

Date Printed: 11/03/2008

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JTS Box Number: IFES\_11  
Tab Number: 7  
Document Title: Romania: A Dream Deferred The 1990  
Elections and Prospects for Future  
Document Date: 1990  
Document Country: Romania  
IFES ID: R01851



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**International Foundation for Electoral Systems**

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**Romania: A Dream Deferred  
The 1990 Elections and  
Prospects for Future Democracy**

**June, 1990**

Report Drafted by Joshua L. Dorosin

*This report was made possible by a grant  
from the National Endowment for Democracy*

*Any person or organization is welcome to quote information  
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## Acknowledgments

This is the report of the ten member International Foundation for Electoral Systems' (IFES) delegation which observed the May 20, 1990 national elections in Romania. It is based upon information gathered by observer teams that visited three regions of country, including the capital city of Bucharest and the Brasov (the two most populated cities) and geographic regions which represent the ethnic diversity of the country.

This report continues the study begun by IFES in its first report on the Romanian electoral process, written in early April, 1990. The first report described the electoral law and the structures developed to implement the May 20 election. This report describes the final weeks of the campaign period and analyzes the balloting and tabulation procedures observed during the mission, and also provides an overall assessment of the Romanian electoral process.

Drafts of this report were circulated to all members of the IFES delegation. The report attempts to take into account the viewpoints of the entire delegation and present a consensus analysis of the events witnessed. It must be stressed, however, that the election observed by the IFES delegation was subject to a variety of interpretations, and among the delegation there was not always complete agreement on the nature of the events observed. Not all members of the delegation, therefore, necessarily agreed with every representation, analysis or conclusion provided herein. The ultimate responsibility for the contents of this report belongs to the foundation and the author.

IFES thanks the members of this observer delegation for their efforts before, during and after the May 20 election. IFES also thanks the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for providing the grant which made this project possible. IFES also expresses its deep appreciation to the many Romanians who served as interpreters and drivers for the delegation during its stay in Romania. IFES wishes to commend the Romanian Central Electoral Bureau for allowing the IFES delegation, and all international observers, free and unfettered access to all stages of the Romanian electoral process.

Finally, IFES wishes to express gratitude to the Polaroid Corporation for its most generous support of the commodities transfer and training component of this project.

## Executive Summary

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) sent a ten-member international delegation of election specialists and Eastern European experts to observe the May 20, 1990 election of the Romanian President and Constituent Assembly. Members of the delegation observed the electoral process in the period of May 10-26 in some fifty polling stations in three regions of Romania: Bucharest and adjoining judets (counties); Brasov and Covasna Judets; and the Bacau and Harghita Judets. The delegation both observed election day procedures and conducted meetings with the primary political actors to discuss the electoral process.<sup>1</sup>

The IFES delegation was offered free access to all stages and elements of the electoral process during its visit to Romania. This was the result of the Romanian Government's decision, soon after the announcement of the May election, to open the process to international observers. The Central Electoral Bureau (CEB) was authorized to invite and accredit international observers. Approximately 500 observers monitored the May 20 election.

Based upon its observations and interviews, the delegation concludes that the choice of Ion Iliescu as President and the composition of the Constituent Assembly appears to accurately reflect the ballots cast during the May 20 election. The delegation found, with only few exceptions, that individuals were able to cast their ballots in secret and without fear of intimidation, and that ballots were counted accurately.

However, the delegation did find significant cause for concern with the Romanian electoral process. Specifically, the delegation was concerned with 1) flaws in election day procedures, 2) a lack of understanding and appreciation of the electoral process among the electorate and 3) the violent character of the campaign period. Because of the magnitude of these latter two concerns, most in the delegation departed Romania with serious reservations about viability of the electoral process as a whole.

First, by the standards of elections in countries with established democratic traditions, the Romanian electoral process showed significant procedural flaws. The delegation witnessed the following inconsistencies on election day:

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<sup>1</sup>. Meetings were held with the following parties and groups: the National Salvation Front, the Hungarian Democratic Union, the National Liberal Party, the Peasants' Party - Christian and Democratic, the Social Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, the Group for Social Dialogue, Fratia-Independent Trade Union, and the Students' League.

1. Unauthorized persons providing unsolicited assistance to voters;
2. Unauthorized persons assisting in vote tabulation procedures;
3. Technically inaccurate implementation of tabulation procedures;
4. Campaign propaganda posted within 500 meters of the polling stations;
5. Improperly sealed or unsealed ballot boxes;
6. Inconsistent implementation of the national identification stamping procedures;

The above procedural inconsistencies did not appear to influence profoundly the outcome of the election.<sup>2</sup> However, measures must be taken to resolve these inconsistencies prior to subsequent elections in order to guarantee that future abuses of the electoral process do not occur.

Second, the delegation found a great deal of confusion among voters as to proper balloting procedure and a general lack of understanding about the voting process. In some instances, voters took up to ten minutes to cast their ballots. The combination of this lack of voter education with severely limited space and inadequately staffed polls resulted in an unbearably slow election: it was typical for voters to wait up to three hours in line to cast their ballots. A voter education program which adequately prepares the electorate for future elections is therefore highly recommended.

Third, the delegation found reason to be concerned with the conduct of the campaign. Specifically, the delegation was troubled by the unwillingness of President Iliescu to adequately respond to:

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<sup>2</sup>. The meaning of this statement is precise: the relative number of votes received by the presidential candidates and parties was not profoundly influenced by the inconsistencies listed. It must be noted that there was considerable debate among the members of the delegation about the extent to which these inconsistencies influenced the election. Although the consensus was that the influence was probably minimal, some insisted that it could have been up to several percentage points. It was noted, however, that with this particular result -- an assembly in which the FSN hovers around the 2/3 majority needed to pass any legislation without debate -- the margin of victory has a significant impact upon the way in which the Constituent Assembly will conduct its business in the future.



1. Genuine and documented instances of violence and intimidation of parties in opposition to the National Salvation Front in the period of election campaigning; and
2. Reasonable complaints by the same parties in the same period of unfair access to radio, television and print media.

Although the delegation did not find evidence to support allegations of conspiracy by the leadership of the National Salvation Front against the political opposition, the unwillingness of the President to acknowledge and to take timely and adequate measures to correct these blatant abuses had a significant inhibiting impact upon the freeness and fairness of the campaign.

## I. Introduction

On May 20, the Romanian people went to the polls to cast ballots in the country's first multi-party elections since 1946. The road to the May 20 Romania election was, when compared to the transitions toward democracy in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, not an easy one. The first steps were taken at great cost in the last days of December, when the region's last despot was removed in a bloody coup.

In the months after the ouster of Nicolai Ceausescu in December, some 80 political parties formed. The most significant of these parties were the National Salvation Front (FSN or Front), led by interim president Ion Iliescu, the three "traditional" parties - the National Liberal Party, the Peasants' Party, and the Social Democratic Party - and the Hungarian Democratic Union. Other parties, ranging greatly in both size and stance, included the Ecological Movement and parties claiming to be more centrist in scope.

The political activity of these parties was augmented by the emergence of strong civic and trade organizations. The Students' League, instrumental in setting in motion the events of December, continued to play a vital role in the development of the democratic process. The Group for Social Dialogue also served as an important catalyst in the growing dialogue on pressing political, social and economic problems. Fratia, the newly formed Free Trade Union, provided a competitive alternative to the traditional party trade union.

At stake in the May 20 election was the Presidency and seats in the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly, consisting of the 119 seat Senate and 387 seat Assembly of Deputies, is charged with the drafting of a new constitution. The Constituent Assembly must fulfill this mandate within eighteen months, at which point the government will set the next round of presidential and parliamentary elections to take place within a year.

### Scope of IFES Activities in Romania

In April 1990, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) received a grant in the amount of \$261,100 from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to conduct a range of activities in Romania and Bulgaria. IFES began its activities in Romania April 1-7 with a pre-election assessment team visit. During its visit in April, the team conducted interviews with the primary political parties and with representatives of the primary civic organizations, the Group for Social Dialogue and the Students' League. The report written by this team, published by IFES in early May, provided an analysis of the electoral law and of the institutions set up to administer the May 20 election.

The report described a nation in the midst of dramatic and emotional change. The FSN and the primary opposition parties quickly polarized and embarked upon a vitriolic and abusive negative campaign against one another. This polarization created a similar split in a population still emotionally charged by the events of December. By April 1, there had been serious violence in the countryside, mostly directed at members of opposition parties involved in campaigns.

The April report also details criticism of the government by opposition parties for limiting access of the opposition parties to television, and for the pro-Front slant offered to the population in all television news coverage. The opposition parties were also critical of the government's decision to ostensibly ameliorate shortages of paper by limiting production of newspapers. The report further describes claims by the opposition parties that papers, once printed, were not being faithfully distributed to the population outside of the primary cities.

The second phase of IFES activities in Romania encompassed the transfer of election commodities to assist the Central Electoral Bureau in administering the May 20 election. During the pre-election assessment mission, the IFES delegation asked the CEB whether they desired such assistance and asked them to provide a list of useful commodities. The Romanian Government, sensitive to the need to provide international legitimacy to their electoral process, decided to allow delegations of international observers free and unfettered access to the electoral process. IFES was asked by the CEB to assist in the accreditation procedures of international observers.

IFES was able to gain the support of the Polaroid Corporation in this accreditation project. Polaroid agreed to provide, as a loan and free of charge, four ID4 system cameras to the Central Electoral Bureau for use in producing photo-ID's for all international observers. Polaroid also volunteered to send two representatives to train technicians at the CEB in the use of the cameras, and to advise the CEB throughout the project on effective organization. At the request of the CEB, IFES purchased enough supplies to produce photo identification cards for the 5,000 observers anticipated by the Romanian government.

Ten days prior to the election, representatives from Polaroid and from IFES arrived in Bucharest with the cameras and supplies. Over the course of the next ten days, the Polaroid representatives worked with the Central Electoral Bureau to produce all photo ID's used by the international observers.

The third component of IFES activities in Romania was the dispatch of a ten member delegation of election specialists and Eastern European experts to Romania to observe the May 20 election. Two members of delegation were sent to Bucharest on May 10, and

conducted interviews with representatives from the political parties and civic organizations. The balance of the delegation arrived on Thursday, May 17.

The goal of the observer delegation was to continue the work begun by the pre-election assessment team in April. The observer team set as its goal the documentation of the last six weeks of the campaign period and of election day procedures, including the administration of balloting procedures and of the process of vote tabulation. The methodology employed by the delegation to achieve these goals was the use of interviews with primary political actors, parties and organizations in the ten days prior to the election and first-hand observation of the electoral process on election day and in the days after the election.

This report describes the electoral process as observed by members of the IFES delegation during the period of May 10-26, 1990. The body of the report is divided into two areas: first, a description of the last six weeks of the campaign period; and second, a description of the balloting and tabulation procedures. The electoral law and structures developed to implement the election were described in great detail in the earlier IFES report, and will only be covered when necessary in this report.

In general terms, the members of the delegation were troubled both by the violent nature of the campaign period, and by significant flaws, inconsistencies and irregularities in the balloting and tabulation process. Each section will detail the problem areas encountered by the delegation, and will conclude with a series of recommendations to improve upon the process prior to the next round of elections.

## II. The Conduct of the Election Campaign

The National Salvation Front enjoyed tremendous popularity in the weeks following the removal of Ceausescu. Widely regarded as the force which rid the country of its most hated dictator, the Front was extremely popular for its initial decision to act as temporary stewards of power and not to participate in the multi-party election which would create the next government.

The Front's decision, on January 23, to form a party and to participate in the election was met with criticism by both newly forming political parties and by the students' groups. This criticism was accompanied by massive protest in Bucharest, and resulted in the formation of a Provisional National Unity Council (PNUC) to replace the ruling National Salvation Council. The PNUC consisted of 253 representatives of different political parties and movements, but was still effectively under the control of the leadership of the Front.

The PNUC drafted and approved all laws regarding both the campaign period and the election.<sup>3</sup> While the laws, in theory, seemed to provide a framework within which the political campaigns might be conducted on equal footing, the character of the campaign period unfortunately worked to the detriment of the electoral process.

The atmosphere in Romania upon the arrival of the first members of the observer delegation on May 9 was marked by aggravated mistrust and fear. In follow-up meetings with parties and civic organizations, the members of the delegation were told that the violence and intimidation had increased in the last month of the campaign. Two of the primary opposition parties called for a postponement of the election, claiming that the opposition parties had not had adequate time to prepare for the election or to communicate their message to the people.

The students began a continuous demonstration on University Square to protest the character of the campaign and the policy of the Iliescu regime on April 21. Fueled by the principles enumerated in the Timisoara Proclamation and the memories of Tirgu Mures<sup>4</sup>, the demonstration enjoyed the active support of thousands of Bucharest residents. Talks between the Students' League and Iliescu broke down approximately three weeks before election day, and the tension between the government and the students increased almost daily.

In interviews with parties and civic organizations in the last week of the campaign, members of the IFES delegation were alerted to a range of criticisms and problems with the campaign period. One of the most common complaints heard was that there had been inadequate time for the opposition parties to develop and to spread their message to the population. The lack of political education and experience within the population at large was a primary concern of many parties and organizations, and, indeed, an ironic feeling of mistrust of the average voter seemed apparent in interviews with representatives of the traditional parties.

By far the most serious complaints about the campaign period, however, were those concerning the widespread occurrence of violence against members of parties in opposition to the FSN and those concerning limited access to the television and print media. It must be noted that while the occurrence of violence and

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<sup>3</sup>. These provisions were passed by 250 of the PNUC's 253 members, with one vote against and two abstentions (See IFES' April report).

<sup>4</sup>. See page 7, "Romania in the Wake of Ceausescu: An Assessment of the Romanian Electoral System on Election Eve," IFES Report, May 1990.

intimidation was not disputed, evidence or proof supporting allegations about the nature of this intimidation was not always offered or available during interviews with parties and civic organizations. In the absence of such evidence or proof, the members of the delegation were left with the choice of dismissing the charges as hearsay or treating the charges as representative of the truth. On the whole, it was the judgement of the members of the delegation to treat the characterizations offered by representatives of the opposition as indicative of serious and real problems.

### Widespread Violence and Intimidation

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the campaign period was the widespread occurrence of violence and intimidation against the "traditional" opposition parties. Attempts by candidates and campaign workers from parties in opposition to the FSN generally -- and by the Peasants' and Liberal parties specifically -- to hold rallies and to put up posters in villages were met with open hostility and physical attacks, and these parties soon became discouraged from actively campaigning outside the main cities. This effectively prevented a large percentage of the population, mainly in areas outside of the primary cities, from being exposed to the platforms and ideas of parties other than the FSN.

The nature of the violence was characterized in different ways by the parties and groups with whom the IFES delegation met. Representatives from the traditional parties charged that FSN activists were responsible for organizing an active campaign of violence and intimidation against the opposition. Cornel Coposu, President of the National Peasants' Party, presented the delegation with a detailed listing of the victims of this violence, and claimed his appearance at rallies outside of Bucharest was always preceded by the arrival of busloads of FSN activists whose sole purpose was to provoke violence.

Underlying the Front's ability to organize and propagate such a campaign, according to the Peasants' and Liberal party representatives, was the continuation of the structure of former Securitate and Communist activists both in the cities and in the villages. The failure of the FSN to provide an accounting of the Securitate did much to foment fear and paranoia among the population and the opposition parties. The number of Securitate killed, wounded or captured during the violence in December was never made public. Likewise, the fate of the thousands of securitate operatives was never announced, giving rise to rumors that the securitate apparatus had been maintained and was being used by the Front in its efforts to consolidate power.

Furthermore, according to the traditional parties, although the events of December resulted in the removal of the former party bosses at the national and judet level, in most cases these

individuals were simply replaced by their former deputies. And, in the case of almost every village, the Mayor (who was always the village party first secretary) was not removed from power. Thus, concluded the traditional parties, the entire structure used by Ceausescu to control Romania is still in place and is being used by Ion Iliescu to consolidate power.

