

Date Printed: 11/03/2008

JTS Box Number: IFES_13
Tab Number: 28
Document Title: Public Opinion In Ukraine 1997
Document Date: 1997
Document Country: Ukraine
IFES ID: R01927



* 6 A E 3 8 3 C 0 - A 0 3 6 - 4 7 1 1 - A 8 7 6 - 0 B 7 B 7 6 4 2 1 7 B 2 *



PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE 1997

GARY A. FERGUSON



**A PUBLICATION IN THE
VOICES OF THE ELECTORATE SERIES
DECEMBER 1997**

**INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS
1101 15TH STREET, NW, THIRD FLOOR, WASHINGTON, DC 20005
TEL (202) 828-8507 FAX (202) 452-0804**

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Background and Overview	3
The Political Environment	5
Views on Economic Reforms	12
Political Reforms, Parties and Participation	24
The Outlook for NGOs	42
The Perceived Importance of Citizens' Rights	45
Perceptions of Ukraine's Constitution	46
Confidence in Government Bodies and Officials	50
The Problem of Official Corruption	52
Information about Political and Economic Affairs	54
The Role of the Media	58
The View from Crimea	62
Summary and Conclusions	72
Appendix I: Regional Breakdown of Ukraine	
Appendix II: Data	

Opinion Research at IFES is a global program developing reliable indicators of public opinion. Results from IFES-sponsored surveys and focus group discussions are published in the *Voices of the Electorate* series. For more information on IFES' opinion research program, please call the IFES Development and New Initiatives office.

Use of information from this publication is permitted, provided the following statement is attached in 10-point type: "Source: International Foundation for Election Systems". As a courtesy, we request that you advise us when using any data from this report.

INTRODUCTION

As part of its ongoing program in Ukraine, the International Foundation for Election Systems commissioned Gary Ferguson and SOCIS-Gallup to conduct a national survey of the Ukrainian electorate. In all, 1,484 personal interviews with adults age 18 and older were conducted from July 6 - 13, 1997.

The total sample includes a national representative sample of 1,200 interviews and proportional oversamples of 40 interviews in Kyiv (for a total of N=100) and 244 interviews on the Crimean Peninsula (for a total N=300). The sample was weighted and is representative of the population by age, sex, ethnicity, and region.

All surveys are subject to errors caused by interviewing a sample of persons rather than the entire population. The margin of error for a sample of 1,200 persons is ± 2.9 percentage points at 95 percent confidence.

The project director and principal analyst for this study was Gary A. Ferguson, vice president of American Viewpoint, Inc. Interviewing was conducted by SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv, under the direction of Svetlana Pototska. The questionnaire design was a joint effort of the project directors and IFES staff, including Vadim Rubin, Chris Siddall, and Michael Conway, IFES Project Director in Ukraine. Additional analysis was provided by Michael Conway.

This is the fourth in a series of surveys of the national Ukrainian electorate. The first was fielded in December 1994, the second in January 1996, and the third in May 1996.

This survey report

- provides a description of the political environment in Ukraine;
- examines views toward economic and political reforms;
- measures attitudes toward government officials;
- assesses the outlook for political participation and volunteerism;
- gauges the viability of political parties; and
- outlines the need for broad-based public information in Ukraine.

The regional breakdowns provided in this analysis are based on the following groupings of *oblasts*:

Northern Region – Zhytomyr, Kyiv City, Kyiv, Chernihiv
Central Region – Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Poltava
Northeastern Region – Sumy, Kharkiv
Eastern Region – Donetsk, Luhansk
Southeastern Region – Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhin
Northwestern Region – Rivne, Volyn, Khmelnytskyi

Western Region – Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk
Southwestern Region – Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi
Southern Region – Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson
Crimea – Republic of Crimea

This publication was made possible through support provided by the Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), under the terms of Cooperative Agreement No. 4081. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or IFES.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

The events of the past few years in Ukraine – particularly economic concerns, payment arrears, and government inaction – have resulted in an electorate preoccupied with the economy and the daily struggle for existence, disillusioned with the government's ability to solve the country's economic problems, and convinced that corruption is ubiquitous.

Dissatisfaction with conditions in the country is nearly universal and the intensity of dissatisfaction has increased over the past year (from 66% very dissatisfied to 75%). For most Ukrainians, dissatisfaction is driven by unemployment and the low standard of living – a response that has grown dramatically over the course of the past year.

A plurality of Ukrainians prefer a market economy over a centrally-planned economy. The number of Ukrainians who feel that the country should pursue a market economy as quickly as possible is back to 1994 levels – after a 20 percent increase in 1996 – and public sentiment for a steady pace toward market reforms is at the highest level since 1994. The percentage opposing movement toward a market economy has remained constant since 1996. Opponents tend to be older, less well-educated, and female.

At the same time, the public is pessimistic about future economic conditions. That is, a plurality says that the economy will worsen over the next year. Ukrainians send a clear message to the government that it needs to pick up the pace of economic reform. Fully 70 percent of the population feels that economic reforms are occurring too slowly and 56 percent say political reforms are occurring too slowly.

Ukrainians remain firmly committed to the notion of private property ownership by the citizens of Ukraine. More than eight out of ten believe that Ukrainian citizens should be able to own land and 77 percent say it is very important that the private property rights of individuals be respected. However, there is less support for land ownership by non-citizens. The public also welcomes foreign investment – 54 percent feel that foreign investments are important to Ukraine's economic recovery – and views the U.S. and Germany as the best political and economic models.

In a time of economic hardship, political activity is, in many ways, a second-tier matter for Ukrainians. Interest in politics and government pales in comparison to economic concerns and there is little evidence of political party activity. Of greater concern is that a majority says that Ukraine is not a democracy and that voter efficacy is declining.

Nevertheless, the data reveal an electorate that has participated in past elections and plans to do so in the future. There is overwhelming support to protect the right of the people that "honest elections are held regularly."

In principle, Ukrainians remain supportive of the concept of political parties. The public generally views parties as necessary for democracy, and party competition in elections is important to them. At the same time, they have read or heard little about the parties, can discern few differences between party platforms, do not feel that parties represent the interests of the people, offer only minimal ballot support to any one party, and have no interest in joining a party.

The political fortunes of the President and Members of the Supreme Rada are uncertain at this time. The difficult conditions facing the country and the overwhelming dissatisfaction of the citizenry would make any politician potentially vulnerable. Confidence in President Leonid Kuchma continues to decline and most Ukrainians say they lack confidence in the President, the Supreme Rada, and all other major institutions save the military.

Despite these conditions, the President's reelection score shows plurality support, as 42 percent say he deserves reelection and 35 percent would support someone else for President. Members of the Rada have less reelection support.

These data clearly support the conclusion that Ukraine has a tremendous need for a broad-based information campaign. On measure after measure, roughly 70 percent of the electorate report that they are underinformed on key issues. This deficit is noted in every region, and for men and women in every age group. Ukrainians lack information on the Constitution, on economic developments, on political developments, and on political parties.

Such information is crucial. Those who are better informed are more likely to favor a market economy, are more interested in politics and government, are more likely to participate in the electoral process, are more optimistic about the economy, believe they have higher vote efficacy, and are generally more supportive of the democratic process. They are also more likely to have realistic expectations about government actions and policies.


Such an information campaign, then, would support both economic and democratic goals. It should not be limited to information about the process of voting. Again, Ukrainians need information about every aspect of their lives – economic, political, legislative, and judicial – to accurately assess developments in the country, to understand and support reforms, and to participate fully in the democratic and economic process. To be effective, any broad-based information campaign will have to use television.

T HE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Interest in Politicians and Government

A 55 percent majority of Ukrainians are very or somewhat interested in matters of politics and government. Yet, a substantial 43 percent are not very interested. In all, 16 percent say they are very interested, 39 percent are somewhat interested, 23 percent are not too interested and 20 percent are not at all interested. This level of interest mirrors that of 1994 and is slightly higher than 1996 (49%).

Figure A. Interest in Politics and Government



"How interested are you in matters of politics and government - are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Kyiv (62%), the West (63%), and the South (65%) express greater interest than other regions. Urban residents (59%) are more interested than those in rural areas (49%). Men are more interested in politics than women, and the intensity of interest increases with age. In fact, only 6 percent of those age 18-24 are very interested as compared to 21 percent of those age 35-44 and 19 percent of those age 55 and older. Among men, 23 percent are very interested while only 11 percent of all women are very interested. Even older women express little interest in politics and government as compared with men. Among women 45 and older, 13 percent are very interested; among men 45 and older, 29 percent are very interested.

University graduates are the most intensely interested (25% very interested) followed by those with some higher education (17%), who have completed secondary school (16%) and those who have less than a secondary education (14%).

Interestingly, those who say that reforms are occurring at the right pace are the most intensely interested (23%) as compared with those who say political reforms are happening too quickly (16%) or too slowly (18%). Those who believe their vote can influence decision-making in the country are somewhat more interested overall than those who believe they have low vote efficacy (61% versus 54%).

Interest is high among those who believe party competition is important (64%) as compared with those who say it is not (45%). Likewise, those inclined to support a party-affiliated candidate are more interested (65%) than those who would prefer an unaffiliated candidate (52%).

As one would expect, there are clear differences in interest according to the amount of information voters have about political and economic affairs. That is, 70 percent of those who have some information about politics are interested in politics as compared with 53 percent of those with little or no information. Also, 72 percent of those with some economic information are interested in politics and government, whereas just 51 percent of those with little or no information are interested.

Predictably, those who rely on newspapers (62%) and radio (58%) for their electoral information are the most interested in politics and government. Those who did not vote in 1994 are, not surprisingly, the least interested in politics and government (9% very interested) and those who are likely to vote in the next elections for Supreme Rada or President are more interested than those who are less likely to vote.

Those who prefer a market economy are more interested in politics (64%) than supporters of a centrally planned economy (49%).

Figure B. Interest in Politics and Government, by Region


REGION (n)	VERY/SOMEWHAT INTERESTED	NOT TOO/NOT AT ALL INTERESTED
UKRAINE (1200)	55%	43%
Kyiv (60)	62%	37%
North (114)	52%	42%
Central (154)	48%	52%
Northeast (104)	58%	42%
Northwest (83)	47%	53%
Southeast (152)	54%	46%
West (119)	63%	37%
Southwest (47)	58%	40%
South (119)	65%	31%
Crimea (56)	52%	47%
East (192)	53%	46%

"How interested are you in matters of politics and government - are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Mood of the Country

There is overwhelming dissatisfaction with the situation in Ukraine today. Only 2 percent express satisfaction and 96 percent are dissatisfied – moreover, 75 percent are very dissatisfied. In 1994, 91 percent were dissatisfied; in 1996, 92 percent were dissatisfied.

Figure C. Satisfaction with Situation in Ukraine



"Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today - would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Dissatisfaction is apparent across all subgroups of the population. Even so, there are differences with regard to intensity. In Kyiv, for example, 57 percent are very dissatisfied and 37 percent are somewhat dissatisfied. In the West and Southwest, too, there is less intense dissatisfaction (45% and 51%, respectively, are very dissatisfied).

On the other hand, those in the North, Central, Northeast, Northwest, South, Southeast, Crimea, and East are profoundly dissatisfied. The figure on the next page outlines sentiment according to region.

Figure D. Mood of the Country, by Region

Region (n)	% Very Dissatisfied
Kyiv (60)	57%
North (114)	84%
Central (154)	79%
Northeast (104)	77%
Northwest (83)	67%
Southeast (152)	80%
West (119)	45%
Southwest (47)	51%
South (119)	84%
Crimea (56)	85%
East (192)	87%

"Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today - would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Overall, urban residents are more dissatisfied (97%) than rural residents (92%). Young respondents are less intensely dissatisfied than older Ukrainians: 67 percent of those age 18-24 are very dissatisfied while between 70 percent and 80 percent of those in older age groups are very dissatisfied. Ethnic Russians (84%) are more intensely dissatisfied than ethnic Ukrainians (72%).


Economic Problems Underlie Dissatisfaction

Dissatisfaction relates directly to unemployment and the low standard of living in Ukraine. Nearly three-fourths of the electorate (73%) name these problems as the reason for their dissatisfaction (up from 36% in 1996; figure E next page). This sentiment is more pronounced in rural areas (79%)

than urban areas (69%). When combined with the 12 percent of general responses relating to the difficult economic situation facing the nation, economic problems account for 85 percent of the dissatisfaction.

Another 9 percent mention bad leadership, 7 percent name imperfect laws and legal protection, 5 percent the absence of social protection, and 2 percent cite the absence of spirituality.

Figure E. Reasons for Dissatisfaction




"Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Many Expect the Economy to Worsen

Along with dissatisfaction caused by economic conditions, Ukrainians are pessimistic about the state of the economy over the next year. A 45 percent plurality thinks that the economy will be worse in a year, 34 percent think it will be the same, and just 12 percent think the economy will improve. In 1996, 47 percent thought the economy would worsen in a year.

Figure F. Economic Situation in One Year



"In your opinion, will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Pessimism is greater in the Northeast (51% worse), South (50%), Crimea (56%), and East (60%). Those in Kyiv (27%), the West (28%), and the Southwest (38%) are the least pessimistic about the economy. Rural residents are somewhat more optimistic (16% better/42% worse) than urban residents (10% better/48% worse).

Older respondents are more negative than younger Ukrainians. A majority of both men 45 and over (52%) and women 45 and over (53%) say the economy will worsen.

As we have seen in past surveys, pessimism is less marked among those who are younger or more reform-oriented. Further, information mitigates pessimism. Those who are better informed about politics and economics are more optimistic about the economy than those who have little or no information. In addition, likely voters and Kuchma supporters are more optimistic than those who are not likely to vote or who would support a candidate other than Kuchma.

Models for Political and Economic Development in Ukraine

The United States and Germany stand out as the two countries considered to be the best models for political and economic development. In terms of economic development, Germany is mentioned by 15 percent and the United States by 12 percent. For political development, the order is reversed, with 15 percent naming the United States and 9 percent Germany. In all, 29 percent don't know which foreign country would be the best economic model and 40 percent are uncertain about which country provides the best political model. In 1996, 13 percent named the United States as a political model and 9 percent as an economic model. Germany received 8 percent and 13 percent, respectively.

The figure below outlines responses.

Figure G. Economic and Political Models

Country	Economic Model		Political Model	
	1996	1997	1996	1997
United States	9%	12%	13%	15%
Germany	13%	15%	8%	9%
Poland	NA	5%	NA	1%
Sweden	5%	4%	4%	3%
Canada	NA	3%	NA	2%
Japan	NA	3%	NA	1%
France	NA	2%	NA	2%
Switzerland	NA	2%	NA	2%
Russia	4%	2%	3%	2%
USSR	NA	2%	NA	1%
Finland	NA	1%	NA	1%
Holland	NA	1%	NA	☆
Czech Republic	NA	1%	NA	☆
Great Britain	NA	1%	NA	3%
Israel	NA	1%	NA	☆
China	NA	1%	NA	1%
Baltic States	NA	1%	NA	☆
Other West European	15%	NA	9%	NA
Other East European	6%	NA	3%	NA
Other	3%	6%	1%	4%
None	7%	6%	8%	7%
Don't Know	38%	29%	51%	40%
Refused	100%	3%	100%	5%

"Which foreign country, in your opinion, could be a model for our country's economic (political) development?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)


☆ = less than .5%

VIEWS ON ECONOMIC REFORMS

Preferred Economic Model

A bare plurality of Ukrainians (39%) say that Ukraine should develop a market economy, 31 percent prefer a centrally-planned economy, 14 percent say both should be developed, and 14 percent don't know. Ethnic Ukrainians are somewhat more supportive of a market economy (41%) than are ethnic Russians (34%).

Figure H. Preferred Type of Economic System



"When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a market economy or a centrally planned economy?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Both Kyiv (64%) and the West (64%) show a strong preference for a market economy. Those in the Southeast (45%) are also more likely to favor a market economy. Other regions are mixed. No region expresses a clear preference for a centrally planned economy (Figure I next page). Pro-market sentiment is more evident in urban areas (43%) than in rural areas (33%).

Figure I. Preferred Economic Model, by Region

Region (n)	Market Economy	Central Planning
UKRAINE (1200)	39%	31%
Kyiv (60)	64%	19%
North (114)	30%	33%
Central (154)	36%	41%
Northeast (104)	33%	33%
Northwest (83)	37%	28%
Southeast (152)	45%	38%
West (119)	64%	8%
Southwest (47)	40%	30%
South (119)	32%	29%
Crimea (56)	32%	30%
East (192)	31%	36%

"When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a market economy or a centrally planned economy?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Men (46% market versus 27% planned) are more likely than women (34% versus 34%) to prefer a market economy. A plurality of those age 55 and older support central planning but a near-majority of those below age 45 prefers a market economy (49%). A majority of men age 18-44 would opt for a market economy (58%) and a plurality of women age 18-44 (47%) shares that view. A plurality of men 45 and older (37%) and women 45 and older (44%) prefer a centrally planned economy.

Figure J. Preferred Economic Model, by Gender and Age

	Market Economy	Central Planning
UKRAINE (n)	39%	31%
Men 18-44 (296)	58%	20%
Men 45+ (232)	32%	37%
Women 18-44 (318)	47%	22%
Women 45+ (354)	22%	44%

"When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a market economy or a centrally planned economy?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

University graduates (59%) and those who have completed their secondary education (47%) are most supportive of a market economy. Only 23 percent of those with less than a high school education favor a market economy while 41 percent opt for central planning.

Pensioners provide the most support for central planning. A plurality of all other major employment categories supports a market economy.

Economic optimists prefer a market economy while pessimists lean toward central planning. That is, those who say the economy will improve over the next year support a market economy by 56 percent to 21 percent. Those who say the economy will be about the same also prefer a market approach (45% to 25%). Those who think the economy will worsen prefer central planning by 39 percent to 30 percent over a market approach.

Likely voters show a marginal preference for a market economy. Likely voters in the Supreme Rada election support a market approach (by 42% versus 29%) as do likely presidential voters (44% versus 28%). Those who are less likely to vote in the Rada elections are split (36% market versus 34% central) and those who are less likely to vote in the presidential election are more inclined to support central planning (39%) over a market approach (29%).

Ukrainians who favor President Kuchma's reelection support a market approach by 46 percent to 26 percent while those who prefer a new person are divided (35% market versus 38% central planning). Interestingly, both those who would reelect their Rada representative and those who would opt for a new person show plurality support for a market economy (41% versus 29% and 42% versus 33%, respectively).

Among those who favor a market economy, 83 percent say that the pace of economic reform is too slow. Sixty percent (60%) of those who prefer central planning say the pace of reforms is lagging.

