, for instance, about twenty people questioned were completely unaware of any election taking place. Fewer knew where the polling stations were...There was perceived indifference of the people in this city. In fact this view was partially confirmed by the Provincial Governor.

The lack of interest in the electoral process, for whatever reason, created a climate ripe for fraud and corruption. There were countless allegations of vote buying and electoral card buying--especially in the low-income urban neighborhoods. The IFES delegation was presented with incomplete evidence of such activity in Rabat-Salé, Casablanca, and Marrakech.

It was noted that in many places voters seemed to be very perfunctory about voting, treating the process like just another daily chore. Delegates were told that this "perfunctory" attitude stems from voters' belief that they had to vote to avoid harassment or non-support by government officials when licenses, government permits, and other public services from local authorities would be needed.

D. Null and Void Ballots

Nationwide, the percentage of null and blank ballots was 13%. In some districts, the percentage was as high as 49.49% (Tangier). In some polling stations visited by IFES delegates, "null and blank" was the

first or second highest category of ballots cast. Possible explanations for this high percentage of spoiled ballots have been listed in an earlier chapter. A certain number of ballots undoubtedly were spoiled by voters who were confused about voting procedures. This points to an insufficient program of voter education.

As observed by the IFES delegates, many of the voided ballots were empty envelopes, or envelopes in which the voter placed all of the available ballots. It is likely that some of these ballots were cast as protest votes. Observers spoke with voters who explained that due to pressure exerted on them to vote for a candidate who they did not prefer, they cast an empty envelope to avoid actually voting for the pressuring party. These voters kept their unused ballots, including the ballot of the party that they truly supported, so that when asked, they would be able to exhibit a political affiliation favorable to the local administrators/political elites.

Protest votes signify a feeling potentially more troubling than the lack of interest in the election process explained above. The fact that Moroccan voters would take the trouble to participate in the voting process, and then place scrap paper, all of the ballots, or nothing at all in an envelope, and deposit it in the ballot box would signal the existence of a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the current political system. In acknowledgement of this dissatisfaction, the administration should initiate confidence-building measures such as demanding the increased accountability of the public sector.

E. Questionable Results

Whereas the Ministry of Interior professes to remain entirely neutral outside of partisan politics while assiduously administering the elections, there appear to be some instances where vote results, for which the Ministry of Interior is responsible, are questionable. As mentioned previously in this report, the election results have been contested in the districts of Bouznika, al-Hay al-Hassani, Moulay Rachid, Tabriket-Salé, Tiflet, and Ben Ahmed.

The elections in Bouznika were invalidated by the Constitutional Court in late August. The results of Tamellalt and Taliouine were annulled by the courts in September. As of September 12, one hundred and twenty additional appeals await action around the nation. The delay may be due to the lack of

replacement of two judges who have retired. It must be noted that such controversies, in this and past elections, inevitably cause distrust and skepticism, which in turn breed apathy and potentially more violent repercussions.

XV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Pre-Election

Registration

The registration system, the system for the distribution of the voters cards, and the model of voters cards should be reconsidered (See: Chapter VIII).

Electoral Law

There is no unified Electoral Law; rather, there is a loose collection of dahirs, laws, decrees, directives and circulars. It is thus easy for gaps, overlaps, or inconsistencies to occur, and for administrators to observe some and forget others. The related laws, etc. should be reanalyzed and updated into one coherent document. In compiling this document, we hope that consideration would be given to this report's recommendations, to the recommendations of the participants in this year's political process, and to the problems and successes encountered by the administrators of the June 25 and September 17 elections.

B. The Election Day Process

Identification

A method of accurate voter identification increases the level of participant confidence in an electoral process. Each polling station should require a voter to present a national identity card (with picture) along with a voter identity card. This will stop many potential delays in the process (as it takes away an important reason to challenge voters) and eliminate "stand-in voters."

If the voters cards are to be kept at a centralization bureau, then the presence of party observers is necessary during the distribution of the cards. The adoption of a system that allows the voters card to

be issued at the same time that the voter is registered simplifies the registration system and reduces the potential for fraud. This is possible with either a computerized or a conventional registration system. Handwritten registration can be organized in such a way that the computerization of the electoral list can take place at a later date. This would allow the creation of the computerized list to take place in one central location (Rabat), requiring less hardware and fewer personnel.

The computer can extract a list of the electors who have registered more than one time. The voter in question would be removed from all of the lists except for the one for where they actually live. The voting lists would be printed for the *commune/arrondissement* level for verification by the population, the political parties, and the administration. Additional corrections--removals and additions of names--are communicated to Rabat to be entered into the computer.

Before election day, each polling station would receive two lists, one of all of the voters registered in that station, and the second of all of the incidents of multiple registration and all additional corrections to the list from the verification period. The voter's name and number would be checked first against the list of multiple registrations and corrections. If the voter is not on that list, and if the number on the card corresponds to the polling station, the voter is allowed to take a ballot and enter the voting booth. Emerging from the booth, the polling station president verifies the voter's identity and the pollworkers strike to voter's name from the voting list.

Candidate's Delegates (Pollwatchers)

Many polling stations were set up in such a way that the seating for the candidates representatives was far from the ballot box and the electoral list. These representatives should not be relegated to the background, but should be positioned as is indicated in the documents constituting the electoral law, where they can be "present next to the president of the polling station to follow all of the voting operations."

The pollworkers, and especially the president, should be clear as to the rights and responsibilities of the candidate and party representatives. The IFES observers were repeatedly informed of complaints or observations filed by representatives that the president refused to note on the polling station minutes.

Candidate and party representatives should be easily identifiable by voters and pollworkers. All pollwatchers should be provided with badges that, at the least, show their party affiliation. This will distinguish these individuals from the pollworkers for the benefit of the voters and the observers.

Pollworkers Selection and Identification

The pollworkers also should be provided with some sort of identity badge, to identify them for the voters, observers, and candidate representatives.

Women should receive equal consideration for all positions in the voting station, as they are equally capable of undertaking all of the responsibilities involved. No positions in the administration of an election should be reserved for males. Male administrators from all levels expressed to team members their belief that "women do not have the strength to stay alert in the polls for an entire day," and "a woman could not maintain control of a polling station." These attitudes do not correspond with the movement underway in Morocco to improve women's position in society. Opening the positions to both genders will more than double the applicant pool and make it easier to staff each of the polling stations with literate, dynamic pollworkers. Moreover, pollworkers are facilitators, not controllers, of the elections process, working to ensure that the voters can exercise their rights to a secret and individual ballot.

Role of Security Forces

The security forces can be used to maintain order on election day. However, no security official, armed or unarmed, should enter a polling station without the consent of the polling center president. In the event that this presence is requested, it must be noted in the polling station minutes.

Security forces present around the polling stations for maintaining order should be unarmed and in uniform. No plainclothes agents should be placed in or around the polling stations on election day. The presence of security forces in the polling station, or plainclothes agents or armed security agents anywhere around the station, causes nothing but intimidation -- intimidation of party pollwatchers, voters, polling station workers, and observers.

Decentralization

Observers remarked positively on the decentralization of the electoral process. Each province and prefecture applied the electoral regulations in different ways. Part of this was due to misunderstandings of the electoral law. However, most of these operational differences existed because each local administration was reacting to the logistical and social realities of their respective areas. This was a strength of the electoral organization. In addition to being able to respond to specific needs, it is crucial that each local administration work to ensure that the basic tenets of the democratic process are respected by the local populations and by the local government.

Ballots

The design of the balloting procedure must be revisited. The multiple ballot, a process following the French model, does not benefit the illiterate voter to a greater degree than the single ballot. A single ballot with all candidates on one ballot alleviates many of the problems encountered during the June 25 election. It has been shown in other countries that illiterate, elderly and otherwise infirm voters can and will adapt easily to a single, marked ballot.

Adoption of a single ballot format would allow the government and political parties to :

1. Establish a more efficient program of voter education.
2. Better ensure the secrecy of the vote during the voting process.
3. Remove the possibility of voters being influenced by discarded ballots on the floor or in an open container inside the voting screen.
4. Remove the possibility of parties buying votes by requiring the voter to exit the polling station with his or her unused ballots for later inspection and payoff.
5. Simplify the system of accounting for all of the ballots delivered to the polling station on election day, decreasing the potential for error and the difficulty of the procedures.
6. Reduce financial and physical resources, devoted to ballot printing and distribution, resources that would be more effectively applied to civic and voters' education.

C. The Election Commission

An Independent Election Commission

The creation of an independent election commission will reduce the potential for fraud and vastly enhance the credibility of the Moroccan electoral process. Candidates and voters would be reassured that any complaints they might have would find a hearing before an impartial judge. Without an independent commission, there can be no guarantee of fairness. The government cannot be regarded as an impartial actor, since it represents certain political interests. As things stand, these interests are inscribed in the electoral process.

The role of the national and local electoral commissions in activities directly related to elections should be invigorated and expanded. Their involvement in running elections and counting votes can further enhance respect for and belief in the process by the citizens and the political parties.

Between elections, an election commission can play a variety of roles to encourage the growth of democracy in Morocco and the development of a democratic ethic in the public and private sectors. The commission could organize and facilitate training sessions for election officials who work for the government, for political party people who need to educate their supporters, and for the public at large.

Democracy is an evolutionary process and one that requires an informed citizenry. Education of the young is central to the development of a sustainable democracy. The lead role in the shaping of an improved curriculum in governance and democracy for all levels of the education system could be assumed by the commission. In addition, the commission could offer training in the form of seminars, conferences and materials to school teachers who could integrate the ideas of democracy into elementary and secondary school curriculum.