The claim that the FSN was responsible for employing a structure of Securitate and party activists to organize a campaign of violence was not, however, corroborated by all those with whom the delegation met prior to the election. The existence of a structure of activists under the employ of the FSN was downplayed or denied by representatives from Fratia-Independent Trade Union, the Group for Social Dialogue, and, of course, by the FSN itself.

Mariana Celac, of the Group for Social Dialogue, offered another interpretation of the reasons behind the inability of the "traditional" opposition parties to effectively spread their platform outside of the main cities. A majority of these villages, from the beginning of the campaign, were considered to be a "lost cause," and the parties deliberately decided to avoid campaigning there. She agreed that the "traditional" parties were so intimidated by early acts of violence that they were discouraged from continuing an active campaign in the villages in the final weeks of the campaign, but did not attribute the blame for the violence directly on the leadership of the Front.

Miron Mitrea, President of the Fratia (Brotherhood), the independent trade union confederation, also minimized the significance of claims that former Communist activists were being utilized by the Front to propagate acts of violence and intimidation. Of greater political significance to Mitrea was Iliescu's decision to allow many old-style bureaucrats to join the Front after the December revolution. This, he believed, would eventually damage Iliescu's ability to maintain power, because this "middle layer" was the same group which allowed the economy to founder under Ceausescu. By maintaining this bureaucracy, Iliescu will guarantee continued poor economic performance. Without significant improvement over his tenure, Iliescu would not stand a good chance of re-election in the future.

Perhaps the strongest argument against the claim that the FSN was actively organizing a campaign of violence and intimidation against the opposition parties came from a western diplomat who has been stationed in Bucharest for almost two years. According to his observations, the vast majority of these acts of violence were propagated by fervent local supporters of the FSN, and went so far as to say that the actions of such individuals were basically out of the control of the national leadership of the party. He discounted the importance of local networks of former Securitate and Communist activists.

Access to the Media

A second major criticism by members of the opposition in the campaign period was that of unfair access to and use of the media. The campaign law provided for equal time on television for the broadcast of party advertisements, and generally all parties agreed that they were given their time. However, parties were asked to tape their own advertisements, and there were complaints that parties were not given proper assistance in the production of commercials. The result was shoddy, amateurish advertising for the majority of the parties while others -- most significantly the FSN -- enjoyed the full support of producers and directors and produced more professional advertisements.<sup>5</sup>

Further criticism was offered of the television station due to the extent to which it profiled, always favorably, the daily activities of PNUC President Iliescu. The amount of television time, in the end, accorded to Iliescu and the leadership of the FSN was much greater than that offered any other candidate or party. The delegation heard arguments from some that the advantages enjoyed by Iliescu and the Front in the media were justified because of their status as incumbents; others, however, were quick to ask from which election did Iliescu and the Front derive status as incumbents.

As important as the advantages enjoyed by Iliescu in television media were those enjoyed in the print media. All newspapers in Romania are published in the State Publishing House, which remained under the effective control of the government. Support for official newspapers, which remained loyal to Iliescu, was much greater than support for the smaller newspapers which burgeoned after December. When it became necessary, because of a severe paper shortage, to curtail the number of newspapers printed, the PNUC put into effect across the board reductions of papers. The cuts had a more devastating impact upon the smaller papers, with their smaller circulations and more limited distribution, than upon the major newspapers.

Complaints were also heard about a failure to distribute newspapers outside of Bucharest and the other major cities. The delegation heard claims that entire runs of newspapers bound for outlying areas were sequestered and hidden, then returned to Bucharest as "unsold" copy. Allegations of destruction of newspapers were also heard by members of the delegation.

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<sup>5</sup>. This characterization was offered by Radu Zilisteanu, Vice President of the National Democratic Party and Vice President of the Parliamentary Commission for Labor and Social Assistance, Provisional National Unity Council. It should be noted, however, that the National Liberal Party ran several extremely professional commercials, possibly produced outside of Romania.



## Other Facets of the Campaign Period

### 1. Impact of Pre-election Salary and Pension Increases

From discussions with dissidents and opposition party representatives, and as supported by random interviews with residents in villages outside of the main cities, the increase of peasant pensions and the increase of some miners' salaries were instrumental in securing voter allegiance to Iliescu and the FSN among large segments of the population.

Peasant pensions were increased from approximately 80 lei to 500 lei monthly. While this represented a six to seven fold increase, most of those with whom we spoke believed it was a justified increase notwithstanding the political benefit that accrued to Iliescu.

The increase for miners, on the other hand, elicited no sympathetic opinion from intellectuals or opposition parties. The coal miners had, since January, proved to be faithful supporters of Iliescu and the FSN in the face of student opposition. The increases were not extended to all miners; however, the targeting criteria were not elaborated. Reportedly, salaries for miners were increased from 2,000 to 5,800 lei per month. These increases were widely viewed as rewards for past loyalty and incentives for continuing support. Beyond the unfair political advantage gained, these raises were viewed as depleting scarce funds and inconsistent with the upcoming sacrifices that will have to be borne as the country addresses the problems of its economy.

### 2. Problems with Campaign Finance

Another significant problem which developed during the campaign period was the great disparity between the limited funds made available to the opposition parties and the free accessibility to government funding and materials enjoyed by the FSN. Without adequate disclosure provisions drawn into the electoral law, the FSN was able to use without limit both governmental funds and, reportedly, moneys from the coffers of the defunct Communist Party. (An accounting of the funds left by the party has still not occurred).

The most obvious abuse of government resources enjoyed by the FSN was the free and unlimited access to governmental buildings, staffs, cars and information technology. Allegations, though impossible to substantiate, were also made by the parties that the FSN had access to more and better quality paper for its campaign posters.

It should be noted, however, that an unknown measure of foreign financial support was also received by some of the opposition

parties. Neither the FSN nor the opposition parties appear to have complied with the electoral law's financial declaration provision, nor was there any effort to enforce this provision.

Fair competition, in the future, will be impossible without a check on the ability of the party in power to use government resources, and difficult without more stringent financial disclosure laws aimed at all participants in the electoral process.

### Conclusions

The widespread occurrence of violence in the countryside had a destructive effect upon the overall freeness and fairness of the May 20 election in Romania. Members of the traditional opposition parties were intimidated enough to cease most campaign activities in most villages well before the formal campaign deadline of May 18. The group most affected by this unfortunate occurrence was the rural population, who were not given the benefit of exposure to the different platforms and ideas of the opposition, and who -- in general -- lacked the political consciousness necessary to critically assess the information which it did receive from television and other media.

It is difficult, based upon the information collected by the delegation, to determine the cause of the violence. These acts of violence may have been, to a large degree, the result of local FSN officials or supporters acting on their own volition or at the request of other local supporters or officials. Certain cases, however, show a degree of forethought and organization which suggest more elaborate and coordinated planning. As a general principle, the delegation observed a tendency to lay blame for any violence -- regardless of the circumstances -- on the central leadership of the Front. The delegation did not find direct evidence to support this allegation.

Nonetheless, Ion Iliescu and the leadership of the FSN must be held accountable for the problems encountered during the campaign period. The unwillingness of the leadership to acknowledge the magnitude of the problems, and to take adequate and timely measures to correct them had a significant inhibiting impact upon the freeness and fairness of the campaign and of the entire electoral process.

At a very minimum, President Iliescu could have made statements condemning the actions of those behind the violence and assuring the population that they should feel free to vote for whomever they choose. His failure to make even this simple gesture raises serious questions about his level of commitment to the process of democratization in Romania.

A high priority must be placed upon the eradication of these problems prior to subsequent elections. One remedy for the violent

character of the campaign would be the promotion, by the electoral bureaus, of organized debates in rural areas between candidates. This could show the population that it is possible for candidates with differing views to share a platform peacefully, and would hopefully promote peaceful campaign practices in the future.

Equal in importance to the promotion by the government of non-violent campaigns is the promotion of free and independent media. The government should eliminate all obstacles to the establishment of independent television studios and production, independent printing houses, and independent presses. Recent statements by President Iliescu which indicate an unwillingness to allow a free and independent media to develop should be viewed as a serious impediment to the continued growth of democracy in Romania.

### III. Balloting and Tabulation Procedures

On Saturday, May 19 the ten member IFES delegation split into five teams. Teams one through three were based in Bucharest, and limited their election observation activities to the city of Bucharest and the judets adjoining Bucharest. Team four traveled to Bacau, and observed elections in the Bacau and Harghita Judets. Team Five traveled to Brasov, and visited the Covasna and Brasov Judets.

On the whole, the delegation observed an electoral process which, though replete with inconsistencies and flaws, appeared to allow the population to cast ballots in secrecy and faithfully and accurately tabulate the votes cast.

The electoral law and the administrative structures designed to implement the electoral law were described extensively in the pre-election assessment report. The following section reviews those balloting and tabulation procedures observed on election day and in the days following the election, and offers an analysis of the efficacy of the system.

#### General Overview of the Balloting and Tabulation Procedure

In accordance with the electoral law, the president of the electoral bureau of the polling place arrived at the polling place on the eve of the elections at 6:00 p.m., and began preparing the polling station "to ensure correctness of the voting operations" (Art.54). At 5:00 a.m. on election day, the vice-president and the other polling workers arrived. In the presence of the representatives, the president checked the ballot boxes, electoral lists, ballots and stamps, then sealed the ballot box. At 6:00 a.m., the polling place was opened to the voters.

Polling stations were generally uniform in set-up. Each station was contained in one room, which in turn contained a long

table at which the polling officers were seated, four to six<sup>6</sup> booths, and a very large ballot box. The boxes were generally constructed out of plywood, covered with paper and sealed with a thick white tape.

Upon entering the polling station, the voter proceeded to the long table. The tables were usually divided into several sections. At the first, the voter presented his/her Romanian identity papers (ID) and was checked against the electoral list. If the name was found, the list was checked and the ID was stamped with the "votat" (vote) stamp. If the name did not appear on the list, the name was added and the ID stamped. At the second point, the voter exchanged his/her ID for a "votat" stamp and a set of three ballots (President, Senate, Deputy). By law, each ballot must be stamped on the back cover with the polling site stamp. These ballots were either stamped with the polling site stamp as they were passed to the voter, or pre-stamped prior to the opening of the poll by polling workers. In a third section, the President and Deputy were usually seated and directed the entire process.

After receiving the ballot, the voter proceeded to the booth. Each ballot contained boxes in which the name of the party, the symbol of the party and list of candidates were printed. With the stamp (usually inked by the polling official before giving it to the voter) the voter firmly marked within the borders of the box which contains his/her choice.

The voter then exited the booth, folded the ballot so that the polling stamp was on the outside and placed the ballots in the envelope. The envelope was deposited, unsealed, into the ballot box. The voter then returned the "votat" stamp to the polling official, received his/her ID, and exited the polling station.

At 11:00 p.m., the polling station was closed.<sup>7</sup> All unused ballots were annulled, usually by writing in pen "anulat" across the front cover and drawing a line across every second page on the ballot. The number of annulled ballots were then counted and the number recorded.

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<sup>6</sup>. In Brasov and Covasna, the delegation observed many polling stations with nine or ten booths.

<sup>7</sup>. By late afternoon on election day, it was clear that a number of polling stations would still have voters in line at 11:00 p.m. The Central Electoral Bureau sent a message to all judets bureaus indicating that polling stations should stay open until everyone in line at 11:00 p.m. had voted. Thus, some polling stations were open well beyond midnight, and rumors were heard about polling stations which stayed open as late as 3:00 a.m. on Monday morning.

At this point, the ballot boxes were opened. The ballots were removed from their envelopes and separated according to office. The ballots were then counted, with the president reading each ballot and announcing the result of the ballot (Art.65). Any ballots not bearing the polling site stamp, not bearing the "votat" stamp, or bearing stamps for more than one candidate or party were disqualified. All valid ballots were recorded by a member of the electoral bureau.

Upon completion of the count, the final tally was recorded in a standard form (one each for the offices of President, Senate and Deputy) which included: a) the number of electors, according to the electors' list; b) the actual number of electors who voted in the polling station; c) total number of valid votes; d) the number of void votes; e) the number of votes for each candidate or party; f) a short expose of the complaints and appeals and of the solutions to such appeals given by the constituency electoral bureaus. These reports were then signed by the bureau president and the members of the polling station bureau.

These reports, with the ballots, were transferred by armed guard to the judet level electoral bureau. The ballots were then stored, while the results of the polling district were entered onto the computer system.

Each of the 40 judets was provided with the following equipment by the Central Electoral Bureau in Bucharest for the tabulation of the vote:

- a. 2 (sometimes 3) IBM-AT compatible PC's manufactured by RCD (Romania-Control Data - a joint venture) with an internal 20 megabyte hard drive and 3 1/2" micro-disk drive. Each PC was equipped with a color monitor.
- b. AC frequency modulator stabilizing current between 50 and 60 Hertz.
- c. A 2400 Baud modem.
- d. "Elect 90" software developed and copyrighted by the National Commission on Statistics for this election.
- e. A small Canon telefacsimile device.
- f. A teletypewriter (telex).

As reports from the polling stations were received, the data therein was keyed into one PC. The Elect 90 program performed certain range edits on the input. The operator then ran a hard copy of the values he/she had entered. That hard copy and the source document were then passed to the Electoral Bureau officers (both jurists and party representatives) for confirmation. Any

errors noted were corrected by the same operator on the same PC. The original polling station report was then passed to a second operator who entered the same data on a second PC. That entry was verified in the same manner as the first entry. When both PC's were assumed to have identical data, a computer match was conducted to verify the data. After both manual and computer verification, the raw data was down-loaded to a micro-disk and added to the judet-level totals.

Every two hours, newly entered raw data were transmitted to Bucharest over the modems and computer reports with updated totals were run at the judets. This data was entered into the Central Electoral Bureau's computer system, which aggregated nationwide totals and published periodic reports on the tabulation. This procedure was repeated until the final tallies were received from all judets. Upon receipt of all totals, the Central Electoral Bureau verified and checked its result before making it public.

#### Flaws, Irregularities and Inconsistencies in the Electoral Process

The balloting and tabulation procedures described above were generally followed at the majority of the polling stations visited by the IFES delegation. However, it must be noted that at nearly every station the delegation observed practices which were considered either irregular or inconsistent with the above practice. In addition, the delegation concluded that the system itself contained several inherent flaws. The following section details these flaws, irregularities and inconsistencies, and concludes with recommended solutions for these problems.

##### 1. Composition of Polling Station Bureaus

The administration of the election at the polling level was the responsibility of the electoral bureau at the polling place. According to Article 34, electoral bureaus of polling places shall be composed of a president, his/her deputy, and (at most) 7 representatives of political parties with candidates on the contested lists. The president and deputy must be non-partisan and be drawn from among the ranks of judges and lawyers in the judet. The seven representatives are comprised of representatives of the parties, in order of the number of candidates which those parties have fielded in the judet.

In the areas visited on election day, the delegation found few if any examples of electoral bureaus whose formation corresponded to the letter of the law. It was not possible to find enough judges and lawyers to fill every president and deputy president position; the Central Electoral Bureau thus decided to expand those eligible to include "citizens of unstained reputation in the town or village."

More significantly, the delegation found many instances of

polling bureaus with less than the seven parties allowed represented. This was generally for one of two reasons: either the polling station was located in an area dominated by one party or members of other parties had been so intimidated that they were unable to find individuals willing to risk life or livelihood to participate on the polling bureau.

This had two deleterious effects upon the process. First and more obvious was the lack of a check or balance against fraudulent practice within the polling station. The absence of opposition party representatives in polling sites was common -- in some cases, the delegation observed polls at which only the FSN representative was present. Although the delegation did not witness actions in these stations which called into question the correctness of the election, the potential for fraud in polls in which this occurred is great and should not be repeated in subsequent elections.

The second, and in this election probably more significant, deleterious effect of having a smaller representation in polling stations is the degree to which those workers at stations with only 3 or 4 workers were forced to work twice as hard implementing the election. The cumbersome, labor intensive process drained the energy of even those stations with full representation. The shortage of workers in some polling stations only served to slow down the process both of balloting and tabulation.

