



ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE 2003

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
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ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE 2003

**Prepared for the
International Foundation for Election Systems**

**Rakesh Sharma
Nathan Van Dusen**

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EXTENDING THE REACH OF DEMOCRACY

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Attitudes and Expectations: Public Opinion in Ukraine 2003
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Map of Ukraine

I. Introduction

This report contains findings from the latest survey and focus group research conducted in Ukraine by IFES. IFES' public opinion research in Ukraine forms a vital contribution to the more than 50 survey and focus group projects IFES has conducted in more than 20 countries around the world. This research in Ukraine, as well as IFES public opinion research in other countries, seeks to provide relevant and reliable information on local opinions and attitudes to government officials, development professionals, political actors, academics, and others interested in democratic and political development.

Since establishing an on-site presence in Kyiv in 1994, IFES has conducted 12 nationwide surveys of public opinion as well as 3 focus group projects. These studies have established a record of public opinion upon which to evaluate Ukraine's progress towards developing a more democratic society. This record has helped shape donor assistance programs, as well as IFES' technical assistance efforts, which are aimed at developing sustainable democratic electoral processes that meet the needs of an inclusive democratic state bound by the rule of law.

The principal analysts for this latest research were IFES Applied Research Officer Rakesh Sharma and Senior Program Assistant Nathan Van Dusen. IFES Senior Program Officer Michael Svetlik and IFES Program Assistant Susan Smith provided programmatic and administrative support to the project. Interviewing and data processing was completed by TNS-Ukraine, under the direction of Oxana Bandurovych.

For this year's research, IFES was also assisted in many facets of the project by a prominent Ukrainian research NGO, Intellectual Perspectives (IP). IP worked with Sharma and Van Dusen to help contextualize the survey findings and aid in presenting the survey data through public presentations in Ukraine. IP also conducted the focus groups and prepared the report on the focus groups that is presented in Appendix 4. IFES would like to recognize Yuri Privalov, Director of IP and Tamila Voytenko, IP Sociologist for their contributions to this project.

The current research relies heavily upon IFES' cumulative experience with opinion research in Ukraine. The questionnaire is reflective of the information and experience garnered from all previous IFES research and technical assistance programs in Ukraine. Previous surveys have been conducted under the direction of Elehie Natalie Skoczylas, Gary A. Ferguson, and Thomas Carson.

This report:

- Analyzes key indicators of democratic development, including: confidence in government and judicial institutions, corruption, and political and economic reform;
- Updates trend data on political efficacy and interest in politics collected by IFES beginning in 1994;
- Examines attitudes toward political parties and NGOs and assesses support for political rights and civic participation;
- Measures the level of contact with local officials and provides evaluations of local services;
- Evaluates perceptions of information available on political and economic developments, as well as the overall performance of Ukrainian media; and
- Summarizes variations in attitudes across social groups and geographic regions in Ukraine.

The report is comprised of seven sections. The Executive Summary provides technical details of the survey and focus group implementation and highlights key survey findings. Section III describes overall satisfaction levels with daily life in Ukraine, as well as evaluations of the economic situation in the country. Section IV examines attitudes toward democracy and rights, and respondents' evaluations of the state of Ukrainian democracy. Section V measures confidence in and interaction with national and local-level government institutions. Section VI explores Ukrainians' interest in politics and related measures of efficacy. Section VII focuses on the stature of political parties and NGOs. Lastly, Section VIII examines access to information and media quality.

II. Executive Summary

This survey is the 12th in a series of surveys conducted by IFES in Ukraine since 1994. The 2003 survey comprises 1,265 interviews throughout Ukraine, including an oversample of 65 interviews in Kyiv. The data used in this report has been weighted with regard to region, sex, and age to be nationally representative. Interviews were conducted in both Ukrainian and Russian, with fieldwork completed between 10 and 19 September, 2003. The margin of error for a survey of this size is plus or minus 3%. For this year's survey, IFES is collaborating with a Ukrainian research organization, Intellectuał'na Perspektiva, in the analysis and contextualization of the data. Following the September survey, Intellectuał'na Perspektiva also conducted a series of eight focus groups that explore further the themes of the nationwide survey research. Four of these focus groups were conducted with residents of Kyiv, two with residents of Kharkiv, and two with residents of Lviv. The findings from these focus groups are also included in this report.

Overall Satisfaction and Economic Situation

- Continuing a trend observed in previous IFES surveys, a solid majority of Ukrainians are either very dissatisfied (47%) or somewhat dissatisfied (38%) with the overall situation in Ukraine. The overall level of dissatisfaction mirrors the data observed in both 2001 and 2002. Ten percent are somewhat satisfied with the overall situation while a meager 3% are very satisfied. Negative perception of the economic situation is once again the primary factor for the high level of dissatisfaction observed in the survey data.
- Eighty-six percent of Ukrainians rate the current economic situation as either very bad or somewhat bad, while only 9% rate it as somewhat good. A plurality of respondents (41%) says that economic conditions have stayed the same since last year. This compares with 19% who say the economic situation has improved and 34% who believe it has worsened compared to one year ago. Most of those who say that the economic situation has stayed the same (88%) also think that current economic situation is bad.
- A plurality (37%) thinks that the economic situation will remain the same over the next year. Twenty-two percent think the situation will get worse and 18% feel it will be better. Combining responses to the questions on current and future economic conditions, 54% of respondents feel the situation is currently bad and likely to stay the same or get worse. This is a slight improvement over the 61% who held these opinions in the 2002 survey.
- IFES surveys since 2000 have shown a consistent preference by Ukrainians for a primarily market-driven economy over a primarily centrally-planned economy. In this year's survey, 31% prefer a market economy, 21% prefer a centrally-planned economy, and 30% prefer a neutral point in between. Preference for a market economy goes down with age, with more than 40% of those aged 18-35 preferring a market-driven economy.
- Despite the fact that a plurality prefers a market-driven economy, many of these respondents are less enamored of privatization of key industries and sectors in Ukraine. A majority of respondents are reluctant to support or don't at all support privatization in the electricity (65%) and coal industries (59%), whereas a plurality does not support privatization in telecommunications (46%) and collective farms (45%). There has been an increase, however, in the percentage of Ukrainians who completely or somewhat support privatization from 2002 to 2003 in all four sectors. Ukrainians 18-35 are most likely to support privatization in these sectors.
- Driving the lack of support for privatization are concerns about the economic impact of privatization as well as a feeling that the industries mentioned are state property. Most significant for privatization's critics is the concern that it will lead to higher prices. Corruption and distrust of privatizing entrepreneurs are less frequently mentioned.

- Corruption in general does, however, remain a widely perceived concern. A large majority of Ukrainians believe that corruption is a very serious or somewhat serious problem among hospitals (85%), the police (83%), universities (79%), courts (74%), customs authorities (67%), and tax authorities (66%). There is also little confidence in the authorities' ability to deal with the problem. Only 29% of Ukrainians believe that corruption can likely be countered, whereas 58% think this is unlikely.
- A majority of Ukrainians also believe that many corrupt actions undertaken by both public officials and ordinary citizens do take place frequently in Ukraine. The list of actions undertaken by ordinary citizens includes: claiming benefits illegally, cheating on taxes, taking money for a vote, and offering money to teachers for better grades. The list of actions that could be undertaken by officials includes: taking bribes, helping acquaintances, benefiting from privatization, taking money for permits, and using public funds privately.

Democracy and Rights

- Respondents were provided a list of ten statements or terms and asked to choose five that they thought represented the meaning of democracy. Human rights received the most mentions (66%), followed by "everyone has work" (60%), "retirees are looked after by the state" (55%), and "no official corruption" (48%). Such tenets of democracy as freedom of choice, speech, and voting were mentioned less frequently. This data contributes to the finding that economic difficulty is the leading factor for opinions on many issues in Ukraine.
- There has been a marked increase in the percentage of Ukrainians who say that Ukraine is not a democracy since 2001 (2001 – 47%, 2002 – 53%, 2003 – 64%). Twenty-two percent of Ukrainians say that Ukraine is a democracy. Of those who feel that Ukraine is not a democracy, a majority (58%) do not feel it is becoming a democracy while 26% believe that it is. Those that are dissatisfied with the overall situation in the country are more likely to say that Ukraine is not a democracy than those who are satisfied with the overall situation.
- Most Ukrainians (63%) say that they have not changed their minds on whether Ukraine is a democracy over the past two years. Twenty percent say that they have changed their minds on Ukrainian democracy over this period. Those Ukrainians who say that the economic situation has improved over the last year are more likely to have changed their minds on Ukrainian democracy (32%) than those the economic situation has stayed the same (17%) or gotten worse (19%). Those who have changed their minds are more likely to feel that Ukraine is currently a democracy (43%) than those who have not changed their minds (17%).
- The fact that a majority does not believe that Ukraine is a democracy does not necessarily mean that Ukrainians are especially wedded to the freedoms a democracy embodies. Respondents on the survey were asked whether they agreed that it was more important for their leaders to maintain order or protect freedoms. A majority (52%) agree that it is more important to maintain order than protect freedoms, while 25% disagree with this assessment. In the 2002 survey, 46% agreed while 26% disagreed. A plurality or majority of almost all major sub-groups in Ukrainian society opt for order over freedoms.
- The amount of latitude that Ukrainians are willing to give government officials in enforcing order depends on the freedoms that are being curtailed. A majority of Ukrainians believe that it is never justified for government authorities to limit citizen protests (52%) or to limit freedom of the press (50%). A plurality believe that it is never justified to limit the authority of the courts (43%), while a minority consider limiting the activities of citizens' groups (32%) or political parties (21%) unjustified.

- Ukrainians generally do not exhibit much confidence in their justice system. Overall, 62% do not think that the courts would acquit a wrongly accused person, while only 21% exhibit such confidence. Levels of confidence vary, however, for different levels of the judiciary. If “Don’t know” responses are discounted, a majority of Ukrainians express a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Appellate Courts. A majority profess little or no confidence in local courts, public prosecutors or the police. All judicial institutions are perceived by a majority of Ukrainians to be influenced in their decision-making by outside interests.
- The majority of Ukrainians (62%) are unaware of the existence of a bill, or bills, mandating constitutional amendments that would change the power relationships between the presidency and parliament. A minority of 38% are aware of it. Of those aware of one or more of the proposals to amend the constitution, 11% say that they support the amendments, 41% say that they partially support them, and 35% say that they do not support them.

Confidence in Officials and Institutions

- Of the major governmental institutions in the country, the military is the only one that elicits confidence among a majority of Ukrainians (56%) and mayors are the only other institution in which more Ukrainians have confidence (47%) than not (40%). Of the institutions about which respondents were asked, the President receives the lowest confidence rating (22%). Seventy percent of Ukrainians have little or no confidence in President Kuchma.
- Nearly all major sub-groups in the population are more likely to profess little or no confidence in President Kuchma than to profess confidence. One exception is those who are very or somewhat satisfied with the overall situation in the country (51% confidence).
- There is also little faith in the effectiveness of Ukraine’s government institutions. A plurality or majority rate as ineffective the oblast governors (44%), city/village councils (45%), mayors (46%), the Rada (70%) and the President (71%). Of the institutions, city/village councils are felt to be effective by the largest percentage of Ukrainians (42%).
- Nearly a third of Ukrainians (29%) have had contact with local level officials in the past. Contact with local elected officials is higher in rural areas (34%) than large cities (24%). Among those who contacted local officials, 66% report having received a response from the official, and 16% received a partial response. Of those who received a reply, 56% report satisfaction with the response, and 43% report dissatisfaction.
- When asked about the level of service in the water supply, district heating and housing maintenance (urban and semi-urban respondents only) provided by their local self-government, more Ukrainians say they have not noticed any change in these services over the past year than those who say they have seen improvements or deterioration. In the case of housing maintenance, 24% say they have seen deterioration in this service compared to the 6% who have seen improvements. Differences between those who noticed deterioration and those who noticed improvement in water supply and district heating services were not statistically significant.
- Forty-one percent report that their cities or villages have citizen advisory boards. Among these respondents, 39% think the boards are at least somewhat effective, while 34% think that they are at best not very effective. Forty-eight percent of Ukrainians do not know if their cities or villages have these institutions and 11% say that they do not.

Interest and Participation in Politics

- A majority of Ukrainians (58%) are very or somewhat interested in politics, while 38% are not interested or not too interested in politics. Education and gender are key factors in explaining interest in politics. Men have greater interest in politics than women (65% men vs. 53% women), and Ukrainians with at least some higher education are more interested than those with less than a complete secondary education (71% vs. 44%). Those who are interested in politics are much more likely to discuss politics often with friends and acquaintances (30%) than those with little or no interest in politics (4%).
- Most Ukrainians have little voter or political efficacy. This is the case whether respondents have an interest in politics or not. Overall, 69% of Ukrainians disagree that voting gives them influence over decision-making (25% agree); 78% disagree that people like them can influence the decisions made by government in Ukraine (14% agree); and 68% agree that politics is too complicated (26% disagree). Economic status may play a role in these beliefs. Those who think that the current economic situation is good are much more likely to agree that voting influences decision-making and that people like them can influence government decisions than those who say that the current economic situation is bad.
- Corresponding to voter and political efficacy are sentiments regarding the 2002 parliamentary and local elections. A majority of respondents think that the 2002 elections were completely or somewhat unfair (55%), while 29% think they were completely or somewhat fair. Perceptions of electoral fairness have a significant impact on likelihood of voting and opinions on whether Ukraine is a democracy. Among those who think the 2002 election was very or somewhat fair, 91% are likely to vote in the 2004 presidential election and 35% think Ukraine is a democracy. Among those who think the 2002 election was unfair, 75% are likely to vote in 2004 and only 14% think Ukraine is a democracy.
- Despite negative perceptions of the electoral and political processes, Ukrainians continue to exhibit high levels of electoral participation. Eighty-two percent of respondents report having voted in the 2002 parliamentary and local elections. Similarly, eighty percent of Ukrainians are very likely (65%) or somewhat likely (15%) to vote in the 2004 election for president. Ethnic Ukrainians are more likely to vote (82%) than ethnic Russians (74%). Those who are satisfied with the overall situation in the country are more likely to vote (90%) than those who are dissatisfied (79%). A plurality of respondents (47%) do not have much confidence that the 2004 election will be fair, whereas 31% believe that it is very or somewhat likely that the election will be fair. Monitoring by international election observers (22%) is cited as the most likely reason why the elections may be fair.
- Only 18% of Ukrainians say that they receive enough information to make a wise choice when voting. Thirty-five percent say they receive barely enough information, and 34% receive little or no information to make wise decisions when voting. Forty-three percent agree that they are informed about the electoral process, not significantly different from the 41% who disagree that they are informed about the electoral process.
- Half of all Ukrainians know that there have been some discussions regarding President Kuchma running for another term as president, while half do not know of these discussions. An overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (79%) are of the opinion that Kuchma should not be allowed to seek another term in 2004. Only 10% support this notion. Even 56% of those who have confidence in the president do not think that he should be allowed to seek another term.
- Seventy percent of Ukrainians feel safe in voting and another 53% agree that their vote is kept confidential during the election process. However, only 33% agree that the official election results reflect the actual voting and 38% agree that elections are competently administered in Ukraine.

Political Parties and NGOs

- Only 23% of Ukrainians say that they support a specific political party, down from 31% in the 2002 IFES survey. Among those who do support a specific party, 30% support the Communist party, 22% the “Our Ukraine” bloc, 10% the Social Democratic Party, 3% the Greens of Ukraine, 3% the Socialist Party, 2% the People’s Rukh, 2% the Tymoshenko bloc, and 0.6% the bloc “For a United Ukraine.”
- The low level of support for specific political parties may reflect that fact that only 14% of Ukrainians think that most parties have clear proposals to address important issues, while 35% feel that only some of the parties have clear proposals. Thirty percent feel that none of the parties have clear proposals. The tendency to support any particular party goes down with the belief that parties have no clear proposals.
- Trade unions are the prominent vehicle for membership in civic organizations in Ukraine. Sixteen percent of Ukrainians report that they are members of trade unions. Three percent are members of religious organizations, 2% political parties, and only 0.1% of NGOs.
- Few respondents (20%) are aware of NGOs active in their communities. However, this represents a nearly two-fold increase from the 12% who were aware of NGOs in their communities in the 2002 IFES survey. Forty-five percent are not aware any NGOs in their communities (55% in 2002), and 24% don’t know what NGOs are. Those who know of active NGOs mention the following areas of activity: providing social help (35%), aid organizations (5%), care for veterans of wars (8%), environmental activities (9%), and youth aid (5%).
- Among those who know what NGOs are, nearly half (49%) feel that NGOs are essential or necessary for Ukraine. Twenty-three percent think that NGOs are not very or not at all necessary, while 28% don’t know. A great deal or fair amount of confidence in NGOs is expressed by 38% of Ukrainians, up from 27% in 2002, while 26% don’t have much or any confidence. Of those who know what NGOs are, 37% still don’t know enough about them to give an opinion as to whether they are necessary or not.

Information and the Media

- For the first time in IFES surveys in Ukraine, more Ukrainians than not say that they have a great deal or fair amount of information on both political and economic developments. Fifty-eight percent of Ukrainians have a great deal or fair amount of information about political events, while 48% have a similar amount of information about economic developments. Those with a great deal or fair amount of information on political and economic developments are more likely to be interested in politics.
- Television, particularly private TV, is the major source of news and information for most Ukrainians. Respondents listed the following media outlets as their primary sources of information: Inter (33%), 1+1 (23%), Ukrainian newspapers (5%), UT-1 (5%), UT-2 (3%), UR-1 (5%), ICTV (3%), ORT (3%), Novyi Canal (2%), and local TV stations (2%).
- The media in Ukraine is generally rated positively by most Ukrainians. Seven percent of respondents have a great deal of confidence in the media, 54% have a fair amount, 20% do not have too much confidence, and 6% have no confidence at all. Most Ukrainians believe, however, that members of the media may be in danger in their quest to objectively report the news. Sixty-eight percent of respondents think it is dangerous for journalists to objectively report the news, while 20% feel that journalists are safe in objectively reporting the news. The percentage citing safety concerns has increased from 62% in the 2002 survey.


III. Overall Satisfaction and Economic Situation

Opinions on many key issues in the 2003 IFES survey in Ukraine are dictated by Ukrainians' bleak assessment of economic conditions in the country. Most Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the overall situation in the country and economic conditions are a primary rationale for this sentiment. The economic difficulties faced by Ukrainians inform their preferences on the future direction of the Ukrainian economy. Preference for a market economy over a state-controlled economy is now entrenched in Ukrainian public opinion, although there is still majority opposition to privatization of key industries. Dissatisfaction with the overall situation is also related to the perceived seriousness of corruption in Ukraine.

Opinions on the Economic Situation

The data from the 2003 IFES survey in Ukraine reveals that most Ukrainians have a negative perception of the economic situation in the country. A plurality of Ukrainians (47%) rate the current economic situation in the country as 'somewhat bad' and another 39% describe it as 'very bad'. Only 9% of Ukrainians have a positive assessment of the current economic situation, describing it as somewhat good. Evaluation of the economic situation has not changed markedly since the 2002 IFES survey (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Assessment of Current Economic Situation, Trend



"How would you describe the economic situation in Ukraine today?" (n=1200)¹


Not only do most Ukrainians rate the current economic situation negatively, a plurality (41%) also thinks that the current economic situation is worse than the economic situation a year ago. Thirty-four percent of Ukrainians think the current economic situation is the same as a year ago while 19% think that it is better.