The establishment of a permanent, independent electoral commission will allow for timely review of the registration lists, electoral laws and procedures, and the plans for election preparation. The commission can also work to establish a data bank of information. Since computers are generally available, the commission is a good place to store all data regarding elections and make it available to demographers,

political parties, academics researching voting patterns, and others who could use the information in market research.

D. General Policy Issues

Frequency of Elections

The establishment of a rotating system of elections could prevent politicians from becoming too entrenched in their positions, and keep them accountable to their constituents. Replacing half of the parliament every three years would also give the population and the election administration the opportunity to participate in more elections. An alternative would be the reduction of the terms of legislators from six to three or four years. Such a change would begin to diminish the widespread cynicism of the population toward politicians and government in general noted by the IFES delegation.

Voting Age

Serious consideration should be given to lowering the voting age in Morocco to 18. Morocco's youth are the future of the nation. The turnout on June 25, as observed by the IFES delegation, indicates that a vast majority of voters are elderly, not the young. A lower voting age will increase the legitimacy of the electoral process, especially among the youth. The sooner that Morocco's young people can participate in the democratic process, the sooner they will understand that they indeed have a voice, and an important one.

Funding of Election Campaigns

The issue of the funding of political campaigns must be addressed. The government cannot be the sole financier of campaigns. That role allows it to assume too much control over the parties. A primary catalyst for the development of civic organizations and civic participation by women, laborers, farmers, religious institutions, businesses, intellectuals, and others is to grant to those organizations the ability to raise private funds for political and social activity. Democracy through popular participation cannot develop in a climate of tight controls of funding, restrictions on independent contributions, and lack of

access to media for advertising.

E. Rebuilding Trust in the Electoral System

Increased Openness and Access

Open access to all records by candidates, citizens, elections observers and the press is the way to foil misperceptions and accusations. This access should be maintained for the entire electoral period. This is especially important during the counting process, from the time the polls close, through the counting, tabulation and adjudication of results, at centralization stations, commissions of results, and the courts. This is not to say that the reporting process should be unduly hampered, but independent observers must be given reasonable access to official reports during and after their completion, with the understanding that they not interfere with the process in any way.

One method of insuring the presence of independent observation bodies is through the development of a domestic monitoring capacity. Civic, religious, and professional organizations can be tapped to contribute monitors, or to organize their individual efforts. The presence of international observers on election day, or even before election day like the IFES mission, are limited in their effectiveness. International monitors come with their experiences from around the world, and the domestic monitors come with their expertise in Moroccan affairs and culture. Combining domestic and international monitoring and observation efforts increases the impact and the effectiveness of both groups.

Accurate Reporting of Election Results

The reporting of election results must be honest and transparent at all levels of the process. Until officials at all levels in all provinces make the process truly transparent, the government will continue to be accused of election fixing. It would be unfortunate for the Moroccan election system to be judged by the actions of a few groups or individuals that appear to mismanage, misinterpret, or subvert their mandate. Increased diligence and transparency is needed, with government officials at all levels not only staying entirely neutral in the reporting process, but providing open access to observers and the press.

Civic Education

It is recommended that primary, middle, and high school as well as college curricula be expanded to include the full range of democratization theory and illustrations from many nations, as well as information on voting and political party campaign processes. Materials suitable for dissemination through the media could also be developed, such as a continuing series of civic education features on a full range of democratic topics.

The universities have a role to play by developing a curriculum on democracy that fits the Moroccan experience. That will take a unique perspective and one that only Moroccans will know how to implement. Just as in the American university experience, political science and public administration departments offer courses that teach students how to function in a democracy. Without university involvement, with reinforcement from political parties also engaged in this effort, no real progress will be made in moving Morocco towards open democracy.

A functioning democracy is based on an informed citizenry. Therefore, civic education efforts should not be limited to the formal education sector. Civic education programs can be implemented through literacy training programs, adult education initiatives, and other components of Morocco's informal education sector. Illiteracy is not a symptom of below-average intelligence--it is an indicator of a below-average access to information. Information on democratic principles and ideals should be made available to all Moroccans.

XVI. CONCLUSION

As stated in the introductory chapter of this report, the IFES mission in Morocco had the task of reporting its observations on three levels: that which was actually observed by the delegation members; evaluation based on those observations such that the general electoral process could be described; and analysis of the observations to arrive at conclusions about the meaning of these elections in the Moroccan context. The three levels are listed here in what is undoubtedly a declining order of reliability but an rising order of interest and importance. This final chapter will summarize the report's attempts at analysis and conclusions about the meaning of the events witnessed.

Elections themselves have meaning on many different levels. Most obvious is their effect as reflected in the results of the voting. Candidates and parties, in the days after an election, are pronounced as winners and losers. These results have some meaning in the make-up of the Moroccan parliament and in policy-making of the Moroccan government. The IFES report has little concern with the effect of the elections on this level.

The elections can also be viewed as an administrative and organizational task. Because IFES as an institution focuses on technical assistance in organizing elections, this is an aspect of interest to the IFES Morocco observer mission. The report has provided description and analysis of the successes and failures of the June 1993 elections on this level, and IFES has found these elections to have been generally successful in these terms.

On yet another level, these elections find a significance in Morocco's ongoing political life as a country, in the context of the past and of the envisioned future; in the context of current government rhetoric about political openness and democracy; and in the context of the democratic aspirations of the people of Morocco. For this report to have any significance, it is incumbent upon the IFES Morocco mission to make some provisional and tentative analysis on this level. IFES, however, is cognizant of the dangers of judgements in this area, because information gathered by the mission is incomplete and because any event can be given vastly different meanings depending on the perspective of the observer.

The question that readers of this report have a right to ask is "Which election did the IFES delegation observe--one that is corrupt, undemocratic and virtually meaningless, or one that is sufficiently democratic for the Moroccan context and exhibits the course toward a more open democracy that Morocco is on?" There is data gathered by the IFES delegation that support the former view, and equally valid data that support the latter. Similarly, there are individual members of the IFES delegation who have reached the former conclusion, and other members who have reached the latter.

In undertaking this observation mission, IFES accepted the implicit responsibility of weighing and evaluating the pieces of gathered evidence and the opinions of the individual delegation members in order to draw some comprehensive conclusions. The readers of this report, Moroccans, Americans, and others have the right to expect the accumulated evidence and opinions, and the 100+ pages of this report, to be summed up into conclusions that are valid, meaningful and useful.

This responsibility on the part of IFES, and this expectation on the part of the readers, exist despite the initial disclaimers made by IFES (and reiterated in Chapter 2 of this Report) that the delegation did not intend to comment on the overall freedom and fairness of the election process. This report will indeed not pass such a judgement, for IFES knows, along with other organizations experienced in the election observation field, that such a conclusion, based on a small delegation's brief experience in a country--as was the case in this instance--is neither valid, meaningful, nor useful.

It is possible from the perspective of some observers to see these elections in a favorable light, and to legitimately derive positive lessons from them for Morocco. The elections were generally peaceful and efficiently administered; there was relatively open debate among candidates and parties; a new parliament was elected that increased the representation of parties in opposition to the government; the parliament itself has been slightly strengthened by the new constitution. Morocco is thus starting on the right track, and the elections were a forward step in the country's gradual democratization.

A diametrically opposite opinion of the June elections can be derived from the "objective facts" of the period with equal legitimacy. From this perspective, the elections were beset with an unacceptably high level of fear, intimidation, corruption, and fraud; debate was excessively curtailed by law and custom; the administrative and judicial processes in place have insufficient checks and balances to prevent abuse

by individuals and parties in power; there is a high level of apathy and cynicism on the part of the electorate that is exacerbated rather than ameliorated by many of the events and practices surrounding the elections.

It is not an abrogation of IFES' responsibility as an external observer of these elections to avoid landing unambiguously in one or the of the above camps. The "truth" from IFES' perspective about these elections is more ambiguous. The meaning of these elections from IFES' point of view derives from the lessons that are drawn from them for the future. There are lessons to be drawn from the elections' positive and successful elements and from Morocco's relatively democratic aspect in the context of the region. The more valuable lessons, however, are to be drawn from the less positive elements. These lessons point to ways of improving the electoral process and democratic structures in Morocco which are undeniably imperfect, as they are in any country.

With a recognition of the fundamental arrogance of offering these brief conclusions to a sovereign government and people, but with the recognition of the necessity of providing some summative guidance to readers who have come this far in the report, the following concluding remarks are made:

- In the areas of technical organization and administration, particularly in regards to the accuracy of voters' rolls and the material preparation for voting on election day, the Moroccan elections proceeded smoothly, with few observed administrative and organizational problems that would prevent a voter from casting his/her ballot secretly and without undue hardship. The system for the provision of voting cards was cumbersome, offered an opportunity for fraudulent handling of the cards, and created suspicion among members of the Moroccan electorate.
- The level of political and civic education of the electorate was apparently enhanced by the increased use of the electronic media in the campaign and the wide range of opinions expressed in the print media. However, the impact of mass media on the illiterate population and the population living in hard to reach rural zones was not apparent.
- There was not an independent body responsible for the organization and the facilitation of the elections. The elections were administered through the Ministry of the Interior, calling into question the neutrality of the administrators of the process.
- Morocco's electoral law is composed of a series of official decrees and circulars that have yet to be compiled into one single document governing the administration of elections. The creation of one concise document will facilitate training of elections workers and the resolution of disputes.