One week before the election<sup>8</sup>, in anticipation of the shortage of polling workers which the lack of party representation would engender, the Central Electoral Bureau decided to allow the mayors to appoint up to four local residents as "polling technicians." This development took the delegation quite by surprise. Members of the delegation had consistently asked electoral officials whether additional workers would be used during the election. Officials had always responded that the only workers at the station would be the president, deputy and party representatives. As late as one day prior to the election, the president of the Giurgiu Judet electoral bureau denied that there would be any additional workers at the polls.

The exercise of the right to appoint additional polling workers varied from polling place to polling place. In some polling places, no additional workers were used. In others, additional polling workers were used to assist in voting procedures only while the polling place was open to the electorate. In others, additional workers were used in all stages of the process, including during the vote tabulation.

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<sup>8</sup>. The exact date of this decision is unclear. Most polling station presidents informed the delegation that they were alerted to this decision on Monday, May 14. Others indicated that they were told only one or two days prior to the election.

In general, the opposition parties, especially the traditional parties, were unhappy about the addition of these polling workers. In later interviews, the opposition parties indicated that they had been informed that the additional workers would be utilized less than one week before the election, and that in most cases the names of these workers were not known until one or two days prior to the election.

The major criticism made by the opposition parties was the role of the mayor in appointing additional workers. In the Brasov region, members of the delegation were told that the "technicians" were in fact the same individuals responsible for administering elections during the Ceausescu regime. Whether or not intentional, it was indicated, the presence of the government workers and former election officials could raise suspicion or fear among those in the electorate unsure of the extent to which their ballot would indeed be secret.

The appointment of the additional workers appears to violate Article 34 of the electoral law, which expressly states that the electoral bureau of the polling station shall include only the president, deputy and seven party representative and that this bureau must be set up not later than 15 days before the election.

It is clear from the experience of the May 20 election that the polls were not sufficiently supplied with individuals to administer the election in a timely fashion. It is recommended that provisions be adopted which provide for an enlarged staff to administer future elections.

## 2. Accuracy of Electoral Lists

According to Section 3 of the electoral law, "electoral lists shall be drawn up by the mayoralties of communes, towns, municipalities and of the sectors of Bucharest municipality." (Art.22) These lists shall be posted in a public and visible place no less than thirty days prior to the election day (Art.24); the voters then have the right to check the registries and to alert authorities to any omissions, mistakes or other errors. (Art.25)

In most cases, mayors drew up electoral lists based upon outdated lists of voters used in prior elections. These lists proved to be, on the whole, seriously inaccurate. Examination of posted lists displayed a great number of names crossed out either because the individual was deceased or had relocated. The lists of voters added-on to the list was generally very long.

Because of the volume of complaints regarding the accuracy of the electoral lists, the Central Electoral Bureau decided on May 19 to allow any individual to register and vote in a polling district on election day itself. The CEB stipulated that the voter



was required to bring documentation (usually the internal passport) proving residency. To ensure against individuals casting multiple votes, the CEB decided to stamp the internal passports with the "votat" stamp used to cast ballots. This last minute change in procedure caused a good deal of confusion on election day.

The practice of stamping the internal passport was not consistent in the polling stations visited. In most polling sites, all voters were asked to present their passport for stamping. In others, only those registering on the day of the election had their passport stamped. It appears that polling bureaus were only given general instructions by the judet level electoral bureau on the implementation of the system of stamping identification papers.

### 3. Unsolicited Voter Assistance

According to Article 62 of the electoral law:

The presence of any person in the booths, excepting the voter's, is prohibited. The elector who out of well grounded reasons also ascertained by the president of the electoral bureau cannot vote by himself has the right to call a companion chosen by him to help him vote, in the booth.

The delegation observed many instances of violation and abuse of Article 62 of the electoral law. The majority of the violations stem from the fact that the law is vague on the exact implementation of voter assistance. The most serious infractions involved cases where individuals offered unsolicited assistance to voters.

In the village of Poiana de Jos, at polling station No. 209, the delegation observed a case in which a woman offered unsolicited assistance to several elderly voters. When questioned, it was discovered that the woman was not a member of the polling station staff. She claimed to have accompanied her elderly mother to the station, and that she simply wanted to help others who might need the same assistance. Further questioning of both polling officials and of voters (voters were questioned outside of the polling station after they had cast their votes) revealed that, in fact, the woman had been in the polling station for several hours and was the wife of the mayor of the village.

In the village of Buftea, at polling station No. 789, voters were asked when they presented their ID's if they "knew how to vote." When questioned about this practice, the president indicated that he felt it was necessary to do this because many of the voters in the village were very old, did not read, or were physically impaired. The president had assigned one staff member to provide all assistance, and this member pursued his responsibility aggressively. On occasion, he entered the booth with the voter (rather than showing the voter how to vote in the

open room), and he sometimes poked his head in the booth and inquired if the person needed help. In the thirty minute visit to this polling site, this same man provided assistance to eight voters.

These irregular procedures, regardless of motive, indicate a serious flaw in the electoral process and should be addressed prior to the next election. IFES recommends the following general rules on voter assistance:

- a. It should be available to anyone who requests it;
- b. It should be permitted only if it is requested;
- c. The assistor should be someone of the voter's own choice. If the voter has no choice, assistance must be rendered by the polling place staff - ideally, by a bi-partisan pair of officials;
- d. The process should be documented. This could be accomplished through an affidavit, signed by the voter and those giving assistance, stating the reason for assistance. A log of all instances of assistance, including the time of day, should be kept.

#### 4. Insufficient Polling Worker Training

Exacerbating nearly all of the problems described above was a general lack of training given to all polling station workers. Notwithstanding the diligence of the majority of polling presidents and workers, the administration of the election at the polling level was inconsistent - from one judet to another, from one site to another within a judet, and even within the same polling site. The law is not specific, and the implementation of the May 20 election was subject to many different (and often contradictory) interpretations.

One inconsistency already described was the stamping of the Romanian ID. A second, and more fundamental, inconsistency which could have been solved by more explicit training of polling workers was the manner in which the ballot box must be sealed. The law only requires that the box be sealed, but does not describe the method by which it should be sealed nor which materials should be used to seal the box. As a result, the sealing of the ballot boxes varied dramatically, and many seals, viewed in terms of the security which they offered, seemed ceremonial and not functional.

A written Instruction Manual for polling place staff should be written which details procedures to carry out the mandate of the election law. Before doing so, the Central Electoral Bureau should critique the experience of the May 20 election, solicit feedback from the judet electoral bureaus and polling place officials on the

strengths and weaknesses of the system in place for the first election, and carefully consider complaints received regarding the electoral process.

Where there are voids and ambiguities in the law, these should be clarified through interpretation by the appropriate governmental policy authorities or through amendment of the law by the new Parliament.

The instruction manual should be organized for easy reference, and illustrations/diagrams provided to improve effectiveness. The CEB should ensure that the judet election officials understand the process, and that they arrange for training of the polling site staff personnel in their jurisdiction.

#### 5. Ballot Paper and Stamping Procedure

The quality of the ballot paper was generally poor, and the thinness of the paper allowed the printing to show through on both sides. On the presidential ballot, which included only three choices, the candidates could easily be seen through the front cover. The delegation noted that it was easy to see exactly which candidate received the vote by simply looking through the front cover. Generally, envelopes were not available in the voting booth; voters left the booth and walked back to the table to retrieve an envelope. In many cases, voters folded and stuffed envelopes within the sight of all of the polling workers, and on a number of occasions it was very easy to tell for whom voters had voted for president. This raised serious questions about the secrecy of the ballot for president.

A second problem concerning the ballot itself was the use of black ink for ballot printing and marking. It was difficult to find the stamp inside the boxes, especially on the ballots for deputy which contained twenty four pages or more of boxes.<sup>9</sup> During the tabulation procedure, the delegation witnessed many cases of polling workers looking through ballots several times in an effort to locate the "votat" stamp. This flaw was seriously complicated by the exhaustion which, by the morning of May 21, effected virtually every individual who worked the polls.

The very existence of the stamping provision is open to question. Does that method of ballot marking offer advantages not available through the simple marking of the ballot with a pen? Perhaps so, but these advantages were not readily apparent to the members of the delegation. Any advantages offered by this system should be weighed against the negatives created by such a system:

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<sup>9</sup>. In the Dimbovita Judet, one polling station used red ink instead of black. This resulted in a mark which was easily recognized and counted.

- a. The stamp often did not soak up enough ink to produce a good mark on all three ballots. The voter on many occasions was forced to leave the booth and have the stamp re-inked or have the ballot voided and reissued.
- b. Sometimes in the confusion of the crowded room the stamp was not returned. With the stamp supply reduced, further delays in voting were created.
- c. The stamp imprint was very difficult to see during the vote counting, due usually to the use of black ink or to the fact that the mark was faint and hardly visible.

#### 6. Campaign Propaganda Within 500 Meters of Polling Place

The delegation witnessed violations of the provision in the electoral law which prohibits the posting of election materials within 500 meters of a polling place. Although this occurred predominantly with FSN posters occurring around (and sometimes even inside) the polling place, the delegation also observed violations of this provision by other parties.

#### 7. Insufficient Voter Education

The degree to which the electorate was unprepared to vote was most striking throughout the polls visited. The Central Electoral Bureau held one broadcast which displayed the ballot and the method of casting a vote. Interviews with voters in the week before the election indicated that a majority had not seen these programs, and observations on election day showed the degree to which this lack of preparedness adversely affected the election.

The act of voting seemed to take, on the average, more than five minutes, with instances of voters taking up to fifteen minutes to cast votes. Because the polling workers only allowed voters into the room when ballot booths became vacant, the result was incredibly long lines of voters waiting to cast their ballots.

Instructions should have been printed both on the cover of the ballot and in clear view on the walls inside the polling station. The instructions should warn about stamping the ballot more than once, about placing the stamp within the box, and should alert the voter that if he/she does not follow the instructions his/her ballot could be disallowed.

Before the documentation for this election is destroyed, election authorities should scrutinize the records to identify the polling sites where ballot disallowance was high, and should review disallowed ballots to determine the reasons for disallowance. As a result of such evaluation, it will be possible to improve both

the voter information program and the ballot review process so that ballot disallowance is kept to a minimum.

#### 8. Vote Tabulation

The tabulation of the ballots, as in other stages of the process, showed some flaws. Perhaps the most basic flaw stemmed from the fact that there were at most nine, and usually fewer, polling station workers who were at once responsible for administering the entire election and counting the ballots following the closing of the polling station. These workers were extremely tired, even exhausted, by the time the polling station closed.

The level of exhaustion resulted in the tabulation procedure being altered in some polling stations. In one, the president allowed all members of the polling station to count the ballots separately instead of counting - and announcing in a loud voice - the results of each ballot himself.

In others, the delegation witnessed the president turn the ballots directly to the page on which the box from the National Salvation Front appeared. If the stamp was found in this box, the vote was recorded without further examination of the ballot. Technically, this is in violation of the electoral law, which requires that the ballot be examined thoroughly to ensure that only one vote stamp has been applied.

Another noteworthy, and easily correctable, problem with the tabulation procedure was the time consuming process of annulling unused ballots. Each unused ballot was annulled by handwriting "anulat" across the front cover and by drawing a line across every second page inside the ballot. This process alone, in some polling stations, took up to three hours. A far simpler, and less time consuming, procedure would be to count the unused ballots and seal them sacks.

The procedure following the completion of the count was also the source of confusion among many polling station presidents. In one, the president did not know where to send either the ballots or the reports upon the completion of the count.

Generally, the aggregation of the count from the polling station level to the judets level and from the judets level to the Central Electoral Bureau in Bucharest ran smoothly. Each Judet experienced a small number of polling stations which failed to report their totals within the 24 hour requirement, but this was statistically a small and insignificant number.

Reflections on the Balloting and Tabulation Procedures

The IFES delegation was offered full and unrestricted access to the Romanian electoral process. This allowed the delegation to observe and record nearly every stage of the administration of the election. There were, however, either because of the limited time available or the small size of the delegation, elements of the electoral process which the delegation was unable to address. These areas are deserving of study, and are enumerated below with the hope that future delegations will address them.

First, the delegation was unable to adequately address the ways in which complaints were resolved by the electoral bureaus. On only one occasion was the delegation shown an official complaint lodged with the polling station president.<sup>10</sup> When asked about complaints by the IFES delegation, CEB Chairman Zarnescu simply responded "there have been complaints and they will all be addressed."

Specifically, it would be useful to know the number of complaints filed, the number of complaints that were not rejected, and the number of complaints which were appealed to higher bodies. In addition to these quantitative questions, it would be extremely interesting to explore the nature of the complaints filed: which parties filed complaints, what were the complaints about.

A second area worthy of further study is the vote validation process. Specifically, how is the national tally validated by the Central Electoral Bureau. What mechanisms exist at the national level to check the tallies at the judet and polling level, and how were these mechanisms employed in the May 20 election.

The results of the May 20 election appear to accurately reflect the ballots cast by the electorate. On balance, the population was afforded an opportunity to cast votes in secret, without overt threat or intimidation. Ballots, in turn, appear to have been counted accurately. Although the implementation of the count at the polling station level was cumbersome and complicated, the aggregation of the votes to the Judet level and to the national level was efficient and effective.

It was also clear, however, that the process was not easily

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<sup>10</sup>. At the Peasants' Party headquarters in Giurgiu, members of the delegation were shown a formal complaint, typed and signed by a Peasants' Party polling station representative to the polling station president, of a breach of the electoral law. The president had written, by hand and across the top of the letter, that he had read the complaint and did not find reason to agree with it. This was sent back to the Peasants' Party representative, who indicated that he would not appeal.

understood by the electorate. This was a function of both complicated balloting procedures and an electorate poorly trained in how to vote. Furthermore, the irregularities, flaws and inconsistencies enumerated in this section are especially serious in that they present areas of potential fraud in future elections. It is hoped that the Romanian Government and the Central Electoral Bureau will benefit from the observations of this and other election observation teams as they re-examine their balloting and tabulation procedures.

#### IV. Election Results

##### RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Ion Iliescu	National Salvation Front	12,232,498	(85.07%)
Radu Campeanu	National Liberal Party	1,529,188	(10.16%)
Ion Ratiu	National Peasants' Party	617,007	(4.29%)

##### RESULTS OF THE ELECTION FOR THE SENATE

119 Seats Available

1. National Salvation Front	92 seats	9,353,006	(67.02%)
2. Hungarian Democratic Union	12 seats	1,004,353	(7.20%)
3. National Liberal Party	9 seats	985,094	(7.06%)
4. Romanian Unity Alliance	2 seats	300,473	(2.15%)
5. Romanian Ecological Movement	1 seat	341,478	(2.45%)
6. National Peasants' Party	1 seat	348,687	(2.50%)
7. Romanian Ecologist Party	1 seat	192,574	(1.38%)
8. Independents	1 seat		

##### RESULTS OF THE ELECTION FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF DEPUTIES

387 Seats Available

1. National Salvation Front	263 seats	9,089,659	(66.31%)
2. Hungarian Democratic Union	29 seats	991,601	(7.23%)
3. National Liberal Party	29 seats	879,290	(6.41%)
4. Romanian Ecological Movement	12 seats	358,864	(2.62%)
5. National Peasants' Party	12 seats	351,357	(2.56%)
6. Romanian Unity Alliance	9 seats	290,875	(2.12%)
7. Agrarian Democratic Party	9 seats	250,403	(1.83%)
8. Romanian Ecologist Party	8 seats	232,212	(1.69%)
9. Socialist Democratic Party	5 seats	143,393	(1.05%)
10. Social Democratic Party	2 seats		(0.53%)
11. Centrist Democratic Group	2 seats		(0.48%)
12. Labour Democratic Party	1 seat		(0.38%)
13. Free-Change Party	1 seat		(0.34%)
14. National Reconstruction Party	1 seat		(0.34%)
15. Free Democratic Youth Party	1 seat		(0.32%)
16. Germans' Democratic Forum	1 seat		(0.28%)
17. Bratianu Liberal Union	1 seat		(0.27%)
18. Romanies' Democratic Union	1 seat		(0.21%)

The final results of the election were announced on May 25. According to the Central Electoral Bureau, as reported in ROMPRES, 14,826,616 electors voted out of 17,200,722 registered voters (86.20 percent of registered voters) in the presidential election. Of the votes cast for president, 14,378,693 (96.98 percent) were valid and 447,923 (3.02 percent) were invalid.<sup>11</sup>

As expected, Ion Iliescu, the National Salvation Front candidate, was the winner. Iliescu received 12,232,498 votes (85.07 percent). Radu Campeanu, the National Liberal Party candidate, received 1,529,188 votes (10.16 percent), while Ion Ratiu, the National Peasants' Party-Christian and Democratic candidate, received 617,007 votes (4.29 percent).