Figure 2 on the next page illustrates that those who say the economic situation is better than that of one year ago, are more likely to say that the current economic situation is very or somewhat good than those who say the economic situation is the same or worse than last year. However, the widespread disillusionment with economic conditions in Ukraine can be glimpsed from the

¹ National Sample Sizes for previous IFES surveys referenced in this report: May 1998, June 1999, and January 2000 (n=1200); November 2000 and September 2001 (n=1500); September 2002 (n=1200).

fact that even 66% of those who say the economic situation is better compared to last year evaluate the current economic situation as very or somewhat bad.

Figure 2. Assessment of Current Economic Situation, by Change in Economic Situation



Overall, 63% of Ukrainians think the current economic situation is somewhat or very bad and that it has stayed the same or gotten worse over the past year. Thirteen percent think that the current economic situation is bad but has gotten better over the past year. Only 9% of Ukrainians think the current economic situation is somewhat or very good and has stayed the same or gotten better over the past year. Most Ukrainians think that the country's economy has followed a downward trend over the past year.

Ukrainians are relatively more positive about economic conditions over the next year. The percentage of respondents who say the economic situation will get worse (22%) is not significantly larger than the percentage that says the economic situation will get better (18%). This is an improvement in positive sentiment over the 2002 IFES survey in Ukraine when 13% felt the economic situation would get better and 22% felt it would get worse. Thirty-seven percent in this year's survey think that the economic situation will stay the same from this year to next year (44% in 2002).

Opinions on changes in the economic situation in the past have a strong influence on expectations for the future. Among those who feel that the economic situation improved over the past year, 50% believe that the economic situation will be better in one year's time, 21% believe it will be the same, and 7% believe it will be worse. Opinions are basically reversed among those who think the economic situation deteriorated over the past year. Among this group, 44% think the economic situation will get worse in a year, 31% think it will stay the same, and 8% believe it will improve.

There are also regional differences in expectations for future economic conditions. Comparing the net expectation rating (% who think economic situation will be better - % who think economic situation will be worse) for various regions, residents of Kyiv are most bullish about future economic conditions (28% better, 9% worse). The two other regions where residents are more confident than pessimistic about future economic conditions are the Southeast (25% better, 18%


worse) and the Eastern region (26% better, 21% worse). The most pessimistic outlook is in the southern portion of the country: Crimea (10% better, 36% worse), Southwest (14% better, 26% worse), and Southern region (18% better, 30% worse).

Satisfaction with Overall Situation

The generally negative perception of economic conditions in the country has a significant impact on satisfaction with the overall situation in Ukraine. The vast majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the overall situation in Ukraine and this dissatisfaction is even greater among those with negative perceptions of the economic situation in the country.

Forty-seven percent of Ukrainians are very dissatisfied with the overall situation in Ukraine and a further 38% are somewhat dissatisfied (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Satisfaction with Overall Situation, Trend



“Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the overall situation in Ukraine?” (n=1200)

Figure 3 indicates that the general level of dissatisfaction in Ukraine has been very high since 1997, although the intensity of dissatisfaction has declined significantly since 1997. Far fewer Ukrainians are very dissatisfied with the situation in 2003 than they were in 1997 (75%). There has been a small increase in the percentage of Ukrainians satisfied with the situation in the country since the December 2000 IFES survey but the percentage dissatisfied still far outnumbers the percentage satisfied.


Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the overall situation in the country, and given the role economic conditions play in this evaluation, the future course of Ukraine’s economy is a key concern for all Ukrainians. The next section indicates that a market economy has become the preferred choice of more Ukrainians than a state-controlled economy.

Economic sentiment plays a large part in dissatisfaction with the overall situation in the country. This can be seen more clearly by creating an ‘economic sentiment’ scale combining the responses to the questions on the current economic conditions and evaluation of the change in the economic situation since last year. On this scale, the higher the value, the more positive is the sentiment toward the economic situation in the country. Values on the scale range from 2 to 6. It should be

pointed out that economic sentiment as measured by this scale is inversely related to age, i.e. economic sentiment goes up with a decrease in age. But for all age groups, more members of the group share negative economic sentiments (values of 2 and 3) than positive economic sentiments (values of 5 and 6).

When these groups are compared by their average level of satisfaction with the overall situation in Ukraine, a direct relationship is evident. The higher the value on the economic sentiment scale, the higher is the average satisfaction in that group with the overall situation in Ukraine². Figure 4 illustrates this relationship between average satisfaction with the overall situation in the county and economic sentiment. Values on the average satisfaction scale range from a low of 1 (very dissatisfied) to a high of 4 (very satisfied).

Figure 4. Average Satisfaction with Overall Situation, by Economic Sentiment




Dissatisfaction with the overall situation is widespread in Ukraine. More than 77% of residents in each region of Ukraine are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the overall situation. The lowest level of satisfaction is exhibited by those in the Northern region (4%) while the highest is among those in the Northwest (19%) and Kyiv (17%).

Preferred Economic System

Starting with the IFES survey in Ukraine in January 2000, more Ukrainians have consistently expressed a preference for a market economy than the number that prefers a state-controlled economy. Even though there has been a slight narrowing in the preference for a market economy over a state-controlled economy since the 2002 IFES survey, this preference for a market economy continues in this year's survey (Figure 5 next page). Respondents were given a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 means a completely free-market economy and 5 means complete state control of the economy), and asked to choose a position on the scale which they would prefer for Ukraine's economic system. In Figure 5, values 1 and 2 represent a 'Market' preference, 3 represents the 'Neutral' position, and 4 and 5 represent a 'State Control' position.

² ANOVA, $p=.000$, significant at 0.05 level.

Figure 5. Preferences for Economic System, Trend



"Here you see a picture with a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state. Where on that scale do you think Ukraine should be located in the future?" (n=1200)

Nearly an equal percentage prefers a market economy (31%) as those that prefer a neutral approach (30%). Fewer prefer a state-controlled economy (21%). While the gap in preference between a market and state-controlled economy has narrowed somewhat since the 2002 IFES survey, significantly more Ukrainians still prefer a market economy over a state-controlled economy.

Findings from the focus groups conducted after the survey seem to indicate that Ukrainians may have a fairly accurate perception of what a market economy means. While focus group findings are not representative of the opinions of all Ukrainians, they can give an indication of the opinions prevalent in society. Many participants in the IFES focus groups equate a market economy with the free regulation of supply and demand and flexible pricing. Market economy is also thought to result in competition which leads to an increase in quality of goods as well as equal opportunities.

When it comes to preference for a market economy, there is a significant discrepancy in this preference between different age groups. Generally, the younger the respondent the more likely he or she is to prefer a market economy over a state-controlled economy. In fact, the only age group in which more respondents prefer a state-controlled economy over a market economy is the 56 and over group (30% state-control, 21% market). More Ukrainians in younger age groups prefer a market economy over state-control. The two age groups with highest support for a market economy are the 18-25 group (44%, 15% state) and the 26-35 age group (42%, 17% state). The significantly higher preference for a market economy among younger age groups is a consistent trend going back to the 1998 IFES survey in Ukraine and indicates that preference for a market economy is now entrenched in Ukrainian public opinion and likely to increase in the future.

Economic sentiment is an important predictor in support for a market or state-controlled economy. Support for a market economy goes up with an increase in positive economic sentiment. Twenty-nine percent of those with the most negative economic sentiment (value of 2)

prefer a market economy and 26% prefer state control. Forty-nine percent of those with the most positive economic sentiment (value of 6) prefer a market economy while 16% prefer state control. Among those with positive economic sentiment (value of 5 or 6), even Ukrainians aged 55 and above have levels of support for a market economy similar to those of respondents aged 18-35.

Residents of the central region of the country are more inclined to express preference for a state-controlled economy over a market economy (36% versus 29%). Residents of most other regions prefer a market economy over a state-controlled economy with those in the northeast (39%) and Kyiv (34%) most likely to do so.


Those who support a market economy were asked their opinions on whether the government has taken significant, minor, or no actions at all to move Ukraine toward a market economy. Most supporters of a market economy (61%) think that the government has only taken minor actions to move Ukraine to a market economy. Ten percent think the government has taken significant actions toward this goal, and 18% think that no actions at all have been taken to move Ukraine to a market economy. The opinion that the government has taken no action is more pronounced among those who think the current economic situation is somewhat or very bad (20%) than those who think the current economic situation is good (8%).

Privatization

A key element of any move toward a market economy is privatization of state-owned industries. However, the checkered history of privatization in the former Soviet republics has led to public apprehension about this process. Public opinion in Ukraine on this issue suggests that Ukrainians are no exception.

When asked whether they support privatization in telecommunications, collective farms, and electricity and coal sectors, more Ukrainians are reluctant to support or do not support privatization in these areas than the number who do support privatization (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Support for Privatization, in %



"In the last few years the government has begun the process to sell state owned enterprises. Please tell me to what degree you support privatization efforts in the following sectors?" (n=1200)

Far more Ukrainians are reluctant to support or do not support privatization of the electricity (65%) and coal (59%) sectors than they are privatization of telecommunications (46%) or collective farms (45%). Despite a minority supporting privatization in all four sectors, there has been significant increase in support for privatization in all four sectors since the 2002 IFES survey. In 2002, 12% supported privatization in electricity compared to 21% in this year's survey. For coal, support has increased from 16% to 24% and for telecommunications support has increased from 30% to 37%. Support for privatization for collective farms has increased from 34% in 2002 to 39% in this year's survey.

Cluster analysis reveals that the attitudes toward privatization are fairly consistent across the four sectors and the responses on these four items can be grouped to create an overall attitude toward privatization for each respondent. Doing so reveals that Ukrainians fall into the following basic categories in relation to privatization:


- Generally supportive (22%)
- Generally reluctant to support (23%)
- Generally non-supportive (39%)
- Generally no opinion (15%)

A majority of Ukrainians are generally reluctant to support or are outright opposed to privatization of key sectors of the economy. The reluctance to support privatization is indicated by the fact that even among those who prefer a market economy for Ukraine, general supporters of privatization are not significantly likely to outnumber general non-supporters of privatization (32% versus 30%).

As with preference for a market economy, younger Ukrainians are more likely to be generally supportive of privatization than those 55 and above. Residents of the southwest (39%) and the eastern region (37%) are most likely to be supportive of privatization. These are also the only two regions where general supporters of privatization outnumber general non-supporters. Residents of the central oblasts are most likely not to support privatization (59%).

To ascertain the reasons why most Ukrainians are opposed to privatization, the IFES survey asked respondents who are reluctant to support or do not support privatization in at least one sector why this is so. Respondents could provide as many responses as they wished. The reasons cited are outlined in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Reasons for Lack of Support for Privatization




"Why are you opposed to privatization in [this area/these areas]?" (n=823)

Looking at the responses in Figure 7, two rationales stand out as reasons for a lack of support for privatization. Many Ukrainians are opposed to privatization because of the perceived negative economic impact of this process: the fact that privatization leads to increases in prices, deterioration of finances, and unemployment. The other primary rationale for opposition is the belief that these sectors are the property of the state and the people, and should not be squandered. Stability is a less important concern. Somewhat surprisingly, negative reactions to oligarchy are not a primary reason for opposition. While distrust of entrepreneurs and corruption are mentioned, they are not the primary reasons for opposition to privatization. Economic concerns are the primary motivators for ambivalence toward privatization. Similar opinions about opposition to privatization were expressed in the focus groups.

Corruption

Even though corruption is not a primary reason for opposition to privatization, it is of general concern to the vast majority of Ukrainians. Previous IFES surveys in Ukraine have shown that corruption is consistently perceived to be both a common and serious problem by more than 85% of Ukrainians. In the 2003 IFES survey, respondents were not asked about corruption in general; rather, they were asked to assess the seriousness of corruption in important public institutions. As Figure 8 illustrates, Ukrainians believe that corruption is a serious problem in all these institutions.

Figure 8. Seriousness of Corruption in Select Institutions



"In your opinion, how serious is the problem of corruption at each of the following institutions -- is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?" (n=1200)

For each of the institutions rated, more than 60% of Ukrainians think that corruption is a very or somewhat serious problem. A majority of Ukrainians think that corruption is a very serious problem in the police force (55%) and hospitals (52%).

Forty-four percent of Ukrainians think that corruption is a serious problem in universities and schools and 35% think it is a somewhat serious problem. Respondents on the survey were also asked whether they were aware of anyone who had given money to a teacher or head of a college or university for the year's entrance examinations. Among those who were asked, 32% say that they do know of someone who had given money. When these respondents were asked why the money was given, 52% replied it was to secure entrance to the college or university and 40% reported it was to secure higher marks on the examination.

Figure 8 indicates that corruption is perceived to be a serious problem in many institutions in Ukraine. In order to judge the frequency of certain actions by both ordinary citizens and officials that can be considered corrupt, respondents were asked how frequently these actions take place in Ukraine. Respondents were also asked whether these actions are always, sometimes, or never justified. The results from the survey are presented below (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Frequency and Justification of Corrupt Actions (in %)

	Always/ Sometimes Happens	Never Justified
Actions Possible by Citizens		
Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties	86	81
Cheating on tax if one had the chance	78	52
Offering gifts or money to teachers/professors to improve one's grade or that of one's child	73	59
Claiming government benefits to which one is not entitled	68	59
Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party	67	77
Actions Taken by Officials		
The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials	83	86
High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries	80	85
High officials helping their acquaintances in private business	78	62
Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly	73	74

"Next, I will read you a list of actions people sometimes do. For each, tell me if this activity occurs often here in Ukraine. Please use the answers listed on your card. Does [READ FIRST ITEM ON LIST] happen very often, sometimes, not very often, or never at all?" (n=1200)

"Now, I will read the list to you again. Please tell me for each, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified." (n=1200)

Further pointing to the perception of corruption in Ukraine, a majority of Ukrainians think that each of these actions happens always or sometimes in Ukraine. Ukrainians have generally similar evaluations of the frequency of these actions among both officials and their fellow citizens. However, Ukrainians in general are more likely to think that corrupt actions that only officials can undertake are never justified (average of 77%) as opposed to actions that ordinary citizens can undertake (average of 66%). Regardless of the perceived differences in justification corrupt actions by citizens or public officials, there is a wide gulf between what Ukrainians expect and what they think actually occurs with regard to corruption in Ukraine.


IV. Attitudes toward Democracy

IFES' public opinion research in Ukraine has chronicled the citizenry's self-assessed progress toward democratic governance. Ukrainians generally do not feel that they live in a genuinely democratic system, a sentiment that is influenced in large part by their perceptions of the state of the economy. To understand why this pessimism abounds and where Ukrainian democracy might be headed, IFES also explored public opinion on issues of order vs. freedom, the meaning of democracy, and the independence and effectiveness of Ukraine's legal institutions.

Democracy and Its Meaning in Ukraine

A majority of Ukrainians in nearly every year since 1997 have said that Ukraine is not a democracy. This year is the high water mark for democracy pessimism, with 64% of Ukrainians agreeing that their country is not a democracy. Of those, a majority (58%) also think that Ukraine is not becoming more democratic. There was also a slight recovery this year in the percentage of Ukrainians who feel that their country is a democracy (22%), with "don't know" responses falling to a four-year low (13%). The trend is represented in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Ukrainian Democracy, Trend Data



"Is Ukraine a democracy?" (2003: n=1200)

The perception of Ukraine as less than democratic is most acute among those who do not feel that they are benefiting financially from the transition process. IFES compared the opinions on democracy of those respondents who fell along different points of the economic sentiments scale described earlier (2 = lowest perception of the state of the economy, 6 = highest). Those respondents scoring a 2 (10%) or 3 (15%) on the economic sentiments scale were significantly less likely to think of Ukraine as a democracy than those who scored a 5 (37%) or 6 (49%).


The tendency to perceive Ukraine as a democracy increases with education and decreases significantly with age (only 15% of those 46-55, compared to 35% of those 18-25). Men (68% not a democracy) are slightly more pessimistic than women (60%) on the question of democracy. Ethnic Russians (74%) are more likely to say that Ukraine is not a democracy than ethnic Ukrainians (62%). Geographically, those in the central region (80%) are the most pessimistic

about democracy in Ukraine, compared to those in the northwestern (34%) and western (48%) regions, where less than half are of the opinion that Ukraine is not a democracy.

An additional finding that has persisted over time in IFES surveys is the stronger perception of Ukraine as a democracy outside of major population centers. Ukrainians in urban areas (68%) are more likely than Ukrainians in rural areas (59%) to state that Ukraine is not a democracy. This is true despite the fact that rural Ukrainians consider themselves poorer and are more pessimistic about their economic futures than urban dwellers.

The IFES surveys have also chronicled Ukrainian perceptions of what it means to be a democracy. This year, respondents were asked to choose among a list of associative terms. Democracy for Ukrainians is most directly associated with the broad concept of human rights (66%). Western notions of human rights as freedoms of speech, association, religion and others do not, however, appear to be what Ukrainians have in mind. After mentions of human rights broadly, economic well-being³ prevails (mentioned by 51% of respondents on average), while key political freedoms⁴ were mentioned, on average, by only 36% of respondents. These findings (mentions for each definition represented in Figure 11 below) are consistent with sentiments expressed elsewhere in the developing world, where economic security is often considered both a fundamental human right and a litmus test for successful democratic transition.

Figure 11. Meaning of Democracy, Percentage of Total Respondents



While the majority of Ukrainians, regardless of what they think a democracy is, feel that their country is not democratic, it is important to note that Ukrainians who strongly associate democracy with economic issues are much less likely to think that Ukraine is a democracy than those who employ political associations. Findings from the focus group studies also suggest that economic security is considered as a prerequisite for democracy. According to the findings, participation in politics is complicated for many Ukrainians by a preoccupation with the need to

³ Economic associations include the following: “everyone has work,” “the state supports all who cannot work,” “retirees are looked after by the state,” and there is “no official corruption.”

⁴ Key political freedoms include the following: “freedom of choice,” “freedom of speech,” “freedom to vote,” and “freedom of religion.”

simply make ends meet. As a majority of Ukrainians use economic performance as a measure of progress toward democracy, it is unlikely that Ukrainian perceptions of democratic change will show improvement until the country's economic growth starts to yield real benefits for the average citizen. The reluctance of Ukrainians to distinguish between economic security and democracy calls into question whether efforts by the West to foster greater demand for democracy in Ukraine have led to a fundamental desire for political freedoms or simply for a Western lifestyle.

Another way to think about Ukrainian attitudes toward democracy is to consider whether democracy represents a galvanizing political ideology or merely a means to an end, again remembering the emphasis placed on economic security. Participants in the focus groups provided some guidance on this when asked about their ability to influence the political situation in the country. Many participants feel that their influence is limited and that one limiting factor is the absence of an idea that unites the people.

“Because we are divided, the atomization of people reached such stage that we do not understand each other. If there would be a force which would be able to unite us... common goal, common idea ... because everything, all values are lost right now” (Group 7).

While comments like this demonstrate that the unity of purpose that defined much of the Soviet era has dissipated, they also indicate that democracy as a political ideology has yet to achieve a similar status in today's Ukraine.


Consistent with the definition of democracy as economic security and with the sentiment that Ukraine's economic future remains bleak is the opinion that democratic change is occurring slowly or not at all. A plurality (48%) feel that democratic change is occurring too slowly, 25% think it is not occurring at all, 12% think it is at the right pace, and 14% don't know. Only 1% of Ukrainians feel that democratic change is occurring too quickly.

The value of democracy in the eyes of Ukrainians and the degree to which it is functioning are further informed by Ukrainian tolerance for the efforts of authorities to ensure order and the perception of the judicial system's ability to serve the public. The next two sections will elaborate attitudes in these two subject areas.

