


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**Public Opinion in Ukraine
1998**

Gary Ferguson

Sample: 1,484
Oversamples in Kyiv (100)
& Crimea (300)
Fieldwork: May 29 - June 8, 1998
Conducted by: SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv

International Foundation for Election Systems

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Appendix I Questions

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Introduction

As part of its ongoing program in Ukraine, the International Foundation for Election Systems commissioned Gary A. Ferguson and SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv, to conduct a national survey of the Ukrainian electorate. In all, 1,484 interviews with adults age 18 and older were conducted from May 29 - June 8, 1998.

The total sample includes a national representative sample of 1,200 interviews and proportional oversamples of 40 interviews in Kyiv (for total interviews of N=100), and 244 interviews on the Crimean Peninsula (for a total of N=300). The sample was weighted and is representative of the population by age, sex, ethnicity, and region.

All surveys are subject to errors caused by interviewing a sample of persons rather than the entire population. The margin of error for a sample of 1,200 persons is ± 2.9 percentage points at 95 percent confidence.

The project director and principal analyst for this survey was Gary A. Ferguson, senior vice president of American Viewpoint, Inc. Interviewing was conducted by SOCIS-Gallup, Kyiv, under the direction of Svetlana Pototskaya. The questionnaire was a joint effort of the project directors and IFES staff, including Michael Conway, IFES program officer for Europe and Asia, and André Bouchard, IFES project director in Ukraine.

This is the fifth in a series of surveys of the Ukrainian national electorate. The first was fielded in December 1994, the second in January 1996, the third in May 1996, and the fourth in July 1997.

This survey report:

- provides a description of the political environment in Ukraine;
- examines views toward economic and political reform;
- views the public perspective on the recent elections;
- examines voting patterns;
- assesses the outlook for political participation;
- gauges the viability of political parties, and
- profiles the level of public information and provides an assessment of the mass media.



The regional breakdowns provided in this analysis are based on the following groupings of oblasts:

Northern Region	Zhytomyr, Kyiv City, Kyiv, Chernihiv
Central Region	Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Poltava
Northeastern Region	Sumy, Kharkiv
Eastern Region	Donetsk, Lughansk
Southeastern Region	Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhin
Northwestern Region	Rivne, Volyn, Khmelnytskyi
Western Region	Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk
Southwestern Region	Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi
Southern Region	Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson
Crimea	Republic of Crimea

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Background and Overview

In the aftermath of Ukraine's 1998 parliamentary elections, this survey finds a nation still plagued by poverty, wage arrears, and unemployment. Citizens are almost universally dissatisfied with the direction of the country. Ukrainians question President Kuchma's leadership but lack information about political or economic affairs. They voted in overwhelming numbers in March, but for a fragmented parliament. The Communist Party is believed to be the most effective party or bloc and now holds the strongest faction in the Verkhovna Rada, receiving the support of better than one voter in four -- far more than the level of support for any other party or bloc. Nevertheless, most Ukrainians believe that political and economic reforms are occurring too slowly.

Clearly, Abraham Maslow's *hierarchy of needs*¹ is at play to some extent in Ukraine as it is elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. As Boris Sergeyev (1997) notes, "Severe deprivation of physiological needs eclipses the influence of more abstract concerns on individual attitudes and actions. In this environment, political objects...are likely to be evaluated in terms of their ability to alleviate the pressure of unsatisfied basic wants."²

As noted in the 1997 IFES report, the events of the past few years in Ukraine have resulted in an electorate preoccupied with the economy and the daily struggle for existence, disillusioned with the ability and motivation of their government officials to solve the country's economic problems, and convinced that corruption is ubiquitous. Given the continued economic hardship, it is not surprising to find that interest in politics and government, and the belief that political parties are necessary to democracy have declined, or that voters are tempted to turn toward political parties that promise to satisfy basic needs. However, that this should be the case in an election year says much about the degree to which political parties, and political matters, are becoming peripheral in a time of economic crisis. A more encouraging note is that public support for multi-party elections remains strong.

The findings of this survey are also discouraging for proponents of a market economy in Ukraine as public support for a market economy has plummeted in the course of one year. For the first time since IFES began this survey in 1994, a plurality of Ukrainians says they would prefer a centrally-planned economy rather than a market economy. This represents a 14-point drop in pro-market sentiment and indicates that proponents of a market economy are losing the battle for public support.

The public remains pessimistic about future economic conditions. That is, a plurality says that conditions will worsen in a year, and nearly as many have resigned themselves to the belief that economic conditions will remain unchanged in the future.

Regardless of their theoretical orientation toward the economy, Ukrainians continue to agree that the pace of economic reform is too slow. Three out of five hold this view, yet they see no particular branch of government as able to solve the nation's economic problems. Indeed, only one

in five think the new Supreme Rada will be more effective than the last.

The political situation in Ukraine is troubling. A plurality believes that political reforms are occurring too slowly, but this is a decline from the majority sentiment in 1997. The vast majority voted in 1998, yet a growing number says that Ukraine is not a democracy. Moreover, despite the proximity to the 1998 elections, voter efficacy² remains low. Less than half believe that the political composition of the Rada reflects the nation's political preferences.

In 1997, the report indicated that Members of the Rada had little reelection support. This survey bears that out as just 28% say they voted for an incumbent deputy and 49% voted for non-incumbents.

The survey provides a clear lesson for parties and candidates in Ukraine: direct voter contact is an effective means of building voting coalitions. Among the third of the population who were directly contacted by candidates or parties, 60% say they were more likely to vote for that candidate or party.

In a positive note, projected voting in the 1999 presidential election is up (to 77%) from last year's projection of 68%. However, President Kuchma's electoral prospects have continued to slide. In 1997, IFES found that confidence in the President had declined from the 1994 and 1996 surveys. Nevertheless, a 42% plurality said that he deserved reelection. This year's survey, however, finds that only one in seven (14%) says that he deserves reelection and 66% say they would support someone else for president at this time.

The public offers a mixed response to questions about the 1998 election process. In many ways, the 1998 elections have to be viewed as a success. A plurality says the elections were well-organized, that the administration of the elections was fair and honest, and that polling stations did a good job of ensuring that the election process was fair to all candidates and parties. A plurality has confidence in the integrity of election officials at their polling station, and few witnessed any violations of the election law or believe that there was any fraud in the administration of the elections. Most voters found their names on the registry when they went to vote, and a majority says that national election results were published in a reasonable time period.

At the same time, other aspects of the election process did not fare so well. A plurality questions the integrity of election officials at the national level and the public is evenly divided on whether election officials protected their rights as voters or not. They are also divided in their view of whether the elections were fair and honest overall; fair to all candidates and parties — a plurality says they were not — and whether or not the count of the votes was fair and honest. A plurality says the campaign leading up to the elections was not fair and honest.

The assignment of responsibility and blame for the relative fairness of the various aspects of the elections reveals some unexpected data about the current political environment in Ukraine. Predictably, the Central Election Commission (CEC), polling station officials, and constituency

election officials get much of the credit among those saying aspects of the elections were fair and honest. Quite surprisingly, the Mafia/organized crime, was also given a lot of credit for the fair nature of the elections in 3 out of 4 measures.

Among those who say that these aspects of the elections were not completely fair and honest, "business interests" (as distinguished from the Mafia) get the most blame in three out of four cases. Other top mentions include polling station officials, the mass media, individual candidates, and the CEC.

The biggest problems faced by voters in 1998 were "too many choices" of candidates and parties, and too many ballots. Few say that anyone tried to influence voting with the promise of material rewards or the prospect of negative consequences. In the same vein, fewer than one in 10 think the prices of staple goods were kept low in order to influence the outcome of the elections. Slightly more (16%), think that public services were improved, repairs made, or other works provided for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the elections.

Another question for voters involves the military. More than one-fourth of the electorate believes that military personnel are compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates and parties, and one in five believes this situation has a substantial impact on the outcome of elections.


As IFES found last year, most Ukrainians continue to have little information about political and economic affairs or their rights under the Constitution, which limits their ability to assess developments in the country as well as participate fully in the democratic or economic process. At that time, the better-informed were significantly more likely to support a market economy, to be interested in politics and government, to be more optimistic about the economy, to have higher vote efficacy, and to support the democratic process. IFES suggested that there was a need for a broad-based information campaign to bolster support for reforms, to engender realistic expectations for government action, and to foster democratic action.

However, this year's survey does not find the dramatic differences noted in 1997 among those who are better-informed and those with less information. After a year of inaction, or ineffective action in the area of public education, those who are well-informed have become as pessimistic about the future economy and as likely to support central planning as those who are poorly informed. It is clear that an opportunity to bolster public support for reforms has been missed during the course of the past year and that efforts must now be stepped up before the nation turns its back on reforms.

Public education can still be effective. The public education campaigns run this year on the election process were, on the whole, quite successful. Among the most positive findings from this research are the increase in the number saying they had adequate information for decision-making and the widespread understanding of the election process. Credit must be given to the reach and utility of the Central Election Commission's "Elections 98" (program of the Central Election Commission) and to the public service announcements (PSAs) (also produced by IFES through the Nova Mova

television production company), shown on UT-2/1+1, a popular TV station. Thanks to the invaluable air time provided by the Ministry of Information, the "Elections 98" program was the nation's number one source of information about the voting process, and more than one in three saw the PSAs. These programs provide practical examples of the types of programs that might be used to inform the public about more far-reaching topics.

Ukraine's television stations — the main vehicles needed for public information campaigns — are perceived to be more objective in their news coverage than at any time since IFES began such measurement in 1996. Nevertheless, a majority of Ukrainians holds the opinion that the news media showed partisan support for different candidates and parties during the 1998 elections.




[The exact question text for each figure in this report can be found in Appendix 1]

Perhaps the most serious problem facing Ukraine is the problem of payment and pension arrears. A majority (57%) says they are owed back wages or pension payments from their employer or the government. In fact, majorities in nine out of eleven regions (Kyiv and the Southeast excepted) are owed back payments.

This problem is directly related to the age of the respondent (from 38% of those 18-24 to more than 70% of those age 55 and older). Three out of five full-time employees (60%), 70% of those working part-time, and 72% of all pensioners are owed back payments. Rural residents (78%) are in worse straits than urbanites (46%). Among voters, 61% are owed back payments — 69% of those who voted for the Communists and 56% of those who voted for other parties.


Some of these arrears are, in a relative sense, short-term. That is, 9% are owed payments for one month or less and 9% for two months (Figure 2 next page). Other terms are much longer — 16% three and four months, 11% five and six months, and 12% six months or longer.



Again, rural areas are particularly hard-hit as 25% have arrears of six months or more. A third of all pensioners haven't been paid in 4 to 6 months, and 22% of those working full-time haven't been paid in more than six months. Clearly, this is a recipe for disaster. Against this backdrop, we now examine the political environment in greater detail.

The Political Environment

Interest in Politics and Government has Declined



Despite the proximity to the elections, this survey finds a decline in Ukrainians' interest in politics and government. In fact, just 50% are interested and 48% are not interested in matters of politics and government. In 1997, 55% were interested and 43% were not. It is not surprising to see lower interest in such matters during times of economic hardship. Nevertheless, to see a fall-off just after an election is not encouraging.

In all, just 14% are very interested, 36% are somewhat interested, 23% are not too interested and 25% are not at all interested. As in the past, interest is highest in Kyiv (64%) and the West (59%). Crimeans are also highly interested (63%). Interest is lowest in the Southwest (22%), the North (40%) and the Northeast (40%).

Men of all ages (58%) are more interested than women (44%). Middle-aged respondents are more interested than the youngest or oldest respondents. Men 45+ are the most intensely interested (21% very interested) as compared to 14% among men 18-44, 13% among women 45+ and just 9% among women 18-44. Interest increases with the education level of respondents. Ethnic Russians (54%) are slightly more interested than ethnic Ukrainians (50%). As in the past, urbanites (55%) are more interested than those residing in rural areas (41%).

There is a natural relationship between interest in politics and the belief that voting and political parties are important. Those who believe that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making in the country are far more interested in politics (60%) than those with low vote efficacy scores (48%). Those who think political parties are necessary to democracy are more interested than those who say that parties are not necessary (56% and 49%, respectively). Similarly, those who believe that party competition is necessary are more interested than those who say that party competition is not important (58% to 43%).

Those who have political information (60% interested) or economic information (63%) are far more interested in politics and government than those who possess little or no political or economic information (48%). Those who rely on newspapers for their political and electoral process information are the most interested (60% and 68%, respectively). Those who relied on the "Elections 98" program are also highly interested (60%). Proponents of a market economy (57%) are more interested than those who favor a centrally-planned economy (51%).


Those who voted in 1998 are more interested (55%) than non-voters (34%). Communist Party supporters (60%) are more interested than those who supported other parties (55%). Early decision-makers in the party ballot, and those who made their voting decision two months or more before the election are more interested (64%) than those who made their voting decisions later in the cycle (52% one month before and 42% last two weeks). Interest is higher among likely presidential voters (59%) than among those who are not likely to vote (31%).

Figure 4. Interest in Politics and Government, By Region and Age

	Very/Somewhat Interested	Not Very/Not At All Interested		Very/Somewhat Interested	Not Very/Not At All Interested
Kyiv	64%	35%	18-24	45%	55%
North	40%	58%	25-34	47%	50%
Central	53%	46%	35-44	56%	43%
Northeast	40%	60%	45-54	55%	43%
Northwest	49%	50%	55-64	50%	48%
Southeast	51%	47%	65+	45%	54%
Southwest	22%	76%			
West	59%	40%			
South	47%	52%			
Crimea	63%	35%			
East	53%	43%			

Nearly Universal Dissatisfaction with Conditions in Ukraine

There has been no improvement in terms of satisfaction with the situation in Ukraine. As in 1997, 96% are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today. Just 3% are satisfied. The intensity of dissatisfaction has abated somewhat — 68% are very dissatisfied today as compared with 75% in 1997 (Figure 5 next page).



Dissatisfaction remains intense across the population. However, the most intense dissatisfaction is registered by older Ukrainians. More than 70% of all those age 45 and older are very dissatisfied with conditions in the country. Certain regions — Kyiv, Central, Northeast, and the Southwest in particular — also express more intense dissatisfaction than the rest of the nation.

Fig 6. Satisfaction with Situation in Ukraine, by Region and Age


	Very/Smwht Satisfied	Very/Smwht Dissatisfied		Very/Smwht Satisfied	Very/Smwht Dissatisfied
Kyiv	3%	96%	18-24	6%	93%
North	7%	91%	25-34	4%	94%
Central	1%	98%	35-44	1%	99%
Northeast	3%	97%	45-54	3%	95%
Northwest	2%	96%	55-64	2%	98%
Southeast	3%	98%	65+	3%	97%
Southwest	6%	90%			
West	5%	94%			
South	1%	97%			
Crimea	1%	98%			
East	2%	96%			

Political idealists are less intensely dissatisfied than those who are less engaged in the process. For example, 62% of those who are interested in politics and government are very dissatisfied as compared to 73% of those who are not interested. Likewise, those who say Ukraine is a democracy (62% very dissatisfied), have high vote efficacy (60%), and those who believe parties are necessary to democracy (64%) are more hopeful than their opposite numbers (not interested - 73% very dissatisfied; is not a democracy — 72%; parties not necessary — 70%).

At the same time, there is little difference between those who are better informed about political

or economic developments (67%/66% very dissatisfied) and those who are not well-informed (68%). Voters and non-voters are also similarly dissatisfied (68% and 65%, respectively). Communist voters are more intensely dissatisfied (74%) than those who voted for other parties (65%). However, those who say they had adequate information to make decisions about the candidates and parties are less intensely dissatisfied than those who did not have adequate information (66% and 75%, respectively). Those who say President Kuchma deserves reelection are far less intensely dissatisfied (57%) than those who call for a new person (71%).

Poverty, Payment Arrears and Unemployment Underlie Dissatisfaction



Dissatisfaction is directly related to the bleak economic conditions Ukrainians face on a daily basis. Fully 45% say that poverty is the reason they are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine. Another 24% mention payment arrears (non-payment) and 23% say their dissatisfaction is related to unemployment. Another 16% mention the chaos and instability of


the nation's life. In fact, economic problems account for 92% of the dissatisfaction — up from 85% in 1997.

A number of groups are more likely to mention poverty as the source of their dissatisfaction. These include: Women 45+ (54%), age 55-64 (50%), age 65+ (53%), urban residents (49%), residents of the Southeast (55%), the South (55%) and Crimea (55%), and those who are owed back wages for two months or less (58%).

Unemployment mentions are more common among men 18-44 (28%), women 18-44 (32%), those who are employed part-time (33%), and homemakers and childcare providers (56%),

The following groups are more likely to mention payment arrears: North (34%), Central (34%), Northwest (44%), age 65+ (33%), those with less than secondary education (32%), rural respondents (39%), those who prefer a centrally-planned economy (30%), and who have wage arrears of three months or more (40%).

A Plurality Expects The Economy To Worsen in the Next Year




Few (10%) expect the economy to improve in a year while 38% feel conditions will be the same and 40% say the economy will worsen. This represents a decline both in the number who think the economy will worsen and who think it will improve.

The public appears to be rather resigned to their economic plight, as the number who think the economy will remain the same continues to increase.

Economic pessimism is greatest in Kyiv (47%), Crimea (53%), and the East (45%). Also, the unemployed (45%), ethnic Russians (44%), those who say Ukraine is not a democracy (54%), those with low voter efficacy (46%), who want central planning (45%), who have experienced shorter-term wage arrears (45%), and those who are not likely to vote in the next presidential election (45%) tend to express pessimism about the economy.

Views on Economic Reforms

A Plurality Now Prefers a Centrally-Planned Economy



In 1997, a 39% plurality of Ukrainians supported a market economy and 31% preferred central planning. In 1998, however, just 25% favor a market economy while 33% want central planning, and 20% would like both in conjunction.

Support for a market approach is fairly high in Kyiv (49%) and the West (41%). A plurality of those age 18-24 (49%) and 25-34 (38%) also prefers a market economy. Support for central planning, however, is the general preference of those age 45 and older. Just 6% of those age 65+ support a market economy.

Support for a market approach is fairly high in Kyiv (49%) and the West (41%).

Fig 10. Support for Market Economy, by Region and Age

	Market	Central	Both		Market	Central	Both
Kyiv	49%	11%	23%	18-24	49%	20%	15%
North	16%	42%	13%	25-34	38%	25%	24%
Central	26%	45%	11%	35-44	31%	25%	28%
Northeast	27%	25%	23%	45-54	21%	40%	21%
Northwest	30%	32%	11%	55-64	10%	44%	13%
Southeast	21%	35%	27%	65+	6%	46%	13%
West	41%	21%	15%				
Southwest	24%	17%	26%				
South	20%	42%	21%				
Crimea	19%	32%	36%				
East	20%	36%	21%				

Young men remain the most enthusiastic supporters of a market economy (44%), but their support has fallen 14% since 1997. Support for a market approach increases with education (from 10% among those with less than secondary education to 45% among college graduates). Support is also higher among those who say Ukraine is a democracy (38%), who have higher vote efficacy (32%), and who believe political parties are necessary to democracy (36%).

Last year, those possessing a higher level of political and economic information were far more likely than the poorly-informed to support a market economic approach for Ukraine's future. In fact, there was a very clear demarcation between the two groups (i.e. 53% among the better informed about economics versus 37% among those with less economic information). Even then, a plurality of the poorly-informed preferred a market economy.


This year's survey, however, finds no such difference and a much different scenario. In fact, a plurality of those who are better-informed about politics and government (34%) would prefer a centrally-planned economy in the future and just 28% favor a market approach. The numbers are very similar for those who hold little or no political information (26% market - 33% centrally-planned). Those with a higher level of economic information are no more inclined to favor a market economy (27% market - 34% central) than those who hold little economic information (26% market - 33% central).

The core proponents of a market economy (those who favor a market economy and want to reach that goal as quickly as possible) comprise just 13% of the adult population. On the other hand, 21% want a centrally-planned economy and believe that the nation should never have a market economy. The core proponents tend to be younger (71% less than 45 years), male (57%), better-educated (57% completed secondary), and urban (75% and 25% rural). The core opponents are older (65% age 45 or older), female (65%) and substantially more rural (43%, 57% urban).

1998 voters prefer a centrally-planned economy by 36%-24% while non-voters give a slight edge to a market approach (29%-24%). Those who support President Kuchma's reelection are more favorable toward a market economy (37%-24%) while those who call for a new person are more inclined toward central planning (37%-25%).

These findings indicate that the opportunity to forge support for economic reforms through a broad-based public information campaign may have been missed over the past year. Clearly, proponents of a market economy are losing the battle for public support.

Pace of Market Development



This downward trend in support for a market economy is also apparent when respondents are questioned about the pace of market reforms. Just 22% say that "we should work toward a market economy as quickly as possible," 29% with steady but small reforms, and 24% not at all. In 1997, 25% wanted a market economy as quickly as possible, 41% with steady but small reforms, and 17% not at all.


Support for rapid change is stronger among young Ukrainians, particularly men, and in Kyiv and the West. Support also increases with education. Not surprisingly, those who are interested in politics and government, who say that Ukraine is a democracy, and who believe in the necessity of political parties all are more supportive of rapid steps toward a market economy.

Older people, residents of the North, Central, and South, the less well-educated, and those who minimize the need for political parties are more likely to say that Ukraine should not move toward a market economy at all. Again, there is no difference in attitudes between the well-informed and the poorly-informed.

Figure 12. Views on the Pace of Market Development, by Selected Subgroups

	Soon as Possible	Steady Reforms	Not At All		Soon as Possible	Steady Reforms	Not At All
Kyiv	46%	29%	10%	<u>Views on Democracy</u>			
Northern	17%	21%	35%	Ukraine is/is becoming			
Central	19%	26%	34%	democracy	30%	38%	16%
Northeast	11%	37%	20%	Ukraine is not/not			
Northwest	23%	27%	20%	becoming democracy	18%	27%	30%
Southeast	24%	26%	27%				
West	29%	39%	13%	<u>Necessity of Parties</u>			
Southwest	15%	37%	17%	Necessary	28%	38%	18%
South	21%	31%	32%	Not Necessary	19%	23%	32%
Crimea	22%	40%	12%				
East	21%	24%	26%	<u>Amount of Political</u>			
				<u>Information</u>			
<u>Age/Sex</u>				Some	25%	32%	26%
Male 18-44	36%	37%	14%	Not Much/None	22%	30%	24%
Male 45+	18%	29%	30%				
Female 18-44	22%	35%	19%	<u>Amount of Economic</u>			
Female 45+	13%	18%	34%	<u>Information</u>			
				Some	25%	32%	25%
<u>Interest in Politics</u>				Not Much/None	22%	30%	24%
Interested	26%	34%	23%				
Not Interested	17%	24%	26%				

A Plurality of Ukrainians Tends to Say Central Planning is "Ideal"



On a five-point scale ranging from a pure market economy to total state control of the economy, a plurality of Ukrainians says that Ukraine's future economy ideally would be state controlled. Just 9% opt for a pure market economy (19% prefer a market economy overall). Conversely, 26% call for total state control (38% overall), and 23% are neutral on the scale. The mean score is 3.46.


All regions, except Kyiv (2.77) lean toward central planning on this scale. Sentiment for central planning increases steadily with age (from 2.97 among those age 18-34 to 4.12 among those age 65 and older).

Support for central planning declines with education (from 4.03 among those with less than secondary school to 2.89 among college graduates). Ethnic Ukrainians are slightly more supportive of central planning (3.49) than ethnic Russians (3.34). Rural residents (3.72) are more supportive than urbanites (3.33).

Those who are well-informed economically are only slightly less likely than the poorly-informed (3.33 versus 3.48). Naturally, Communist voters (4.08) are more likely than other voters (3.27).

Pace of Economic Reforms Remains Too Slow

Regardless of their theoretical orientation toward the economy, Ukrainians continue to agree that the pace of economic reform is too slow. In fact, 61% hold this view while 6% say that reforms are occurring too quickly and 6% believe reforms are occurring at the right pace. One in four can't rate the pace of reforms. This represents some change from 1997 when 70% said that reforms were occurring too slowly.




In 1997, a majority of all subgroups felt that reforms were too slow. In 1998, a majority of most groups still holds this view. However, there has been a dramatic increase in the "don't know" response among several major subgroups. For example, 40% in the North, 40% of

females age 45 and older, and 39% of all pensioners can't rate the pace of reforms. The following table outlines the view by major subgroups.

Figure 15. Views on the Pace of Reform, by Region and Sex/Age							
	Too Quickly	Too Slowly	Right Pace		Too Quickly	Too Slowly	Right Pace
Kyiv	9%	73%	8%	Male 18-44	6%	70%	9%
Northern	8%	41%	8%	Male 45+	6%	64%	5%
Central	4%	62%	11%	Female 18-44	8%	64%	5%
Northeast	8%	56%	5%	Female 45+	3%	49%	4%
Northwest	5%	59%	10%				
Southeast	5%	70%	3%				
West	2%	83%	2%				
Southwest	4%	46%	12%				
South	8%	62%	2%				
Crimea	4%	64%	5%				
East	6%	53%	3%				

No Branch of Government is Seen as Able to Solve Economic Problems



As in the past, when Ukrainians are asked which branch of government is most likely to solve the economic problems facing Ukraine, the plurality response (23%) is "none." Of the branches tested, the Supreme Rada received the highest score (21%), followed by the executive (17%), local government (16%), and the judiciary (5%). These scores are

fairly comparable to those observed in 1997 and there are no major deviations from the average scores among subgroups.

Political Reforms, Parties, and Participation

Pace of Political Reforms is Too Slow

This question also represents a change from 1997 when a 56% majority felt that political reforms were occurring too slowly. Now, just 43% express that sentiment while 13% say that reforms are occurring too quickly, and 8% at the right pace. Nearly one in three (31%) have no opinion.

In this case, there are differences by region, age and sex with men, younger Ukrainians, and those residing in Kyiv, the West, the South, Southeast, and Crimea more likely to say that reforms are occurring too slowly. Women, older respondents, and those in the North, Northeast, and Northwest are more apt to say they "don't know" about the pace of political reforms.

Other groups that are more likely to say that political reforms are occurring too slowly include: people with higher education levels, who are interested in politics and government, who say that political parties are necessary, that party competition is important, who are better informed politically and support a market economy.


Figure 17. Views on the Pace of Political Reforms, by Selected Subgroups

	Too Quickly	Too Slowly	Right Pace		Too Quickly	Too Slowly	Right Pace
Kyiv	10%	55%	9%	<u>Views on Democracy</u>			
Northern	14%	34%	10%	Ukraine is/is becoming			
Central	15%	43%	14%	democracy	16%	49%	9%
Northeast	7%	40%	11%	Ukraine is not/not			
Northwest	8%	43%	7%	becoming democracy	11%	47%	9%
Southeast	17%	48%	5%				
West	22%	50%	8%	<u>Amt. of Economic</u>			
Southwest	4%	39%	8%	<u>Information</u>			
South	7%	48%	9%	Some	14%	48%	12%
Crimea	9%	54%	7%	Not Much/None	13%	45%	7%
East	14%	43%	4%				
				<u>Amount of Political</u>			
				<u>Information</u>			
<u>Interest in Politics</u>				Some	15%	50%	11%
Interested	14%	52%	9%	Not Much/None	13%	44%	7%
Not Interested	12%	37%	8%				

Figure 17. Views on the Pace of Political Reforms, by Selected Subgroups

	Too Quickly	Too Slowly	Right Pace		Too Quickly	Too Slowly	Right Pace
Preferred Type of Economy				Party Competition			
Market Economy	11%	57%	11%	Important	11%	51%	10%
Centrally-Planned	16%	41%	7%	Not Important	17%	40%	6%
Necessity of Parties				Sex/Age			
Necessary	11%	52%	9%	Male 18-44	14%	53%	11%
Not Necessary	17%	43%	8%	Male 45+	14%	49%	9%
				Female 18-44	11%	45%	9%
				Female 45+	13%	34%	5%

To a Majority, Ukraine is Not a Democracy



Despite the recent parliamentary elections, a 55% majority (up from 52% in 1997) says that Ukraine is not a democracy. Just 19% say the nation is a democracy, 9% say it is both, and 15% don't know.

A majority of most -- and a plurality of all subgroups except economic optimists -- says that Ukraine is not a democracy.

Nevertheless, a few subgroups are more likely to believe that Ukraine is a democracy. These include: Central (26%); West (34%); Southwest (33%); 18-24 (33%); those who say that political reforms are occurring too quickly (34%); those with high vote efficacy (33%); the newspaper-reliant (32%); economic optimists (42%), and Kuchma supporters (29%).