In the Parliamentary elections, the National Salvation Front also won sizeable majorities. In the race for seats in the Senate, the National Salvation Front took 92 of 119 seats with 67% of the vote. In the elections for the Assembly of Deputies, the Front took 263 of 387 seats with 66% of the vote. There were approximately 886,000 invalid votes for the Senate 1,100,000 invalid votes for the Assembly of Delegates.<sup>12</sup>

While the victories of the Front in the Presidential and parliamentary elections were no great surprise, the margin of victory and the failure of the traditional parties to garner a larger percentage of the vote was somewhat unexpected. With approximately 7% of the national total, the National Liberal Party received 9 seats in the Senate and 29 seats in the Assembly of Delegates. Most striking, perhaps, was the poor showing of the National Peasants' Party, which only received 1 seat in the Senate and 12 seats in the Assembly of Delegates with approximately 2.5% of the national vote.

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<sup>11</sup>. This number and percentage was, in the view of the IFES delegation, unacceptably high when compared with the lower number and percentage in other new democracies. This is further evidence of the need to provide thorough and effective voter education prior to subsequent elections on the mechanics of casting a ballot.

<sup>12</sup>. Members of the delegation observed that many non-voted ballots (ballots on which no parties were stamped) were deposited in the ballot box, and that these ballots were classified as "invalid" rather than blank ballots. Thus, the discrepancy in invalid votes between the presidential and assembly elections appears to indicate that a number of voters cast ballots for the president and not for the assembly. One member of the delegation noted that in many states in the United States, a distinction is made between an "invalid" ballot - that is, one which has been incorrectly cast - and a ballot purposefully left blank.



With the poor showing of the traditional parties, the Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR) emerged as the second largest vote-getter in the parliamentary elections. With approximately 7.2% of the popular vote, the UDMR received 12 seats in the Senate and 29 seats in the Assembly. When asked about this result, representatives of the UDMR responded that the national total was almost exactly the result anticipated prior to the elections. However, the representatives were greatly surprised that this total was enough to emerge second -- almost the entire UDMR leadership anticipated that the traditional parties would finish with higher totals than the UDMR.

The difference between Ratiu's poor finish and Campeanu's somewhat respectable second-place finish can also be traced to the UDMR. Hungarians voted as a bloc both for the UDMR and for Campeanu. Interestingly, however, there was a perception among the representatives of the UDMR that Campeanu's popularity among the Hungarians, and the general cooperation between the UDMR and the National Liberal Party, might have cost Campeanu a significant amount of support among more nationalistic Romanians.

It should be anticipated that the vast majority of the 81 parties which contested seats in the May election will fold in the period leading up to the next election. It is not clear, however, whether or by whom these small parties will be replaced. It was widely anticipated, prior to the election, that one or two centrist parties would emerge from the election with enough of a mandate to begin building a center bloc. This did not occur.

## V. Conclusions

Although the balloting and tabulation procedures observed by the IFES delegation appeared to be, on the whole, fair, many on the IFES delegation were left with the overriding feeling that the "real" election was over well before May 20. The "real" election occurred in months leading up to polling day, during which the well endowed National Salvation Front was able to solidify its popular support while its opposition foundered in the face of violence and intimidation of its candidates and workers, unfair access to television and print media, and, perhaps most significantly, a population which, at times, seemed unsympathetic to the very democratic process which the opposition attempted to foster.

Nevertheless, it still seems possible to view the May 20 Romanian elections as a positive transitional step in the dramatic change which has occurred since the removal of Ceausescu in December, 1989. The basic ingredients of a democratic society seem to be growing in Romania. Political parties representing a wide range of viewpoints have grown. Civic organizations, the most important of which are the Students' League and the Group for Social Dialogue, play an important role in shaping the form of Romanian policy. The referee of democracy, a free press, has also

begun to develop. It is critical that these institutions, so fragile in these early stages of development, be allowed -- and encouraged -- to grow.

The advantages enjoyed and abused in the campaign period by the leadership of the National Salvation Front were clearly unfair. In a true democracy, however, it is ultimately the duty of the people to call to account poor leadership. These elections have created an opportunity for a pluralistic constituent assembly to work together in good faith towards the further democratization of Romania. If true democracy continues to develop, the Front will relinquish these advantages over the course of the next eighteen months or will, in the next election, be called to account by the people.

The FSN's landslide victory could also, ultimately, prove to be troublesome to the party. By gaining such a clear mandate, the Front will be solely accountable for the political, economic and social path of the nation in the eighteen months to come. The opposition, in no uncertain terms, has made it clear that they are not interested in forming a coalition. The only rationale for such a coalition ultimately emanates from the FSN -- a coalition would allow, to a certain degree, shared accountability.

Finally, the May 20 election in Romania was also striking in the absence of debate on real issues. Most obviously, the issue transforming the centralized economy into a more market-oriented economy was never elaborated by any of the major parties. If, as is expected, the FSN is unable to transform the Romanian economy into a productive and efficient machine, they could find themselves in the same unfortunate situation as did the Communist leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland approximately two years ago - the sole possessors of political accountability for seemingly insurmountable economic, political and social problems.

## VI. Recommendations

This report has outlined that flawed character of the campaign and the flaws, irregularities and inconsistencies of the balloting and tabulation process. Recommendations have been made throughout the report as problems were described. The following is a review of the primary measures -- both general and specific -- which should be taken over the next eighteen months to ensure that the process of democratization continues in Romania and that subsequent elections are not marred by the problems of the May 20 election.

1. The establishment of free and independent television, radio and newspapers. Any and all barriers to allowing the emergence of independent media should be removed by the constituent assembly and new government. Media should be encouraged to develop at both the national and regional levels. The international community should offer financial

and technical assistance to those Romanians interested in developing independent media.

2. The establishment of a national program of civic education in Romania. It is critical to increase the level of voter education prior to the next election. At a minimum, the electorate should enter the polls with a firm grasp of the basic principles of fair elections. Ideally, the electorate should be encouraged to become more active in the Romanian political process. The international community should offer financial and technical assistance to those Romanians interested in promoting civic education.
3. Condemnation of violence as a means of political expression. The Romanian government should, in both words and deeds, take steps to prevent the continuation of violence which has marred the character of politics in Romania for so many decades. The international community must in no uncertain terms condemn the use of violence in Romania by any government or political party.
4. Review and reform of the composition of polling station workers. Polling station staffs should be enlarged to accommodate the number of voters. The staffs should be provided effective training in balloting procedures, ideally in the form of a handbook on electoral rules and regulations. Workers should work in shifts of no longer than twelve hours.
5. Instructions in proper voting procedure should be posted in the polling station and printed on the cover of the ballot.
6. Voter assistance should be available to anyone who requests it, permitted only if requested, and should be provided by someone of the voter's choice. If the voter has no choice, assistance should be provided by the polling staff, ideally, by a bi-partisan pair of officials. All cases of voter assistance should be documented.
7. A new ballot should be developed. The ballots used in the May 20 election were printed on paper too thin to guarantee secrecy. The use of black ink to cast ballots on ballots printed in black ink caused problems in the tabulation stage of the election.

## Appendix A

IFES Delegation  
Romania Election Observer Mission  
May 16-25, 1990

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Thomas Whatman  
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International Foundation  
for Electoral Systems  
Washington, DC

## Appendix B

Romania Election Observer Mission  
 May 9-26, 1990  
 Itinerary

Wednesday, May 9

4:00 p.m. Josh Dorosin and Anca Hassing Depart IFES office for Dulles International Airport.

6:50 p.m. Depart Dulles for Frankfurt Pan Am 60

Thursday, May 10

9:00 a.m. Arrive Frankfurt  
 Meet Ronald O'Connor, Director of Worldwide Sales, Polaroid Corporation

12:15 p.m. Depart Frankfurt for Bucharest Pan Am 120

5:45 p.m. Arrive Bucharest

7:00 p.m. Check in at Hotel Lido  
 5 Boulevard Magheru  
 011-144-930-70161

9:00 p.m. Walk to University Square to observe student's demonstration.

Friday, May 11

9:30 a.m. Dorosin and O'Connor depart for Bucharest Airport. Pick-up four polaroid photo ID4 cameras and shipment of film, clips and chains for photo ID's.

11:00 a.m. Hassing attends Press Conference of Central Electoral Bureau, Intercontinental Hotel.

Panel: Ovidiu Zarnescu, President  
 Gheorghe Tinca, Chief, Section of Foreign Relations and Protocol.  
 Dumitru Tancu, Technical Advisor

12:30 p.m. Dorosin and O'Connor deliver photo equipment to Central Electoral Bureau headquarters.

3:00 p.m. Briefing by Brian Flora, Counselor for Political Affairs, US Embassy.

Saturday, May 12

Morning and  
Afternoon

Visits to two villages north of Bucharest: Gruiu, 30 km. from Bucharest and Snagov, 35 km. from Bucharest. Interview villagers about character of election campaign, attitudes toward upcoming election.

Sunday, May 13

11:00 a.m.

Meeting with Ion Radu Zilisteanu, leader of the National Democratic Party and vice-president of the parliamentary commission for labor and social assistance of the Provisional National Unity Council (PNUC).

Afternoon

Visit to the cemetery of the heroes of the revolution. Visit to Copaceni-Adunati village. Continue interviews with villagers.

Monday, May 14

10:00 a.m.

Meeting with Ovidiu Zarnescu, Chairman of the Central Electoral Bureau, and Gheorghe Tinca, Chief of Protocol, Central Electoral Bureau.

12:00 p.m.

Meeting with Mariana Celac, Group for Social Dialogue.

3:00 p.m.

Meeting with Marian Monteanu, President and Founder of the Students' League.

Evening

Meeting with interpreters and drivers on the observer mission.

Tuesday, May 15

9:15 a.m.

Meeting with Cornel Coposu, President of the National Peasants' Party, Christian and Democratic.

1:00 p.m.

Meeting with Ion Radoi, President of the National Peasants' Party Youth Organization, and Nicusor Lambrache, Leader of the same.

3:00 p.m.

Meeting with Miron Mitrea, President, and Adrian Cosmescu, Secretary of the Executive Bureau, Fratia-The Brotherhood Trade Union Confederation.

Wednesday, May 16

(Romania)

10:00 a.m. Meeting with Raoul Sorban, Vice-President of the Romanian Cultural Foundation.

Afternoon Meeting with interpreters and drivers on the observer mission.

(Washington, D.C.)

1:00 p.m. Delegates arrive at IFES for briefings  
1620 I Street, NW Suite 611

1:30 - 2:30 p.m. Briefing on IFES and on purpose and goals of mission.

2:30 - 3:45 p.m. Briefing on current political conditions in Romania by Rick Becker, Romania Desk Officer, U.S. Department of State

4:00 p.m. Depart IFES office for Dulles International Airport.

6:50 p.m. Depart Dulles for Frankfurt Pan Am 60

Thursday, May 17

9:00 a.m. Arrive Frankfurt

12:15 p.m. Depart Frankfurt for Bucharest Pan Am 120  
Rod Tuck meets delegation.

5:45 p.m. Arrive Bucharest  
Delegation met at airport by Josh Dorosin and Anca Hassing. Transfer to hotel.

7:00 p.m. Check in at Hotel Lido  
5 Boulevard Magheru  
011-144-930-70161

8:00 p.m. Dinner and briefing on formal schedule, political developments by Josh Dorosin and Anca Hassing.

Friday, May 18

9:00 a.m. Meeting with PNUC President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman. Victoria Palace.

10:30 a.m. Panel Discussion with representatives of the political parties, Hotel Bucharest Conference Hall.

Sorin Botez, Vice President and Secretary for Foreign Relations, National Liberal Party.  
Ion Diaconescu, National Peasants' Party.

12:30 p.m. Panel Discussion with members of the Group for Social Dialogue.

Thomas Kleininger, Vice President,  
Administrative Council.  
Alin Teodorescu  
Mariana Celac

1:30 p.m. Ion Iliescu and Ion Ratiu, Presidential Candidates Panel, Parliament Building.

4:00 p.m. Panel Discussion with Media Representatives.

Romeo Nadasan, General Secretary of Rompres.  
Nicolae Melinescu, Romanian Television News  
Romulus Caplescu, Adevarul  
Gelu Netea, Director, Viitorul  
Ilie Iliescu, Editor-in-Chief, Dreptatea  
Alexandru Dinca, Deputy Editor-in-Chief,  
Viitorul.

6:30 p.m. Reception at the residence of the US Ambassador.

8:30 p.m. Dinner at Casa Lido

Saturday, May 19

Morning Michael Radu and Thomas Whatman depart for Brasov. Judith Ingram and John Surina depart for Bacau.

Remaining delegates travel through Bucharest and adjoining judets.

Daily activities: Delegates visit Electoral Bureaus, party headquarters, candidates/campaign headquarters, and interview Romanians on electoral process.



Sunday, May 20

Daily activities: Delegates observe elections at polling locations. Delegates observe counting procedures after polling stations close.

Monday, May 21

Daily activities: Continue observing tabulation procedures, visit election bureaus, gauge reaction to election.

Tuesday, May 22

10:00 a.m. Press Conference, International Helsinki Federation, Hotel Continental.

12:00 p.m. Press Conference, British Observer Delegations, Hotel Intercontinental.

3:00 p.m. Meeting with Marian Celac, Group for Social Dialogue.

Afternoon Ingram, Surina, Whatman and Radu return to Bucharest.

7:00 p.m. Delegation reassembles for briefing on collective observation.

Wednesday, May 23

10:00 a.m. Meeting with Ovidiu Zarnescu, President, Central Electoral Bureau, and Gheorge Tinca, Chief of Protocol.

12:00 p.m. Press Conference, European Democratic Union, Intercontinental Hotel.

3:00 p.m. Press Conference, The Students' League. Law School Conference Hall.

Thursday, May 24

10:00 a.m. Meeting with Gabriel Andreescu, Group for Social Dialogue.

Afternoon Free time

Friday, May 25

7:20 a.m. Depart Bucharest Pan AM 121  
1:15 p.m. Depart Frankfurt for Dulles Pan Am 61  
4:20 p.m. Arrive Dulles International Airport

Saturday, May 26

8:10 a.m. Josh Dorosin departs Bucharest.  
Tarom 225  
1:15 p.m. Depart Frankfurt for Dulles Pan Am 61  
4:20 p.m. Arrive Dulles International Airport

Appendix C: List of Places and Polling Stations visited by IFES Delegation.