Rights

Another way of judging a society's appetite for democracy is to measure the value it attaches to certain features that are often associated with democratic life. One feature that is often associated with Western democracy is a preference for freedom over order in society. IFES has asked survey participants if they agree with the statement “It is more important that leaders maintain order than protect freedoms” in all three surveys since 2001. For the first time, an absolute majority (52%) somewhat or strongly agrees that order takes precedence over freedoms. Only 25% feel that freedoms should take precedence and 23% don't express a preference. The propensity to support order over freedoms increases significantly with age (see cross-tabulation at Figure 12) and decreases, though less remarkably, with education.

Figure 12. Order More Important than Freedoms by Age



Levels of agreement with the statement "It is more important that leaders maintain order than protect freedoms" within each age group.


IFES also asked a qualifying question to determine what sorts of freedoms Ukrainians are most readily willing to exchange for order. Among these, the most readily exchanged are freedoms of association. A majority of Ukrainians (60%) feel that it is sometimes or always justified for the government to limit the activities of certain political parties to ensure order. A plurality (42%) feel similarly regarding the activities of citizens' groups and unions. Ukrainians are much less likely to support government controls on the press (36% justified), citizen protests (34%), or the courts (34%).

Rule of Law and the Legal System

Overall lack of confidence in Ukraine's democratic institutions is mirrored in attitudes toward the legal system. When asked whether a court is likely to acquit a subject wrongly accused of a crime, only 21% expressed such confidence, while 62% felt that justice would go unserved. These are consistent with findings in prior years. Confidence in the judiciary is strongly associated with sentiments regarding the state of Ukrainian democracy. Of those who strongly feel that courts would not acquit a wrongly accused defendant, only 16% feel that Ukraine is a democracy. This compares with 38% among those who strongly feel that Ukraine's courts would acquit a wrongly accused defendant.

Levels of confidence in specific judicial institutions appears to vary with proximity and prestige. The institutions with the least stature and the highest levels of interaction with the people, including the police, local courts, and prosecutors, inspire the least confidence. More people are not confident that these institutions treat cases with fairness and justice than are confident. In contrast, more Ukrainians than not say that the national courts, from the appellate to constitutional levels, treat cases with fairness and justice. This contrast is highlighted in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Confidence in Judicial Institutions



“And how much confidence do you have in each of the following institutions to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions?” (n=1200)

The upper-level courts enjoy the most confidence, with a plurality of the Ukrainian public maintaining at least a fair amount of confidence in all three (42% Constitutional, 41% Supreme, and 38% appellate). This contrasts most sharply with the police, where an absolute majority (58%) of Ukrainians exhibits little or no confidence.


Courts at all levels are thought to be influenced in their decision-making by outside interests. A majority of Ukrainians think that the Constitutional (57%), Supreme (60%), appellate (60%), and local (74%) courts are subject to at least some outside influence when making decisions.

V. Attitudes toward Government Institutions

Confidence in Institutions and Leaders

Given the predominately negative perceptions of the economic and political situation in the country, it should not be a surprise that Ukrainians generally have little confidence in their public institutions and leaders. Most central-level institutions are not rated highly by Ukrainians, while local leaders and institutions are generally rated higher (Figure 14).

Figure 14. Confidence in Institutions and Leaders



"I am now going to ask you about several government institutions. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them." (n=1200)

There are two institutions in which more Ukrainians have confidence than not. Fifty-six percent of Ukrainians have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the military compared to 32% who have little or no confidence. Confidence in the military has increased since the 2002 IFES survey (49%). There are some regional disparities in confidence in the military. Residents of the central region of the country are most likely to have confidence in the military (64%), whereas fewer residents of Kyiv have confidence in the military (38%) than those who do not (44%).

Local mayors are the only other institutions in which more Ukrainians have confidence (47%) than not (40%). Ukrainians seem to generally have more confidence in local institutions than central-level institutions. More Ukrainians have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in their city or village's elected local council (42%) than they do in oblast governors or *raion* administrators (30% each) who are appointed by the central government. The lowest levels of confidence are for the three central institutions: the cabinet of ministers (29%), the *Verhovna Rada* (26%), and the president (22%).

Confidence in the president has gradually declined since the January 2000 IFES survey in Ukraine. In that survey, 49% expressed a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the president. In the November 2000 IFES survey, this fell to 29%, followed by 30% in 2001, and 22% both last year and this year.

The level of confidence in the president is directly related to economic sentiment. The more positive the level of economic sentiment, the more confidence Ukrainians have in the president. Among those Ukrainians with an economic sentiment level of 2, 13% have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the president and 84% have little or none. At level 3, 17% have confidence and 78% do not; at level 4, 23% and 70%; at level 5, 40% and 56%; and at level 6, 56% have confidence in the president and 36% have little or none.

A majority of Ukrainians in each region of the country say they have little or no confidence in the president. Residents of the northern region (11% confidence, 74% not) and the southwest (10% confidence, 80% not) are especially likely to have negative ratings of the president.

The perceived lack of effectiveness of these institutions is one factor in the general lack of confidence Ukrainians profess in the institutions. Seventy-one percent of Ukrainians think that the president is not very or not at all effective in carrying out his responsibilities. Seventy percent echo the same sentiments with regard to the *Verkhovna Rada*. Fewer Ukrainians have these opinions of their oblast governor (44%), city or village council (45%), and mayors (46%).

Contact with Local Officials

The last chapter reported that the more interaction Ukrainians are likely to have with a judicial institution, the less confidence they are likely to have in these institutions. The findings in the section above, however, indicate that the closer an elected or appointed official is to a respondent, the more confidence he or she is likely to have in this institution. One explanation for this may be that it is easier for citizens to interact with local-level officials and institutions than it is for them to contact central-level officials. Data from the survey validates this and shows that contact with local officials does lead to higher levels of confidence in these local officials.

Overall, 29% of Ukrainians say that they have contacted an official in their city or village's local self-government in the past to help resolve a problem. Contact with local officials is higher in rural areas (34%) than in urban areas (24%). Residents of the southwest region have the lowest level of contact with local officials (14%) and the rate of contact is also fairly low in Kyiv (22%).

When those who had contacted local officials (n=342) were asked to name the types of problems for which they had contacted local officials, the following were listed most often:

- Problems with house maintenance and housing problems (25%);
- Help with receiving material aid (24%);
- Settlement of legal issues (23%);
- Settlement of land-ownership issues (11%);
- Problems with public utilities (9%); and
- Help with finding work/resolving back-wages (8%).

Respondents who reported contacting local self-government officials were asked whether the contacted official(s) had responded to the contact. Overall, 66% of those who had contacted local officials say that they did receive a response and a further 16% say that they received a partial response from the official. Response from the officials is a key factor in explaining confidence in officials. Among those who received a response from the contacted official, 54% say they have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in their city or village's local council, and 60% of these respondents have confidence in their mayors. Among those who did not receive a response, 20% have confidence in their local councils and 25% in their mayors.

A majority of those who received a response from a local official were satisfied with the response. Fifty-six percent of those receiving a response were completely or somewhat satisfied with the response they receive and 43% were completely or somewhat dissatisfied. Most of those who approached local officials with legal or land-ownership issues are likely to have been satisfied with the response of the local officials (66%), and a majority of those who approached for help receiving material aid were also satisfied (56%). A majority of those who contacted officials regarding problems with public utilities (55%) were dissatisfied with the response of the official.

Forty-one percent of those who have never contacted an official of their local self-government have not done so because they have not had a need to do so, and 27% say that they like to resolve their problems themselves. Many Ukrainians have not contacted local officials because they do not think it would result in the resolution of their problem (30%).

Citizen Advisory Boards

In many Ukrainian localities, Citizen Advisory Boards (CABs) have been established to promote greater citizen involvement in the work of local councils. Respondents were asked whether they were aware that their city or village has a CAB. Forty-one percent of Ukrainians are aware that their community has a CAB. Eleven percent of Ukrainians say that their community does not have a CAB and 48% do not know if their community has a CAB or not.

Residents of urban areas are more likely to know their community has a citizen advisory board than residents of rural areas (45% versus 30%). However, a majority of urban respondents (52%) do not know whether their community has a CAB or not, compared to 42% of rural respondents. This suggests a need for information campaigns to make Ukrainians, especially in urban areas, aware of these bodies.


Residents of Crimea (63%) and the central and southeastern part of the country (51% each) are most likely to know that there is a CAB in their community. Those in the southwest (12%) and the west (24%) are least likely to know that there is a CAB in their community.

Among those who know that there is a CAB in their community, 39% think that these bodies are very or somewhat effective, while 34% think that they are not very or at all effective. The perceived effectiveness of CABs has a positive impact on perceived effectiveness of local councils and mayors. Among those who think CABs are effective, 58% believe that their mayors are very or somewhat effective, and 61% feel similarly about their local councils. Among those who do not think that CABs are effective, 63% think their mayors are ineffective and 60% think their local councils are ineffective. This finding indicates that collaboration between local officials and CABs can be mutually beneficial for both, and could increase the perceived effectiveness of both bodies in the minds of their constituents.

Local Services

Respondents to the IFES survey were asked to evaluate the change in certain local services over the course of the last year, including: water supply, district heating, and housing maintenance. Most respondents have not seen an improvement in these services over the past year (Figure 15). Only urban respondents were asked about housing maintenance.

Figure 15. Change in Local Services



"I will now provide you with a list of services provided by your city/village local self-government. For each, please tell me if the quality of the service has improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated over the past year?"


For each of the services, more Ukrainians say that they have seen no change in the services than either improvement or deterioration. Urban respondents are much more likely to give a definitive response to the question than rural respondents, more than 40% of whom reply "don't know" to the questions on water supply and district heating.

VI. Interest in and Attitudes toward Politics

Interest in Politics

A majority of all Ukrainians (58%) say they are either very or somewhat interested in politics. Thirty-eight percent indicate that they are either not too interested or not at all interested in politics. Interest in politics has fallen somewhat from its high of 65% in the December 2000 IFES survey. Interest is dependent to a large extent on gender, age, and education (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Interest in Politics (in %)



“Can you tell me how interested you are in matters of politics and government -- are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?”

Men are much more interested in politics than women (65% versus 53%). This is particularly the case in rural areas. In urban areas, 65% of men are very or somewhat interested in politics compared to 57% of women, a difference of 8%. In rural areas, 64% of men are interested in politics compared to 48% of women, a difference of 16%.

A significant reason for the difference in political interest between urban and rural women is due to the lower levels of education among rural women. Figure 12 illustrates that interest in politics goes up with the level of education of the respondent. There is a 27% difference in political interest between those whose highest level of education is a university degree and those whose highest level of education is primary schooling. In urban areas, 29% of women have a university education and 12% have only elementary schooling. In contrast, 30% of rural women have only elementary schooling and 8% have a university education.

The relationship between education and interest in politics does not always hold true. This is especially the case when looking at the difference in political interest between men and women.


At every level of education below university education, men still have significantly greater interest in politics than women with a similar level of education. This suggests that structural or cultural factors may play a role in limiting women's political interest in Ukraine.

Ukrainians interested in politics are more likely to discuss politics with their friends and acquaintances than those with little or no interest in politics. Overall, 20% of Ukrainians say that they often discuss politics with their acquaintances, 33% say they discuss politics sometimes, 28% rarely and 18% never. Among those who are very or somewhat interested in politics, 30% discuss politics often and 42% discuss it sometimes. Among those who have little or no interest in politics, 4% discuss politics often and 20% discuss it sometimes.

Political Efficacy

While IFES surveys in Ukraine over the last few years have shown a majority of people interested in politics, they have also consistently shown a lack of belief among Ukrainian citizens that they can influence the actions of their political leaders. This finding is mirrored in this year's survey (Figure 17).

Figure 17. Voter and Political Efficacy



Agree or Disagree:

*"Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country."
"Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening."
"People like you can have influence on the decisions made by the government."*

Sixty-nine percent of Ukrainians strongly or somewhat disagree that voting gives them influence over decision-making in Ukraine. An even larger 78% strongly or somewhat disagree that people like them can have influence on the decisions made by government. And 68% of Ukrainians strongly or somewhat agree that politics is so complicated that people like them cannot understand what's really happening.

Economic sentiment plays a part in political efficacy. Generally, the lower the level of economic sentiment, the less likely is the respondent to feel that he or she can influence decision-making in Ukraine. Among those at the lowest level of economic sentiment of 2, 15% agree that voting

gives them influence over decision-making and a similar percentage agrees that people like them can influence decisions made by government. The comparable percentages for those at the highest economic sentiment level of 6 are 56% and 34%. Clearly, economic pessimists in Ukraine are significantly more likely to feel left out of the political process than those positive about economic conditions in the country.

Many participants in the focus groups also point to economic problems as one reason for the lack of political efficacy among Ukrainians. These participants opine that the tough economic conditions in the country force most Ukrainians to focus on these concerns rather than on trying to influence political development in the country. Many participants also point to the need for collective rather than individual action in trying to exert influence on public officials in Ukraine.

“Because we are divided, the atomization of people reached such stage that we do not understand each other. If there would be a force which would be able to unite us... common goal, common idea ...” (Group 7)

“One person is not able to influence politics.” (Group 4)

“Only those people can attain their goal, who unite into some groups for collective actions...” (Group 3)

The impact of political interest is ambiguous. One would assume that people who are interested in politics would be more likely to feel that they can have influence over their government. This does turn out to be the case to a slight extent, but even among those interested in politics, a majority does not feel that they can influence political decision-making in Ukraine. What is perhaps even more surprising is the fact that those who are interested in politics are just as likely as those not interested to say that politics is too complicated (Figure 18).

Figure 18. Relationship between Political Interest and Efficacy

	Very/Somewhat Interested	Not Too/Not at All Interested
Voting Gives Influence over Decision-Making		
Strongly/Somewhat Agree	29%	18%
Strongly/Somewhat Disagree	67%	75%
People Like You can Influence Government Decisions		
Strongly/Somewhat Agree	17%	11%
Strongly/Somewhat Disagree	78%	81%
Politics is Too Complicated		
Strongly/Somewhat Agree	70%	67%
Strongly/Somewhat Disagree	27%	26%

It was noted earlier that interest in politics has fallen from its high point of 65% in the December 2000 IFES survey. It may be the case that decline in the interest level in politics may be related to the fact that there has also been a decline in efficacy over the same time. Taking the question on voter efficacy as an example, in the December 2000 survey, 34% strongly or somewhat agreed that voting can influence decision-making. In the September 2002 survey, this percentage had fallen to 27%, fairly similar to the 25% who agree with the statement in this year’s survey.

The decline in agreement with the statement that voting influences decision-making has been even more precipitous among those interested in politics. In the December 2000 survey, 42% of those interested in politics strongly or somewhat agreed that voting can influence decision-


making. In the 2001 survey, this percentage had fallen to 36% and further to 29% in this year's survey. Ukrainians generally, and those Ukrainians interested in politics specifically, are increasingly of the opinion that their vote is not influential. This may account for the recent decline in interest in political affairs. It does not, however, seem to have had an appreciable impact on the likelihood of voting in elections.

Voting

The vast majority of Ukrainians are likely to participate in elections. Eighty-two percent of Ukrainians report having voted in the 2002 parliamentary and local elections. Participation rates for the 2002 elections were somewhat lower in large urban centers than in rural areas and smaller urban centers. Nevertheless, more than 77% of Ukrainians in any location report having voted in the 2002 election.

Ukrainians are also likely to vote in the 2004 presidential election in large numbers. Sixty-five percent of Ukrainians are very likely to vote and a further 15% are somewhat likely to vote. This figure is similar to the 80% who reported being certain or likely to vote in the pre-election survey IFES conducted before the 1999 presidential election. The actual turnout in the 1999 election was 74.87%, suggesting that turnout over 70% can be expected for the 2004 presidential election. Figure 19 reports on the overall likelihood of voting in Ukraine, as well as a breakdown by specific sub-groups in the population.

Figure 19. Likelihood of Voting



"How likely is it that you will vote in the 2004 presidential election? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely that you will vote in the next elections?"

Ethnic Ukrainians are slightly more likely to vote in the 2004 presidential election than ethnic Russians. Residents of rural areas are slightly more likely to vote than residents of urban areas. There is not a significant difference in likelihood of voting between men and women, a positive sign given the relatively low level of political interest among women. Among all Ukrainians, a

higher percentage of those interested in politics are very or somewhat likely to vote (87%) than those not interested in politics (71%).

The likelihood of voting in the election is significantly impacted by opinions on the conduct of previous elections. Respondents to the survey were asked whether they thought the 2002 parliamentary and local elections were fair. A majority (55%) thinks that the 2002 elections were completely or somewhat unfair and 29% thinks they were completely or somewhat fair. Among those who think the 2002 elections were fair, 91% are likely to vote in 2004. Among those who think they were unfair, 75% are likely to vote in 2004.

Participants in the focus groups were asked to state the reasons why they would vote in the 2004 election. Many respondents reply they vote because it is their civic duty to vote. Others are going to vote because they would like to see a change in government and elect different leaders. A few participants say they will vote to ensure that others do not vote in their place. When participants were asked why they continue to vote despite the widespread opinion that voting does not give influence, many participants reply that they vote out of hope for change in the country. Others reply that they vote out of habit.

Participants in the focus groups were also asked what issues would be important for presidential candidates to address during the election. Given the concern with economic conditions, it is not surprising that economic development was frequently mentioned. Among economic problems mentioned are inflation, employment, and restoration of industry. Social welfare and distribution of land in the agricultural sector were also mentioned as important issues. On foreign policy, participants would like Ukraine to make a choice between integration with the west or east.

“The development of the economy is obligatory; social policy, foreign policy and image of Ukraine are built upon it.” (Group 6)

“It is necessary to pay attention to materials issues: increasing the salary and reducing the prices.” (Group 4)

“Agricultural sector of our state. First of all, the question is about the land, payment for it, its transfer to the private ownership, it should be supervised.” (Group 3)

“It is desirable the program of each candidate to have precise programs about education, health care.” (Group 6)

“The main emphasis should be put on the integration with the West or with the East, Russia. This integration choice should be based on the opinion of the citizens of Ukraine.” (Group 8)

Fairness of Elections

While the vast majority of Ukrainians are likely to vote in the 2004 presidential election, many do not have confidence that this election will be free and fair. When asked whether they think the election will be free and fair, 47% of Ukrainians reply that it is very or somewhat unlikely that the election will be fair, while 31% think it is likely to be fair. Twenty-two percent do not have an opinion on this issue.

Those who are likely to vote in 2004 have more confidence in the fairness of the election than those who are unlikely to vote. Among those likely to vote, 37% think the election will be completely or somewhat fair. Among those unlikely to vote, only 6% think the election will be fair.

When asked why the the election may be fair, Ukrainians cite five major factors:

- Monitoring by international election observers (22%);
- Law ensures free and fair elections (18%);
- Local EC is fair (16%);
- CEC consists of representatives from different parties (13%);
- Monitoring by independent Ukrainian observers (7%); and
- Don't know (21%).

The mass media and opinion polls are two tools that focus group participants say they will use after the 2004 election to assess whether the election was fair or not.

“I will compare information received from these sources [mass media, Internet, in particular] with official information – rating, candidates’ programs and promises... and by doing this way, I will have an opinion about honesty of elections.” (Group 8)

“There are sociological polls conducted before elections which give indicators of the support to be given to this or that candidate. If these indicators will differ from official ones, I will understand that elections were falsified.” (Group 6)

Ukrainians are more likely to have faith in international election observers (22%) than in domestic observers (7%). This finding is also echoed in another series of questions assessing Ukrainian attitudes toward different facets of the electoral process in the country. Respondents were given a series of statements and asked to agree or disagree with these statements. Data from this series of questions is presented in Figure 20.