Those expressing the strongest conviction that Ukraine is not a democracy include: residents of Kyiv (64%); the Southeast (62%); the South (69%); people aged 35-44 (64%); age 45-54 (66%); college graduates (66%); ethnic Russians (65%); those with low vote efficacy (62%); who say there are not clear differences between the parties (63%); who used "Elections 98" as their main source of information about the voting process (64%); economic pessimists (66%), and those who generally hold a negative view of the way the 1998 elections were conducted.


In a follow-up question to those who say that Ukraine is not a democracy, we find a slight increase since 1997 in the number saying that Ukraine is becoming a democracy (from 23% to 27%). This view is more prevalent in the Northwest (50%), in the West (44%), among market supporters (47%), economic optimists (56%), those who did not vote for the Communist Party (36%), Kuchma supporters (39%), and among men 18-44 (35%).

Figure 19. Views on Democracy in Ukraine, by Selected Subgroups*

	Becoming a Democracy	Not Becoming a Democracy		Becoming a Democracy	Not Becoming a Democracy
Kyiv	33%	52%	Sex/Age		
Northern	10%	38%	Male 18-44	35%	46%
Central	28%	39%	Male 45+	26%	50%
Northeast	28%	33%	Female 18-44	29%	44%
Northwest	50%	27%	Female 45+	18%	41%
Southeast	27%	48%	Nationality		
West	44%	31%	Ukrainian	29%	41%
Southwest	24%	41%	Russian	23%	55%
South	29%	53%	Vote Efficacy		
Crimea	15%	65%	Agree	43%	32%
East	18%	57%	Disagree	24%	51%
Interest in Politics			Amount of Political Information		
Interested	34%	45%	Some	30%	44%
Not Interested	20%	44%	Not Much/None	27%	45%
Preferred Type of Economy			Pace of Economic Reforms		
Market Economy	47%	35%	Too Quick	28%	48%
Centrally-Planned	16%	56%	Too Slow	35%	45%
Future Economy			Right Pace	17%	50%
Better	56%	24%	Kuchma Re-Elect		
Same	30%	40%	Re-elect	39%	39%
Worse	19%	56%	New Person	27%	46%
Necessity of Parties			Party Differences		
Necessary	33%	45%	Clear Differences	32%	46%
Not Necessary	22%	50%	Not Clear Diff.	27%	49%
Party Competition					
Important	35%	45%			
Not Important	18%	48%			

*Percentages based on 967 respondents who do not think Ukraine is a democracy

Vote Efficacy Remains Low



Despite the proximity to the elections, a majority continues to disagree with the statement "Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country. Although fewer disagree with the statement than in 1996 or 1997, there is also a drop in the number who agree. It seems that vote efficacy, for some, is rather ephemeral, since

efficacy scores were much higher immediately after the election. National post-election research commissioned by IFES in May 1998 found that 35% agreed and 48% disagreed that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making.

A majority of all subgroups save the Northwest (38% agree - 42% disagree), the newspaper-reliant (44%-49%), and economic optimists (45%-45%) disagree.

Reported Turnout Mirrors Actual Voting Patterns


More than three-fourths of those questioned (77%) say they voted in the March 1998 election. Typically, young people were the least likely to vote and those under 45 years of age account for 65% of all non-voters (and 52% of the voting age population). This is a crucial problem for all democracies, but is particularly problematic for emerging democracies.

Reported turnout was highest in the North, Central, Northwest, and Western regions. Turnout was lowest in Kyiv, Crimea, and the Southwest. Newspaper readers (82%) and those who relied on the Central Election Commission's "Elections 98" program (85%) also voted in large numbers. Equal percentages of men and women voted. Accordingly, the women's vote accounts for 56% of the votes cast in March.

Figure 21. Voter Turnout, by Selected Subgroups


	Voted	Didn't Vote		Voted	Didn't Vote
Kyiv	67%	33%	<u>Sex/Age</u>		
Northern	83%	17%	Male 18-44	72%	28%
Central	80%	20%	Male 45+	84%	16%
Northeast	71%	29%	Female 18-44	69%	31%
Northwest	83%	17%	Female 45+	83%	17%
Southeast	77%	23%			
West	86%	14%	<u>Nationality</u>		
Southwest	64%	36%	Ukrainian	78%	22%
South	78%	22%	Russian	75%	25%
Crimea	67%	33%			
East	74%	26%	<u>Education</u>		
			Less than Secondary	81%	19%
<u>Interest in Politics</u>			Secondary Completed	75%	25%
Interested	84%	16%	Some College, less than 3 years	78%	22%
Not Interested	69%	31%	College, Advanced Degree	71%	28%
<u>Preferred Type of Economy</u>			<u>Vote Efficacy</u>		
Market Economy	73%	27%	Agree	86%	14%
Centrally-Planned	83%	17%	Disagree	74%	26%
<u>Future Economy</u>			<u>Amount of Political Information</u>		
Better	81%	19%	Some	79%	21%
Same	75%	25%	Not Much/None	76%	24%
Worse	79%	21%			
			<u>Pace of Economic Reforms</u>		
<u>Necessity of Parties</u>			Too Quick	78%	22%
Necessary	76%	24%	Too Slow	78%	22%
Not Necessary	78%	22%	Right Pace	69%	31%
<u>Party Competition</u>			<u>Kuchma Re-Elect</u>		
Important	78%	21%	Re-elect	77%	23%
Not Important	76%	24%	New Person	79%	21%
			<u>Party Differences</u>		
			Clear Differences	82%	18%
			Not Clear Differences	75%	25%

Reasons for Not Voting



Among non-voters, the main reasons given for not voting were “too busy/away” (24%), “did not want to” (11%), “illness” (11%), and there was “no one worth voting for” (9%). Women 18-44 are somewhat more likely to say they were busy or away (28%), and older non-voters are more likely to mention illness (23% of those age 55 and older).

Reasons for Voting



“Hope,” “duty,” and a desire “to have an impact on the elections” are the main reasons given for voting.

Hope receives a greater number of mentions from: voters in the Central, Northwest, West, and Southwest regions; Women 18-44, rural residents, the UT-I reliant, those who support central planning, and economic optimists.

Duty was the driving reason for: the Kyiv, North, and Southeast regions.

Impact responses were higher among: men 18-44, Kyiv, voters in the Northeast, South, and Crimea regions; age 35-44, college graduates, urbanites, those with high vote efficacy, the better-informed politically, the newspaper-reliant, market economy proponents, and likely presidential voters.

Figure 24. Reasons for Voting (Hope, Duty, Impact), by Selected Subgroups*


	Hope	Duty	Impact		Hope	Duty	Impact
Kyiv	26%	33%	22%	<u>Sex/Age</u>			
Northern	14%	30%	14%	Male 18-44	25%	25%	21%
Central	49%	9%	16%	Male 45+	33%	25%	16%
Northeast	25%	20%	21%	Female 18-44	40%	18%	17%
Northwest	41%	18%	11%	Female 45+	36%	19%	13%
Southeast	38%	38%	15%	<u>Nationality</u>			
West	41%	11%	14%	Ukrainian	36%	22%	17%
Southwest	53%	24%	3%	Russian	27%	22%	19%
South	29%	22%	24%	<u>Education</u>			
Crimea	21%	25%	22%	Less than Secondary	36%	21%	13%
East	32%	18%	17%	Secondary Completed	36%	20%	15%
<u>Interest in Politics</u>				Some College, less than 3 years	31%	26%	25%
Interested	34%	22%	20%	College, Advanced Degree	19%	25%	31%
Not Interested	34%	21%	12%	<u>Vote Efficacy</u>			
<u>Kuchma Re-Elect</u>				Agree	33%	19%	25%
Re-elect	34%	23%	15%	Disagree	35%	23%	13%
New Person	34%	21%	19%	<u>Amount of Political Information</u>			
<u>Future Economy</u>				Some	31%	20%	22%
Better	45%	17%	14%	Not Much/None	36%	23%	15%
Same	31%	24%	18%	<u>Pace of Economic Reforms</u>			
Worse	32%	20%	18%	Too Quick	28%	17%	30%
<u>Necessity of Parties</u>				Too Slow	36%	21%	18%
Necessary	34%	21%	20%	Right Pace	26%	25%	16%
Not Necessary	35%	23%	13%	<u>Preferred Type of Economy</u>			
<u>Party Competition</u>				Market Economy	29%	23%	23%
Important	35%	22%	19%	Centrally-Planned	38%	18%	18%
Not Important	34%	21%	12%	<u>Party Differences</u>			
<u>Party Differences</u>				Clear Differences	37%	19%	19%
Clear Differences	37%	19%	19%	Not Clear Diff.	30%	26%	16%
Not Clear Diff.	30%	26%	16%				

*Percentages based on 921 respondents who voted

Few Used the Mobile Ballot Box

Just 6% say they used the mobile ballot box to vote in March. Women comprised 65% of those who used the mobile box (43% age 45 and older).

Party Voting



Percentages based on 921 respondents who voted

The reported vote for the Communist Party (31%) is slightly higher than actual results (24.5%). It is fairly common in post-election surveys conducted farther away from the elections to find a similar "bandwagon effect," or reported support for the winning party or candidate. In IFES' May research, the reported party vote approximated actual percentages.

The Communist Constituency (31%/N=281)

Communist support is higher in the South (44%), East (41%) and Crimea (61%) than in other regions. Support increases with older age groups (to 42% among those age 65 and older) and declines with the education level of the respondent. Ethnic Russians (40%) are more likely to support the CPU than ethnic Ukrainians (28%). CPU supporters reflect the entire population in urban (60%) and rural (40%) distribution.

Four regions (Central - 13%, Southeast - 11%, South - 15%, and East - 20%) comprise 59% of the Communist vote. Crimea adds another 8%. As is the case elsewhere in the NIS, voters age 45+ account for the vast majority of the Communist vote (69%). Women 45 and older make up 45% of the CPU's voters and 44% are pensioners.

Communist voters are slightly less well-educated than the overall voting-age population (46% less than secondary as compared to 37% for the full sample), and 26% are ethnic Russian (6% more than the voting-age population). They are slightly less well-informed about politics (28%) and economics (24%). The party platform was the most influential medium in their vote decision. The most important voting issues were "to restore the past" (36%) as well as the party's platform and promises (23%). A 57% majority voted for individual candidates who are members of the Communist Party.

They are more interested in politics and government (60% versus 55%), far more likely to support central planning (53% versus 36%), more likely to be owed back wages or pensions (69% versus 61%) and to be owed those payments for a longer period (46% three months or longer versus

40%). In all, 43% say the pace of political reforms is too slow (45% nationally) and a 42% plurality believes the economy will worsen during the next year.

They are somewhat less likely to say that political parties are necessary for democracy (42% versus 46%) and to say that party competition is important (54% versus 59%), but more likely to discern clear differences between the parties (46% to 44%). Communist voters are much less likely than average to say that Ukraine is, or is becoming, a democracy (32% versus 43%).

Communist voters made their party list voting decision early (74% two months or more before the election versus 49% among other voters), are highly likely to vote in the next presidential election (62%) and unlikely to support President Kuchma (8% Reelect - 74% New Person versus 14%-68% overall).

Other Party Constituencies

People's Rukh (9%/N=84)

A majority of Rukh voters are centered in two regions, the Northwest (22%) and West (30%). A majority (56%) are male, and supporters are fairly evenly distributed by age (46% less than 45 years, 54% age 45 and older). Nearly all (93%) describe their nationality as Ukrainian. Supporters are more rural than the norm (49% versus 39%).

They are somewhat less well-informed politically (71% not much or no political information versus 64% nationwide), and even less well-informed regarding economic matters (76% versus 70%). They are more likely to favor a market economy (41%), to think that such an economy should be achieved as quickly as possible (35%), and to believe that Ukraine's economy will worsen over the next year (47%). They, like the Communists, have long-standing wage arrears (45% three months or more). 36% are employed full-time, 34% are pensioners, and 64% have children living at home.

Rukh supporters have above-average vote efficacy (37% versus 29%) and interest in politics (62% versus 55%); made voting decisions very early in the process (71% at least two months before); are highly likely to vote in the 1999 presidential election (66% very likely); a majority (67%) calls for a new person as president.

Rukh voters say that the party platform (30%) was the most influential medium in their voting decision and the party's program (39%) and platform promises (23%) were the most important issues to their vote (Here and subsequently, the use of "program" and "platform" is considered to reflect a choice of labels in referring to the same document). Like the Communists, 57% of Rukh voters voted for individual candidates of the same party. They attach above-average importance to political parties: 48% say that parties are necessary to democracy, 62% discern clear differences between the parties, and 71% say that party competition is important. They are very likely to say that Ukraine is a democracy (66%). Employment distribution is average for the nation but Rukh voters are slightly more likely to have children living at home (64%).

Green Party (8%/N=74)

Eastern Ukrainians make up the biggest segment of the Green Coalition (20%), followed by the Northeast (15%) and Southeast (14%). 57% are female (43% under age 45). Most (77%) are younger than age 45. Most have completed secondary school (62%), 44% are employed full-time and the coalition is largely urban (81%). They are slightly more likely to have children living at home (62%).

Ethnic Russians represent 30% of this bloc. 67% say that parties are necessary to democracy and 72% that party competition is important but just 40% discern clear differences among the parties and 33% have high vote efficacy. Interest in politics is just average (56%) and 45% think political reforms are occurring too slowly. An above-average 48% say that Ukraine is a democracy. 44% support a market economy and 51% are owed back wages. 47% made early voting decisions and 31% decided in the last two weeks. A plurality of Green voters (48%) says that the economy will be the same in one year as it is today.

An average of 31% consider themselves well-informed politically but only 25% are informed about economic matters. The party's platform (21%) and television advertisements (19%) were influential media. Their most important voting issue was the party's program (73%). Just 13% voted for a candidate of the same party. 64% are very likely to vote in the next presidential election; 25% say that President Kuchma deserves reelection and 63% call for a new person as president.

Hromada (6%/N=54)

Nearly all of Hromada's voters are located in the Southeast (66%), an area with a lower than average level of wage arrears (35% versus 57% nationwide/61% of all voters). Hromada's voters, too, have a lower level of wage arrears (46%). Nevertheless, 56% see the economy worsening over the next year. Also, 45% are male, 43% are age 55 and older, 86% are Ukrainian, and 32% rural. In terms of education, 41% have less than secondary, 37% completed secondary, 11% have some college, and 11% have completed college. This constituency is slightly above-average in the number who are employed full-time (39%) and the number who are pensioners (38%). Only 51% have children at home.

Only 46% are interested in politics, and 62% have low vote efficacy. Only 15% support a market economy but a 49% plurality says the pace of political reforms is too slow. They are below-average in terms of their views regarding the importance and diversity of political parties. Only 41% say that parties are necessary to democracy, 47% say that party competition is important, and just 32% can discern clear differences between the parties. Further, just 31% say that Ukraine is, or is becoming, a democracy.

They display average information levels as 32% have some political information and 26% have some economic information. Hromada voters made fairly early decisions (41% more than two months/37% one month) and found television debates (20%) and newspaper articles (16%) to be influential media. The party's platform and promises were the most important voting issue (48%)

and voting was very consistent as 81% voted for individual candidates who are members of the same party. They are less intense in their likelihood to vote in the next presidential election — just 41% are very likely as compared to 60% nationwide. They are also less likely to support President Kuchma (10% reelect - 82% new person).

People's Democratic Party/NDPU (4%/N=41)

The largest bloc of People's Democratic Party voters is found in the Central region (23%). 62% are urban and 38% rural. They are younger (55% less than 45 years of age), a majority are female (55%); 35% are women 18-44. They tend to have secondary schooling (53%), are slightly more likely to be employed part-time (16% of NDPU voters as compared to 10% nationwide), and much more likely to have young children (70%). 78% are ethnic Ukrainian; they have above-average interest in politics (57%), higher vote efficacy (42%) and are much more likely to say Ukraine is a democracy (54%).

They are somewhat more likely (49%) to discern differences between the parties and more likely (18%) to say that political reforms are occurring at the right pace. 44% say that parties are necessary to democracy and 75% believe that party competition is important.

An average 23% support a market economy, and they are relatively well-informed politically (46%) and economically (33%). They tended to be late deciders — 39% made their voting decision in the last two weeks. Television debates (30%) were the most influential medium, the party's program (36%) the most important voting issue, and 41% voted for a candidate from the same party as their party-list vote.

NDPU voters are somewhat less likely (56%) to suffer wage arrears, but only slightly more likely (16%) to be optimistic about the economy. They are highly likely to vote in the next presidential election (67% very likely) and more likely than other coalitions to support the president (26% reelect - 55% new person).

Progressive Socialists (4%/N=37)

Progressive Socialist voters are concentrated in the Northeast (37%) and East (19%). Most are women (64%) and older (63% age 45 and older); 39% are women 45+. Only 54% have children living at home. They are not well-educated as 44% have less than secondary and 46% have secondary education. A large bloc (42%) are pensioners, 31% are ethnic Russians, and 87% live in urban areas. They are highly interested in politics (61%), but a plurality (49%) says Ukraine is not becoming a democracy and 66% have low vote efficacy. They are above average in saying that parties are necessary to democracy (55%), in discerning clear differences between the parties (55%), and in saying that party competition is important (64%).

Progressive Socialist voters are poorly-informed (71% have little or no political information and 76% lack economic information) and highly likely to favor a centrally-planned economy (51%). They are less likely to be owed back wages or pensions, but the percentage is substantial

nevertheless (47%). They are slightly more likely (16%) to say that political reforms are occurring too quickly and that the economy will worsen (46%).

These voters made relatively late voting decisions (30% last two weeks), found television debates to be the most influential medium (43%), and the party's leader to be the most important voting issue (38%). An above-average 48% voted for candidates from the same party as their party list vote. Progressive Socialists are very likely to vote in the presidential election (73% very likely), but only 3% say that President Kuchma deserves reelection and 89% call for a new person.

Social Democratic Party United (3%/N=26)

These voters are relatively well-distributed geographically with some concentration in the Central (19%) and Northern (16%) regions. 68% are urban and 32% rural, and their 58% employed full-time figure is far above average. In all, 47% are male and 57% female; 58% are younger than 45. Most of these respondents (92%) have children living at home and 77% are ethnic Ukrainians. Most (56%) have secondary education; average interest in politics (53%); only 19% have high vote efficacy; a majority believes in the necessity of parties (59%) and party competition (59%), but are less likely (39%) to discern clear differences between the parties. Only 31% think Ukraine is, or is becoming, a democracy.

An average 32% are relatively well-informed politically and 26% have some economic information. In all, 35% prefer a market economy, and 61% report wage or pension arrears. Fully 55% think the pace of political reforms is too slow. A 42% plurality believes the economy will remain the same over the next year. They were relatively late deciders (34% last two weeks); were influenced by television debates (25%) and the opinion of family members (20%); say the party's program (27%) and platform promises (20%) were the most important voting issues, and 46% voted for individual and party list candidates who represented the same party. In all, 60% say they are very likely to vote in the next presidential election, 2% say that President Kuchma deserves reelection and 72% call for a new person.

Socialist-Peasant Bloc "For Truth" (3%/N=30)


These respondents tend to be from the Northern (41%) and Central (31%) regions. Only 22% are from urban areas and 78% are rural residents. They are fairly evenly divided between men (48%) and women (52%); 53% are age 45 and older and 34% are age 65 or older. They are poorly educated (54% less than secondary), likely to be pensioners (44%) or employed full-time (29%); 66% have children at home, and 89% are ethnic Ukrainian.

Only 39% are interested in politics (compared to 55% nationally); they are below average in their ability to assess the pace of political reforms (42% don't know or no answer); only 31% say that Ukraine is/is becoming a democracy; vote efficacy is very low (22%); just 21% say that parties are necessary to democracy and 25% that party competition is important, but 52% can discern clear differences between the parties.

Socialist-Peasant voters are poorly informed about politics (18%) and economics (11%); 58% prefer a centrally-planned economy; 51% believe the economy will be in the same condition a year from now, and 79% suffer wage arrears. These voters made early voting decisions (68% two months or before), are likely to vote in the next presidential election (62% very likely) and unlikely to support President Kuchma (11% reelect-79% new person).

In 1998, the party's program was the most important voting issue (51%), but only 24% voted for single-mandate candidates of the same party. The most influential media were the party platform (23%), family members (18%), and newspaper articles (17%).

Time of Decision-Making (Party)



Percentages based on 921 respondents who voted

Ukrainians made early decisions about their party vote. Nearly half (49%) made their decision at least two months before the election and 35% more than three months before. Another 19% decided one month out, and 25% during the last two weeks.


Women 18-44 are the most likely to be late deciders (30%) while men 45+ are more likely to have

decided early (46% more than three months before). Those who are interested in politics and government decided early (49% at least three months before) while those who are less interested are more likely to have made their decision in the last two weeks (31%). Predictably, those who see clear differences between the parties made their voting decisions earlier (56% at least two months before), and those who do not see differences tend to have made later decisions (30% in the last two weeks).

The better-informed politically made earlier decisions (53% two months or longer) and the poorly-informed made later decisions (26% last two weeks). Proponents of a market economy were later deciders (31% more than three months) than advocates of central planning (45% more than three months).


Fully 62% of the Communist voters made their decisions more than three months before the election as compared to just 26% among the supporters of other parties.

Issues Driving Decision-Making



Percentages based on 921 respondents who voted

The party's program, platform promises, and a desire to restore the past are the most important reasons for voting for a particular party.




Percentages based on 921 respondents who voted

Although responses are fairly consistent across the subgroups, there are certain differences. Men 18-44 (36%) and women 18-44 (39%) are most likely to cite the party's program, while women 45+ and those with less than secondary education are more likely to say "to restore the past" (18% and 17%, respectively).

Those with a higher level of political information are more likely to cite the party's program (41%) as the reason for their choice. This is also true of market proponents (43%) and of those who voted for non-Communist parties (41%). Communist voters' number-one issue is "to restore the past (36%)."

Most Influential Medium of Information




Percentages based on 921 respondents who voted

A plurality (21%) reports that a television debate was the most influential medium in convincing them to vote for a particular party. Second is the party's platform (17%) followed by the opinion of a family member (9%) and television advertising (7%).

Responses are, for the most part, consistent by subgroup. However, Communist voters are somewhat more

likely to name the party platform (24%) while other voters are slightly more likely to say that televised debates were the most influential (23%).

High Correlation of Party and Candidate Voting




Percentages based on 921 respondents who voted

A 42% plurality says that the single mandate candidate for whom they voted is a member of, or supported by, the same party they supported in the party list ballot.

Communist voters are more likely to have supported candidates from the same party (57%) than are those who voted for other parties (41%). Other groups who are more likely to have voted

consistently include: Southeastern voters (65%), men 45+ (47%), urban voters (47%), those interested in politics (47%), those who see clear differences between the parties (47%), the UT-3 reliant (48%), newspaper readers (55%), those who relied on television advertisements for voting process information (48%), economic pessimists (47%), early decision-makers (53% party/75% candidate), those who were contacted by candidate or party representatives (51%), and those who had adequate decision-making information (48%).

Time of Candidate Decision-Making



Percentages based on 616 respondents who voted for a candidate

Decisions about individual candidates were made somewhat later than party voting decisions. In all, 39% made this decision at least two months before the election (25% more than three months) while 33% made a decision in the last two weeks.

Men 45+ made the earliest decisions (37% more than three months before, while young women made the latest decisions (68% in the last month). Other early deciders include: ethnic Russians (30% more than three months before), those interested in politics (30%), who say Ukraine is not a democracy (31%), and those who discern clear differences between the parties (31%). Also, the better-informed politically (31%) and economically (34%), the newspaper reliant (35%), and Communist voters (36%).

Late deciders also include rural residents (40% in the last two weeks), those with little political information (37%), those who were not well-informed on the voting process (46%), those with long-term payment arrears (38%), non-Communist voters (37%), and Kuchma supporters (44%).

Few Report Voting for Incumbents

Just 28% say that the candidate for whom they voted was an incumbent deputy of the Supreme Rada while 49% voted for a non-incumbent, and 23% don't know whether they cast a vote for an incumbent or not. Incumbent voting was highest in Kyiv, and the Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, West, and East regions. Women 45+ are also more likely to report voting for an incumbent as are those with higher education levels and those interested in politics.

Other groups that supported incumbents include: market proponents, UT-2 reliant voters, those who used "Elections 98" and television ads as their main process information sources, and those who are not owed back wages. Finally, non-Communist voters, early deciders, and those who perceived the elections to be fraudulent are more likely to report voting for an incumbent.

Figure 32. Incumbent Voting, by Selected Subgroups
 (% based on 616 people who voted for candidates)

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Kyiv	38%	41%	<u>Sex/Age</u>		
Northern	14%	53%	Male 18-44	29%	54%
Central	21%	66%	Male 45+	25%	53%
Northeast	38%	27%	Female 18-44	25%	49%
Northwest	38%	52%	Female 45+	33%	41%
Southeast	32%	42%	<u>Perception of Vote Fraud</u>		
West	36%	45%	Fraud	32%	56%
Southwest	20%	75%	No Fraud	28%	49%
South	19%	52%	<u>Wage Arrears</u>		
Crimea	14%	51%	Yes	27%	51%
East	32%	43%	No	32%	46%
<u>Preferred Type of Economy</u>			<u>Source of Info for Govt. & Pol.</u>		
Market Economy	31%	51%	UT-1	28%	58%
Centrally-Planned	28%	43%	UT-2	36%	41%
<u>Party Voted For</u>			UT-3	27%	47%
Communist	22%	47%	ORT	31%	44%
Other	33%	49%	UR-1	16%	59%
			Family Friend	22%	55%
			Newspapers	18%	55%


Figure 32. Incumbent Voting, by Selected Subgroups
 (% based on 616 people who voted for candidates)

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Source of Info for Voting			Timing of Voting Decision		
Process			Two Months or More Before Elections	36%	42%
"Elections 98"	35%	44%	One Month Before Elections	27%	48%
TV Ads	34%	45%	Last Two Weeks Before Elections	22%	56%
TV News	26%	49%			
Newspapers	24%	52%			
Friend/Acquaintance	21%	62%			

Issues Driving Candidate Voting

The candidate's platform, personal qualities, party membership, and the confidence of voters in an individual candidate are the main factors that were important in this voting decision.

Fig 33. Issues of Importance when Voting for Candidates (% based on 616 respondents)




The number one issue for males and females 18-44 is the candidate's platform (31% and 28%, respectively) while women 45+ give a slight edge to personal qualities (26%). Men 45+ also give top mention to the platform (25%), but in second place list party membership.

There is a great deal of consistency in the scores of the various subgroups on this question, including very similar responses from the politically informed and uninformed (Figure 34 next page). The notable exception is Communist voters, who list party membership as the number one issue, and non-Communist voters, who name platform, personal qualities, and confidence above party membership.

Figure 34. Reasons for Voting for Candidates, by Select Subgroups
 (% based on 616 people who voted for candidates)

	Platform	Personal Qualities	Party Membership		Platform	Personal Qualities	Party Membership
Sex/Age				Political Info.			
Male 18-44	31%	24%	14%	Some	29%	21%	16%
Male 45+	25%	15%	19%	Not Much	26%	22%	15%
Female 18-44	28%	18%	15%	Party Voted For			
Female 45+	24%	26%	14%	Communist	24%	17%	26%
				Other	29%	22%	10%


Most Influential Medium in Voting Decision



No single medium stands out as the most influential medium affecting decision-making in the candidate ballot. Television debates receive the most mentions (16%), but flyers (13%), party platforms (11%), voters' meetings (9%), and personal contact (9%) are not far behind. Subgroup differences are insignificant. It is interesting to note, however, that Communist

voters are far less likely to have relied on televised debates than non-Communist voters (9% and 20%, respectively). The following chart lists responses.

International Organizations a Minor Factor in Voting Decisions




Clearly, international organizations were a minor factor in voting decisions in March. Only 15% say that party or candidate attitudes toward international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund were important to their voting decision. In all, 5% say such attitudes were very important, 10% somewhat

important, 9% not very important, and 26% not at all important. A 44% plurality doesn't know whether such attitudes were important or not.

Several groups considered this a more important factor, including: Southeast (23% very/somewhat), West (21%), some college (29%), college graduates (28%), better-informed politically (21%), newspaper readers (20%), those who relied on "Elections 98" (22%), who saw the PSAs (22%), who favor a market economy (24%), and who are not owed back wages or pensions (20%).