Bucharest, Giurgiu, and Dimbovita Judets

Bucharest, Sector 1, Polling Stations #1,2,3,6,7,8  
Lunguletu, Dimbovita Judet, Polling Station #174  
Poiana de Jos, Dimbovita Judet, Polling Station #209  
Pasarea, Ilfov Agricultural Sector, Polling Station #803  
Buftea, Polling Station #789  
Crevedia, Polling Station #132  
Luciana, Polling Station #106  
Cornesti, Polling Station #127  
Ploesti, Polling Station #20

Brasov and Covasna Judets

Brasov City, Polling Station #3  
Brasov City, Polling Station #65  
Village of Girein  
Village of Zizin, Polling Station #265  
Village of Prejmer, Polling Station #293  
Village of Intorbura Buzaulia, Polling Station #96  
Sjinta Gheorghe City, Polling Station #3  
Sjinta Gheorghe City, Polling Station #9  
Vilcele Village  
Araci Commune  
Bod Commune, Polling Station #170  
Bod Commune  
Ghimrav, Polling Station #1  
Brasov City, Polling Station #2  
Brasov City, Polling Station #15

Bacau and Harghita Judets

Bacua City, Polling Station #16  
Bacau City, Polling Station #43  
Bacua City, Polling Station #45  
Bacau City, Polling Station #63  
Village of Buhoci, Polling Station #165  
Village of Vultureni, Polling Station #371  
Village of Cotofanesti, Polling Station #182  
Moinesti, Polling Station #117  
Village of Poduri, Polling Station #299  
Village of Livezi, Polling Station #237



NEWS RELEASE  
May 24, 1990

For more information,  
contact Sarah Tinsley  
or Josh Dorosin at  
14.49.30 ext. 207/310.

Statement by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems  
on the May 20 Romanian election

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a Washington, D.C. based non-profit organization dedicated to the promotion of free and fair electoral systems, sent a ten-member international delegation of election specialists and experts to observe the May 20 Romanian election. Members of the delegation observed the election in some fifty pollings stations in three regions of Romania: Bucharest and adjoining judets, Brasov and adjoining judets, and the Bacau and Harghita judets. In addition, the delegation met with the National Salvation Front, the Hungarian Democratic Union, the National Liberal Party, the Peasants' Party, the Social Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, the Group for Social Dialogue, Fratia-Free Trade Union and the Students' League.

The IFES delegation was offered open access to all components of the electoral process during its visit to Romania. For this, the delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the Chairman and members of the Central Electoral Bureau and to those who worked in the bureau's office of protocol. The Central Electoral Bureau is commended for opening the electoral process to the IFES delegation and to all international observers.

The May 20 Romanian elections must be viewed as a transitional step in the dramatic change which has occurred since the removal of Ceausescu in December, 1989. The credit for the positive movement toward democracy must go to the Romanian people, a significant number of whom has embraced and expounded democratic principles with an enthusiasm worthy of emulation in many of today's western democracies.

The basic ingredients of a democratic society seem to be growing in Romania. Most importantly, free speech has returned. Political parties representing a wide range of viewpoints have burgeoned. Civic organizations, the most important of which are the Students' League and the Group for Social Dialogue, play an important role in shaping the form of Romanian politics. The referee of democracy, a free press, has also begun to develop.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS	Patricia Hutar Secretary	James M. Cannon	Richard B. Stone	FAX: (202) 452-0804
F. Clifton White Chairman	Robert C. Walker Treasurer	Charles T. Manatt	Randal C. Teague Counsel	
		Richard M. Scammon		

The composition of the constituent assembly created by the May 20 election appears to this delegation to reflect the political will of the people. The election has created an assembly charged with the drafting of a new constitution. The assembly displays pluralism, with a real and significant - if fragmented - opposition. The task at hand for this assembly is to create a constitution which will provide genuine guarantees for the continued development of democratic principles of government.

It must be noted, however, that by the standards of elections in countries with established democratic traditions, the delegation found that the electoral process showed significant procedural flaws. The delegation witnessed the following inconsistencies on election day:

1. Unauthorized persons providing unsolicited assistance to voters;
2. Unauthorized persons assisting in vote tabulation procedures. In two cases, individuals appointed as technical assistants by the mayors to assist in election day procedures remained after the close of the polls to assist in tabulation;
3. Technically inaccurate implementation of tabulation procedure;
4. Many instances of campaign propaganda within 500 meters of the polling stations, including instances of campaign materials inside the polling station;
5. Improperly sealed or unsealed ballot boxes;
6. Polling stations with only one party representative present to assist in election day procedures;
7. Inconsistent implementation of the national identification stamping procedures;
8. An electorate inadequately educated in proper voting procedures. This resulted in a great deal of confusion in the polling stations and in a slowing of the electoral process.

The above inconsistencies did not appear to influence profoundly the outcome of the election. However, measures should be taken to resolve these inconsistencies prior to subsequent elections in order to guarantee that future abuses do not occur. Finally, despite these inconsistencies, election officials at all levels must be commended for demonstrating remarkable diligence and dedication in serving the large turnout in extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

More troubling than these systemic faults on election day was the unwillingness by the President and Prime Minister of the Provisional National Unity Council to adequately respond to:

1. Genuine and documented instances of violence and intimidation of parties in opposition to the National Salvation Front in the period of election campaigning; and
2. Reasonable complaints by the same parties in the same period of unfair access to radio, television and print media.

Although this delegation did not find evidence to support allegations of conspiracy by the collective leadership of the National Salvation Front against the political opposition, the unwillingness of the President and Prime Minister to acknowledge and to take timely and adequate measures to correct these blatant abuses had a significant inhibiting impact upon the freeness and fairness of the campaign. It is the responsibility of good government to administer faithfully and fairly its own stated policy. Provisional National Unity Council President Iliescu, in our estimation, failed at this important task.

The advantages enjoyed and abused in the campaign period by the leadership of the National Salvation Front were, in our estimation, clearly unfair. In a true democracy, however, it is ultimately the duty of the people to call to account poor leadership. If true democracy continues to develop, the Front will relinquish these advantages over the course of the next eighteen months or will, in the next election, be called to account by the people of Romania.

These elections have created an opportunity for a pluralistic constituent assembly to work together in good faith towards the democratization of Romania. It now remains for the leadership of Romania to prove to the international community, through leading this assembly in the drafting of a constitution which eliminates any and all obstacles for normal political activity, its commitment to democratic principles.

# România liberă

ANUL XLVIII  
Nr. 14163

(Serie nouă  
nr. 129)

DUMINICĂ  
27 MAI 1990

4 PAGINI - 1 LEU

ZIAR INDEPENDENT, DE OPINIE, INFORMAȚIE ȘI REPORTAJ

## Declarația Fundației Internaționale pentru Sisteme Electorale despre alegerile de la 20 mai din România

Fundația Internațională pentru Sistemele Internaționale (FISI) o organizație non-profit cu sediul în Washington D.C., care își consacră eforturile promovării unor sisteme electorale libere și corecte, a trimis o delegație internațională de 10 membri formată din specialiști și experți ca observatori la alegerile din România din 20 mai. Membrii delegației au fost observatori în aproximativ 30 de secții de votare din trei raioane: București și județele adiacente - Brașov și județele adiacente și în județele Bacău și Harghita. În afară de asta delegația s-a întâlnit cu Frontul Salvării Naționale, cu Uniunea Democrată Maghiară, Partidul Național Liberal, Partidul Național Tărănesc creștin și democratic, Partidul Social-Democrat, Partidul Național Democrat, Grupul pentru Dialog Social, Sindicatul Liber Frăția și Liga Studenților.

Delegației FISI i s-a oferit acces neingrădit la toate componentele procesului electoral pe durata vizitei sale în România.

Pentru aceasta delegația dorește să-și exprime aprecierile față de președinție și membrii Biroului Electoral Central și față de cei care au lucrat în biroul de protocol. Biroul Electoral Central este mandatat să deschidă procesul electoral central pentru delegația FISI și pentru toți observatorii internaționali.

Alegerile de la 20 mai din România trebuie privite ca o perioadă tranzitorie în schimbările dramatice care au apărut de la înălțarea lui Ceaușescu în decembrie 1989. Creditul pentru mișcarea pozitivă către democrație trebuie acordat poporului român din care un mare număr au îmbrățișat și ex-

(Urmare din pag. 1)

pus principiile democratice cu un entuziasm demn de a fi urmată de multe democrații occidentale contemporane.

Se pare că elementele de bază ale unei societăți democratice apar acum în România. Cel mai important, a reapărut libertatea de expresie. Partidele politice prezentând o gamă largă de puncte de vedere au înflorit. Organizațiile civice, dintre care cele mai importante sînt Liga Studenților și Grupul pentru Dialog Social joacă un rol important în politica românească. Dispușele privind democrația, o presă liberă au început de asemenea să se dezvolte.

Componenta adunării constituante creată de alegerile din 20 mai oglindește din punctul de vedere al acestei delegații, voința poporului. Alegerile au creat o adunare investită cu redactarea noii constituții. Adunarea reflectă pluralismul cu o opoziție reală și semnificativă, chiar dacă este fragmentată. Sarcina imediată a acestei adunări este să redacteze constituția care va da garanții adevărate pentru continuarea procesului de dezvoltare a principiilor democratice de guvernare.

Totuși trebuie să notăm că după criteriile electorale din țări cu tradiții democratice stabilite, delegația a găsit că procesul electoral a avut imperfecțiuni procedurale semnificative. Delegația a constatat următoarele nereguli în ziua alegerilor.

1. Persoane neautorizate acordau nesolicitate asistența celor care votau;

2. Persoane neautorizate asistau la procedurile de numărare a voturilor. În două cazuri persoane numite ca asistenți tehnici de către primar pentru a asista la procedurile electora-

le de peste zi au rămas după închiderea secțiilor pentru a asista la numărătoare;

3. Folosirea neadecvată din punct de vedere tehnic a modului de numărare;

4. De multe ori propaganda electorală efectuată la o distanță mai mică de 500 metri de secția de votare, inclusiv materiale de propagandă electorală în circa de votare;

5. Urne nesigilate sau prost sigilate;

6. Secții de votare cu numai un reprezentant de la un singur partid pentru a asista la votare;

7. Realizarea necorespunzătoare a procedurilor de identificare a stampilelor la scară națională.

8. Un electorat slab pregătit în procedurile de votare. Aceasta a dus la confuzii la secțiile de votare și la încetinirea procesului electoral.

Neregulile de mai sus nu par a fi influențat profund rezultatul alegerilor. Totuși, ar trebui luate măsuri pentru îndreptarea unor astfel de nereguli înaintea alegerilor viitoare pentru a garanta că nu vor apărea abuzuri în viitor. În final, în ciuda acestor nereguli, oficialitățile electorale trebuie mandate pentru că au dat dovadă de mare răbdare și devotament față de numărul mare de oameni în condiții foarte dificile.

Mult mai îngrijorător decât aceste greșeli sistematice în ziua alegerilor a fost lipsa de bunăvoință a președintelui și a primului ministru al C.P.U.N. de a răspunde în mod adecvat la următoarele:

1. Exemple reale și documentate de violență și intimidare a partidelor din opoziție de către FSN în perioada campaniei electorale și

2. Plingerile întemelte ale celorlalte partide pe parcursul a-

celelalte perioade de acces înădecvat la radio, televiziune și presa scrisă.

Deși această delegație nu a găsit dovezi care să sprijine acuzațiile de conspirație ale conducerii colective a FSN împotriva opoziției politice, lipsa de bunăvoință a președintelui și a primului ministru să la cunoștință și să ia măsuri din timp și adecvate pentru a corecta aceste abuzuri flagrante nu au avut un impact semnificativ de inhibare a libertății și corectitudinii campaniei. Este sarcina guvernului să asigure o politică de stat de bună credință și cinstită. Președintele C.P.U.N. Ion Iliescu, în opinia noastră, a eșuat în această sarcină importantă.

Avantajele de care s-a bucurat și a abuzat în timpul campaniei electorale conducerea FSN, sînt, după opinia noastră total nedrepte. Într-o democrație adevărată, totuși, este datoria poporului în primul rînd să tragă la răspundere o conducere pronată. Dacă o adevărată democrație va continua să se dezvolte, Frontul sau va trebui să renunțe la aceste avantaje în timpul celor 18 luni care vor veni sau va trebui, la viitoarele alegeri, să dea socoteală poporului român.

Aceste alegeri au creat ocazia pentru o adunare constituantă de diverse coloraturi care să lucreze împreună în bună credință pentru democratizarea României. Este acum de datoria conducerii României să dovedească comunității internaționale prin modul în care va conduce această adunare în elaborarea unei constituții care să elimine toate obstacolele din calea unei activități politice normale, hotărîrea ei de a aplica principiile democratice. (urmează semnăturile și calitățile membrilor delegației).

Continuare în pag. a 4-a)

## Appendix F: Commodities and training provided by IFES

Training:

1. Training in the administration of large scale accreditation procedures and in the use of Polaroid camera systems by:

Ronald R. O'Connor  
Director  
Government Identification  
Systems  
Polaroid Corporation  
575 Technology Square  
Cambridge, MA 02139

Terrence E. Dalton  
Worldwide Project Manager  
Government Identification  
Systems  
Polaroid Corporation  
575 Technology Square  
Cambridge, MA 02139

Commodities:

1. Four Polaroid ID4 System Cameras (loaned by Polaroid Corporation)
2. Ten Cases Type 669 Polaroid Film
3. 6000 Badge Clips
4. 6000 Neckchains 30 inch NPS
5. 6000 Printed Data Cards to Specification
6. Twelve boxes Polaroid Laminate #823
7. Three hand held slot punches



P

ROMÂNIA

BULETIN DE VOT

PENTRU ALEGEREA PREȘEDINTELUI ROMÂNIEI

20 MAI 1990

Circumscripția electorală Nr. 41

FRONTUL SALVĂRII  
NAȚIONALE



ILIESCU ION

PARTIDUL  
NAȚIONAL-LIBERAL



CĂMPEANU RADU

PARTIDUL NAȚIONAL  
ȚĂRĂNESC — creștin și  
democrat



RĂȚIU ION



# ROMÂNIA

## BULETIN DE VOT PENTRU ALEGEREA SENATULUI

20 MAI 1990

Circumscripția electorală Nr. 41

**ANULAT**

PARTIDUL DREPTĂȚII SOCIALE  
(NOUA DEMOCRAȚIE) DE NORD-  
VEST din ROMANIA

1. DIACONU GHEORGHE
2. DJIMA SORIN
3. PANAITI  
CONSTANTIN-ION

PARTIDUL  
ECOLOGIST ROMAN



1. MANOLACHE ADRIAN
2. VASILESCU VALENTIN
3. BRATU CONSTANTIN-  
ALEXANDRU

PARTIDUL NAȚIONAL  
ȚĂRĂNESC CREȘTIN ȘI  
DEMOCRAT



1. IACOB CAIUS
2. DUMITRESCU CONSTANTIN
3. POPA STELIAN
4. GHIGA MIHAIL-IONEL
5. MIHAILA MIHAIL
6. OPRICA MIHAI-HORIA
7. ELEFTERESCU DUMITRU
8. CHISTRUGA ALEXIE
9. CIUBREAG ION
10. ZAIT CONSTANTIN
11. NIȚA OPREA
12. RAICA FLORICA-RĂDIȚA
13. MARIA ACHIM
14. MACOVEI C. IOAN

PARTIDUL TINERETULUI  
LIBER DEMOCRAT DIN  
ROMANIA




1. AFRIM MARCEL
2. LEONĂCHESCU NICOLAE
3. DINCĂ PETRE
4. BENEĂ ION

PARTIDUL ALIANȚA  
PENTRU DEMOCRAȚIE



1. VOICULESCU MIHAI
2. IGREȚ ION
3. PETRESCU VALERIU-IOAN
4. GRIGORIU JEAN EMIL

PARTIDUL LIBERAL  
(AL LIBERTAȚII) DIN  
ROMANIA



1. APOSTOLESCU HARALAMBIE-DUMITRU
2. MUNTEANU EMIL
3. POPESCU ȘTEFAN
4. ȘERBAN LEONARD
5. TUDUCE ANTON
6. VOICU DUMITRU
7. SMARANDIU NICOLAE
8. POPESCU MARCEL
9. GEORGESCU MIHAIL
10. MATEI DIMITRIE
11. PREJBEANU NICOLAE
12. DOBRICEANU MICHAELA
13. LEORDA CONSTANTIN
14. VUZITAS GHEORGHE

PARTIDUL UNIUNEA  
REPUBLICANA




1. IOANA NICOLAE
2. NIȚU M. GHEORGHE
3. GHERMAN TUDOR
4. MUȘAT AURELIAN
5. DRAGOMIR TRAIAN CAIUS
6. ANGHEL PETRE
7. ELIN MIHAI
8. PITUȚ GHEORGHE
9. GRIGORESCU DINU
10. IOVAN ION
11. GRĂNESCU HARALAMBIE

UNIUNEA  
DEMOCRATĂ A  
ROMILOR  
DIN ROMANIA

1. CIOABĂ ION

PARTIDUL RADICAL  
DEMOCRAT  
BUCUREȘTI



1. CARJEAN ION RINDUNEL AUREL

PARTIDUL VIITORUL  
DEMOCRAT  
AL PATRIEI



1. MIRILA ION
2. DIACONESCU A. VASILE
3. VERNESCU JAK

**ANULAT**

ALIANȚA  
PENTRU UNITATEA  
ROMÂNILOR -- A.U.R.