Impact of Information on Economic Preference

Ukrainians who are better informed about political and economic matters are far more likely than the poorly informed to support a market economy. For example, those with some political information prefer a market economy over central planning by a margin of 50 percent to 24 percent. Those possessing little or no information are evenly divided on the subject – 38 percent support a market approach and 34 percent support central planning.

In the same vein, those who have a higher degree of information about economic affairs prefer a market economy by 53 percent to 22 percent, while the pro-market margin among those with little information is a slim 37 percent to 34 percent. Those with more information about the Constitution are pro-market by 54 percent to 19 percent but those with little information about the constitution are split 35 percent to 35 percent.

Frequent newspaper readers are more likely to favor a market economy (51% versus 26%) than frequent television viewers (41% versus 30%) or radio news listeners (39% versus 31%).

The Meaning of a Market Economy

In open-ended questioning, Ukrainians offer a range of definitions for a market economy. The following table outlines their responses.

Figure K. Meaning of Market Economy


Free Enterprise/Trade	12%
Functioning of Market Rules	9%
Reasonable Control of Economy by Gov't	8%
Competition	7%
Speculation/Reselling	6%
Developing/Working Enterprises	5%
High Welfare of the Population	5%
Absence of Market Regulations	5%
Abundance of Goods	4%
Free/Flexible Prices	4%
Private Property/Enterprises	3%
Low Prices	2%
Stratification of Society	2%

"In your opinion, what does a market economy mean?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Ukrainians Offer Mixed View of the Current Economy

When describing the type of economy operating in Ukraine today, 25 percent say it is more of a market economy, 34 percent describe it as more government controlled, and 24 percent say it is an even mix (Figure L next page).

Figure L. Ukrainian Economy




"On a scale of one to five, where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state, where on that scale would you ideally place Ukraine?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Those with a greater amount of economic information are more likely to call it a market economy (34%). Young men (39%) are more likely than other age/gender cohorts to call it a market economy. Proponents of a market economy are highly likely (59%) to say that Ukraine's economy is mainly a market economy.

Pace of Market Development

Respondents were asked, "When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, with steady but small reforms, or should we not pursue a market economy at all?" In response, 25 percent said Ukraine should pursue a market economy as quickly as possible, 41 percent with steady but small reforms, 17 percent that Ukraine should not pursue a market economy, and 16 percent don't know (Figure M next page). In 1996, 43 percent said as quickly as possible, 13 percent said slowly, and 18 percent said Ukraine should not pursue a market economy.

Figure M. Desired Pace of Economic Reforms



"When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, with steady but small reforms, or should we not pursue a free market economy at all?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

A number of groups are more likely to support a fast pace toward a market economy. These include the West (43%), men age 18-44 (36%), and those who have a greater level of political (31%) and economic information (36%). Still, even among most of these groups, the dominant view is that steady but small reforms set the best course.


Those who say Ukraine should not pursue a market economy tend to be female (64%); age 55 or older (56%), and have little education (56%). More than half (55%) are pensioners and 48 percent are women age 45 and older.

Urbanites (26% quickly, 46% steadily, and 14% not at all) are more likely to support a faster pace than rural residents (22% quickly, 33% steadily, and 20% not at all).

Pace of Economic Reforms Is Too Slow

Ukrainians send a clear message to the government that it needs to pick up the pace of economic reforms. Regardless of orientation, the vast majority of Ukrainians feel that economic reforms are occurring too slowly. Seventy percent (70%) hold this view, while just 5 percent say that economic reforms are occurring too quickly and 4 percent at the right pace. Nearly one in five (19%) can't say. A majority of all subgroups say reforms are occurring too slowly (Figure N next page).

Figure N. Actual Pace of Economic Reforms




"In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at about the right pace?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Responsibility for Impeding the Pace of Economic Reform

The Supreme Rada receives the most mentions (24%) as the government entity most responsible for impeding the pace of economic reform. However, the President (16%) and the Cabinet of Ministers (14%) combined together are perceived as the most responsible. Another 14 percent point to local government while 7 percent mention some other source and 1 percent the judicial branch. Twenty percent (20%) don't know who is most responsible.

Figure O. Institutions Responsible for Impeding Economic Reforms



"Between the various branches of government, which one of the following is most responsible for impeding the pace of economic reform?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)


Respondents from a number of regions are more likely to place responsibility with the Rada, including Kyiv (32%), Central (29%), West (42%), and Southwest (30%). Also, those age 18-24 (34%), men age 18-44 (34%), those with at least some college (31%), full-time employees (26%), those who think political reforms are occurring too slowly (30%), those who believe that party competition is necessary (30%), those who have a greater level of economic information (30%), those who are newspaper-reliant (30%), and those who want to move toward a market economy as soon as possible (37%) are likely to blame the Rada.

Presidential responsibility is cited more frequently by those in the Central region (25%), men age 45 and older (23%), pensioners (20%), those who say party competition is not necessary (21%), the radio-reliant (20%), those who watch television news infrequently (21%), who say Ukraine should not move toward a market economy (22%), who are pessimistic about the future economy (21%), who say that foreign investment is not important (23%) and that land ownership for citizens should not be allowed (21%), and those who would support a new president (21%).

Who Can Solve Ukraine's Economic Problems?

When asked which branch of the government is most likely to solve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year, the public gives a mixed response. Nineteen percent (19%) named the executive branch, 18 percent the Supreme Rada, 13 percent say local government, and 2 percent the Judiciary. However, nearly one in four (24%) say that none of these can solve the problems and 22 percent don't know who is most likely to solve the problems.

Figure P. Institution Most Likely to Solve Economic Problems



"Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the judiciary, and your local government. Which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Those in Kyiv (26%), the South (26%), and Crimea (26%) are most likely to name the executive branch. At the same time, residents of Kyiv and Crimea are highly likely to say that none of these officials can solve the problems (39% and 30% respectively). Others who tend to look to the executive are those with more education (29% of those with some college and 22% of those who have completed college), the unemployed (24%), the better informed (27%), those who support quick steps to a market economy (26%), and economic optimists (31%).

Those in the Northeast (30%) and Northwest (29%) are more likely to look to the Rada. Others more likely to name the Rada include those who say party competition is necessary (22%), who see clear differences between the political parties (23%), and who would be more inclined to support a party-affiliated candidate (25%). Economic optimists also name the Rada (26%) in greater numbers.

Northern and Eastern respondents are more likely to say that none of the branches can solve the economic problems in the next year (30% and 32%). Also, those age 55-64 (32%), part-time employees (32%), Russian speakers (29%), those who say that Ukraine is not, or is not becoming, a democracy (32%), those who say their vote has low efficacy (30%), or those who say there are not clear differences between the parties (28%) are more likely to say that none of the branches can solve economic problems. Others more likely to hold this view include those who oppose a market economy (34%), oppose land ownership by citizens (28%) or who say that foreign investment is not important (36%). Finally, this group includes those who are not likely to vote (29%) or who support a new person for President (28%).

Those age 65 and older (32%) are most likely to say they don't know who can solve the economic problems. In 1996, 21 percent named the executive, 8 percent the Supreme Rada, 8 percent the local government, 33 percent none, and 29 percent answered "don't know."

Ukrainians Support Private Land Ownership

By Citizens of Ukraine

By and large, Ukrainians believe that citizens should be able to own land. However, 49 percent say that the amount of land owned should be limited while 34 percent call for unlimited land ownership. Only 11 percent say that citizens should not be allowed to own land. Perhaps the plurality view is driven by a concern that those with authority and/or wealth are in a position to buy up much of the country's land.

Limited ownership is the plurality or majority opinion in all regions and age groups, and among both men and women. In fact, this position is fairly stable across the major population subgroups.

Certain groups are more supportive of unlimited ownership, namely, Kyiv (39%), Central (41%), West (39%), Southwest (43%), age 18-24 (44%), men 18-44 (44%), college graduates (41%), those


with higher levels of economic information (42%), proponents of a market economy (43%), and economic optimists (44%).

Only those age 55-64 (17%) and 65 and older (20%) are more likely to say that ownership should not be allowed.

By Non-Citizens

Ukrainians are less supportive of land ownership by non-citizens. In all, 38 percent support limited ownership, 11 percent unlimited, and 43 percent say ownership should not be allowed. Younger respondents, market proponents, and those in Kyiv, the North, West, South, and Crimea are more supportive of limited ownership. A majority of those age 55 and older oppose any form of ownership by non-citizens. A majority of those in the Northeast, Southeast, and Southwest also oppose such ownership.

Figure Q. Ownership of Land



"Should the amount of land that Citizens of Ukraine (Non-citizens) may own be limited, unlimited, or should private land ownership not be allowed?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Laws Pertaining to Land Ownership

For Citizens

A 59 percent majority agree and 34 percent disagree that the laws of Ukraine should allow citizens to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty. In all 37 percent agree completely, 22 percent agree somewhat, 10 percent disagree somewhat, and 24 percent disagree completely.

Agreement declines with age from 74 percent of those age 18-24 to 39 percent of those age 65

and older. Regionally, majority agreement is noted in all regions except the North. Agreement is most pronounced among younger men and women – 74 percent among men 18-44 and 70 percent among women 18-44. Forty-nine percent (49%) of men 45 and older agree while 43 percent disagree (32% completely). Also, 44 percent of women 45 and older agree and 44 percent disagree – 35 percent completely.


Information levels are related to support for laws that ease the sale of land. That is, those with more information about politics and economics are more likely to support such laws, while those with less information are less likely to support them.

Naturally, market proponents are very likely to agree (73%), while those who support central planning are less likely (46%).

Tougher Standards For Non-Citizens

A parallel question for laws pertaining to non-citizens shows that Ukrainians favor tougher standards for them. Only 19 percent agree that laws should not impose unreasonable difficulty, while 72 percent disagree. In all, 70 percent of all market proponents and 79 percent of those who prefer central planning disagree.

Figure R. Buying and Selling of Private Property




"How much do you agree with each of the following statements: do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree completely? The laws of Ukraine should allow citizens of Ukraine (non-citizens) to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Foreign Investments Seen As Important To Economic Recovery

A majority of Ukrainians (55%) feel that foreign investments are important to Ukraine's economic recovery, but 30 percent say they are not. Again, there is a distinct age split on this question as the vast majority of those under age 45 say such investments are important and a plurality of those age 55 and older say they are not.

Figure S. Importance of Foreign Investment




In addition, those with more education, more information, or greater political interest, as well as those who support a market economy, are most likely to recognize the importance of such investments. Rural residents (41%) are less likely than urbanites (61%) to say foreign investments are important. In 1996, 50 percent said foreign investments are important and 32 percent that such investments are not important.

POLITICAL REFORMS, PARTIES, AND PARTICIPATION

Pace of Political Reforms Is Too Slow

As with economic reforms, a majority of Ukrainians (56%) believe political reforms are occurring too slowly. Only 7 percent think they are happening too quickly and 9 percent say they are occurring at the right pace. A substantial number, 27 percent, cannot assess the pace of political reforms. This group is predominantly female (70%) -- particularly women age 45 and older (45%). More than half (52%) of the undecideds have less than secondary-level education.

Figure T. Pace of Political Reforms




"In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at about the right pace?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Responsibility for Impeding the Pace of Political Reforms

Again, a plurality (25%) perceives the Supreme Rada to be most responsible for impeding reforms. Another 16 percent name the President, 12 percent the Cabinet of Ministers, 8 percent local government, and 29 percent cannot say (Figure U next page).

Figure U. Institutions Responsible for Impeding Political Reforms




"Between the various branches of government, which one of the following is most responsible for impeding the pace of economic (political) reform?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Responses naming the President and the Cabinet of Ministers are fairly uniform across the population. Respondents most likely to cite the Supreme Rada include those in Kyiv (37%), the West (47%), and the Southwest (34%); those age 25-34 (32%) or 35-44 (30%); men 18-44 (35%); those who have had at least some college (33%); those who think political reforms are occurring too slowly (33%); those who think party competition is important (32%); proponents of a market economy (34%); and those who have a greater degree of political (29%) or economic information (33%).

A Majority Say Ukraine Is Not A Democracy

Only 20 percent say that Ukraine is a democracy at this time, while 52 percent say it is not. Another 8 percent say it is both, and 20 percent don't know.

Figure V. Ukrainian Democracy



"Would you say that Ukraine is a democracy, or is it not a democracy?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Regional differences exist, as majorities in six of the country's eleven regions declare it is not a democracy and five offer more mixed responses. Urban residents are more likely to say Ukraine is not a democracy (58%) than are rural residents (42%). Rural residents, on the other hand, are more likely to say they don't know whether or not Ukraine is a democracy (29%).

A majority of all age groups (except a plurality of those age 65 and older) say that Ukraine is not a democracy.

The majority view is consistent across most population subgroups. Ethnic Ukrainians are more likely to perceive the country as a democracy (22%) than are ethnic Russians (13%). In 1994 and 1996, 18 percent of Ukrainian citizens felt Ukraine was a democracy and 60 percent felt it was not.

Figure W. Perceptions of Democracy in Ukraine, By Region

Region (n)	Is a Democracy	Is Not a Democracy
UKRAINE (1200)	20%	52%
Kyiv (60)	17%	58%
North ((114)	24%	37%
Central (154)	28%	41%
Northeast (104)	14%	68%
Northwest (83)	29%	39%
Southeast (152)	16%	69%
West (119)	26%	35%
Southwest (47)	38%	36%
South (119)	14%	54%
Crimea (56)	12%	62%
East (192)	13%	60%

"Would you say that Ukraine is a democracy, or is it not a democracy?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey)

In a follow-up question to those who say Ukraine is not a democracy, we find that 23 percent say that Ukraine is becoming a democracy. Men are more likely to hold this view.

What Does It Mean To Live In A Democracy?

This open-ended question yields an interesting mix of responses. A majority of responses pointed to those aspects of democracy that ensure adherence to laws by governing institutions (Figure X next page).

Figure X. Meaning of Democracy

Guarantee of all rights	37%
High standard of living	12%
Law-abiding	10%
Government takes care of citizens	8%
Having a job/fair salary	6%
All are equal under law	4%
Confidence in the future	3%
Justice/Fairness	2%
Power belongs to the people	1%

"What does it mean to you to live in a democracy?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Vote Efficacy Declining

Responses regarding the impact of voting depicts a populace that questions its power to affect decision-making through voting. Only 28 percent agree and 67 percent disagree that "Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country." This is the view across all age groups and regions (except the Southwest) and indicates declining belief in vote efficacy since a survey conducted in 1996. In 1996, 30 percent agreed and 60 percent disagreed with this statement. Ethnic Russians have even lower feelings of vote efficacy (20% versus 77%) than do ethnic Ukrainians (31% versus 64%).

Again, the level of information held is an important factor in respondents' views. Those who are better informed have a greater sense of the efficacy of their vote whereas those who are less well-informed exhibit a greater sense of powerlessness. Even then, a majority of those who are better informed say they cannot affect decision-making through voting.

Figure Y. Voting Can Influence Decision-Making


Region (n)	Agree	Disagree
UKRAINE (1200)	28%	67%
Great Deal/Some Political Information (285)	37%	61%
Little/None (850)	25%	68%
Great Deal/Some Economic Information (280)	33%	63%
Little/None (862)	27%	68%

"How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country? Do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Political Participation

A majority of Ukrainians report having voted in the 1994 elections. Responses generally mirror actual turnout in the 1994 elections, although the question did not break down participation according to voting in initial elections and runoffs. 71 percent say they voted in the Presidential election, 61 percent in the Supreme Rada elections, 63 percent in local elections, and 20 percent say they did not vote.

Figure Z. Voting in 1994 Elections



"Did you vote in the 1994 elections or not?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

In all cases, women are more likely than men to say they voted. Reported turnout increases with age. A majority (55%) of those age 18-24 did not vote. Of course, many were ineligible in 1994.

Those who are more interested in politics and government are more likely to have voted, as are those who feel they can affect the political process. Ethnic Ukrainians are somewhat more likely than ethnic Russians to report having voted in the last elections than ethnic Russians.

A Majority Likely to Vote in the Next Rada Elections

Just 56 percent say they are likely to vote in the next elections for Supreme Rada (33% very/23% somewhat). Another 18 percent say they are not very likely to vote, 10 percent are not at all likely, and 12 percent are certain they will not vote. There are major regional variations regarding turnout (Figure AA next page).

Again, older respondents are the most likely to vote. Other factors affecting political participation include interest in politics and government, a belief that Ukraine is, or is becoming, a democracy, high vote efficacy, and the degree to which one is informed about political and economic affairs.

Figure AA. Likelihood of Voting In Rada Elections, Breakdown of Several Factors


Age & Region (n)	More Likely	Less Likely	Attitudinal & Informational Factors	More Likely	Less Likely
UKRAINE (1200)	56%	40%			
Ages 18-24 (144)	56%	40%	Interested in Politics (661)	61%	37%
25-34 (221)	51%	44%	Not Interested in Politics (523)	49%	46%
35-44 (250)	51%	45%			
45-54 (196)	54%	44%	Ukraine is/is Becoming Democracy (520)	62%	34%
55-64 (192)	58%	39%	Is not/Is not Becoming Democracy (440)	47%	49%
65+ (198)	64%	31%			
			High Vote Efficacy (332)	73%	24%
Kyiv (60)	48%	51%	Low Vote Efficacy (779)	48%	46%
North (114)	60%	33%			
Central (154)	66%	31%	More Informed Politically (285)	65%	32%
Northeast (104)	46%	53%	Less informed Politically (850)	53%	43%
Northwest (83)	62%	34%			
Southeast (152)	56%	39%	More Informed Economically (280)	64%	33%
West (119)	71%	29%	Less Informed Economically (862)	53%	43%
Southwest (47)	47%	53%			
South (119)	43%	50%			
Crimea (56)	38%	58%			
East (192)	54%	40%			

"How likely are you to vote in the next elections for Supreme Rada?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Party Support in the Rada Elections

A ballot test for the Supreme Rada reveals that few parties have significant voter support. Only the Communist Party registers double-digit support (13%) and 75 percent of its supporters are age 45 or older (59% are age 55 and older). Next is the Democratic Party of Ukraine at 5 percent, the People's Rukh at 4 percent, and several parties at 1 percent or less. Fully 35 percent say they would not vote for any party and 22 percent don't know.