Campaign Contact



More than one-third (35%) say they were contacted by a candidate, candidate's representative, or political party during the recent campaign. Just 3% say they were not contacted. The remainder either "don't know" (31%) or refused to answer the question (31%).

Refusal rates are highest in the Central region (57%), the West (44%), and among non-voters (40%).

Among those who were contacted, the various forms of contact are as follows (multiple responses were allowed):

Local Candidate	51%
National Candidate	36%
Local Candidate's Representative	25%
Political Party Representative	19%
National Candidate's Representative	15%


Local candidate contact reports are highest in the Southwest (35%), among women 18-44 (22%), college graduates (26%), those who say Ukraine is a democracy (23%), those with high vote efficacy (24%), the newspaper-reliant (25%), those who saw voting process PSAs (24%), economic optimists (23%), Communist voters (23%), and early decision-makers (23% party/26% candidate).

National candidate contact reports are highest in: the North (17%), Southeast (17%), Southwest (25%), and South (18%). Also more likely to have been contacted are college graduates (18%), those who are employed full-time (17%), those who think parties are necessary (17%), who saw

PSAs (18%), early deciders in the candidate ballot (18%), and, in general, those who found the elections to be fair and honest.

Political party contact was higher in the East (12%).

Direct Contact Moves Voters



% based on 429 respondents who had contact with party/candidate

There is an overwhelmingly positive response to this contact. Six out of 10 voters contacted (60%) say this contact made them more likely to vote for that candidate or party while just 11% say they were less likely, and 24% indicate the contact had no influence.

The positive impact of direct contact is apparent across all major subgroups.


	Much/Smwht More Likely	Much/Smwht Less Likely	No Influence		Much/Smwht More Likely	Much/Smwht Less Likely	No Influence
Kyiv	63%	3%	34%	Male 18-44	58%	10%	27%
Northern	57%	5%	27%	Male 45+	69%	10%	18%
Central	62%	17%	18%	Female 18-44	60%	11%	24%
Northeast	34%	20%	32%	Female 45+	52%	10%	25%
Northwest	59%	0%	31%				
Southeast	63%	8%	24%				
Southwest	59%	10%	26%				
West	58%	7%	34%				
South	58%	22%	15%				
Crimea	57%	10%	23%				
East	68%	7%	17%				

Respondents give the following reasons for their positive response.

Believed Promises	19%
Got to know the program better	13%
Liked (the person/party)	11%
Got to know candidate/party	7%

Clearly, then, the basic campaign skills employed in this manner have a big payoff. Direct voter contact is exactly what is needed — in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union — to build and organize voting coalitions. If parties remain elite affairs, making little outreach effort and failing to organize or build coalitions, they will remain fragmented and capable only of peripheral impact.

Ukrainians Question Whether Rada Reflects Popular Political Preferences



A plurality (48%) holds the opinion that the political composition of the Supreme Rada does not reflect the population's political preferences overall while 26% say the Rada does reflect national political preferences. Sentiment on this issue is not particularly strong, as just 3% strongly feel that the Rada is reflective and 16% strongly feel it is not.

Regionally, only the Southeast (35%) is more likely to say the Rada reflects political preferences. Women 45+ are the least likely to hold an opinion either way, and fully 35% don't know. Those with higher education are more likely to say political preferences are represented.

Those who are interested in politics, who think Ukraine is a democracy, have high vote efficacy, think parties are necessary, are better-informed, were contacted by candidates or parties, are likely to vote in 1999, and support the current electoral system, are more likely to say the Rada is representative of the spectrum of political preferences in the nation.


Several groups are significantly less likely to say that the Rada is representative (Figure 41 next page). These include: Kyiv residents, Western Ukrainians, men, those who are employed part-time or unemployed, who say that Ukraine is not a democracy, have low vote efficacy, believe that political parties are not necessary, discern no clear differences between parties, and do not support the current electoral system. This view is also higher among proponents of a market economy, those who think economic reforms are occurring too slowly, and economic pessimists. Finally, those who lacked electoral decision-making information and those with an overall negative view of the 1998 elections indicate that the Rada is not representative of the political preferences of the nation.

**Figure 41. Supreme Rada Representative of Population's Political Preferences?
by Selected Subgroups**

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Kyiv	19%	64%	Sex		
Northern	21%	47%	Male	27%	53%
Central	31%	38%	Female	26%	44%
Northeast	26%	52%			
Northwest	21%	50%	Amount of Economic Information		
Southeast	35%	45%	Some	32%	47%
West	26%	60%	Not Much/None	25%	50%
Southwest	19%	48%			
South	22%	50%	Amount of Political Information		
Crimea	25%	46%	Some	31%	48%
East	26%	41%	Not Much/None	25%	50%
			Views on Democracy		
Interest in Politics			Ukraine is/is becoming democracy	34%	46%
Interested	30%	52%	Ukraine is not/not becoming democracy	22%	54%
Not Interested	21%	44%			
			Attitude toward Mixed System		
Preferred Type of Economy			Good electoral system	36%	47%
Market Economy	29%	55%	Bad electoral system	26%	51%
Centrally-Planned	26%	45%			
			Contact by Candidate Reps.		
Necessity of Parties			Yes	31%	50%
Necessary	31%	48%	No	18%	45%
Not Necessary	23%	54%			
			Vote Efficacy		
Agree	37%	44%			
Disagree	22%	53%			

Ukrainians Express Little Optimism About Improved Rada Effectiveness

Fig 42. Effectiveness of New Supreme Rada vs. Last Rada



Most Ukrainians are not optimistic about any improvement in the effectiveness of the Supreme Rada during this term. A total of 21% believe the new Supreme Rada will be more effective than the last, 11% think it will be less effective, 41% think it will be about the same, and 26% don't know.

Scores are fairly consistent across regions, age/sex groups, ethnicity, and type of settlement. Political optimists (Ukraine a democracy, high vote efficacy) are more likely to say the Rada will be more effective, as are those who support the current electoral system and those who relied on "Elections 98." Proponents of central planning, Communist voters, and likely presidential voters also have a more positive outlook on the Rada.

Figure 43. Perceived Effectiveness of New Supreme Rada vs. Last Rada, by Selected Subgroups

	More Effective	Less Effective	Same		More Effective	Less Effective	Same
Kyiv	12%	12%	57%	Sex/Age			
Northern	22%	5%	51%	Male 18-44	20%	11%	44%
Central	26%	8%	37%	Male 45+	23%	14%	35%
Northeast	17%	14%	47%	Female 18-44	20%	10%	47%
Northwest	19%	21%	29%	Female 45+	21%	10%	38%
Southeast	28%	7%	41%				
West	16%	17%	44%	Ethnicity			
Southwest	17%	13%	28%	Ukrainian	21%	12%	41%
South	23%	13%	36%	Russian	22%	9%	43%
Crimea	23%	4%	41%				
East	19%	10%	41%	Settlement			
				Urban	21%	11%	44%
Ukrainian Democracy				Rural	21%	12%	36%
Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	24%	12%	40%				
Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Democracy	18%	9%	43%	Views on Mixed System			
				Good Electoral System	28%	9%	42%
				Bad Electoral System	20%	18%	39%

Figure 43. Perceived Effectiveness of New Supreme Rada vs. Last Rada, by Selected Subgroups							
	More Effective	Less Effective	Same		More Effective	Less Effective	Same
Vote Efficacy				Type of Economy			
Agree	33%	10%	35%	Market Economy	22%	15%	43%
Disagree	16%	12%	46%	Central Planning	27%	10%	33%
Party Voted For				Vote in Pres. Elect.			
Communist	30%	8%	32%	Very likely	27%	12%	37%
Other	23%	15%	41%	Somewhat likely	17%	11%	44%
				Not likely	12%	9%	47%


Communist Party Perceived to be the Most Effective Party or Bloc

When asked to rate the effectiveness of the top eight parties and independent deputies in addressing the problems facing Ukraine, the Communist Party receives the highest rating by far. The following table ranks the parties and blocs by their mean score on a one-nine scale where "1" is least effective and "9" is most effective. Clearly, most are seen as relatively ineffective. In all cases, save the independent deputies, those who are able to discern clear differences between the parties give higher effectiveness scores than those who cannot discern clear differences.

Figure 44. Perceived Effectiveness of the Parties and Blocs* By Party Vote			
Total		Voted Communist	Voted Other
5.20	Communist Party of Ukraine	7.67	4.18
4.31	Socialist Party of Ukraine	4.82	4.41
4.14	National Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU)	3.57	4.63
3.89	All-Ukrainian Association Hromada	3.54	4.37
3.88	Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	4.05	4.11
3.85	Green Party	3.40	4.25
3.74	Independent Deputies	3.45	4.00
3.49	People's Rukh	2.59	4.17
3.47	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU)	2.76	3.89

*Scale of 1-9; 1 least effective, 9 most effective

Survey Shows a Declining Belief in the Necessity of Political Parties



This year's survey finds that only 46% believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy (9% strongly, 37% not strongly) while 40% say they are not necessary and 13% don't know. This is sharply down from last year when 58% said that parties are necessary. That this should be the case in an election year speaks volumes about the degree to which

political parties are becoming peripheral in this time of economic crisis as well as the degree to which political parties may have failed to convince voters that they can provide effective leadership. Or it may simply be that Ukrainians have lost faith in the country's leadership.

Some regions offer very low numbers regarding the necessity of political parties. For example, in the North and Central regions, just 33% say that parties are necessary, and the Northwest (32%) and Southwest (34%) are just as low. On the other hand, Kyiv (66% necessary), the Northeast (67%), Crimea (52%) and the East (56%) regard parties as necessary to democracy.

	Necessary	Not Necessary		Necessary	Not Necessary
Kyiv	66%	26%	Southeast	45%	46%
Northern	33%	44%	West	43%	43%
Central	33%	58%	Southwest	34%	49%
Northeast	68%	20%	South	49%	40%
Northwest	33%	52%	Crimea	52%	31%
			East	55%	26%

Those age 18-44 are far more likely than older people to believe in the necessity of political parties. Belief in the necessity of parties rises with education. Urban Ukrainians and ethnic Russians offer higher scores than rural and ethnic Ukrainians. These findings track with 1997 results.


As would be expected, belief in political parties rises with interest in politics, the view that Ukraine is a democracy, vote efficacy, support for the current electoral system, and information regarding the process of voting. Proponents of a market economy are much more likely to cite the necessity of parties than those who back central planning. These findings are also consistent with

comparable subgroups in 1997. Non-Communist voters are more likely than Communist voters to believe in the necessity of political parties. Nevertheless, 42% of all Communist voters believe parties are necessary. Those who have not suffered wage arrears are more likely than those who are owed back wages and pensions.

Figure 47. Necessity of Political Parties for Ukrainian Democracy, by Selected Subgroups

	Necessary	Not Necessary		Necessary	Not Necessary
Ukrainian Democracy			Sex/Age		
Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	53%	35%	Male 18-44	57%	35%
Isn't/Isn't Becoming Democracy	46%	42%	Male 45+	48%	42%
Vote Efficacy			Female 18-44	53%	34%
Agree	51%	38%	Female 45+	30%	47%
Disagree	49%	39%	Ethnicity		
Party Voted For			Ukrainian	45%	41%
Communist	42%	45%	Russian	52%	33%
Other	41%	38%	Settlement		
Views on Mixed System			Urban	53%	35%
Good Electoral System	68%	25%	Rural	34%	47%
Bad Electoral System	41%	54%	Type of Economy		
Informed on Vote Process			Market Economy	65%	28%
Well	54%	37%	Central Planning	38%	49%
Not Well	35%	44%			

But Support for Multi-Party Elections Remains Strong



Despite the lukewarm response to the necessity of political parties, a substantial majority (58%) thinks it is important for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election while 30% think it is not important. These numbers are very similar to findings from 1997 (57% important, 28% not important). Support, then, remains well above 1996 levels (46%).


Only two regions, the North (42% important - 35% not important) and the Southeast (49%-43%) fall below majority support for multi-party elections. As in 1997, majorities in all age groups, except those age 65 and older (42%), support party competition.

Women 45+ are the least supportive of multi-party elections (45%). The perceived importance of such elections increases with education, interest in politics, vote efficacy, the belief that Ukraine is a democracy, the belief in the necessity of parties to democracy, support for a market economy, and information about politics and the political process. Urban voters and ethnic Russians are more supportive of multi-party elections than rural residents and ethnic Ukrainians.

Figure 49. Importance of Multi-Party Elections, by Selected Subgroups

	Important	Not Important		Important	Not Important
Kyiv	71%	24%	Sex		
Northern	42%	35%	Male	64%	29%
Central	55%	35%	Female	53%	32%
Northeast	67%	23%	Education		
Northwest	56%	32%	Less than Secondary	47%	35%
Southeast	49%	43%	Secondary	62%	29%
West	68%	23%	Some College, less than 3 years	62%	34%
Southwest	51%	34%	College, Advanced Degree	78%	18%
South	59%	32%	Ethnicity		
Crimea	60%	24%	Ukrainian	57%	32%
East	63%	25%	Russian	63%	26%
Ukrainian Democracy			Settlement		
Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	69%	23%	Urban	65%	27%
Is not/Isn't Becoming A Democracy	57%	33%	Rural	46%	38%
Vote Efficacy			Age		
Agree	66%	26%	18-24	74%	19%
Disagree	58%	31%	25-34	58%	32%
Type of Economy			35-44	64%	30%
Market Economy	76%	18%	45-54	59%	29%
Central Planning	49%	39%	55-64	53%	30%
Party Voted For			65+	42%	40%
Communist	53%	34%	Vote in Pres. Elect.		
Other	63%	29%	Very likely	66%	27%
			Somewhat likely	55%	32%
			Not likely	44%	37%


Differentiation Among Parties



In the aftermath of the elections, the survey finds an increase in the number who find there are clear differences among the various political parties and blocs concerning the way they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine. In 1997, just 31% could discern clear differences. In 1998, 41% say there are clear differences, 39% say there are not clear differences, and 19% don't know.

Majorities in Kyiv (62%), the Northwest (52%), and the West (58%) say there are clear differences. Differentiation is also higher among: those interested in politics (46%), those who say Ukraine is a democracy (50%), who say parties are necessary (48%), and proponents of a market economy (49%).

Mixed System of Elections Met with Ambivalence



One in three respondents (34%) say that the mixed system of elections, in which one-half of the seats in the Supreme Rada is allocated to political parties and the other half is allocated to individual candidates, is a good way to determine the composition of the Supreme Rada. Another 23% say it is a bad way to determine the composition, and a plurality (42%) doesn't know.


Those who are interested in politics (40%), who say Ukraine is a democracy (44%), who have high vote efficacy (45%), and who say parties are necessary to democracy (45%) are more supportive of the current system. So, too, are those who relied on "Elections 98" for their voting process information (45%), proponents of a market system (48%), those who were contacted by candidates or parties (42%), and Kuchma supporters (44%).

Those who say parties are not necessary (32% bad way), the better-informed politically (28%), who relied on television news programs for voting process information (28%), and non-Communist voters (28%) are somewhat more likely to say the current system is a bad way to allocate seats.

As Figure 52 indicates, there is considerable variation by region, age and sex.

Figure 52. Reaction to Mixed System of Voting By Region, Age, and Sex							
	Good System	Bad System	Don't Know		Good System	Bad System	Don't Know
Kyiv	27%	34%	35%	Age			
Northern	32%	13%	54%	18-24	45%	19%	35%
Central	28%	31%	41%	25-34	39%	24%	34%
Northeast	46%	19%	34%	35-44	41%	22%	36%
Northwest	34%	30%	33%	45-54	34%	27%	37%
Southeast	43%	30%	27%	55-64	25%	27%	48%
West	34%	22%	43%	65+	20%	21%	60%
Southwest	27%	31%	39%				
South	33%	21%	46%	Sex			
Crimea	25%	18%	51%	Male	38%	24%	37%
East	33%	16%	5%	Female	30%	23%	46%

How Many Seats Should be Allocated to Political Parties?




When asked how many seats should be allocated to political parties, a 44% plurality doesn't know. Another 24% say that half of the seats should be allocated, 14% one-fourth, 6% three-fourths, 6% all, and 6% say that none of the seats should be allocated to the parties.

Majorities in the North (54%), West (52%), and Southwest (55%) regions (and 51% in rural areas) have no opinion. The same is true of women age 45+ (61%) and all those age 55 and older (57%). Education is clearly a factor since a majority of those with less than secondary schooling (56%) have no opinion (as compared with just 24% of those with college degrees).

Fairness of No Run-Off Elections in Single Mandate Elections

Fig 54. Fairness of a Lack of Run-Off Elections



Similarly, a plurality (40%) is unable to assess the fairness of the lack of a run-off election between the top two candidates in single mandate elections. In all, 31% say this situation is fair, 27% say it is not fair.


In general, responses are evenly distributed. Regionally, only Kyiv residents (44% Fair) are more likely

to say this system is fair while those in the Central and Southeastern regions are more likely to say it is not fair. "Fair" opinions increase with the level of the respondent's education. In addition, those who voted for non-Communist parties are somewhat more likely to say the system is both fair (36%) and not fair (32%).

As with the assessment of seat allocation, a majority of older voters, women 45+ in particular, is unable to assess the fairness of this system.

1999 Presidential Voting

Fig 55. Likelihood of Voting in 1999 Presidential Elections



The vast majority of Ukrainians is likely to vote in the 1999 presidential election (75%). This is an increase over last year's projected figure of 68%. In all, 4% are certain to vote, 47% are very likely, and 24% are somewhat likely. Just 10% are not very likely, 5% not at all likely, and 1% definitely will not vote.

Likelihood of voting is greatest among men 45+, and those with higher education levels, more interest in politics, and a sense that voting and political parties are important. Market proponents

and economic optimists are also more likely to vote. So, too, are 1998 voters, those who were contacted by candidates or parties, those who had adequate information for decision-making in 1998, and those who would support a new person as president.

Regionally, voters in the Central and Western areas are more likely to vote, while those in the Northeast and Southwest are less likely. The following table outlines subgroup variations.


**Figure 56. Likelihood of Voting in the 1999 Presidential Election
 By Selected Subgroups**

	Certain/ Likely	Not Likely/ No		Certain/ Likely	Not Likely/ No
Kyiv	78%	16%	Sex/Age		
Northern	77%	13%	Male 18-44	74%	16%
Central	82%	16%	Male 45+	82%	11%
Northeast	77%	20%	Female 18-44	76%	16%
Northwest	75%	17%	Female 45+	73%	17%
Southeast	78%	16%	Education		
West	87%	8%	Less than Secondary	72%	17%
Southwest	51%	16%	Secondary	76%	17%
South	79%	16%	Some College, less than 3 years	88%	6%
Crimea	76%	17%	College, Advanced Degree	82%	13%
East	72%	18%	Future Economy		
Ukrainian Democracy			Better	86%	8%
Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	83%	9%	Same	77%	15%
Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Demo.	74%	19%	Worse	73%	19%
Vote Efficacy			Contact by Party/Candid.		
Agree	87%	7%	Yes	80%	11%
Disagree	74%	17%	No	76%	18%
Type of Economy			Adequate Info for Voting?		
Market Economy	82%	11%	Yes	82%	12%
Central Planning	78%	15%	No	70%	21%
Voted in 1998?			Kuchma Re-elect?		
Yes	84%	9%	Kuchma	77%	14%
No	48%	37%	Someone Else	81%	13%

President Kuchma Faces Tough Reelection Campaign

Given the nation's bleak economic outlook, the continuing wage and pension arrears, and the overwhelming dissatisfaction Ukrainians express about conditions in the country, it is not surprising that President Kuchma's reelect figures have fallen substantially since 1997. At that time, IFES

reported the President's potential vulnerability when 42% said he deserves reelection but 35% said they would support a new person. This year, his vulnerability is greater as only 14% — or roughly one in seven — say the president has done his job well enough to deserve reelection and 66% say they would support someone else for president.




The power of incumbency, the lack of a strong opponent, and the possibility of a two-way race with a Communist nominee are all mitigating factors that have to be remembered because of their potential to secure the president's reelection. Nevertheless, these numbers clearly indicate that the people reject President Kuchma's leadership at this time.

Few groups offer even 20% support for the president's reelection at this time. These include: Kyiv (21%), West (25%), age 18-24 (20%), market economic proponents (20%), and economic optimists (26%).

More express significantly higher preference for a new President. These include: residents of Central Ukraine (75%), the Northeast (75%), Southeast (71%), and East (73%) regions; those who say Ukraine is not a democracy (72%), the newspaper-reliant (71%), proponents of central planning (74%), those with short-term wage arrears (71%), Communist voters (74%), and likely presidential voters (71%).


Issues Driving Presidential Voting



No one issue stands out as the most important determinant in deciding how to vote for president. Instead, voters list a variety of characteristics they seek in a president. Respondents want someone who is honest and decent (15%) and who will take care of people (10%). They also look for the ability to get out of crisis (8%), business qualities (7%), competence (7%), and real leadership (5%). Responses are evenly distributed.

Impressions of the March Elections

Organization



A plurality (45%) says the March 1998 elections were well-organized while 38% say they were not.

There are substantial regional variations in perceptions about the organization of elections. Majorities in the North, Central, and Northwest regions say elections were well-organized while majorities in Kyiv and the


Southeast say they were not. The view that they were poorly organized increases with the education level of the respondent. Urban residents are evenly divided while a majority of rural voters says the elections were well-organized.

Several other groups are more likely to say the elections were well organized. These include: those who believe Ukraine is a democracy (53%), who have high vote efficacy (59%), who see clear differences between the parties (51%), who say the current system is a good way to handle elections (52%), who are well-informed regarding the voting process (53%), who saw public service announcements on the voting process (50%), who say Ukraine should not move toward a market economy (51%), economic optimists (54%), 1998 voters (54%), those who received direct contact from parties or candidates (52%), who had adequate decision-making information (53%), who say the elections were not fraudulent (59%), and very likely presidential voters (53%).

**Figure 60. Organization of March 1998 Elections
By Selected Subgroups**

	Well Organized	Not Well Organized		Well Organized	Not Well Organized
Kyiv	25%	50%	<u>Settlement</u>		
Northern	51%	30%	Urban	41%	51%
Central	54%	38%	Rural	42%	32%
Northeast	45%	40%	<u>Education</u>		
Northwest	61%	23%	<Secondary	49%	31%
Southeast	40%	50%	Secondary	43%	40%
West	49%	39%	Some College, <3 years	38%	52%
Southwest	42%	28%	College, Advanced Degree	41%	47%
South	36%	47%	<u>Future Economy</u>		
Crimea	39%	32%	Better	54%	37%
East	41%	36%	Same	47%	37%
<u>Ukrainian Democracy</u>			Worse	40%	43%
Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	53%	36%	<u>Contact by Party/Candid.</u>		
Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Demo.	36%	44%	Yes	52%	42%
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>			No	25%	28%
Agree	59%	30%	<u>Adequate Info for Voting?</u>		
Disagree	39%	45%	Yes	51%	39%
<u>Type of Economy</u>			No	34%	44%
Market Economy	41%	44%	<u>Kuchma Re-elect?</u>		
Central Planning	49%	38%	Kuchma	41%	44%
<u>Voted in 1998?</u>			Someone Else	47%	38%
Yes	54%	38%	<u>Party Differences</u>		
No	14%	39%	Clear Differences	51%	36%
<u>Mixed System</u>			Not Clear Differences	43%	43%
Good System	52%	37%	<u>Viewed Voting PSAs?</u>		
Bad System	40%	49%	Yes	50%	40%
<u>Vote in Presidential Elec.</u>			No	42%	38%
Very Likely	53%	37%	<u>Elections Fraudulent?</u>		
Somewhat Likely	45%	39%	Yes	32%	59%
Not Likely	25%	41%	No	59%	30%

Confidence in Local Polling Officials is Divided



Ukrainians express a mixed view regarding their confidence in the integrity of election officials at their polling station. Although a plurality (43%) has a great deal or some confidence, 33% say they don't have very much or have no confidence in these officials. Further, just 10% have a great deal of confidence while 15% have none at all.


Several regions express more confidence. These include the North (54%), Central (47%), Northwest (55%), and West (49%) areas. Men 45+ also show a higher level of confidence (47%). Confidence declines as education level increases (from 49% among those with less than secondary to 39% among college graduates). Rural respondents (54%) have far more confidence than urban residents (37%).

Those who believe Ukraine is a democracy (52%), who have high vote efficacy (59%), and who discern clear differences between the parties (50%) all have higher than average confidence in local polling officials. Also, those with a higher level of information are more likely to trust their local polling officials. For example, those with more political information (47%), those who are well-informed about the voting process (51%), and those who saw public service announcements on the voting process all have above-average scores.

Those who voted in 1998 (53%), who were contacted directly (51%), who are very likely to vote in 1999 (51%), and those who have a generally positive view of the 1998 election process also express high confidence in the local election officials.

Several groups express lower levels of confidence, including: Kyiv (43% not much/none), those who say the pace of political reforms is too fast (43%), who say Ukraine is not a democracy (41%), those who cannot discern clear differences between the parties (40%), those who disapprove of the current voting system (42%), who rely on UT-3 (40%), unlikely presidential voters (41%), and those with a generally negative view of the 1998 elections.

Less Confidence Expressed in the Integrity of National Election Officials



Far less confidence is expressed in the integrity of election officials at the national level. Just 32% have a great deal or some confidence while a 38% plurality has little

or none. Only those in the South show plurality confidence (40% confident - 30% not confident). At the same time, a majority of those in the Northeast (52%) have little or no confidence. Scores are consistent by age and sex. Voters have more confidence (38%-39%) than non-voters (11%-37%). On the other hand, those with a positive view of other aspects of the elections show greater confidence in national election officials.

Public Divided on Election Officials' Success in Protecting Their Rights


A bare plurality (33%) feels that election officials protected their rights as voters during the March 1998 elections, 31% feel they did not, and 32% don't know. Several regions, including Kyiv, Central, the West, and the Southwest are less likely to say their rights were protected. The Northwest, Southeast, and South, on the other hand, are more likely to say their rights were protected.

Those with high vote efficacy, some political information, more information on the voting process, who relied on the CEC's "Elections 98" program, who saw public service announcements on the voting process, 1998 voters, and those with a positive view of the 1998 elections are all more likely to say their rights were protected.

Figure 63. Protection of Rights by Election Officials, By Selected Subgroups

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Kyiv	23%	42%	<u>Viewed Voting PSAs?</u>		
Northern	19%	37%	Yes	40%	32%
Central	30%	43%	No	29%	33%
Northeast	36%	17%	<u>Elections Fraudulent?</u>		
Northwest	39%	27%	Yes	24%	44%
Southeast	40%	31%	No	42%	26%
West	25%	46%	<u>Political Information</u>		
Southwest	23%	43%	Some	40%	30%
South	48%	12%	Not Much/None	30%	32%
Crimea	30%	28%	<u>Informed on Vote Process</u>		
East	34%	23%	Well	40%	30%
<u>Voted in 1998?</u>			Not Well	21%	34%
Yes	41%	30%	<u>Source of Info for Elections</u>		
No	5%	33%	"Elections 98"	40%	28%
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>			TV Ads	33%	34%
Agree	48%	28%	TV News	31%	29%
Disagree	28%	33%	Newspapers	32%	38%
			Friend, Acquaintance	26%	27%

Plurality Says That Elections Were Not Fair to All Candidates and Parties




Just 36% agree, and 40% disagree, that the election was fair to all candidates and parties. Interestingly, voters — regardless of whether they voted for the Communist or another party — are far more likely (41%) than non-voters (18%) to say that the elections were fair.

Regionally, Kyiv, the Northeast, the Southwest, South, and Crimea are less likely to say the elections were fair while the Northwest and West are more likely. As with many other variables, those who say Ukraine is a democracy, who have high vote efficacy, more political and process information, and who have a favorable impression of other aspects of the elections have a more positive view on this question.

Figure 65. March 1998 Election Fair to All Candidates and Parties? By Selected Subgroups

	Agree	Disagree		Agree	Disagree
Kyiv	23%	54%	<u>Political Information</u>		
Northern	34%	30%	Some	41%	40%
Central	39%	40%	Not Much/None	34%	42%
Northeast	37%	47%	<u>Informed on Vote Process</u>		
Northwest	43%	36%	Well	43%	41%
Southeast	34%	40%	Not Well	25%	39%
West	46%	40%	<u>Ukrainian Democracy</u>		
Southwest	28%	42%	Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	43%	39%
South	37%	43%	Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Democracy	30%	46%
Crimea	29%	42%	<u>Election Organization</u>		
East	34%	36%	Well	56%	27%
<u>Voted in 1998?</u>			Not Well	20%	62%
Yes	41%	40%	<u>Overall Administration of Elec.</u>		
No	18%	41%	Well	68%	24%
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>			Not Well	12%	78%
Agree	48%	33%	<u>Vote Count Honest?</u>		
Disagree	32%	46%	Yes	79%	16%
			No	13%	80%

Voters Spilt on Honesty of the Vote Count



Ukrainians are also divided in their views on the honesty of the counting of votes in the March elections. Just 32% say the count was honest, while 33% say it was not and 33% don't know.