1. MICU DUMITRU
2. ZAMFIRESCU VIRGIL
3. BREAZU OCTAVIAN
4. CRISTESCU MIRCEA

UNIUNEA CREȘTIN  
ORTODOXA



1. CIOBANU EUGEN
2. BALĂNOIU CORNELIA

FRONTUL SALVĂRII  
NAȚIONALE



1. MANOLIU LIA
2. VULPESCU ROMULUS
3. ANAGNOSTE VICTOR
4. BIRLADEANU ALEXANDRU
5. SOARE V. MIRCEA
6. TATU NECULAI SEMION
7. COTEANU ION
8. PIRU ALEXANDRU
9. CAJAL NICOLAE
10. TUGULEA ANDREI
11. BĂRBULESCU CONSTANTIN
12. IONESCU VICTOR MARIUS
13. BESOIU ION
14. FOCHIANU VASILE

PARTIDUL  
RECONSTRUCȚIEI  
NAȚIONALE  
DIN ROMANIA



1. AGAPESCU ILIR
2. IACOB PAULA
3. CIOFLAN EMIL

PARTIDUL LIBER  
SCHIMBIST



1. GROZA VASILE
2. TRICOLICI CHIRIE
3. CIOBANU MIRCEA
4. ULMU BOGDAN
5. BANCU THEODOR
6. RIZESCU DINU NICULAE
7. IONESCU ANDREI FLORIN
8. JURCĂ EMIL
9. POPESCU N. CORNELIU
10. SCRIPCARIU DRAGOȘ
11. COSTINESCU PETRE-ȘTEFAN-VLAD
12. COSTA CONSTANTIN
13. RADU MARIA

UNIUNEA LIBERALA  
„BRĂTIANU”

1. GOLIMĂȘ AUREL
2. CUZA IOAN
3. ȘTEFĂNESCU DINU
4. GHEORGHE ION
5. BERCIU DUMITRU
6. GHEORGHIU DELIA-  
BEATRICE
7. DOBREANU DAN-EMANOIL
8. ALBU BUJOR
9. GULER GHEORGHE
10. ORZAN PETRU
11. OPREA DUMITRU
12. BERGHEȘ COSTICA

PARTIDUL  
DEMOCRAT AGRAR  
DIN ROMANIA



1. DUMITRESCU MARIN (PUIU)
2. IONESCU SISEȘTI-VLAD
3. BOLD ION
4. OHANESIAN DAVID
5. HARTIA SERGHIE

PARTIDUL ROMAN PENTRU  
NOUA SOCIETATE

1. BOZDOG NICOLAE

**ANULAT**

PARTIDUL SOCIALIST  
DEMOCRATIC ROMÂN



1. SIMU ION
2. PODANI DUMITRU-MIRCEA
3. DUMITRU IOAN
4. DĂDĂRLAT MARIA
5. GLODEANU ANTONETA
6. ICONARU ION
7. TEODORESCU ROMEO-  
CONSTANTIN
8. MANEA VICTORIA-MARIA
9. POPESCU GABRIELA
10. NIȚESCU DAN-NICOLAE
11. VIȚION DUMITRA
12. STRATULAT VASILE
13. ANDREIANA NECULAIU
14. SANDEȚCHI MIRCEA

PARTIDUL UMANITAR  
AL PĂCII



1. TIPA TOADER

PARTIDUL PENTRU CINSTIREA  
EROILOR REVOLUȚIEI ȘI  
SALVARE NAȚIONALĂ

1. ANTONESCU IOAN
2. ȘERBAN OVIDIU

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
CONSTITUȚIONAL



1. ADRIAN CONSTANTIN
2. CIOCIOC GEORGE-MIRCEA
3. NUTU CONSTANTIN
4. PETRE IOAN
5. BĂNESCU MIRCEA
6. MIHAI MARIAN

PARTIDUL  
NAȚIONAL ROMÂN



1. MOSCU FLORIN-EMIL



PARTIDUL  
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT  
ROMÂN



1. STĂNESCU ISTRU RADU-MIRCEA
2. DIMITRESCU RADU-ALEXANDRU
3. CONSTANTINESCU CONSTANTIN
4. PLEȘA EMIL
5. ALEXE GH. FLORIN-NICULAE
6. BOTEANU MATEI
7. CUNESCU CONSTANTIN
8. SELARU MIRCEA
9. APOSTOL ION
10. DOBRESCU LEONTE
11. BRĂTESCU GHEORGHE
12. GHECIU RADU
13. ZAMFIRESCU T. DUMITRU

GRUPAREA  
DEMOCRATICA  
DE CENTRU



1. GERVENI NICULAE
2. GRIGORESCU ALEXANDRU
3. GROSU ANDREI
4. ȘMINA ZISU
5. COSTACHE N. ADRIAN
6. NICOLESCU MIRCEA SERBAN
7. PETRESCU ELENA
8. GEORGESCU GEORGETTA
9. PAPADOPOL ECATERINA-VIOLETA
10. AUREL IONESCU
11. APOSTOLESU VICTORIA
12. IORDACHE MARCEL
13. GRFCHE ELENA
14. STRACHINARU DUMITRU

PARTIDUL MUNCH



1. ONOFREI VALERIU
2. MIHAILĂ ȘTEFAN

**ANULAT**

UNIUNEA  
POLONEZILOR DIN  
ROMANIA  
„DOM POLSKI“



1. RAINER MIHAI

PARTIDUL MIȘCAREA  
„TINARA DEMOCRATIE“

1. RAȘNOVEANU CONSTANTIN

GRUPAREA DE CENTRU  
„NOUA ROMANIA“

1. SUSANU GHEORGHE  
2. CANA IONEL

MIȘCAREA  
ECOLOGISTA DIN  
ROMANIA



1. BLEAHU MARCIAN  
2. PASCU VIRGIL  
3. FAĞARĂȘANU GABRIELA  
4. MATEESCU DELIA-OLGA  
5. IONESCU GABRIELA  
6. RADULESCU MIHAI  
7. MIHAILA GHEORGHE  
8. DANET GHEORGHE  
9. DUMITRACHE VASILE  
10. KHIRCOR NICOLAE  
11. TEODORESCU CORNELIU  
12. MODORCEA MITICĂ-PIIU  
13. CONSTANTINESCU MARIAN  
14. LUPAȘCU ALEXANDRU

PARTIDUL  
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT  
CREȘTIN ROMÂN



1. VIȘINESCU CONSTANTIN  
2. DÂNCIULESCU IONEL

PARTIDUL  
NAȚIONAL-LIBERAL



1. CĂMPEANU RADU-ANTON
2. SANDULESCU IONEL
3. NEGROPONTES MARIA-SANDA (TĂTARESCU)
4. REBENGIUC VICTOR-GEORGE
5. ȚEȚU MARIA-MATILDA
6. POPESCU-NECȘEȘTI ADRIAN
7. MANOLESCU NICOLAE
8. IONESCU CALINEȘTI MIHAIL-ANTON
9. BOGDAN GEORGE
10. PASCU NADEJDA
11. CARAMZULESCU MIHAIL
12. LEONTE DINU-IOAN
13. POPESCU NEGREANU TIBERIU
14. SOARE GH. ION

PARTIDUL MUNCII ȘI  
DREPTĂȚII SOCIALE  
DIN ROMANIA

1. DOBRESCU VASILE EMILIAN
2. STEGARU CORNELIU
3. VEZURE NICULAE
4. UNGUREANU ORESTE
5. ANTONESCU ION
6. CĂMĂRZAN DUMITRU

UNIUNEA  
DEMOCRAT CREȘTINA



1. IONESCU BOGDAN
2. ȘTEFĂNESCU PAUL
3. CONSTANTINESCU CONSTANTIN
4. MATEȘIU OCTAVIAN
5. SĂVESCU MIRCEA
6. PICULESCU STELIAN
7. TANASE GHEORGHE
8. NASUI V. GHEORGHE

PARTIDUL NAȚIONAL  
PROGRESIST



1. BĂNAC VICTOR
2. ANTONACHE CONSTANTIN

PARTIDUL  
CASA ROMANA  
A EUROPEI  
DEMOCRATICE



1. VIȘOIU DORINEL
2. DUMBRĂVĂ NICOLAE
3. MISCHIE SERGIU
4. GRIGOR MIHAI

PARTIDUL COOPERATIST  
FILIALA MUNICIPIULUI  
BUCUREȘTI



1. DÂNGĂ DUMITRU
2. BULUMEFE DUMITRU
3. NEAȚU CORNELIU
4. CILIBIA VASILE
5. NEAMȚU MIRCEA
6. MITROFAN ȘTEFAN
7. CRISTEA VANGHELE
8. BARBULESCU NICOLAE
9. ARMEANU CRAUCIUC  
FEVRONIA CONSTANȚA
10. CIOBANU MIHAIL
11. PASCU MĂRIUCA
12. CAZAN ALEXANDRU
13. SECĂREANU MIHAI
14. RUSE ȘTEFAN

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
AL MUNCII



1. AVRAM I. IOAN
2. DOBRESCU C. RADU
3. PĂNESCU CONSTANTIN
4. CONSTANTINESCU VIRGILIU
5. MOISESCU ANTON
6. DINUȚ NICOLAE
7. BALĂSOIU NICOLAE-ION

PARTIDUL ECOLOGIST  
UMANIST FONDAT ÎN  
ARAD



1. SIMIONESCU SIMICEL PAUL
2. HOTĂRAN CĂLIN MARCEL

PARTIDUL  
ȚĂRĂNESC ROMAN



1. MANOLE DIONISIE

PARTIDUL  
REPUBLICAN  
CREȘTIN  
DIN ROMANIA



1. POPILEAN GHEORGHE  
2. COSTACHE GH. CONSTANTIN

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
PROGRESIST



1. MOISESCU ZAMFIR

LISTA DE CANDIDAȚI  
INDEPENDENȚI

CUCIUREANU ADRIAN  
ANDREI CONSTANTIN

PARTIDUL UNITĂȚII  
DEMOCRATICE  
NUCLEUL CENTRAL  
BUCUREȘTI



1. POPESCU HRISTACHE  
2. ZAHARESCU RADU  
3. BOERIU PETRU-AURELIAN  
4. HOMOCEA DUMITRU  
5. SCHIOPIRLAN VERGILIU  
6. PANACHE PAUL

LISTA DE CANDIDAȚI  
INDEPENDENȚI

PALER OCTAVIAN  
DAMIAN ASCANIO  
CRETIA PETRU AUREL  
DUMITRESCU SORIN  
MARCHIS IOAN  
PESAMOSCA ALEXANDRU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
OCULESCU DAN ALEXANDRU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
GRIGORE MARIN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
CURELEA B. IULIAN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
CRISTESCU DUMITRU  
OLGA VIORICA

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
BERCAN MIRCEA

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
LUPOI MIHAIL

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
MIHAIL POPESCU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
ISTODORESCU STELIANA

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
RADULESCU OCTAVIAN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
RAI ILIE MIRCEA

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
NEDEA MARIN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
PEREȚEANU ANDREI

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
MOGOȘANU GHEORGHE

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
VĂCĂROIU ANDRE EUGEN  
CRISTIAN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

MARINESCU  
CONSTANTIN



CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
MOȚIU DOINA MARIANA





D

ROMÂNIA

ANULAT

BULETIN DE VOT

PENTRU ALEGEREA ADUNĂRII DEPUTAȚILOR

20 MAI 1990

Circumscripția electorală Nr. 41

PARTIDUL NAȚIONAL  
TĂRĂNESCU-CREȘTIN ȘI  
DEMOCRAT




1. DIACONESCU ION
2. CONSTANTINESCU  
CONSTANTIN CLAPS
3. IONESCU-GALBENI  
NICOLAE VASILE
4. LAZĂRESCU PAUL
5. MACARIE SERGIU
6. GHIKA CONSTANTIN
7. WARIN SILVIA-NARCISA
8. ANTONIU IOAN
9. VASILE RADU
10. DRAGOMIRESCU ADRIANA
11. AMZUȚĂ CONSTANTIN
12. ENESCU GH. ION
13. COMĂNESCU GHEORGHE
14. BARBARESSO EMANOIL-DAN
15. GREGORIAN NICULAE
16. POPA MIRCEA-IOAN
17. ILIE MINODORA
18. STĂNESCU GHEORGHE-DAN
19. IACOVESCU ANDREI
20. TEODORESCU DUMITRU
21. IONESCU CONSTANTIN
22. PANĂ EMILIA
23. SILVESTRU MARIUS
24. TEODORESCU ION-EUGEN
25. IONESCU CORNELIU
26. POPA MIRCEA-ALEXANDRU
27. STĂNESCU CEZAR
28. HÂNCU CRISTIANA-MARIA
29. DIMITRIU LELIA-MIOARA
30. COSEAC TEODOR-GABRIEL
31. DINUȚA IOAN
32. PUȚUREANU MARIUS-  
ADRIAN
33. CUZEA VALENTIN
34. PĂUNESCU M. COSTEL
35. PASCALE FELICIA
36. RĂDULESCU SERBAN-  
ALEXANDRU-VICTOR
37. COTINGHIU MIHAIL
38. POPESCU RADU-MIRCEA
39. LEUCUȚIA CORNEL

PARTIDUL ECOLOGIST  
ROMÂN



1. WEBER ERNEST OTTO
2. TUDOR GHEORGHE
3. GRUIA LUCIAN
4. RĂDULESCU SORIN-  
GABRIEL
5. PRODAN SORIN-MARGARIT
6. SUIU ION
7. STOICUȚ CRISTIANA
8. NISIPEANU TEODORA
9. CREANGĂ ANTON

PARTIDUL TINERETULUI  
LIBER DEMOCRAT  
DIN ROMÂNIA



1. TODIRĂȘ IOAN
2. RAICU ROMEO
3. ZAHARIA VALENTIN-AMATO
4. ILIE CRISTIAN
5. NAE DINCĂ-EDUARD
6. ZLOTEA SEVASTIAN
7. SAVIN GHEORGHE
8. BOTAR REMUS

PARTIDUL  
ALIANȚA PENTRU  
DEMOCRAȚIE




1. NEGOIȚA VASILE
2. MAFTEI V. IOAN
3. VLAD ROMULUS
4. BUCATA LUCIAN
5. COTOR GABRIEL
6. VLAD ȘTEFANIA
7. TATOMIR SORIN
8. BUCATA COSTEL
9. VEZUREANU D-TRU
10. GROMIC GEORGE-DAN

PARTIDUL LIBERAL  
(AL LIBERTĂȚII)  
DIN ROMÂNIA



1. APOSTOL DAN-CONSTANTIN
2. DUMITRESCU BOGDAN
3. ȘERBAN CARMEN
4. NICOLAE M. DAN-LIVIU
5. ZAMFIR MIHAI
6. BENGĂ MARIAN
7. MERIȘANU NICOLAE
8. PALOȘ NICOLETA-CORNELIA
9. RETAS MATEI
10. RADULESCU ADRIAN
11. RADU HOMER
12. GOJA DAN
13. NEPOTEAN LAURENȚIU
14. CHIRIȚA DUMITRU-MARIAN
15. IONESCU MARIN
16. DINU NARCIS-IULIAN
17. HOPU ADELINA
18. GRAUR GABRIELA
19. COVACI IOSIF
20. LUPU ALEXANDRU DUMITRU
21. BARBULESCU DAN-MIRCEA
22. NAUM ANDREEA
23. VIȘOIU GHEORGHE
24. STOIAN VALERIU
25. LUPU ALEXANDRINA
26. CORAJ DUMITRU
27. IONESCU CRISTIAN-TEODOR
28. BUZATU ILIE
29. ȘECIU DAN-TEODOR
30. MOȚ LUCIA-MARIA
31. TOMA VASILICA
32. CONSTANTIN MARIA
33. BUDEANU ȘTEFAN
34. ENESCU ION
35. MICU VIOREL
36. BUDE MARIANA
37. ANGHEL VALENTIN
38. BABAN DRAGOȘ-ARMAND
39. IONESCU MARIAN