Figure 20. Attitudes toward Electoral Process (in %)

“Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.” (n=1200)	Strongly/ Somewhat Agree	Strongly/ Somewhat Disagree
The presence of international observers has a positive affect on the fairness of elections in Ukraine.	70	19
I feel safe in voting however I wish in an election.	70	19
The presence of political party observers has a positive affect on the legitimacy of elections in Ukraine.	57	30
The presence of non-partisan domestic observers has a positive affect on the fairness of elections in Ukraine.	57	31
My vote is kept confidential by election authorities in Ukraine.	53	34
Our local media provides thorough coverage of parties and candidates up for election.	49	40
I am informed about the electoral process in Ukraine.	43	41
Elections in Ukraine are competently administered.	38	49
The results of elections in Ukraine accurately reflect the way people voted in the election.	33	59
Our local media provides objective coverage of parties and candidates up for election.	31	54
Ukraine’s electoral system provides adequate means to challenge election violations.	31	49

Seventy percent of Ukrainians agree that the presence of international observers has a positive affect on the fairness of elections in Ukraine. This compares to 57% who feel this way about domestic non-partisan observers. This may point to polarization in the domestic political environment that precludes many non-partisan entities from being accorded legitimacy by Ukrainians.

On a positive note for election administration in Ukraine, a majority (53%) does feel that Ukrainians' votes are kept secret by election authorities. However, overall competence of electoral authorities is not rated highly. Forty-nine percent of Ukrainians disagree with the statement that elections in Ukraine are competently administered, while 38% agree with this statement. Dissatisfaction with electoral administration is strongly related to perceptions on the fairness of the 2002 election. Those who think the 2002 election was fair are more likely than not to say elections are competently administered (45% versus 38%). Those who think the election was unfair are more likely to say that elections are not competently administered (71%) than those who say they are (19%).

The perceived lack of fairness of elections in Ukraine is also reflected in the fact that a majority of Ukrainians (59%) disagree that election results accurately reflect the way people voted in an election. Thirty-one percent agree with this statement. Once again, opinions on this question are tied to perceived fairness of the 2002 election. In addition, 49% of Ukrainians disagree that the electoral system provides adequate means to challenge election results, versus 31% who agree.


This series of questions also points to a lack of satisfactory information about the electoral process in Ukraine. While 43% of Ukrainians agree that they are informed about the electoral process in Ukraine, 41% disagree with this statement. And while 49% agree that their local media provides thorough coverage of parties and candidates up for election, a majority (54%) disagrees that this coverage is objective. On another question asking whether the respondent receives enough information to make wise choices when voting, only 18% say that receive enough information. Thirty-five percent say that they receive barely enough information and 34% say they receive little or no information to make a wise choice when voting.

Third Term for President Kuchma

There have been some recent discussions in Ukraine suggesting that even though President Kuchma is in his second term and the Ukrainian constitution bars a president from serving more than two terms, Kuchma might be eligible for another term because his first term was served under the old constitution where this provision was not in place. To gauge sentiment on this issue, the IFES survey asked respondents about their awareness of the issue and also whether President Kuchma should be eligible for another term.

Half of all Ukrainians say that they have heard about discussions on a possible third term for Kuchma, and half say that they have not heard discussions on this issue. As would be expected, awareness is higher among those interested in politics (58%) than among those not interested in politics (39%). Awareness of this issue is also higher among higher-educated Ukrainians. No matter the awareness of the issue, the vast majority of Ukrainians do not think that President Kuchma should be eligible for another term (Figure 21 next page).

Figure 21. Approval of Kuchma Eligibility for Third Term



"Do you think that President Kuchma should be allowed to seek another term in the next elections?" (n=1200)

Opposition to eligibility for a third term for Kuchma is widespread in Ukraine and a majority of most major subgroups in the population are opposed to a third term. Even a majority of those who profess confidence in the president (56%) do not think that Kuchma should be eligible for a third term.


VII. Political Parties and NGOs

One way of judging Ukrainians' enthusiasm for the democratic process in their country is to measure levels of activism in civil society. While most Ukrainians profess an interest in politics and participate in the electoral process through exercising their voting rights, few are likely to take a more active role and participate in the activities of civic institutions. Membership in political parties and NGOs remains low and support for particular parties is waning, with all major parties except for the Our Ukraine Bloc losing supporters in both absolute and relative terms over the past 3 years.

Political Parties

Over the years, IFES surveys have monitored the degree to which Ukrainians affiliate themselves with ideologies, platforms, and personalities that political parties represent. In general, party affiliation in Ukraine has been lackluster, and this year proved even more remarkable in that regard. A mere 23% of Ukrainians support a particular party in 2003, compared to 31% in 2002 and 32% in 2001. Whether the recent decline is due to a lack of interest in the activities of political parties between election cycles is unclear, but in the least it further underscores the general lack of identification with party politics professed by the majority of Ukrainians. The trend line is represented in Figure 22.

Figure 22. Support for Political Parties, Trend Data




“Are you a supporter of any particular political party, even if you are not a member?”
(n=1200)

Consistent with previous years, less than 2% of Ukrainians are actual members of political parties. Support for political parties varies across different sectors of the population. Older Ukrainians (33%, 56-65 years of age) and those most interested in politics (38%) are more likely to support a party than younger Ukrainians (15%, 18-25 years of age) and those least interested in politics (16%). Tendency to support a particular party also varies with ideological persuasion. Only 18% of those that favor a pure market approach to economic development support a particular party, while 35% of those favoring central planning are party supporters. This is further reflected in party preferences, which are discussed in greater detail below

Lack of support for a particular political party appears to be driven more by the perception that parties do not clearly present their goals or differentiate themselves effectively from one another than by a lack of appreciation for the role of parties in the political process. All respondents were asked if the major political parties present clear proposals for addressing the issues facing Ukraine. Those that thought most or some parties present clear proposals were then asked about the extent to which those proposals were differentiated. As in past years, there is little sense that most of the parties have clear proposals, with only 14% holding this opinion, while 35% feel that some have clear proposals and 30% volunteered the response that none have clear proposals. Among the 49% that feel at least some parties have clear proposals, 54% think that there are also clear differences between the parties' programs, while 38% think that the differences are unclear.

A party's ability to effectively broadcast its message has an impact on its ability to establish a constituency. This becomes clear when responses on clarity of party proposals are compared to those on party support (Figure 23). Those that feel strongest about political parties not presenting clear proposals are significantly less likely to give their support to a party.

Figure 23. Party Support by Clarity of Proposals



The belief that parties do not present clear and effective proposals is widely held across age and gender lines. Perceptions of party effectiveness do have an impact on likelihood of voting in the 2004 presidential elections, with 75% of those who feel that most parties address Ukraine's pressing issues very likely to vote, while those who feel that only some (68% very likely) or none (61% very likely) the parties address such issues are less likely to come to the polls.

The link between party message and party support is further underscored by focus group findings. When asked why political party membership is so low, participants frequently cited lack of knowledge among voters regarding party platforms, lack of information on becoming a member, and lack of differences between parties.

“...there is no ideological direction. All parties are ideologically mute. Parties are perceived as groups formed to lobby particular issues...” (Group 2).

“Many people do not know where to go for becoming a member of the party they like” (Group 3).

“... the programs of the majority of parties are the same” (Group 6).

Focus group participants were also asked about the redeeming qualities of political parties and about ways that they can influence politics in Ukraine. Under both lines of questioning, participants emphasized the importance of political parties as instruments of expressing popular will and consolidating democracy.

“Only those people can attain their goal, who unite into some groups for collective actions...” (Group 3).

“Party is a tool which can change something” (Group 6).

“ ... we have multi-party system as an element of democracy” (Group 1).

The contradiction between the perception of parties as important instruments of political expression and the lack of support for or membership in specific parties suggests that the frustration with parties not projecting a coherent message is the overwhelming factor driving weak party affiliation.

Among those who do support a particular party, strongest support is given to the Communist Party (30%), followed by the Our Ukraine bloc (22%). The support figures presented here are probably not a good predictor of voting patterns, as they are based on the sentiments of less than 1/3 of likely voters in 2004. They are reflective, however, of which major parties have managed to develop core constituencies, and thus have an incentive for continuity. Year-on-year party affiliations of those that pledge support to a particular party are given in Figure 24 below.

Figure 24. Support for Individual Political Parties

<i>Party</i>	<i>2002 Support (n=375)</i>	<i>2003 Support (n=317)</i>
Communist Party	33%	30%
Our Ukraine Bloc	17%	22%
Social Democratic Party (United)	13%	10%
People’s Rukh	5%	2%
For a United Ukraine Bloc	5%	<1%
Socialist Party	4%	3%
Batkyvschyna	3%	<1%
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	2%	2%
Green Party	2%	3%
Party of Regions	<1%	3%

“And which party is that?” (Second part of question 44)

The downward trend in support for the Communist Party continued this year, but it still maintains the largest core constituency of any single party. The constituencies of the leading parties are differentiated by region, age, and education. The Communist Party is strongest in the southeast, with 23% of its constituents residing in that region. The Our Ukraine Bloc is strongest in the far west, with 33% of its constituents residing in that region. A large majority (72%) of the Communist Party’s core constituency is over the age of 55, which likely explains its steady decline, while the Our Ukraine Bloc’s core constituency is drawn more evenly from all age


groups. The Our Ukraine Bloc's constituents also tend to be better educated, with 66% having gone beyond a secondary education, while only 44% of the Communist Party's constituents have surpassed a secondary education.

Perhaps most interesting is that both leading party's core constituents appear ideologically centrist, with a majority (61% of Communist Party supporters and 62% of Our Ukraine supporters) preferring one of the middle three versions of a mixed state/market economy. And while 54% of those who both support a particular party and favor central planning are supporters of the Communist Party, this figure is down from 2002 (70%).

Civic Organizations and Participation

Political parties are not the only sector of civil society in Ukraine that suffers from low levels of participation. In general, Ukrainians are not highly aware of or involved in the activities of civic institutions. This year, IFES asked respondents to identify whether they are current members in a number of such institutions. Membership rates are presented in Figure 25 below.

Figure 25. Membership in Civic Institutions




"Can you tell me whether you are a member of any of the different types of civic organizations listed on this card?" (n=1200)

The only civic organizations enjoying any substantial membership are trade unions (16%). Only 1 respondent claimed to be a member of an NGO.

There was an encouraging rise, however, in the recognition of NGO activity by Ukrainians this year. Both this year and last respondents were asked: "Do you know of any Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are active in Ukraine?" This year, 20% of Ukrainians were aware of NGO activity, an increase of 8% over 2002. Despite this increase, there are still more Ukrainians who are not familiar with the concept of NGOs at all. The change is represented in Figure 26 below.

Figure 26. NGOs Active in Community?




"Do you know of any non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are active in your community/city/village?" (n=1200)

There is little variation in knowledge of NGO activity across different demographic groups, with the exception of levels of education. Those with a university education (35%) are far more likely to know of active NGOs in their communities than those with a primary (10%) or secondary (16%) education. Regionally, those in Kyiv (30%) and the southeast (32%) are most likely to be familiar with NGO activity.

Those who are aware of NGOs as organizations were also asked two follow-on questions. These respondents were asked to identify the issues that the NGOs they are aware of are working on and to rate their levels of confidence in them. The only frequently cited example of NGO issue focus was social protection/assistance, mentioned by 35% of those who are familiar with NGO activity. In general, these respondents had more confidence (24%) than not (17%), but an equal percentage (24%) could not provide a clear confidence rating.

Those familiar with NGOs as a concept (76% of respondents) were also asked to rate how necessary NGOs are for Ukraine. Fourteen percent of those asked think that NGOs are essential and 35% think they are necessary. This compares to 23% who think that they are not very or not at all necessary, and 28% that do not know. Perceptions of the necessity of NGOs hit a low in early 2000 and have been recovering steadily since, with an anomalous surge in 2001. Today, more than twice as many Ukrainians feel that NGOs are necessary than those that do not. The trend is represented in Figure 27 below.

Figure 27. Necessity of NGOs, Trend Data



“How necessary are non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, for Ukraine -- essential, necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?” (2003: n=908)

Findings from the focus group studies also support the notion that NGOs are viewed as necessary in Ukraine. Those participants who view NGOs as necessary cited the importance of their activities mainly in the socio-political sphere. The minority of focus group participants who view NGOs as exerting a negative influence cited selfish motives on the part of their founders, arguing that NGOs are created simply for the purpose of winning grants.

Support for NGOs is evenly distributed among men and women, as well as Ukrainians of all ages and ideological persuasions. Variation on the issue of NGO necessity is only notable among those with different levels of education. A majority of Ukrainians with a university education (61%) view NGOs as necessary, while those that completed only a secondary (48%) or primary (39%) education view them as not necessary.


VIII. Information Levels and Media

Freedom of information is one of the pillars of democracy and is frequently cited as a key element for successful transition to a market economy. The degree to which the media is perceived to report on political and economic developments in an effective and meaningful way, and the degree to which those reports are thought to be free from censorship have been closely tracked in IFES surveys. This year reveals similar trends visible in past survey reports, with the overall levels of information in society showing improvement over time, despite the perception of constraints on the ability of the media to operate freely. Most notably, 2003 marks the first year since IFES began asking about information levels in 1997 that a plurality of Ukrainians claim to have a great deal or fair amount of information on economic developments in the country.

Information Levels

Levels of information on political developments rose remarkably in the latter part of the 1990s and have stabilized in recent years. The trend in information levels since 1997 is presented in Figure 28 below.

Figure 28. Information on Political Developments




"How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine?"
(n=1200)

Information on political developments increases significantly with an increase in interest in politics, as well as with level of education. Thirty-four percent of those not at all interested in politics say they have a great deal or fair amount of information on political developments. This compares with 48% for those not too interested in politics, 66% for those somewhat interested and 74% for those very interested. Of those with a university education, 66% say that they have at least a fair amount of information, while only 44% of those with a primary education have at least a fair amount. Information levels also vary somewhat according to the primary source of information for the respondent. Of the top five sources, readers of national newspapers (68%) are most likely to say that they have at least a fair amount of information, while readers of local newspapers (42%) are the least likely to hold this opinion.

A majority of Ukrainians in all parts of the country, with the exception of the far west (43%) and the south (43%) feel that they have at least a fair amount of information on political developments. Men (64%), however, are more likely than women (53%) to have at least a fair amount of political information.

Survey participants were also asked about the availability of information on economic developments in the country. Ukrainians generally have less information on economic developments, but 2003 is the first year in which this question was asked that a plurality (48%) feels that they have at least a fair amount. The trend in levels of information on economic developments is represented in Figure 29.

Figure 29. Information on Economic Developments



“And how much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine?” (n=1200)


As with information on political developments, interest in politics is again a key determinant for the amount of information on economic developments enjoyed by respondents. Sixty percent of those very interested in politics have at least a fair amount of economic information. This compares with 55% of those somewhat interested, 39% of those not too interested, and 30% of those not at all interested in politics. The disparities amongst men and women and those between education groups that were noted in the section on information in politics are mirrored here as well. Men (53%) are more likely to have information on economic developments than women (44%). Those with a university education (58%) are more likely to have such information than those with only a primary education (39%).

Those with more information on economic developments also come to different conclusions about the most desirable path for Ukraine’s economic development. Forty-two percent of those with a great deal of economic information are likely to support a strongly market-oriented economy, while 31% of those with little and 20% of those with no economic information are favorable to market principles.

Sources of Information

In addition to the quantity of information available, IFES asked respondents a series of questions about the source and quality of that information. Respondents were asked about the media sources they mainly use for political and economic news in Ukraine, as well as their primary and secondary sources of information. Consistent with findings in 2002, television is the most frequently consulted source of information by the Ukrainian public (Figure 30).

Figure 30. Sources of Information Consulted (in percent)




*“What media are your main sources of information about political and economic events in Ukraine?”
(n=1200)*

Two private television channels, Inter and 1+1, are the most frequently consulted sources of information, mentioned by over 70% of respondents. The next most frequently consulted source is local newspapers, also mentioned by a majority (59%) of respondents. No other media outlets are consulted by a majority of the Ukrainian public.

Participants in this year’s survey were also asked to identify their primary and secondary sources of information. Figure 31 lists the primary and secondary sources relied upon by respondents.

Figure 31. Primary and Secondary Sources



*“Of all these you mentioned, which one do you rely on the most for political and economic news?”
 “And which one is the next most important source of political and economic news for you?”*

Again, Ukrainians tend to overwhelmingly rely on television as their primary source of information, followed by local newspapers. The dominance of Inter as a primary information source for a plurality (33%) of Ukrainians is noteworthy. The next closest primary source, 1+1, is a full 10 percentage points behind in primary viewership at 23%. Local newspapers are relied upon as a primary source of news and information by 8% and a higher percentage relies on them as a secondary source (12%).

While there is little demographic variance in regards to primary sources of information, age is one area where different constituencies exhibit different preferences. Reliance on both local and national newspapers increases with age. In contrast, reliance decreases with age for each 1+1, ICTV, and Novyi Canal. Interestingly, education level does not appear to have a significant impact on a respondent’s choice of primary information source.

Survey participants were also asked to rate the objectivity of the media outlets that they cited as primary information sources. Most of the top information sources are viewed as at least somewhat objective by about 65% of their consumers +/- 3%. The only exceptions are Inter and 1+1, which are viewed as objective by 77% of those respondents citing them as primary sources. Interestingly, the highest objectivity scores were given to two sources that are infrequently relied upon by Ukrainians. ORT was rated at least somewhat objective by 85% of its consumers and NTV was viewed as objective by 81%. Participants in the focus group studies gave the highest objectivity ratings to internet sources, citing lack of “control” over content.


Also not captured in the survey results, but stressed by participants in the focus group studies, is the tendency of Ukrainians to rely on more than one source of information. Participants emphasized the necessity of comparing information from various sources, including international news outlets, in order to obtain an accurate picture of events.

“I can assess information only comprehensively. One can not assess information objectively when it is obtained only from one source” (Group 4).

Media Safety

While most Ukrainians have a positive image of the media outlets that they rely upon for information, all are not convinced that those outlets are permitted to report the news without constraints. Indeed, a majority of Ukrainians think that it at least somewhat dangerous to report news objectively when the nature of that reporting could be viewed as critical of the government. Trend data on perceived safety of the media for the past four surveys is presented in Figure 32.

Figure 32. Safety of Media, Trend



“In your opinion, how safe is it for media in Ukraine to broadcast or print news and information objectively, even if this is critical of those in power? Is it very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat dangerous, or very dangerous?” (n=1200)

As the trend reveals, there was a rapid restoration of confidence in the safety of the media shortly after the original allegations of President Kuchma’s involvement in the death of a missing journalist. In the two years since September of 2001, however, Ukrainians have grown less confident in the safety of the media in reporting the news objectively. This year, in fact, represents the high water mark (68%) for Ukrainians feeling that it is at least somewhat dangerous for media outlets to objectively report the news.

While there has been some convergence from previous years, attitudes toward media freedom are still correlated with attitudes toward Ukrainian democracy. Among those who think Ukraine is a democracy, 25% think that it is very or somewhat safe for journalists to report news objectively while 61% think it is dangerous. Among respondents who don’t think Ukraine is a democracy, 20% think it is safe for journalists in Ukraine to report news objectively while 71% think it is dangerous.

Respondents were also asked how much confidence they have in the media in general. A majority report either a great deal of confidence in the media (7%) or a fair amount of confidence

(54%). Both of these figures are up slightly from last year's survey, which suggests that confidence has either risen or remained strong in spite of deteriorating opinions of media safety.