As with other questions, there are regional variations. In this case, confidence is higher in the Northeast and West and lower in Kyiv, the South and the Southeast.

Scores are fairly consistent by age, sex, education, ethnicity and type of settlement. Again, those with higher marks on the pro-democracy variables and those with a positive view of other aspects of the elections are more likely to take a positive view of the vote count. Perceptions also improve with the level of information held by the respondent.

Voters, while evenly divided on this question, are much more likely than non-voters to say the count was fair. Communist voters are less likely than those who voted for other parties to believe there was a fair count. Kuchma supporters are more likely to say the count was honest.


Figure 67. Honesty of Vote Count, by Selected Subgroups

	Agree	Disagree		Agree	Disagree
Kyiv	29%	45%	Political Information		
Northern	30%	19%	Some	37%	35%
Central	39%	34%	Not Much/None	30%	33%
Northeast	43%	39%	Informed on Vote Process		
Northwest	33%	24%	Well	38%	33%
Southeast	24%	43%	Not Well	21%	35%
West	42%	39%	Ukrainian Democracy		
Southwest	18%	40%	Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	38%	34%
South	26%	34%	Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Democracy	25%	37%
Crimea	26%	24%	Election Organization		
East	29%	28%	Well	52%	19%
Voted in 1998?			Not Well	16%	56%
Yes	36%	33%	Overall Administration of Elec.		
No	17%	36%	Well	63%	16%
			Not Well	7%	73%

Figure 67. Honesty of Vote Count, by Selected Subgroups

	Agree	Disagree		Agree	Disagree
Vote Efficacy			Party Voted For		
Agree	44%	26%	Communist	32%	32%
Disagree	29%	39%	Other	40%	34%

Voters Split on Overall Fairness and Honesty of Elections



In a similar vein, 39% say that, overall, the elections were completely or mostly fair and honest while 37% say they were not very or not at all fair and honest.

In this case, the Central, Northeast, Northwest, and Western regions are more positive while Kyiv, the Southeast, the Southwest, and

Crimea are less positive. Men are more likely than women to say the elections were fair and honest. Positive perceptions increase with education. Ethnic Ukrainians have a more positive impression than ethnic Russians. Those who perceive Ukraine becoming a democracy, with higher levels of information, and 1998 voters are also more likely to say the elections were fair and honest.

Figure 69. Overall Fairness of Elections, by Selected Subgroups

	Fair	Not Fair		Fair	Not Fair
Kyiv	24%	53%	Sex		
Northern	39%	22%	Male	42%	39%
Central	42%	37%	Female	37%	36%
Northeast	43%	44%	Ethnicity		
Northwest	46%	36%	Ukrainian	40%	38%
Southeast	40%	42%	Russian	34%	40%
West	48%	35%	Political Information		
Southwest	27%	41%	Some	43%	38%
South	41%	39%	Not Much/None	38%	39%
Crimea	24%	34%			
East	35%	35%			

Figure 69. Overall Fairness of Elections, by Selected Subgroups

	Fair	Not Fair		Fair	Not Fair
<u>Voted in 1998?</u>			<u>Informed on Vote Process</u>		
Yes	45%	37%	Well	47%	37%
No	19%	37%	Not Well	26%	39%
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>			<u>Ukrainian Democracy</u>		
Agree	54%	28%	Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	48%	35%
Disagree	34%	44%	Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Democracy	31%	44%

Credit and Blame for Elections Being/Not Being Fair and Honest

Those who say the elections were fair and honest (N=467) give the credit to a wide variety of government and private entities. It is interesting to note that organized crime receives a substantial 13% of all mentions. The following table ranks the top responses.


23%	Central Election Commission
15%	Constituency election officials
15%	Polling station officials
13%	Mafia/Organized crime
6%	Individual candidates
5%	NGOs
20%	Don't Know

Two regions, the North and Northeast (which comprise 19% of those saying the elections were fair and honest) account for 40% of the organized crime mentions.

Among those who say the elections were not fair and honest (N=448), business interests, polling station officials, individual candidates, and the Central Election Commission bear the brunt of the blame.

19%	Business interests
11%	Polling station officials
10%	Individual candidates
9%	Central Election Commission
7%	Constituency election officials
6%	Other officials
5%	Press
21%	Don't Know

Pre-Election Campaign Viewed Even More Negatively



Only 32% say that the campaign leading up to the March 1998 election was fair and honest. Another 43% say it was not and 23% don't know.

Majorities in Kyiv, the Southeast, and South say the campaign was not fair and honest. A majority in the Northwest believes it was. Again, those perceiving a transition

to democracy have a more positive view as do those with higher levels of information, those who voted for non-Communist parties, and those with a positive view of other aspects of the elections.

Figure 71. Fairness of Election Campaigning, by Selected Subgroups

	Fair	Not Fair		Fair	Not Fair
Kyiv	20%	55%	Political Information		
Northern	31%	28%	Some	36%	43%
Central	28%	46%	Not Much/None	30%	44%
Northeast	39%	47%	Informed on Vote Process		
Northwest	52%	25%	Well	37%	45%
Southeast	29%	51%	Not Well	22%	41%
West	37%	45%	Ukrainian Democracy		
Southwest	19%	46%	Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	39%	42%
South	25%	55%	Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Democracy	22%	51%
Crimea	19%	39%	Vote Efficacy		
East	33%	37%	Agree	43%	39%
Party Voted For			Disagree	28%	48%
Communist	33%	44%	Vote Count Honest?		
Other	38%	46%	Yes	63%	27%
Overall Administration of Elec.			No	17%	73%
Well	63%	32%			
Not Well	11%	82%			

Responsibility and Blame for Elections Being/Not Being Fair and Honest

Those who say the campaign leading up to the elections was fair and honest (N=374) credit the Central Election Commission, NGOs, constituency and polling station officials, individual candidates and, again, organized crime for this success.

15%	Central Election Commission
12%	NGOs
11%	Constituency election officials
11%	Polling station officials
9%	Individual candidates
6%	Mafia/Organized crime
4%	Press/Mass Media
2%	Supreme Rada
24%	Don't Know

Those who say the campaign was not fair and honest (N=515) mainly blame business interests, the press, individual candidates, NGOs, political parties and polling station officials.

16%	Business interests
11%	Press/Mass Media
11%	Individual candidates
9%	NGOs
8%	Political parties
7%	Polling station officials
6%	Other Officials
4%	Central Election Commission
4%	Constituency election officials
2%	President
2%	Cabinet of Ministers
1%	Courts
21%	Don't Know

Plurality Views Election Administration Positively

In this case, 42% say that the administration of the election was fair and honest, 31% say it was not, and 24% don't know. Kyiv is the only region more likely to say election administration was not fair and honest while the Northeast and Northwest are more likely.

Men are more likely than women to hold a positive view of election administration. Perceptions also improve with increases in education, interest in politics, "democracy" scores, and political and process information. Voters are more positive than non-voters as are likely presidential voters and

those who were contacted by candidate or party representatives. Again, those with a positive view of other election variables hold a positive view of this aspect of the election.

Figure 72. Administration of Elections, by Selected Subgroups

	Good	Not Good		Good	Not Good
Kyiv	27%	47%	Sex		
Northern	40%	20%	Male	46%	32%
Central	45%	29%	Female	39%	30%
Northeast	47%	37%	Education		
Northwest	55%	22%	<Secondary	41%	27%
Southeast	43%	38%	Secondary	41%	33%
West	43%	33%	Some College, <3 Years	50%	34%
Southwest	31%	32%	College, Advanced Degree	47%	34%
South	46%	35%	Political Information		
Crimea	28%	29%	Some	46%	33%
East	41%	26%	Not Much/None	42%	31%
Party Voted For			Informed on Vote Process		
Communist	48%	32%	Well	52%	31%
Other	53%	30%	Not Well	27%	32%
Organization of Elections			Ukrainian Democracy		
Well	67%	16%	Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	52%	29%
Not Well	27%	54%	Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Democracy	34%	37%
Vote Count Honest?			Vote Efficacy		
Yes	84%	7%	Agree	59%	21%
No	21%	68%	Disagree	38%	37%
Interest in Politics			Voted in 1998?		
Interested	46%	35%	Yes	49%	31%
Not Interested	39%	27%	No	20%	30%

Responsibility and Blame for Election Administration Being/Not Being Fair and Honest


Those who say the administration of the elections was fair and honest (N=507; N refers to number of respondents giving a particular answer) give the most credit to polling station officials, but also assign significant responsibility to the Central Election Commission, organized crime, and constituency election officials.

- 24% Polling station officials
- 16% Central Election Commission
- 15% Mafia/Organized crime
- 14% Constituency election officials
- 4% Individual candidates
- 3% International organizations
- 2% NGOs
- 2% Supreme Rada
- 1% President
- 1% Cabinet of Ministers
- 20% Don't Know

Among those who say election administration was not fair and honest (N=371), business interests, again, get more blame than any other entity.

- 19% Business interests
- 14% Polling station officials
- 7% Central Election Commission
- 7% Constituency election officials
- 6% Political parties
- 6% Other Officials
- 5% Individual candidates
- 4% Press/Mass Media
- 3% Cabinet of Ministers
- 2% NGOs
- 2% President
- 1% Courts
- 1% Supreme Rada
- 24% Don't Know

Tabulation and Reporting



Like many other aspects of the election, this one shows an electorate evenly divided between those who think the tabulation and reporting was fair and honest, those who do not, and those who don't know.

Regionally, negative scores are highest in Kyiv, and "don't know" responses are

quite high in the North, Northwest, South, and Crimea. There are no real differences by sex or age, although “don’t know” scores are somewhat higher among the oldest age groups.

Positive scores are somewhat higher among those who say Ukraine is becoming a democracy, those who have high vote efficacy, who say the current election system is a good way to hold elections and those with a greater degree of political or electoral process information. Those who voted for non-Communist parties are more likely than Communist voters to say the tabulation and reporting of election results was fair and honest.

**Figure 74. Tabulation and Reporting of Election Results
By Selected Subgroups**

	Fair	Not Fair		Fair	Not Fair
Kyiv	24%	44%	<u>Sex</u>		
Northern	30%	23%	Male	30%	34%
Central	38%	31%	Female	31%	32%
Northeast	41%	40%	<u>Age</u>		
Northwest	34%	24%	18-24	30%	35%
Southeast	18%	49%	25-34	29%	34%
West	39%	35%	35-44	35%	33%
Southwest	19%	38%	45-54	30%	39%
South	25%	29%	55-64	28%	29%
Crimea	22%	29%	65+	32%	28%
East	34%	26%	<u>Political Information</u>		
<u>Party Voted For</u>			Some	38%	33%
Communist	31%	33%	Not Much/None	28%	34%
Other	39%	34%	<u>Informed on Vote Process</u>		
<u>Ukrainian Democracy</u>			Well	37%	34%
Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	37%	33%	Not Well	20%	33%
Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Democracy	24%	36%	<u>Mixed System of Voting</u>		
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>			Good System	41%	31%
Agree	41%	28%	Bad System	27%	41%
Disagree	28%	38%			

Responsibility and Blame for Tabulation and Reporting Being/Not Being Fair and Honest

Those who say the tabulation and reporting of the election results was fair and honest (N=368) give the most credit to polling station officials and the Central Election Commission. Again,

however, they ascribe a large share of the credit to organized crime.


23%	Polling station officials
21%	Central Election Commission
17%	Mafia/Organized crime
14%	Constituency election officials
3%	Individual candidates
2%	International organizations
1%	NGOs
1%	Cabinet of Ministers
22%	Don't Know

Those who say the tabulation and reporting were not fair and honest (N=396), blame polling station officials, business interests, the CEC, and constituency election officials.

20%	Polling station officials
15%	Business interests
13%	Central Election Commission
12%	Constituency election officials
5%	Political parties
3%	Other Officials
3%	Individual candidates
3%	Press/Mass Media
2%	Cabinet of Ministers
1%	President
21%	Don't Know

Few Witnessed Violations of the Election Law

Figure 75. Violations of Election Law



Only 9% of all 1998 voters say they personally witnessed any type of violation of the election law on March 29, 1998. Most, 88%, say they did not, and 2% don't know.

Violation observations were evenly distributed by region, but somewhat more common among women (59% of all observations) than men. Observations were also

more common among young people. More than one-third of all observations were made by

women 18-44 (who account for just 24% of 1998's voters). Ethnic Russians are also disproportionately represented (30% of observed violations/20% of all voters). Urban residents account for 74% of all observed violations but just 61% of all voters.

Interestingly, those with low voter efficacy (57% of all voters) account for 74% of all observed violations. Those who observed violations are more likely to say there was election fraud in 1998 (37% fraud - 24% no fraud) while just 15% of those who did not witness a violation believe there was election fraud (64% say there was not).


Those who witnessed violations (N=83), report seeing the following:

- 44% Group voting
- 23% Material/financial incentives
- 22% Poll watchers trying to influence the vote
- 20% Ballots not kept secret
- 20% Voting for family members
- 18% No appropriate documentation
- 8% Local officials trying to influence the vote
- 8% Election officials trying to influence the vote
- 5% Threats
- 3% Employer/Manager trying to influence the vote
- 9% Other

Just 13% (N=10) say they reported the violation to a local authority.

Few Perceive Election Administration Fraud

Figure 76. Fraud in Election Administration



Just 17% are of the opinion that there was fraud in the administration of the March elections while a 52% majority says there was no fraud, and 29% don't know.


Perceptions of fraud are fairly evenly distributed by region, age, and sex as well as by other demographic groups. Among

voters, 59% say there was no fraud. Non-voters are more likely to say they don't know (46%). "Don't know" scores are higher among those who were not well-informed about the election process.

Those who believe there was fraud (N=207) say it took place at the following locations:

40%	Polling station
13%	Constituency Commission
13%	Oblast Commission
8%	Individual level
7%	Central Election Commission
19%	Don't Know

Voters Give Mixed Review of Polling Station Efforts to Ensure Fairness



Overall, 47% say that polling stations did a good job of ensuring that the election process was fair to all candidates and parties or blocs, 42% say they did a poor job, and 10% don't know.

Certain regions are more likely to say polling stations performed well in this regard: North (54%), Central (55%), Northwest (64%),

and West (54%). Others are more likely to say polling stations did a poor job. These include: Kyiv (61%) and Crimea (62%).

Women 45+ (53% excellent/good) are more likely to say the stations did a good job while men 18-44 (48% fair/poor) and women 18-44 (49%) are more likely to doubt their efforts. Negative perceptions increase with the respondent's level of education. Ethnic Ukrainians (50% excellent/good) give a more positive assessment than ethnic Russians (51% fair/poor). The better-informed politically are also more likely to give a positive assessment of the efforts of the polling stations (53% excellent/good). Communist voters give a better assessment (56% excellent/good) than non-Communist voters (45% excellent/good)

Most Voters Found Their Names on the Registry

The overwhelming majority of voters (92%) say their names were already on the voter registry when they went to vote on March 29. Another 4% say their names were placed on the registry after they presented their identification. Less than one percent had to travel to another polling station (Figure 78 next page).


Likewise, 95% say their personal information on the voter registry was correct when they voted.

Figure 78. Experience on Voting Day (% based on 921 respondents who voted)

Name was already on the registry	92%
Name was placed on the registry after ID was presented	4%
Prohibited from voting at one station but allowed to vote at another station	<0.5%
Prohibited from voting	0%
Other	1%
Don't know	2%

Majority Says Election Results Were Published in a Reasonable Time Period

Figure 79. Announcement of Election Results




A majority of Ukrainians (50%) says that national results from the March elections were announced in a reasonable time period. Just 10% think results were published too quickly, 23% too slowly, and 16% don't know. Results are evenly distributed.

Those who said "too slowly," "a reasonable time period," or "don't know" were asked how their confidence in the transparency of the election process would have been affected if the results had been publicized sooner. In all, 17% say their confidence would have increased, 5% decreased, 47% say it would have made no difference, and 29% don't know.

Those who said "too slowly," "a reasonable time period," or "don't know" were asked how their confidence in the transparency of the election process would have been affected if the results had been publicized sooner. In all, 17% say their confidence would have increased, 5% decreased, 47% say it would have made no difference, and 29% don't know.

Too Many Choices/Too Many Ballots Cited as Problems




% based on 921 respondents who voted, multiple responses allowed


When asked "Which were the greatest problems you encountered in voting on March 29, 1998?" the two main responses were "too many choices of candidates and parties," and "too many ballots." The other significant problems cited were "the polling station was too crowded," and "not enough information on candidates and parties."

“Too many choices” was cited by a majority in all regions except the Northeast, and among all age groups. “Too many ballots” was cited by majorities in all regions except Kyiv, the Northeast, the Northwest, and the West. Majorities of all age groups 35 and older also cited this problem. Crowded polling stations were a problem for majorities in the South and Southeast.

Few Say Someone Tried to Influence their Vote with Promised Rewards



When asked “Did anyone try to influence you to vote for or against a party or candidate by promising rewards that were not part of a political platform?” only three percent say that such attempts were made while 93% say they were not.




Only six percent say that such influence was attempted on people they know.


Among those who acknowledged such attempts in either case (N=78), the following types of rewards are mentioned:

- 31% Money
- 23% Food
- 11% Medicine
- 9% Free meal
- 9% Clothes
- 6% Alcohol

Few Concerned about Negative Consequences of Their Vote



Just six percent say they were concerned that there might be negative consequences if they failed to vote for a particular party or candidate in the March elections. Most (87%) were not concerned.




Likewise, only four percent say others that they know were so concerned.

Those who were concerned in either case (N=85) list the following specific consequences:

- 22% Losing job
- 22% That the deputy or party would fail
- 18% The future
- 6% Wasted vote
- 4% Personal safety

Few Think Prices of Staple Goods Were Kept Low or Services Improved




Only seven percent think the prices of staple goods were kept low for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the elections.

In general, voters holding this opinion were unaffected by the effort. That is, 59% say it had no influence on the way they voted, 22% not very much, and 15%

say it had a fair amount of influence on the way they voted. No one says it had a great deal of influence.


Figure 86. Improvement of Public Services for Elections



A slightly greater number (16%), believe that public services were improved, repairs made, or other works provided for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the elections. This figure is slightly higher in the Kyiv (22%), Central (22%), and Southeast (23%) regions.


Again, few were influenced by this effort. Most (55%) say they were not influenced at all, 29% not very much, eight percent a fair amount, and 3% a great deal (percentages based on N=150).

One in Four Think Military Personnel Compelled to Vote by Superiors



More than one-fourth of the electorate (26%) believes that military personnel are compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or parties, 16% think that military personnel exercise free choice in voting, and 11% say it depends. A plurality (45%) doesn't know.

The following groups are more likely to say military personnel are compelled to vote in certain ways: Kyiv (35%), Northeast (41%), Southeast (31%), Southwest (33%), men 18-44 (32%), college graduates (34%), proponents of a market economy (35%), and non-voters (36%).





Those who believed the military are compelled (N=307) also tend to believe this situation has a substantial impact on the outcome of elections (84%).

% based on 307 respondents who believe military personnel are influenced in vote

Information about Political and Economic Affairs

Ukrainians Remain Poorly Informed About Political and Economic Affairs




Most Ukrainians continue to have little information about political and economic affairs, limiting their ability to assess developments in the country or participate fully in the democratic or economic process. Although this year's survey finds some improvement in the number who say they have a fair amount in information in these areas, the vast majority continues to have little or no information. All surveys conducted since 1994 have found the majority poorly informed.

The lack of information is consistent across all regions, sex, and age groups. Information levels are higher among men, the better-educated, those interested in politics, those with higher vote efficacy, and the newspaper-reliant (Figure 91 next page).

Figure 91. Information on Economic and Political Developments By Selected Subgroups (I=Informed, Somewhat Informed; UI=Uninformed, Somewhat Uninformed)				
	Political Development		Economic Development	
	I	UI	I	UI
Kyiv	24%	74%	17%	80%
Northern	27%	64%	23%	67%
Central	32%	61%	27%	68%
Northeast	16%	79%	16%	79%
Northwest	26%	68%	16%	77%
Southeast	31%	67%	23%	75%
West	26%	70%	20%	75%
Southwest	37%	49%	39%	49%
South	38%	59%	34%	64%
Crimea	24%	68%	18%	74%
East	38%	55%	30%	66%
<u>Sex</u>				
Male	35%	62%	28%	68%
Female	26%	66%	21%	72%
<u>Age</u>				
18-24	26%	73%	24%	73%
25-34	32%	65%	26%	73%
35-44	36%	61%	29%	68%
45-54	28%	64%	25%	70%
55-64	23%	68%	21%	72%
65+	31%	57%	20%	69%
<u>Education</u>				
Less than Secondary	26%	64%	22%	70%
Secondary	30%	65%	25%	71%
Some College, less than 3 yrs.	35%	64%	24%	76%
College, Advanced Degree	41%	59%	32%	68%
<u>Interest in Politics</u>				
Interested	36%	62%	31%	67%
Not Interested	24%	67%	18%	74%
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>				
Agree	36%	60%	30%	67%
Disagree	29%	66%	24%	72%


Sources of Information About Government and Politics



Most Ukrainians (72%) rely on television for their news and information about government and politics. The television stations UT-2/1+1 (28%), UT-3/INTER (24%), and UT-1 (14%) are the main sources. All other sources continue to be in single digits. UT-1 appears to have lost some of its market to UT-2. In 1997, UT-1 was the most watched (at 25%) and UT-2 was third at 18%.

Regionally, UT-1 has higher viewership in the North (24%) and Central (34%) regions. UT-2/1+1 has a substantial audience in the North (29%), the Northeast (35%), the Northwest (56%), the West (36%), and the South (44%). UT-3/INTER has its largest shares in the Northeast (26%), the Southeast (45%), the Southwest (23%), the South (22%), Crimea (27%), and the East (45%).

Improvements Noted in the Adequacy of Information about Candidates and Parties




Unlike the last Rada election, when 56% said they did not receive enough information about the candidates and parties to make a good choice in the elections (1997 data), a near-majority in 1998 (48%) says they received enough information about both candidates and parties. Another 6% received adequate information about the candidates but not the parties, and

10% had enough information about the parties but not the candidates. Just 19% say they lacked information about both, and 15% don't know.

Majorities in the North, Southeast, Southwest, and East report having adequate information about both parties and candidates. Crimea is the least well-informed. A majority of women 18-44, college graduates, urbanites, those interested in politics, those with high voter efficacy, the better-informed politically, and those who relied on "Elections 98" or newspapers also had adequate information about both candidates and parties.

Women 18-44, Crimea, the Northeast, Northwest, and South, rural residents, those with little political information, and those who relied on television advertisements for their process information had the least adequate information.

Most Ukrainians Somewhat Well Informed About the Voting Process



More than six out of 10 Ukrainians (61%) say they were very well or somewhat well informed about the voting process. Just over one-third (36%) say they were not well-informed.

Majorities in all regions and age/sex groups say they were well-informed. Women 45+ (53% well - 44% not well) are the least well-

informed. The level of reported information increases with education and declines among the oldest respondents. Urban respondents are more likely than rural residents to say they were well-informed.

Those who are interested in politics are more likely than those who are not interested to be well-informed. A similar contrast exists between those with high and low vote efficacy, those who think political parties are necessary and those who do not, and those who have a high or low level of political or economic information.


In terms of media reliance, those who watched the CEC's "Elections 98" program were the best-informed, followed by those who saw public service announcements on the voting process, newspaper readers, and those who relied on television advertisements. Respondents who used television news for their voting process information report being somewhat less well-informed than the previous group, and those who relied on information provided by friends or acquaintances are poorly-informed about the process (Figure 95 next page).

Fully 69% of 1998 voters say they were well informed. Those who were contacted by candidates or representatives also report higher levels of information (74%).

Figure 95. Information about Voting Process, by Selected Subgroups

	Well Informed	Not Well Informed		Well Informed	Not Well Informed
Kyiv	60%	37%	Settlement		
Northern	56%	41%	Urban	67%	32%
Central	56%	42%	Rural	53%	44%
Northeast	67%	29%	Education		
Northwest	66%	30%	<Secondary	51%	46%
Southeast	61%	38%	Secondary	65%	33%
West	62%	37%	Some College, <3 years	66%	33%
Southwest	55%	45%	College, Advanced Degree	80%	19%
South	64%	36%	Age/Sex		
Crimea	54%	39%	Male 18-44	66%	32%
East	68%	30%	Male 45+	67%	32%
Vote Efficacy			Female 18-44	63%	34%
Agree	73%	26%	Female 45+	53%	44%
Disagree	63%	35%	Economic Information		
Political Information			Some	74%	24%
Some	76%	23%	Not Much/None	59%	39%
Not Much/None	57%	41%	Necessity of Parties		
Interest in Politics			Necessary	72%	27%
Interested	71%	27%	Not Necessary	58%	41%
Not Interested	53%	46%			

Main Source of Information Regarding the Voting Process



Most Ukrainians (55%) relied on some form of television as their primary source of information regarding the voting process for the March elections. The number one source was the CEC program "Elections 98," followed by television news. The following chart outlines responses.

"Elections 98"

Several groups are more likely to mention this program including: Southeast, East, Crimea, women 18-44, college graduates, people interested in politics,

those who thought that reforms are moving at the right pace, that parties are necessary to democracy, support the current electoral system, better-informed on economic developments, better-informed on the electoral process, saw voting process public service announcements, voted Communist, early decision-makers, and likely presidential voters.

Television News Greater reliance on television news programs is noted in the South and Crimea, among homemakers, and those who are reluctant to support a market economy.

Television Ads Those in the Southeast, age 18-24, men 18-44, who think the pace of reforms is too fast, who think a market economy should be reached as soon as possible, and those who think there was fraud in the administration of elections rely on television ads to form opinion about the voting process.

**Figure 97. Main Source of Information about Voting Process
By Selected Subgroups**


	Elections 98	TV Ads	TV News		Elections 98	TV Ads	TV News
Kyiv	19%	10%	25%	<u>Education</u>			
Northern	21%	8%	12%	<Secondary	18%	8%	19%
Central	23%	8%	17%	Secondary	26%	12%	22%
Northeast	20%	9%	19%	Some College, <3 years	24%	14%	26%
Northwest	27%	10%	10%	College, Advanced Degree	35%	10%	20%
Southeast	28%	19%	23%	<u>Age/Sex</u>			
West	21%	13%	25%	Male 18-44	23%	15%	21%
Southwest	15%	13%	23%	Male 45+	24%	7%	24%
South	20%	6%	31%	Female 18-44	28%	12%	24%
Crimea	29%	9%	16%	Female 45+	21%	8%	16%
East	30%	9%	26%	<u>Economic Information</u>			
<u>Mixed Voting System</u>				Some	28%	10%	22%
Good System	32%	11%	21%	Not Much/None	23%	11%	22%
Bad System	21%	10%	25%	<u>Necessity of Parties</u>			
<u>Info on Voting Process</u>				Necessary	30%	12%	20%
Well	30%	11%	20%	Not Necessary	20%	10%	21%
Not Well	14%	10%	24%	<u>Party Voted For</u>			
<u>Interest in Politics</u>				Communist	28%	8%	22%
Interested	29%	9%	23%	Other	26%	11%	21%
Not Interested	18%	12%	20%				

**Figure 97. Main Source of Information about Voting Process
By Selected Subgroups**

	Elections 98	TV Ads	TV News		Elections 98	TV Ads	TV News
Exposure to PSAs				Time of Decision for			
Yes	39%	12%	21%	>2 months	29%	9%	20%
No	16%	10%	20%	1 month	26%	13%	21%
				Last 2 weeks	24%	9%	20%

More than One in Three Saw PSAs

Fig 98. Exposure to PSAs



More than one in three (34%) say they saw public service announcements that provided voters with instructions about the voting process. While it is possible that this number is skewed in that IFES named the host—the TSN newscaster Alla Mazur, the fact that those who saw public service announcements consistently consider themselves to be well informed does indicate that these respondents are, indeed, paying closer attention to the election process.