Figure AB. Party Support



"If there were to be an election tomorrow for the Supreme Rada, for which party would you vote?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Projected Turnout Higher for the Next Presidential Election

A greater number of Ukrainians (68%) are likely to vote in the next Presidential election than in the Rada elections. In all, 42 percent are very likely, 26 percent are somewhat likely, 11 percent are not very likely, 7 percent are not at all likely, and 10 percent are certain they will not vote. Ethnic Ukrainians are somewhat more likely to vote (45% very likely) than are ethnic Russians (35% very likely).

Again, likelihood of voting – particularly very likely scores – increases with age, interest in politics, the sense that Ukraine is a democracy, the belief in higher vote efficacy, and information level. There are also marked differences regionally (Figure AC next page).

Figure AC. Likelihood of Voting In Presidential Elections, Breakdown of Several Factors


Age & Region	More Likely	Less Likely	Attitudinal & Informational Factors	More Likely	Less Likely
UKRAINE (1200)	68%	28%			
Ages 18-24 (144)	68%	28%	Interested in Politics (661)	73%	24%
25-34 (221)	65%	29%	Not Interested in Politics (523)	63%	31%
35-44 (250)	67%	30%			
45-54 (196)	68%	29%	Ukraine is/is Becoming Democracy (520)	77%	21%
55-64 (192)	73%	24%	Is not/is not Becoming Democracy (440)	61%	36%
65+ (198)	71%	25%			
			High Vote Efficacy (332)	83%	15%
Kyiv (60)	70%	29%	Low Vote Efficacy (779)	63%	32%
North (114)	72%	25%			
Central (154)	72%	25%	More Informed Politically (285)	77%	20%
Northeast (104)	56%	42%	Less informed Politically (850)	66%	30%
Northwest (83)	73%	24%			
Southeast (152)	73%	24%	More Informed Economically (280)	80%	18%
West (119)	90%	8%	Less Informed Economically (862)	65%	31%
Southwest (47)	57%	39%			
South (119)	62%	30%			
Crimea (56)	50%	45%			
East (192)	63%	31%			

"How likely are you to vote in the next elections for President?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Kuchma Reelect Shows Potential Vulnerability

Given the high level of dissatisfaction in Ukraine and the lack of confidence in the President or his administration, Kuchma's reelect score is remarkably high. In all, 42 percent say that he has done his job as President well enough to deserve reelection, while 35 percent would support someone else for President. In terms of intensity, however, 21 percent feel strongly that he deserves reelection and 21 percent do not hold a strong opinion. On the other side, 23 percent feel strongly about their intention to support someone new while 12 percent are less intense in their opinion. Politically, this must be considered a sign of potential vulnerability (Figure AD next page).

Figure AD. Support for President Kuchma



"In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well enough to deserve re-election, or would you support someone else for President? Do you feel strongly about that or not strongly?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)


Kuchma's reelect score is strongest in the West (55%) and East (50%). The sentiment for a new President is higher in the North (39%), Northeast (47%), Southeast (46%), and Crimea (44%). Urbanites (45% reelect versus 38% new person) are more likely to reelect the President than rural residents (36% versus 31%). Scores are relatively uniform across age groups and most other subgroups. However, those who believe in high vote efficacy are more likely to support the President (50% versus 32%) than are those with low scores (39% versus 38%).

The President receives stronger support from market economy proponents (49% versus 31%) than from those who prefer central planning (35% versus 43%). Likewise, economic optimists (53% versus 29%) are stronger supporters than are pessimists (35% versus 41%). Likely voters are stronger supporters (45% versus 36%) than are those less likely to vote in the next presidential contest (33% versus 33%). Urban voters are more likely to support his reelection (45% versus 38%) than are rural voters (36% versus 31%). Ethnic Russians are somewhat more likely to support a new person (40% versus 40%) than are ethnic Ukrainians (42%-33%).

Supreme Rada Reelect Also Indicates Vulnerability

The reelect scores for Rada members are less positive and also indicate political vulnerability. Only 24 percent say their representative deserves reelection while 33 percent call for a new person. "Don't know" scores are high in this test – 28 percent. Only 14 percent feel strongly that their representative deserves reelection, while 24 percent strongly support a new person (Figure AE next page).

Figure AE. Support for Supreme Rada Representative



"In general, would you say that your representative to the Supreme Rada has done his job as his or her job well enough to deserve re-election, or would you support someone else for the Supreme Rada? Do you feel strongly about that or not strongly?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Reelect scores are higher in Kyiv (31%), the Southeast (29%), and the East (34%). Ethnic Russians (29%), those who prefer a party-affiliated candidate (32%), and those who rely on official sources for electoral information (35%) are also more likely to support the reelection of their Rada representative.

"New Person" scores are highest in the Northwest (43%), the West (38%), and Crimea (39%). Urban residents (28% reelect versus 31% new person) indicate stronger support for their representatives than do rural residents (16% versus 34%). Otherwise, there is little differentiation among subgroups.

Most Important Issue Determining the Vote for Supreme Rada

A plurality of Ukrainians (35%) respond "don't know" to the question, "Which issue will be most important to you when you vote for candidates and parties in the next Supreme Rada elections?" "Don't know" scores are high across all age groups and in all regions outside of Kyiv. Rural residents (44%) are particularly unlikely to name an issue. Women (39%) are more likely to give this response than are men (29%). The most frequent substantive comment indicates that many are looking for "someone like me" who understands their problems. This finding indicates considerable opportunity for a populist appeal – particularly since 35 percent hold this sentiment when first and second mentions are combined.

Substantive responses include those listed on the next page.

Figure AF. Important Qualities for a Deputy

Personal Qualities (e.g. someone like me)	19%
Solution for Social Problems	13%
Pre-Election Campaign	8%
His Party	4%
Education/Competence/Professionalism	3%
Solutions for Economic Problems	3%
Experience/Performance	3%
Solutions for Political Problems	2%
Opinion of Others	1%

"In general, which issue would be most important to you if you will vote for candidates and/or parties in the next Supreme Rada elections?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Don't know scores jump to 49 percent when respondents are prompted for the second most important issue.

Necessity of Political Parties

A majority of Ukrainians (58%) believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy and 28 percent say they are not necessary. In terms of intensity, 37 percent feel strongly that parties are necessary and 16 percent feel strongly that they are not necessary.

A majority in all regions except the East (46%) say parties are necessary, but the pro-party sentiment is strongest in Kyiv (72%), the Southeast (69%), and the Southwest (69%). In addition, there are clear differences between urbanites (63% necessary) and rural people (48% necessary).

Men (67%) are far more likely than women (50%) to say that parties are necessary. Older respondents are the least likely to say that parties are necessary – only 40 percent of those age 65 and older as compared with 72 percent of all 18-24 year-olds believe parties are necessary. As illustrated by the following table, this differential is driven by older women.

In addition, those with higher information scores are more likely to say that political parties are necessary to democracy (Figure AG next page).

**Figure AG. Necessity of Political Parties for Democracy,
by Gender, Age, and Information Score**

	Necessary	Not Necessary
UKRAINE	58%	28%
<u>Gender & Age</u>		
Men 18-44 (296)	69%	24%
Men 45+ (232)	65%	26%
Women 18-44 (318)	61%	25%
Women 45+ (354)	40%	35%
<u>Information Score</u>		
Politics - More Informed (285)	69%	23%
Politics - Less Informed (850)	55%	30%
Economics - More Informed (280)	66%	26%
Economics - Less Informed (862)	57%	28%


*Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not? And do you feel strongly about that or not strongly? (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Those who favor a market economy (73%) are far more likely than central planning advocates (43%) to note the need for political parties.

Information about Political Parties

As with political and economic developments in general, Ukrainians are uninformed about political parties. Only 5 percent say they have read or heard a great deal about political parties, and 13 percent a fair amount, whereas 55 percent have not heard very much, and 25 percent have heard nothing at all (Figure AH next page). Only residents of Kyiv and the West are significantly more likely to have read or heard a great deal about political parties.

Figure AH. Amount of Information on Parties




"Thinking of all the parties and movements that are currently in existence, how much have you read or heard about political parties - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Importance of Party Competition

Fifty-seven percent (57%) say it is important to have at least two political parties competing in an election, while 28 percent say it is not important. This represents a growth in pro-party sentiments. In 1996, 46 percent said party competition is important and 34 percent said it is not. Support for party competition falls off in the North (41%), the South (49%), and the East (49%). Both urban (60%) and rural residents (52%) say party competition is important.

Figure AI. Multiparty System



"How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election - very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Majorities in all age groups except those 65 and older (42%) support party competition. Again, women age 45 and older are the least likely as only 42 percent back this concept. Large majorities of other age/sex groups support competition. Again, there are notable differences between those who are better informed and those with less information.

Figure AJ. Importance of Party Competition

	Important	Not Important
UKRAINE	57%	28%
<u>Politics</u>		
More Informed (285)	69%	22%
Less Informed (850)	54%	30%
<u>Economics</u>		
More Informed (280)	70%	21%
Less Informed (862)	54%	30%


"How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election – very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Market proponents (71%) are much more likely than central planning advocates (46%) to support party competition.

Differentiation Between Parties

At the same time, only 31 percent say that there are clear differences between the various political parties' approaches to the important problems facing Ukraine. Another 49 percent say there are not clear differences and 19 percent don't know (Figure AK next page). Clearly, the political parties themselves have done little to make an impression on the people of Ukraine. Again, the vast majority (80%) of Ukrainians have seen, read, or heard little or nothing at all about the country's parties and movements.

Figure AK. Differences Between Parties




"Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties in how they would solve the important problems facing Ukraine, or are there not clear differences between the parties?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Ideal Number of Parties

Only 3 percent say that there should be no political parties, and just 26 percent say that one party is ideal. Another 21 percent say there should be two parties and 27 percent say several. Sentiment for one party increases with age and is strongest among women age 45 and older (40%), those with little education (38%), and pensioners (37%). In 1994, 2 percent said none, 32 percent one, 10 percent two, and 27 percent several. In 1996, 5 percent said none, 31 percent one, 18 percent two, and 20 percent several.

Figure AL. Number of Parties




"What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties to have - none, one, two, several, or as many as we have today?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Support for Party-Affiliated Candidates

There is no clear preference for or objection to party-affiliated candidates. That is, 29 percent say they are more likely to support a party-affiliated candidate, 23 percent would prefer one who is not connected to a party, and 26 percent say it depends. There are no clear-cut differences by region, age, gender, or ethnicity. Urban dwellers (32%) are more likely than those in rural areas (23%) to support affiliated candidates. In 1994, the party candidate support score was 21 percent; in 1996, 30 percent.

Figure AM. Support for Party Candidates




"If an election were held tomorrow, would you be more likely to support a candidate for the Supreme Rada who was affiliated with a political party or who was not affiliated with a party?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Role of Parties in the Next Supreme Rada Elections

Nearly four in 10 (39%) say that political parties will play a stronger role in the next Rada elections than they did in 1994. At the same time, 17 percent think they will play a weaker role. A plurality, 43 percent, don't know how strong a role parties will play in comparison with 1994 (Figure AN next page). Urban residents (43%) are far more likely than those in rural areas (32%) to say that parties will play a stronger role.

Figure AN. Role of Parties



"Overall, will political parties play a stronger or weaker role in the next Supreme Rada election than they did in the 1994 elections?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Majorities in the Southeast (61%) and Southwest (68%) say that parties will play a stronger role. Men (45%) are more likely than women (34%) to predict that parties will play a stronger role. In fact, a majority of women don't know.

As education level increases, so does the opinion that parties will play a stronger role. Also, those who believe in high vote efficacy (54%) are more likely to say that parties will play a stronger role than those who believe in low efficacy (35%). Those with more political information (49%) are more likely than those with little information (38%) to say parties will play an expanded role.

Which Party Best Represents Your Views and Interests?

Only a few parties receive a significant number of mentions in response to this question. By far, "none" (31%) and "don't know" (26%) are the dominant responses.

Figure AO. Favored Political Party

Communist Party	13%
People's Rukh	5%
Democratic Party	5%
Socialist party	5%
None	31%
Don't Know	26%

"Which of the political parties or social movements listed below best represents the views and interests of people like you?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Communist supporters tend to be women (61%), particularly women age 45 and older (49%), as well as older respondents of both genders (55% are age 55 or older).

Whose Interests do Parties Represent?

There is a clear disconnect between parties and the people. Only 4 percent say parties represent "the interests of voters in my region" and 7 percent "the national interests." The following table outlines responses.

Figure AP. Interests Parties Represent

Interests of the Party's Leaders	26%
Monied Interests	13%
Interests of the Government Apparat	10%
National Interests	7%
Criminal Interests	4%
Interests of Voters in My Region	4%
Special Interests such as the Military or Labor Unions	4%
Interests of the Intelligentsia	2%
Other	2%
Don't Know	25%

"Which of the following do you think most accurately reflects the interests of Ukrainian political parties (one answer only)?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Only 1 percent say they themselves are members of a political party and just 2 percent express an interest in joining a party.

T HE OUTLOOK FOR NGOS

NGO Formation is Possible

For most Ukrainians, there are no apparent obstacles to forming associations without the participation of government. That is, 60 percent say that it is possible to form such associations and only 17 percent say it is not. Another 6 percent say it depends and 16 percent don't know. In 1996, 54 percent said forming associations was possible and 22 percent that it was not. A majority of all age/gender groups say that non-governmental organization (NGO) formation is possible, with the exception of women age 45 and older (48%/28% don't know). Again, those with more information are more likely to say that NGOs are possible than are those with less information. There are no differences by ethnicity or by type of settlement.

Figure AQ. Possibility of Forming NGOs


	Possible	Not Possible
UKRAINE	60%	17%
<u>Politics</u>		
More Informed (285)	68%	19%
Less Informed (850)	59%	17%
<u>Economics</u>		
More Informed (280)	71%	16%
Less Informed (862)	57%	18%

"In your opinion, do citizens of Ukraine have the possibility to unite into groups or form associations without the participation of government or not?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey)

NGOs Not Seen As Necessary

Yet, a plurality (45%) says that NGOs are not necessary, while just 32 percent say they are necessary. Only 9 percent say they are essential and 23 percent that they are very necessary. In all, 33 percent say they are not very necessary and 12 percent that they are not at all necessary. Another 8 percent say it depends and 14 percent don't know (Figure AR next page). Responses are consistent across the subgroups. In 1996, 18 percent found NGOs essential, 33 percent very necessary, 15 percent not very necessary, and 10 percent not at all necessary.

Figure AR. Necessity of NGOs



"How necessary are such organizations - essential, very necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

NGOs Most Likely To Attract Members

No one type of NGO stands out as the type of organization Ukrainians are most likely to join, and fewer Ukrainians are likely to join than they were in 1996.

Figure AS. Attractiveness of Various NGOs


Type of NGO	1996	1997
Consumer Advocate	15%	12%
Assistance to the Poor	15%	11%
Women's Groups	12%	10%
Educational	7%	7%
Religious	12%	6%
Environmental	10%	6%
Youth	5%	4%
Sports	8%	3%
Political	5%	2%
Ethnic	1%	1%
None	25%	33%
Don't Know	5%	4%

"Please look at this card and tell me which of the types of non-governmental organizations listed would you most likely join?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Volunteerism

The potential for volunteerism, however, is rather strong. In all, 15 percent say they definitely would give their time to work for a NGO without being paid, and 26 percent probably would give their time. Another 10 percent say they probably would not and 9 percent definitely would not give their time. Just 4 percent say it depends and 4 percent don't know.

Figure AT. Work for NGO Without Pay



"Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without being paid -definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, or definitely no?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Women 18-44 are the most likely to say they definitely or probably would volunteer (51%), while women 45 and older are the least likely (29%). Willingness to volunteer increases with education, interest in politics, and the belief that NGOs are necessary.

T

HE PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF CITIZENS' RIGHTS

Respondents were asked how important it is that certain rights be respected. The following table ranks rights by the percent responding "very important." Responses suggest that rights that Ukrainians perceive to be less threatened are considered less important than those for which status is in question.

Figure AU. Importance of Select Rights, Percent Answering "Very Important"

	1996	1997
The private property of individuals is protected by law	72%	77%
Honest elections are held regularly	65%	65%
All can freely practice the religion of one's choice	57%	60%
The right to publicly criticize the government is protected	53%	58%
The rights of minority groups are protected	47%	39%
One can choose between several parties and candidates when voting	32%	38%
All can form associations or unions without any government involvement	29%	23%
Citizens have the right to form political parties	28%	22%

"How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in the country where you live – is it very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)


It is interesting to note that even among ethnic Russians, the perceived importance of protecting minority rights does not differ greatly from the population at large (45% versus 39%). Further, among ethnic Russians, protecting minority rights ranks well below private property rights (76%), holding honest elections (67%), the right to publicly criticize the government (63%), and freedom of religion (60%).

P ERCEPTIONS OF UKRAINE'S CONSTITUTION

Information About Rights Under the Constitution

The vast majority of Ukrainians have little information about their rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine. Only 4 percent have a great deal of information, 21 percent have some information, 35 percent not very much, and 38 percent say they have no information at all.

Figure AV. Information about Constitution



"How much information do you have about your rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

The information deficit is greatest in the Northeast (51% none), the Southwest (55% none), and the Southeast (42% none). Yet, in nine out of the eleven regions, more than 35 percent of respondents report they have no information about their rights under the Constitution. The best informed areas are Kyiv (22% none) and the West (15% none). Older respondents have less information than younger Ukrainians. Half (50%) of all women age 45 and older say they have no such information. Even college graduates are uninformed – 52 percent say they have little or no information.

Sources of Constitutional Information

Ukrainians relied on varying sources listed in Figure AW (next page) to obtain most of their information about the new Constitution.

Figure AW. Sources of Information about Constitution


UT-1	33%
UT-2/1+1	26%
Local Newspapers	20%
UT-3/INTER	18%
UR-1	11%
Local Radio	11%
National Newspapers	9%
Discussions with Friends/Family/Colleagues	9%

"From which of the following sources did you get information about the new Constitution? On this card [SHOW CARD] are a number of sources of information."
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Availability of Information

A 43 percent plurality (of those with some information on the Constitution) say that information about the new Constitution is readily available to most people. Nearly as many (39%), however, say it is not. In six of eleven regions, in fact, a plurality or majority say information is not readily available. These include Kyiv, North, Central, Southeast, Southwest, and South. Younger people tend to think information is available, whereas older respondents are less likely to hold this view.

Figure AX. Availability of Information about Constitution




"In your opinion, is information about the new Constitution readily available to most people or not?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Perceived Impact of the New Constitution Is Minimal

Despite the optimism leading up to the enactment of the new Constitution in 1996, few Ukrainians now feel that the Constitution will have much impact on Ukrainian life. Only 4 percent of those with information about the Constitution think it will have a great deal of impact, 14 percent say it will have some impact, 14 percent say not very much, and 10 percent say it will have no impact at all. Another 15 percent say it is too soon to tell. Forty percent (40%) of those surveyed were not asked this question.