- The utilization of the multiple ballot format offers the opportunity for vote buying and undue influencing of voters. Illiterate voters do not benefit from this system. The adoption of a single ballot will significantly diminish the potential for fraud, reduce the overall cost of the electoral process, and enhance the secrecy of the vote.
- More Moroccan women are registered to vote than men. The role of women in Morocco's electoral process and in the nation's political institutions does not correspond with this statistic. Women want to play a greater role in the process. The way must be cleared for them to do so.
- Moroccans' cynicism toward the electoral process and politics in general is apparent to even the most poorly-informed observer. To begin to reverse this trend, workable checks and balances are needed between the branches of government. The legislature must be accorded greater decision-making authority and be directly accountable to their constituencies.
- The overall reaction of the Moroccans to the presence of international observers was positive. However, the effect of international observers is constrained by some combination of limits on: supporting resources, the number of observers, the time allotted for the mission, linguistic capabilities, and knowledge of a nation's history. The impact of international observers can be complemented by the presence of domestic monitors. Civic organizations exist in Morocco that are capable of organizing and facilitating a domestic monitoring presence. The development of these groups will increase citizen participation in the electoral process, in turn increasing the confidence of the electorate in the elections.

Ultimately, the significance of these elections will be decided in Morocco over period of time. The IFES report is not intended to be, nor should it be considered to be, the last word. IFES hopes, however, that the report is a valid, meaningful and helpful contribution to the dialogue, both inside and outside of Morocco, on the events of the June 1993 elections and their meaning for Morocco's future directions.

APPENDIX A.



International Foundation for Electoral Systems

1620 I STREET, N.W. • SUITE 611 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 • (202) 828-8507 • FAX (202) 452-0804

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO
MOROCCAN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, JUNE 25, 1993

Biographical Sketches

Observers

Roland Amoussouga (Togo). Mr. Amoussouga, a lawyer, is an Associate at Curtis Lewis & Associates, an international consulting firm based in Washington, DC. With GERDDES-Africa, he has organized and facilitated seminars on the democractization process in francophone Africa. In 1992 he was a member of an international delegation which observed the presidential elections in Madagascar. He speaks fluent French.

John Entelis (U.S.). Dr. Entelis is Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Middle East Studies Program at Fordham University. He has written numerous books and articles about North Africa and the Middle East in general, and Morocco in particular. He speaks fluent French and some Arabic.

Rose Esber (U.S.). Ms. Esber is a currently employed by the International Finance Corporation at the World Bank, where she is engaged in financial evaluation of a number of IFC initiatives. She recently spent a year in Morocco for Catholic Relief Services. She holds a Master of International Economics and Development from The Johns Hopkins University. Ms. Esber speaks French and Arabic.

Mahassen Mara Hanna (U.S.). Ms. Hanna has most recently been a consultant for Management Systems International in Washington, DC, where she helped develop a proposal for a USAID Near East Democratic Initiatives project. She holds a Master of Public Administration & International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh and speaks fluent Arabic and French.

Rakia Humeidan (Yemen). Ms. Humeidan is an attorney who lives and works in Aden, Yemen. She served as a member of Yemen's Supreme Elections Committee (SEC), and as a member of SEC's Legal Committee, and as such was integrally involved in the administration of Yemen's legislative elections held on April 27, 1993. Ms. Humeidan speaks fluent English and Arabic.

Adeyinka Oyinlola (Nigeria). Mr. Oyinlola is Assistant Director of the International Division at Curtis Lewis & Associates, a consulting firm based in Washington, DC. He was a member of the IFES delegation which observed the Angolan presidential and legislative elections in September 1992. He is fluent in several languages, among them French.

BOARD OF	Charles T. Manatt	Patricia Hutar	James M. Cannon	Richard M. Scammon	Randal C. Teague
DIRECTORS	Chairman	Secretary	Jean-Pierre Kingsley	L. Ronald Scheman	Counsel
	David R. Jones	Joseph Napolitan	Peter McPherson	William R. Sweeney, Jr.	Richard W. Soudriette
	Vice Chairman	Treasurer	Sonia Picado S.		Director

mission in Uganda. She was the Director of the American Red Cross Centers in Morocco in 1959-60. She speaks French.

IFES Staff

Tom Bayer (U.S.). Mr. Bayer is IFES Program Officer for Africa and the Near East, and the project manager for IFES' observation mission in Morocco. He has served as IFES' Project Manager for a five month election assistance project in Mali, and has managed IFES projects in Madagascar and Guinea. He was also the project officer for IFES' 40-member observer delegation in Angola in September 1992. He speaks fluent French.

Gabriel Hütter (Germany). Mr. Hütter, an IFES Program Assistant, is a member of the logistical staff supporting this delegation. He has previously worked for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, where he helped organize a high-level international observer delegation to the 1990 general elections in Haiti. He speaks fluent French.

Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, 12 juin 1993.

Arrivée au Maroc de la délégation «The International Foundation For Electoral Systems» (IFES)

pour l'observation des élections du 25 juin 1993

Une délégation, composée de quatre membres, est arrivée au Maroc le 9 juin 1993 pour observer les préparatifs des élections législatives marocaines qui se dérouleront le 25 juin 1993. Cette délégation indépendante est parrainée par «The International Foundation For Electoral Systems» (IFES), (Fondation internationale pour les Systèmes électoraux). C'est une organisation non gouvernementale, a but non lucratif, basée à Washington (Etats-Unis) et spécialisée dans l'analyse, le soutien et le suivi des processus électoraux dans le monde entier.

Cette délégation comprend :

— Dr Henry Munson, professeur d'anthropologie à «University of Maine» aux Etats-Unis, auteur de nombreux ouvrages sur les questions socio-

politiques marocaines :

— Mme Hilary Whittaker, expert-conseil indépendant, conseiller de plusieurs campagnes électorales aux Etats-Unis et à l'étranger ;

— Dr Omar Kader, Américain d'origine palestinienne, politologue et ancien directeur exécutif du comité américano-arabe contre la discrimination ;

— Mme Christine Trigg, spécialiste des études arabes, ayant séjourné et travaillé dans plusieurs pays arabes notamment et récemment au Maroc.

Cette délégation venue au Maroc, avec la coopération du gouvernement marocain, sera soutenue par M. Tom Bayer, directeur de Programmes pour l'IFES. La délégation procédera à une évaluation du processus

électoral au Maroc et cristallisera son attention sur toute la période de campagne électorale, qui débutera le 12 juin.

Les membres de cette délégation auront, par ailleurs, des entretiens avec les hauts responsables du gouvernement marocain, chargés de l'organisation et de l'encadrement des élections ; avec les dirigeants des partis politiques ainsi qu'avec les candidats aux élections. Les observateurs s'entreprendront également avec des Marocains engagés dans la vie politique nationale. Pour mener à bien sa mission, après son séjour initial à Rabat, la délégation se rendra dans plusieurs villes du Royaume.

Dix autres observateurs se joindront aux précédents et arriveront à Rabat avant le 25 juin

pour suivre le déroulement des élections dans plusieurs bureaux électoraux à travers le Maroc.

Les résultats de ces observations seront récapitulés dans un rapport officiel, qui sera publié par l'IFES dans les semaines qui suivront les élections.

«The International Foundation For Electoral Systems» (IFES) a travaillé dans plus de 60 pays y compris la Russie, la Slovaquie, la Tunisie, le Honduras, le Pakistan et l'Angola.

Pour plus d'informations, les intéressés sont priés de contacter M. Tom Bayer, à l'hôtel Tour Hassan à Rabat ou bien Keith Klein à Washington (Washington, D.C.), téléphone : 202 828-8507 ou par Fax au 202 452 0804.



Rabat, June 28, 1993

MISSION SUMMARY

OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (IFES)

INTERNATIONAL MONITORING TEAM

ON THE ELECTIONS IN MOROCCO

JUNE 25, 1993

Following is a summary of the activities undertaken by the 15 member international delegation sponsored by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to observe the legislative elections in Morocco held June 25, 1993. This delegation was formed in response to an invitation of the Government of Morocco. Individual IFES delegates are nationals of Germany, Haiti, Nigeria, Togo, the United States, and Yemen. The United States Agency for International Development provided funding for this delegation to IFES, an independent non-partisan non-profit organization based in the United States.

The objectives of the IFES observation mission in Morocco were to demonstrate the interest and support of the international community in the democratic process in Morocco and, more importantly, to gather information for inclusion in an election assessment report. The purpose of this report is to collect the observations made by the IFES team and to make recommendations for possible improvement of the electoral process in Morocco. The report will be addressed to the government and people of Morocco as well as to the international community.

To prepare for the mission, a group of four campaign monitors and an IFES staff person arrived in Rabat on June 8, 1993. This team met with Moroccans, both those in leadership roles and ordinary citizens, travelling around the country to

BOARD OF DIRECTORS	Charles T. Manatt Chairman	Patricia Hutar Secretary	James M. Cannon Jean-Pierre Kingsley	Richard M. Scammon L. Ronald Scheman	Randal C. Teague Counsel
	David R. Jones Vice Chairman	Joseph Napolitan Treasurer	Peter McPherson Sonia Picado S.	William R. Sweeney, Jr.	Richard W. Soudriette Director

APPENDIX B.

ADMINISTRATIVE and ELECTORAL ORGANIGRAMME

Geographic Divisions		Leadership Hierarchy	
Economic Zones (7)		King Hassan II	
Government		<i>Appointed Leaders</i>	
<i>Internal Administration</i>		Prime Minister Cabinet Ministers	
Wilaya		Walis	
<i>Urban</i> Prefecture	<i>Rural</i> Province	<i>Urban</i> Prefets Pasha Khalifa Muqaddam	<i>Rural</i> Governors Supercaid or Chef de Cercle Caid Khalifa Shiekh
Circumscription Arrondissement	District Cirde Caldat		
<i>Election Offices</i>		<i>Elected Leaders</i>	
National Election Commission		Parliment (333 Members)	
120 Provincial Election Commissions		222 by Direct Election 111 by Indirect Election	
Approx. 8,000 Centralizing Stations		Provincial Councils	
50,000 Polling Stations -- 6 members each		<i>(60 -- 11 to 39 members in each. Elected by the Municipal Councils)</i>	
		Municipal Councils	
		<i>(1544 Total -- 247 urban and 1297 rural. Members elected in September 1992.)</i>	
		Circonscriptions	
		<i>(22,282 -- Between 11 and 41 cirscs. per Municipality based on population.)</i>	

APPENDIX C.