IX. Conclusion

This 12th survey of public opinion in Ukraine seeks to reveal trends in the overall attitudes of the populace regarding the economic, social, and political situation in the country. It also examines opinions regarding specific sectors and institutions, creating a broad picture of where Ukrainians see their country heading. The most enduring theme throughout the IFES survey series is dissatisfaction with the economic situation, a sentiment that has vast influence on the universe of opinions and attitudes explored in this report. The pessimism that most Ukrainians feel toward the economic situation in the country colors attitudes towards the overall political development and individual political institutions alike.

Despite the majority pessimism surrounding the economic situation, one silver lining in the trend data is a slow, but consistent, improvement in attitudes on some key issues, including assessments of the economy. It can generally be said that, when compared to earliest trend data collected in 1997, there is a consistent and pronounced upward trend in positive attitudes toward the economy and the overall situation in Ukraine. The trend data also underscores the emergence of a generation coming of age since independence, with a more favorable view of the market rather than the state as the prime motivator of economic activity .

Even more pronounced are the upward trends in access to information on economic and political events in the country. In both spheres, a larger percentage of Ukrainians than in 1997 feel that they are at least somewhat informed about political and economic developments in the country. In the economic sphere, a plurality of the population holds this opinion for the first time.

On the issue of governance, Ukrainians generally do not view their country as a democracy. The trend in this regard has fluctuated over time, with this year representing a high point in the percentage of respondents who say, flatly, that Ukraine is not a democracy. This, in and of itself, is not a negative trend. Most analysts would agree that Ukrainian democracy is a long way from fulfilling its potential, and the fact that its citizenry increasingly views the state of governance in their country with a healthy degree of skepticism could be a positive development. Probing deeper, however, it is evident that the average Ukrainian's views on democracy are exceedingly influenced by their assessment of the economic situation in the country and not necessarily by concerns about freedoms and rights.

The connection between democracy and the economic situation means that, at a minimum, the view of Ukraine as non-democratic can be expected to endure in the absence of substantial economic growth. At the worst, the data suggest that the political freedoms often considered as the defining features of democracy are not in particularly high demand, but rather are viewed mostly as a means to achieving economic well-being. Parallel preferences among an absolute majority for order over freedoms further underscores this point and supports the view that Ukrainian society has yet to fully embrace democracy as a political ideology. Hence, future democratization in Ukraine may be at risk given the seemingly higher premium placed by ordinary Ukrainians on economic development.

Ukrainians' faith in democracy is also hampered by their confidence in many of its constituent institutions. Lack of confidence in nearly all government institutions at both central and local levels, as well as frustration with political parties and the excessive self-interest that they are perceived to serve, contributes to disillusionment with the practice of democracy. Ukrainians have little confidence in their leaders and have little faith that the current political party structure,

which focus group participants describe as overcrowded and controlled by oligarchs, can yield significant change.

This pervasive lack of confidence is compounded by a sense that citizens are not receiving from the state the services that they deserve and that power is exercised irresponsibly by their leaders. From the justice system down to the local institutions responsible for delivery of basic services, Ukrainians feel that their officials are underperforming. It is also a generally held view that corruption within state institutions is a very serious problem in Ukraine. While the high levels of corruption are viewed as unjustified and pernicious by the majority of Ukrainians, most Ukrainians are seen to be taking part in corrupt actions that can prove corrosive to the development of a fair and transparent democratic system.

While political parties and formal state institutions generally dampen sentiments regarding progress toward democracy, much hope and confidence is placed in both the media and NGOs. Positive trends in both knowledge of NGO activity and the view of NGOs as necessary are observable in IFES' data. Still, as is the case with political parties, most Ukrainians are unlikely to join NGOs or participate in their activities. Active engagement of the populace on the part of NGOs remains problematic, and focus group participants suggest that this is unlikely to change as long as most Ukrainians necessarily remain focused on day-to-day survival.

The seeming contradiction of media as a trusted institution and media as heavily influenced by state control persists in 2003. Journalists appear to have achieved a sort of hero status within society, with a large majority (68%) of Ukrainians expressing the opinion that it is dangerous for them to objectively report the news and a similar majority expressing confidence in the objectivity of every major media outlet. This bodes well for the endurance of a free press in Ukraine and suggests that Ukrainians have come to highly value the fourth estate. Also of import is the relationship between perceptions of Ukraine as a democracy and perceptions of media safety. The enduring opinion of objective reporting as a dangerous vocation impacts directly upon democracy sentiments.

Ukrainians also demonstrate a healthy proclivity toward seeking diversity in the information that they receive. Most Ukrainians are unlikely to rely on a single media source for daily information and value diversity of information as a way of attaining a truer picture of the events occurring around them. This further underscores the strong support for a vibrant mass media in Ukraine.

Television remains the source of choice for the majority of the population, with local newspapers emerging as the next most relied upon source. 2003 was the first year that local newspapers were given as an option to respondents, revealing a significant difference in both reliance on and trust in local versus national papers. This preference for local papers parallels the divergence in confidence in local versus national institutions of governance, which includes executive, legislative, and judicial bodies.

The findings from this year's survey and focus group studies reflect the persistent and widespread concerns of the public over the state of the economy and the performance of state institutions. Looking ahead, Ukrainians see few reasons to believe that significant changes are on the horizon. Combating this pessimism will require meaningful change in the approach of the country's leadership to governance and the implementation of policies that improve the economic lives of its citizens. The data suggests that market-oriented policies aimed at improving the material well-being of the public could help to curb the negative outlook. Similarly, the efforts of political parties to offer real policy alternatives based on clear ideological orientations could stimulate

broader participation of Ukrainians in the political life of the country. Until such changes begin to take shape, the current environment of pessimism is likely to endure.

Appendix 1. Data Tables^{5 6}

Q1. How much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)	(1500)	(1200)	(1200)
Great deal	5%	7%	12%	8%	11%	8%
Fair amount	36%	31%	48%	49%	47%	50%
Not very much	47%	47%	32%	31%	26%	27%
None at all	7%	10%	6%	3%	3%	3%
Don't know	4%	4%	2%	2%	2%	2%
No answer	★	1%	★	7%	--	--
Not interested in this	--	--	--	--	11%	10%
Total	99% ✓	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q2. And how much information do you feel you have about economic developments in Ukraine – a great deal, fair amount, not very much or none at all?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)	(1500)	(1500)	(1200)	(1200)
Great deal	5%	5%	7%	4%	6%	4%
Fair amount	32%	25%	39%	35%	38%	44%
Not very much	51%	51%	43%	48%	36%	35%
None at all	8%	14%	8%	6%	8%	6%
Don't know	5%	4%	3%	3%	8%	2%
No answer	★	1%	★	5%	4%	--
Not interested in this	--	--	--	--	--	9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%	100%

⁵ When applicable, the results of former surveys are included with this year's data. For the results of surveys completed before 5/1998, please contact Mr. Rakesh Sharma: Rakesh@ifes.org.

⁶ There may be a slight variation between numbers presented in the analysis and the data tables due to rounding error (there are only a few cases, and the difference is usually less than 1 per cent).

Q3. What media are your main sources of information about political and economic events in Ukraine?

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
National newspapers	47%	32%
Local newspapers	--	59%
Russian newspapers	7%	7%
Other international newspapers	1%	1%
UT-1	50%	44%
UT-2	44%	41%
Inter	78%	78%
1+1	73%	75%
Novyi Canal	22%	28%
ICTV	28%	32%
STB	20%	19%
Tonis	--	8%
NBM	--	2%
NTV	10%	7%
ORT	12%	12%
RTR	6%	8%
Local TV station	30%	29%
Other Ukrainian TV Stations	3%	4%
Other int'l TV Stations	2%	2%
UR-1	31%	29%
UR-2	8%	5%
UR-3	5%	3%
Private radio	18%	15%
Public radio	--	4%
Russian radio	6%	4%
Other int'l radio	4%	1%
Ukrainian internet sites	1%	1%
Russian internet sites	1%	1%
Other int'l internet sites	1%	★
None of these	--	1%

Q4. Of all these you mentioned, which one do you rely on the most for political and economic news?

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
National newspapers	8%	5%
Local newspapers	--	8%
Russian newspapers	1%	1%
Other international newspapers	★	★
UT-1	6%	5%
UT-2	5%	3%
Inter	34%	33%
1+1	23%	23%
Novyi Canal	1%	2%
ICTV	3%	3%
STB	1%	1%
Tonis	--	1%
NBM	--	★
NTV	3%	1%
ORT	3%	3%
RTR	1%	1%
Local TV station	3%	2%
Other Ukrainian TV Stations	★	1%
Other int'l TV Stations	★	★
UR-1	5%	5%
UR-2	★	★
UR-3	★	★
Private radio	1%	1%
Public radio	--	★
Russian radio	★	★
Other int'l radio	2%	1%
Ukrainian internet sites	★	★
Russian internet sites	★	★
Other int'l internet sites	★	★
None of these	--	1%
Total	99% ✓	101% ✓

Q5. And which one is the next most important source of political and economic news for you?

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
National newspapers	12%	5%
Local newspapers	--	12%
Russian newspapers	1%	1%
Other international newspapers	★	★
UT-1	10%	8%
UT-2	5%	4%
Inter	21%	20%
1+1	18%	23%
Novyi Canal	3%	3%
ICTV	4%	4%
STB	2%	1%
Tonis	--	1%
NBM	--	★
NTV	3%	1%
ORT	2%	2%
RTR	1%	1%
Local TV station	6%	4%
Other Ukrainian TV Stations	★	★
Other int'l TV Stations	★	★
UR-1	7%	5%
UR-2	★	1%
UR-3	★	★
Private radio	2%	2%
Public radio	--	1%
Russian radio	★	★
Other int'l radio	1%	★
Ukrainian internet sites	★	★
Russian internet sites	★	★
Other int'l internet sites	★	★
None of these	--	3%
Total	98% ✓	102% ✓

Q6. For each of the different sources you mentioned, please tell me how objective each one is in your opinion. Is it very objective, somewhat objective, not too objective, or not objective at all?
[Asked only for main information sources cited]

Q6A. National newspapers

	9/02	9/03
	(229)	(385)
Very objective	12%	11%
Somewhat objective	69%	53%
Not too objective	16%	24%
Not at all objective	1%	2%
Don't Know	2%	11%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6B. Local newspapers

	9/03
	<u>(709)</u>
Very objective	12%
Somewhat objective	53%
Not too objective	25%
Not at all objective	3%
Don't know	7%
Total	100%

Q6C. Russian newspapers

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(17)</u>	<u>(80)</u>
Very objective	4%	28%
Somewhat objective	92%	43%
Not too objective	4%	15%
Not at all objective	★	2%
Don't know	★	12%
Total	100%	100%

Q6D. Other International Newspapers

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(9)</u>
Very objective	★	43%
Somewhat objective	★	31%
Not too objective	★	15%
Don't know	100%	11%
Total	100%	100%

Q6E. UT-1

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(189)</u>	<u>(531)</u>
Very objective	13%	11%
Somewhat objective	58%	52%
Not too objective	16%	22%
Not at all objective	2%	5%
Don't Know	11%	10%
Total	100%	100%

Q6F. UT-2

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(122)</u>	<u>(490)</u>
Very objective	18%	11%
Somewhat objective	66%	51%
Not too objective	7%	23%
Not at all objective	2%	4%
Don't Know	6%	11%
Total	99% ✓	100%

Q6G. Inter

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(642)</u>	<u>(930)</u>
Very objective	15%	23%
Somewhat objective	64%	54%
Not too objective	14%	16%
Not at all objective	1%	2%
Don't Know	6%	6%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6H. 1+1

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(473)</u>	<u>(904)</u>
Very objective	17%	20%
Somewhat objective	64%	57%
Not too objective	11%	14%
Not at all objective	★	2%
Don't Know	8%	8%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6I. Novyi Canal

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(50)</u>	<u>(341)</u>
Very objective	27%	16%
Somewhat objective	57%	48%
Not too objective	9%	19%
Not at all objective	★	3%
Don't Know	7%	14%
Total	100%	100%

Q6J. ICTV

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(79)</u>	<u>(380)</u>
Very objective	9%	11%
Somewhat objective	81%	56%
Not too objective	4%	19%
Not at all objective	★	3%
Don't Know	6%	11%
Total	100%	100%

Q6K. STB

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(60)</u>	<u>(224)</u>
Very objective	17%	12%
Somewhat objective	73%	50%
Not too objective	6%	18%
Not at all objective	★	1%
Don't Know	4%	19%
Total	100%	100%

Q6L. Tonis

	9/03
	<u>(100)</u>
Very objective	9%
Somewhat objective	36%
Not too objective	27%
Not at all objective	5%
Don't Know	24%
Total	101% ✓

Q6M. NBM

	9/03
	<u>(23)</u>
Very objective	16%
Somewhat objective	48%
Not too objective	29%
Not at all objective	★
Don't Know	7%
Total	100%

Q6N. NTV

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(60)</u>	<u>(82)</u>
Very objective	21%	27%
Somewhat objective	64%	54%
Not too objective	10%	10%
Not at all objective	★	★
Don't Know	6%	9%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q6O. ORT

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(60)</u>	<u>(141)</u>
Very objective	13%	30%
Somewhat objective	78%	54%
Not too objective	5%	8%
Not at all objective	★	3%
Don't Know	4%	5%
Total	100%	100%

Q6P. RTR

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(27)</u>	<u>(96)</u>
Very objective	20%	26%
Somewhat objective	48%	52%
Not too objective	27%	17%
Not at all objective	★	1%
Don't Know	5%	4%
Total	100%	100%

Q6Q. Local Television Stations

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(96)</u>	<u>(343)</u>
Very objective	6%	14%
Somewhat objective	67%	54%
Not too objective	11%	22%
Not at all objective	4%	4%
Don't Know	12%	7%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6R. Other Ukrainian TV Stations

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(8)</u>	<u>(45)</u>
Very objective	24%	5%
Somewhat objective	37%	55%
Not too objective	★	26%
Not at all objective	★	6%
Don't Know	40%	8%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q6S. Other International TV Stations

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(2)</u>	<u>(24)</u>
Very objective	★	20%
Somewhat objective	★	48%
Not too objective	100%	10%
Not at all objective	★	★
Don't Know	★	23%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6T. UR-1

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(132)</u>	<u>(344)</u>
Very objective	13%	20%
Somewhat objective	58%	48%
Not too objective	17%	20%
Not at all objective	3%	2%
Don't Know	9%	10%
Total	99% ✓	100%

Q6U. UR-2

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(6)</u>	<u>(55)</u>
Very objective	4%	12%
Somewhat objective	59%	58%
Not too objective	15%	15%
Not at all objective	★	3%
Don't Know	22%	13%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6V. UR-3

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(8)</u>	<u>(38)</u>
Very objective	38%	14%
Somewhat objective	52%	47%
Not too objective	10%	24%
Not at all objective	★	3%
Don't Know	★	14%
Total	100%	102% ✓

Q6W. Private Radio Stations

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(29)</u>	<u>(175)</u>
Very objective	12%	18%
Somewhat objective	68%	54%
Not too objective	16%	18%
Not at all objective	★	2%
Don't Know	5%	8%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q6X. Public Radio Stations

	9/03
	<u>(53)</u>
Very objective	10%
Somewhat objective	67%
Not too objective	15%
Not at all objective	1%
Don't Know	8%
Total	101% ✓

Q6Y. Russian Radio Stations

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(8)</u>	<u>(53)</u>
Very objective	★	8%
Somewhat objective	82%	60%
Not too objective	18%	20%
Not at all objective	★	3%
Don't Know	★	9%
Total	100%	100%

Q6Z. Other International Radio

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(32)</u>	<u>(13)</u>
Very objective	94%	53%
Somewhat objective	3%	36%
Not too objective	★	12%
Not at all objective	★	★
Don't Know	3%	★
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6AA Ukrainian Internet Sites

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(13)</u>
Very objective	22%	10%
Somewhat objective	41%	60%
Not too objective	37%	17%
Not at all objective	★	★
Don't Know	★	14%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q6BB Russian Internet Sites

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1)</u>	<u>(17)</u>
Very objective	★	21%
Somewhat objective	★	53%
Not too objective	100%	24%
Not at all objective	★	★
Don't Know	★	2%
Total	100%	100%

Q6CC Other International Internet Sites

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(2)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
Very objective	★	38%
Somewhat objective	100%	31%
Not too objective	★	14%
Not at all objective	★	★
Don't Know	★	17%
Total	100%	100% ✓

Q7. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the overall situation in Ukraine today?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Generally satisfied	★	★	1%	2%	2%	3%
Somewhat satisfied	2%	5%	4%	9%	9%	10%
Somewhat dissatisfied	29%	36%	33%	39%	41%	38%
Generally dissatisfied	65%	56%	59%	46%	44%	47%
Don't know	2%	2%	2%	4%	5%	3%
No answer	★	★	1%	--	--	--
Total	98% ✓	99% ✓	100%	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q8. How would you describe the economic situation in Ukraine today? Is it...

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very good	★	★
Somewhat good	7%	9%
Somewhat bad	43%	47%
Very bad	43%	39%
Don't know	7%	5%
Total	100%	100%

Q9. Is the current economic situation in Ukraine better or worse than it was one year ago?

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
Better	19%
Worse	34%
Same	41%
Don't know	6%
Total	100%

Q10. And in your opinion, will the economic situation in Ukraine in a year be better than it is now, remain the same, or get worse?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Better than now	7%	16%	13%	27%	13%	18%
Remain the same	35%	35%	35%	46%	44%	37%
Get worse	44%	36%	41%	11%	22%	22%
Don't know	14%	13%	12%	15%	21%	23%
No answer	★	★	★	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓	99% ✓	100%	100%

Q11. Here you see a picture with a scale of one to five where one means a pure market economy and five means an economy that is completely centrally planned by the state. Where on that scale do you think Ukraine should be located in the future?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
1 (Pure market economy)	9%	9%	14%	14%	10%	7%
2	11%	19%	18%	18%	26%	24%
3	26%	33%	32%	30%	28%	30%
4	15%	12%	13%	12%	11%	13%
5 (Centrally planned)	22%	14%	14%	14%	6%	9%
Don't know	16%	13%	10%	14%	19%	18%
No answer	1%	1%	★	--	--	--
Total	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓	102% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q12. [If 1 or 2 in Q11] Do you think that in the past year the government has taken significant actions, minor actions, or no actions at all to move Ukraine toward a market economy?

	9/03
	<u>(369)</u>
Significant actions	10%
Minor actions	61%
No actions at all	18%
Don't know	12%
Total	101% ✓

Q13. In general, would you say that economic reforms in Ukraine are occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at the right pace?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Too quickly	5%	6%	6%	3%	1%	4%
Too slowly	43%	38%	52%	50%	47%	43%
At the right pace	6%	9%	5%	10%	9%	10%
Reforms not happening	26%	21%	20%	19%	26%	24%
Reforms are late	--	3%	--	--	--	--
Don't know	19%	22%	16%	18%	17%	19%
No answer	2%	1%	1%	--	--	--
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q14. Can you tell me how interested you are in matters of politics and government – are you very interested, not too interested, or not at all interested

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very interested	13%	15%	18%	15%	12%	13%
Somewhat interested	30%	35%	47%	47%	48%	46%
Not too interested	35%	30%	23%	23%	24%	26%
Not at all interested	21%	18%	11%	11%	11%	12%
Don't know	1%	1%	1%	4%	5%	4%
No answer	★	★	★	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q15. How often do you talk about politics when you converse with your friends? Do you talk about politics – often, sometimes, rarely or never?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Often	24%	20%
Sometimes	34%	33%
Rarely	26%	28%
Never	14%	18%
Don't know	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%

I will now read you several statements. For each statement, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the statement.

Q16A. Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country.