Figure AY. Impact of Constitution on Ukrainian Life



"How much impact will the new Constitution have on Ukrainian life: a great deal, some, not very much, or no impact at all?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=712)

There is virtually no difference by region, gender, or age in the number of people who say there will be a great deal of or some impact. Those who are interested in politics are more likely to perceive an impact (32%) than are those who are not interested (22%). Likewise, those who say Ukraine is, or is becoming, a democracy (38%) are more likely than those who say it is not (17%). In fact, all pro-democratic groups are more likely to say the Constitution will have an impact on Ukrainian life.

Again, those who have more political information (33%) are more likely to perceive an impact than are those with less information (25%). The same is true for economic information (35% versus 25%). Those with more information about the Constitution are also more likely to say there will be greater impact (33%) than are those with little or no information (25%). Ethnic Ukrainians (30%) are somewhat more likely than ethnic Russians (21%) to say that the Constitution will have a great deal of or some impact.

Market proponents (34%) are far more likely than central-planning advocates (18%) to say that the Constitution will have an impact. Economic optimists (42%) are more likely than pessimists (20%)

to perceive an impact. The same is true for likely voters (35% for Rada and 33% for Presidential) as compared with non-voters (18% for Rada and 15% for Presidential).

Voters who have some information about the Constitution are divided in their opinion on the statement, "It will take time before the new Constitution has an impact on life in Ukraine and the Ukrainian people must be patient in order to allow it to work." In all, 51 percent agree and 40 percent disagree.

C ONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT BODIES AND OFFICIALS

As the following table clearly indicates, Ukrainians have little confidence in government entities at this time – with the exception of the military forces.

Figure AZ. Confidence in Government

Institution/Personality	Great Deal/Fair Amount		Not Very Much/None	
	1996	1997	1996	1997
Supreme Rada	25%	16%	68%	79%
Cabinet of Ministers	–	13%	–	80%
Presidential Administration	28%	21%	66%	68%
Local Government	22%	17%	73%	79%
Central Bank	15%	24%	63%	57%
Ukraine's Military Forces	58%	56%	30%	36%
Judicial Branch	–	27%	–	64%
State Security Service	–	36%	–	46%
President Kuchma	–	31%	–	64%
Oleksandr Moroz	–	19%	–	64%
Pavlo Lazarenko	–	12%	–	63%
Hennady Udovenko	–	14%	–	43%
Yevhen Marchuk	–	9%	–	46%
Volodymyr Horbulin	–	9%	–	37%
Leonid Kravchuk	–	17%	–	71%

"I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them – a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all."
 (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Judicial Branch

Similar skepticism is apparent with regard to the public's confidence in the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice. The figure on the next page indicates worsening perceptions regarding confidence in the judicial branch.

Figure BA. Confidence in Judicial Branch


Institution	Great Deal/Fair Amount			Not Very Much/None		
	1994	1996	1997	1994	1996	1997
Courts	33%	33%	28%	53%	57%	65%
Public Prosecutors	31%	31%	29%	54%	56%	62%
Militia	24%	20%	21%	67%	71%	74%

*And how much confidence do you have in each of the following branches of the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions: a great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Familiarity with the Constitutional Court

Few people (24%) understand the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court, while a vast majority (70%) does not. Just 4 percent say they understand it very well, 20 percent somewhat well, 34 percent not very well, and 36 percent not at all well.

Figure BB. Understanding of Purpose of Constitutional Court



*How well do you understand the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court? Do you understand very well, somewhat, not very well, or not at all well? (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)


T HE PROBLEM OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Corruption is Common and Constitutes a Serious Problem

Most voters believe that official corruption is quite common. In fact, 67 percent say it is very common, 22 percent fairly common, and just 2 percent say it is rare. Those who are more informed politically are even more likely to hold this view (75% very common). In 1994, 67 percent said corruption was very common; in 1996, 59 percent said corruption was very common.

Further, voters perceive corruption, in general, to be a serious problem – 72 percent say it is very serious and 18 percent fairly serious. Again, just 2 percent say it is not serious. In 1994, 67 percent said corruption was very serious; in 1996, 69 percent said it was very serious.

Figure BC. Frequency and Seriousness of Corruption



"In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption - is it very common, fairly common, fairly rare, or very rare?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

"And how serious is the problem of official corruption, meaning how much does it matter - is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Perceived Corruption Of Groups

As Figure BD (next page) illustrates, corruption is believed common across government and commerce. However, foreign businesses are perceived to be less corrupt than other election entities tested.

Figure BD. How Common Is Corruption?


Institution	Common		Not Common	
	1996	1997	1996	1997
Cabinet of Ministers	63%	70%	7%	5%
Government Officials	72%	81%	8%	4%
Ukrainian Banks	59%	59%	9%	11%
Private Entrepreneurs	65%	64%	10%	15%
Foreign Businesses	42%	42%	13%	19%
Supreme Rada	NA	69%	NA	6%
Kuchma Administration	NA	61%	NA	11%

"In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Comparative Corruption of the Kuchma Administration

It is somewhat difficult for Ukrainians to assess the level of corruption in the Kuchma Administration in comparison with corruption under Leonid Kravchuk and Mikhail Gorbachev. Regarding the Kravchuk Administration, 21 percent say that Kuchma's Administration is more corrupt, 9 percent say it is less corrupt, 34 percent about the same, and 35 percent don't know. When compared with Gorbachev's administration, 18 percent say Kuchma's is more corrupt, 14 percent less, 24 percent about the same, and 42 percent don't know.

Figure BE. Corruption of Kuchma Administration



"Would you say that President Kuchma's administration is more corrupt than the Kravchuk administration (Gorbachev administration), less corrupt, or about the same?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

As the following sections reveal, most Ukrainians have little information about political and economic affairs. Clearly, this lack of information limits their ability to assess developments in the country accurately or to participate fully in the democratic or economic process.


Economic Information

Only 3 percent of Ukrainians say they have a great deal of information about economic developments in Ukraine, 21 percent have a fair amount of information, 57 percent don't have very much information, and 15 percent have none at all. The lack of information is consistent across all regions, gender, and age groups. Information levels are higher among men; those with more education; and those who live in Kyiv and the West, are younger, or are interested in politics. In 1994, 60 percent had little or no information; in 1996, 77 percent had little or no information.

Political Information

Similarly, only 3 percent say they have a great deal of information about political developments in Ukraine, 21 percent have a fair amount of information, 56 percent don't have very much information, and 15 percent have none at all. Again, the lack of information is pervasive across all regions, gender, and age groups. Urbanites, men, those age 18-54, those who have more education, and those who are interested in politics report higher than average information levels. In 1996, 68 percent reported having little information.

Figure BF. Information about Economic and Political Developments



"How much information do you feel you have about economic (political) developments in Ukraine - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Figure BG. Information on Economic and Political Developments, by Region and Age


	Economic		Political	
	Great Deal/Some	Not Much/None	Great Deal/Some	Not Much/None
UKRAINE (1200)	24%	73%	24%	71%
Kyiv (60)	31%	69%	33%	66%
North (114)	17%	75%	19%	74%
Central (154)	13%	85%	12%	85%
Northeast (104)	28%	72%	30%	70%
Northwest (83)	15%	81%	18%	76%
Southeast (152)	27%	67%	30%	67%
West (119)	46%	48%	32%	62%
Southwest (47)	23%	70%	30%	66%
South (119)	14%	79%	16%	76%
Crimea (56)	24%	72%	24%	71%
East (192)	22%	72%	28%	64%
Men 18-44 (296)	33%	67%	29%	68%
Men 45+ (232)	28%	70%	30%	67%
Women 18-44 (318)	19%	76%	19%	76%
Women 45+ (354)	17%	75%	20%	71%

"How much information do you feel you have about economic (political) developments in Ukraine - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?" (IFES July 1997 Survey)

Sources of Electoral Information

Most Ukrainians are television-reliant for their news and information about the electoral process. That is, 73 percent say they get most of such information from television. To a lesser degree, the public also uses newspapers (37%), radio (31%), and other individuals (20%) as sources of information. Only 16 percent rely on official sources of information (Figure BH next page). Note that for this question, multiple responses were allowed.

Figure BH. Sources for Electoral Information




"Where do you get most of your information about the election process itself, that is, where to vote, how to fill out ballots, voting requirements and the like?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Still, 72 percent find nonpartisan election information provided by election officials useful and only 15 percent say such information is not useful.

Adequacy of Information Regarding Candidates and Parties in 1994

A majority (56%) say they did not receive enough information about the candidates and parties to make a good choice between the candidates for the Supreme Rada in 1994. Just 24 percent feel they had adequate information and 19 percent don't know (Figure BI next page). A majority in all regions – except the Northwest, Southwest, and East – had inadequate information, but even these exceptions had "inadequate" scores of 40 percent or more. A majority of both men and women said they received insufficient information. Inadequate scores ranged from 46 percent among those age 18-24 to 63 percent of those age 55-64.

Figure B1. Adequacy of Election Information




"Do you feel that you received enough information about the candidates and parties to make a good choice between the candidates for the Supreme Rada in the 1994 elections?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Media Analysis is Important

In all, 81 percent say it is important for the media to analyze differences between the candidates and political parties on the various issues to help the public understand these differences. Only 9 percent say that such analysis is not important, while 45 percent say it is very important. Responses are consistent across regions and age groups.

Figure BJ. Importance of Election Analysis by Media




"In their political coverage, how important is it for the media to analyze the differences between the candidates and political parties on the various issues in order to help the public understand these differences?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Ukrainians are Television-Reliant

Most Ukrainians rely mainly on television for their news and information. That is, 62 percent watch television news on a daily basis, whereas only 13 percent read the newspaper daily, and 43 percent listen to radio news daily (Figure BK next page).

Figure BK. Popular Media Sources



"How often do you read the newspaper?" "How often do you watch news programs on television?"
 "How often do you listen to news programs on the radio?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

Although radio is a fairly effective means of reaching older Ukrainians, any broad-based information campaign will have to use television to be effective. Even then, it will remain difficult to reach the youngest voters. Only 45 percent of those age 18-24 watch television news on a daily basis as compared with at least 58 percent among older age groups. Programs geared toward younger voters may attract higher viewership.

Main Source of Information About Government and Politics

The television stations UT-1 (25%), UT-2 (18%), and UT-3 (24%) are the main sources of information about government and politics in Ukraine. All other sources are in single digits. There are clear regional differences as illustrated by Figure BL (next page).

Figure BL. Sources of Information about Government and Politics

Region (n)	UT-1	UT-2	UT-3	ORT
UKRAINE (1200)	25%	18%	24%	5%
Kyiv (60)	23%	20%	18%	7%
North (114)	30%	18%	26%	4%
Central (154)	42%	14%	14%	3%
Northeast (104)	11%	18%	38%	1%
Northwest (83)	32%	30%	11%	4%
Southeast (152)	22%	12%	32%	8%
West (119)	34%	44%	3%	-
Southwest (47)	41%	9%	15%	-
South (119)	19%	21%	27%	8%
Crimea (56)	9%	8%	24%	22%
East (192)	15%	7%	41%	7%

"What is your main source of information about government and politics?"
(IFES July 1997 Survey)

Russians use UT-3 most often (38%) while Ukrainians divide their responses more evenly between UT-1 (29%), UT-2 (21%), and UT-3 (20%).

Which Television Station is Most Reliable?

No single television station stands out as providing the most reliable information about news and politics. UT-3 receives 28 percent of all mentions, UT-2 is at 27 percent, UT-1 at 22 percent, ORT 9 percent, and all others are below 5 percent. Twenty-three percent (23%) don't know which station has the greatest reliability. There are regional preferences. In Kyiv, the Northwest, South, and West, UT-2 has a significantly higher reliability score. In the Central and Southwest regions, UT-1 is perceived to be the most reliable. In the Northeast, East and Southeast, UT-3 receives the most mentions. In Crimea, ORT receives twice as many mentions as the runner-up. In the North, roughly equal numbers mention UT-1, UT-2 and UT-3.

Objectivity of Various Media

As Figure BM on the next page illustrates, UT-2 is considered to be the most objective of the listed media sources in its domestic news coverage.

Figure BM. Rating Objectivity of Domestic News Coverage

	Objective		Not Objective	
	1996	1997	1996	1997
UT-1	31%	35%	36%	25%
UT-2	33%	41%	31%	17%
Independent TV	32%	31%	18%	10%
National Radio	29%	27%	32%	20%
Independent Radio	27%	26%	14%	7%

"And finally a question about your views on the way our mass media report news about events and developments in our country. For each medium mentioned, how would you describe its domestic news coverage – objective or not objective?"
 (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=1200)

THE VIEW FROM CRIMEA

Introduction

A total of 300 interviews were conducted in Crimea to provide a more complete assessment of opinion in the region. The sample is representative by age, sex, and ethnicity. Most of those in Crimea are ethnic Russians (60%) and 71 percent of the respondents live in urban areas. Forty-five percent (45%) are men and 55 percent are women.

Interest in Politics and Government

Although still a majority, interest in politics and government is slightly lower in Crimea than it is in the nation as a whole. That is, 52 percent are very or somewhat interested in politics and government and 47 percent are not particularly interested. Men (65%) are far more interested than are females (42%). Young Crimeans are only moderately interested (6% very and 56% somewhat). Only 14 percent of young Crimeans say they are not at all interested. Crimeans age 45 and over express both the most intense interest (16% very and 19% somewhat) as well as the most intense disinterest (35% very and 36% somewhat).

Mood of the Region

Crimeans are even more intensely dissatisfied with conditions in the country than are other Ukrainians. That is, 85 percent are very dissatisfied as compared with 75 percent nationally. Men 45 and older are the most intensely dissatisfied (92% very dissatisfied). As with the rest of the nation, nearly three out of four (74%) Crimeans name unemployment and the low standard of living as the reasons for their dissatisfaction.

Political and Economic Models

Like Ukrainians elsewhere, Crimeans also look to the United States and Germany as the best economic and political models. They differ in placing the United States first in both economics (13%) and politics (18%). Germany is second in both questions (10% and 8% respectively). Russia receives 7 percent as an economic model and 6 percent as a political model as compared with 2 percent in the total sample.

Crimeans Are Pessimistic About the Economy

Crimean respondents are more pessimistic than the nation as a whole concerning the direction of the economy over the course of the next year. That is, 55 percent say the economy will worsen (as compared with 45% nationwide), 8 percent think it will improve and 29 percent say it will stay the same. A majority of those age 25 and older say the economy will worsen.

Preferred Economic Model

As in the national sample, a bare plurality of Crimeans (32%) favors a market economy whereas 29 percent support central planning. There is more sentiment for some combination, as 23 percent say "both."

Here too, men (40% market versus 27% central) are more likely than women (25% versus 31%) to favor a market economy. Support for a market economy is extremely low among those age 45 and older.

Figure BN. Support for Market Economy, by Age

	Market Economy	Central Planning	Both
UKRAINE	32%	29%	23%
18-24	58%	11%	25%
25-34	41%	20%	28%
35-44	43%	23%	23%
45-54	20%	39%	27%
55-64	8%	43%	27%
65+	16%	46%	3%

"When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a market economy or a centrally planned economy?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=300)

In all, 23 percent say that Ukraine should pursue a market economy as quickly as possible and 45 percent think steady but small reforms should be made. Only 14 percent say that a market economy should not be pursued. Again age is a factor, as 35 percent of those age 65 and older say Ukraine should not pursue a market economy. Rural Crimeans (32%) are more likely than urbanites (19%) to want quick steps to a market economy. In all, 63 percent say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too slowly.

Perceived Impediment to Economic Reforms

Crimeans (14%) are less likely than the nation as a whole (24%) to blame the Supreme Rada for impeding the pace of economic reform. Twenty percent (20%) blame the President, 13 percent blame the Cabinet of Ministers and 16 percent blame local government. Those who are better informed about political developments (34%) and economic developments (32%) are far more likely to blame the President than those who are less well-informed.

Political Reforms

A 51 percent majority of Crimeans say that political reforms are occurring too slowly. Just 12 percent think reforms are occurring too quickly, 6 percent at the right pace, and 29 percent don't know. Interestingly, those with higher levels of political information are more likely to say that political reforms are occurring too quickly (30%).

Again, the President (21%) and his Cabinet (14%) combined are seen as the most responsible for impeding the pace of reform. Another 16 percent believe the Rada is most responsible.

Crimeans Support Land Ownership for Citizens and Non-Citizens

Only 12 percent of Crimeans say that land ownership should not be allowed for citizens of Ukraine whereas 52 percent say citizens should be able to own a limited amount and 31 percent call for unlimited ownership of land. Just 7 percent of men and 16 percent of women say that land ownership should be prohibited. Prohibitionist sentiment is highest among those age 65 and older (35%). Only 16 percent of the oldest voters say that land ownership should be unlimited. Of rural Crimeans, 78 percent support some form of land ownership as compared with 85 percent of those in urban areas. Those with more information about economic and political affairs are more likely to support unlimited ownership.

Just 25 percent say that land ownership should be denied to non-citizens whereas 47 percent call for limited ownership and 20 percent for unlimited ownership. Again, men are more likely than women to support land ownership and opposition increases with age. The main opposition is found among women age 45 and older. In this group, 46 percent say that land ownership should not be allowed for non-citizens.

As in the nation at-large, Crimeans say that laws regarding land ownership should be less stringent for citizens than for non-citizens. In all, 60 percent agree and 32 percent disagree that the laws should allow citizens of Ukraine to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty. When applied to non-citizens, only 38 percent agree and 54 percent disagree.

Foreign Investments

Overall, 65 percent say that foreign investments are important to the economic recovery of Ukraine and 26 percent say they are not important. Men (74%) are more likely than women (57%) to perceive the importance of foreign investments. Perceived importance declines with age (from 86 percent among those age 18-24 to 57 percent of those 45-54 to 32 percent of those age 65 and older). Those with higher levels of information (83%) are more likely than those with less information (60%) to say that foreign investments are important.

Democratic Issues

Crimeans are less likely than people in the rest of the country to view Ukraine as a democracy. Just 12 percent say that Ukraine is a democracy and 62 percent say it is not. Nationwide, 20 percent say it is a democracy and 52 percent say it is not. Ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea (21%) are more likely than ethnic Russians (7%) to call Ukraine a democracy, but a majority of both groups (54% and 66% respectively) say it is not. Rural dwellers (22% yes versus 51% no) are more likely to think of Ukraine as a democracy than are urbanites (8% yes versus 67% no). Those who are better informed are more likely to think of Ukraine as a democracy. Only 17 percent of those who say Ukraine is not a democracy believe it is moving toward democracy.