PARTIDUL RADICAL  
DEMOCRAT  
BUCUREȘTI



1. COSTEF FLORIAN
2. CARJEAN VICTORIA
3. ISTRATE GEORGE

UNIUNEA CREȘTINA  
DIN  
ROMÂNIA



1. POP. GHEORGHE
2. EREMIA MIRELA
3. DAN ION

PARTIDUL UNIUNEA  
REPUBLICANA



1. DEAC MIRCEA
2. IUGA GABRIEL
3. SMĂRANDESCU VASILE
4. NIȚU MIHAI
5. ANDREESCU CRISTIANA  
RODICA
6. ONEȘEANU D-TRU DAN  
IOAN
7. ONEȘEANU IRINA
8. NICULESCU ALEXANDRU

UNIUNEA DEMOCRATA  
A ROMILOR DIN ROMÂNIA

1. RĂDUCANU GHEORGHE
2. NICOLAE GHEORGHE
3. IVAN GHEORGHE
4. IONIȚA ȘTEFAN

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
ECOLOGIST  
ORGANIZAȚIA  
MUNICIPIULUI  
BUCUREȘTI



1. ANGHELUȚA VADINEANU

PARTIDUL VIITORUL  
DEMOCRAT AL PATRIEI



1. PETRIA EUGENIU-DRAGOȘ
2. CHIRIAC SERGIU
3. ȘURLIN LIANA-ANCA-MARIA
4. MAZAT GH. PETRE
5. MILEA ALEXANDRINA-IOANA
6. MIRCESCU CORNELIA
7. ILIESCU GABRIEL
8. DIACONIUC SERIOIA
9. BOLOVAN MARIA
10. CHIRIȚA MARIANA
11. STAN IOANA
12. ILIESCU ROMIO

PARTIDUL MIȘCAREA  
DEMOCRAȚIA  
MODERNA



1. POPESCU ALEXANDRU
2. DRAGOMIRESCU RADU
3. APOSTOLESCU CONSTANTIN
4. IONESCU CONSTANTIN
5. TUCA ION
6. MARTON MIHAI
7. TILICĂ ELEONORA-ALEXANDRA
8. POPESCU MIHAI
9. MIHAI I. MATEI
10. DRAGOMIRESCU MARIA

ALIANȚA  
PENTRU UNITATEA  
ROMÂNILOR — A.U.R.



1. STAMANICHI ION
2. CRAUCIUC OLIMPU
3. VASILESCU PAVELESCU IOAN
4. TINJALA MEDREA CORNELIU
5. ROMILĂ FLORIN ALEXANDRU
6. PATRU VALENTIN
7. ENESCU DAN GHEORGHE
8. BADEA SORIN-MIHAIL
9. NEGRUȚU VIRGIL EUGEN
10. BREAZU DANIELA-VIORICA
11. NISTOR N. ION
12. BIBIRI OCTAVIAN
13. GEORGESCU SILVIU
14. CREANGA LUCIA SIMONA
15. SIMENY NAGY LAUR-MIHAIL
16. DUMITRU PROFIRA
17. BANICĂ VIOREL

FRONTUL SALVĂRII  
NAȚIONALE



1. ROMAN PETRE
2. DIJMARESCU EUGEN
3. NASTASE ADRIAN
4. ZAMFIR BASARAB CĂTALIN
5. ZAHARIA CORNELIU DAN
6. GOLU MIHAIL
7. NICULESCU DUVAZ BOGDAN  
NICOLAE
8. SEVERIN ADRIAN
9. SCORTAN GHEORGHE  
DORIN
10. SORESCU CONSTANTIN
11. BABIUC VICTOR
12. MIHAIESCU TEODOR HORIA
13. MUREȘAN LIVIU
14. BOTNARU SORIN THEODOR
15. SARAFOLEANU DORIN
16. DOCHIA AURELIAN
17. CRĂSNARU DANIELA  
CARMEN
18. CANACHEU COSTICĂ
19. VOICU MIHAI
20. GEORGESCU ADRIAN
21. MANOLE GHEORGHE
22. LIXANDROIU VIOREL
23. COSMIN VICTORIA
24. MUȘĂTESCU OVIDIU  
TIBERIU
25. ILIESCU NICOLAU AGATA
26. IANCU MIHAI
27. FLEACĂ DANUȚ IOAN
28. IONESCU SMARANDA
29. MIREA STELIAN CORNELIU
30. MIHAIESCU TEODORA  
DORINA
31. GĂVĂLIUGOV CORNELIU  
DORIN
32. PAVLU MIRCEA
33. RADU AURICA
34. IORGA EUGENIA
35. POPESCU GEORGE
36. GHÎȚIU PAUL
37. SVORONOS ANDREI
38. VADUVA ADRIAN VIOREL
39. POROJAN MIRCEA

UNIUNEA UCRAINENILOR DIN  
ROMANIA

1. NEPOHODA IVAN  
(SEREDENCIUC IOAN)

UNIUNEA  
„CREȘTIN ORTODOXA”



1. POPESCU GH. GHEORGHE
2. HEMEI DANIEL
3. IORDĂNESCU VALERIA
4. HEMEI CONSTANTIN
5. MATACHE GABRIEL
6. BREZEANU NICOLAE
7. BĂDUCU ION
8. ALESSIU NICOLAE-ADRIAN
9. DEMBINSKI DOMINIC
10. SAVU EUGENIA
11. POCORA CORINA
12. ALENE ALEXANDRU
13. VASILE ION
14. IONESCU MIHNEA
15. MATACHE MARIA
16. PERDIVARĂ AGLAIA
17. TIMU PARASCHIVA . .

UNIUNEA ELLENA  
DIN ROMANIA



1. MULARIDIS GEORGE
2. IOANIDI ARISTOTEL

PARTIDUL  
RECONSTRUCTIEI  
NATIONALE  
DIN ROMANIA



1. MACARENCO VASILE
2. GHEORGHIU SPERANTA
3. DRAGHICI MARIN
4. PLEȘOIANU VALERIU
5. GALATEANU IOAN
6. POPESCU GHEORGHE
7. NIȚA DIANA-MIHAELA
8. COSOR EMANOIL
9. GHEORGHE M. MIHAI
10. MAIORESCU M. GHEORGHE
11. PAPAGHEORGHE  
ALECSANDRU-LIVIU

FORUMUL DEMOCRATIC AL  
GERMANILOR DIN ROMANIA

1. SCHWARTZ ROBERT  
CRISTIAN
2. KLEININGER NICULAE
3. HERBERT RUDOLF

PARTIDUL LIBER  
SCHIMBIST



1. CAZIMIR ȘTEFAN
2. CORNIȘTEANU MIRCEA  
MIHAI
3. GRIGORESCU IOAN
4. VISARION ALEXA
5. DIPLAN CONSTANTIN
6. HODOROGEA LILIANA
7. BOȘMAN NICULAE
8. FRANKL SOFIA
9. MAXIM LAURA
10. MOARCĂȘ ROZALIA
11. TOTT VALERIA-RODICA
12. PĂUNESCU DAN TITUS
13. VOINESCU LUMINIȚA
14. TANASESCU ZAHARIA-  
ANTOANETA
15. DOBREANU GHEORGHE
16. ZAFIU RODICA
17. MIRON FLORIN MIHAIL
18. DUMITRESCU AURELIAN
19. ACHETRĂRIȚEI EUGEN
20. POPESCU I. AUREL
21. PRODAN P. CONSTANTIN
22. GREJDINOIU ANDREI
23. IORDACHE MARIAN
24. UNGUREANU GABRIELA
25. IAGĂDĂ CRISTIAN
26. GHERGHEIȘ TEREZA
27. NIȚA DANUȚ
28. URSESCU NICOLAE-  
EDUARD
29. RIZESCU DAN GEORGE
30. PATRĂȘCU DAN
31. DUBAN PETRE
32. EVIAN NICOLAE ALEX.
33. VACHNIUC NICOLAE
34. MLADINOVICI MARIAN
35. VASILE LILIANA
36. DOBRE MIHAI
37. ILIESCU MIHAIL
38. FRANZUTI CORNEL

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
AGRAR DIN ROMANIA



1. TEACI DUMITRU
2. ZAVORANU NICOLAE
3. RADULESCU ADRIAN
4. FANIȚĂ TRIȚĂ
5. GLĂMAN GHEORGHE
6. BASAMAC SERGIU
7. ALECU N. IOAN-NICOLAE
8. CHERMAN ALEXANDRU
9. MALAIMARE MIHAI
10. SIMA CONSTANTIN
11. SPIRIDON LAURA-IULIANA
12. DRĂGAN TOMA
13. STĂNESCU ZENOVIE
14. LUPĂȘCU PETRE
15. PODGOREAN RADU
16. PRUNIȘ LUCIAN-ION
17. ILIESCU CONSTANTIN-  
HORIA
18. DĂNACU VIOREL
19. DIACONEASA AUREL

UNIUNEA LIBERALA  
„BRĂTIANU”


1. BRĂTIANU I. ION
2. COCIȘ ELENA
3. CERNEA EMIL-EUGENIU
4. BĂDĂNAU ION
5. NEAGOIE MANOLEA
6. MIRESCU CONSTANTIN
7. GAȘTEANU GABRIELA
8. SOARE NICOLAE
9. PAVEL PETRICA-MIRCEA
10. MOGA EUGEN
11. HĂGĂLIE DRAGOȘ-MIRCEA
12. MOSCALCIUC MARCEL
13. MITRUȘ CRISTIAN
14. COPOIU NICOLAE
15. BERCIU ADINA
16. GEORGESCU VIOREL
17. DRĂGHICESCU INOCENȚIU
18. CANGEA TEODOR
19. STAN VIRGILIU
20. BADEA DUMITRU
21. CURDOV NICOLAE
22. STANCIU IORDAN
23. MADESCU NICOLAE
24. CIUCIU DUMITRU
25. SANDU I. ȘTEFAN
26. MICU ADRIANA
27. TRANDAFIR MARCEL
28. COJOCARU SIMONA-  
MARILENA
29. RADU SIMONA-CRISTINA
30. PANFILOIU MARIAN
31. ION MATEI



PARTIDUL ROMÂN PENTRU  
NOUA SOCIETATE

1. GRECESCU CORNELIA
2. PETRESCU ANCA  
(MĂRCULET)
3. TEODORU EUGENIA

PARTIDUL SOCIALIST-  
DEMOCRATIC ROMÂN



1. BOTTA GHICA
2. MOCANU AURELIU-STEFAN
3. MOSCOVICI ADRIAN
4. TOMA I. CRISTIAN
5. UDRESCU VICTOR
6. LAZUREANU TRAIAN
7. MANEA ȘTEFAN
8. TĂNĂSESCU ȘTEFAN-  
VIOREL
9. BULIGIOIU DUMITRA
10. STAN DAVID
11. CATU CONSTANTIN-ION
12. NICULCEA COSTEL
13. TATARU DAN-SORIN
14. MIRCEA SARMIZA
15. STOIAN FIRU-DOREL
16. CÂNDEA N. DUMITRA
17. OPREA AURICĂ
18. NECUREAC ARBORE
19. STANCU OVIDIU
20. MUNTEANU CRISTINA
21. GEORGESCU ADRIAN-LIVIU
22. NICULCEA MARIA
23. NECUREAC GABRIEL
24. DUNĂREANU VILSON
25. GRAUR MIRCEA
26. MACOVEI EREMIJA
27. TEODORESCU SABINA
28. TINDECHE MARIANA
29. BADEA MIHAIL
30. AJOANEI LUCIA
31. SERIA IOAN
32. VLAD GABRIELA
33. BOTTA VALERIU
34. ANGHEL ION
35. GHEORGHE LAURENȚIA
36. IVĂNESCU ELENA
37. SIMION CARMEN
38. MILEA ELENA
39. VLAD ELENA

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
CONSTITUTIONAL



1. FLOREA FLORIN-CORNELIU
2. SIMACHE NICULAE
3. BALACEANU MARIN-NUCU
4. SIMIONOV WALTER
5. BARBULESCU-MARIUS-  
TIBERIU
6. MITA ȘTEFAN
7. ROMAN IONEL-VALENTIN
8. COJOCARU MARIN
9. IVASCU GEORGE
10. BANEA BOGDAN-SORIN
11. DUMITRESCU DUMITRU
12. BUCUR VICTOR
13. RISTEA ION
14. CRĂCIUN FLORIAN
15. ION IRINEL
16. NICULAE GELU
17. APOSTOLOIU EMIL
18. ALEXANDRU ION

PARTIDUL PENTRU CINSTIREA  
EROILOR REVOLUTIEI  
ȘI SALVARE NAȚIONALĂ

1. TODIRCAN GHEORGHE
2. GHITĂ ION
3. VOICU TRAJAN
4. CILINGHIR MIHAI  
ATANASIE
5. GEGEA ION
6. SCURTU EMILIA
7. ANDREI MARIOARA
8. IONESCU ELENA
9. TIMNEA VALENTIN
10. IUREA DAN MIHAI
11. DAN PREDESCU
12. PANAIT IORCU
13. TESCULA MIRCEA
14. DUZINEANU MIRCEA
15. POPESCU ION
16. TUDORA MARIUS
17. PREDESCU ELENA
18. ZOTESCU DIANA
19. GRIGORESCU GRIG-  
GRIGORE
20. DOBROGEANU CONSTANTIN
21. DAESCU GHEORGHE

PARTIDUL  
NATIONAL ROMAN



1. IOAN DI CESARE
2. NASTA VIRGILIU
3. MARINESCU NICULAE

PARTIDUL SOCIAL  
DEMOCRAT ROMAN



1. CUNESCU SERGHU
2. AVRAMESCU... CONSTANTIN  
GHEORGHE
3. ARONEANU VADIM
4. PETRARU MIHAIL-GEORGE
5. BOESTEANU VLADIMIR-  
VICTOR
6. ŞTEFANUĆ N. MIHAI
7. DUMITRIU MONICA-LIANA
8. DIMITRIU OCTAV
9. ARBORE VALERIU
10. DINU MUGUREL-  
ALEXANDRU
11. DRAGNEA ION
12. DOBRESCU SMARANDA
13. VASILESCU I.M. GHEORGHE
14. ALEXANDRESCU CRISTIAN-  
CONSTANTIN
15. MARINESCU CONSTANTIN
16. MIREA VASILE
17. BABOŞ GAVRIL
18. IVAN O. NICOLAE
19. GALIŞ MARIA-  
MAGDALENA
20. TOMA IULIAN-VALERIU
21. COBILA DĂNUT
22. BADEA IULIAN-  
CONSTANTIN
23. BEŞCHIA SORIN
24. LAZEA VALENTIN
25. ANDREI GEORGE
26. ANDREAS IOANA
27. EPURE IONEL
28. POPA LIVIU
29. LUDIG MIRCEA
30. MARCOFF LUCIAN
31. VIRLAN S. IOAN
32. RADU DRAGOS
33. GAMAN GEORGE
34. CRETU I. VASILE
35. SIMION SORIN-MARIUS
36. POP FLORIN
37. OSMAN EUGEN