	<u>6/99</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>1-2/00</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>11-12/00</u> <u>(1500)</u>	<u>9/01</u> <u>(1500)</u>	<u>9/02</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>9/03</u> <u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	11%	17%	13%	9%	8%	6%
Somewhat agree	24%	23%	21%	21%	19%	18%
Somewhat disagree	29%	25%	29%	31%	28%	29%
Strongly disagree	29%	27%	33%	32%	38%	41%
Neither Agree nor disagree	2%	1%	--	--	--	--
Don't know	5%	6%	4%	8%	8%	6%
No answer	★	1%	★	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%	100%

Q16B. Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like you can't understand what's really happening.

	<u>1-2/00</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>11-12/00</u> <u>(1500)</u>	<u>9/01</u> <u>(1500)</u>	<u>9/02</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>9/03</u> <u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	36%	44%	37%	35%	34%
Somewhat agree	34%	32%	36%	35%	34%
Somewhat disagree	15%	14%	16%	15%	15%
Strongly disagree	8%	6%	6%	9%	11%
Neither agree nor disagree	1%	--	--	--	--
Don't know	5%	4%	7%	8%	5%
No answer	1%	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	101% ✓	102% ✓	102% ✓	99% ✓

Q16C. People like you can have influence on the decisions made by the government.

	<u>9/02</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>9/03</u> <u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	4%	3%
Somewhat agree	10%	11%
Somewhat disagree	23%	25%
Strongly disagree	54%	53%
Don't know	9%	8%
Total	100%	100%

Q17. Listed on this card are several statements. Please pick any statement or statements that you think accurately define what it means for a country to be a democracy.

Q17A. Freedom of choice

	<u>9/03</u> <u>(1200)</u>
No	55%
Yes	45%
Total	100%

Q17B. Freedom of religion

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	72%
Yes	28%
Total	100%

Q17C. Freedom to vote

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	70%
Yes	30%
Total	100%

Q17D. Everyone has work

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	40%
Yes	60%
Total	100%

Q17E. Freedom of speech

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	58%
Yes	42%
Total	100%

Q17F. Human rights

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	34%
Yes	66%
Total	100%

Q17G. The state supports all who cannot work

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	58%
Yes	43%
Total	101% ✓

Q17H. Retirees are looked after by the state

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	45%
Yes	55%
Total	100%

Q17I. System of checks and balances between executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	75%
Yes	25%
Total	100%

Q17J. No official corruption

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
No	53%
Yes	48%
Total	101% ✓

Q18. Is Ukraine a Democracy?

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes	17%	31%	22%	30%	18%	22%
No	58%	50%	59%	46%	53%	64%
Other	10%	6%	2%	3%	2%	1%
Don't know	14%	12%	16%	20%	27%	13%
No answer	1%	★	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	99% ✓	100%	99% ✓	100%	100%

Q19. Is Ukraine moving toward becoming a democracy or not? [If "No" to Q18]

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(993)</u>	<u>(822)</u>	<u>(1174)</u>	<u>(1046)</u>	<u>(640)</u>	<u>(762)</u>
Moving toward becoming a democracy	20%	35%	23%	39%	23%	26%
Not moving toward becoming a democracy	38%	38%	51%	32%	59%	58%
Don't know	25%	26%	25%	29%	19%	16%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	--	--	--
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q20. Has your opinion on whether Ukraine is a democracy changed over the last two years?

	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
Yes	20%
No	63%
No answer	17%
Total	100%

Q21. Next, I will read you a list of actions governments sometimes take to ensure order. Please tell me for each, whether the action can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified. The answers are listed on your card.

Q21A. Limit the activities of certain political parties

	<u>9/01</u> (1500)	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
Always be justified	17%	12%	17%
Sometimes be justified	48%	47%	44%
Never be justified	20%	23%	21%
Don't know	16%	19%	19%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q21B. Limit the rights of citizens to protest

	<u>9/01</u> (1500)	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
Always be justified	7%	7%	5%
Sometimes be justified	35%	35%	29%
Never be justified	45%	45%	52%
Don't know	13%	14%	14%
Total	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q21C. Limit freedom of the press

	<u>9/01</u> (1500)	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
Always be justified	5%	6%	5%
Sometimes be justified	31%	30%	31%
Never be justified	51%	51%	50%
Don't know	12%	14%	14%
Total	99% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q21D. Limit the authority of the courts

	<u>9/01</u> (1500)	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
Always be justified	5%	8%	6%
Sometimes be justified	22%	27%	28%
Never be justified	52%	41%	43%
Don't know	21%	25%	23%
Total	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q21E. Limit the activities of citizens' groups and unions

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(1500)	(1200)	(1200)
Always be justified	10%	8%	6%
Sometimes be justified	40%	40%	37%
Never be justified	29%	27%	32%
Don't know	21%	26%	26%
Total	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q22. Have you ever contacted an official in your city/village local self-government before to help solve a problem?

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(1500)	(1500)	(1200)	(1200)
Yes	24%	22%	30%	29%
No	75%	76%	67%	70%
Don't know	★	2%	3%	2%
No answer	2%	--	--	--
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q23. [IF NO TO Q22] Why haven't you ever contacted these officials before? [Multiple answers allowed]

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(1125)	(1144)	(807)	(835)
Difficult to arrange an appointment	2%	2%	2%	1%
It will result in nothing	27%	--	33%	30%
No need/problem not important enough	32%	23%	32%	41%
Effort/cost greater than benefit	18%	36%	--	--
Work out my problems unassisted	10%	26%	26%	27%
Don't trust them	--	8%	12%	6%
Other	1%	2%	2%	1%
Don't know	8%	2%	★	1%
No answer	2%	--	--	--

Q24. [IF YES TO Q22] For what reason did you contact the official of your city/village local self-government? [Multiple responses allowed; Open-ended]

	9/03
	(342)
Settlement of legal issues	23%
Telephone communication problems	2%
House maintenance problems	19%
Public utilities concerns	9%
Settlement of land ownership issues	11%
Material aid/privileges	24%
Housing problems resolution	6%
Medical service improvement	1%
Assistance finding work	4%
Assistance resolving back-wages	4%
Other	4%
Don't remember	5%

Q25. [If yes to Q22] Did the elected official respond to you?

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(352)</u>	<u>(328)</u>	<u>(357)</u>	<u>(342)</u>
Yes	73%	65%	57%	66%
No	15%	19%	16%	17%
Partially	12%	16%	26%	16%
Don't know	★	★	1%	1%
No answer	★	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q26. [If YES or PARTIALLY to Q25] How satisfied were you with the response of this official?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(298)</u>	<u>(280)</u>
Completely dissatisfied	21%	27%
Somewhat dissatisfied	28%	16%
Somewhat satisfied	34%	23%
Completely satisfied	14%	34%
Don't know	2%	1%
No answer	★	--
Total	99% ✓	101 ✓

Q27. How reliable and trustworthy is the information you receive from your local self-government. It is very reliable, somewhat reliable, not too reliable, or not reliable at all?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very reliable	1%	2%
Somewhat reliable	32%	23%
Not too reliable	34%	26%
Not reliable at all	10%	9%
Don't get any information from local self-government	3%	24%
Don't know	19%	17%
Total	99% ✓	101% ✓

Q28. In general, what is your main source of information about the activities of your city/village local self-government? [Only One Answer Allowed]

	9/01 (1500)	9/02 (1200)	9/03 (1200)
National newspapers	1%	6%	2%
Local newspapers	20%	36%	26%
National radio	1%	5%	1%
Local radio	8%	20%	5%
National television	8%	13%	8%
Local television	16%	32%	11%
Local Officials	2%	8%	4%
Public Meetings	--	--	3%
Friends/Acquaintances	22%	40%	21%
Internet sites	--	--	★
Other	1%	1%	1%
No information available	15%	14%	11%
Not interested in local government	3%	5%	5%
Don't Know	3%	2%	3%
Total	100%	182%⁷	101% ✓

Q29. I will now provide you with a list of services provided by your city/village local government. Please tell me if you have noticed improvement in these services over the past year, whether you have not noticed any change, or whether there has been deterioration in these services over the past year.

Q29A. Water Supply

	9/02 (1200)	9/03 (1200)
Improvement	10%	15%
No change	53%	50%
Deterioration	23%	17%
Don't know/No answer	14%	18%
Total	100%	100%

Q29B. District Heating

	9/02 (1200)	9/03 (1200)
Improvement	7%	12%
No change	54%	50%
Deterioration	18%	14%
Don't know/No answer	21%	25%
Total	100%	101% ✓

⁷ In the 2002 Survey, respondents were allowed to provide more than one answer.

Q29C. Housing Maintenance (Only for those in the urban areas)

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(819)</u>	<u>(821)</u>
Improvement	4%	6%
No change	40%	38%
Deterioration	21%	24%
Don't know/No answer	35%	33%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q30. Does your city/village local self-government have any citizen advisory boards?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Yes	39%	41%
No	8%	11%
Don't know/No answer	53%	48%
Total	100%	100%

Q31. [If "YES" to Q30] How effective are the citizen advisory boards in influencing the decisions of your city/village self-government?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(471)</u>	<u>(497)</u>
Very effective	5%	4%
Somewhat effective	23%	35%
Not very effective	29%	24%
Not at all effective	9%	10%
Don't know	35%	28%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q32. I am now going to ask you about several government institutions. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them.

Q32A. The Verkhovna Rada

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	3%	4%	3%	4%	2%	3%
Fair amount	18%	18%	18%	27%	20%	24%
Not very much	39%	36%	40%	35%	38%	29%
None at all	32%	31%	33%	24%	28%	35%
Don't know	7%	10%	6%	10%	11%	9%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	--	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q32B. Cabinet of Ministers

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	2%	7%	4%	4%	2%	3%
Fair amount	18%	30%	22%	30%	23%	25%
Not very much	38%	30%	35%	32%	36%	29%
None at all	31%	20%	31%	22%	25%	32%
Don't know	10%	12%	7%	13%	12%	11%
No answer	1%	1%	1%	--	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q32C. The President of Ukraine -- Leonid Kuchma

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	2%	20%	8%	7%	3%	3%
Fair amount	13%	29%	21%	23%	18%	19%
Not very much	32%	19%	28%	25%	29%	24%
None at all	32%	21%	37%	35%	40%	46%
Don't know	20%	9%	6%	10%	8%	6%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	--	2%	2%
Total	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓	100%	100%	100%

Q32D. Ukraine's military forces

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	17%	28%	24%	24%	9%	15%
Fair amount	42%	40%	43%	46%	39%	41%
Not very much	15%	9%	12%	11%	22%	15%
None at all	12%	7%	12%	8%	15%	17%
Don't know	12%	14%	9%	10%	12%	10%
No answer	1%	2%	1%	--	2%	2%
Total	99% ✓	100%	101% ✓	99% ✓	99% ✓	100%

Q32E. Your City/Village council

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	4%	8%
Fair amount	33%	33%
Not very much	30%	22%
None at all	18%	24%
Don't know	13%	11%
No answer	3%	3%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q32F. Mayor of your city/village local self-government

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	7%	11%
Fair amount	35%	36%
Not very much	24%	19%
None at all	17%	21%
Don't know	14%	10%
No answer	3%	3%
Total	100%	100%

Q32G. Your Raion administrator

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	4%	6%
Fair amount	23%	25%
Not very much	22%	18%
None at all	16%	18%
Don't know	30%	27%
No answer	5%	7%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q32H. Your Oblast governor

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	4%	6%
Fair amount	26%	24%
Not very much	22%	16%
None at all	16%	16%
Don't know	27%	30%
No answer	5%	9%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q33. And how much confidence do you have in each of the following branches of the legal system to treat people with fairness and justice when making their decisions?

Q33A. Constitutional Court

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	8%	15%	11%	13%	7%	11%
Fair amount	27%	28%	29%	32%	34%	30%
Not very much	20%	17%	22%	14%	17%	13%
None at all	16%	12%	18%	15%	10%	14%
Don't know	26%	26%	19%	27%	33%	32%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	--	--	--
Total	99% ✓	100%	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q33B. Supreme Court

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	11%	6%	11%
Fair amount	33%	33%	30%
Not very much	15%	19%	13%
None at all	16%	10%	15%
Don't know	25%	32%	30%
Total	100%	100%	99% ✓

Q33C. Appeals Court

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	5%	9%
Fair amount	28%	28%
Not very much	18%	13%
None at all	10%	14%
Don't know	39%	35%
Total	100%	99% ✓

Q33D. Local Courts

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	5%	3%	6%
Fair amount	22%	23%	21%
Not very much	29%	31%	25%
None at all	27%	20%	25%
Don't know	17%	24%	24%
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q33E. Public Prosecutors

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	6%	8%	7%	7%	3%	7%
Fair amount	31%	28%	25%	25%	28%	24%
Not very much	25%	25%	28%	25%	26%	21%
None at all	22%	21%	29%	24%	19%	24%
Don't know	15%	16%	12%	19%	24%	25%
No answer	1%	2%	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	102% ✓	100%	97% ✓	101% ✓

Q33F. The Police

	6/99	1-2/00	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
A great deal	4%	7%	6%	6%	3%	6%
Fair amount	18%	19%	16%	20%	22%	21%
Not very much	31%	27%	32%	27%	30%	24%
None at all	36%	34%	40%	35%	30%	34%
Don't know	10%	11%	7%	13%	15%	16%
No answer	1%	2%	1%	--	--	
Total	100%	100%	102% ✓	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q34. As you may know, some people in Ukraine say that the courts are influenced by outside interests, such as politicians, businessmen, etc. Others say that this is not the case. For the four courts listed below, can you tell me how much influence you think outside interests have on the court's decision-making?

Q34A. Constitutional Court

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
No influence	14%	13%	14%
Some influence	35%	34%	36%
Great influence	19%	18%	21%
Don't know	32%	35%	29%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Q34B. Supreme Court

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
No influence	11%	9%	10%
Some influence	37%	35%	37%
Great influence	22%	21%	23%
Don't know	31%	35%	29%
Total	101% ✓	100%	99% ✓

Q34C. Appeals Court

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
No influence	7%	8%
Some influence	34%	36%
Great influence	20%	24%
Don't know	40%	32%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q34D. Local Courts

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
No influence	6%	2%	4%
Some influence	26%	31%	31%
Great influence	44%	42%	43%
Don't know	25%	25%	22%
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%

Q35. If I were wrongly accused of a crime, I am sure that our judicial system would acquit me.

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	4%	4%	4%	6%
Somewhat agree	17%	19%	19%	16%
Somewhat disagree	33%	33%	34%	28%
Strongly disagree	34%	26%	21%	34%
Don't know	12%	18%	22%	17%
No answer	★	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q36. Did you vote in the 2002 elections for Verhovna Rada and local self-government?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Voted for both offices	79%	81%
Voted only for Verhovna Rada	1%	1%
Voted only for local self-government	1%	1%
No, I was too young	1%	2%
No, I could vote, but did not	16%	13%
Other	★	★
Don't know	2%	2%
Total	100%	100%

Q37. In your opinion, how fair were the 2002 elections?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Completely fair	2%	5%
Somewhat fair	23%	24%
Somewhat unfair	35%	35%
Completely unfair	22%	21%
Don't know	19%	16%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q38. How likely is it that you will vote in the 2004 elections for the President? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely that you will vote in the next elections?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very likely	63%	65%
Somewhat likely	23%	15%
Somewhat unlikely	3%	6%
Very unlikely	3%	7%
Don't know	8%	7%
Total	100%	100%

Q39. In your opinion, how likely is it that the 2004 elections for President will be free and fair: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not likely at all?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very likely	6%	10%
Somewhat likely	23%	21%
Somewhat unlikely	26%	30%
Very unlikely	19%	17%
Don't know	27%	23%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q40. What will be the most important reason that ensures the next Presidential elections are free and fair? Will it be because: [Only One Answer Allowed]

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
The law ensures free and fair elections in Ukraine	21%	18%
International observers will monitor the election process	16%	22%
Independent Ukrainian observers will monitor the election process	6%	7%
The Election Commissions consist of representatives of different political parties	12%	13%
The local election commission is fair	14%	16%
Other	5%	4%
Don't know	26%	21%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q41. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Q41A. My vote is kept confidential by election authorities in Ukraine.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	19%	22%
Somewhat agree	34%	31%
Somewhat disagree	23%	22%
Strongly disagree	7%	12%
Don't know	18%	13%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q41B. The results of elections in Ukraine accurately reflect the way people voted in the election.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	12%	12%
Somewhat agree	24%	21%
Somewhat disagree	34%	33%
Strongly disagree	21%	26%
Don't know	9%	9%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q41C. The presence of non-partisan domestic observers has a positive affect on the fairness of elections Ukraine.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	16%	18%
Somewhat agree	40%	39%
Somewhat disagree	21%	21%
Strongly disagree	7%	10%
Don't know	16%	12%
Total	100%	100%

Q41D. The presence of international observers has a positive affect on the fairness of elections in Ukraine.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	22%	29%
Somewhat agree	45%	41%
Somewhat disagree	13%	13%
Strongly disagree	5%	6%
Don't know	16%	12%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q41E. The presence of political party observers has a positive affect on the legitimacy of elections in Ukraine.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	18%	21%
Somewhat agree	43%	37%
Somewhat disagree	16%	20%
Strongly disagree	8%	10%
Don't know	15%	13%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q41F. Elections in Ukraine are competently administered.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	8%	11%
Somewhat agree	24%	27%
Somewhat disagree	32%	28%
Strongly disagree	23%	21%
Don't know	14%	14%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q41G. Our local media provides thorough coverage of parties and candidates up for election.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	12%	14%
Somewhat agree	37%	34%
Somewhat disagree	27%	26%
Strongly disagree	12%	14%
Don't know	13%	12%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q41H. Our local media provides objective coverage of parties and candidates up for election.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	8%	8%
Somewhat agree	23%	23%
Somewhat disagree	31%	35%
Strongly disagree	17%	19%
Don't know	21%	15%
Total	100%	100%

Q41I. Ukraine's electoral system provides adequate means to challenge election violations.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	7%	9%
Somewhat agree	19%	22%
Somewhat disagree	30%	29%
Strongly disagree	17%	21%
Don't know	27%	20%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q41J. I feel safe voting however I wish in an election.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	30%	38%
Somewhat agree	40%	32%
Somewhat disagree	12%	12%
Strongly disagree	5%	8%
Don't know	14%	11%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q41K. I am informed about the electoral process in Ukraine.

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Strongly agree	11%	14%
Somewhat agree	29%	30%
Somewhat disagree	25%	26%
Strongly disagree	16%	15%
Don't know	19%	16%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q42. In your opinion, do you receive enough information about political developments in our country to make wise choices when it is time to vote in the elections? Do you receive enough information, barely enough, very little, or no information at all?

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Enough information	28%	15%	18%
Barely enough	27%	38%	35%
Very little	28%	32%	30%
None at all	7%	2%	4%
Don't know	4%	6%	8%
No answer	7%	--	--
Not interested in this	--	7%	5%
Total	101% ✓	100%	100%

Q43. [If 1, 2, 3, 4 in Q42] And what sources of information do you use to receive information about the elections? [Multiple choices accepted]

	9/02	9/03
	(1500)	(1046)
Ukrainian national newspapers	35%	29%
Local newspapers	39%	53%
Ukrainian state television	42%	35%
Ukrainian private television stations (e.g. 1+1, ICTV, Inter, etc.)	67%	77%
Local government-owned TV stations	16%	8%
Local private television stations	16%	12%
Ukrainian state radio	22%	23%
Private radio	8%	8%
Local government-owned radio stations	7%	6%
Local private radio stations	5%	5%
Ukrainian internet sites	1%	1%
Other	4%	6%
Don't know	2%	2%

Q44A. Are you a supporter of any political party, even if you are not a member?