Crimeans' views of what it means to live in a democracy generally matches the opinions of the nation as a whole. That is, 34 percent say a guarantee of all rights, 17 percent a high standard of living, 15 percent a law-abiding society, and 11 percent that government takes care of its citizens.

Voter Efficacy

Regarding voter efficacy, what is a negative finding for the nation is even more profound for Crimea. Nearly eight out of ten (78%) disagree that by voting, they have a chance to influence decision-making in the country. Only 19 percent agree. Those who believe in higher efficacy are somewhat better informed but, otherwise, are fairly evenly distributed across the population.

Past Voting Behavior

Not surprisingly, then, reported voting levels are lower than in the rest of the country. Although a majority of Crimeans say they voted in the 1994 presidential election, only 37 percent voted in the Supreme Rada election, and 43 percent voted in local elections. Overall turnout was higher among those age 45 and older and highest among those age 55-64. Those who are more interested in politics and who are better informed about political and economic matters are more likely to have voted in these elections.

Projected Vote For Supreme Rada Elections

Only 38 percent of Crimeans are likely to vote in the next Rada elections as compared with 56 percent of the population at large. As noted elsewhere, older respondents are more likely to vote than younger respondents. Urbanites (40%) are more likely than rural residents (31%) to say they will vote in the next Rada elections. Even those who are interested in politics indicate limited likelihood of voting. That is, 45 percent say they are likely to vote and 51 percent are not likely. Those who are better informed are more likely to vote: 53 percent of those with political information are likely to vote as compared with 32 percent of those with little or no information. Only 56 percent of those who voted in all elections in 1994 are likely to vote in the next Rada elections. In all, 16 percent would support the Communist Party of Ukraine, 6 percent would back the Labor Party, 5 percent the Party for the Economic Revival of Crimea, and 40 percent no party.

Projected Vote In the Presidential Election

A somewhat greater number of Crimeans, 50 percent say they are likely to vote in the next election for President. Men (58%) are more likely to vote than women (43%) and the very young (64%) and those age 45 and older are most likely to vote. Those age 25-34 (42%) and 35-44 (34%) are far less likely to vote. There are no differences between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians or between urban and rural voters. Again, those who are better informed politically (66%) are more likely to vote than those who are not well informed (44%).

Kuchma Reelect Rating

President Kuchma's reelection score, which is 42 percent in the national sample, is just 34 percent in Crimea, and a 45 percent plurality of Crimeans say they would support a new person for President. Young women are the least likely to support Kuchma's reelection (25% versus 48%). Ethnic Russians (37% versus 42%) are marginally more supportive than are ethnic Ukrainians (31% versus 51%).

Supreme Rada Reelect Rating

The Rada reelection score is also weak, with 21 percent saying their representative deserves reelection and 39 percent offering support for a new person. Pluralities in all age and gender groups would support a new person. Urban and rural voters, as well as ethnic Ukrainians and Russians alike, would support a new person for the Supreme Rada. As in the rest of the nation, there is considerable potential for a populist political message. The most important factor in voting for the Rada will be the personal qualities of the candidates. In all, 23 percent of Crimeans indicate that they seek someone who understands their problems and concerns to represent them in the Rada.

Political Parties

Despite the low opinion of vote efficacy noted earlier, 60 percent of the Crimean sample feel that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy. However, only 22 percent say that there are clear differences between the parties and 54 percent say there are no clear differences. In addition, only 19 percent have read or heard a great deal or a fair amount about the parties and movements currently in existence.

Only 3 percent of Crimeans say that Ukraine should have no political parties, and just 19 percent would opt for one party. In fact, 63 percent say it is important for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election and only 25 percent say such competition is not important. Nevertheless, only 29 percent say they would be more likely to support a party-affiliated candidate, 20 percent would opt for a non-affiliated candidate, and 29 percent say it depends. Likewise, 29 percent think that political parties will play a stronger role in the next Supreme Rada elections than they did in 1994.

The same kind of disconnect between the parties and the people that is apparent nationwide is found in Crimea. That is, only 5 percent think that political parties represent the interests of the voters in the region and 5 percent think parties represent the national interests. At the same time, 17 percent think they represent monied interests, 15 percent the interests of the party's leader, 14 percent the interests of the government apparatus, and 13 percent think parties represent criminal interests.

NGOs

A majority, 57 percent, says it is possible to form associations without government involvement. This tracks with a nationwide response of 60 percent. A 55 percent majority, however, indicates that such organizations are not particularly necessary. That is, 38 percent say they are not very necessary and 17 percent that they are not at all necessary. Only 7 percent say they are essential and 19 percent feel they are very necessary. Surprisingly, then, 16 percent say they definitely would volunteer their time to such an organization without pay, and 23 percent say they probably would volunteer. In Crimea, young men (24% "definitely") are the most likely volunteers.

Protection of Rights

As Figure BO on the next page indicates, Crimeans place a lower priority on the protection of most rights than does the nation as a whole. Still, private property, honest elections held regularly, and freedom of speech and religion are considered to be very important.

Figure B0. Importance of Select Rights

	Crimea	National
Private property of individuals is protected by law	74%	77%
Honest elections are held regularly	55%	65%
All can freely practice the religion of one's choice	43%	60%
Right to publicly criticize the government is protected	47%	58%
Rights of minority groups are protected	29%	39%
One can choose between several parties and candidates when voting	37%	38%
All can form associations or union without any government involvement	16%	23%
Citizens have the right to form political parties	21%	22%

"How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in the country where you live - is it very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=300)

The Constitution

Not surprisingly, only 4 percent have a great deal of information and 17 percent have some information about their rights under the new Constitution. Forty-seven percent (47%) of Crimeans say they have no information at all or don't know; these individuals were not asked any further questions on this topic. The source of information mentioned most often is local newspapers (23%). Of course, television is the highest combined response. Of those with some information, 41 percent feel that information is readily available to most people. However, only 24 percent say that the Constitution will have a great deal or some impact whereas 47 percent think it will have little or no impact. By a 48 percent to 44 percent margin, these Crimeans agree that it will take time before the new Constitution has an impact on Ukrainian life and that the people must be patient and to allow it to work. At the same time, only 13 percent agree completely, and 30 percent disagree completely.

Confidence in Government

As Figure BP on the next page clearly indicates, Crimeans have even less confidence in government than the nation at large.

Figure BP. Confidence in Government

	Great Deal/Fair Amount		Not Very Much/None	
	Crimea	National	Crimea	National
Supreme Rada	9%	16%	85%	79%
Cabinet of Ministers	11%	13%	82%	80%
Presidential Administration	12%	21%	80%	68%
Local Government	11%	17%	85%	79%
Central Bank	16%	24%	53%	57%
Ukraine's Military Forces	40%	56%	41%	36%
Judicial Branch	21%	27%	66%	64%
State Security Service	24%	36%	55%	46%
President Kuchma	14%	31%	80%	64%
Oleksandr Moroz	12%	19%	53%	64%
Pavlo Lazarenko	6%	12%	46%	63%
Hennady Udovenko	5%	14%	39%	43%
Yevhen Marchuk	7%	9%	39%	46%
Volodymyr Horbulin	3%	9%	30%	37%
Leonid Kravchuk	5%	17%	84%	71%

"I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them - a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all."
(IFES July 1997 Survey, n=300)

Judicial Branch

Low confidence scores are also found with regard to public confidence in the judicial system.

Figure BQ. Confidence in Judicial Branch

	Great Deal/Fair Amount		Not Very Much/None	
	Crimea	National	Crimea	National
Courts	23%	28%	71%	65%
Public Prosecutors	23%	29%	71%	62%
Militia	16%	21%	80%	74%

"And how much confidence do you have in each of the following branches of the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions: a great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=300)

As in the rest of the nation, few understand the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court. Just 7 percent understand it very well and 16 percent somewhat well. In contrast, 70 percent have a poor understanding.

Corruption

Crimean residents are even more likely than the national sample to believe that official corruption is common. In all, 79 percent think that it is very common, 15 percent fairly common, and 1 percent think it fairly rare. This perception extends across all major subgroups. In addition, 95 percent say official corruption is a serious problem – 81 percent say it is very serious.

The following table illustrates perceived corruption levels for a number of public and private entities.

Figure BR. Perceived Frequency of Corruption

	Common		Not Common	
	Crimea	National	Crimea	National
Cabinet of Ministers	75%	70%	2%	5%
Government Officials	85%	81%	1%	4%
Ukrainian Banks	60%	59%	7%	11%
Private Entrepreneurs	68%	64%	9%	15%
Foreign Businesses	46%	42%	15%	19%
Supreme Rada	71%	69%	4%	6%
Kuchma Administration	69%	61%	5%	11%

"In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption?" (IFES July 1997 Survey, n=300)

Information on Economic and Political Developments

Like the rest of the nation, Crimeans are severely under-informed. Only 24 percent have information on economic developments whereas 72 percent have little or no information. Similarly, just 24 percent have at least a fair amount of information about political developments whereas 71 percent have little or none. Only 20 percent say they had sufficient information in 1994 to make good choices between candidates and parties, while 62 percent did not.

Like the rest of the country, Crimea is television-reliant. That is, 74 percent say they get most of the information about the election process from television. Crimea is, however, far more reliant

on ORT (22%) than is the rest of the country. UT-3 (24%) edges out ORT as the most important source of information about government and politics.

Most Crimeans (80%) say that it is important for the media to provide analysis of the differences between candidates and parties on the various issues of the day. Further, 31 percent say such analysis is very important. Just 11 percent say media analysis is not important.

Voters in Crimea are more likely to read the newspaper on a daily basis (31%) than are the voters in the rest of the nation (13%), and they are less likely to listen to radio news (28% in Crimea versus 43% nationally). Sixty-five percent (65%) watch television news daily (versus 62% nationwide).

Crimean voters tend to say that ORT (41%) provides the most reliable information about government and politics. Next is UT-3 at 23 percent. With the exception of independent stations, a plurality of Crimeans say that the various stations are not objective in their domestic news coverage.

Summary

On many issues, public opinion in Crimea is very similar to that of the nation as a whole. There is, however, more dissatisfaction with conditions in the country, less confidence in government, and less political involvement than in the rest of the nation. The key differences relate to democracy, perceptions of vote efficacy, and participation in the political process. Crimeans are less likely to feel that Ukraine is a democracy, less likely to say that they can influence decision-making through voting, less likely to have voted in the past, and less likely to vote in the future.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This survey marks the fourth wave of IFES-sponsored survey research since 1994. The findings are, in many ways, consistent with earlier IFES research and also confirm many of the findings of other independent surveys in Ukraine.

There are certain positive findings in this survey. First of all, a majority of Ukrainians is interested in matters relating to politics and government. Further, a majority plans to continue to participate in the process by voting in the next elections for President and Supreme Rada. In addition, Ukrainians support the concept of political parties and strongly back multi-party elections as an important part of the democratic process.

Further, a plurality prefers the development of a market economy, and a majority of Ukrainians supports private land ownership for citizens and, to a lesser extent, for non-citizens. Further, 77 percent say that the protection of private property rights is very important.

At the same time, this survey reveals a downward trend on many important variables that should be of concern to policymakers and others working to promote political and economic reforms in Ukraine. Ukrainians are extremely dissatisfied with current conditions in the country – more dissatisfied than ever. Unemployment and the economy are the overriding concerns of the public and twice as many people as in 1996 express this concern. In addition, the public tends to be pessimistic about the economy, as a plurality say the economy will worsen in the next year.

In 1996, a plurality (43%) wanted to move toward a market economy as quickly as possible. Now, however, the mood resembles that of 1994 (31%) in which a plurality opts for a slow but steady approach to a market economy.

A majority says that Ukraine is not a democracy at this time and confidence in the government is virtually nonexistent. No branch of the government is considered likely to be able to solve Ukraine's economic problems during the next year. Public corruption is considered widespread and serious.

President Kuchma, although achieving a higher reelection score than one might expect given the mood of the country and his low confidence scores, has to be considered potentially vulnerable. Only 31 percent say they have at least a fair amount of confidence in him, whereas 64 percent have little or no confidence. At the same time, 42 percent support his reelection and 35 percent would support a new person for President.

Supreme Rada members are even more vulnerable. Just 24 percent support their member's reelection and 33 percent would support a new person; 28 percent are undecided.

The continuing decline in the Ukrainian public's perception of vote efficacy is quite profound. Only 28 percent say that "voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country," and 67 percent disagree. This perception of low efficacy is due, in many ways, to a lack of basic information on the mechanisms and systems that guarantee democracy, justice, and prosperity. Such information is needed in order to provide indications of Ukraine's progress toward these goals.

Clearly, participation in the political process and a positive perception of change depend in no small measure on the public's understanding of the complex forces that have been – or need to be – mobilized to shape future success. The Ukrainian public has woefully inadequate information in this regard. More than 70 percent of the voting-age public has little or no information about economic developments, political developments, or the new Constitution, and a majority of Ukrainians say they had inadequate information in making their voting decisions for the Supreme Rada in 1994.

In the absence of such information, it is extremely difficult for the public to discern the proper approaches required for reforms or to identify the leaders who have the most cogent programs.

In short, the lack of public information effectively immobilizes the public and reduces its perception of the efficacy of voting. What does this mean for successful aid to Ukraine or any other emerging democracy? It means that while supporting the change of the systems themselves in a transitional society, it is essential to educate the citizenry about the need for change, the goals of change, the public's role in the process, and about progress made to date.


Organizations providing assistance to build institutions and systems to support public welfare should also undertake public information campaigns dedicated to introducing recognized world standards for the operation of these institutions and systems. These organizations should also ensure that steps are being taken to achieve these standards. Failure to adequately address the concerns of the people for their future livelihood – which is inextricably linked to these systems – by informing them of the need for change and their role in the process, can result in further exacerbation of the widespread feelings of helplessness of their situation.

The media has a clear role to play in disseminating this information. In terms of information, Ukraine is a television-reliant society, but newspapers and radio are also important sources of information. At this time, in fact, newspapers are perceived to be doing the best job of informing the public. Ukrainians express a hunger for more analysis of the candidates and issues in elections, and a thirst for general information about politics, economics, and government. They expect the mass media to provide this information.

Clearly, as mentioned at the outset, Ukraine has a tremendous need for a broad-based public information campaign. Ideally, such a campaign would touch on every aspect of Ukrainian life – economic, political, legislative, and judicial – in addition to providing information about the process of elections. With such information, Ukrainians will be able to take a more active role in assessing

developments in their country and thus should be willing to participate more fully in the democratic and economic process.

APPENDIX I: REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF UKRAINE



REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF UKRAINE

APPENDIX II: DATA

TABLE 1

Q-1. How interested are you in matters of politics and government – are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
Year	1994	1996	1997	1997	1997
(Sample Size)	(1201)	(1660)	(1200)	(100)	(300)
1. Very Interested	19%	15%	16%	21%	13%
2. Somewhat Interested	36%	34%	39%	41%	39%
3. Not Too Interested	20%	23%	23%	26%	18%
4. Not At All Interested	23%	26%	20%	11%	29%
9. Don't Know	2%	3%	1%	1%	1%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 2

Q-2. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today – would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
Year	1994	1996	1997	1997	1997
(Sample Size)	(1201)	(1660)	(1200)	(100)	(300)
1. Very Satisfied	2%	1%	☆	1%	☆
2. Fairly Satisfied	5%	3%	2%	4%	2%
3. Somewhat Dissatisfied	25%	32%	21%	37%	11%
4. Very Dissatisfied	66%	59%	75%	57%	85%
9. Don't Know	3%	6%	2%	-	2%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	☆	1%	1%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	101%✓	100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 3 Q-3.1 Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are satisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Peace in country	☆	☆	2%	-
Independence of Ukraine	1%	1%	-	-
Political freedom	☆	☆	-	☆
Free enterprise	-	☆	1%	1%
Satisfaction by material status	-	1%	-	-
Other	2%	☆	-	-
Don't know	1%	☆	2%	☆
NOT ASKED	-	98%	95%✓	98%✓

TABLE 4 Q-3.2 Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Bad leadership in country	16%	9%	13%	5%
2. Difficult economic situation	19%	12%	16%	10%
3. Absence of social protection	34%	5%	5%	5%
4. Unemployment, low level of life	36%	73%	50%	74%
5. Imperfect laws	4%	7%	13%	8%
6. Absence of spirituality	-	2%	1%	1%
7. Other	15%	2%	3%	5%
99. Don't know	4%	2%	6%	3%
NOT ASKED	-	2%	5%	5%

TABLE 5

Q-4 Which foreign country, in your opinion, could be a model for our country's economic development?

Dates of Fieldwork Sample Year (Sample Size)	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Germany	13%	15%	25%	10%
USA	9%	12%	11%	13%
Poland	-	5%	3%	2%
Sweden	5%	4%	9%	6%
Canada	-	3%	3%	1%
France	-	2%	1%	2%
Russia	4%	2%	-	7%
Former USSR	-	2%	-	3%
Japan	-	3%	3%	3%
Other western European countries	15%	5%	8%	9%
Other	9%	1%	11%	8%
98. No country is a model	7%	6%	3%	5%
99. Don't Know	38%	29%	-	-
0. Refused/ NA	-	3%	23%	30%
<i>Total</i>	100%	102%✓	100%	99%✓

TABLE 6 Q-5 Which foreign country, in your opinion, could be a model for our country's political development?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997				
	Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
		1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
USA	13%	15%	11%	18%	
Germany	8%	9%	15%	8%	
Great Britain	-	3%	4%	6%	
Sweden	4%	3%	9%	2%	
Switzerland	-	2%	3%	2%	
Canada	-	2%	1%	-	
Russia	3%	2%	-	6%	
Poland	-	1%	1%	-	
France	-	2%	7%	1%	
China	-	1%	-	-	
Former USSR	-	1%	-	3%	
Other western European countries	9%	2%	2%	3%	
Other	4%	5%	8%	4%	
98. No country is a model	8%	7%	3%	7%	
99. Don't Know	51%	40%	-	-	
0. Refused/ NA	-	5%	36%	37%	
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	97%✓	

TABLE 7

Q-6 When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a [ROTATE] market economy or a centrally planned economy?