Les nouveaux pouvoirs du Parlement dans la constitution de 1992

Le premier nouveau pouvoir qu'accorde la constitution de 1992 au Parlement, c'est celui de sanctionner le gouvernement dès son investiture. La pratique du vote d'investiture n'existait pas auparavant. Elle a été introduite par l'article 59 qui énonce ce qui suit.

ARTICLE 59 - Le Gouvernement est responsable devant le Roi et devant la Chambre des Représentants. Après la nomination des membres du Gouvernement par le Roi, le Premier Ministre se présente devant la Chambre des Représentants et expose le programme qu'il compte appliquer. Ce programme doit dégager les lignes directrices de l'action que le Gouvernement se propose de mener dans les divers secteurs de l'activité nationale et notamment, dans les domaines intéressant la politique économique, sociale, culturelle et extérieure.

Ce programme fait l'objet d'un débat suivi d'un vote dans les conditions et avec les effets prévus par l'article 74.

ARTICLE 74 - Le Premier Ministre peut engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement devant la Chambre des Représentants, sur une déclaration de politique générale ou sur le vote d'un texte.

La confiance ne peut être refusée ou le texte rejeté qu'à la majorité absolue des membres composant la Chambre des Représentants. Le vote ne peut intervenir que trois jours francs après que la question de confiance ait été posée.

Le refus de la confiance entraîne la démission collective du Gouvernement.

Le Parlement peut désormais exiger du gouvernement une réponse à ses questions dans un délai de vingt jours selon le dernier alinéa de l'article 55

ARTICLE 55 - L'ordre du jour de la Chambre des Représentants est établi par son bureau. Il comporte, par priorité, et dans l'ordre que le gouvernement a fixé, la discussion des projets de loi déposés par le Gouvernement et des propositions de loi acceptées par lui. Une séance par semaine est réservée, par priorité, aux questions des membres de la Chambre des Représentants et aux réponses du Gouvernement. La réponse du Gouvernement doit être donnée dans les vingt jours suivant la date à laquelle le Gouvernement a été saisi de la question.

Innovation de l'article 26: Après son adoption par le Parlement, la loi est promulguée par le Roi dans un délai de 30 jours.

ARTICLE 26 - Le Roi promulgue la loi dans les 30 jours qui suivent la transmission au Gouvernement de la Loi définitivement adoptée.

Le contrôle parlementaire a été renforcé par la possibilité pour la Chambre des Représentants de créer des commissions d'enquêtes, conformément à l'article 40.

ARTICLE 40 - Les ministres ont accès à la Chambre des Représentants et à ses commissions; ils peuvent se faire assister de commissaires désignés par eux. Outre les commissions permanentes mentionnées à l'alinéa précédent, peuvent être créées, à l'initiative du Roi ou à la demande de la majorité de la Chambre des Représentants, au sein de la Chambre des Représentants, des commissions d'enquêtes formées pour recueillir des éléments d'information sur des faits déterminés et soumettre leurs conclusions à la Chambre des Représentants. Il ne peut être créé de commissions d'enquêtes lorsque les faits ont donné lieu à des poursuites judiciaires et aussi longtemps que ces poursuites sont en cours. Si une commission a déjà été créée, sa mission prend fin dès l'ouverture d'une information judiciaire relative aux faits qui ont motivé sa création.

Les commissions d'enquêtes ont un caractère temporaire. Leur mission prend fin par le dépôt de leur rapport.

Une loi organique fixera les modalités de fonctionnement de ces commissions.

APPENDIX D.



ROYAUME DU MAROC
MINISTÈRE DE L'INTÉRIEUR
CABINET

RABAT, LE 15 JUIN 1993

8500/SP

LE MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR ET DE
L'INFORMATION

A

MM. LES WALIS ET GOUVERNEURS DE RABAT-SALÉ - CASABLANCA
MARRAKECH - FES - MEKNÈS - OUJDA - TETOUAN -
KENITRA - SIDI KACEM - CHEFCHAOUEN - ERRACHIDIA -
FIGUIG - IFRANE - EL ISMAÏLIA - EL HAJEB -
KHÉNIFRA - TIZNIT - AGADIR - TAROUDANT - ESSAOUIRA -
SAFI - KELAÂ - KHÉHISSET - TEMARA - OUARZAZATE -
BENSLIMANE - BENI-MELLAL - KHOURIBGA - LARACHE - SALE.

HONNEUR VOUS FAIRE SAVOIR QU'UNE DELEGATION
AMERICAINE REPRESENTANT L'IFES - FONDATION INTERNATIONALE
POUR L'ETUDE DES SYSTEMES ELECTORAUX - EST EN VISITE AU
MAROC SUR INVITATION DU GOUVERNEMENT DE SA MAJESTE LE ROI.

DES MEMBRES DE CETTE DELEGATION VISITERONT VOS
PREFECTURES ET PROVINCES RESPECTIVES EN VUE DE S'INFORMER
SUR LE DEROULEMENT DE L'ENSEMBLE DES OPERATIONS ELECTORALES.

VOUS DEMANDE BIEN VOULOIR LEUR RESERVER BON ACCUEIL
ET LEUR FACILITER L'ACCOMPLISSEMENT DE LEUR MISSION.

COPIE DE LA PRESENTE NOTE EST REMISE A CHAQUE
MEMBRE DE LA DELEGATION POUR ETRE PRESENTEE A L'AUTORITE
ADMINISTRATIVE DU COMMANDEMENT A VISITER.

CI-JOINT LISTE NOMINATIVE DES MEMBRE DE LA
DELEGATION.



P. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur et P. O.
Le Gouverneur détaché au Service Central

Signé : BENHACHEM Haïd

APPENDIX E.

رقم الناظرة الانتخابية

مقر مكتب التصويت

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الناخب

السلطة المحلية

العساة أو الإقليم :

الجماعة :

الإسم العائلي :

الإسم الشخصي :

محل وتاريخ الأزدباد :

البطاقة الوطنية

أو التعريف الشخصي


أو الحالة المدنية

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APPENDIX F.

Libération, 23 juin 1993: p.1.

Casa - Aïn Chock

Un agent de l'autorité demande la protection de l'USFP

Le moukadem du 25ème arrondissement, Mohamed El Khadari, s'est réfugié mardi matin au local de l'USFP. Cet agent de l'autorité a souhaité se mettre «sous la protection de l'USFP» car estime-t-il «il serait menacé par le caïd de l'arrondissement California».

D'après les déclarations de M. Khadari, ce caïd aurait réuni, lundi à 9h30, les chioukhs et les moukadems de Aïn-Chock pour leur ordonner de faire campagne au profit du candidat de l'UC, El Aroui (président de la commune de Aïn-Chock).

Le caïd Cherkaoui Miloud, c'est son nom, aurait par ailleurs menacé de prison tout agent qui ne se soumettrait pas à ses ordres électoraux! M. Khadari aurait alors refusé de faire pression sur les citoyens et d'intervenir illégalement dans la campagne.

M. Khadari a affirmé aux responsables locaux de l'USFP qu'il serait prêt à consigner par écrit la totalité de ces faits. Il s'est déclaré disposé à rencontrer le ministre de l'Intérieur pour lui relater les détails de cette affaire.

Le candidat de l'Union, le camarade Mustapha Kanane a saisi la commission provinciale de contrôle et lui a indiqué que le caïd Charkaoui serait responsable de toute mesure de rétorsion à l'encontre de M. Khadari qui a courageusement refusé de cautionner l'illégalité.

Selon M. Khadari le caïd Cherkaoui lui aurait ordonné de faire venir Mme Fatima Bent Kharbouch de Bouskoura pour l'utiliser comme moyen de pression à l'égard des habitants de Douar Kharbouch.

Mme Kharbouch étant propriétaire des terres de ce douar!!

(الأخ العراقي)

أنا الموقع أسفله السيد مقدم بالدارة ٤٤ بمقاه
 ٣٢ كالمبغوريا السيد فخار محمد بن عبد الله السائني بابو ملو
 يدوار اولاد بن آدم الحامل للبطاقة الوضعية رقم ٢١٣١٣
 أشهد آت قائد المقاهر أعلاه السيد السرفاوي
 ميلود قاع بضغق على يقين بعيلة لقائه
 السيد المرشح العربي لسعيه وقد هددني بالسيد
 إن لم أفعل ذلك .

ويوم الاثنين ٤١ . ٥٦ . ٩٣ على الساعة التاسعة صباحاً
 قاع القائد السرفاوي ميلود يجمع جميع المقدمين
 وأمرهم بالقياح يجمعين بنا لود المرشح السنوري .

ويوم الجمعة ٤٤ . ٥٦ . ٩٣ أمرني القائد بأن أحمله
 نسمة السيد فاطمة بنت خريوش حامية دوار غروي .

APPENDIX G.