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(1470)	(1153)	(1200)
Yes	32%	31%	23%
No	68%	65%	74%
Refused	--	4%	4%
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q44B. [IF YES TO QUESTION 44A] Which party is that?

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(466)	(375)	(317)
Agrarian Party of Ukraine	2%	★	--
All-Ukrainian Association "Batkyivstchyna"	5%	3%	1%
Communist Party of Ukraine	37%	34%	30%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	1%	--	--
People's Rukh Party (Udoenko)	10%	5%	2%
People's Democratic Party	3%	1%	1%
Party "Democratic Union"	1%	--	--
Green Party	10%	2%	3%
Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs	2%	--	★
Party of Regions of Ukraine	2%	--	3%
Party of Reforms and Order	2%	--	--
"Young Ukraine" Party	1%	--	--
Labor Ukraine	★	--	--
Progressive Socialist Party	5%	1%	★
Selyanska Party	★	★	--
Social Democratic Party (United)	9%	13%	10%
Socialist Party	4%	4%	3%
People's Rukh Party (Kostenko)	2%	--	--
Christian Democratic Party	1%	--	--
"New Generation of Ukraine" Party	1%	--	--
All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada"	★	--	--
Ukrainian National Assembly	★	★	--
Yabluko Party	1%	1%	--
"Our Ukraine" Bloc	1%	17%	22%
Women for the Future of Ukraine	1%	★	1%
Bloc "For United Ukraine"	--	5%	1%
UNA-UNSO	--	--	★
"Democratic Party"	--	--	1%
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko	--	--	2%
Other	1%	2%	3%
No answer	--	--	18%
Total	102% ✓	96% ✓	101% ✓

Q45. In your opinion, do the major political parties in Ukraine have clear proposals to address the issues facing the country?

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
Yes, most address issues	18%	14%
No, only some address issues	34%	35%
No, none address issues	25%	30%
[Volunteered]		
Don't know	23%	21%
Total	100%	100%

Q46. [If “most” or “some” to Q45] And to what extent do these parties have clear differences in their programs?

	9/02	9/03
	(626)	(587)
Most have clear differences	58%	54%
Only some have clear differences	31%	38%
Don't know	11%	8%
Total	100%	100%

Q47. Can you tell me whether you are a member of any of the different types of civic organizations listed on this card?

	9/03
	(1200)
Trade unions	16%
Political parties	2%
Religious groups	3%
NGOs	★
Artist/Scientist unions	★
Local self-governance institutions	★
Other	1%
None of these	71%
No answer	8%
Total	101% ✓

Q48. Do you know of any Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are active in Ukraine?

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)⁸	(1200)
Yes	12%	20%
No	55%	45%
Don't know what NGO is	22%	24%
Don't know	11%	10%
Total	100%	99% ✓

⁸ In the 2002 Survey, this question read “Do you know of any NGOs that are active in your community/city/village?”

Q49. What issues are these NGOs working on in Ukraine? [Open Ended]

	<u>9/02</u> <u>(148)</u>	<u>9/03</u> <u>(242)</u>
Care for war veterans	6%	8%
Work on Chernobyl matter	3%	--
Providing social assistance	20%	36%
Protection of rights (civil, consumer)	1%	13%
Conservancy, ecology	11%	8%
Help for women	3%	--
Philanthropy, charity	2%	3%
Help for schools	3%	--
Work with youth	6%	5%
Protection of cultural monuments	--	1%
Spiritual renaissance of nation	--	5%
Improvement of people's well-being	--	5%
Propagation of religious wealth	--	9%
Don't work on any problems	--	6%
Other	--	11%
Don't know	51%	23%

Q50. How necessary are these non-governmental organizations, or NGOs-- essential, very necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?

	<u>6/99</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>1-2/00</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>11-12/00</u> <u>(1500)</u>	<u>9/01</u> <u>(1500)</u>	<u>9/02</u> <u>(933)</u>	<u>9/03</u> <u>(908)</u>
Essential	12%	8%	13%	19%	14%	14%
Necessary	--	--	--	--	--	35%
Very necessary	11%	13%	22%	43%	30%	--
Not very necessary	39%	26%	34%	18%	17%	18%
Not at all necessary	11%	16%	9%	4%	6%	5%
Depends	3%	9%	--	--	--	--
Don't know	21%	26%	22%	16%	32%	28%
No answer	2%	2%	1%	--	--	--
Total	99% ✓	100%	101% ✓	100%	99% ✓	100%

Q51. In the past year, have you made efforts to ensure that your rights/interests as a citizen are respected by government officials?

	<u>9/02</u> <u>(1200)</u>	<u>9/03</u> <u>(1200)</u>
Yes	10%	12%
No	90%	88%
Total	100%	100%

Q52. In general, would you say that democratic change in Ukraine is occurring too quickly, too slowly, or at the right pace?

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
Too quickly	1%	1%
Too slowly	46%	48%
At the right pace	9%	12%
Change not occurring [volunteered]	28%	25%
Don't know	16%	14%
Total	100%	100%

Q53. Which one of these government institutions do you think is most likely to institute reforms in its spheres of influence? [Only one response allowed]

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
Central Government	23%	29%
Oblast/reion state administration	6%	6%
City/Village local self-government	7%	7%
None of these [volunteered]	30%	28%
Don't know	35%	30%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q54. As you may know, there has been some discussion recently whether President Kuchma should be able to run for another term. Are you aware of the detail surrounding this issue?

	9/03
	(1200)
Yes	50%
No	50%
Total	100%

Q55. Do you think that President Kuchma should be allowed to seek another term in the next elections?

	9/03
	(1200)
Yes	10%
No	79%
Don't know	10%
Total	99% ✓

Q56. There has recently been a bill introduced in Parliament that would amend certain provisions in the Ukrainian constitution related to the powers of the President and of Parliament. Are you familiar with these amendments?

	9/03
	(1200)
Yes	38%
No	63%
Total	101% ✓

Q57. [If “yes” in Q56] Do you support the amendments that have been introduced?

	9/03
	<u>(450)</u>
Yes	11%
Partially [volunteered]	41%
No	35%
Don't know	13%
Total	100%

Q58. In the last few years the government has begun the process to sell state owned enterprises. Please tell me to what degree you support privatization efforts in the following sectors?

Q58A. Electricity

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Totally support	3%	5%
Somewhat support	9%	16%
Reluctant to support	23%	14%
Do not support at all	54%	50%
Don't know	11%	15%
Total	100%	100%

Q58B. Coal

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Totally support	4%	5%
Somewhat support	12%	19%
Reluctant to support	22%	12%
Do not support at all	49%	47%
Don't know	12%	17%
Total	99% ✓	100%

Q58C. Telecommunications

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Totally support	8%	9%
Somewhat support	22%	28%
Reluctant to support	18%	11%
Do not support at all	39%	35%
Don't know	14%	17%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q58D. Collective farms

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Totally support	10%	15%
Somewhat support	24%	24%
Reluctant to support	16%	10%
Do not support at all	36%	35%
Don't know	14%	16%
Total	100%	100%

Q59. [If reluctant to support or do not support in any case] Why are you opposed to privatization in this area/these areas? [Multiple responses allowed]

	9/03
	<u>(823)</u>
Privatization leads to higher prices	26%
State should own such enterprises	21%
Enterprise requires state subsidies	3%
Privatization deteriorates finances	6%
Privatization decreases service standards	3%
Lose control over privatized enterprises	15%
Benefits only private entrepreneurs	7%
Leads to loss of stability/order in nation	8%
Privatization squanders public wealth	7%
Leads to reduction in efficiency	6%
Threat of corruption	2%
Privatization process is unfair	6%
Distrust of private entrepreneurs	3%
Privatization leads to unemployment	12%
Other	3%
Don't know	11%

Q60. Look at this list of private institutions. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in each of them.

Q60A. [Only for those who know what NGO is] Civic Organizations/NGOs

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(933)</u>	<u>(784)</u>
A great deal	3%	7%
Fair amount	24%	31%
Not very much	14%	16%
None at all	6%	10%
Don't know	53%	37%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q60B. Private/Commercial Banks

	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
A great deal	2%	3%
Fair amount	14%	21%
Not very much	31%	27%
None at all	35%	30%
Don't know	19%	19%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q60C. The Church

	<u>1-2/00</u> (1200)	<u>11-12/00</u> (1500)	<u>9/01</u> (1500)	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
A great deal	34%	32%	31%	24%	28%
Fair amount	30%	30%	35%	40%	37%
Not very much	9%	11%	11%	13%	12%
None at all	9%	15%	11%	7%	9%
Don't know	17%	11%	12%	16%	15%
No answer	1%	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q60D. The Media

	<u>9/01</u> (1500)	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
A great deal	9%	6%	7%
Fair amount	52%	52%	54%
Not very much	21%	22%	20%
None at all	9%	6%	6%
Don't know	10%	15%	13%
No answer	--	--	--
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q61. In your opinion, how safe is it for media in Ukraine to broadcast or print news and information objectively, even if this is critical of the government? Is it very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat dangerous, or very dangerous?

	<u>11-12/00</u> (1500)	<u>9/01</u> (1500)	<u>9/02</u> (1200)	<u>9/03</u> (1200)
Very safe	3%	3%	3%	3%
Somewhat safe	17%	26%	20%	17%
Somewhat dangerous	42%	33%	42%	45%
Very dangerous	24%	14%	20%	23%
I don't care about this [Volunteered]	6%	--	--	--
Don't know	8%	23%	15%	12%
No answer	★	--	--	--
Total	100%	99% ✓	100%	100%

Q62. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: It is more important that leaders maintain order than protect freedoms.

	9/01	9/02	9/03
	(1500)	(1200)	(1200)
Strongly agree	19%	21%	24%
Somewhat agree	29%	25%	29%
Somewhat disagree	22%	19%	20%
Strongly disagree	11%	7%	5%
Don't know	20%	27%	23%
Total	101% ✓	99% ✓	101% ✓

Q63. Please look at the following list of institutions and leaders. In your opinion, how effective are they in carrying out the duties that are their responsibility.

Q63A. The President

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
Very effective	2%	1%
Somewhat effective	19%	18%
Not very effective	36%	37%
Not at all effective	32%	35%
Don't know	10%	10%
Total	99% ✓	101% ✓

Q63B. The Verhovna Rada

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
Very effective	1%	1%
Somewhat effective	17%	18%
Not very effective	44%	39%
Not at all effective	25%	31%
Don't know	12%	10%
Total	99% ✓	99% ✓

Q63C. Your oblast governor

	9/02	9/03
	(1200)	(1200)
Very effective	2%	2%
Somewhat effective	26%	25%
Not very effective	32%	24%
Not at all effective	18%	20%
Don't know	22%	30%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q63D. The mayor of your city/village local self-government

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very effective	2%	3%
Somewhat effective	27%	29%
Not very effective	30%	27%
Not at all effective	16%	19%
Don't know	25%	22%
Total	100%	100%

Q63E. Your city/village council

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very effective	5%	6%
Somewhat effective	36%	35%
Not very effective	26%	26%
Not at all effective	17%	19%
Don't know	17%	14%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q63F. Local courts

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very effective	1%	2%
Somewhat effective	18%	17%
Not very effective	28%	23%
Not at all effective	17%	20%
Don't know	36%	38%
Total	100%	100%

Q63G. Supreme Court

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very effective	1%	3%
Somewhat effective	23%	21%
Not very effective	22%	17%
Not at all effective	12%	15%
Don't know	42%	45%
Total	100%	101% ✓

Q64. In your opinion, how serious is the problem of corruption at each of the following institutions – is it very serious, fairly serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?

Q64A. Universities/Schools

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very serious	44%
Fairly serious	35%
Not too serious	10%
Not serious at all	2%
Don't know	9%
Total	100%

Q64B. Hospitals

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very serious	52%
Fairly serious	34%
Not too serious	8%
Not serious at all	1%
Don't know	6%
Total	101% ✓

Q64C. Police

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very serious	55%
Fairly serious	28%
Not too serious	4%
Not serious at all	1%
Don't know	12%
Total	100%

Q64D. Courts

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very serious	47%
Fairly serious	27%
Not too serious	6%
Not serious at all	1%
Don't know	19%
Total	100%

Q64E. Customs authorities

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very serious	44%
Fairly serious	22%
Not too serious	5%
Not serious at all	1%
Don't know	27%
Total	99% ✓

Q64F. Tax authorities

	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>
Very serious	45%
Fairly serious	21%
Not too serious	6%
Not serious at all	2%
Don't know	26%
Total	100%

Q65. How likely do you think is that the problem of official corruption can be countered in Ukraine?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Very likely	8%	6%
Somewhat likely	19%	23%
Somewhat unlikely	37%	33%
Very unlikely	19%	25%
Don't know	18%	14%
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓

Q66. Next, I will read you a list of actions people sometimes do. For each, tell me if this activity occurs often here in Ukraine. Does this happen very often, sometimes, not very often, or never at all.

Q66A. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	50%	46%	34%	34%
Sometimes	27%	29%	36%	35%
Not very often	9%	8%	11%	15%
Never at all	3%	2%	5%	5%
Don't know	10%	15%	14%	12%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	101% ✓

Q66B. Cheating on tax if you had the chance

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	63%	60%	56%	49%
Sometimes	24%	25%	26%	30%
Not very often	5%	4%	5%	8%
Never at all	2%	2%	2%	2%
Don't know	6%	10%	12%	11%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q66C. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	77%	71%	66%	63%
Sometimes	14%	16%	21%	23%
Not very often	3%	3%	3%	4%
Never at all	1%	2%	2%	2%
Don't know	4%	8%	8%	8%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q66D. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	46%	48%	39%	41%
Sometimes	26%	24%	30%	25%
Not very often	10%	8%	9%	9%
Never at all	2%	3%	2%	5%
Don't know	17%	18%	20%	19%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	102% ✓	101% ✓	100%	99% ✓

Q66E. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	64%	60%	57%	53%
Sometimes	20%	18%	22%	20%
Not very often	4%	4%	4%	5%
Never at all	1%	2%	2%	2%
Don't know	11%	16%	16%	20%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q66F. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	71%	67%	61%	61%
Sometimes	15%	16%	21%	18%
Not very often	3%	3%	2%	3%
Never at all	★	2%	2%	2%
Don't know	10%	12%	14%	15%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	99% ✓

Q66G. High officials helping their associates in private business

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	72%	64%	59%	56%
Sometimes	16%	18%	23%	23%
Not very often	2%	3%	3%	4%
Never at all	★	2%	1%	2%
Don't know	8%	12%	13%	16%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	99% ✓	99% ✓	99% ✓	101% ✓

Q66H. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	78%	70%	61%	60%
Sometimes	13%	17%	23%	23%
Not very often	3%	2%	3%	4%
Never at all	★	2%	2%	2%
Don't know	5%	9%	12%	11%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q66I. Offering gifts or money to teachers/professors to improve one's grade or that of one's child

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Happen very often	44%	44%
Sometimes	28%	30%
Not very often	9%	9%
Never at all	4%	4%
Don't know	16%	15%
No answer	--	--
Total	101% ✓	102% ✓

Q67. Now, I will read the list to you again. For each, tell me if this activity occurs often here in Ukraine. Does it happen very often, sometimes, not very often, or never at all?

Q67A. Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	6%	4%	3%	2%
Sometimes be justified	27%	22%	35%	30%
Never be justified	60%	66%	51%	59%
Don't know	6%	9%	12%	9%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q67B. Cheating on tax if you had the chance

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	8%	5%	5%	3%
Sometimes be justified	38%	32%	35%	36%
Never be justified	48%	56%	47%	52%
Don't know	6%	8%	13%	10%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q67C. Someone taking a bribe in the course of their duties

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	4%	3%	1%	2%
Sometimes be justified	12%	9%	11%	10%
Never be justified	79%	84%	78%	80%
Don't know	4%	5%	10%	8%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	101% ✓	100%	100%

Q67D. Accepting money to vote for a politician or political party

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	3%	2%	2%	3%
Sometimes be justified	9%	10%	14%	10%
Never be justified	80%	80%	73%	77%
Don't know	6%	8%	11%	10%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	99% ✓	100%	100%	100%

Q67E. Officials taking money from entrepreneurs to approve businesses quickly

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	4%	3%	2%	2%
Sometimes be justified	13%	13%	15%	13%
Never be justified	74%	76%	71%	74%
Don't know	8%	8%	13%	11%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	101% ✓	100%

Q67F. High officials benefiting from the privatization of Ukrainian public industries

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	3%	2%	1%	2%
Sometimes be justified	5%	6%	5%	5%
Never be justified	86%	86%	85%	85%
Don't know	5%	6%	9%	8%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Q67G. High officials helping their associates in private business

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	4%	4%	3%	4%
Sometimes be justified	16%	18%	22%	24%
Never be justified	72%	70%	63%	62%
Don't know	7%	9%	12%	11%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	101% ✓	100%	101% ✓

Q67H. The use of public funds for the personal benefit of officials

	11-12/00	9/01	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1500)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	3%	3%	2%	2%
Sometimes be justified	4%	4%	5%	5%
Never be justified	89%	89%	85%	86%
Don't know	3%	5%	9%	7%
No answer	1%	--	--	--
Total	100%	101% ✓	101% ✓	100%

Q67I. Offering gifts or money to teachers/professors to improve one's grade or that of one's child

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(1200)</u>	<u>(1200)</u>
Always be justified	5%	3%
Sometimes be justified	30%	26%
Never be justified	52%	59%
Don't know	13%	12%
No answer	--	--
Total	100%	100%

Q68. [If "often Q 66] Do you know of someone who gave a gift or money to a teacher/professor or the head of a college or university during the year's entrance examinations to colleges/universities?

	9/02	9/03
	<u>(971)</u>	<u>(980)</u>
Yes	37%	32%
No	42%	52%
Don't know	22%	16%
Total	101% ✓	100%

Q69. For what purpose was this money given to the teacher/professor?

	9/03
	<u>(315)</u>
For higher grades/passing exams	40%
For admission to an institution	52%
To improve teacher's attitude to pupil	6%
As token of gratitude	4%
Extortion on teacher's part	2%
Other	3%
Don't know	7%

Respondents' Background

Q70. Gender

Male	45%
Female	55%
Total	100%

Q71. Age

18-25	13%
26-35	19%
36-45	18%
46-55	18%
56+	32%
Total	100%

Q72. What is the highest level of education you received?

Elementary	6%
Partial secondary	10%
Complete secondary	26%
Special secondary	36%
Partial higher	3%
Complete higher	18%
Post-graduate	★
Total	99% ✓

Q73. What is your employment status?

Full-time, one job	37%
Part-time, one job	5%
Part-time, multiple jobs	2%
Student	4%
Pensioner	33%
Unemployed	13%
Homemaker	5%
Other	1%
Refused/Don't know	★
Total	100%

Q74. What is (was for pensioners) your field of employment? (n=1076)

“Intellectual” Worker-Teacher, Journalist, Writer	7%
Executive or Professional at Senior-level (Government or Private)	9%
Executive or Professional at Mid-level (Government or Private)	18%
Skilled Laborer	38%
Unskilled Laborer	12%
Soldier, in Military Service	2%
Farmer	10%
Student	1%
Other	3%
Don't know	1%
Total	101% ✓

Q75. [Do not ask if 4, 7, 8, or 9 on Q73] Are you currently owed any back wages or pension payments from your employer of the government? (n=1076)

Yes	10%
No	78%
Does not apply to me	11%
Don't know	1%
Total	100%

Q76. [If “Yes” to Q75] For how long a period are you owed back payments? (n=106)

One month or less	28%
Two months	19%
Three months	5%
Four months	6%
Five months	2%
Six months	8%
More than six months	24%
Don't know	8%
Total	100%

Q77. What is your marital status?