1996 question: When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop an economy with limited government control or return to an economy fully controlled by the state?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Market Economy	35%	39%	64%	32%
2. Centrally Planned Economy	47%	31%	19%	29%
3. Both [VOLUNTEERED]	-	14%	10%	23%
Other (1996 only)	2%	-	-	-
9. Don't Know	16%	14%	-	-
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	7%	16%
<i>Total</i>	100%	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 8

Q-7 On a scale of one to five, where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state, where on that scale would you ideally place Ukraine?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
Sample (Sample Size)			
1	11%	14%	5%
2	14%	23%	11%
3	24%	30%	23%
4	12%	8%	23%
5	22%	13%	23%
99. Don't Know	14%	8%	12%
00. Refused/ NA	2%	4%	3%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 9

Q-8 In your opinion, what does a market economy mean?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
Free enterprise, trade	12%	9%	12%
Functioning of market rules	9%	19%	8%
Reasonable control of economy by government	8%	8%	8%
Competition	7%	15%	7%
Speculation, reselling	6%	5%	6%
Developing and work of enterprises	5%	7%	6%
High welfare of population	5%	2%	11%
Absence of market regulation	5%	8%	5%
Free, flexible prices	4%	4%	3%
Private property, enterprises	3%	2%	2%
Stratification of society	2%	-	3%
Low prices	2%	1%	2%
Other	3%	7%	5%
Refused/ NA	36%	26%	31%

TABLE 10

Q-9 When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, with steady but small reforms, or should we not pursue a free market economy at all?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997					
	Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
		1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. As quickly as possible	23%	43%	25%	35%	23%	
2. Steady but small reforms	31%	13%	41%	48%	45%	
3. Should not pursue	2%	18%	17%	10%	14%	
4. Other [VOLUNTEERED]	-	2%	1%	3%	2%	
9. Don't Know	25%	24%	16%	4%	15%	
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	1%	-	1%	
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	101%✓	100%	100%	

TABLE 11

Q-10 In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring [ROTATE 1-3]

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Too quickly	5%	7%	4%
2. Too slowly	70%	73%	63%
3. At about the right pace	4%	6%	5%
9. Don't Know	19%	8%	24%
0. Refused/ NA	2%	6%	3%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 12

Q-11 Between the various government bodies, which one of the following is most responsible for impeding the pace of economic reform? **READ 1-5/ROTATE TOP TO BOTTOM, BOTTOM TO TOP**

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. The President		16%	12%	20%
2. The Cabinet of Ministers		14%	25%	13%
3. Judicial		1%	-	1%
4. Supreme Rada		24%	32%	14%
5. Local Government		14%	2%	16%
6. Other [SPECIFY]		7%	14%	10%
7. None/Reforms not being impeded [VOLUNTEERED]		2%	2%	1%
9. Don't Know		20%	10%	22%
0. Refused/ NA		2%	3%	2%
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 13

Q-12 In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring [ROTATE 1-3]

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Too Quickly		7%	10%	12%
2. Too Slowly		56%	48%	51%
3. At about the right pace		9%	22%	6%
9. Don't Know		27%	19%	29%
0. Refused/ NA		1%	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	100%

TABLE 14

Q-13 Between the various branches of government, which one of the following is most responsible for impeding the pace of political reform? **READ 1-5/ROTATE TOP TO BOTTOM/BOTTOM TO TOP**

Dates of Fieldwork Sample (Sample Size)	July 1997		
	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. The President	16%	16%	27%
2. The Cabinet of Ministers	12%	16%	19%
3. Judicial	☆	-	☆
4. Supreme Rada	25%	45%	21%
5. Local Government	8%	-	14%
6. Other	4%	15%	7%
7. None/Reforms not being impeded [VOLUNTEERED]	4%	9%	8%
9. Don't Know	29%	-	-
0. Refused/ NA	3%	-	4%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	101✓	100%

TABLE 15 Q-14 Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the judiciary, and your local government. Which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year? (ACCEPT VOLUNTEERED RESPONSE NONE)

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Executive branch	21%	19%	26%	26%
2. Supreme Rada	8%	18%	13%	8%
3. Local Government	8%	13%	3%	14%
4. Judiciary	NA	2%	1%	3%
5. None [VOLUNTEERED]	33%	24%	39%	30%
9. Don't Know	29%	22%	18%	18%
0. Refused/ NA	-	2%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 16 Q-15 In your opinion will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Better	9%	12%	11%	8%
2. Same	32%	34%	58%	29%
3. Worse	47%	45%	27%	55%
9. Don't Know	12%	8%	4%	8%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	99%✓	100%	100%

Thinking about land ownership in Ukraine...

TABLE 17 Q-16 Should the amount of land that CITIZENS OF UKRAINE may own be limited, unlimited, or should private land ownership not be allowed?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Limited	49%	41%	52%
2. Unlimited	34%	39%	31%
3. Not Allowed	11%	6%	12%
9. Don't Know	6%	14%	5%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 18 Q-16.1 Should the amount of land that NON-CITIZENS may own be limited, unlimited, or should private land ownership by non-citizens be allowed.

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Limited	38%	41%	47%
2. Unlimited	11%	9%	20%
3. Not Allowed	43%	40%	25%
9. Don't Know	8%	10%	8%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

Q-17 How much do you agree with each of the following statements: do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree completely?

TABLE 19 **Q-17.1** The laws of Ukraine should allow citizens of Ukraine to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty.
1996 questions: Citizens of Ukraine should have the right to buy and sell land.

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide 1996 (1660)	Kyiv 1997 (1200)	Crimea 1997 (300)
1. Agree Completely		42%	37%	46%
2. Agree Somewhat		20%	22%	30%
3. Disagree Somewhat		12%	10%	11%
4. Disagree Completely		17%	24%	11%
5. Neither Agree Nor Disagree [VOLUNTEERED]		NA	1%	1%
9. Don't Know		7%	6%	1%
0. Refused/NA		-	☆	-
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	100%
				99%✓

TABLE 20 **Q-17.2** The laws of Ukraine should allow NON-CITIZENS to buy and sell land as private property without unreasonable difficulty.

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Agree Completely		7%	6%	18%
2. Agree Somewhat		12%	18%	20%
3. Disagree Somewhat		14%	13%	16%
4. Disagree Completely		58%	56%	38%
5. Neither Agree Nor Disagree [VOLUNTEERED]		1%	4%	1%
9. Don't Know		7%	3%	7%
0. Refused/ NA		☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>		99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 21

Q-18 In your opinion, how important are foreign investments to the economic recovery of our country – very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Very Important	19%	26%	35%	25%
2. Somewhat Important	31%	29%	32%	40%
3. Not Very Important	14%	12%	14%	11%
4. Not At All Important	18%	18%	11%	15%
9. Don't Know	18%	15%	8%	8%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 22

Q-19 Would you say that Ukraine is a democracy, or is it not a democracy?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Ukraine is a democracy	18%	20%	20%	17%	12%
2. Ukraine is not a democracy	60%	55%	52%	58%	62%
3. Both [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	NA	8%	10%	11%
9. Don't Know	27%	25%	20%	14%	14%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	1%	1%	1%
<i>Total</i>	105%✓	100%	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 23

Q-20 Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Yes, Is moving toward becoming a democracy		24%	36%	15%
2. No, Is not moving toward becoming a democracy		37%	32%	49%
9. Don't Know		19%	15%	21%
0. Refused/ NA		1%	-	3%
NOT ASKED		20%	17%	12%
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	100%

TABLE 24

Q-21 What does it mean to you to live in a democracy?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
Guarantee of rights		37%	52%	34%
High level of life		12%	18%	17%
Law-abiding		10%	5%	15%
Government cares about citizens		8%	5%	11%
Having a job and fair salary		6%	7%	4%
Equality of all before law		4%	4%	2%
There is answer		3%	1%	3%
Confidence in future		3%	2%	7%
Justice, fairness		2%	1%	☆
Power belongs to people		1%	2%	2%
Other		4%	4%	5%

TABLE 25

Q-22 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country? **WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND ASK:** Do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide 1996 (1660)	Nationwide 1997 (1200)	Kyiv 1997 (100)	Crimea 1997 (300)
1. Agree completely	11%	7%	8%	6%
2. Agree somewhat	19%	21%	27%	13%
3. Disagree somewhat	25%	17%	14%	16%
4. Disagree completely	35%	50%	46%	62%
5. Neither	NA	2%	4%	1%
9. Don't know	10%	4%	1%	1%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 26

Q-23 Did you vote in the 1994 elections or not? **READ 1-4/ALLOW MULTIPLE RESPONSES:**

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Yes, in the Presidential elections	71%	64%	56%
2. Yes, in the Supreme Rada elections	61%	50%	37%
3. Yes, in the local elections	63%	41%	43%
4. Did Not Vote	21%	26%	26%
9. Don't Recall	6%	6%	14%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	-

TABLE 27

Q-24 How likely are you to vote in the next elections for Supreme Rada?
READ 1-4

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Very Likely		33%	26%	20%
2. Somewhat Likely		23%	22%	18%
3. Not Very Likely		18%	28%	28%
4. Not At All Likely		10%	12%	13%
5. Definitely Will Not Vote [VOLUNTEERED]		12%	11%	17%
9. Don't Know		4%	1%	4%
0. Refused/ NA		☆	-	☆
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	100%

Q-25 If there were to be an election tomorrow for the Supreme Rada, for which party would you vote? (ACCEPT VOLUNTEERED RESPONSE WOULD NOT VOTE FOR a PARTY CANDIDATE) [ROTATED LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES USED]

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
1. Ukrainian Republic Party	1%	2%	1%
2. Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party	1%	2%	-
3. Green Party of Ukraine	1%	3%	1%
4. Democratic Party of Ukraine	5%	7%	2%
5. Peoples Party of Ukraine	1%	3%	1%
6. Liberal Party of Ukraine	☆	-	-
7. Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Party	☆	2%	-
8. Socialist Party of Ukraine	3%	-	1%
9. Peasants Party of Ukraine	1%	-	-
10. Ukrainian National Party	☆	-	-
11. Ukrainian Party of Beer Lovers	☆	1%	1%
12. Ukrainian National Conservative Party	☆	-	-
13. Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine	☆	1%	☆
14. Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party	-	-	-
15. Party of Rehabilitation of Seriously-Ill People of Ukraine	-	-	-
16. Christian-Democratic Party of Ukraine	☆	-	-
17. People's Democratic Party of Ukraine	1%	5%	-
18. Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	1%	-	-
19. Labor Party	1%	1%	6%
20. People's Rukh of Ukraine	4%	4%	1%
21. Ukrainian Party of Justice	1%	3%	1%
22. Party of Spiritual, Economic, and Social Progress	☆	2%	☆

TABLE 28 CONTINUED

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
23. Christian-Liberal Party	-	-	-
24. Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine	1%	-	-
25. Social-National Party of Ukraine	☆	-	-
26. Party of Economic Revival of Crimea	☆	-	5%
27. State Independence of Ukraine	☆	-	-
28. Constitutional-Democratic Party of Ukraine	1%	-	☆
29. Party of National Rescue of Ukraine	☆	-	-
30. Party of Free Peasants and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine	☆	1%	1%
31. Civil Congress of Ukraine	☆	-	1%
32. Ukrainian Party of Solidarity and Social Justice	1%	1%	☆
33. Communist Party of Ukraine	13%	8%	16%
34. Party of Slavic Unity of Ukraine	☆	-	1%
35. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine	-	-	-
36. Party of Center "Public Consent"	-	-	-
37. Interregional Block of Reforms	☆	-	☆
38. Social-Democratic (united) Party	☆	1%	-
39. Not for a Candidate of any Party [VOLUNTEERED]	35%	39%	40%
40. OTHER	1%	-	1%
99. Don't Know	22%	14%	17%
0. Refused/ NA	2%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	97%✓	100%	98%✓

TABLE 29

Q-26 How likely are you to vote in the next elections for President?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Very Likely	42%	40%	26%
2. Somewhat Likely	26%	30%	24%
3. Not Very Likely	11%	13%	20%
4. Not At All Likely	7%	8%	9%
5. Definitely Will Not Vote [VOLUNTEERED]	10%	8%	16%
9. Don't Know	4%	1%	4%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 30

Q-27 In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well enough to deserve reelection, or would you support someone else for President? **DO YOU FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT THAT OR NOT STRONGLY?**

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Reelect, Strongly	21%	19%	19%
2. Reelect, Not Strongly	22%	23%	15%
3. New Person, Not Strongly	13%	11%	14%
4. New Person, Strongly	24%	24%	31%
5. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	8%	11%	5%
9. Don't Know	10%	8%	8%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	4%	8%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 31

Q-28 In general, would you say that your representative to the Supreme Rada has done his or her job well enough to deserve reelection, or would you vote for someone else for Supreme Rada? Do you feel strongly about that or not strongly?

Dates of Fieldwork Sample (Sample Size)	July 1997		
	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Reelect, Strongly	14%	21%	13%
2. Reelect, Not Strongly	10%	10%	8%
3. Vote for someone else, Not Strongly	9%	18%	12%
4. Vote for someone else, Strongly	24%	17%	27%
5. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	7%	9%	6%
6. Definitely Will Not Vote [VOLUNTEERED]	7%	7%	8%
9. Don't Know	28%	15%	24%
0. Refused/ NA	2%	3%	2%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 32

Q-29 In general, which issue will be most important to you when you will vote for candidates and/or parties in the next Supreme Rada elections? **ASK AS OPEN-END**

Dates of Fieldwork Sample (Sample Size)	July 1997		
	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
Personal qualities of deputy	19%	16%	23%
Solving of social problems	13%	24%	15%
Pre-election program	8%	11%	8%
His or Her party	4%	3%	3%
Experience, quality	3%	5%	2%
Education, competence, professionalism	3%	4%	3%
Solving of economic problems	3%	2%	1%
Solving of political problems	2%	2%	2%
Opinion of other people	1%	-	☆
Will not vote	1%	1%	1%
Other	1%	1%	2%
9. Don't know	35%	16%	26%
0. Refused/ NA	9%	15%	-

TABLE 33

Q-30 Which issue will be **SECOND** most important to you when you will be voting for candidates and/or parties in the next Supreme Rada elections? **ASK AS OPEN-END**

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
Personal qualities of deputy	16%	12%	19%
Solving of social problems	6%	11%	8%
Experience, quality	4%	10%	2%
Pre-election program	4%	7%	3%
His or Her party	2%	2%	2%
Education, competence, professionalism	2%	6%	1%
Solving of economic problems	1%	3%	1%
Solving of political problems	1%	-	1%
Opinion of other people	1%	2%	☆
Will not vote	☆	-	☆
Other	2%	5%	3%
9. Don't know	49%	25%	36%
0. Refused/ NA	13%	17%	23%

TABLE 34

Q-31 Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not? **[WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND ASK:]** And do you feel strongly about that or not strongly?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Necessary, Strongly	37%	51%	38%
2. Necessary, Not Strongly	21%	21%	22%
3. Not Necessary, Not Strongly	12%	7%	10%
4. Not Necessary, Strongly	16%	11%	17%
9. Don't Know	14%	10%	13%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 35

Q-32 Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties in how they would solve the important problems facing Ukraine, or are there not clear differences between the parties?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Clear Differences	31%	26%	22%
2. Not Clear Differences	49%	50%	54%
9. Don't Know	19%	22%	24%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	2%	☆
Total	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 36

Q-33 Thinking of all the parties and movements that are currently in existence, how much have you read or heard about political parties – a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Great Deal	11%	5%	10%	3%
2. Fair Amount	22%	13%	18%	16%
3. Not Very Much	47%	55%	51%	49%
4. Nothing At All	18%	25%	18%	28%
9. Don't Know	2%	2%	3%	3%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	-	☆
Total	100%	101%✓	100%	99%✓

TABLE 37 Q-34 What do you think would be the ideal number of political parties to have -- none, one, two, several, or as many as we have today?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. None	7%	5%	3%	3%	3%
2. One	32%	31%	26%	18%	19%
3. Two	10%	18%	21%	21%	28%
4. Several	27%	20%	27%	38%	27%
5. As Many as we have today	10%	7%	2%	-	3%
6. As Many as will be [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	NA	6%	8%	8%
9. Don't Know	15%	19%	14%	12%	12%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	1%	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 38 Q-35 How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election – very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Very Important	23%	26%	36%	31%
2. Somewhat Important	23%	31%	28%	32%
3. Not Very Important	14%	15%	15%	16%
4. Not At All Important	20%	13%	14%	9%
9. Don't Know	20%	14%	7%	12%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 39

Q-36 If an election were held tomorrow, would you be more likely to support a candidate for the Supreme Rada who was affiliated with a political party or who was not affiliated with a party?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Affiliated	21%	30%	29%	25%	29%
2. Not Affiliated	47%	33%	23%	31%	20%
3. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	NA	26%	33%	29%
4. Definitely Will Not Vote [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	NA	10%	7%	9%
9. Don't Know	33%	37%	12%	4%	13%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	1%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	101%✓	100%	101%✓

TABLE 40

Q-37 Overall, will political parties play a stronger or weaker role in the next Supreme Rada election than they did in the 1994 election?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Stronger	39%	35%	29%
2. Weaker	17%	17%	18%
9. Don't Know	43%	48%	52%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 41

Q-38 Which of the political parties or social movements listed below best represents the views and interests of people like you? (Card: List all parties and include "other [SPECIFY];" accept volunteered response "no party") [Half-sample received only party list; other half had name of leader as well]

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Ukrainian Republican Party (B. Yaroshinskiy)	1%	2%	1%
2. Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party (Shkarban M.)	1%	3%	☆
3. Green Party of Ukraine (V. Kononov)	1%	4%	3%
4. Democratic Party of Ukraine (V. Yavorivskiy)	5%	9%	2%
5. Peoples Party of Ukraine (Taburanskiy, L.)	1%	1%	2%
6. Liberal Party of Ukraine (V. Shcherban)	☆	1%	-
7. Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Party (I, Sergiyenko)	☆	1%	☆
8. Socialist Party of Ukraine (I, Moroz)	4%	3%	2%