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	<i>Skhirate-Temara (3)</i>	Skhirate-Temara (1)	63,169	42,778	67.72	6,434	15.04	36,344
		Nahda (2)	24,934	20,023	80.30	1,716	8.57	18,307
		Total	88,103	62,801	71.28	8,150	12.98	54,651
	<i>Chefchaouen (31)</i>	Chefchaouen (1)	60,360	35,371	58.60	3,373	9.54	31,998
		Ghamara (2)	61,382	30,662	49.95	2,096	6.84	28,566
		Moghrissat (3)	41,215	27,776	67.39	962	3.46	26,814
		Total	162,957	93,809	57.57	6,431	6.86	87,378
	<i>Kenitra (40)</i>	Kenitra el Gharbia (1)	66,775	44,818	67.12	8,768	19.56	36,050
		Kenitra Echerkiya (2)	67,382	49,547	73.53	9,081	18.33	40,466
		El Amrya (3)	65,068	48,124	73.96	1,824	3.79	46,300
		Sidi Slimane-Kceibya (4)	43,306	32,690	75.49	4,332	13.25	28,358
		Bni Hsaine (5)	42,851	34,252	79.93	2,524	7.37	31,728
		Souk el Arbaa el Gharb (6)	44,583	32,071	71.94	2,884	8.99	29,187
		Moulay Bouselham (7)	55,517	38,543	69.43	1,542	4.00	37,001
		Total	385,482	280,045	72.65	30,955	11.05	249,090
	<i>Khemisset (41)</i>	Khemisset (1)	67,839	46,400	68.40	3,815	8.22	42,585
		Tiflet (2)	62,865	49,869	79.33	736	1.48	49,133
		Oulmes (3)	60,108	40,058	66.64	2,657	6.63	37,401
		Rommani (4)	50,887	28,295	55.60	1,330	4.70	26,965
		Total	241,699	164,622	68.11	8,538	5.19	156,084
	<i>Larache (45)</i>	Larache (1)	56,223	37,283	66.31	3,200	8.58	34,083
		Ksar-el Kebir (2)	57,838	41,393	71.57	3,051	7.37	38,342
		Bni Arouss (3)	49,843	33,368	66.95	1,542	4.62	31,826
		Total	163,904	112,044	68.36	7,793	6.96	104,251
	<i>Sidi Kacem (52)</i>	Sidi Kacem (1)	63,082	38,151	60.48	3,534	9.26	34,617
		Mechra Bel Ksiri (52)	56,115	41,670	74.26	3,420	8.21	38,250
		Had Kourt (3)	50,861	35,056	68.93	2,744	7.83	32,312
		Ouazzane (4)	49,401	33,340	67.49	3,215	9.64	30,125
		Teroual (5)	47,599	34,201	71.85	1,755	5.13	32,446
		Total	267,058	182,418	68.31	14,668	8.04	167,750

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
Eastern	Figuig (37)	Figuig (1)	28,722	21,756	75.75	1,144	5.26	20,612
		Bni-Tadjite (2)	24,671	17,503	70.95	1,441	8.23	16,062
		Total	53,393	39,259	73.53	2,585	6.58	36,674
	Nador (46)	Nador (1)	59,445	26,654	44.84	2,660	9.98	23,994
		Zeghangane (2)	55,851	29,593	52.99	1,539	5.20	28,054
		Al Aaroui (3)	32,748	16,210	49.50	750	4.63	15,460
		Zaio (4)	42,303	24,933	58.94	900	3.61	24,033
		Driouch (5)	43,789	21,054	48.08	884	4.20	20,170
		Midar (6)	67,969	27,876	41.01	918	3.29	26,958
		Total	302,105	146,320	48.43	7,651	5.23	138,669
	Oujda (48)	Oujda Centre (1)	64,102	36,212	56.49	11,059	30.54	25,153
		Oujda Nord (2)	61,214	32,837	53.64	6,142	18.70	26,695
		Oujda Ouest (3)	71,965	30,882	42.91	5,796	18.77	25,086
		Jerada (4)	57,258	33,230	58.04	2,905	8.74	30,325
		Taourirt (5)	77,518	30,241	39.01	4,184	13.84	26,057
		Berkane (6)	62,851	29,282	46.59	2,213	7.56	27,069
		Ahfir (7)	56,156	27,324	48.66	2,726	9.98	24,598
		Total	451,064	220,008	48.78	35,025	15.92	184,983
	TOTAL--EASTERN REGION			806,562	405,587	50.29	45,261	11.16
Northwest	Rabat (1)	Hassan (1)	44,060	27,311	61.99	6,353	23.26	20,958
		Hassan-Agdal (2)	47,275	27,054	57.23	6,148	22.72	20,906
		Yacoub el Mansour-1 (3)	40,946	26,120	63.79	5,816	22.27	20,304
		Yacoub el Mansour-2 (4)	52,764	33,737	63.94	8,000	23.71	25,737
		El Yousseoufia (5)	47,002	32,544	69.24	6,815	20.94	25,729
		El Yousseoufia-Riyad (6)	47,823	32,816	68.62	5,128	15.63	27,688
		Total	279,870	179,582	64.17	38,260	21.31	141,322
	Sale (2)	Layayda (1)	41,812	27,619	66.06	2,643	9.57	24,976
		Lamrissa (2)	52,290	32,641	62.42	7,924	24.28	24,717
		Tabriket (3)	86,582	43,030	49.70	7,776	18.07	35,254
		Bettana Hssaine (4)	67,434	38,828	57.58	6,006	15.47	32,822
Total	248,118	142,118	57.28	24,349	17.13	117,769		

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	<i>Tangier (53)</i>	Tangier (1)	64,001	45,674	71.36	22,602	49.49	23,072
		Charf (2)	85,553	37,584	43.93	13,860	36.88	23,724
		Bni Makada (3)	43,777	32,448	74.12	14,491	44.66	17,957
		Fahs (4)	22,573	12,318	54.57	2,015	16.36	10,303
		Assilah (5)	32,392	23,087	71.27	1,994	8.64	21,093
		Total	248,296	151,111	60.86	54,962	36.37	96,149
	<i>Tetouan (59)</i>	Sidi Al Mandri (1)	60,797	32,318	53.16	3,848	11.91	28,470
		Al Azhar (2)	60,161	29,989	49.85	5,221	17.41	24,768
		Jebala (3)	67,603	36,037	53.31	3,389	9.40	32,648
		Ahouaz - Tetouan (4)	44,032	24,729	56.16	1,317	5.33	23,412
		Total	232,593	123,073	52.91	13,775	11.19	109,298
		TOTAL -- NORTHWEST REGION	2,318,080	1,491,623	64.35	207,881	13.94	1,283,742
<i>Middle South</i>	<i>Meknes-el-Menzeh (20)</i>	Menzeh-Hamria (1)	71,308	41,185	57.76	9,595	23.30	31,590
		Menzeh-Zerhoune (2)	58,540	39,770	67.94	4,338	10.91	35,432
		Total	129,848	80,955	62.35	13,933	17.21	67,022
	<i>Al-Ismailia (21)</i>	Al Ismailia (1)	55,295	33,256	60.14	9,882	29.71	23,374
		Azzaytoun (2)	57,331	33,433	58.32	10,294	30.79	23,139
		Guerrouane (3)	37,365	24,582	65.79	4,865	19.79	19,717
		Total	149,991	91,271	60.85	25,041	27.44	66,230
	<i>El-Hajeb (22)</i>	Ain Taoujdate (1)	40,512	30,932	76.35	1,615	5.22	29,317
		El-Hajeb-Agourai (2)	40,021	30,941	77.31	3,613	11.68	27,328
		Total	80,533	61,873	76.83	5,228	8.45	56,645
	<i>Errachidia (34)</i>	Er-Rich-Imilchil (1)	37,133	25,507	68.69	3,219	12.62	22,288
		Errichidia (2)	48,799	35,889	73.54	5,734	15.98	30,155
		Arloud (3)	38,166	32,792	85.92	2,842	8.67	29,950
		Er-Rissani (4)	29,363	19,706	67.11	2,059	10.45	17,647
		Goulmima-Assoul (5)	46,086	35,376	76.76	1,532	4.33	33,844
		Total	199,547	149,270	74.80	15,386	10.31	133,884

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Partici- pation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	Ifrane (39)	Ifrane (1)	60,515	43,159	71.32	5,079	11.77	38,080
		Total	60,515	43,159	71.32	5,079	11.77	38,080
	Khenifra (42)	Mrit - Moha ou Hammou Zaya (1)	49,947	35,733	71.54	1,853	5.19	33,880
		Khenifra - Moulay Bouazza (2)	67,996	48,735	71.67	3,544	7.27	45,191
		Boumia - el Kbab (3)	44,844	35,002	78.05	2,328	6.65	32,674
		Midelt - Tounifite (4)	49,165	37,106	75.47	4,245	11.44	32,861
		Total	211,952	156,576	73.87	11,970	7.64	144,606
		TOTAL -- MIDDLE SOUTH REGION	832,386	583,104	70.05	76,637	13.14	506,467
<i>Middle North</i>	Fes - el - Jadid - Dar Dbibagh (11)	Mechour Fes al Jadid (1)	54,573	30,186	55.31	6,303	20.88	23,883
		Saiss (2)	56,131	30,495	54.33	5,863	19.23	24,632
		Total	110,704	60,681	54.81	12,166	20.05	48,515
	Fes - Medina (12)	Al Batha (1)	48,546	29,212	60.17	6,122	20.96	23,090
		Bab Lkhokha (2)	68,932	37,216	53.99	7,636	20.52	29,580
		Total	117,478	66,428	56.55	13,758	20.71	52,670
	Zouaga - Moulay - Yacoub (1)	El Mariniyene (1)	53,476	33,381	62.42	7,881	23.61	25,500
		Zouagha (2)	40,870	26,522	64.89	5,543	20.90	20,979
		Moulay Yacoub (3)	51,588	34,531	66.94	2,153	6.23	32,378
		Total	145,934	94,434	64.71	15,577	16.50	78,857
	Sefrou (14)	Sefrou (1)	66,359	43,695	65.85	7,391	16.91	36,304
		El Menzel (2)	47,037	28,976	61.60	1,942	6.70	27,034
		Total	113,396	72,671	64.09	9,333	12.84	63,338
	Al Hocema (24)	Al Hocema (1)	57,064	26,605	46.62	2,783	10.46	23,822
		Bni Boufra - Bni Ouriaghel (2)	36,279	18,161	50.06	703.00	3.87	17,458
		Targuist (3)	48,190	29,755	61.75	1,663	5.59	28,092
		Total	141,533	74,521	52.65	5,149	6.91	69,372