The following groups are more likely to report seeing the public service announcements: Ukrainian from the North, Northwest, and West regions; age 18-24, men 18-44, the college educated, and homemakers. This is also true of those interested in politics, who say Ukraine is a democracy, who have high vote efficacy, who discern clear party differences, and those who support the current electoral system. The better-informed politically and economically, those who use UT-2 as main source of information on politics and government, those who are well-informed about the voting process, who saw "Elections 98" and/or television ads on the voting process, proponents of a market economy, and economic optimists are also more likely to have seen such announcements. Finally, 1998 voters, non-Communist voters, early decision-makers, those contacted by candidate or party representatives, Kuchma supporters, likely presidential voters, and those with adequate decision-making information are more likely to have seen the public service announcements (Figure 99 next page).

Groups less likely to have seen the public service announcements include: Kyiv, Southeast, Southwest, Crimea, and those not interested in politics.

Figure 99. Exposure to PSAs, by Selected Subgroups

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Kyiv	24%	75%	<u>Education</u>		
Northern	46%	50%	Less than Secondary	29%	56%
Central	36%	52%	Secondary	37%	55%
Northeast	30%	45%	Some College, less than 3 years	35%	51%
Northwest	55%	28%	College, Advanced Degree	42%	45%
Southeast	23%	66%	<u>Age/Sex</u>		
West	41%	54%	Male 18-44	39%	51%
Southwest	17%	69%	Male 45+	37%	52%
South	36%	54%	Female 18-44	36%	55%
Crimea	22%	63%	Female 45+	28%	57%
East	35%	52%	<u>Economic Information</u>		
<u>Mixed Voting System</u>			Some	40%	52%
Good System	40%	49%	Not Much/None	34%	54%
Bad System	39%	54%	<u>Political Information</u>		
<u>Info on Voting Process</u>			Some	40%	52%
Well	43%	47%	Not Much/None	33%	55%
Not Well	22%	65%	<u>Necessity of Parties</u>		
<u>Interest in Politics</u>			Necessary	38%	50%
Interested	42%	48%	Not Necessary	33%	58%
Not Interested	28%	60%	<u>Party Voted For</u>		
<u>Type of Economy</u>			Communist	37%	48%
Market Economy	40%	52%	Other	40%	51%
Centrally-Planned	36%	51%	<u>Future Economy</u>		
<u>Ukrainian Democracy</u>			Better	40%	48%
Is/Is Becoming a Democracy	41%	49%	Same	36%	51%
Isn't/Isn't Becoming a Demo.	33%	57%	Worse	34%	57%
<u>Vote Efficacy</u>					
Agree	42%	48%			
Disagree	32%	56%			


PSAs Found Useful



% based on 414 respondents who saw PSAs

Among those who saw the public service announcements on the election process (N=414), the vast majority (83%) found them useful and 26% say they were very useful. Just 13% say they were not useful. Responses are consistent across the subgroups.

Understanding the Election Process



No clear pattern emerges when data are examined regarding the time-frame it took for respondents to fully understand the process of voting. Quite a few understood the process months before the election, while many reached full understanding only days before the election or even on election day.

Assessment of The Media

Respondents were asked to assess the objectivity of the way the mass media report the news about events and developments in Ukraine. The following chart outlines their responses.


	OBJECTIVE			NOT OBJECTIVE		
	1996	1997	1998	1996	1997	1998
UT-1	31%	37%	46%	36%	25%	18%
UT-2/1+1	33%	41%	59%	31%	17%	10%
UT-3/INTER	32%	31%	49%	18%	10%	11%
STB (VIKNA)	--	--	16%	--	--	6%
ICTV (Visti)	--	--	15%	--	--	7%
TET	--	--	4%	--	--	5%
State Radio	31%	35%	32%	32%	20%	12%
Ind. Radio	27%	26%	15%	14%	7%	6%

As the table indicates, UT-1, UT-2 (I+I), and UT-3 (INTER) all made big gains in perceived objectivity since our last survey in 1997. Independent radio, on the other hand, suffered a loss in perceived objectivity.

Media Perceived to be Partisan


However, a 58% majority holds the opinion that the news media showed partisan support for different candidates or parties in their coverage of the news during the 1998 elections for the Supreme Rada. Only 15% say the media were not partisan and 27% don't know.

Fig 103. Media Partisanship



Majorities in all regions except the West (41% partisan), of all age/sex groups except women 45+ (47%), among both Communist and non-Communist voters, and in all education groups (except those with less than secondary) perceive partisan bias in mass media coverage.

Information About Rights Under The Constitution



Fewer Ukrainians have information about their rights under the Constitution today than in 1997. At that time, 25% had a great deal or some information and 73% had little or none. That situation has deteriorated as just 15% say they have a great deal or some information and 81% have little or none. Only 2% have a great deal of information while 36% have none at all.

The information deficit is greatest in the Central region (52% none), the Northeast (48%), the North (43%) and Crimea (42%). The best-informed areas are the Southwest (22% none) and the East (23%). As in the past, older Ukrainians have less information than younger people. Women 45+ continue to be the least well-informed as 49% have no information about their rights. Fully



65% of all college graduates have little or no information (up from 52% in 1997).

Just 24% say that information about the new Constitution is readily available, 46% say it is not available, 15% say it depends, and 14% don't know. In 10 of 11 regions (the Southwest excepted) a majority or plurality says that information is not readily available.

Among those reliant on the various media sources, only newspaper readers are significantly more likely to say that information is readily available.

The View from Crimea

Introduction

A total of 300 interviews were conducted in Crimea to provide a more complete assessment of opinion in the region. The sample is representative by age, sex, and ethnicity. A 63% majority in the region are ethnic Russians and 70% live in urban areas. Like the national sample, 44% of all respondents are men and 56% women.

Interest in Politics and Government

In a change from 1997, interest in politics and government is considerably higher in Crimea (62%) than in the nation as a whole (50%). Just 37% say they are not interested. A majority of all age/sex groups are interested. Men and women 45+ (75% and 64%, respectively) are more interested than younger men and women (59% and 55%).

Mood of the Region

Overall, Crimeans share the same level of dissatisfaction (97% dissatisfied) as the rest of the nation (96%). They are, however, somewhat less intensely dissatisfied (60% very dissatisfied) than the nation's average (68%). At least 61% of all, except men 18-44 (45%), are very dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine. As with the rest of the nation, poverty (54%), unemployment (19%), non-payment (15%) and the nation's chaos and instability (15%) are the reasons underlying dissatisfaction.

Preferred Economic Model

Crimeans are more likely to say that Ukraine should develop a market economy alongside a centrally-planned economy (34% versus 20% overall), and somewhat less likely to support either a market economy (20% versus 25%) or central planning (32% versus 33%) exclusively. Men of all ages (but particularly men 18-44 — 32%) are more likely than women to back a market economy. Just 18% of women 18-44 and 10% of women 18-45 support a free market policy exclusively.

In all, 22% say that Ukraine should work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, 41% prefer a steady but gradual approach, and 11% that a market approach should not be pursued at all. Men and women 18-44 are the most likely to want quick steps toward a market economy (30% and 26%, respectively).

The "ideal" economy for Crimeans, as with the nation at this time, is closer to a centrally-planned economy than a market approach. The mean score in the region is 3.42 as compared to 3.46 for the nation. Men 18-44 are the only age/sex group with a mean score below 3.00. Ethnic Russians

lean less toward a central economy (3.38) than ethnic Ukrainians in the region (3.58).

Most Crimeans (64%) say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too slowly. This is roughly comparable to the nation (61%).

Branch of Government Most Likely to Solve Economic Problems

Like the nation as a whole, Crimeans tend to say that no branch of government is likely to solve Ukraine's economic problems in the next year. In all, 20% name the executive, 19% the Supreme Rada, 3% the judiciary, 9% local government, and 28% cite none of these. Crimea, however, has less faith in local government than the national sample (16%).

Political Reforms

The region is somewhat more impatient with the pace of political reforms than the nation as a whole. In fact, 52% say that reforms are occurring too slowly as compared with 45% at the national level. Just 10% think they are occurring too quickly and 8% at the right pace. Women (55%) are more likely than men (48%) to think reforms are occurring too slowly. A majority of all those age 35 and older say reforms are occurring too slowly.

Pessimism on the Future Economy

A majority (52%) say the economic situation in Ukraine will be worse a year from now, a more pessimistic view than the national sample (40% worse). Another 31% say conditions will be the same, and just 7% think conditions will improve. A majority of both men and women, and all respondents age 35 and older, say the economy will worsen. Ethnic Russians (53%) are more pessimistic than ethnic Ukrainians (43%).

Democracy in Ukraine

As we found in 1997, Crimeans are less likely than people in the rest of the country to view Ukraine as a democracy. Just 9% say Ukraine is a democracy and 69% say it is not. Nationwide, 19% say the country is a democracy and 55% say it is not. A majority of all those age 25 and older say Ukraine is not a democracy. Another 17% say that Ukraine is moving toward becoming a democracy, but 63% say it is not.

Voter Efficacy

Voter efficacy in Crimea is marginally lower (17%) than in the nation (26%). In all, 17% agree and 57% disagree that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making. Men (21%) have higher efficacy scores than women (14%).

Necessity of Political Parties

Crimea is more supportive of political parties than the rest of the nation. In Crimea, 54% say that parties are necessary to democracy and 29% that they are not. A majority of all age groups (except age 35-44) say that parties are necessary. Nationally, just 46% say parties are necessary and 40% say they are not necessary.

In addition, 61% say that multi-party elections are important (58% nationally). Somewhat fewer in Crimea (36%) than nationally (41%) can discern clear differences among the parties.

1998 Voting

Reported voter turnout in the region is lower (67%) than the national average (77%). Men and women age 45+ have the highest voting percentages (71% and 74%, respectively). Rural residents (74%) are more likely than urbanites (64%) to have voted. Those interested in politics (76%) are more likely to vote than are the disinterested (51%).

Non-voters give these reasons for not voting:

- 29% Busy/away
- 12% No one worth voting for
- 11% Didn't want to
- 7% Illness
- 6% No citizenship
- 4% Big queue

Voters list these motivations:

- 27% Duty
- 23% Hope
- 22% Impact the elections
- 14% To use my vote
- 9% Habit
- 4% Support for party/candidate
- 1% To restore the past

In Crimea, 8% voted by using the mobile ballot box. Nationally, 6% percent used the mobile ballot box.

Voters in Crimea are far more likely than the nation to have voted for the Communist Party. In all, 62% voted for the Communist Party and just 27% for other parties. Nationally, 31% voted Communist and 56% for other parties. The Communist vote

increases with age (from just 29% of those 18-24 and 39% of those age 25-34 to 84% of those age 55 and older). The Communists received 53% of the ethnic Ukrainian vote and 66% of the ethnic Russian vote.

- More than the rest of the nation, Crimeans feel that the party for which they voted reflects their own views and interests (82% as compared with 75% nationwide).
- A 51% majority in the region made their party voting decision at least two months before the election (49% nationwide). The main issues driving decision-making were the party's program (34%), platform and promises (25%), and to restore the past (13%).
- As in the nation as a whole, no single factor stands out as the most influential in their decision to vote for a particular party: 14% mention the party platform; 13% television debates; 10% opinion of family member; 9% television advertisements; 8% personal contact; 7% television report; and 6% newspaper article.
- In the single mandate ballot, Crimeans are slightly more likely than the rest of the nation (47% versus 42%) to have voted for a candidate who is a member of, or is supported by the same party that they voted for on the party list ballot.
- As in the party list ballot, Crimeans made earlier voting decisions (42% at least two months before) than the nation (39%).
- The main issues in the candidate ballot were: platform (26%), personal qualities (20%), confidence in the candidate (19%), party membership (14%), and his activities (8%).
- Again, no single factor stands out as the most influential in the decision-making process: 21% party platform; 11% personal contact; 10% opinion of family members; 8% televised debate; 8% television ads; 8% newspaper article; 6% flyer; 5% television report; 4% radio report, and 3% party list candidate.
- International organizations played even less of a role in Crimea (9%) than in the nation (15%).
- As in the full sample, 35% of respondents were contacted by a candidate or party during the campaign. However, voters in Crimea were more likely to have been contacted by a local candidate (21% versus 18%), and less likely to have been contacted by a national candidate (3% versus 13%). Contact levels are similar across age groups. As noted earlier, this contact was effective. Six out of 10 of those contacted say that contact made them more likely to vote for that candidate or party and just 8% say the contact made them less likely to vote for that candidate or party.

- Only 24% say that the political composition of the Rada reflects the population's political preferences overall and 46% say it does not. This nearly matches the national numbers (26% yes - 48% no).
- Roughly one in four (23%) believe the new Supreme Rada will be more effective than the last Rada. Another 4% think it will be less effective, 42% the same, and 30% don't know.
- As we found nationally, when asked to rate the effectiveness of the top eight parties and independent deputies in addressing the problems facing Ukraine, the Communist Party receives the highest rating by far. The following table ranks the parties and blocs by their mean score on a one-nine scale where "1" is least effective and "9" is most effective.

TABLE I
Perceived Effectiveness of the Parties and Blocs
Ukraine and Crimea

<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CRIMEA</u>	
5.20	6.49	Communist Party of Ukraine
4.31	3.51	Socialist Party of Ukraine
4.14	3.86	National Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU)
3.89	3.34	All-Ukrainian Association Hromada
3.88	2.46	Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
3.85	3.75	Green Party
3.74	3.48	Independent Deputies
3.49	3.01	People's Rukh
3.47	2.71	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU)

- As in the rest of Ukraine, more than three-fourths in Crimea (77%) say they are likely to vote in the next presidential election. More than 80% of those age 45 and older plan to vote.
- President Kuchma's reelection prospects are no less dim in Crimea (14% reelect - 63% new person) than they are nationwide (14%-66%). As in the rest of the nation, personal characteristics will be important voting factors in the presidential contest.

Elections Assessment

- A 42% plurality says the 1998 elections were well organized; 30% say they were not. Nationally, 45% say the elections were well organized and 38% that they were not.

- Crimea expresses less confidence in the integrity of their polling station officials than the rest of the nation. Only 33% have either a great deal or some confidence while 30% have little or no confidence. Nationally, 43% are confident and 34% are not.
- Scores are also lower with regard to confidence in the integrity of national election officials (25% confident/31% not confident as compared to the national sample (31% confident/38% not confident).
- In other areas, 31% feel that election officials protected their rights as voters; 30% agree; and 40% disagree that the election was fair to all candidates and parties.
- While 25% say the vote count was honest, 24% say it was not and 43% don't know.
- Similarly, 24% think the 1998 elections were fair and honest, 36% say they were not, and 32% don't know. Constituency election officials and the CEC get most of the credit from those who believe the elections were fair and honest. Polling station officials and business interests receive the largest share of the blame from those who say the elections were not fair.
- Only 21% think the pre-election campaign was fair and honest while 38% say it was not, and 33% don't know. Again, the CEC and constituency officials are credited by those who call the campaign fair. Polling station officials and business interests receive most of the blame.
- Crimeans are evenly divided in their view of election administration. That is, 29% say it was fair and honest, 28% say it was not, and 34% don't know. The CEC, constituency officials, and polling station officials are credited; polling station officials and business interests are blamed.
- Crimeans are similarly unable to rate the tabulation and reporting of results. Just 21% say this aspect was fair and honest, 29% that it was not, and 41% don't know. Credit goes to constituency officials, organized crime, and polling station officials. Blame generally goes to polling station officials, business interests, and other officials.
- Crimeans give a rather negative assessment of their local polling station's efforts to ensure that the election process was fair to all candidates and parties. Just 29% think the stations did a good job while 62% think they did a fair or poor job.
- Few in the region (11%) observed any type of election law violation on election day (as compared with 9% at the national level).
- Only 12% believe there was fraud in the administration of elections in March. At the national level, 17% believe such fraud existed.

- As with the rest of the nation, the main problems encountered in voting were too many choices of candidate and parties (78%) and too many ballots (64%).
- Only 2% say that attempts were made to influence them to vote by promising rewards unrelated to a political platform, and 3% report such attempts being made on their acquaintances. Typically, these rewards consisted of money, food, and drink.
- In all, 4% say they were concerned that there might be negative consequences if they failed to vote in a certain way (and 6% say people they know were concerned). The main consequence cited was that "the deputy or party might fail."
- Few (9%) believe that the prices of staple goods were kept low to influence the outcome of the elections while 22% say that public services, repairs, and other works were used to influence voting. In neither case was this influence significant.
- Theoretical questions regarding the elections elude Crimeans as they do the nation as a whole. A majority of Crimeans can't rate the current system of allocating seats in the Supreme Rada. Another 26% favor the current system and 18% believe it is a bad way to allocate seats. A 42% plurality can't say how many seats should be set aside for political parties, and 46% can't assess the current system governing single-mandate elections.
- Almost all voters found that their names were already on the registry when they went to vote and that their personal information was correct.
- A 55% majority believes that election results were published in a reasonable time period.
- Crimeans are slightly more likely (32%) than the nation (26%) to feel that military personnel are compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or parties. Here too, this situation is believed to have a substantial impact on elections.

Information About Political and Economic Affairs

- Crimea is marginally less well-informed than national voters with regard to political developments. 25% claim to have at least some information in this area while 66% have little or non. Nationally, 30% have some information and 64% lack such information.
- Likewise, Crimeans have less information about economic affairs than the nation as a whole (19% have at least some, 72% have little or none versus 25%-70%).
- Only 10% claim to have at least some information about their rights under the new Constitution and 87% little to none information. Just 15% say that such information is readily available.

- In the region, the main sources of information about government and politics are UT-3/INTER (27%), UT-2/1+1 (18%), ORT (13%), and local television stations (9%).
- Crimean voters received less adequate information about candidates and parties than the national sample. Whereas 64% of all Ukrainians say they had enough information to make informed choices in the 1998 elections, just 48% of those in Crimea had adequate information.
- A 54% majority says they were well-informed about the process of voting and 39% were not well-informed. Men and middle-aged voters were the best informed. As for the rest of the nation, "Elections 98" was the main source of voting process information for the region (29%).
- Exposure to the public service announcements was lower in Crimea (21%) than in the nation (34%). Nearly three out of four who saw the PSAs (73%) found them useful.

Assessment of the Media

Respondents were asked to assess the objectivity of the way the mass media report the news about events and developments in Ukraine. The following chart compares the responses in the nation and in Crimea.

Table 2. Objectivity of Media Sources

	Objective		Not Objective	
	<u>Crimea</u>	<u>Ukraine</u>	<u>Crimea</u>	<u>Ukraine</u>
UT-1	28%	46%	19%	18%
UT-2/1+1	47	59	10	10
UT-3/INTER	45	49	11	11
STB (VIKNA)	6	16	9	6
ICTV (Visti)	6	15	7	7
TET	1	4	7	5
State Radio	9	32	7	12
Ind. Radio	8	15	5	6

- Crimea (65%) is more likely than the nation (58%) to say that the news media showed partisan support for different candidates and parties in their coverage of the news during the election.

Summary

Overall, Crimeans are more interested in politics than is the rest of the nation, but are less well-informed. In general, they give the 1998 elections a lower assessment than does the nation as a whole. At the same time, many are unable to rate various aspects of the elections. They are more impatient with the pace of political reforms, but voted in fewer numbers than other regions. They also have lower vote efficacy levels and are less likely to say that Ukraine is a democracy. Voters in the region are far more likely to have voted for the Communist Party and are likely voters in 1999.

The View From Kyiv

Introduction

A total of 100 interviews were conducted in Kyiv to provide a more complete assessment of opinion in the region. The sample is representative by age, sex, and ethnicity. A 76% majority in the region are ethnic Ukrainians. Like the national sample, 44% of all respondents are men and 56% women.

Interest in Politics and Government

As in Crimea, interest in politics and government is considerably higher in Kyiv (63%) than in the nation as a whole (50%). 36% say they are not interested. Majorities of all age groups are interested except for those age 18-24 (64% not interested). Men and women (61% and 64%, respectively) are equally interested.

Mood of the Region

Overall, residents of Kyiv share the same level of dissatisfaction (96% dissatisfied) as the rest of the nation (96%). They are, however, more intensely dissatisfied (77% very dissatisfied) than the nation's average (68%). All of the women interviewed in the region, and 91% of the men are dissatisfied with living conditions. As with the rest of the nation, poverty (40%), unemployment (22%), non-payment (8%) and the nation's chaos and instability (13%) are the reasons underlying dissatisfaction. Another 12% mention the quality of the government. 23% are owed back payments or pensions as compared with 57% nationally.

Preferred Economic Model

Kyiv residents are far more likely to say that Ukraine should develop a market economy than is the rest of the nation (48% versus 25%). Just 11% want a centrally-planned economy and 24% a combination of market and centrally-planned economy (versus 20% overall). They are somewhat less likely to support a market economy exclusively (20% versus 25%). Nevertheless, as many as 55% of men and 43% of women want a pure market economy. Support for a market economy declines with age.

In the same vein, Kyiv residents generally are rather supportive of a rapid transition to a market economy. In all, 46% say that Ukraine should work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, 29% favor steady but small steps, and only 10% of respondents felt that a market approach should not be pursued.

The "ideal" economy for Kyiv, is closer to a market approach. The mean score in the region is 2.78 as compared to 3.46 for the nation. Men (2.29) are more supportive of a market approach than women (3.24).

Most (74%) say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too slowly (as compared to 61% in the nation).

Branch of Government Most Likely to Solve Economic Problems

Like the nation as a whole, Kyiv residents do not believe that any branch of government is likely to solve Ukraine's economic problems in the next year. In all, 20% name the executive, 23% the Verkhovna Rada, 8% the judiciary, 5% local government, and 33% say none of these. Like Crimea, Kyiv has less faith in local government than the national sample (16%).

Political Reforms

The region is more impatient with the pace of political reforms than either Crimea or the nation as a whole. In fact, 55% say that reforms are occurring too slowly as compared with 45% at the national level and 52% in Crimea. Just 10% think they are occurring too quickly and 9% them to be about right. Men (59%) are more likely than women (52%) to think reforms are occurring too slowly.

Pessimism on the Future Economy

A plurality (47%) say the economic situation in Ukraine will be worse a year from now, a more pessimistic view than the national sample (40% worse). Another 41% say conditions will be the same, and just 8% think conditions will improve. A majority of respondents age 45 and older say the economy will worsen.

Democracy in Ukraine

Kyiv is somewhat more likely than people in the rest of the country both to view Ukraine as a democracy and to say it is not a democracy. In all, 21% say Ukraine is a democracy and 64% say it is not. Nationwide, 19% say the country is a democracy and 55% say it is not. Women (25%) are slightly more likely than men (16%) to call Ukraine a democracy. Another 33% say that Ukraine is moving toward becoming a democracy, and 52% say it is not.

Voter Efficacy

Voter efficacy in Kyiv is lower (18%) than in the nation (26%). Nearly eight of 10 (77%) disagree that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making. Men (23%) have higher efficacy scores than women (14%).

Necessity of Political Parties

Kyiv is much more supportive of political parties than the nation. In all, 66% say that parties are necessary to democracy and 26% that they are not. A majority of all age groups (except age 55-64) says that parties are necessary. Nationally, just 46% say parties are necessary and 40% say they are not necessary.

In addition, 71% say that at least two parties competing in an election is important (58% nationally). A far greater number in Kyiv (62%) than nationally (41%) can discern clear differences between the parties.

1998 Voting

As in Crimea, reported voter turnout in Kyiv is lower (66%) than the national average (77%). A majority of those age 25 and older went to the polls as compared to just 36% of respondents age 18-24.

Non-voters give these reasons for not voting:

- 21% Busy/away
- 12% Didn't want to
- 9% No one worth voting for
- 9% Illness
- 6% Ballot box not brought
- 3% No citizenship
- 3% No residence permit

Voters list these motivations:

- 33% Duty
- 26% Hope
- 21% Impact the elections
- 8% Support for party/candidate
- 6% Habit
- 3% To use my vote

Just 2% voted by using the mobile ballot box. Nationally, 6% used the mobile ballot box.

Voters in Kyiv are far less likely than the nation to have voted for the Communist Party. In all, just 20% voted for the Communist Party and 66% for other parties. Nationally, 31% voted Communist and 56% for other parties. Kyiv was a strong area for Rukh (18%) and the Green Party (15%).

- Kyiv voters are slightly less likely than the rest of the nation to feel that the party for which they voted adequately reflects their own views and interests (73% as compared with 75% nationwide).
- 47% in the region made their party voting decision at least two months before the election (49% nationwide). The main issues driving decision-making were the party's program (36%), platform promises (11%), confidence in the party's leader (9%) and coincidence of interests (8%).
- As in the nation as a whole, no single factor stands out as the most influential in their decision to vote for a particular party: 21% mention the party platform; 18% television debates; 11% opinion of family member; 6% flyers, 6% opinion of others, 6% personal contact, 6% newspaper articles, 5% television advertisements, and 3% television reports.
- In the single mandate ballot, Kyiv residents are also slightly more likely than the rest of the nation (45% versus 42%) to have voted for a candidate who is a member of, or supported by the same party that they voted for on the party list ballot.
- Kyiv residents tended to make later voting decisions (35% at least two months before) than the nation (39%).
- The main issues in the candidate ballot were: platform (29%), personal qualities (22%), confidence in the candidate (12%), his actions (12%), and party membership (10%).
- Again, no single factor stands out as the most influential in the decision-making process: 18% mention televised debates; 16% party platform; 14% personal contact; 14% opinion of family members; 12% flyer; 6% voters meeting, 4% television report; 4% party list candidate, and 2% radio report.
- International organizations had roughly the same significance in determining voting behavior in Kyiv (14%) than in the rest of the nation (15%).
- Direct voter contact by candidates and parties was higher in Kyiv (44%) than in the rest of the nation (35%). Contact was as effective in Kyiv as in the nation. More than 6 out of 10 of those contacted (63%) say contact made them more likely to vote for that candidate or party and just 3% say the contact made them less likely to vote for that candidate or party.
- Kyiv residents are less likely than the nation (20% versus 26%) to say that the political composition of the Rada reflects the population's political preferences overall. The vast majority (63%) says it does not (versus 48% at the national level).
- Only one in 10 (11%) believe the new Verkhovna Rada will be more effective than the last

Rada. Another 12% think it will be less effective, 58% the same, and 18% don't know.

- As IFES found nationally, when asked to rate the effectiveness of the top eight parties and independent deputies in addressing the problems facing Ukraine, the Communist Party receives the highest rating, but by less of a margin than in other regions. The following table ranks the parties and blocs by their mean score on a one-nine scale where "1" is least effective and "9" is most effective.

TABLE 3
Perceived Effectiveness of the Parties and Blocs
Ukraine and Kyiv

<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>KYIV</u>	
5.20	4.01	Communist Party of Ukraine
4.31	3.14	Socialist Party of Ukraine
4.14	3.19	National Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU)
3.89	3.49	All-Ukrainian Association Hromada
3.88	3.02	Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
3.85	3.44	Green Party
3.74	3.18	Independent Deputies
3.49	3.27	People's Rukh
3.47	2.39	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU)

- As in the rest of the nation, more than three-fourths of Kyiv residents (79%) say they are likely to vote in the next presidential election. Women (84%) are more likely to vote than men (73%).
- President Kuchma's reelection prospects are only slightly more positive in Kyiv (21% reelect - 62% new person) as they are nationwide (14%-66%). As in the rest of the nation, personal characteristics will be important voting factors in the presidential contest.

Elections Assessment

- Kyiv voters hold a more negative view of the 1998 elections than does the rest of the nation. A 49% plurality says the 1998 elections were not well organized and just 26% say they were well organized. Nationally, 45% say the elections were well organized and 38% that they were not.
- Kyiv residents also express less confidence in the integrity of their polling station officials than is the case for the national results. Only 27% have a great deal/some confidence while 42% have little or no confidence. Nationally, 43% are confident and 34% are not.