TABLE 41 CONTINUED

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
9. Peasants Party of Ukraine (S. Dovgan')	1%	1%	1%
0. Ukrainian National Assembly (I, Vitovych)	☆	-	-
1. Ukrainian Party of Beer Lovers (V. Yermakov)	☆	-	1%
2. Ukrainian National-Conservative Party (I, Soskin)	-	-	-
3. Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine (V. Klimchuk)	☆	1%	☆
4. Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (S. Hmara)	☆	1%	-
5. Party of Rehabilitation of Seriously-Ill People of Ukraine (H. Chernysh)	-	-	-
6. Christian-Democratic Party of Ukraine (Zhuravskiy V.)	1%	1%	-
7. People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (a. Matviyenko)	1%	-	☆
8. Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (S.A. Stetsko)	1%	-	-
9. Labor Party (V. Landyk)	1%	1%	4%
0. People's Ruhk of Ukraine (V. Chernovil)	5%	7%	1%
1. Ukrainian Party of Justice (U. Zubko)	1%	5%	1%
2. Party of Spiritual, Economic, and Social Progress (Y. Burdak)	☆	1%	-
3. Christian-Liberal Union (Stepanuk)	☆	1%	-
4. Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (U. Buzdugan)	1%	1%	-
5. Social-National Party of Ukraine (Andrushkiv Y.)	☆	-	-
6. Party of Economic Revival in Crimea (V. Shev'ov)	-	-	5%
7. State Independence of Ukraine (R. Koval')	☆	-	-
8. Constitutional-Democratic Party of Ukraine (V. Zolotar'ov)	☆	-	☆

TABLE 41 CONTINUED

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
9. Party of National Rescue of Ukraine (Yershov)	☆	-	-
0. Party of Free Peasants and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (Biskulc'kiy M)	1%	-	1%
1. Civil Congress of Ukraine (Bazyluk I)	☆	-	1%
2. Ukrainian Party of Solidarity and Social Justice (Y. Lashutin)	1%	2%	2%
3. Communist Party of Ukraine (P. Symonenko)	13%	6%	15%
4. Party of Slavic Unity of Ukraine (V. Glushko)	☆	-	☆
5. Organization of Ukrianian Nationalists in Ukraine (S. Balinskiy)	☆	-	-
6. Party of Center "Public Consent" (V. Babichev)	-	-	-
7. Interregional Block of Reforms (V. Gryn'ov)	1%	1%	☆
8. Social-Democratic (united) Party (V. Inipenko)	1%	-	-
9. No Party [VOLUNTEERED]	30%	28%	26%
0. OTHER [SPECIFY]	1%	1%	☆
9. Don't Know	26%	16%	30%
0. Refused/NA	1%	2%	2%
<i>Total</i>	105%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 42

Q-39 Which of the following do you think most accurately reflects the interests of Ukrainian political parties (one answer only)? [READ]
ROTATE 1-8 TOP TO BOTTOM/BOTTOM TO TOP

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. The interests of the leader of the political party		26%	16%	15%
2. The interests of the intelligentsia		2%	4%	1%
3. The national interests		7%	13%	5%
4. The interests of the government apparat		10%	20%	14%
5. Monied interests		13%	17%	17%
6. Criminal interests		4%	6%	13%
7. The interests of voters in my region		4%	4%	5%
8. Special interests, such as the military Industrial complex or labor unions		4%	1%	5%
9. Other		2%	3%	1%
9. Don't Know		25%	16%	22%
0. Refused/ NA		2%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>		99%✓	100%	99%✓

TABLE 43

Q-40 Are you a member of a political party?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Yes		1%	1%	1%
2. No		98%	99%	99%
9. Don't Know		☆	-	-
0. Refused/ NA		☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>		99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 44

Q-41 [IF YES TO Q-40 ASK:] Which one? [USE LIST FROM Q25]

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
Ukrainian Republican Party		☆	1%	-
Ukrainian Peasant- Democratic Party		☆	-	-
People's Party of Ukraine		☆	-	-
Socialist Party of Ukraine		☆	-	-
Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine		☆	-	☆
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists		☆	-	-
People's Rukh of Ukraine		☆	-	-
Communist party of Ukraine		☆	-	-
Interregional Bloc of Reforms		☆	-	-
Other		☆	-	1%
Not Asked		98%	99%	99%
<i>Total</i>		99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 45 Q-42 [IF NO IN Q-40 ASK:] Would you consider joining a political party?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Yes	2%	4%	3%
2. No	94%	93%	94%
9. Don't Know	3%	2%	2%
NOT ASKED	☆	1%	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 46 Q-43 In your opinion, do citizens of Ukraine have the possibility to unite into groups or form associations without the participation of government or not?

1996 question: In your opinion, do citizens of Ukraine have the possibility to unite into groups or form associations without the participation of government in order to better their living conditions?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. NGOs possible	54%	60%	55%	57%
2. Associations Not Possible	22%	17%	18%	24%
3. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	6%	13%	7%
9. Don't Know	24%	16%	14%	12%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	99%✓	100%	101%✓

TABLE 47

Q-44 How necessary are such organizations – essential, very necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Essential	18%	9%	7%	7%
2. Very necessary	33%	23%	27%	19%
3. Not Very Necessary	15%	33%	31%	38%
4. Not At All Necessary	10%	12%	8%	17%
5. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	8%	19%	9%
9. Don't Know	24%	14%	8%	9%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 48

Q-45 Please look at this CARD and tell me which of the types of non-government organizations listed would you most likely join? [ALLOW MULTIPLE RESPONSES] (CARD: educational, religious, ethnic, assistance to the poor, women, youth, sport, environmental, political, consumer advocate; other)

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Educational	7%	7%	16%	13%
2. Religious	12%	6%	8%	5%
3. Ethnic	1%	1%	1%	2%
4. Assistance to the poor	15%	11%	7%	15%
5. Women	12%	10%	11%	6%
6. Youth	5%	4%	5%	4%
7. Sport	8%	3%	3%	4%
8. Environmental	10%	6%	7%	7%
9. Political	5%	2%	2%	2%
0. Consumer advocate	15%	12%	30%	11%
1. Other [SPECIFY]	1%	☆	-	☆
2. None	25%	33%	10%	26%
9. Don't Know	5%	4%	-	4%
0. Refused/NA	-	☆	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	121%*	99%✓	100%	99%✓

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 49

Q-45.1[SECOND MENTION]

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Educational	5%	13%	5%
2. Religious	3%	1%	1%
3. Ethnic	1%	2%	1%
4. Assistance to the poor	8%	6%	7%
5. Women	6%	11%	5%
6. Youth	4%	8%	7%
7. Sport	5%	7%	3%
8. Environmental	8%	10%	11%
9. Political	1%	4%	1%
0. Consumer advocate	9%	18%	12%
1. Other [SPECIFY]	☆	1%	-
2. None	3%	3%	5%
9. Don't Know	9%	3%	10%
0. Refused/NA	3%	13%	31%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 50

Q-45.2 [THIRD MENTION]

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Educational	4%	10%	5%
2. Religious	3%	5%	2%
3. Ethnic	1%	2%	1%
4. Assistance to the poor	5%	12%	6%
5. Women	3%	3%	3%
6. Youth	4%	3%	4%
7. Sport	3%	6%	2%
8. Environmental	7%	15%	8%
9. Political	2%	1%	4%
0. Consumer advocate	8%	9%	10%
1. Other [SPECIFY]	-	-	-
2. None	3%	14%	7%
9. Don't Know	15%	2%	17%
0. Refused/NA	42%	18%	31%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 51

Q-46 Would you give your time to work for a non-governmental organization without being paid – definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, or definitely no?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Definitely Yes	15%	8%	16%
2. Probably Yes	26%	37%	23%
3. Probably No	10%	14%	17%
4. Definitely No	9%	14%	11%
5. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	4%	15%	2%
9. Don't Know	4%	2%	5%
0. Refused/ NA	32%	10%	26%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

Q-47 How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in the country where you live – is it very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not at all important?

Table 52

Q-47.1 One can choose from several parties and candidates when voting

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Very Important	32%	38%	43%	37%
2. Somewhat Important	28%	28%	35%	26%
3. Not Very Important	16%	17%	13%	20%
4. Not At All Important	13%	10%	7%	7%
9. Don't Know	11%	6%	2%	11%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	101%✓

Table 53

Q-47.2 Honest elections are held regularly

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Important	65%	65%	78%	55%
2. Somewhat Important	22%	22%	17%	25%
3. Not Very Important	6%	7%	-	11%
4. Not At All Important	2%	3%	3%	2%
9. Don't Know	4%	3%	2%	6%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	101%✓	100%	100%

Table 54

Q-47.3 Rights of minority ethnic groups are protected

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Important	47%	39%	45%	29%
2. Somewhat Important	35%	29%	25%	36%
3. Not Very Important	7%	16%	18%	22%
4. Not At All Important	3%	8%	7%	5%
9. Don't Know	8%	7%	3%	7%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	2%	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 55

Q-47.4 The private property of individuals is protected by law

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Important	72%	77%	69%	74%
2. Somewhat Important	19%	16%	26%	20%
3. Not Very Important	2%	2%	2%	3%
4. Not At All Important	2%	2%	-	2%
9. Don't Know	5%	3%	1%	2%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	2%	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	100%	101%✓

TABLE 56

Q-47.5 Citizens have the right to form political parties

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Important	28%	22%	18%	21%
2. Somewhat Important	29%	24%	40%	21%
3. Not Very Important	19%	29%	34%	37%
4. Not At All Important	13%	16%	6%	15%
9. Don't Know	12%	8%	1%	6%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	1%	☆
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 57

Q-47.6 The right to publicly criticize the government is protected

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Important	53%	58%	58%	47%
2. Somewhat Important	28%	26%	30%	31%
3. Not Very Important	8%	9%	9%	12%
4. Not At All Important	4%	3%	1%	7%
9. Don't Know	7%	4%	2%	3%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 58

Q-47.7 All can freely practice the religion of one's choice

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Important	57%	60%	48%	43%
2. Somewhat Important	28%	26%	36%	35%
3. Not Very Important	7%	9%	14%	14%
4. Not At All Important	3%	3%	1%	7%
9. Don't Know	4%	2%	1%	2%
0. Refused/NA	-	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 59 Q-47.8 All can form associations or unions without any government involvement

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide 1996 (1660)	Nationwide 1997 (1200)	Kyiv 1997 (100)	Crimea 1997 (300)
1. Very Important	29%	23%	22%	16%
2. Somewhat Important	29%	27%	37%	27%
3. Not Very Important	16%	26%	29%	26%
4. Not At All Important	9%	14%	5%	19%
9. Don't Know	17%	10%	7%	11%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	101% ✓	100%	100%

TABLE 60 Q-48 How much information do you have about your rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine? **READ 1-4**

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	4%	7%	4%
2. Some	21%	25%	17%
3. Not Very Much	35%	46%	32%
4. None At All	38%	22%	41%
9. Don't Know	3%	-	5%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	101% ✓	100%	99% ✓

TABLE 61 Q-49 From which of the following sources did you get your information about the new Constitution . On this card [SHOW CARD] are a number of sources of information.

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. UT-1	33%	46%	16%
2. UT-2	26%	35%	15%
3. UT-3	18%	24%	14%
4. ORT	4%	4%	11%
5. ICTV	2%	7%	-
6. UNIKA	1%	1%	1%
7. NART/TONIS	1%	1%	-
8. TET/Kyiv	1%	10%	-
9. UTAR	☆	1%	-
0. GRAVIS	-	-	-
1. Troeshchina	-	-	-
2. Channel 7	1%	5%	-
3. OBRIV	-	-	-
4. IVK	-	-	-
5. VIKATV	-	-	-
6. KUPOL	-	-	-
7. Independent (nongovernmental) television stations	1%	-	1%
8. Channels of Russian Television	1%	-	3%
9. UR-1	11%	15%	1%
0. UR-2	1%	3%	-
1. UR-3	1%	2%	1%
2. Local radio stations	11%	14%	9%
3. Central (national) newspapers	9%	21%	6%
4. Local newspapers	20%	21%	23%
5. Articles in journals	2%	6%	2%

TABLE 61 CONTINUED

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
6. Speeches and other presentations public meetings	1%	-	1%
7. Discussions with colleagues, friends, and family	9%	20%	11%
8. Other	2%	5%	5%
9. Don't Know	1%	2%	1%
0. Refused/NA	☆	23%	48%

TABLE 62 Q-50 In your opinion, is information about the new Constitution readily available to most people or not?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Yes, Information is readily available	26%	28%	22%
2. No, Information is not Readily available	23%	37%	22%
3. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	5%	5%	6%
9. Don't Know	5%	8%	3%
NOT ASKED	40%	22%	47%
Total	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 63

Q-51 How much of an impact will the new Constitution have on Ukrainian life: a great deal, some, not very much, or no impact at all?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	4%	2%	1%
2. Some	14%	22%	12%
3. Not very Much	14%	20%	16%
4. No Impact	10%	13%	9%
5. Too Soon To Tell [VOLUNTEERED]	15%	17%	11%
6. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	2%	3%	2%
9. Don't know	3%	1%	2%
NOT ASKED	40%	-	47%
<i>Total</i>	102%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 64

Q-52 Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: It will take time before the new Constitution has an impact on life in Ukraine and the Ukrainian people must be patient in order to allow it to work. **WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND ASK:** do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree completely?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Agree Completely	10%	12%	7%
2. Agree Somewhat	20%	20%	19%
3. Disagree Somewhat	10%	14%	7%
4. Disagree Completely	14%	20%	16%
5. Neither Agree Nor Disagree [VOLUNTEERED]	3%	7%	2%
9. Don't Know	3%	5%	2%
NOT ASKED	40%	-	47%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

Q-53 I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them – a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all.

TABLE 65 Q-53.1 The Supreme Rada

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. A Great Deal	6%	2%	2%	☆
2. A Fair Amount	19%	14%	9%	9%
3. Not Very Much	36%	36%	44%	36%
4. None At All	32%	43%	45%	49%
9. Don't Know	7%	5%	-	5%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 66 Q-53.2 The Cabinet of Ministers

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. A Great Deal	6%	2%	2%	☆
2. A Fair Amount	19%	14%	9%	9%
3. Not Very Much	36%	36%	44%	36%
4. None At All	32%	43%	45%	49%
9. Don't Know	7%	5%	-	5%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 67 Q-53.3 The Presidential Administration

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. A Great Deal	6%	2%	2%	1%
2. A Fair Amount	22%	19%	14%	11%
3. Not Very Much	38%	31%	42%	31%
4. None At All	28%	37%	37%	49%
9. Don't Know	6%	10%	4%	6%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 68 Q-53.4 Local Government

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. A Great Deal	4%	3%	5%	3%
2. A Fair Amount	18%	14%	9%	8%
3. Not Very Much	36%	31%	29%	33%
4. None At All	37%	48%	55%	52%
9. Don't Know	5%	4%	-	3%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	2%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 69

Q-53.5 Central Bank

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. A Great Deal	4%	5%	8%	3%
2. A Fair Amount	11%	19%	28%	13%
3. Not Very Much	25%	24%	32%	18%
4. None At All	38%	33%	24%	38%
9. Don't Know	22%	18%	5%	18%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	3%	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 70

Q-53.6 Ukraine's military forces

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. A Great Deal	8%	21%	9%	9%
2. A Fair Amount	16%	35%	29%	31%
3. Not Very Much	32%	22%	31%	16%
4. None At All	35%	14%	26%	25%
9. Don't Know	10%	8%	4%	14%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	1%	4%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 71

Q-53.7

The Judicial Branch

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	7%	2%	3%
2. A Fair Amount	20%	11%	18%
3. Not Very much	29%	42%	27%
4. None At All	35%	38%	39%
9. Don't Know	9%	6%	8%
0. Refused/NA	1%	1%	4%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	99%✓

TABLE 72

Q-53.8

State Security Service

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	11%	9%	5%
2. A Fair Amount	25%	26%	19%
3. Not Very much	24%	32%	24%
4. None At All	22%	23%	31%
9. Don't Know	18%	6%	15%
0. Refused/NA	1%	4%	6%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 73

Q-53.9

President Kuchma

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	8%	5%	2%
2. A Fair Amount	23%	23%	12%
3. Not Very Much	27%	39%	25%
4. None At All	37%	29%	55%
9. Don't Know	5%	4%	4%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 74

Q-53.10

Oleksandr Moroz

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great deal	5%	2%	3%
2. A fair Amount	14%	4%	9%
3. Not Very Much	25%	39%	17%
4. Not At All	39%	44%	36%
9. Don't Know	15%	10%	34%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	101%✓

TABLE 75 Q-53.11 Pavlo Lazarenko

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	2%	2%	-
2. A Fair Amount	10%	5%	6%
3. Not Very Much	18%	29%	11%
4. None At All	45%	49%	35%
9. Don't Know	25%	14%	46%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 76 Q-53.12 Hennady Udovenko

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	3%	4%	1%
2. A Fair Amount	11%	7%	4%
3. Not Very Much	18%	35%	12%
4. None At All	25%	34%	27%
9. Don't Know	43%	18%	54%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	2%	2%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 77 Q-53.13 Yevhen Marchuck

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	2%	3%	1%
2. A fair Amount	7%	6%	6%
3. Not Very Much	19%	31%	13%
4. None At All	27%	34%	26%
9. Don't Know	44%	25%	53%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 78 Q-53.14 Volodymyr Horbulin

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	1%	2%	1%
2. A Fair Amount	8%	6%	2%
3. Not Very Much	16%	33%	7%
4. None At All	21%	28%	23%
9. Don't Know	53%	30%	65%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 79 Q-53.15 Leonid Kravchuk

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal		4%	2%	2%
2. A Fair Amount		13%	12%	3%
3. Not Very Much		23%	36%	12%
4. None At All		48%	41%	72%
9. Don't Know		11%	8%	10%
0. Refused/ NA		1%	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	101%✓

Q-54 And how much confidence do you have in each of the following branches of the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions: a great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

TABLE 80 Q-54.1 The Courts

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997					
	Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
		1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. A Great Deal		11%	6%	4%	1%	2%
2. A Fair Amount		22%	27%	24%	23%	21%
3. Not Very Much		30%	32%	37%	50%	38%
4. None At All		23%	25%	28%	22%	33%
9. Don't Know		14%	10%	7%	4%	6%
0. Refused/ NA		-	-	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%✓

TABLE 81 Q-54.2 The Public Prosecutors

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. A Great Deal	9%	5%	5%	3%	3%
2. A Fair Amount	22%	26%	24%	26%	20%
3. Not Very Much	31%	31%	34%	43%	37%
4. None At All	23%	25%	28%	23%	34%
9. Don't Know	16%	11%	8%	5%	6%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	98%✓	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 82 Q-54.3 The Militia

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. A Great Deal	8%	4%	4%	1%	1%
2. A Fair Amount	16%	16%	17%	15%	15%
3. Not Very Much	32%	33%	32%	46%	33%
4. None At All	35%	38%	42%	36%	47%
9. Don't Know	10%	9%	5%	2%	4%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 83

Q-55 How well do you understand the purpose and function of the Constitutional Court? Do you understand:

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Very Well	4%	6%	7%
2. Somewhat	20%	38%	16%
3. Not Very Well	34%	36%	35%
4. Not At All Well	36%	18%	35%
9. Don't Know	5%	2%	6%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	99%✓

TABLE 84

Q-56 In your opinion, how common is the problem of official corruption— is it: [ROTATE 1-4 TOP TO BOTTOM/BOTTOM TO TOP]

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Very Common	67%	59%	67%	72%	79%
2. Fairly Common	20%	25%	22%	21%	15%
3. Fairly Rare	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%
4. Very Rare	1%	1%	☆	-	-
9. Don't Know	11%	13%	8%	4%	5%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	☆	1%	-
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 85 Q-57 And how serious is the problem of official corruption, meaning how much does it matter – is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Very Serious	67%	69%	72%	74%	81%
2. Fairly Serious	20%	19%	18%	21%	14%
3. Fairly Rare (Uncommon)*	2%	1%	1%	-	☆
4. Very Rare (Uncommon)	1%	-	1%	-	☆
9. Don't Know	11%	11%	8%	4%	4%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	☆	1%	-
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%	100%	99%✓

*Term in brackets is one used in 1994 and 1996

Q-58 For each body or group I mention, please tell me whether, in your opinion, corruption is very common, fairly common, fairly rare, or very rare?