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	<i>Boulemane (30)</i>	Boulemane (1)	30,287	21,404	70.67	2,144	10.02	19,260
		Outat el Haj (2)	43,076	27,740	64.40	1,483	5.35	26,257
		Total	73,363	49,144	66.99	3,627	7.38	45,517
	<i>Taounate (55)</i>	Karia (1)	56,612	32,646	57.67	1,263	3.87	31,383
		Rhafsai (2)	55,004	28,786	52.33	1,810	6.29	26,976
		Thar Es-Souk (3)	53,532	37,218	69.52	1,346	3.62	35,872
		Tissa (4)	59,798	23,076	38.59	1,286	5.57	21,790
		Taounate (5)	52,991	33,138	62.54	1,305	3.94	31,833
		Total	277,937	154,864	55.72	7,010	4.53	147,854
	<i>Taza (58)</i>	Taza (1)	67,305	43,859	65.16	4,924	11.23	38,935
		Ghiata el Gharbia (2)	45,648	26,189	57.37	1,176	4.49	25,013
		Tahla (3)	37,594	29,159	77.56	1,531	5.25	27,628
		Tainaste (4)	47,993	24,307	50.65	1,607	6.61	22,700
		Aknoul (5)	39,644	26,067	65.75	1,910	7.33	24,157
		Guercif (6)	61,512	37,381	60.77	1,728	4.62	35,653
		Total	299,696	186,962	62.38	12,876	6.89	174,086
		TOTAL -- MIDDLE NORTH REGION	1,280,041	759,705	59.35	79,496	10.46	680,209
<i>Tensift</i>	<i>Merrakech-Menara (15)</i>	Gueliz-Kasba (1)	64,114	36,191	56.45	10,212	28.22	25,979
		Menara (2)	64,190	34,210	53.29	9,323	27.25	24,887
		Saada-Loudaya (3)	47,684	34,260	71.85	2,631	7.68	31,629
		Total	175,988	104,661	59.47	22,166	21.18	82,495
	<i>Marrakech-Medina (16)</i>	Abbassia (1)	46,632	27,684	59.37	7,861	28.40	19,823
		Al Bahia (2)	52,931	29,099	54.98	10,568	36.32	18,531
		Total	99,563	56,783	57.03	18,429	32.46	38,354
	<i>Sidi Youssef Ben Ali (17)</i>	Sidi Youssef Ben Ali (1)	52,298	33,292	63.66	8,578	25.77	24,714
		Bour (2)	54,236	30,888	56.95	3,944	12.77	26,944
		Total	106,534	64,180	60.24	12,522	19.51	51,658

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	<i>Chichaoua (18)</i>	Chichaoua (1)	43,850	20,528	46.81	1,760	8.57	18,768
		Imintanoute (2)	71,654	37,461	52.28	1,768	4.72	35,693
		Mejjat (3)	43,956	27,433	62.41	1,140	4.16	26,293
		Total	159,460	85,422	53.57	4,668	5.46	80,754
	<i>Al Haouz (19)</i>	Ait-Ouir-1 (1)	55,343	32,946	59.53	1,301	3.95	31,645
		Air Ourir-2 (2)	44,233	27,694	62.61	690	2.49	27,004
		Tahannaout (3)	47,848	32,380	67.67	2,138	6.60	30,242
		Amizmiz (4)	43,943	33,418	76.05	1,598	4.78	31,820
		Total	191,367	126,438	66.07	5,727	4.53	120,711
	<i>El Kelaa des Sraghna (33)</i>	Kalaat Sraghna (1)	90,453	59,317	65.58	4,509	7.60	54,808
		Laattaouia (2)	74,436	29,052	39.03	2,496	8.59	26,556
		Rhamna (3)	88,233	58,781	66.62	4,062	6.91	54,719
		Sidi Bou Othmane (4)	47,948	28,862	60.19	1,299	4.50	27,563
		Tameflalt (5)	41,682	23,571	56.55	1,044	4.43	22,527
		Total	342,752	199,583	58.23	13,410	6.72	186,173
	<i>Essaouira (35)</i>	Essaouira (1)	57,492	30,632	53.28	4,406	14.38	26,226
		Talmest (2)	57,264	24,039	41.98	2,836	11.80	21,203
		Ait Daoud (3)	23,777	16,793	70.63	931	5.54	15,862
		Tamanar (4)	49,756	27,164	54.59	1,768	6.51	25,396
		Total	188,289	98,628	52.38	9,941	10.08	88,687
	<i>Sali (50)</i>	Asfi-Biyada (1)	58,464	31,714	54.25	4,849	15.29	26,865
		Asfi-Boudhebb (2)	64,479	34,438	53.41	6,409	18.61	28,029
		Asfi-Zaouia (3)	79,286	45,706	57.65	6,870	15.03	38,836
		Abda (4)	59,641	31,286	52.46	1,670	5.34	29,616
		Youssoufia (5)	46,789	27,549	58.88	3,807	13.82	23,742
		Ahmer (6)	52,326	30,461	58.21	1,851	6.08	28,610
		Total	360,985	201,154	55.72	25,456	12.65	175,698
		TOTAL--TENSIFT REGION	1,624,938	936,849	57.65	112,319	11.99	824,530

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED	
South	Agadir (23)	Agadir (1)	66,693	46,081	69.09	8,980	19.49	37,101	
		Inezgane-Ait Melloul (2)	61,197	45,454	74.27	8,519	18.74	36,935	
		Anza-Nord (3)	58,962	43,334	73.49	3,489	8.05	39,845	
		Chtouka-Massa (4)	60,169	47,120	78.31	3,124	6.63	43,996	
		Biougra (5)	52,275	39,155	74.90	3,072	7.85	36,083	
		Dcheira (6)	51,766	37,847	73.11	4,241	11.21	33,606	
			Total	351,062	258,991	73.77	31,425	12.13	227,566
		Assa-Zag (25)	Assa-Zag (1)	8,397	5,939	70.73	276	4.65	5,663
			Total	8,397	5,939	70.73	276	4.65	5,663
		Boujdour (29)	Boujdour (1)	10,982	8,293	75.51	767	9.25	7,526
			Total	10,982	8,293	75.51	767	9.25	7,526
		Es-Semara (36)	Es-Semara (1)	19,318	16,604	85.95	165	0.99	16,439
			Total	19,318	16,604	85.95	165	0.99	16,439
		Guelmini (38)	Guelmini (1)	31,496	21,975	69.77	1,232	5.61	20,743
			Bouizakarne (2)	20,838	16,700	80.14	1,191	7.13	15,509
			Total	52,334	38,675	73.90	2,423	6.27	36,252
		Laayoune (44)	Laayoune (1)	74,007	58,002	78.37	3,250	5.60	54,752
			Daoura (2)	3,997	3,072	76.86	266	8.66	2,806
			Total	78,004	61,074	78.30	3,516	5.76	57,558
		Ourazazate (47)	Ouarzazate (1)	69,650	36,082	51.80	3,343	9.27	32,739
			Amerzgane (2)	60,082	36,286	60.39	1,341	3.70	34,945
			Boumalne Dades (3)	59,382	30,938	52.10	1,551	5.01	29,387
			Tanghir (4)	48,913	22,827	46.67	1,381	6.05	21,446
			Agdz (5)	69,024	32,963	47.76	1,480	4.49	31,483
			Zagora (6)	71,844	33,547	46.69	2,041	6.08	31,506
			Total	378,895	192,643	50.84	11,137	5.78	181,506

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	<i>Oued Ed Dahab (49)</i>	Dakhla (1)	14,164	9,943	70.20	769	7.73	9,174
		Lagouira (2)	5,216	4,689	89.90	98	2.09	4,591
		Total	19,380	14,632	75.50	867	5.93	13,765
	<i>Tan-Tan (54)</i>	Tan-Tan (1)	22,711	16,451	72.44	3,045	18.51	13,406
		Total	22,711	16,451	72.44	3,045	18.51	13,406
	<i>Taroudannt (56)</i>	Oulad Teima (1)	53,139	41,273	77.67	3,259	7.90	38,014
		Taroudannt (2)	64,568	41,275	63.92	3,644	8.83	37,631
		Igoudar-Aoulouz (3)	46,034	33,399	72.55	2,276	6.81	31,123
		Taliouine (4)	52,020	35,407	68.06	1,088	3.07	34,319
		Irhem (5)	54,976	28,218	51.33	2,499	8.86	25,719
		Argana-Freija (6)	49,797	35,804	71.90	2,981	8.33	32,823
		Total	320,534	215,376	67.19	15,747	7.31	199,629
	<i>Tata (57)</i>	Tata (1)	54,132	36,280	67.02	2,310	6.37	33,970
		Total	54,132	36,280	67.02	2,310	6.37	33,970
	<i>Tiznit (60)</i>	Tiznit (1)	52,305	38,797	74.17	2,988	7.70	35,809
		Tafraout (2)	39,533	25,675	64.95	2,254	8.78	23,421
		Sidi Ifni (3)	54,593	40,271	73.77	2,253	5.59	38,018
		Total	146,431	104,743	71.53	7,495	7.16	97,248
		TOTAL--SOUTH REGION	1,462,180	969,701	66.32	79,173	8.16	890,528
<i>Center</i>	<i>Casablanca Anfa (4)</i>	El Borj (1)	48,420	32,112	66.32	3,133	9.76	28,979
		Medina (2)	39,595	22,851	57.71	5,493	24.04	17,358
		Moulay Youssef (3)	44,428	32,168	72.40	9,943	30.91	22,225
		Anfa (4)	42,623	29,713	69.71	6,417	21.60	23,296
		El Maarif (5)	40,057	26,401	65.91	6,102	23.11	20,299
		El Ouaha (6)	42,687	28,919	67.75	6,777	23.43	22,142
		Total	257,810	172,164	66.78	37,865	21.99	134,299


REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	<i>Al Fida Derb Sultan (5)</i>	Al Idrissia (1)	54,828	35,178	64.16	10,637	30.24	24,541
		Al Fida (2)	61,157	39,161	64.03	11,934	30.47	27,227
		Al Ahbess (3)	49,122	32,000	65.14	8,392	26.23	23,608
		Al Mohammadi Derb Sultan (4)	49,773	31,721	63.73	8,548	26.95	23,173
		Total	214,880	138,060	64.25	39,511	28.62	98,549
	<i>Ain Sebaa Hay Mohammedi</i>	Sidi Mouden (1)	40,063	27,201	67.90	7,555	27.77	19,646
		Ain Sebaa (2)	56,812	37,594	66.17	11,887	31.62	25,707
		Hay Mohammadi	47,625	31,218	65.55	7,183	23.01	24,035
		Derb Moulay Chrif (4)	39,176	24,612	62.82	6,440	26.17	18,172
		Assoukhour Assawda (5)	47,796	28,529	59.69	7,432	26.05	21,097
		Total	231,472	149,154	64.44	40,497	27.15	108,657
	<i>Ain Chock Hay Hassani (7)</i>	Ain Chock (1)	81,006	49,822	61.50	12,876	25.84	36,946
		Hay Hassani (2)	88,638	58,287	65.76	7,965	13.67	50,322
		Sidi Maarouf Lissasfa (3)	56,454	42,944	76.07	5,678	13.22	37,266
		Total	226,098	151,053	66.81	26,519	17.56	124,534
	<i>Sidi Bernoussi Zenata (8)</i>	Sidi Bernoussi (1)	69,293	44,034	63.55	8,372	19.01	35,662
		Zenata Tit-Mellil (2)	43,367	34,361	79.23	4,886	14.22	29,475
		Total	112,660	78,395	69.59	13,258	16.91	65,137
	<i>Ben Bsick Sidi-Othmane (9)</i>	Dar Lkhlifa Ahmed (1)	49,237	34,120	69.30	11,838	34.70	22,282
		Mabrouka (2)	64,790	41,663	64.30	10,731	25.76	30,932
		Sidi Othmane (3)	54,696	39,050	71.39	9,922	25.41	29,128
		Kariat el Jamaa (4)	49,827	31,778	63.78	9,417	29.63	22,361
		Moulay Rachid (5)	46,499	33,573	72.20	11,161	33.24	22,412
		Sbata-Mediouna (6)	61,064	41,503	67.97	9,505	22.90	31,998
		Total	326,113	221,687	67.98	62,574	28.23	159,113
	<i>Mohammedia (10)</i>	Mohammedia (1)	77,839	51,144	65.70	10,379	20.29	40,765
		Total	77,839	51,144	65.70	10,379	20.29	40,765

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Participation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
	<i>Azilal (26)</i>	Azilal (1)	50,623	30,615	60.48	2,105	6.88	28,510
		Bzou (2)	50,698	28,483	56.18	1,674	5.88	26,809
		Demnate (3)	47,693	27,986	58.68	1,495	5.34	26,491
		Ouaouizeght (4)	47,764	29,933	62.67	1,488	4.97	28,445
		Total	196,778	117,017	59.47	6,762	5.78	110,255
	<i>Beni Mellal (27)</i>	Beni Mellal (1)	60,722	34,606	56.99	11,446	33.08	23,160
		Kasba Tadla (2)	51,275	33,711	65.75	3,355	9.95	30,356
		El Ksiba (3)	60,278	37,401	62.05	4,212	11.26	33,189
		Fquih Ben Salah (4)	60,467	35,982	59.51	2,984	8.29	32,998
		Souk Sebt Oulaed Nemma (5)	38,324	24,255	63.29	1,212	5.00	23,043
		Bni Moussa - oulad Ayad (6)	42,695	27,279	63.89	878	3.22	26,401
		Bradia - Sidi Aissa (7)	51,676	35,035	67.80	2,064	5.89	32,971
		Total	365,437	228,269	62.46	26,151	11.46	202,118
	<i>Benslimane (28)</i>	Benslimane (1)	48,392	36,292	75.00	4,038	11.13	32,254
		Bouznika (2)	46,281	38,765	83.76	1,114	2.87	37,651
		Total	94,673	75,057	79.28	5,152	6.86	69,905
	<i>El Jadida (32)</i>	Azemmour (1)	51,006	33,405	65.49	3,033	9.08	30,372
		El Jadida - 1 (2)	53,840	34,826	64.68	3,976	11.42	30,850
		El Jadida - 2 (3)	36,273	21,393	58.98	2,030	9.49	19,363
		Loualidia (4)	38,909	26,491	68.08	1,599	6.04	24,892
		Zmamra (5)	48,477	33,421	68.94	2,034	6.09	31,387
		Sidi Smail (6)	54,464	31,318	57.50	1,424	4.55	29,894
		Sidi Bennour - 1 (7)	49,213	34,775	70.66	1,979	5.69	32,796
		Sidi Bennour - 2 (8)	34,977	24,030	68.70	1,309	5.45	22,721
		Total	367,159	239,659	65.27	17,384	7.25	222,275

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	REGISTERED	VOTED	Partici- pation %	Null	Null %	VOTES COUNTED
		<i>REGIONAL TOTALS</i>						
		<i>EASTERN</i>	806,562	405,587	50.29	45,261	11.16	360,326
		<i>NORTHWEST</i>	2,318,080	1,491,623	64.35	207,881	13.94	1,283,742
		<i>MIDDLE SOUTH</i>	832,386	583,104	70.05	76,637	13.14	506,467
		<i>MIDDLE NORTH</i>	1,280,041	759,705	59.35	79,496	10.46	680,209
		<i>TENSIFT</i>	1,624,938	936,849	57.65	112,319	11.99	824,530
		<i>SOUTH</i>	1,462,180	969,701	66.32	79,173	8.16	890,528
		<i>CENTER</i>	3,074,800	2,006,642	65.26	330,226	16.46	1,676,416
		<i>NATIONAL TOTAL</i>	11,398,987	7,153,211	62.75	930,993	13.02	6,222,218

APPENDIX H.

TRACKING THE ELECTION MINUTES*



*Source: GOM Circulaire #147, Section VI, of May 24, 1993.

APPENDIX I.

USFP PROVIDED RESULTS FOR THE AIN CHOK HAY HASSANI / HAY HASSANI DISTRICT

The breakdown is given by political party acronym. Only the names of the candidates appeared on the polling station minutes.

Voting Station 26 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 5, al-Nadi al-niswi, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani*)

USFP	144
void not indicated	
UC	41
PPS	8
RNI	6
MNP	6
OADP	4

Total 209 out of 490 registered voters, number of void votes not indicated.

Voting Station 27 (*Da'ira intikhabiyya 5, al-Nadi al-niswi, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani*)

USFP	57
void	36
UC	20
MNP	6
OADP	5
RNI	2
PPS	2

Total 128 out of 270 registered voters, voting rate 47%, 28% void votes.

Voting Station 35 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 7, l'dadiyya al-Darb al-jadid, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani*)

USFP	125
void	79
UC	47
MNP	20
RNI	11
OADP	10
PPS	5

Total 297 out of 450 registered voters, voting rate of 66%, 27% void votes.

Voting Station 43, *Da'ira Intikhabiyya 8, Idriss al-Harizi School, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani*)

USFP	104
void	95
UC	50
MNP	15
OADP	13
PPS	11
RNI	10

Total 298 out of 500 registered, 60% voting rate, 32% void votes.

Voting Station 54 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 10, al-Hay al-Hassani School, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani*)

USFP	113
UC	33
void	16
MNP	17
OADP	11
PPS	10
RNI	3

Total 276 out of 594 registered, 46% voting rate, 6% void votes.
(Unusually low rate) Could the relatively low voting rate mean that some void votes were discarded?

Voting Station 61 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 10, al-Hay al-Hassani School, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani*):

USFP	122
void	94
UC	29
MNP	18
OADP	13
RNI	9
PPS	8

Total 293 out of 525 registered, 56% voting rate, 32% void vote.

Voting Station 71 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 12, Madrasat al-Akhtal Lil Banin, Muqata'at al-Hay al-Hassani*)

USFP	159
void	75
UC	28
PPS	11
RNI	9
MNP	7
OADP	7

Total 296 out of 500 registered, voting rate of 59%, void votes 25%.

Voting Station 82 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 15, Madrasat Sama bin Zaid, Muqata'at Hay al-Salam*)

USFP	118
void	73
UC	34
PPS	12
MNP	8
RNI	6
OADP	5

Total 256 out of 400 registered, voting rate of 64%, void votes 29%.