- Scores are also lower with regard to confidence in the integrity of national election officials (24% confident/40% not confident as compared to the national sample (31% confident/38% not confident).
- The negative view extends to other areas as 22% feel that election officials protected their rights as voters; moreover, 23% agree, and 53% disagree that the election was fair to all candidates and parties.
- 29% say the vote count was honest, 44% say it was not and 25% don't know.
- Similarly, only 24% of Kyiv residents think the 1998 elections were fair and honest, 52% say they were not, and 18% don't know. The CEC, organized crime, and constituency election officials receive most of the credit from those who believe the elections were fair and honest. Business interests, polling station officials, constituency election officials, and the CEC receive the largest share of the blame from those who say the elections were not fair.
- Only 20% think the pre-election campaign was fair and honest while 54% say it was not, and 20% don't know. The CEC and polling station officials are credited by those who call the campaign fair. Business interests receive most of the blame.
- Kyiv voters also hold a negative view of election administration. That is, 27% say it was fair and honest, 47% say it was not, and 20% don't know. The CEC, constituency officials, organized crime, and polling station officials are credited; and business interests are blamed.
- They are similarly skeptical about the tabulation and reporting of results. Just 24% say this aspect was fair and honest, 43% that it was not, and 27% don't know. Credit goes to organized crime, polling station officials and constituency officials. Blame again goes to business interests.
- Kiev also gives a negative assessment of their local polling station's efforts to ensure that the election process was fair to all candidates and parties. Just 23% think the stations did a good job while 60% think they did a fair or poor job.
- Few in the region (11%) observed any type of election law violation on election day (as compared with 9% at the national level).
- Only 19% believe there was fraud in the administration of elections in March. At the national level, 17% believe such fraud existed.
- As with the rest of the nation, the main problems encountered in voting were too many

choices of candidates and parties (65%) and too many ballots (45%). A significant number (33%) also mention crowded polling stations.

- Only 3% say that attempts were made to influence them to vote by promising rewards unrelated to a political platform, and 3% report such attempts being made affecting their acquaintances. These rewards consisted of money and food.
- In all, 4% say they were concerned that there might be negative consequences if they failed to vote in a certain way (and 1% say people they know who were concerned). The main consequence cited was "the future."
- In all, (16%) believe that the prices of staple goods were kept low to influence the outcome of the elections while 21% say that public services, repairs, and other works were used to influence voting. In neither case was this influence significant.
- More than one-third of Kyiv (36%) cannot rate the current system of allocating seats in the Supreme Rada. Another 28% favor the current system and 34% believe it is a bad way to allocate seats. A 29% plurality cannot say how many seats should be set aside for political parties. 43% say the current system governing single-mandate elections is fair, 24% say it is not fair, and 32% don't know.
- Almost all voters found that their names were already on the registry when they went to vote and that their personal information was correct.
- Kyiv residents are somewhat divided in their opinions regarding the publication of election results. A 39% plurality believes that election results were published too slowly while 37% think they were published in a reasonable time period.
- Kyiv is more likely (35%) than the nation (26%) to feel that military personnel are compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or parties. Here too, this situation is believed to have a substantial impact on elections.

Information About Political and Economic Affairs

- Like Crimea, Kyiv is less well-informed than national voters with regard to political developments. Only 23% have some information in this area while 75% do not. Nationally, 30% have some information and 64% lack such information.
- Likewise, they have less information about economic affairs than the nation as a whole (17%-80% versus 25%-70%).
- Only 8% have some information about their rights under the new Constitution and 90%

lack such information. Just 25% say that such information is readily available.

- In the region, the main sources of information about government and politics are UT-3/INTER (17%), UT-2/I+I (17%), UT-1 (10%), local newspapers (11%), and discussions (10%).
- Kyiv voters received adequate information about candidates and parties. 64% of all Ukrainians say they had enough information to make informed choices in the 1998 elections, and 62% of those in Kyiv had adequate information.
- A 60% majority says they were well informed about the process of voting and 37% were not well informed. Kyiv was somewhat less reliant on "Elections 98" (19%) than the nation (29%). The number one source in Kyiv was television news programs (24%).
- Exposure to the IFES public service announcement was lower in Kyiv (23%) than in the nation (34%). Nearly nine out of ten who saw the PSAs (87%) found them useful.

Assessment of the Media

Respondents were asked to assess the objectivity of the way the mass media report the news about events and developments in Ukraine. The following chart compares the responses in the nation and in Kyiv.

Table 4
Objectivity of Media Sources

	Objective		Not Objective	
	<u>Kyiv</u>	<u>Ukraine</u>	<u>Kyiv</u>	<u>Ukraine</u>
UT-1	44%	46%	20%	18%
UT-2/I+I	58	59	15	10
UT-3/INTER	56	49	16	11
STB (VIKNA)	34	16	12	6
ICTV (Visti)	26	15	16	7
TET	28	4	14	5
State Radio	40	32	12	12
Ind. Radio	28	15	8	6

- Kyiv residents (62%) are more likely than the nation (58%) to say that the news media showed partisan support for different candidates and parties in their coverage of the news during the election.

Summary



Kyiv residents are more interested in politics than are their compatriots in other regions, but less well-informed. They give the 1998 elections a much lower assessment than the nation as a whole. They are far more supportive of a market economic approach and are more impatient with the pace of political reforms than the rest of the country. As in Crimea, they voted in fewer numbers than other regions, have lower vote efficacy levels and are less likely to say that Ukraine is a democracy. These voters are more likely to have voted for Rukh or the Green Party and are pessimistic about the new Rada.

Summary and Conclusions

This survey marks the fifth wave of IFES-sponsored survey research in Ukraine since 1994. In certain ways, the findings remain consistent with earlier IFES research as well as other independent surveys in Ukraine.

However, the findings in this survey have a decidedly negative cast. In the immediate post-election period, it finds interest in politics and government, belief in the necessity of political parties, and support for a market economy all declining. Perhaps declines in the political variables can be dismissed as dissatisfaction with the election results or merely weariness of political topics after a long campaign. This, however, is unlikely given the decline in support for market economics, continued economic crisis, widespread dissatisfaction with conditions, and resignation regarding the future economy.

Voters have not, however, given up on the electoral system. They continue to support multi-party elections, are increasingly able to discern differences in the various political parties' platforms, and plan to vote in large numbers in the 1999 presidential election.

They have, however, lost confidence in the president at this point. An independent survey released in June showed President Kuchma's approval rating drastically reduced and this survey finds 66% planning to vote for a new person as president. Clearly, there are many mitigating factors that could change this situation — the power of incumbency not the least of these — but at this time, the president's political vulnerability is tangible. Ukrainians also lack confidence in the Supreme Rada and few expect this Rada to be more effective than the last.

Despite the aging of its base, the Communist Party remains the most formidable political bloc in the land. Their voters are committed, organized, and likely to vote. Reformers and establishment parties face a difficult future. In order to be successful, these parties must practice a more direct brand of politics that is based on voter contact, coalition building, effective communications, grassroots organization, and voter turnout.¹

Ukrainians continue to lack the broad-based information they need to assess their political and economic situation adequately and they are unable to rate larger questions regarding the electoral system. For example, a plurality cannot decide whether or not the current system of allocating seats in the Supreme Rada is good or bad; cannot venture an opinion on how many seats should be allocated to political parties; and cannot assess the fairness of the current rules governing single-mandate elections.

In the absence of information, it is all too tempting to look to the past and recall it through rose-colored glasses -- and too easy for political figures to exploit that longing. The past was, after all, a time when the prevailing system produced substantive, although diminishing, social and economic results.

Although most citizens have never had an adequate understanding of how the system failed or why it could not continue, most remember that the system did work even if it was unfair, inefficient, and the subject of legendary humor. On the other hand, most Ukrainians have no clear picture of how a reformed economic and political system would look or how it would affect their lives.

In the absence of discernable reforms or explanations of progress (or the lack thereof), the country appears to be mired in economic crisis with no real plan of action or the political will to overcome inertia and reestablish control over the course of development. This probably best explains why little optimism is expressed for the work of the new Parliament and no confidence is shown in the ability of any branch of government to solve the problems facing Ukraine. In the face of continued payment arrears and economic hardship, the public may lose faith in reforms and turn to reactionary approaches. Common dissatisfaction with the situation in the country may provide a strange unifying factor that transcends cultural, religious, and political differences during this period of Ukraine's history.

One of the most serious concerns identified in this survey is the low level of participation by young people. Although this is common in other democracies, political apathy among young Ukrainians comes at a crucial time in the nation's political and economic development.

It is, therefore, disheartening to see that many young adults in Ukraine view the political process as irrelevant and exhibit low levels of voting and interest in politics. Despite their support for political reform and market economics, they are allowing the nation's future to be shaped by voters who do not hold their views.

For this reason, long-range, sustained public information campaigns targeted toward young adults, and those who will soon be eligible to participate in the political process, should be implemented in order to provide a continuous source of information and encouragement to this vital segment of the population. This survey indicates that programs such as those produced by IFES and implemented in the national media are quite effective. Provision of state air-time is crucial to such programming.

In addition, programs that will attempt to inspire an interest in contemporary politics among youths approaching the age of eligibility should be encouraged. State-sponsored civics and mock-election programs within schools, youth-oriented informational radio and television programming, and independent, non-partisan, non-governmental youth-oriented organizations aimed at encouraging greater civic and political involvement of young adults may offer the best means of convincing young people to take greater responsibility for shaping the country's future. Again, outreach programs should not begin near the time of elections and then abruptly terminate immediately after a new political order is established. The cultivation of involvement and concern needs to be a sustained, rather than merely a superficial, short-term, effort.

Involving the nation's youth in the political process is a difficult challenge. For one thing, young people tend to have an agenda that involves personal, rather than societal, goals and objectives. More important, the lack of progress in the economic sector and perceived ineffectiveness of political entities to improve conditions in Ukrainian life make it difficult to realize that personal involvement does, indeed, matter. Nevertheless, one of the clear lessons from this research is that direct voter contact is a very persuasive and effective means of building coalitions and fostering activism.

Despite the need to engage young people in the political process, programs should not target young adults solely. The public at large continues to have inadequate information regarding the complex political and economic forces that will shape the nation's future. As a result, the media, the Central Election Commission, and organizations providing assistance to build public institutions and systems should increase their involvement in public education campaigns of this nature.

Economic assistance alone fails to produce immediate results, and without public information to bolster and provide context to the effort and hardship, sociopolitical conditions may continue to worsen even as the seeds of true economic reform begin to take root.⁵

ENDNOTES

1. Maslow, Abraham, **Motivation and Personality**, Harper and Row, New York, 1970.
2. Sergeyev, Boris, "Micro-consequences of Macro-changes: Sources of Regime Support in Russia," paper presented to the American Association for Public Opinion, 1997.
3. The perception of voters regarding the importance of their vote in determining how they are governed.
4. Ferguson, Gary A., adapted from "Parties at the Crossroads," **The Public Perspective**, Volume 7, Number 2, February/March 1996.
5. Conway, Michael, unpublished memorandum on voter information, Kyiv, 1997.

APPENDIX I: Questions

- Fig 1. Q92. Are you currently owed any back wages or pension payments from your employer or the government?
- Fig 2. Q93. [IF YES IN Q92 ASK:] For how long a period are you owed back payments?
- Fig 3&4. Q1. How interested are you in matters of politics and government – are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?
- Fig 5&6. Q2. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today – would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?
- Fig 7. Q3. Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED)
- Fig 8. Q10. In your opinion will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?
- Fig 9&10. Q4. When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a [ROTATE] market economy or a centrally planned economy?
- Fig 11&12. Q5. When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, with steady but small reforms, or should we not pursue a free market economy at all?
- Fig 13. Q6. On a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state, where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?
- Fig 14&15. Q7. In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring [ROTATE 1-3]
- Fig 16. Q9. Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the Judiciary, and your local government. Which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year? (ACCEPT VOLUNTEERED RESPONSE NONE)
- Fig 17. Q8. In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring [ROTATE 1-3]
- Fig 18. Q11. Would you say that Ukraine is a democracy, or is it not a democracy?
- Fig 19. Q12. Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy?

- Fig 20. Q13. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country? **WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND ASK:** Do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely?
- Fig 21. Q14. Did you vote in the March 1998 election for Supreme Rada or not?
- Fig 22&24. Q15. [IF DID NOT VOTE IN Q14 ASK:] What is the main reason why you did not vote?
- Fig 23. Q16. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] What is the main reason why you voted?
- Fig 25. Q17. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Did you vote by the mobile ballot box?
- Fig 26. Q19. When did you make your decision about which party you would vote for?
- Fig 27. Q20. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Which issue was the most important to you when making your decision to vote for [PARTY NAMED IN Q18]?
- Fig 28. Q21. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] And which issue was second most important to you when making your decision to vote for [PARTY NAMED IN Q18]?
- Fig 29. Q22. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] What was the medium of information that was most influential in convincing you to vote for [PARTY NAMED IN Q18]?
- Fig 30. Q23. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Thinking now about the ballot in which you selected an individual candidate... Was the candidate you voted for in this ballot a member of, or supported by, the same political party that you voted for in the party list ballot?
- Fig 31. Q25. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] When did you make your decision about which candidate you would vote for on the candidate ballot?
- Fig 32. Q26. Was the candidate for who you voted on the candidate ballot an incumbent deputy of the Supreme Rada or not?
- Fig 33&34.. Q27. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] And which issue was the most important to you when making your decision to vote for this candidate?
- Q28. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] And which issue was second most important to you when making your decision to vote for this candidate?
- Fig 35. Q29. What was the medium of information that was most influential in convincing you to vote for this candidate?

- Fig 36. Q30. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Now thinking about your decision to vote for the party and/or candidate you supported in the recent election for Supreme Rada...How important to your voting decision was their position on global organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund?
- Fig 37. Q31. During the recent election campaign, were you contacted at any time by: **[TAKE MULTIPLE RESPONSES]**
- Fig 38&39. Q32. [IF CONTACTED IN Q31 ASK:] How did this contact influence your opinion of that candidate or party?
- Fig 40&41. Q63. In your opinion, does the political composition of Supreme Rada adequately reflect the population's political preferences overall?
- Fig 42&43. Q64. Do you think that the Supreme Rada elected in March 1998 will be **[ROTATE]** more effective than the last Rada in addressing the problems facing Ukraine, less effective, or about the same as the last Rada?
- Fig 44. Q65. On a scale of one to nine where "1" is the least effective and "9" is the most effective, where on that scale would you place each of the following parties and blocs in how effective they are in addressing the problems facing Ukraine?
- Fig 45, 46 &47. Q74. Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not?
- Fig 48&49. How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election — very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important?
- Fig 50. Q75. Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine?
- Fig 51&52. Q66. In your opinion, is the mixed system of elections in which one-half of the seats in Parliament are allocated to political parties and the other half is allocated to individual candidates a good way or a bad way to determine the composition of Supreme Rada?
- Fig 53. Q67. In your opinion, how many seats should be set aside for political parties?
- Fig 54. Q68. What is your assessment of the lack of a run-off election between the top two candidates in the single-mandate (candidate) elections? Is this a fair approach or not?
- Fig 55&56. Q33. How likely are you to vote in the 1999 election for President?

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- Fig 57. Q34. In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well enough to deserve re-election, or would you support someone else for President?
- Fig 58. Q35. Which issue will be the most important to you when you vote for a candidate for President of Ukraine in 1999?
- Fig 59&60. Q36. What is your overall impression of how the March 1998 elections were organized?
- Fig 61. Q37. How much confidence do you have in the integrity of election officials at your polling station?
- Fig 62. Q38. How much confidence do you have in the integrity of election officials at the national level?
- Fig 63. Q39. During the March 1998 elections, do you feel that election officials protected your rights as a voter?
- Fig 64&65. Q40. For each of the following questions, please tell me whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely: The election was fair to all candidates and political parties?
- Fig 66&67. Q40. For each of the following questions, please tell me whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely: The count of the votes was honest.
- Fig 68&69. Q41a. On the whole, how fair and honest were the March 1998 elections in your opinion?
- Fig 70&71. Q41b. How fair and honest was the campaigning leading up to the March 1998 elections in your opinion?
- Fig 72. Q41c. How fair and honest was the administration of the March 1998 elections in your opinion?
- Fig 73&74. Q41d. How fair and honest were the tabulation and reporting of the results of the March 1998 elections in your opinion?
- Fig 75. Q43. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Did you personally witness any type of violation of the election law on election day, March 29, 1998?
- Fig 76. Q45. In your opinion, was there fraud in the administration of elections during the March 1998 elections?
- Fig 77. Q69. [IF VOTED IN Q. 14] How good of a job did your local polling station do in

ensuring that the election process was fair to all candidates and parties or blocs?

- Fig 78. Q70. [IF VOTED IN Q14] Which of the following best describes what happened when you went to vote on March 29, 1998?
- Fig 79. Q72. Were national results from the March elections announced [ROTATE] too quickly, too slowly, or were they announced in a reasonable time period?
- Fig 80. Q52. [IF VOTED IN Q.14] Of those I will read to you, which were the greatest problems you encountered in voting on March 29, 1998? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED]
- Fig 81. Q53. Did anyone try to influence you to vote for a party or candidate by promising rewards that were not part of a political platform?
- Fig 82. Q54. Did anyone try to influence other people that you know to vote for a party or a candidate by promising rewards that were not part of a political platform?
- Fig 83. Q56. Were you concerned that there might be negative consequences if you failed to vote for a particular party or candidate in the March 1998 elections?
- Fig 84. Q57. Were others that you know concerned that there might be negative consequences if they failed to vote for a particular party or candidate in the March 1998 elections?
- Fig 85. Q59. In your opinion, were the prices of staple goods kept low for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the elections?
- Fig 86. Q61. In your opinion, were public services improved, repairs made, or other works provided for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the elections?
- Fig 87. Q82. In your opinion, are military personnel compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or parties or do they exercise free choice in voting?
- Fig 88. Q83. [IF COMPELLED IN Q82:] In your opinion, how much of an impact does this have on the outcome of elections?
- Fig 89&91. Q78. How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?
- Fig 90&91. Q79. How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?
- Fig 92. Q80. What is you main source of information about government and politics? [SHOW CARD]

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- Fig 93. Q81. Do you feel that you received enough information about the candidates or parties to make an informed choice for the 1998 Supreme Rada elections?
- Fig 94&95. Q47. How well informed were you regarding the process of voting?
- Fig 96&97. Q48. What was your main source of information regarding the process of voting for the March 1998 elections? [SHOW CARD]
- Fig 98&99. Q 49. During the month before the 1998 election, do you recall seeing any public service announcements on television that were hosted by Alla Mazur, the newscaster for "TSN" news on Studio 1+1, that provided voters with instructions about the voting process?
- Fig 100. Q50. [IF YES IN Q.49 ASK:] How useful were those public service announcements in instructing you about the voting process?
- Fig 101. Q51. When would you say fully understood the process of voting for the March 1998 elections?
- Fig 102. Q76. Now I'm going to ask about your views on the way our mass media report the news about events and developments in our country. For each of the following media, please tell me whether you would describe its domestic news coverage as objective or not objective.
- Fig 103. Q77. In your opinion, did the news media show partisan support for different candidates or parties in their coverage of the news during the 1998 elections for Supreme Rada?
- Fig 104. Q84. Thinking now about the Ukrainian Constitution...How much information do you have about your rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine?

APPENDIX II: Topline Data

Table 1. Interest in Politics and Government

Q1. How interested are you in matters of politics and government – are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE				KYIV		CRIMEA	
	12/94 (1201)	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Very Interested	19%	15%	16%	14%	21%	24%	13%	18%
2. Somewhat Interested	36%	34%	39%	36%	41%	39%	39%	44%
3. Not Too Interested	20%	23%	23%	23%	26%	21%	18%	23%
4. Not At All Interested	23%	26%	20%	25%	11%	15%	29%	13%
9. Don't Know	2%	3%	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%	1%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	-	☆	-	1%	-	-
TOTAL	100%	101%✓	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%✓

Table 2. Satisfaction with Situation in Ukraine

Q2. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today – would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE				KYIV		CRIMEA	
	12/94 (1201)	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Very Satisfied	2%	1%	☆	0%	1%	0%	☆	☆
2. Fairly Satisfied	5%	3%	2%	3%	4%	3%	2%	2%
3. Somewhat Dissatisfied	25%	32%	21%	28%	37%	19%	11%	37%
4. Very Dissatisfied	66%	59%	75%	68%	57%	77%	85%	60%
9. Don't Know	3%	6%	2%	1%	-	1%	2%	☆
0. Refused/NA	-	-	☆	☆	1%	0%	1%	☆
TOTAL	101%✓	101%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%✓	99%✓

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Table 3. Reasons for Dissatisfaction

Q3. Please tell me some of the reasons why you said you are dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine today? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED)

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
Poverty	45%	40%	54%
Non-Payment	24%	8%	15%
Unemployment	23%	22%	19%
Chaos/Instability	16%	13%	15%
Bad Country Government	6%	12%	3%
Soc./Jud. Unprotected	4%	7%	5%
Economy	2%	5%	6%
Other	3%	3%	4%
NOT ASKED	1%	3%	2%

Table 4. Preferred Economic System

Q4. When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a [ROTATE] market economy or a centrally planned economy?

	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
Year (Sample Size)	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Market Economy	35%	39%	25%	64%	48%	32%	20%
2. Centrally Planned Economy	47%	31%	33%	19%	11%	29%	32%
3. Both in Conjunction [VOLUNTEERED]	-	14%	20%	10%	24%	23%	34%
Other [1996 ONLY]	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-
9. Don't Know	16%	14%	20%	-	17%	-	12%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	2%	7%	0%	16%	2%
TOTAL	100%	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Table 5. Pace of Economic Reforms

Q5. When it comes to our economic development, should we work toward a market economy as quickly as possible, with steady but small reforms, or should we not pursue a free market economy at all?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE				KYIV		CRIMEA	
	12/94 (1201)	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. As Quickly as Possible	23%	43%	25%	22%	35%	46%	23%	22%
2. Steady but Small Reforms	31%	13%	41%	29%	48%	29%	45%	41%
3. Should not Pursue	2%	18%	17%	24%	10%	10%	14%	11%
4. Other [VOLUNTEERED]	-	2%	1%	3%	3%	1%	2%	3%
9. Don't Know	25%	24%	16%	21%	4%	14%	15%	20%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	1%	1%	-	0%	1%	4%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	101%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%✓

Table 6. Ideal Economy for Ukraine

Q6. On a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state, where on that scale should Ukraine be located in the future?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. One/Pure Market Economy	11%	9%	14%	20%	5%	9%
2. Two	14%	10%	23%	15%	11%	10%
3. Three	24%	23%	30%	22%	23%	28%
4. Four	12%	12%	8%	6%	23%	14%
5. Five/Total State Control	22%	26%	13%	16%	23%	25%
9. Don't Know	14%	18%	8%	20%	12%	11%
0. Refused/NA	2%	2%	4%	1%	3%	3%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Table 7. Actual Pace of Economic Reforms

Q7. In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring [ROTATE 1-3]

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Too Quickly	5%	6%	7%	9%	4%	4%
2. Too Slowly	70%	61%	73%	74%	63%	64%
3. At About the Right Pace	4%	6%	6%	7%	5%	6%
9. Don't Know	19%	25%	8%	10%	24%	23%
0. Refused/NA	2%	3%	6%	0%	3%	3%
TOTAL	100%	101%✓	100%	100%	99%✓	100%

Table 8. Actual Pace of Political Reforms

Q8. In general, would you say that political reforms in Ukraine are occurring [ROTATE 1-3]

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Too Quickly	7%	13%	7%	10%	4%	10%
2. Too Slowly	56%	45%	73%	55%	63%	52%
3. At About the Right Pace	9%	8%	6%	9%	5%	8%
9. Don't Know	27%	31%	8%	26%	24%	27%
0. Refused/NA	1%	4%	6%	0%	3%	4%
TOTAL	100%	101%✓	100%	100%	99%✓	101%✓

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Table 9. Institution Most Likely to Resolve Economic Problems

Q9. Thinking only of the Executive Branch, the Supreme Rada, the Judiciary, and your local government. Which of these four, in your opinion, is most likely to resolve the economic problems facing Ukraine in the next year? (ACCEPT VOLUNTEERED RESPONSE NONE)

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Executive Branch	21%	19%	17%	26%	20%	26%	20%
2. Supreme Rada	8%	18%	21%	13%	23%	8%	19%
3. Judiciary	8%	13%	5%	3%	8%	14%	3%
4. Local Government	NA	2%	16%	1%	5%	3%	9%
5. None [VOUNTEERED]	33%	24%	23%	39%	33%	30%	28%
9. Don't Know	29%	22%	17%	18%	11%	18%	20%
0. Refused/NA	-	2%	☆	-	0%	1%	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 10. Economic Situation in a Year

Q10. In your opinion will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Better	9%	12%	10%	11%	8%	8%	7%
2. Same	32%	34%	38%	58%	41%	29%	31%
3. Worse	47%	45%	40%	27%	47%	55%	52%
9. Don't Know	12%	8%	11%	4%	4%	8%	10%
0. Refused/NA	-	☆	☆	-	0%	-	☆
TOTAL	100%	99%✓	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Table 11. Ukrainian Democracy

Q11. Would you say that Ukraine is a democracy, or is it not a democracy?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE				KYIV		CRIMEA	
	12/94 (1201)	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Ukraine is a Democracy	18%	20%	20%	19%	17%	21%	12%	9%
2. Ukraine is Not a Democracy	60%	55%	52%	55%	58%	64%	62%	69%
3. Both [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	NA	8%	9%	10%	5%	11%	8%
9. Don't Know	27%	25%	20%	15%	14%	10%	14%	12%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%
TOTAL	105%✓	100%	101%✓	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	99%✓

Table 12. Ukraine Becoming a Democracy

Q12. Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Moving toward Democracy	24%	22%	36%	26%	15%	15%
2. No, Not Moving toward Democracy	37%	36%	32%	41%	49%	57%
9. Don't Know	19%	22%	15%	12%	21%	17%
0. Refused/NA	1%	1%	-	0%	3%	1%
Not Asked	20%	19%	17%	21%	12%	7%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	97%✓

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Table 13. Perceived Influence of Voting

Q13. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country? **WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND ASK:** Do you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Agree Completely	11%	7%	5%	8%	6%	6%	3%
2. Agree Somewhat	19%	21%	20%	27%	12%	13%	14%
3. Disagree Somewhat	25%	17%	26%	14%	32%	16%	31%
4. Disagree Completely	35%	50%	33%	46%	45%	62%	26%
5. Neither Agree nor Disagree [VOLUNTEERED]	NA	2%	9%	4%	4%	1%	9%
9. Don't Know	10%	4%	6%	1%	1%	1%	11%
0. Refused/NA	-	☆	1%	-	0%	1%	6%
TOTAL	100%	101%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 14. Vote In March 1998 Elections?

Q14. Did you vote in the March 1998 election for Supreme Rada or not?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Voted	77%	66%	67%
2. No, Did Not Vote	23%	34%	33%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	☆
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 15. Reasons for Not Voting

Q15. [IF DID NOT VOTE IN Q14 ASK:] What is the main reason why you did not vote?*

*% based on number of respondents who did not vote	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (278)	5/98 (34)	5/98 (99)
Busy/Away	24%	21%	29%
Did not want to	11%	12%	11%
Illness	11%	9%	7%
No one worth voting for	9%	9%	12%
Ballot box not brought	6%	6%	1%
Big queue	3%	-	4%
Not invited	2%	-	1%
Not on list	2%	-	-
No content	24%	32%	24%
Other	5%	9%	11%
TOTAL	97%✓	98%✓	100%

Table 16. Reasons for Voting

Q16. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] What is the main reason why you voted?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
Hope	34%	26%	23%
Duty	21%	33%	27%
Impact the elections	17%	21%	22%
Support for party/candidate	9%	8%	4%
Habit	9%	6%	9%
To use my vote	6%	3%	14%
To restore the past	1%	0%	1%
Other	2%	2%	2%
TOTAL	99%✓	99%✓	102%✓

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Table 17. Mobile Ballot Box Voting

Q17. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Did you vote by the mobile ballot box?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	6%	2%	8%
2. No	92%	98%	91%
9. Don't Know	1%	-	2%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	-
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	101%✓

Table 18. Vote for Party

Q18. As you may recall, there were two ballots in the election for the Verkhovna Rada, a party list ballot in which you voted for a political party, and a candidate ballot in which you selected an individual candidate. Thinking only about the party list ballot for a moment, for which party did you vote?* **SHOW LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES – DO NOT SHOW PARTY LEADERS**

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
Communist Party of Ukraine	31%	20%	62%
People's Rukh of Ukraine	9%	18%	2%
Green Party of Ukraine	8%	15%	5%
All Ukrainian Association Hromada	6%	6%	3%
People's Democratic Party	4%	3%	5%
Progressive Socialists	4%	3%	-
Socialist Peasant "Bloc for Truth"	3%	-	1%
Social Democratic Party United	3%	3%	1%
Other	18%	18%	13%
None	5%	11%	4%
Don't Know	5%	2%	5%
Refused	3%	3%	2%
TOTAL	99%✓	102%✓	103%✓

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Table 19. Party Represents Views and Interests?