GRUPAREA  
DEMOCRATICĂ  
DE CENTRU



1. MESAROS SERGHEI
2. NICA LEON
3. ZILISTEANU ION RADU
4. DRAGOMIR PETRE
5. OANĂ GHEORGHE
6. MAZILU GHEORGHE
7. DUMITRESCU DUMITRU
8. TĂNĂSESCU MIHAI-  
ALEXANDRU
9. ȘEPTILICI ALEXANDRA
10. MORĂRESCU ALEXANDRU
11. VĂRZARIU NICOLAE
12. HUREZEANU IGOR-DĂNUȚ
13. GHIBAN PĂVEL
14. MIHALA ALEXANDRU-  
VALENTIN
15. POPA ECATERINA-RODICA
16. TĂVALICĂ PAUL-FLAVIUS
17. PRISLOPEANU IOAN
18. STAN DOINA ANCA
19. TOBESCU MARIN
20. POPESCU SORIN
21. ȘOIMU IOAN
22. CIUCĂ MIHAI
23. ȘTEFAN IOANA-CRĂIȚA
24. BARBU MIHAIL
25. POPA ROMEO
26. FLOREA MIOARA
27. VELICU MARIAN
28. ANGHIEL IOANA-CRISTINA
29. STANCIU ALEXANDRU
30. DOBRIN GHEORGHE
31. CONSTANTIN MARIA  
LOUISE
32. DRAGOMIR GINA
33. IONESCU MARIA-GABRIELA
34. FILIP GHEORGHE
35. CIOBANU COSTEL
36. DIACONU LUCIAN-VIOREL
37. MIHAI MOLDOVEANU
38. IORDACHE ANICA
39. VELICU STELIAN

PARTIDUL MUNCII



1. POPA MARIN
2. IVAN R. ȘTEFAN
3. MOȘESCU DAN-MIHAIL
4. STĂVĂRACHE NECULAI
5. TANCU DUMITRU
6. CIOBANU G. FLORIN-  
VALERIU

UNIUNEA  
POLONEZILOR DIN  
ROMÂNIA  
„DOM POLSKI“



1. STOICA XENIA
2. RADU JANINA-MARTA
3. RĂUȚĂ ANDREI

UNIUNEA DEMOCRATA  
MAGHIARA DIN  
ROMANIA



1. BARA IULIU
2. NAGY IOSIF
3. BANYAI VASILE
4. ADORJANI DEZSO-ZOLTAN
5. BACS LUDOVIC
6. CSIRE IOSIF
7. GYORFI VIORICA-IULIANA

UNIUNEA ARMENILOR DIN  
ROMANIA

1. VOSGANIAN VARUJAN

GRUPAREA DE CENTRU  
„NOUA ROMANIA”

1. RADULESCU-BOTICA  
NICULAE
2. ALEXE ION
3. HURMUZACHE DAN
4. VINCLER ANTONIU  
ALEXANDRU
5. BALACEANU NICOLAE
6. BANATEANU FLORIN-PETRE
7. VARUT CONSTANTIN
8. SERBANESCU NATAL
9. MIRISTEA MARIAN
10. IACINTE DAN
11. DRAGAN V. MIRCEA
12. VIGARU I. CONSTANTIN
13. IOVAN ILIE
14. MEGULETE ION
15. CERACEANU FLORICA
16. VITAM MARIANA
17. SALCEANU MARIN
18. ANUTA AURICA
19. MEGULETE EUGENIA

PARTIDUL UNIT  
DEMOCRAT  
AL ROMILOR  
RUDARILOR SI  
LAUTARILOR  
DIN ROMANIA



1. STOICA OCTAVIAN
2. RADIȚA PETRU

PARTIDUL  
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT  
CREȘTIN ROMÂN



1. CONSTANTINESCU  
VALENTIN-VIRGIL
2. ȘIPITCĂ GHEORGHE
3. DRAGUȚ EUGEN-  
ALEXANDRU
4. BĂJENARU SORIN
5. BORDEIANU NICOLAE
6. CARTĂRESCU CONSTANTIN
7. DUMITRU MIHAELA
8. CIOARĂ GHEORGHE
9. GAVRILAȘ CRISTIAN

PARTIDUL MIȘCAREA „ȚINARA  
DEMOCRAȚIE”

1. PREDĂ FLOREA

UNIUNEA BULGARĂ  
DIN BANAT  
ASOCIAȚIA CULTURALĂ  
BULGARĂ DIN  
BUCUREȘTI



1. RONKOV GHEORGHE

FRONTUL POPULAR  
ROMÂN  
Filiala București



1. BUZULOIU ARISTIDE
2. CHENDREA CRISTINA-  
MIHAELA
3. TELEOACĂ GH. GEORGE-  
LIVIU
3. MUTHU SORIN
4. POPESCU NICOLAE

COMUNITATEA  
LIPOVENILOR  
DIN ROMÂNIA



1. PETUHOV TEODOR
2. MOCENCO PETRE

MISCAREA ECOLOGISTA  
DIN ROMANIA



1. BALANESCU MIHAIL
2. ROSU GH. ALEXANDRU
3. IONESCU ALEXANDRU
4. PALALAU SILVIU
5. SCARLATESCU GHEORGHE
6. STANCULESCU CORNEL
7. CIOBOTA OCTAVIAN
8. IVANA IOAN-FILEA
9. PAIS ILIE
10. PRISTAVU NICOLAE
11. GHERGHEL AUREL
12. FURTUNA OCTAV-ANTONIO
13. DUNAREANU MIHAIL
14. CROITORU M. OCTAVIAN-  
CRISTIAN
15. POSTAVARU NICOLAE
16. PETROSEL EMILIAN
17. MUNTEANU VIORICA
18. ELISEI IONEL
19. CONSTANTIN GHEORGHE
20. STEFANESCU ION-TRAIAN
21. BUTOI DANIEL-CORNEL
22. LASZLO GHEORGHE-ANDREI
23. ANGHEL RUXANDRA-  
RODICA
24. BREZEANU GHEORGHE
25. PREDA TEANO
26. KHIRCOR IONEL
27. LEMENI LAURENTIU-  
NICOLAE
28. COTEANU CRISTIAN
29. DRAGOESCU ELENA
30. CRISTEA ANTON
31. DUNAREANU RODICA
32. DANALACHE OLGA-SILVIA
33. NOISESCU DAN-FLORIAN
34. BLAJEAN GHEORGHE
35. FLUTURE CONSTANTIN
36. DOGARU ROMULUS-DAN
37. CRIVAT MIHAEL
38. GAVRILESCU CALIN
39. PALALAU RAZVAN-ZAMFIR

PARTIDUL  
TIGANILOR  
DIN ROMANIA



1. CRACIUN COSTEL



PARTIDUL  
NAȚIONAL-LIBERAL



1. LAZĂRESCU DAN
2. BOTEZ SORIN MIRCEA
3. BASGAN ION
4. PASCU HORIA-RADU
5. BEDROS NAE-PETRU
6. GUTZULESCU IOAN
7. NETEA VASILE-GHEORGHE
8. GHIMBAȘEANU NICOLAE-VASILE
9. BALĂCEANU STOLNICI-CONSTANTIN
10. POPESCU BOGDAN
11. COCEAN GHEORGHE
12. STERESCU NICOLAE-VICTOR
13. MARIN ION
14. BADEA POPESCU-TRAIAN-GRIGORE
15. DOBRESCU CONSTANTIN-NICULAE
16. IOANOVICI DORU-CRISTIAN
17. VERUSSI ERNEST-EUGEN
18. GAVRILAȘ CONSTANTIN
19. BRĂTESCU IONEL-DAN
20. DANIELOPOLU CORNELIA-TEOFANIA-MARIA
21. POPESCU GEORGE-ADRIAN
22. POPESCU PAVEL
23. TRIFULESCU MIRCEA
24. ADAM PETRU
25. SCRABA RODION
26. RIZEA VICTOR
27. CRĂCIUN VASILE
28. POPESCU CRISTIAN-MARIAN
29. BALOC CRISTIAN-RĂZVĂN
30. IVAN EMIL
31. DINCULESCU EUGENIU
32. DUMITRESCU RADU-STELIAN
33. IUPCEANU NICOLAE-SORIN
34. MOSOR MARIO-GABRIEL
35. RĂDULESCU CĂRSTEA-RADU
36. VLĂDESCU EMIL-MARIUS
37. SĂVULESCU APRIL-GEO
38. BURLACU VICTOR
39. MĂNESCU JEAN-NICOLAS

PARTIDUL NAȚIONAL  
PROGRESIST



1. IOSIPESCU ZAMBRA-ADELINA-SANDA
2. GHIULEA MARIAN
3. CĂPRARU PETRE

PARTIDUL MUNCII  
ȘI DREPTĂȚII SOCIALE  
DIN ROMÂNIA

1. SANDU MIRCEA
2. DUMITRESCU ALEXANDRU-FLORIN
3. CUȚUCACHE RADU
4. GHEORGHÎȘAN ION
5. RĂDUCANU NECULA
6. ALBITER GAVRIL
7. TOFILIST TÎRPE
8. TEODORESCU BOGDAN



UNIUNEA  
DEMOCRAT CREȘTINA



1. GRAMA MIHAIL
2. FULGER VLADIMIR
3. MINTULESCU ȘTEFAN
4. ȘTEFĂNESCU  
FLORINA-DOINA
5. NEMEȘ IOAN-VALENTIN
6. NORAN SEVER
7. STĂNESCU CRISTIAN-  
FLORIAN
8. IACOB DUMITRU
9. MUȘAT ALEXANDRU
10. PETRESCU  
GHEORGHE-OCTAVIAN
11. DIAONU VASILE
12. GUȘEILA IOAN
13. SIMION GHEORGHE

PARTIDUL CASA  
ROMÂNĂ  
A EUROPEI  
DEMOCRATE



1. CÂNDEA MUSCEL MIHAIL
2. NICULESCU MARIN
3. CIUCA DORU
4. ATUDOSIE  
DONȚU-ALEXANDRU
5. TUDOR GHEORGHE

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
AL MUNCII



1. DUMITRU CONSTANTIN
2. MOTOC ION
3. STAN GHEORGHE
4. BAZAC ION
5. ȘERBĂNESCU CONSTANTIN
6. UNGUREANU AURELIAN
7. CHIROIU IOAN
8. STĂNICA MARIN
9. TUDOR GH. ION
10. ANDREI CONSTANTIN
11. ȘUFLEA GHEORGHE
12. BUDULECI FLORIN
13. VLAICU CAROL-OCTAVIAN
14. VASILIU MIHAIL
15. GRĂDIȘTEANU IULIAN-  
DUMITRU
16. GIȚMAN GHEORGHE
17. DUMITRU CONSTANTIN
18. ȘTEFAN MOISE
19. ȘERBĂNESCU ION
20. FLORESCU ION
21. ȘERBAN GEORGE
22. URSU CONSTANTIN-  
LAURIAN

PARTIDUL COOPERATIST  
Filiala mun. București



1. ZERVU ION
2. BERCA DAN
3. CRISTU IOAN
4. DRAGOMIR ION
5. POPESCU HARALAMBIE
6. ILIE ADRIAN CRISTIN
7. DAVID ALEXANDRU
8. DĂRNEA NICOLAE
9. PĂRJOLOIU IONEL
10. POPA MIRON
11. ZAHARIA AURORA
12. ONICEL TRAIAN
13. TONCIU VASILE
14. CHIȚU ECATERINA
15. TEODORESCU EMIL
16. NASTASE GHEORGHE
17. MILITARU ION
18. MINCIU GHEORGHE
19. ARSENIU DUMITRU
20. DUMITRU MIHAI
21. TĂTARU MIHAELA-ELVIRA-  
LUCIA
22. SAVIN MARIUS

PARTIDUL ECOLOGIST-  
UMANIST  
FONDAT IN ARAD



1. TOMESCU VIOREL-  
ALEXANDRU
2. OPREA VASILE

PARTIDUL ȚĂRANESC  
ROMÂN



1. MITROI ION
2. MIHALACHE DRĂGOȘ
3. STAN LIDIA
4. MIHALACHE DORIN
5. FARCAȘ PETRE

PARTIDUL DEMOCRAT  
PROGRESIST



1. ZBURLEA P. MIHAI
2. VELICU T. AURORA

PARTIDUL UNITAȚII  
DEMOCRATICE  
NUCLEUL CENTRAL  
BUCUREȘTI



1. STĂNCESCU NICU
2. CIPERE I. LUCIAN
3. CHITIC PAUL-CORNEL
4. PETROVICI VASILE
5. BOER IVAN
6. MOLDOVEANU NICOLAE
7. ATANASIU DUMITRU
8. CODÎRLA ANCA
9. CUATU CĂTĂLIN
10. NEGOIȚESCU FELIX
11. RÎNDAȘU ION
12. SECELEANU MIHAI
13. FĂTULESCU ȘTEFAN
14. MĂNESCU MIHAI
15. GALAȘIU ANCA
16. TRICULESCU NICOLAE
17. MARDARE ION
18. HORCHIDAN NICOLAE
19. COANDĂ C. ION
20. SOARE SIMA
21. HALIPA VERONICA
22. VĂTĂMANU PAUL-  
CONSTANTIN
23. CONSTANTIN PAVEL
24. DESPINA LUCIAN
25. CRETEANU DANIELA-MARIA
26. NEGHINĂ ADRIAN
27. NEGREA ALEXANDRU

PARTIDUL SOCIALIST  
AL DREPTĂȚII  
(INDEPENDENT)



1. POPESCU DAN-ALEXANDRU
2. CAZACOV F. GHEORGHE
3. NICULAE AURICA
4. CIORTAN ALEXANDRU
5. IORDACHE ION
6. SIMIONESCU SOTIR-PETRU
7. BUZATU NICOLAE

LISTĂ DE CANDIDAȚI  
INDEPENDENȚI

DINESCU MIRCEA  
CARAMITRU ION HORIA-  
LEONIDA  
HAULICĂ DAN  
PLEȘU ANDREI

PARTIDUL  
REPUBLICAN CREȘTIN  
DIN ROMANIA



1. IONESCU RODICA
2. RĂULEA ARISTOTEL

LISTĂ DE CANDIDAȚI  
INDEPENDENȚI

SORESCU MARIN  
EUGEN SIMION  
CRISTESCU DAN NICOLAE  
CONSTANTINESCU VIRGILIU-  
NICULAE

LISTĂ DE CANDIDAȚI  
INDEPENDENȚI

GHINESCU ALEXANDRU  
DRĂGHICI DUMITRU

LISTĂ DE CANDIDAȚI  
INDEPENDENȚI

LIICEANU GABRIEL  
BĂCANU MIHAI PETRE  
DUMITRESCU CONSTANTIN  
(TICU)  
MARCULESCU FLORIN-  
GABRIEL  
TANASE STELIAN  
FILIPESCU RADU  
MARCULESCU IOAN  
POPA RADU IOAN-  
CONSTANTIN  
MILITARU POMPILIU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

DEȘLIU BORIS

7

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

RADULESCU  
NICOLAE MIHAI



CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

TRANDAFIRA CORNEL

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

MARINESCU NICULAE  
MARIAN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

PANEA ION

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

ZUGRAVU ZAMFIRESCU  
SILVIU CORNELIU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT


HODOIU VIOREL

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

TOMA PETRU ILIE STELIAN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

VIȘTEANU DORU



CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

HUICĂ LAURENȚIU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

DUMITRESCU DAN VICTOR

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

TOLSTOBRACH IOAN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

GROZEA NICOLAE

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

FUCIEC ALEXANDRU  
VASILE GHEORGHE

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

LUPU AUREL

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

DEMETRESCU VULCAN  
ALEXANDRU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

ZĂRNESCU MARIA

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

MIRESCU VALENTIN  
GABRIEL

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

SIMA ȘTEFAN ION



CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

NEAMȚU IOAN

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT

DUMITRU VICTOR

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
MUSCALU GHEORGHE

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
CANTAR JANETA

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
ISTRATE AUREL



CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
ALBERT ALEXANDRU

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
ROTARU D. DANIEL

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
HOGEA AMET

CANDIDAT INDEPENDENT  
RADULESCU  
MANOLE HORIA