Voting Station 104 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 21, I'dadiyya al-Hana' School, Muqata'at Hay al-Salam*) (Next to 103, where the observations mentioned above were made).

USFP	139
void	74
UC	47
MNP	16
PPS	8
OADP	6
RNI	5

Total 295 out of 450 registered, 66% voting rate, 25% void votes.

Voting Station 105 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 21, I'dadiyya al-Hana', Muqata'at Hay al-Salam*)

USFP	117
void	73
UC	48
OADP	16
PPS	12
MNP	11
RNI	11

Total 288 out of 450 registered, 64% voting rate, 25% void votes.

Voting Station 106 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 21, I'dadiyya al-Hana', Muqata'at Hay al-Salam*):

USFP	111
void	106
UC	48
MNP	11
PPS	8
RNI	7
OADP	6

Total 297 out of 449 registered, 66% voting rate, 36% void votes.

Voting Station 107 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 21, I'dadiyya al-Hana', Muqata'at Hay al-Salam*)

USFP	129
void	86
UC	37
MNP	17
PPS	12
OADP	10
RNI	7

Total 298 out of 449 registered, 66% voting rate, 29% void votes.

Voting Station 108 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 21, I'dadiyya al-Hana', Muqata'at Hay al-Salam*)

USFP	112
void	61
UC	29
MNP	11
OADP	10
RNI	10
PPS	5

Total 238 out of 347 registered, 69% voting rate, 26% void votes.

(The USFP observer's figures differed slightly for this voting station. He had 239 rather than 238 votes cast, with the OADP candidate receiving 11 rather than 10 voices.)

Voting Station 113 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 23, Madrasat al-Tantawi Bannin, Muqata'at Hay al-Matar*)

USFP	157
void	82
UC	40
PPS	17
MNP	15
OADP	12
RNI	6

Total 329 out of 500 registered, 66% voting rate, 25% void votes.

Voting Station 114 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 23, Madrasat al-Tantawi Bannin, Muqata'at Hay al-Matar*)

USFP	162
void	not indicated
UC	58
MNP	15
OADP	13
PPS	11
RNI	2

Total 261 out of 499 registered. Void votes not indicated.

Voting Station 122 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 25, Madrasat al-Farabi, Muqata'at Hay al-Matar*):

USFP	94
void	86
UC	42
OADP	11
MNP	10
RNI	7
PPS	9

Total 259 out of 396 registered, 65% voting rate, 33% void votes.

Voting Station 188 (*Da'ira Intikhabiyya 31, Ma'had al-Taknulujiyya al-Tarbiyya, Muqata'at al-Ufa*)

USFP	128
void	90
UC	78
OADP	15
RNI	12
MNP	11
PPS	9

Total 343 out of 503 registered, 68% voting rate, 26% void votes.

APPENDIX J.

Répartition des recours et des circonscriptions
ayant fait l'objet de recours par Préfectures et Provinces

Préfectures et Provinces	Nbe. Circon	recours	Circon touchées	Préfectures et Provinces	Nbe. Circon	recours	Circon touchées
Préfec. Rabat	6	5	4	Chefchaouen	3	2	2
Préféc. Salé	4	5	3	El-Jadida	8	9	5
Préfec. Skhirat-Témara	2	3	2	El-Kelâa	5	3	2
Préfec Casa-Anfa	6	1	1	Errachidia	5	9	5
Préfec. Al Fida Derb Sultan	4	1	1	Essaouira	4	5	4
Préfec. Ben M'Sik Sidi Othmane	6	1	1	Es-Semara	1	1	1
Préfec. Hay Hassani - Ain Chok	3	3	3	Figuig	2	1	1
Préfec. Hay Mohammadi Ain Sebaâ	5	5	3	Guélmim	2	1	1
Préfec. Sidi Bernoussi Zénata	2	3	2	Ifrane	1	0	
Préfec. Mohammadia	1	0		Kénitra	7	3	3
Préfec Fès El Jadid Dar D'Bibegh	2	1	1	Khémisset	4	3	2
Préfec. Fès - Médina	2	1	1	Khénifra	4	4	3
Préfec. Zouagha My Yacoub	3	1	1	Khouribga	5	6	3
Province Séfrou	2	1	1	Laâyoune	2	0	
Préfec Marrakech- Ménara	3	7	6	Larache	3	1	1
Préfec. Marrakech Médina	2	3	1	Nador	6	3	3
Préfec. Sidi Youssef Ben Ali	2	2	2	Ouarzazate	6	0	
Province Chichaoua	3	4	3	Oued Ed-Dahab	2	4	2
Province Al Haouz	4	3	3	Oujda	7	8	6
Préfec Meknès El Menzeh	2	3	2	Safi	6	11	6
Préfec. Al Ismailia	3	4	2	Settat	8	5	3
El Hajeb	2	2	1	Sidi Kacem	5	6	3
Agadir	6	2	2	Tanger	5	10	5
Assa-Zag	1	0		Tan-Tan	1	7	1
Al Hoceima	3	6	2	Taounate	5	9	3
Azilal	4	3	3	Taroudannt	6	5	3
Béni Mellal	7	8	3	Tata	1	0	
Benslimane	2	4	2	Taza	6	2	1
Boujdour	1	1	1	Tétouan	4	1	1
Boulemane	2	2	1	Tiznit	3	6	4
				TOTAL	222	210	132

APPENDIX K.

**Composition provisoire de la Chambre des représentants par tendances politiques et syndicales
après les deux scrutins législatives**

Formations politiques et syndicales	Sièges du scrutin direct du 25 juin	Sièges du scrutin indirect du 17 sept.	Total des sièges
USFP	48	04	52
CDT	--	04	04
UC	27	27	54
PI	43	09	52
MP	33	18	51
RNI	28	13	41
PND	14	10	24
MNP	14	11	25
PPS	06	04	10
PDI	03	06	09
SAP	02	02	04
UMT	--	03	03
PA	02	--	02
OADP	02	--	02
TOTAL	222	111	333

- L'Union USFP-PI 108 Sièges
- Le bloc démocratique 120 Sièges
- L'Entente (UC, MP, PND) 129 Sièges
- L'Entente avec le MNP 154 Sièges

Ce tableau est susceptible de subir quelques modifications, compte tenu des changements qui pourraient intervenir dans les affiliations des parlementaires.

Résultats du suffrage indirect

Formations politiques et syndicales	Collège élus Communaux	Chambres des Salaries	Chambres d'Artisanat	Chambres de Commerce et d'Industrie	Chambres d'Agriculture	Total des sièges
UC	20	0	1	3	3	27
MP	14	0	0	1	3	18
RNI	8	0	1	1	3	13
MNP	7	0	1	1	2	11
PND	9	0	0	0	1	10
PI	4	2	1	1	1	9
USFP	2	4	1	1	0	8
PDI	3	0	1	1	1	6
PPS	1	1	1	0	1	4
UMT	0	3	0	0	0	3
SAP	1*	0	0	1	0	2
Total	69	10	7	10	15	111

* Il s'agit du M. HAMOU OUHLI élu SAP mais affilié au PPS à Azrou Province d'Ifrane.

APPENDIX L.

1993 Elections Législatives – Liste des partis, sigles, et couleurs des bulletins du vote

A. Partis politiques

- Union Constitutionnelle (UC) : Orange
- Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI) : Bleu
- Parti de l'Istiqlal (PI) : Rose
- Mouvement Populaire (MP) : Jaune
- Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) : Mauve
- Parti National Démocrate (PND) : Kaki
- Mouvement National Populaire (MNP) : Marron
- Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS) : Gris
- Organisation de l'Action Démocrate et Populaire (OADP) : Bleu rayé Noir
- Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC) : Mauve rayé Jaune
- Parti de l'Action (PA) : Orange rayé Mauve
- Parti Démocratique et de l'Indépendance (PDI) : Rose rayé Bleu

B. Sans appartenance politique

Les couleurs suivantes sont attribuées aux candidats S.A.P. par ordre de dépôt des candidatures:

- Orange rayé par deux traits verticaux Noirs
- Rose rayé par deux traits verticaux Noirs
- Jaune rayé par deux traits verticaux Noirs
- Mauve rayé par deux traits verticaux Noirs
- Kaki rayé par deux traits verticaux Noirs
- Marron rayé par deux traits verticaux Noirs
- Gris rayé par deux traits verticaux Noirs
- Gris rayé par deux traits verticaux Oranges
- Orange rayé par deux traits verticaux Gris
- Mauve rayé par deux traits verticaux Marrons
- Marron rayé par deux traits verticaux Mauves

APPENDIX M.

Messieurs les Walis et Gouverneurs
des Préfectures et Provinces du Royaume

Objet : Directives concernant le déroulement de la Campagne
électorale , l'organisation et le fonctionnement des
bureaux de vote et la proclamation des résultats .

Ref : Circulaire n°- 56 du 2 Rebia I 1413 (30 Septembre 1992) .

B - Le Respect des dispositions légales régissant
la Campagne électorale :

- La presse doit s'abstenir de publier tous propos,
déclarations ou allégations non fondés ou non vérifiés et tous
articles ou publications à caractère calomnieux, injurieux infamant
ou diffamatoire (Chapitre IV du Dahir formant code de la presse).

- Les partis politiques et les candidats doivent s'abstenir
de porter à la connaissance de l'opinion publique internationale
tous faits , informations ou documents susceptibles de revêtir un
caractère attentatoire à la dignité nationale . De même, ils devront
s'interdire tout contact avec les chancelleries de nature à susciter
des doutes ou visant à influencer sur le déroulement normal du
processus électoral (article 17 du dahir réglementant le droit
d'association) .

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