Q18a. How well does the party for which you voted reflect your own views and interests?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Very Well	19%	17%	18%
2. Fairly well	55%	56%	64%
3. Not so Well	8%	6%	9%
4. Not at All Well	3%	9%	1%
9. Don't Know	8%	3%	4%
0. Refused/NA	4%	6%	3%
TOTAL	97%✓	97%✓	99%✓

Table 20. Timing of Voting Decision

Q19. When did you make your decision about which party you would vote for?

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. More than Three Months Before Election	35%	30%	38%
2. Three Months Before Election	6%	8%	9%
3. Two Months Before Election	8%	9%	4%
4. One Month Before Election	19%	18%	23%
5. Two Weeks Before Election	8%	5%	10%
6. During Week Before Election	8%	11%	6%
7. On Election Day	8%	12%	7%
9. Don't Know	4%	2%	2%
0. Refused/NA	2%	5%	3%
TOTAL	98%✓	100%	102%✓

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Table 21. Most Important Issue when Voting

Q20. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Which issue was the most important to you when making your decision to vote for [PARTY NAMED IN Q18]?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
Program	30%	36%	34%
Platform	20%	11%	25%
To restore the past	12%	3%	13%
Coincidence of interests	7%	8%	1%
Trust	7%	5%	9%
Confidence in party's leader	6%	9%	4%
I was advised	2%	2%	3%
Member of party	2%	2%	1%
Other	6%	16%	4%
NA	2%	3%	1%
Refused/No answer	6%	5%	5%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 22. Second Most Important Issue when Voting

Q21. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] And which issue was second most important to you when making your decision to vote for [PARTY NAMED IN Q18]?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (300)
Program	11%	12%	9%
Platform	18%	8%	32%
To restore the past	7%	3%	-
Coincidence of interests	3%	3%	-
Trust	5%	11%	8%
Confidence in party's leader	9%	9%	4%
I was advised	1%	3%	1%
Member of party	1%	3%	1%
Other	4%	0%	1%
NA	6%	3%	2%
Refused	35%	45%	38%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 23. Influential Medium of Information

Q22. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:]What was the medium of information that was most influential in convincing you to vote for [PARTY NAMED IN Q18]?

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Televised Debate	21%	18%	13%
2. Television Advertisement	7%	5%	9%
3. Television Report or Opinion of Television Journalist	4%	3%	7%
4. Radio Report or Opinion of Radio Journalist	4%	2%	4%
5. Newspaper Article of Opinion of Newspaper Journalist	4%	6%	6%
6. Magazine Article or Opinion of Magazine Journalist	☆	-	-
7. Flyer with Party Literature	4%	6%	5%
8. Personal Contact with Party Representative or Party Candidate	3%	6%	8%
9. Voters' Meeting with Candidates or Party Representatives	4%	3%	4%
0. Party Platform	17%	21%	14%
1. Party List Candidates	2%	-	2%
2. Opinion of Friend	2%	3%	1%
3. Opinion of Family Member	9%	11%	10%
4. Opinion of Other	4%	6%	5%
5. Other	6%	6%	12%
9. Don't Know	4%	-	3%
0. Refused/NA	1%	5%	1%
TOTAL	96%✓	101%✓	104%✓

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Table 24. Candidate and Party

Q23. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Thinking now about the ballot in which you selected an individual candidate...Was the candidate you voted for in this ballot a member of, or supported by, the same political party that you voted for in the party list ballot?

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Yes, Same Party	42%	45%	47%
2. No, Different Party	15%	18%	11%
3. No, Not Affiliated with A Party	10%	14%	10%
4. Did Not Vote for Individual Candidate	7%	11%	6%
9. Don't Know	25%	12%	26%
0. Refused/NA	1%	0%	2%
TOTAL	100%	100%	102%✓

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Table 25. Candidate's Party

Q24. [IF DIFFERENT PARTY IN Q23 ASK:] With which party was the candidate affiliated? [SHOW LIST]

*% based on number of respondents who voted for candidate from different party	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (138)	5/98 (12)	5/98 (21)
All-Ukrainian Association Hromada	13%	-	14%
People's Rukh of Ukraine	7%	8%	-
Communist Party of Ukraine	5%	-	14%
People's Democratic Party	4%	-	14%
Party of "Reforms and Order"	4%	-	5%
Party of Fath. Defenders	4%	-	-
Socialist Peasant Bloc "For Truth"	4%	-	-
Green Party	3%	-	-
Progressive Socialists	1%	8%	5%
Bloc "Labor Party and Liberal Party"	1%	8%	5%
Other	7%	-	14%
Don't Know	43%	75%	29%
Refused/NA	4%	-	-
TOTAL	100%	99%✓	100%

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Table 26. Timing of Decision on Candidate

Q25. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] When did you make your decision about which candidate you would vote for on the candidate ballot?

*% based on number of respondents who voted for candidate	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (616)	5/98 (51)	5/98 (133)
1. More than Three Months Before Election	25%	25%	30%
2. Three Months Before Election	5%	6%	8%
3. Two Months Before Election	9%	4%	4%
4. One Month Before Election	25%	18%	28%
5. Two Weeks Before Election	12%	12%	11%
6. During Week Before Election	12%	18%	6%
7. On Election Day	9%	14%	11%
9. Don't Know	2%	4%	2%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	101%✓	101%✓

Table 27. Incumbent Candidate

Q26. Was the candidate for who you voted on the candidate ballot an incumbent deputy of the Supreme Rada or not?

*% based on number of respondents who voted for candidate	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (616)	5/98 (51)	5/98 (133)
1. Yes	28%	39%	17%
2. No	49%	39%	47%
9. Don't Know	23%	22%	35%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	2%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	101%✓

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Table 28. Most Important Issue for Deciding on Candidate

Q27. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] And which issue was the most important to you when making your decision to vote for this candidate?

*% based on number of respondents who voted for candidate	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (616)	5/98 (51)	5/98 (133)
Platform	27%	29%	26%
Personal Qualities	21%	22%	20%
Party Membership	15%	12%	14%
Confidence in Candidate	14%	12%	19%
Candidate's Deeds	8%	10%	8%
Personal Contact	6%	6%	3%
Other	3%	4%	4%
NA	2%	2%	2%
Not Responding	4%	4%	5%
TOTAL	100%	101%✓	101%✓

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Table 29. Second Most Important Issue when Deciding on Candidate

Q28. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] And which issue was second most important to you when making your decision to vote for this candidate?

*% based on number of respondents who voted for candidate	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (616)	5/98 (51)	5/98 (133)
Personal Qualities	21%	16%	22%
Platform	13%	12%	9%
Confidence in Candidate	8%	16%	16%
Candidate's Deeds	6%	8%	2%
Party Membership	6%	2%	6%
Other	3%	2%	6%
Personal Contact	3%	-	-
NA	5%	2%	2%
Not Responding	37%	43%	38%
TOTAL	102%✓	101%✓	101%✓

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Table 30. Influential Medium of Information in Voting for Candidate

Q29. What was the medium of information that was most influential in convincing you to vote for this candidate?

*% based on number of respondents who voted for candidate	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (616)	5/98 (51)	5/98 (133)
1. Televised Debate	16%	18%	8%
2. Television Advertisement	4%	-	8%
3. Television Report or Opinion of Television Journalist	3%	4%	5%
4. Radio Report or Opinion of Radio Journalist	2%	2%	4%
5. Newspaper Article or Opinion of Newspaper Journalist	6%	2%	8%
6. Magazine Article or Opinion of Magazine Journalist	☆	-	-
7. Flyer with Candidate Literature	13%	12%	6%
8. Personal Contact with Candidate Representative or Candidate	9%	14%	11%
9. Voters' Meeting with Candidates or Party Representatives	9%	6%	5%
0. Party Platform	11%	16%	21%
1. Party List Candidate	4%	4%	3%
2. Opinion of Friend	3%	4%	2%
3. Opinion of Family Member	7%	14%	10%
4. Opinion of Other	5%	-	3%
5. Other	4%	2%	8%
9. Don't Know	2%	2%	2%
0. Refused/NA	1%	2%	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	102%✓	105%✓

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Table 31. International Organizations

Q30. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Now thinking about your decision to vote for the party and/or candidate you supported in the recent election for Supreme Rada...How important to your voting decision was their position on global organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund?

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Very Important	5%	2%	1%
2. Somewhat Important	10%	12%	8%
3. Not Very Important	9%	11%	9%
4. Not At All Important	26%	32%	14%
9. Don't Know	44%	41%	61%
0. Refused/NA	6%	3%	8%
TOTAL	100%	101%✓	101%✓

Table 32. Election Campaigning

Q31. During the recent election campaign, were you contacted at any time by: [TAKE MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Local Candidate	18%	20%	21%
2. Local Candidate's Representative	9%	7%	9%
3. National Candidate	13%	9%	3%
4. National Candidate's Representative	5%	4%	2%
5. Political Party Representative	7%	4%	5%
6. No, Not Contacted	3%	-	12%
9. Don't Know	31%	47%	33%
0. Refused/NA	31%	20%	21%

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Table 33. Influence of Election Campaigning

Q32. [IF CONTACTED IN Q31 ASK:] How did this contact influence your opinion of that candidate or party? Did it make you:*

*% based on number of respondents who had personal contact	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (429)	5/98 (33)	5/98 (105)
1. Much More Likely to Vote for Candidate/Party	18%	18%	17%
2. Somewhat More Likely to Vote for Candidate/Party	42%	45%	43%
3. Somewhat Less Likely to Vote for Candidate/Party	5%	-	6%
4. Much Less Likely to Vote for Candidate/Party	6%	3%	2%
5. Had No Influence [DO NOT READ]	24%	33%	20%
9. Don't Know	6%	-	11%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	101%✓	99%✓	100%

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Table 33b. Reason for Reaction to Personal Contact

Q32b. [IF 1-5 IN Q32 ASK:] Why do you feel that way? [Response Given in Q.32]*

*% based on number of respondents who had personal contact	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (105)
Believed promises	19%	21%	23%
Got to know program better	13%	9%	6%
Liked candidate	11%	21%	13%
No confidence	7%	15%	6%
Got to know candidate/party	7%	3%	4%
Many words, not many actions	6%	-	4%
Decided long ago	3%	3%	2%
Desire for power	2%	3%	-
Did not like candidate/party representative	2%	-	3%
Nothing new	3%	-	3%
Other	3%	6%	4%
NA	6%	3%	2%
Refused	18%	16%	30%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 34. Likelihood of Voting in 1999 Presidential Election

Q33. How likely are you to vote in the 1999 election for President?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Certain to Vote	4%	9%	6%
2. Very Likely	47%	50%	34%
3. Somewhat Likely	24%	20%	38%
4. Not Very Likely	10%	9%	11%
5. Not At All Likely	5%	5%	3%
6. Definitely Will Not Vote	1%	2%	1%
9. Don't Know	8%	5%	7%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	101%✓

Table 35. Job Performance of Leonid Kuchma

Q34. In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well enough to deserve re-election, or would you support someone else for President?

	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
Year (Sample Size)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Re-elect, Strongly	21%	5%	19%	5%	19%	5%
2. Re-elect, Not Strongly	22%	8%	23%	16%	15%	9%
3. New Person, Not Strongly	13%	7%	11%	13%	14%	8%
4. New Person, Strongly	24%	59%	24%	49%	31%	55%
5. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	8%	10%	11%	13%	5%	15%
9. Don't Know	10%	8%	8%	2%	8%	7%
0. Refused/NA	1%	1%	4%	2%	8%	1%
TOTAL	101%	98%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Table 36. Issue of Importance for Presidential Election

Q35. Which issue will be the most important to you when you vote for a candidate for President of Ukraine in 1999?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
Honesty, Decency	15%	16%	18%
Care of People	10%	8%	6%
Pre-Election Platform	9%	7%	10%
Feed People	8%	15%	10%
Ability to Get Out of Crisis	8%	10%	7%
Business Qualities	7%	7%	9%
Competent	7%	8%	8%
Real Leadership	5%	2%	2%
Party Membership	4%	2%	2%
Past Activity	3%	5%	4%
Any Other Person	2%	3%	-
Reform-oriented	2%	2%	3%
Other	11%	8%	14%
Refused/NA	6%	4%	5%
TOTAL	97%✓	97%✓	98%✓

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Table 37. Organization of March Elections

Q36. What is your overall impression of how the March 1998 elections were organized? Were they:

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Very Well Organized	7%	1%	3%
2. Somewhat Well Organized	38%	25%	38%
3. Not Very Well Organized	27%	34%	22%
4. Not At all Well Organized	11%	15%	8%
9. Don't Know	15%	22%	23%
0. Refused/NA	2%	3%	6%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 38. Confidence in Local Election Officials

Q37. How much confidence do you have in the integrity of election officials at your polling station?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. A Great Deal	10%	8%	3%
2. Some	33%	19%	31%
3. Not Very Much	18%	26%	17%
4. None	15%	16%	13%
5. Depends [DO NOT READ]	2%	1%	6%
9. Don't Know	20%	30%	23%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	7%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%

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Table 39. Confidence in National Election Officials

Q38. How much confidence do you have in the integrity of election officials at the national level?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. A Great Deal	4%	4%	1%
2. Some	28%	20%	24%
3. Not Very Much	21%	21%	19%
4. None	17%	19%	12%
5. Depends [DO NOT READ]	2%	1%	6%
9. Don't Know	27%	35%	31%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	7%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 40. Protection of Voter Rights

Q39. During the March 1998 elections, do you feel that election officials protected your rights as a voter?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	33%	22%	31%
2. No	31%	49%	27%
9. Don't Know	32%	35%	31%
0. Refused/NA	4%	-	11%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 41. Integrity of Elections

Q40. For each of the following questions, please tell me whether you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely.

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
A. The election was fair to all candidates and political parties?			
1. Agree Completely	7%	5%	3%
2. Agree Somewhat	29%	18%	26%
3. Disagree Somewhat	30%	34%	31%
4. Disagree Completely	10%	19%	9%
9. Don't Know	22%	22%	23%
0. Refused/NA	2%	2%	8%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%
B. The count of the votes was honest			
1. Agree Completely	6%	7%	3%
2. Agree Somewhat	26%	22%	22%
3. Disagree Somewhat	24%	25%	16%
4. Disagree Completely	10%	19%	8%
9. Don't Know	33%	25%	43%
0. Refused/NA	2%	2%	8%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	100%

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Table 42. Overall Honesty and Fairness of Elections

Q41a. On the whole, how fair and honest were the March 1998 elections in your opinion?
Were they:

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Completely Fair and Honest	3%	1%	1%
2. Mostly Fair and Honest	36%	23%	23%
3. Not Very Fair and Honest	31%	40%	28%
4. Not At All Fair and Honest	6%	12%	7%
9. Don't Know	21%	18%	32%
0. Refused/NA	2%	6%	9%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%

Table 43. Honesty and Fairness of Election Campaigning

Q41b. How fair and honest was the campaigning leading up to the March 1998 elections
in your opinion? Was it:

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Completely Fair and Honest	3%	1%	1%
2. Mostly Fair and Honest	29%	19%	19%
3. Not Very Fair and Honest	34%	36%	27%
4. Not At All Fair and Honest	9%	18%	11%
9. Don't Know	23%	20%	33%
0. Refused/NA	2%	6%	8%
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%✓

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Table 44. Honesty and Fairness in Administration of Elections

Q41c. How fair and honest was the administration of the March 1998 elections in your opinion? Was it:

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Completely Fair and Honest	4%	1%	2%
2. Mostly Fair and Honest	38%	26%	27%
3. Not Very Fair and Honest	25%	34%	22%
4. Not At All Fair and Honest	6%	13%	7%
9. Don't Know	24%	20%	34%
0. Refused/NA	2%	6%	8%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%

Table 45. Honesty and Fairness in Reporting of Election Results

Q41d. How fair and honest were the tabulation and reporting of the results of the March 1998 elections in your opinion? Were they:

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Completely Fair and Honest	3%	6%	1%
2. Mostly Fair and Honest	27%	18%	20%
3. Not Very Fair and Honest	26%	29%	21%
4. Not At All Fair and Honest	7%	14%	8%
9. Don't Know	34%	27%	41%
0. Refused/NA	2%	6%	8%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	99%✓

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Table 46A. Institutions Responsible for Honesty of Election Process

Q42A-D. You have just assessed various aspects of the March 1998 elections. Now looking at this card, please tell me who you think is most responsible, or most to blame, for that assessment. [% BASED ON NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO THOUGHT EACH ELECTION ELEMENT WAS HONEST]

Fieldwork: May, 1998	A. Overall Honesty and Fairness of Elections			B. Honesty and Fairness of Election Campaigning			C. Honesty and Fairness of Election Administration			D. Honesty and Fairness of Results Reporting		
Sample (Sample Size)	Ukraine (467)	Kyiv (27)	Crimea (71)	Ukraine (374)	Kyiv (20)	Crimea (62)	Ukraine (507)	Kyiv (27)	Crimea (88)	Ukraine (368)	Kyiv (24)	Crimea (64)
1. Central Election Commission	23%	33%	25%	15%	30%	26%	16%	30%	22%	21%	33%	22%
2. Constituency Election Officials	15%	15%	28%	11%	5%	27%	14%	22%	22%	14%	13%	27%
3. Polling Station Officials	15%	11%	8%	11%	15%	5%	24%	15%	20%	23%	25%	13%
4. Other Officials	1%	-	-	2%	-	2%	1%	-	1%	2%	-	-
5. Int'l Organizations	3%	7%	1%	1%	5%	-	3%	4%	-	2%	4%	2%
6. Mafia (Organized Crime)	13%	19%	7%	6%	10%	5%	15%	19%	7%	17%	25%	16%
7. Business Interests	☆	-	1%	1%	-	-	☆	-	-	☆	-	-
8. Political Parties	☆	-	1%	1%	-	2%	☆	-	-	0%	-	-
9. Individual Candidates	6%	4%	3%	9%	5%	2%	4%	-	3%	3%	-	2%
0. Press (Mass Media)	1%	-	4%	4%	5%	5%	1%	4%	2%	☆	-	2%
1. NGOs	5%	7%	3%	12%	5%	3%	2%	-	5%	1%	-	-
2. Parliament	1%	-	-	2%	5%	-	2%	-	-	☆	4%	-
3. President	1%	-	-	☆	-	-	1%	4%	-	0%	-	-
4. Cabinet of Ministers	☆	4%	-	☆	-	-	1%	-	-	1%	-	-
5. Courts	☆	-	-	1%	-	-	☆	-	-	☆	-	-
6. Military	☆	-	-	☆	-	-	0%	-	-	☆	-	-
7. Security Forces	☆	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-
8. Observers	☆	-	-	1%	-	-	1%	-	-	0%	-	-
9. Other	☆	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-
99. Don't Know	20%	15%	13%	24%	20%	15%	20%	15%	9%	22%	8%	13%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	4%	2%	-	10%	1%	-	9%	1%	-	6%

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Table 46B. Institutions Responsible for Dishonesty of Election Process

Q42A-D. You have just assessed various aspects of the March 1998 elections. Now looking at this card, please tell me who you think is most responsible, or most to blame, for that assessment. [% BASED ON NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO THOUGHT EACH ELECTION ELEMENT WAS DISHONEST]

Fieldwork: May, 1998	A. Overall Honesty and Fairness of Elections			B. Honesty and Fairness of Election Campaigning			C. Honesty and Fairness of Election Administration			D. Honesty and Fairness of Results Reporting		
Sample (Sample Size)	Ukraine (448)	Kyiv (47)	Crimea (107)	Ukraine (515)	Kyiv (54)	Crimea (113)	Ukraine (371)	Kyiv (100)	Crimea (85)	Ukraine (396)	Kyiv (43)	Crimea (87)
1. Central Election Commission	9%	13%	5%	4%	6%	4%	7%	2%	2%	13%	12%	5%
2. Constituency Election Officials	7%	15%	7%	4%	9%	3%	7%	11%	2%	12%	9%	5%
3. Polling Station Officials	11%	17%	19%	7%	7%	18%	14%	6%	29%	20%	9%	21%
4. Other Officials	6%	2%	8%	6%	6%	8%	6%	4%	9%	3%	-	13%
5. Int'l Organizations	☆	-	-	☆	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-
6. Mafia (Organized Crime)	1%	-	2%	☆	-	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%	2%	3%
7. Business Interests	19%	30%	12%	16%	24%	14%	19%	30%	14%	15%	33%	13%
8. Political Parties	7%	9%	5%	8%	7%	4%	6%	2%	6%	5%	9%	6%
9. Individual Candidates	10%	6%	5%	11%	7%	7%	5%	11%	2%	3%	5%	5%
0. Press (Mass Media)	5%	9%	6%	11%	11%	4%	4%	6%	2%	3%	5%	-
1. NGOs	1%	4%	1%	9%	6%	7%	2%	2%	-	☆	2%	-
2. Parliament	☆	-	-	☆	4%	1%	1%	-	-	☆	-	-
3. President	2%	6%	-	2%	7%	-	2%	11%	-	1%	7%	-
4. Cabinet of Ministers	3%	11%	-	2%	7%	-	3%	11%	-	2%	16%	-
5. Courts	1%	-	-	1%	-	-	1%	-	-	☆	2%	1%
6. Military	0%	-	-	☆	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	1%
7. Security Forces	0%	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-
8. Observers	☆	-	1%	0%	-	-	0%	-	1%	0%	-	-
9. Other	0%	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-	0%	-	-
99. Don't Know	21%	6%	17%	21%	11%	15%	24%	13%	12%	21%	9%	10%
0. Refused/NA	2%	-	14%	3%	-	12%	4%	-	16%	4%	-	20%

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Table 47. Violation of Election Law

Q43. [IF VOTED IN Q14 ASK:] Did you personally witness any type of violation of the election law on election day, March 29, 1998?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	9%	11%	11%
2. No	88%	80%	83%
9. Don't Know	2%	6%	4%
0. Refused/NA	1%	3%	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓

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Table 48. Types of Violations

Q43a. [IF YES IN Q43 ASK:] What type of violation of the election law did you observe?
[ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES]*

*% based on number of respondents who witnessed violations	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (83)	5/98 (7)	5/98 (22)
1. Poll watchers at the voting place tried to tell voters to vote for certain candidates or parties	22%	29%	41%
2. Local or election officials at the voting place tried to tell voters to vote for certain candidates or parties	8%	-	14%
3. Election officials at the voting place tried to tell voters to vote for certain candidates or parties	8%	-	27%
4. Your employer or manager, or their representative, tried to tell you to vote for certain candidates or parties	3%	-	18%
5. I felt that my ballot was not kept secret and that someone would know how I voted	20%	29%	5%
6. I saw other people voting in groups without a secret ballot	44%	71%	27%
7. Material or financial incentives were being offered to voters	23%	29%	18%
8. People were being allowed to vote for family members	20%	14%	14%
9. Threats were made to force people to vote in a certain way	5%	14%	-
10. People were allowed to vote without appropriate documentation	18%	14%	9%
11. Other	9%	-	23%
99. Don't Know	1%	-	-
0. Refused/NA	3%	-	-

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Table 49. Reporting of Violations

Q44. [IF YES IN Q43 ASK:] Did you report this violation of the election law to a local authority or not?*

*% based on number of respondents who witnessed violations	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (83)	5/98 (7)	5/98 (22)
1. Yes	13%	43%	9%
2. No	81%	57%	86%
9. Don't Know	1%	-	-
0. Refused/NA	5%	-	5%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 50. Fraud in Administration of Elections

Q45. In your opinion, was there fraud in the administration of elections during the March 1998 elections?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, A Great Deal	3%	4%	3%
2. Yes, Some	14%	15%	9%
2. No, None	52%	40%	53%
9. Don't Know	29%	36%	30%
0. Refused/NA	2%	5%	5%
TOTAL	100%	100%	12%

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Table 51. Fraud Locations

Q46. [IF YES IN Q45 ASK] Where did this fraud take place?*

*% based on number of respondents who perceived fraud	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (207)	5/98 (19)	5/98 (35)
1. At Polling Station	40%	21%	66%
2. At Constituency Commission	13%	21%	6%
3. At Oblast Commission	13%	16%	6%
4. At Central Election Commission	7%	26%	-
5. At Individual Level	8%	11%	6%
9. Don't Know	19%	5%	14%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓

Table 52. Information About Voting Process

Q47. How well informed were you regarding the process of voting?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Very Well Informed	14%	9%	9%
2. Somewhat Well Informed	47%	51%	45%
3. Not Very Well Informed	26%	27%	31%
4. Not At All Well Informed	10%	10%	8%
9. Don't Know	2%	2%	6%
0. Refused/NA	☆	1%	2%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	101%✓

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Table 53. Source of Information about Voting Process

Q48. What was your main source of information regarding the process of voting for the March 1998 elections? [SHOW CARD]

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Television Program "Elections 98"	24%	19%	29%
2. Television Advertisements [SHOW LOGO FROM PSAs]	10%	10%	10%
3. Television News Programs	21%	24%	16%
4. Radio	6%	7%	5%
5. Newspaper	9%	14%	11%
6. Non-Governmental Organization	1%	3%	☆
7. Local Polling Station Official	7%	-	3%
8. Family Member	6%	10%	3%
9. Friend or Acquaintance	7%	9%	10%
0. Other	2%	1%	2%
99. Don't Know	6%	3%	8%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	2%
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%✓

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Table 54. Recognition of Voter Information PSAs

Q 49. During the month before the 1998 election, do you recall seeing any public service announcements on television that were hosted by Alla Mazur, the newscaster for "TSN" news on Studio 1+1, that provided voters with instructions about the voting process?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	34%	23%	21%
2. No	54%	76%	64%
9. Don't Know	10%	1%	7%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	7%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	99%✓

Table 55. Usefulness of PSAs

Q50. [IF YES IN Q.49 ASK:] How useful were those public service announcements in instructing you about the voting process?*

*% based on number of respondents who saw PSAs	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (414)	5/98 (23)	5/98 (64)
1. Very Useful	26%	22%	16%
2. Somewhat Useful	57%	65%	58%
3. Not Very Useful	10%	13%	20%
4. Not At All Useful	3%	-	5%
9. Don't Know	4%	-	2%
0. Refused/NA	0%	-	-
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓

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Table 56. Understanding of Voting Process

Q51. When would you say fully understood the process of voting for the March 1998 elections?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Four Months Before Election	7%	7%	8%
2. Three Months Before Election	5%	5%	7%
3. Two Months Before Election	7%	5%	6%
4. One Month Before Election	19%	20%	24%
5. Two Weeks Before Election	10%	11%	7%
6. One Week Before Election	11%	9%	7%
7. Several Days	10%	12%	9%
8. On Election Day	13%	11%	10%
9. Never	8%	9%	12%
99. Don't Know	9%	10%	7%
0. Refused/NA	1%	1%	2%
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%✓

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Table 57. Problems on Voting Day

Q52. [IF VOTED IN Q.14] Of those I will read to you, which were the greatest problems you encountered in voting on March 29, 1998? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED]*

*% based on number of people who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Too many choices of candidates and parties	66%	65%	78%
2. Not enough information on candidates and parties	21%	18%	40%
3. Too many ballots	56%	45%	64%
4. Polling station was too crowded	35%	33%	40%
5. Polling station workers were disorganized	4%	11%	8%
6. There were too many materials for polling station workers to control	4%	5%	5%
7. I did not understand the process before I arrived at the polling station	6%	3%	5%
8. I did not know where I was supposed to vote	☆	-	2%
9. My personal information on the voting list was incorrect	2%	2%	1%
10. The polling station was not adequately equipped	7%	11%	13%
11. Other	2%	2%	1%
99. Don't Know	5%	3%	4%
0. Refused/NA	3%	3%	6%

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Table 58. Rewards to Influence Vote

Q53. Did anyone try to influence you to vote for a party or candidate by promising rewards that were not part of a political platform?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Party	1%	-	1%
2. Yes, Candidate	1%	3%	1%
3. Yes, Both	1%	-	☆
4. No	93%	90%	89%
9. Don't Know	3%	3%	6%
0. Refused/NA	1%	4%	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 59. Rewards for Other People to Influence Vote

Q54. Did anyone try to influence other people that you know to vote for a party or a candidate by promising rewards that were not part of a political platform?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Party	2%	-	-
2. Yes, Candidate	3%	3%	3%
3. Yes, Both	1%	-	-
4. No	87%	75%	89%
9. Don't Know	7%	20%	4%
0. Refused/NA	1%	2%	4%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	100%