TABLE 86 Q-58.1 Cabinet of Ministers

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Very Common	31%	39%	51%	40%
2. Fairly common	32%	31%	27%	35%
3. Fairly rare	6%	4%	2%	2%
4. Very Rare	1%	1%	1%	-
9. Don't Know	30%	24%	17%	22%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	2%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 87 Q-58.2 Government Officials

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide 1996 (1660)	Nationwide 1997 (1200)	Kyiv 1997 (100)	Crimea 1997 (300)
1. Very Common	36%	52%	62%	61%
2. Fairly Common	36%	29%	24%	24%
3. Fairly Rare	7%	3%	1%	1%
4. Very Rare	1%	1%	-	-
9. Don't Know	20%	15%	11%	13%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	2%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 88 Q-58.3 Ukrainian Banks

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide 1996 (1660)	Nationwide 1997 (1200)	Kyiv 1997 (100)	Crimea 1997 (300)
1. Very Common	32%	33%	36%	36%
2. Fairly Common	27%	26%	38%	24%
3. Fairly Rare	8%	9%	3%	5%
4. Very Rare	1%	2%	2%	2%
9. Don't Know	31%	28%	19%	32%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	2%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 89

Q-58.4 Private Entrepreneurs

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Common	35%	35%	42%	42%
2. Fairly Common	30%	29%	24%	26%
3. Fairly Rare	7%	10%	12%	7%
4. Very Rare	3%	5%	6%	2%
9. Don't Know	25%	20%	14%	21%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	2%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 90

Q-58.5 Foreign Business

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Very Common	21%	21%	14%	25%
2. Fairly Common	21%	21%	20%	21%
3. Fairly Rare	8%	12%	12%	9%
4. Very Rare	5%	7%	13%	6%
9. Don't Know	44%	39%	37%	38%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	4%	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 91 Q-58.6 Supreme Rada

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Very Common	39%	61%	40%
2. Fairly Common	30%	20%	31%
3. Fairly Rare	4%	3%	3%
4. Vary Rare	2%	2%	1%
9. Don't Know	23%	12%	25%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	2%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 92 Q-58.7 President Kuchma's administration

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Very Common	36%	49%	38%
2. Fairly Common	25%	24%	31%
3. Fairly Rare	8%	4%	4%
4. Very Rare	3%	2%	1%
9. Don't Know	27%	18%	26%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	3%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 93 Q-59 Would you say that President Kuchma's administration is more corrupt than the Kravchuk administration, less corrupt, or about the same?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. More Corrupt	21%	32%	25%
2. Less Corrupt	9%	8%	10%
3. About the same	34%	35%	36%
9. Don't Know	35%	22%	27%
0. Refused/ NA	2%	3%	1%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	99%✓

TABLE 94 Q-60 Would you say that President Kuchma's administration is more corrupt than the Gorbachev administration, less corrupt, or about the same?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. More Corrupt	18%	15%	33%
2. Less Corrupt	14%	25%	12%
3. About The Same	24%	19%	21%
9. Don't Know	42%	38%	32%
0. Refused/ NA	2%	3%	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 95

Q-61 How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine – a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

Dates of Fieldwork	December 1994, May 1996, July 1997				
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide			Kyiv	Crimea
	1994 (1201)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Great Deal	10%	2%	3%	5%	4%
2. Fair Amount	24%	15%	21%	26%	20%
3. Not Very Much	43%	55%	57%	58%	55%
4. None At All	17%	22%	15%	-	17%
9. Don't Know	6%	7%	5%	11%	5%
0. Refused/ NA	-	-	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	101%✓	100%	101%✓

TABLE 96

Q-62 How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine – a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Great Deal	2%	3%	7%	4%
2. Fair Amount	15%	21%	26%	20%
3. Not Very Much	57%	56%	56%	52%
4. None At All	19%	15%	10%	19%
9. Don't Know	7%	5%	1%	5%
0. Refused/ NA	-	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 97

Q-63 Where do you get most of your information about the election process itself, that is, where to vote, how to fill out ballots, voting requirements and the like?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Official Sources	16%	21%	10%
2. Television	73%	75%	74%
3. Newspaper	37%	43%	47%
4. Radio	31%	37%	26%
5. Other Individuals	20%	13%	36%
6. From some other source [SPECIFY]	1%	2%	☆
9. Don't Know	4%	3%	2%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	1%

TABLE 98

Q-64 In your opinion, is non-partisan election information provided by election officials:

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Very Useful	32%	26%	26%
2. Somewhat Useful	40%	49%	50%
3. Not Very Useful	11%	13%	8%
4. Not At All Useful	4%	4%	5%
9. Don't Know	13%	5%	10%
0. Refused/NA	☆	3%	1%
<i>Total</i>	102%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 99

Q-65 What is your main source of information about government and politics? (SHOW CARD)

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. UT-1	25%	23%	9%
2. UT-2/1+1	18%	20%	8%
3. UT-3/INTER	24%	18%	24%
4. ORT	5%	7%	22%
5. ICTV	1%	3%	-
6. UNIKA	☆	-	1%
7. Nart TONIS	1%	-	-
8. TET/ Kyiv	☆	2%	-
9. UTAR	☆	-	-
0. GRAVIS	-	-	-
1. Troeschina	-	-	-
2. Channel 7	☆	-	-
3. OBRIY	-	-	-
4. IVK	-	-	-
5. VIKA TV	-	-	-
6. KUPOL	-	-	-
7. Independent (nongovernmental) television stations	1%	1%	4%
8. Channels of Russian Television	1%	-	2%
9. UR-1	4%	9%	-
0. UR-2	-	1%	-
1. UR-3	☆	-	-
2. Local Radio Stations	3%	1%	4%
3. Central (national) Newspapers	2%	6%	2%
4. Local Newspapers	3%	2%	10%

TABLE 99 CONTINUED

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
5. Articles in journals	-	-	-
6. Speeches and other presentations public meetings	☆	-	☆
7. Discussions with colleagues, friends, family	3%	1%	7%
8. Other	1%	2%	2%
9. Don't Know	5%	4%	3%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	1%

TABLE 100 Q-66 Do you feel that you have received enough information about the candidates or parties to make a good choice between the candidates for the Supreme Rada in 1994 elections?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
1. Yes	24%	25%	20%
2. No	56%	50%	62%
3. Don't Know	19%	18%	14%
4. Refused/ NA	2%	7%	4%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 101 Q-67 In their political coverage, how important is it for the media to analyze the differences between the candidates and political parties on the various issues in order to help the public understand these differences? READ 1-4

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Very Important	45%	56%	31%
2. Somewhat Important	36%	34%	49%
3. Not Very Important	6%	6%	8%
4. Not At All Important	3%	1%	3%
9. Don't Know	9%	3%	7%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	-	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 102 Q-68 How often do you read the newspaper? READ 1-5

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Daily	13%	22%	31%
2. Several times a week	28%	37%	31%
3. Once a week	28%	20%	16%
4. Several times a month	8%	7%	7%
5. Once a month or less	16%	11%	11%
9. Don't Know	5%	2%	2%
0. Refused/ NA	2%	1%	2%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 103 Q-69 How often do you watch news programs on television? READ 1-5

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Daily	62%	75%	65%
2. Several times a week	27%	23%	23%
3. Once a week	4%	-	4%
4. Several times a month	2%	1%	3%
5. Once a month	3%	-	1%
9. Don't Know	1%	-	2%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	1%	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	99%✓

TABLE 104 Q-70 How often do you listen to news programs on the radio? READ 1-5

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Daily	43%	60%	28%
2. Several times a week	22%	16%	21%
3. Once a week	6%	4%	8%
4. Several times a month	4%	5%	9%
5. Once a month	13%	9%	15%
9. Don't Know	9%	3%	10%
0. Refused/ NA	3%	3%	9%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 105

Q-71 Which television station provides the most reliable information about government and politics?
 ASK AS OPEN END: DO NOT READ LIST

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. UT-1	22%	25%	14%
2. UT-2/ 1+1	27%	42%	17%
3. UT-3/ INTER	28%	32%	23%
4. ORT	9%	13%	41%
5. ICTV	3%	17%	-
6. UNIKA	☆	1%	1%
7. NART/ TONIS	2%	1%	-
8. TET/ Kyiv	1%	10%	-
9. UTAR	1%	3%	1%
0. GRAVIS	☆	2%	-
1. Troeshchina	-	-	-
2. Channel 7	2%	5%	☆
3. OBRIY	-	-	-
4. IVK	-	-	-
5. VIKATV	-	-	-
6. KUPOL	-	-	-
7. Independent (nongovernmental) television stations	4%	4%	14%
8. Channels of Russian Television	2%	2%	11%

Q-72

And finally a question about your views on the way our mass media report news about events and developments in our country. For each medium mentioned. How would you describe its domestic news coverage—objective or not?

TABLE 106 Q-72.1 UT-1

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Objective	31%	35%	32%	20%
2. Not Objective	36%	25%	29%	33%
9. Don't Know	32%	39%	37%	43%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	2%	4%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 107 Q-72.2 UT-2

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
Sample Year (Sample Size)	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Objective	33%	41%	57%	21%
2. Not Objective	31%	17%	12%	30%
9. Don't Know	36%	40%	29%	45%
0. Refused/ NA	-	1%	2%	4%
<i>Total</i>	100%	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 108 Q-72.3 Independent Television Stations

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Objective	32%	31%	32%	33%
2. Not Objective	18%	10%	14%	13%
9. Don't Know	50%	56%	50%	50%
0. Refused/ NA	-	3%	4%	4%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 109 Q-72.4 National Radio

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
Sample Year (Sample Size)				
1. Objective	29%	27%	36%	10%
2. Not Objective	32%	20%	19%	24%
9. Don't Know	39%	51%	43%	59%
0. Refused/ NA	-	3%	2%	7%
<i>Total</i>	100%	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 110 Q-72.5 Independent Radio Stations

Dates of Fieldwork	May 1996, July 1997			
	Nationwide		Kyiv	Crimea
Sample Year (Sample Size)	1996 (1660)	1997 (1200)	1997 (100)	1997 (300)
1. Objective	27%	26%	26%	25%
2. Not Objective	14%	7%	11%	10%
9. Don't Know	58%	63%	58%	57%
0. Refused/ NA	-	3%	5%	8%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	99%✓	100%	100%

DEMOGRAPHICS

TABLE 111 Q-73 Sex of Respondent

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Male	44%	45%	45%
2. Female	56%	55%	55%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 112

Q-74 What is your age? (RECORD EXACT AGE)

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. 18-24	12%	21%	12%
2. 25-29	10%	5%	11%
3. 30-34	9%	11%	11%
4. 35-39	11%	13%	12%
5. 40-44	10%	11%	11%
6. 45-49	9%	8%	7%
7. 50-54	8%	9%	7%
8. 55-59	8%	6%	8%
9. 60-64	8%	4%	9%
0. 65-69	7%	4%	4%
1. 70-74	7%	3%	6%
2. 75+	3%	5%	3%
0. Refused	-	-	-
<i>Total</i>	102%	100%	101%

TABLE 113

Q-75 Your education level?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Primary	13%	2%	9%
2. Secondary Incomplete	23%	7%	19%
3. Secondary Complete	47%	52%	51%
4. Less than three years of University	6%	9%	6%
5. More than three years of University	11%	30%	15%
6. Advanced Degree	☆	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 114

Q-76 What is your employment situation?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Employed full-time at one job		36%	45%	33%
2. Employed part-time at one job		7%	11%	8%
3. Employed at more than one part-time job		2%	3%	3%
4. Student		3%	10%	3%
5. Pensioner		31%	22%	27%
6. Not Employed		12%	2%	17%
7. I do housework and take care of children		7%	4%	7%
8. Other [SPECIFY]		2%	3%	3%
9. Refused/ NA		-	-	-
<i>Total</i>		100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 115

Q-77 What is your field of employment?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. "Intellectual" worker--teacher, journalist, writer	3%	9%	4%
2. Executive and professional and senior level (government or private)	2%	4%	2%
3. Executive or professional at mid-level (government or private)	6%	16%	8%
4. Skilled laborer	24%	28%	16%
5. Unskilled laborer	12%	5%	12%
6. Soldier, in military service	2%	2%	2%
7. Farmer	☆	-	3%
8. Student	3%	8%	3%
9. Other	3%	5%	5%
NOT ASKED	45%	28%	43%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	105%✓	96%✓

TABLE 116 Q-78 Occupation (Field of Employment)

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Industrial productions (state)	9%	8%	3%
Industrial productions (Private)	2%	5%	3%
2. Construction (State)	3%	4%	3%
Construction (Private)	2%	5%	-
3. Transportation (State)	5%	3%	6%
Transportation (Private)	☆	1%	☆
4. Culture and "nauka"(State)	5%	10%	4%
Culture and "nauka" (Private)	☆	-	☆
5. Trade and services (State)	3%	8%	7%
Trade and services (Private)	4%	7%	6%
6. Agriculture (State)	8%	-	45
Agriculture (Private)	1%	-	4%
7. Security, defense (State)	2%	5%	3%
Security, defense (Private)	-	-	☆
8. OTHER [SPECIFY](State)	8%	9%	8%
OTHER [SPECIFY] (Private)	1%	1%	1%
NOT ASKED	45%	28%	

TABLE 117 Q-79 What is your marital status?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Married	72%	69%	65%
2. Single/ Never Married	11%	22%	12%
3. Divorced/ Separated	7%	6%	9%
4. Widowed	10%	3%	13%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 118 **Q-80** Do you have children? [IF YES] Do they live with you? (PRECODE: have children living with me; have children not living with me; no children; Don't know/ no response)

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Yes, live with respondent	59%	59%	60%
2. Yes, do not live with respondent	27%	18%	25%
3. No	17%	28%	16%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	☆
<i>Total</i>	103%✓	105%✓	101%✓

TABLE 119 **Q-81** What is your main ethnic heritage?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Ukrainian	72%	77%	22%
2. Russian	23%	19%	60%
3. Other	4%	4%	17%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 120 Q-82 Have you ever been discriminated against because of your ethnicity?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Yes	8%	8%	9%
2. No	91%	90%	90%
3. Don't Know	1%	1%	1%
0. Refused/NA	☆	1%	-
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 121 Q-83 What is the main language you speak at home?*

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Ukrainian	55%	38%	5%
2. Russian	51%	71%	96%
3. Other	2%	-	8%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	-
<i>Total</i>	102%	109%✓	109%✓

*Multiple responses allowed

TABLE 122

Q-84 Are you [or your husband/wife] a member of any of the following organizations? [ALLOW MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. Educational/ Scientific/ Scholarly organization	1%	1%	2%
2. Religious	2%	6%	1%
3. Ethnic rights	☆	-	☆
4. Charitable group	☆	-	☆
5. Women's group	☆	-	1%
6. Youth group	☆	1%	-
7. Sports Organizations	1%	3%	2%
8. Environmental	1%	-	-
9. Political parties	☆	2%	-
0. Consumer rights	☆	-	-
1. Independent trade union	☆	-	1%
2. Veterans Group	☆	1%	-
3. Labor collective	7%	2%	10%
4. Creative union	☆	1%	1%
5. NONE	85%	84%	80%
9. Don't Know	2%	-	1%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	1%	1%
<i>TOTAL</i>	100%	102%✓	100%

TABLE 123

Q-85 To what church or religious group do you belong?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
1. Ukrainian Orthodox	13%	10%	8%
2. Other Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalna)	38%	48%	6%
3. Greek Catholic	7%	1%	-
4. Russian Orthodox	4%	1%	38%
5. Roman Catholic	1%	2%	-
6. Protestant	☆	1%	-
7. Muslim	☆	-	8%
8. Jewish	☆	-	2%
9. Other	3%	7%	2%
0. Don't know	6%		
9. None	26%	22%	34%
0. Refused/NA	1%	8%	2%
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 124

Q-86 How would you describe the income level of your household?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)
1. High	☆	1%	1%
2. Moderate	16%	29%	23%
3. Lower than moderate	25%	29%	33%
4. Low	58%	41%	44%
0. Refused/ NA	☆	-	-
<i>Total</i>	99%✓	100%	101%✓

TABLE 125 **Q-87** In your opinion, how much do most people in Ukraine rely on the shadow economy for their livelihood?

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. A Great Deal	22%	28%	24%
2. A Fair Amount	34%	45%	29%
3. Not Very Much	14%	13%	14%
4. Not At All	3%	2%	9%
9. Don't Know	26%	12%	24%
0. Refused/ NA	1%	-	1%
<i>Total</i>	100%	100%	101%✓

TABLE 126 **Q-88** Place of residence:

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997		
Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. City of 500,000+	26%	100%	☆
2. City of 2000,000-499,999	15%	-	33%
3. City of 50,000-199,999	11%	-	28%
4. City of 20,000-49,999	11%	-	10%
5. Towns of less than 20,000	5%	-	-
6. SMT	1%	-	5%
7. Rural residents	32%	-	24%
<i>Total</i>	101%✓	100%	100%

TABLE 127 Q-89 Observed SES

Dates of Fieldwork	July 6 - 13, 1997			
	Sample (Sample Size)	Nationwide (1200)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (300)
1. High		1%	2%	2%
2. Moderate		27%	40%	34%
3. Lower than moderate		27%	24%	26%
4. Low		41%	31%	35%
5. Intermediate		5%	3%	3%
<i>Total</i>		101%✓	100%	100%