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Table 60. Rewards Offered

Q55. [IF YES IN Q53 or Q54 ASK:] What kind of reward, or rewards, were offered?*

*% based on number of respondents who knew of rewards being offered	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (78)	5/98 (4)	5/98 (13)
Money	31%	50%	23%
Food	23%	-	31%
Free Meal	9%	25%	-
Medicine	11%	-	-
Clothes	9%	-	-
Alcohol	6%	-	8%
Other	1%	-	-
NA	14%	25%	15%

Table 61. Negative Effects of Voting

Q56. Were you concerned that there might be negative consequences if you failed to vote for a particular party or candidate in the March 1998 elections?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Party	2%	1%	1%
2. Yes, Candidate	1%	-	☆
3. Yes, Both	3%	3%	3%
4. No	87%	92%	76%
9. Don't Know	7%	2%	9%
0. Refused/NA	2%	2%	11%
TOTAL	102%✓	100%	100%

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Table 62. Negative Consequences of Voting for Others

Q57. Were others that you know concerned that there might be negative consequences if they failed to vote for a particular party or candidate in the March 1998 elections?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Party	1%	1%	2%
2. Yes, Candidate	1%	-	1%
3. Yes, Both	2%	-	3%
4. No	77%	67%	73%
9. Don't Know	16%	32%	13%
0. Refuse/NA	1%	-	9%
TOTAL	98%✓	100%	101%✓

Table 63. Types of Consequences

Q58. [IF YES IN Q56 or Q57 ASK:] What kind of consequences caused you or others to be concerned?*

*% based on number of respondents who feared consequences	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (85)	5/98 (5)	5/98 (19)
Losing Job	22%	-	5%
Personal Safety	4%	-	5%
Future	18%	20%	5%
Not Used Vote	6%	-	5%
Deputy/Party would Fail	22%	-	63%
Other	6%	-	-
NA	4%	80%	-

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Table 64. Price Tampering for Elections

Q59. In your opinion, were the prices of staple goods kept low for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the elections?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	7%	16%	9%
2. No	78%	66%	77%
9. Don't Know	15%	18%	13%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	☆
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%✓

Table 65. Influence of Price Tampering on Vote

Q60. [IF YES IN Q59 AND VOTED IN Q. 14] How much influence did this have on the way you voted?*

*% based on number of respondents who felt there was price tampering for elections and who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (62)	5/98 (12)	5/98 (22)
1. A Great Deal	0%	-	-
2. A Fair Amount	15%	-	-
3. Not Very Much	22%	17%	14%
4. None At All	59%	83%	77%
9. Don't Know	4%	-	5%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	5%
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓

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Table 66. Improved Public Services for Elections

Q61. In your opinion, were public services improved, repairs made, or other works provided for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the elections?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	16%	21%	22%
2. No	70%	62%	65%
9. Don't Know	13%	14%	9%
0. Refused/NA	1%	3%	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%✓

Table 67. Influence of Improved Public Services on Vote

Q62. [IF YES IN Q61 AND VOTED IN Q14] How much influence did this have on the way you voted?*

*% based on number of respondents who perceived an improvement of public services and who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (150)	5/98 (19)	5/98 (53)
1. A Great Deal	3%	-	2%
2. A Fair Amount	8%	-	2%
3. Not Very Much	29%	26%	13%
4. None At All	55%	68%	81%
9. Don't Know	4%	5%	2%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	-
TOTAL	100%	99%✓	100%

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Table 68. Representativeness of Parliament

Q63. In your opinion, does the political composition of Supreme Rada adequately reflect the population's political preferences overall?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Strongly	3%	9%	2%
2. Yes, Somewhat	23%	11%	22%
3. No, Somewhat	31%	36%	30%
4. No, Strongly	16%	27%	17%
9. Don't Know	25%	13%	27%
0. Refused/NA	1%	4%	3%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	101%✓

Table 69. Effectiveness of Supreme Rada

Q64. Do you think that the Supreme Rada elected in March 1998 will be [ROTATE] more effective than the last Rada in addressing the problems facing Ukraine, less effective, or about the same as the last Rada?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. More Effective	21%	11%	23%
2. Less Effective	11%	12%	4%
3. Same	41%	58%	42%
9. Don't Know	26%	18%	30%
0. Refused/NA	1%	1%	1%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 70. Perceived Effectiveness of Parties and Blocs

Q65. On a scale of one to nine where "1" is the least effective and "9" is the most effective, where on that scale would you place each of the following parties and blocs in how effective they are in addressing the problems facing Ukraine?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA		UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)		5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
Communist Party				Green Party			
1. Least Productive	12%	25%	5%	1. Least Productive	13%	23%	8%
2	5%	3%	2%	2	8%	13%	8%
3	8%	10%	3%	3	11%	8%	13%
4	6%	6%	3%	4	10%	9%	7%
5	10%	9%	9%	5	11%	9%	4%
6	5%	2%	4%	6	5%	-	3%
7	5%	2%	10%	7	3%	4%	2%
8	4%	2%	7%	8	2%	5%	1%
9. Most Productive	18%	13%	23%	9. Most Productive	3%	4%	4%
99. Don't Know	23%	23%	23%	99. Don't Know	29%	20%	35%
0. Refused/NA	3%	5%	11%	0. Refused/NA	4%	5%	15%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%	TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%
People's Rukh				SDPU			
1. Least Productive	22%	27%	22%	1. Least Productive	14%	24%	18%
2	10%	5%	8%	2	8%	9%	4%
3	10%	11%	6%	3	10%	9%	5%
4	8%	8%	3%	4	8%	5%	3%
5	8%	10%	2%	5	8%	4%	3%
6	4%	6%	2%	6	4%	2%	1%
7	3%	1%	2%	7	2%	-	1%
8	2%	1%	4%	8	2%	1%	1%
9. Most Productive	5%	4%	2%	9. Most Productive	2%	-	2%
99. Don't Know	24%	22%	32%	99. Don't Know	37%	41%	45%
0. Refused/NA	4%	5%	17%	0. Refused/NA	5%	5%	18%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓

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	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA		UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Hromada				Socialist Party			
1. Least Productive	12%	23%	10%	1. Least Productive	9%	18%	10%
2	9%	8%	8%	2	9%	13%	4%
3	9%	6%	7%	3	8%	9%	8%
4	7%	7%	6%	4	8%	11%	5%
5	10%	9%	6%	5	10%	6%	6%
6	5%	6%	3%	6	4%	1%	5%
7	3%	4%	2%	7	4%	1%	2%
8	3%	2%	1%	8	4%	2%	☆
9. Most Productive	3%	3%	1%	9. Most Productive	5%	3%	1%
99. Don't Know	35%	27%	41%	99. Don't Know	34%	31%	42%
0. Refused/NA	4%	5%	16%	0. Refused/NA	4%	5%	17%
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓	TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%
Progressive Socialist				NDPU			
1. Least Productive	12%	20%	15%	1. Least Productive	11%	22%	11%
2	9%	7%	6%	2	8%	6%	3%
3	9%	9%	6%	3	8%	3%	5%
4	7%	7%	4%	4	7%	11%	5%
5	6%	9%	2%	5	8%	6%	5%
6	3%	-	1%	6	4%	4%	2%
7	3%	3%	☆	7	4%	1%	3%
8	3%	1%	-	8	3%	2%	1%
9. Most Productive	4%	1%	1%	9. Most Productive	5%	2%	3%
99. Don't Know	38%	38%	48%	99. Don't Know	37%	38%	46%
0. Refused/NA	5%	5%	18%	0. Refused/NA	5%	5%	16%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	101%✓	TOTAL	100%	100%	100%
Independents							
1. Least Productive	14%	24%	11%				
2	7%	7%	4%				
3	8%	6%	9%				
4	5%	5%	2%				
5	9%	11%	2%				
6	3%	2%	3%				
7	3%	1%	2%				
8	3%	1%	1%				
9. Most Productive	3%	4%	3%				
99. Don't Know	40%	34%	47%				
0. Refused/NA	5%	5%	16%				
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%				

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Table 71. Attractiveness of Mixed System of Elections

Q66. In your opinion, is the mixed system of elections in which one-half of the seats in Parliament are allocated to political parties and the other half is allocated to individual candidates a good way or a bad way to determine the composition of Supreme Rada?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Good Way, Strongly	11%	6%	4%
2. Good Way, Not Strongly	25%	22%	23%
3. Bad Way, Not Strongly	12%	22%	13%
4. Bad Way, Strongly	11%	12%	5%
9. Don't Know	42%	36%	51%
0. Refused/NA	1%	2%	5%
TOTAL	102%✓	100%	101%✓

Table 72. Seats for Political Parties

Q67. In your opinion, how many seats should be set aside for political parties?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. None	5%	10%	4%
2. One-quarter	14%	20%	19%
3. Half	24%	25%	21%
4. Three-quarters	6%	5%	8%
5. All	6%	9%	3%
9. Don't Know	44%	29%	42%
0. Refused/NA	2%	2%	3%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	100%

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Table 73. Assessment of Lack of Run-off

Q68. What is your assessment of the lack of a run-off election between the top two candidates in the single-mandate (candidate) elections? Is this a fair approach or not?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Fair	31%	43%	22%
2. Not Fair	27%	24%	25%
9. Don't Know	40%	32%	46%
0. Refused/NA	2%	1%	7%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 74. Job Performance of Local Polling Station

Q69. [IF VOTED IN Q. 14] How good of a job did your local polling station do in ensuring that the election process was fair to all candidates and parties or blocs?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Excellent	6%	-	2%
2. Good	41%	23%	27%
3. Fair	34%	45%	52%
4. Poor	8%	15%	10%
9. Don't Know	10%	17%	7%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓

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Table 75. Voter Lists at Polling Stations

Q70. [IF VOTED IN Q14] Which of the following best describes what happened when you went to vote on March 29, 1998?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (921)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Your name was already on the voter registry at the one polling station you visited	92%	91%	92%
2. Your name was placed on the registry after you presented identification	4%	6%	4%
3. You were prohibited from voting at one polling station, but sent to another where your name was on the registry and you voted there	☆	-	2%
4. You were prohibited from voting	0%	-	-
5. Other	1%	-	1%
9. Don't Know	2%	3%	2%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	102%✓

Table 76. Personal Information on Voter Registry

Q71. [IF VOTED IN Q14] Was your personal information on the voter registry correct when you voted?*

*% based on number of respondents who voted	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (66)	5/98 (200)
1. Yes	95%	97%	95%
2. No	4%	3%	4%
9. Don't Know	1%	-	1%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	100%	100%	101%✓

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Table 77. Announcement of National Election Results

Q72. Were national results from the March elections announced [ROTATE] too quickly, too slowly, or were they announced in a reasonable time period?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Too Quickly	10%	7%	4%
2. Too Slowly	23%	39%	28%
3. Reasonable Time Period	50%	37%	55%
9. Don't Know	16%	17%	11%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	1%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 78. Effect of Announcement of Results

Q73. [IF 2, 3, 9, 0 in Q.72 ASK] If the results had been publicized sooner, would this have increased, decreased, or made no difference in your confidence in the transparency of the election process?*

*% based on number of respondents who didn't feel election results were publicized too quickly	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1080)	5/98 (93)	5/98 (287)
1. Increased	17%	27%	11%
2. Decreased	5%	3%	3%
3. No Difference	47%	41%	59%
9. Don't Know	29%	29%	22%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	5%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%

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Table 79. Necessity of Political Parties

Q74. Do you believe that political parties are necessary for Ukrainian democracy or not?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Necessary, Strongly	37%	9%	51%	13%	38%	8%
2. Necessary, Not Strongly	21%	37%	21%	53%	22%	46%
3. Not Necessary, Not Strongly	12%	22%	7%	16%	10%	24%
4. Not Necessary, Strongly	16%	18%	11%	10%	17%	5%
9. Don't Know	14%	13%	10%	8%	13%	14%
0. Refused/NA	☆	1%	-	-	1%	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%✓	100%

Table 79b. Importance of Multi-Party Elections

How important do you think it is for Ukraine to have at least two political parties competing in an election – very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Very Important	23%	26%	23%	36%	34%	31%	17%
2. Somewhat Important	23%	31%	35%	28%	37%	32%	44%
3. Not Very Important	14%	15%	16%	15%	14%	16%	14%
4. Not At All Important	20%	13%	14%	14%	10%	9%	10%
9. Don't Know	20%	14%	11%	7%	5%	12%	13%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	☆	-	-	☆	3%
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	101%

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Table 80. Differences between Political Parties

Q75. Do you find that there are clear differences between the various political parties and blocs in how they plan to solve problems facing Ukraine?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Clear Differences	31%	41%	26%	62%	22%	36%
2. No, Not Clear Differences	49%	39%	50%	26%	54%	42%
9. Don't Know	19%	19%	22%	12%	24%	21%
0. Refused/NA	☆	1%	2%	-	☆	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Table 81. Objectiveness of Media

Q76. Now I'm going to ask about your views on the way our mass media report the news about events and developments in our country. For each of the following media, please tell me whether you would describe its domestic news coverage as objective or not objective.

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
A. UT-1							
1. Objective	31%	35%	46%	32%	44%	20%	28%
2. Not Objective	38%	25%	18%	29%	20%	33%	19%
9. Don't Know	22%	39%	33%	37%	31%	43%	45%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	3%	2%	5%	4%	8%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
B. UT-2/1 + 1							
1. Objective	33%	41%	59%	57%	58%	21%	47%
2. Not Objective	31%	17%	10%	12%	15%	30%	10%
9. Don't Know	36%	40%	28%	29%	25%	45%	38%
0. Refused/NA	-	1%	3%	2%	2%	4%	5%
TOTAL	100%	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
C. UT-3/INTER							
1. Objective	-	-	49%	-	56%	-	45%
2. Not Objective	-	-	11%	-	16%	-	1%
9. Don't Know	-	-	35%	-	25%	-	34%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	5%	-	3%	-	9%
TOTAL			100%		100%		99%✓

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
D. State Radio							
1. Objective	-	-	32%	-	40%	-	9%
2. Not Objective	-	-	12%	-	12%	-	7%
9. Don't Know	-	-	46%	-	42%	-	59%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	11%	-	6%	-	25%
TOTAL			101%✓		100%		100%
E. Independent Radio							
1. Objective	27%	26%	15%	26%	28%		8%
2. Not Objective	14%	7%	6%	11%	8%		5%
9. Don't Know	58%	63%	65%	58%	54%		61%
0. Refused/NA	-	3%	15%	5%	10%		25%
TOTAL	99%✓	99%✓	101%✓	100%	100%		99%✓
F. STB (Vikna)							
1. Objective	-	-	16%	-	34%	-	6%
2. Not Objective	-	-	6%	-	12%	-	9%
9. Don't Know	-	-	66%	-	48%	-	61%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	13%	-	6%	-	24%
TOTAL			101%✓		100%		100%
G. ICTV (VISTI)							
1. Objective	-	-	15%	-	26%	-	6%
2. Not Objective	-	-	7%	-	16%	-	7%
9. Don't Know	-	-	65%	-	51%	-	63%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	13%	-	7%	-	24%
TOTAL			100%		100%		100%

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Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
H. TET							
1. Objective	-	-	4%	-	28%	-	1%
2. Not Objective	-	-	5%	-	14%	-	7%
9. Don't Know	-	-	74%	-	53%	-	65%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	18%	-	5%	-	26%
TOTAL			101%✓		100%		101%

Table 82. Partisan Coverage in Media

Q77. In your opinion, did the news media show partisan support for different candidates or parties in their coverage of the news during the 1998 elections for Supreme Rada?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	58%	62%	65%
2. No	15%	7%	10%
9. Don't Know	27%	31%	24%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	1%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	100%

Table 83. Information about Political Developments

Q78. How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Great Deal	2%	3%	5%	7%	4%	4%	3%
2. Fair Amount	15%	21%	25%	26%	19%	20%	23%
3. Not Very Much	57%	56%	52%	56%	63%	52%	55%
4. None At All	19%	15%	12%	10%	12%	19%	12%
9. Don't Know	7%	5%	6%	1%	2%	5%	8%
0. Refused	-	☆	☆	-	-	-	☆
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%✓

Table 84. Information about Economic Developments

Q79. How much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE			KYIV		CRIMEA	
	5/96 (1660)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Great Deal	10%	2%	2%	5%	2%	4%	2%
2. Fair Amount	24%	15%	22%	26%	15%	20%	17%
3. Not Very Much	43%	55%	55%	58%	69%	55%	58%
4. None At All	17%	22%	15%	-	11%	17%	14%
9. Don't Know	6%	7%	5%	11%	3%	5%	9%
0. Refused/NA	-	-	☆	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	100%	101%✓	99%☆	100%	100%	101%✓	100%

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Table 85. Source of Information about Government and Politics

Q80. What is your main source of information about government and politics? [SHOW CARD]

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. UT-1	25%	14%	23%	10%	9%	5%
2. UT-2	18%	28%	20%	17%	8%	18%
3. UT-3	24%	24%	18%	17%	24%	27%
4. ICTV	1%	1%	3%	4%	-	1%
5. Independent Television Stations	1%	-	1%	-	4%	-
6. ORT	5%	3%	7%	6%	22%	13%
7. Other Channels of Russian Television	1%	☆	-	3%	2%	3%
8. Local TV Stations	-	1%	-	5%	-	9%
9. UR-1	4%	5%	9%	6%	-	☆
10. UR-2	-	-	1%	-	-	1%
11. UR-3	☆	-	-	-	-	-
12. Local Radio Stations	3%	2%	1%	-	4%	1%
13. Central (National) Newspapers	2%	3%	6%	6%	2%	2%
14. Local Newspapers	3%	5%	2%	11%	10%	3%
15. Articles in Journals	-	☆	-	1%	-	☆
16. Speeches, Public Meetings	☆	☆	-	-	☆	1%
17. Discussion with Family and Friends	3%	7%	1%	10%	7%	7%
18. STB	na	1%	na	1%	na	-
19. Other	1%	1%	2%	-	2%	1%
99. Don't Know	5%	4%	4%	3%	3%	7%
0. Refused/NA	☆	1%	-	-	1%	1%
TOTAL	96%✓	100%	98%✓	100%	98%✓	100%

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Table 86. Adequacy of Information about Candidates and Elections

Q81. Do you feel that you received enough information about the candidates or parties to make an informed choice for the 1998 Supreme Rada elections?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Candidates and Parties	48%	43%	38%
2. Yes, Candidates, Not Parties	6%	13%	7%
3. Yes, Parties, Not Candidates	10%	6%	3%
4. No, Neither	19%	27%	21%
9. Don't Know	15%	1%	29%
0. Refused/NA	2%	-	2%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 87. Influence on Military Personnel

Q82. In your opinion, are military personnel compelled by their superiors to vote for certain candidates or parties or do they exercise free choice in voting?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Compelled to Vote	26%	35%	32%
2. Free Choice	16%	18%	12%
3. Depends (VOLUNTEERED)	11%	9%	15%
9. Don't Know	45%	36%	34%
0. Refused/NA	2%	2%	7%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 88. Impact of Influence on Military Personnel

Q83. [IF COMPELLED IN Q82:] In your opinion, how much of an impact does this have on the outcome of elections?*

*% based on number of respondents who feel military personnel are compelled	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (307)	5/98 (35)	5/98 (96)
1. Great Impact	36%	43%	39%
2. Substantial Impact	47%	51%	52%
3. Not Much Impact	12%	6%	3%
4. No Impact	1%	-	4%
9. Don't Know	3%	-	2%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	-
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%

Table 89. Information about Rights under the Constitution

Q84. Thinking now about the Ukrainian Constitution...How much information do you have about your rights under the new Constitution of Ukraine?

	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
Year (Sample Size)	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. A Great Deal	4%	2%	7%	2%	4%	1%
2. Some	21%	13%	25%	6%	17%	9%
3. Not Very Much	35%	45%	46%	52%	32%	46%
4. None At All	38%	36%	22%	38%	41%	41%
9. Don't Know	3%	2%	-	1%	5%	2%
0. Refused/NA	☆	☆	-	1%	☆	1%
TOTAL	101%✓	98%✓	100%	100%	99%✓	100%

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Table 90. Availability of Information about Constitution

Q85. In your opinion, is information about the new Constitution readily available to most people or not?

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE		KYIV		CRIMEA	
	7/97 (1200)	5/98 (1200)	7/97 (100)	5/98 (100)	7/97 (300)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Information is Readily Available	26%	24%	28%	25%	22%	15%
2. No, Information is Not Readily Available	23%	46%	37%	56%	22%	57%
3. Depends [VOLUNTEERED]	5%	15%	5%	11%	6%	22%
9. Don't Know	5%	14%	8%	8%	3%	5%
0. Refused/NA	40%	1%	22%	-	47%	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

DEMOGRAPHICS

Table 91. Sex of Respondent

Year (Sample Size)	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Male	44%	44%	44%
2. Female	56%	56%	56%

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Table 92. What is your age please?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. 18-24	12%	14%	11%
2. 25-29	8%	10%	12%
3. 30-34	10%	8%	8%
4. 35-39	12%	18%	13%
5. 40-44	9%	6%	9%
6. 45-49	10%	14%	11%
7. 50-54	7%	7%	6%
8. 55-59	8%	8%	8%
9. 60-64	8%	7%	8%
10. 65-69	7%	-	5%
11. 70-74	6%	5%	5%
12. 75+	4%	3%	4%
0. Refused	0%	-	-
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	100%

Table 93. What is the highest level of education you received?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Primary	13%	-	10%
2. Secondary Incomplete	23%	15%	21%
3. Secondary Complete	48%	49%	52%
4. Less than Three Years of University	6%	10%	3%
5. More than Three Years of University	10%	24%	13%
6. Advanced Degree	1%	2%	1%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	100%

Table 94. What is your employment situation?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Employed Full-time at One Job	36%	35%	41%
2. Employed Part-time at One Job	9%	12%	8%
3. Employed at More than One Part-time Job	1%	1%	-
4. Student	4%	6%	3%
5. Pensioner	31%	22%	28%
6. Not Employed	13%	16%	14%
7. Homemaker	6%	8%	5%
8. Other	☆	-	-
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	-
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%✓

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Table 95. What is your field of employment?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. "Intellectual" Worker - Teacher, Journalist, Writer	3%	5%	4%
2. Executive and Professional and Senior-level (Government or Private)	3%	6%	3%
3. Executive or Professional at Mid-level (Government or Private)	9%	10%	12%
4. Skilled Laborer	20%	19%	18%
5. Unskilled Laborer	7%	5%	7%
6. Soldier, in Military Service	1%	2%	1%
7. Farmer	3%	-	4%
8. Student	4%	5%	3%
9. Other	1%	2%	1%
0. Refused/NA	0%	-	-
Not Employed/Pensioner/Other	50%	46%	47%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	99%✓

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Table 96. Occupation

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
State Sector			
1. Industrial Productions	9%	12%	4%
2. Construction	2%	-	3%
3. Transportation, Communications	3%	2%	3%
4. Culture and "nauka"	5%	9%	5%
5. Trade and Services	5%	7%	9%
6. Agriculture	5%	1%	6%
7. Security, Defense	2%	2%	3%
8. Other	5%	4%	5%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	1%
Private Sector			
1. Industrial Productions	3%	1%	☆
2. Construction	1%	1%	2%
3. Transportation, Communications	☆	2%	-
4. Culture and "nauka"	☆	3%	2%
5. Trade and Services	5%	6%	7%
6. Agriculture	☆	-	1%
7. Security, Defense	☆	3%	-
8. Other	1%	2%	2%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	1%

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Table 97. Back Wages

Q92. Are you currently owed any back wages or pension payments from your employer or the government?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	57%	23%	54%
2. No	36%	72%	26%
9. Don't Know	3%	-	6%
0. Refused/NA	4%	5%	14%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 98. Period for Which Back Wages Owed

Q93. [IF YES IN Q92 ASK:] For how long a period are you owed back payments?*

*% based on number of respondents owed back wages	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (688)	5/98 (23)	5/98 (163)
1. One Month or Less	16%	26%	15%
2. Two Months	16%	9%	16%
3. Three Months	14%	17%	16%
4. Four Months	14%	9%	16%
5. Five Months	11%	9%	16%
6. Six Months	6%	9%	6%
7. More than Six Months	21%	22%	12%
9. Don't Know	1%	-	2%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	105%✓	101%✓	100%

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Table 99. What is your marital status?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Married	69%	67%	62%
2. Single/Never Married	11%	14%	17%
3. Divorced/Separated	8%	12%	9%
9. Widowed	11%	7%	11%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	99%✓	100%	100%

Table 100. Do you have any children? [IF YES] Do they live with you?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes, Live with Respondent	60%	60%	53%
2. Yes, Do Not Live with Respondent	24%	23%	25%
3. No	16%	17%	20%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	2%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 101. What is your main ethnic heritage?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Ukrainian	74%	76%	25%
2. Russian	21%	20%	63%
3. Ukrainian and Russian	2%	4%	6%
4. Other	3%	-	6%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	☆
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 102. Have you ever been discriminated against because of your ethnicity?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Yes	7%	5%	8%
2. No	93%	94%	90%
9. Don't Know	☆	1%	2%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	☆
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 103. What is the main language you speak in your home? (Two Answers Acceptable)

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Ukrainian	54%	46%	8%
2. Russian	53%	70%	95%
3. Other	3%	-	4%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	☆

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**Table 104. Are you [or your husband/wife] a member of any of the following organizations?
[ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES]**

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Educational/Scientific/Scholarly Org.	☆	-	1%
2. Religious	2%	1%	3%
3. Ethnic Rights	☆	-	-
4. Charitable Group	☆	-	2%
5. Women's Group	1%	-	1%
6. Youth Groups	☆	-	☆
7. Sports Organization	1%	1%	1%
8. Environmental	1%	-	1%
9. Political Parties	1%	-	☆
10. Consumer Rights	☆	1%	1%
11. Independent Trade Union	1%	6%	1%
12. Veterans Group	1%	2%	2%
13. Labor Collective	8%	9%	7%
14. Creative Union	1%	1%	1%
15. None	81%	83%	78%
99. Don't Know	1%	1%	2%
0. Refused	1%	-	1%
TOTAL	100%	105%✓	102%✓

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For more information, contact: IFES, 1101 15th Street, NW, 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20005; Tel: (202) 828-8507; Fax: (202) 452-0804;
E-mail: opinion@ifes.org

Table 105. To what church or religious group do you belong?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. Ukrainian Orthodox	45%	39%	3%
2. Ukrainian Autocephalous Orth.	1%	3%	-
3. Greek Catholic	4%	1%	-
4. Russian Orthodox	4%	1%	3%
5. Roman Catholic	☆	-	☆
6. Orthodox	17%	26%	57%
7. Protestant	☆	-	☆
8. Muslim	☆	-	4%
9. Jewish	1%	-	-
10. Other	9%	12%	9%
11. None	10%	14%	17%
0. Refused/NA	6%	4%	6%
TOTAL	98%✓	100%	99%✓

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Table 106. Income Level

Q101. How would you describe the income level of your household – high, moderate, lower than moderate, low?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. High	☆	-	-
2. Moderate	16%	23%	20%
3. Lower than Moderate	26%	25%	25%
4. Low	58%	52%	54%
0. Refused/NA	☆	-	1%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

Table 107. Reliance on Shadow Economy

Q102. In your opinion, how much do most people in Ukraine rely on the shadow economy for their livelihood?

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. A Great Deal	23%	32%	11%
2. A Fair Amount	35%	36%	51%
3. Not Very Much	11%	9%	9%
4. Not At All	2%	1%	2%
9. Don't Know	28%	22%	22%
0. Refused/NA	1%	-	5%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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Table 108. Place of Residence

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. City of 500,000+	26%	100%	-
2. City 200,000-499,999	13%	-	28%
3. City 50,000-199,999	13%	-	32%
4. City 20,000-49,999	13%	-	10%
5. Towns of less than 20,000	4%	-	-
6. SMT	na	-	-
7. Rural Residents	32%	-	30%
TOTAL	101%✓	100%	100%

Table 109. Observed SES

	UKRAINE	KYIV	CRIMEA
Year (Sample Size)	5/98 (1200)	5/98 (100)	5/98 (300)
1. High	1%	-	1%
2. Moderate	28%	39%	24%
3. Lower than Moderate	31%	22%	31%
4. Low	35%	34%	39%
5. Indeterminate	5%	5%	5%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

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REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF UKRAINE