Married	63%
Single/Never Married	14%
Divorced/Separated	7%
Widowed	15%
Total	99% ✓

Q78. How many people are in your family, who live with you and keep one household (including you)?

1	17%
2	28%
3	25%
4	20%
5	6%
6	2%
7	1%
8	★
9+	★
Total	99% ✓

Q79. What is your nationality? Please pick the appropriate category from this list.

Ukrainian	78%
Russian	18%
Ukrainian and Russian	1%
Polish	★
Hungarian	★
Bulgarian	1%
Byelorussian	1%
Moldovan	★
Other	1%
Total	100%

Q80. What is the main language you speak in your home?

Ukrainian	46%
Russian	39%
Ukrainian and Russian	14%
Other	1%
Total	100%

Q81. With which church or religious group do you identify yourself?

Ukrainian Orthodox	20%
Other Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalna)	1%
Russian Orthodox	8%
Orthodox Christianity	43%
Roman Catholic	1%
Greek Catholic	6%
Protestant	1%
Muslim	★
Jewish	★
Other	1%
None	18%
Total	99% ✓

Q82. How often do you attend religious services?

Daily	★
Multiple times weekly	2%
Weekly	5%
A few times a month	8%
A few times each year	34%
Once a year or less	17%
Depends	15%
Don't attend	20%
Don't know	★
Total	99% ✓

Q83. What best describes the current financial situation of you and your family living there with you?

Very poor, we do not have enough money for our most basic needs	23%
Poor, we barely have enough money to buy food, we rarely buy clothes	28%
Modest, we have enough to eat, we occasionally buy clothes, but we have nothing left over to save	42%
Moderate, we have some savings	7%
Above average, we have savings, and can afford a lot	★
Refused	★
Total	100%

Appendix 2. Details of the Sample and Fieldwork⁹

Survey

The 2003 IFES Survey of Public Opinion Ukraine was fielded between September 10 and 19, 2003. IFES utilized the services of Taylor Nelson Sofres Ukraine (TNS) to conduct the fieldwork and data processing for the survey. A total of 1,265 respondents were interviewed during the survey. The total number of interviews comprised a nationally-representative sample of 1,200 interviews as well as an oversample of 65 interviews in Kyiv. The total of 130 interviews was weighted down by 50% in order to reflect the proper allocation of 65 interviews in Kyiv for the national sample. The breakdown of the interviews by region in the weighted sample are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Regional Breakdown of Weighted Sample

Region	Total # of urban respondents	Total # of rural respondents	Total for region
Kyiv	65	-	65
North	63	47	110
Center	81	67	148
North-East	80	27	107
East	167	21	188
South-East	114	26	140
North-West	44	42	86
West	66	59	125
South-West	21	30	51
South	79	41	120
Crimea	41	19	60
TOTAL	821	379	1200

The national-level percentages cited in this report are based on the weighted data. Besides the adjustment for Kyiv interviews, the final weighted data also contained adjustments for education and age distribution. Table 1 provides information on the before weighting and after weighting age and education distribution in the sample.

Table 2. Age and Education Distribution in Unweighted and Weighted Sample

	Universe	Before weighting	After weighting
Sex:			
Male	45,1%	36%	45%
Female	54,9%	64%	55%
Age:			
18-34	31%	22%	31%
35-54	36%	36%	36%
55+	33%	42%	33%

Respondents for the survey were chosen through a multi-state stratification design. In the first stage, oblasts in Ukraine were grouped into 10 regions by TNS with respect to more than 150 social, economic, and cultural factors. At the second stage, urban and rural settlements within each region were selected. At the third state, streets, houses, and apartments were selected. At

⁹ This methodological section is based upon the report provided by TNS-Ukraine.

the final stage, the appropriate respondent 18 or over was selected based on the next birthday method.

The average length of interviews was 44 minutes. Fifty-seven percent of the interviews were conducted in Russian and 43% in Ukrainian. The response rate for the survey was 30%. The main reasons for not being willing to be interviewed were a lack of time and a general unwillingness to be interviewed.

TNS conducted quality control on 15% of completed interviews. The quality control procedures checked whether an interview had been completed, whether the respondent had been selected using proper procedures, and a check on the responses to some of the questions on the interview. There were no significant problems discovered during the quality control process.

In addition to TNS conducting quality control for the survey, IFES also instituted random checks of the fieldwork to ensure that proper procedures were being followed. An IFES representative traveled with TNS interviewers to observe interviews on these occasions. To check data processing procedures, IFES randomly selected several completed questionnaires and asked for a second verification on the data entry for these questionnaires. No significant problems were discovered. At the data analysis stage, skip patterns and individual respondent response patterns were checked to ensure accuracy of the data file. In addition, trends from past data on IFES surveys also served as a check on the legitimacy of the data. No particularly noteworthy deviations from trend were observed in the data.

Focus Groups

Eight focus groups in total were held in Kyiv, Lviv, and Kharkiv. The location of the groups, the number of participants, and the language used are detailed in Table 3.

Table 3. Focus Group Breakdown

Group No.	Location	Language	# of Participants
1	Lviv	Ukrainian	8 (3 Men, 4 Women)
2	Lviv	Ukrainian	8 (3 M, 4 W)
3	Kyiv	Russian	8 (4 M, 4 W)
4	Kyiv	Ukrainian	8 (4 M, 4 W)
5	Kyiv	Ukrainian	8 (4 M, 4 W)
6	Kyiv	Russian	8 (4 M, 4 W)
7	Kharkiv	Russian	8 (4 M, 4 W)
8	Kharkiv	Russian	8 (4 M, 4 W)

The discussions took close to an average of 2 hours. All sessions were video-taped.

Participants for the focus groups were recruited on the basis of gender, age, education, language, and interest in politics. Only those at least somewhat interested in politics were invited to be participants.

Appendix 3. Regional Classifications

Regional classifications are provided by TNS based upon their own research. The following classifications are used in this report:

1. The NORTHERN Region: Kyivs'ka Zhytomyrs'ka and Chernigivs'ka oblasts;
2. The CENTRAL Region: Vinnits'ka, Kirovograds'ka, Poltavs'ka and Cherkas'ka oblasts;
3. The NORTHWESTERN Region: Volyns'ka, Rivens'ka and Khmel'nits'ka oblasts;
4. The SOUTHWESTERN Region: Zakarpats'ka and Chernivets'ka oblasts;
5. The WESTERN Region: Lvivs'ka, Ivano-Frankivs'ka and Ternopil'ska oblasts;
6. The NORTHEASTERN Region: Kharkivs'ka and Sums'ka oblasts;
7. The EASTERN Region: Dnipropetrivs'ka and Zaporiz'ka oblasts;
8. The SOUTHEASTERN Region: Donetsk'ka and Lugans'ka oblasts;
9. The SOUTHERN Region: Odes'ka, Mykolajivs'ka and Khersons'ka oblasts;
10. Autonomous Republic of the Crimea.

Regrouping the TNS regions provides the following:

Region	Total
Kyiv	65
Northern	111
Central	148
Northeastern	106
Northwestern	86
Southeastern	140
Western	125
Southwestern	50
Southern	120
Crimea	60
Eastern	188
Total	1200

*Weighted counts.

Appendix 4. Focus Groups Final Report¹⁰

1. INTEREST IN POLITICAL PROCESSES

Almost all respondents' explanations concerning their interest in politics lead to the statement that politics plays an important role in their lives. The main reasons respondents gave for their interest in politics are as follows:

Civic duty

"It is impossible to live in the society and to be not interested in the political situation or political life. That is why everybody is interested to some extent. The interest depends on the personal abilities, personal concern, the work..." (gr.1)

"Because we are citizens of our country, we must be interested in what is going on in our country, how it develops" (gr.6)

"I am interested because it is my country, I don't feel apathy to it" (gr.8)

Desire to participate in the life of society

"Because we would like to vote consciously. Not just crossing the box in the ballot" (gr.5)

"If I am not interested in politics, politics will not bother about me" (gr.1)

Personal awareness

"I think if the person is not interested in the politics at all, then, he or she lives as if in a space-suit. It is impossible to live without it" (gr. 4)

Concern for their future and the future of their children

"Because we would like to know is it worth giving birth to children" (gr.5)

"In order to understand, how to live better. I hope for better life" (gr.5)

Possibility to communicate

"I am afraid I will not be interesting for other people to talk to me" (gr.6)

One of the respondents said he takes an interest not in those issues he likes to know but in those issues he is allowed to: *"...It seems I am interested in those things I am allowed to be interested, i.e. certain political force influencing the channel or journalists ... they give me those pictures I watch" (gr. 2).*

Respondents are most interested in the following issues of the political sphere:

International politics

- International conflicts: *"I am most interested in the military situations in politics" (gr. 2); "...I have strong interest about our American brothers who were captured in Iraq" (gr. 7)*
- Image of Ukraine in international arena: *"to what extent our politicians are able to represent our country on international level" (gr. 5)*
- The problem of Kerch Strait: *"I keep thinking about Tuzla island ...to whom it belongs" (gr. 3)*
"As for me I am interested in Kerch Strait issues. The sovereignty of the state is breaking" (gr. 4)

¹⁰ Appendix 4 is excerpted from the complete final report produced by Intellectual Perspectives. For a full copy of the focus groups report, contact Rakesh Sharma at rakesh@ifes.org.

Internal politics in Ukraine:

- Elections: *“Elections are the most interesting in politics. They are interesting because we really can choose”* (gr. 6); *“...the fact that unofficial electoral campaign has already started...”* (gr. 4); *“Every election provokes the most interest because with every election I connect some hopes...”* (gr. 3)
- The work of the government bodies: *“How our state abides by the laws in our country”* (gr. 5); *“Appointment of the Cabinet of Ministers. How parties, groups and coalitions are formed”* (gr. 5)
- The work of the Parliament: *“I bother about irresponsibility of our parliament...”* (gr. 8); *“... it is sessions of the Verkhovna Rada which are too “interesting”, in other words are unproductive, because to block the work of session – it’s silly at the least”* (gr. 7)
- Legislation of Ukraine: *“...amendments to the Constitution, administrative reform, political reform...”* (gr. 4).

Economic problems

- Overall economic situation in Ukraine: *“...and politics are connected with the economy...”* (gr. 1); *“... effectiveness of political influence on the economy...”* (gr. 8)

Social security

- Pension reform: *“Of course, I am too interested in the pension rate increasing”* (gr. 3); *“I am also uneasy about unsettled state of people of my age. Neither pensions nor work”* (gr. 3)
- Municipal services, payment for municipal services: *“...there is a discrepancy between the minimum living standard we are promised and the payment for municipal services”* (gr. 3)
- Health care: *“...health care is not in the best situation today.”* (gr. 3); *“... medicine is very expensive ... though it is free of charge”* (gr. 3)
- Education: *“I am a father of a student, so I am personally interested in the level of education and the state of educational institutions”* (gr. 3)

Cultural issues

- *“And I am interested in the issues of culture. When will it reach at least the previous level?”* (gr. 3).

Respondents are the most interested in the events which are urgent today for Ukraine. In the sphere of international relations, it is the conflict over Kerch Strait which occupies the headlines of recent newspapers. Among the issues of domestic politics, respondents more often mention the 2004 presidential elections.

Besides that, there are differences in the views of different age groups. Older respondents (before pension and pension age) often mention issues of pensions because it is very pertinent for them.

The opinions of the respondents concerning their ability to influence the political development in the country divided into two categories. Most respondents say they cannot influence those processes whereas a few believe they can.

Those who believe they are not able to influence political situation in the country mention the following reasons:

Absence of real mechanisms of influence

Participants noted that even though there are in theory mechanisms for citizens to influence political development of the country, they do not work in practice.

“In theory, it is feasible. People are the main force. But in practice ... not. There are facts proving it.” (gr. 7)

“I personally do not believe I am able to influence because there are no concrete mechanisms for influence. Even if they exist, they [those mechanisms] have only the form of influence” (gr. 4)

Inability of an individual to influence

Participants said that an individual is not able to influence processes of the political development in the country.

“One person is not able to influence politics” (gr. 4)

“Individuals are not able ... But if together... There is need to unite into factions, parties” (gr. 2)

Absence of interaction with the state

Citizens are not certain that their voice is important for the state.

“And who will listen to us?” (gr. 1)

“Our voice is very weak” (gr. 8)

Absence of an idea uniting citizens

To many respondents, the absence of a uniting force is an important obstacle for citizens' participation and influence on the political processes in the country.

“Because of our disunity, the separation of people reached such stage that we do not understand each other. If there was a force which would be able to unite us... common goal, common idea ... because everything, all values are lost right now (gr. 7)

“There are no incentives which would push people to action. But if we want something to do, we will be able to” (gr. 8)

“We do not have enough information and there is no ideology” (gr. 8)

Poorly organized work of the Parliament

It was noted that the badly organized work of the Parliament is an obstacle for the participation of the citizenry in political processes. This conclusion made by the participants is informed by the news broadcasts from Parliament that periodically conflicts between different groups in Parliament.

“ ... we can change nothing, if they [the Verkhovna Rada] cannot settle their disputes... there is such a disorder in the state” (gr. 2)

“ ... I believe that even people's deputies do not like what's going on there [in the Verkhovna Rada], nobody likes it, it is impossible to work under such conditions” (gr. 6)

Socio-economic conditions of the people

Respondents believe that bad socio-economic living conditions prevent participation in the political development of the country because people are preoccupied with the problems of personal survival.

“...a person being at the bottom of the social ladder in our country is ruined, half-hungry... is not able to make an influence...” (gr. 7)

“... hard living conditions ... man thinks only about how to earn a piece of bread” (gr. 7)

More optimistic respondents who said they are capable of influencing political processes in the state believe they can have an influence:

Through communication with their acquaintances

Respondents noted that their conversations with other people (friends, colleagues) may persuade these people and, in such a way, they will be able to influence the general situation in the country.

“...by influencing friends and colleagues, persuading them to vote for the president that I choose” (gr. 7)

By taking part in the elections

Many participants stated that voting is the only possible way to participate in the political process and to influence political development in the country.

“Only the right to vote at elections” (gr. 4)

“Only through elections. There is no VIP-access here” (gr. 4)

“We are capable of influence during elections by electing these or those people” (gr. 1)

By joining parties and political groups

As mentioned above, respondents noted that they, as separate individuals, do not have much influence on political processes in the country. At the same time, they recognize that their membership in parties, associations etc., gives them more opportunities for influence.

“Only those people can attain their goal, who unite into some groups for collective actions...” (gr. 3)

2. MASS MEDIA

The main information channels that respondents use are as follows:

- ✓ TV: „1+1”, „ICTV”, „RTR”, „Euronews”, „BBC”, „CNN”, „NTV mir”, „RTR planeta”, „UT-1”, „Inter”, „STB”
- ✓ Radio: „Era”, „Svoboda”, „Rosiya”, „Golos Ameriki”, „Dovira”, UR-1
- ✓ Newspapers: „Dzerkalo tyzhnya”, „Stolichniye novosti”, „Segodnya”, „Den”, „Fakty”, „Stolytsya”, „MK”, „Dilova stolytsya”, „Biznes”, „Kyivskiy visnyk” (national); „Ekspress”, „Postup”, „Vysokiy zamok” (local)
- ✓ Personal communication
- ✓ The Internet
- ✓ Leaflets

TV, radio and newspapers are the main sources among all mentioned above.

Out of all television broadcasts, TV news is most often used by the participants to keep up with socio-political developments. Also mentioned are analytical programs such as, “Pro te” (with Dmytro Korchynsky and Dmytro Dzhangirov) on 1+1, “Epicenter” with Vyacheslav Pikhovshek (1+1), and “Podrobno” with Dmytro Kyselyov (ICTV). Participants also cite television debates with representatives of various parties as programs that allow the viewer to hear differing opinions.

Participants also indicated personal communication as a source of information:

“... at work, some friends...” (gr. 1), “I come to the work and we ... exchange information with friends and colleagues at work – it is also an important source of information, it highlights many things” (gr. 7), “I trust my friends and colleagues more ” (gr. 4).

Participants state that they do not use a single TV channel, radio station or newspaper for information. More often they use several different sources of information, with different points of view about events in society:

"If I would like to have complete picture, I need to analyze several mass media" (gr.5)

"I do not favour any TV channel ... I listen to, analyze and choose on my own" (gr. 7)

The accuracy of the information is assessed by participants with the use of the following criteria:

Personal judgment

Participants trust their own judgments and conclusions regarding TV broadcasts or print articles.

"I always rely on my own judgment" (gr. 4)

"I just have my own opinion, I think this way" (gr. 2)

"... by making my own conclusions" (gr. 3)

"... I look between the lines" (gr. 5)

"Looking through and choosing the information which is true to your opinion" (gr. 3)

Comprehensive assessment of information from different sources

Participants state one should not trust a single source of information because all mass media are biased. It is better to summarize the information from different sources and, on the basis of such summary, to build a comprehensive assessment of events.

"... I turn on TV, [there is] one piece of information there, another one – here... Then, I switch to Russian TV, Polish TV, and then ... some kind of impression or understanding of the issue we were given information about appears" (gr. 1)

"I can assess information only comprehensively. One can not assess information objectively when it comes from a single source" (gr. 4)

"In order to have adequate opinion, it is necessary to look at opinions of different newspapers" (gr. 3)

"I determine the trust owing to the analysis of various sources of information" (gr. 7)

Awareness about activity of any given mass media

Knowledge about those who influence mass media determines participants' level of trust in the information.

"If I know that the person somehow connected with this channels has some influence on the information, then, I conclude that it is necessary to watch this news at another channel" (gr.6)

Availability of foreign specialists' comments

Many respondents display more trust and confidence in the opinions of foreign experts because they believe they are not interested in disseminating false information or refraining from reporting real events.

"I believe the news is true when there is a foreign experts' comment" (gr.8)

"... [in order to know] the truth about what's going on in Ukraine, it is better to turn on Poland or Russia. They will tell the truth, at least" (gr. 1)

"Poland provided very good coverage of our events... one can listen to them and trust them. Because I know it is not our juggling" (gr. 1)

The respondents were not unanimous about what information should be trusted more – information about national or local development.

Trust in local vs. national news

Some respondents mentioned that local news should be trusted more because local events happen nearby and can be checked:

“It is possible to check regional news” (gr. 8)

“... I trust local information because I can check – it is by my side” (gr. 5)

“ ... local. That is close to us, we can see this ...” (gr. 1)

Other people believe the news of the national level is more trustworthy because global character of the information about national development gives fewer opportunities for censoring/controlling information:

“Because – what does it mean – local news? It is carefully controlled mafia” (gr.7)

“I think there are less interested persons at the local level” (gr. 6)

Some respondents said the level of their trust toward local or national news is the same:

“... they’ve got different functions... different level” (gr.7)

“I have the trust of the same level. The more information I received, the better opinion is formed. One should have an opportunity to choose different sources of information. ” (gr. 4)

“I need to find this and that information to analyze and to form the line” (gr. 8)

There are also respondents who think neither local nor national news can be trusted:

“They all lie” (gr.8)

“... I do not trust either of them. Events at the local level are covered with the hidden purpose to influence events at the national level, and vice versa” (gr.4)

Participants have also stated that they have more trust in news that does not touch upon politics.

“About cosmos, technology, agriculture – I trust, but about politics - not” (gr.5).

Information about international events enjoys more trust than information regarding domestic affairs.

Media Safety

Almost all respondents agreed that it is dangerous for mass media to provide objective coverage and information, especially, if this information is critical towards government. On the other hand, in participants’ opinion, providing objective information is not as dangerous as it has been before. According to many participants, media outlets today reflect the views and interests of various parties and communities. So, the varied opinions and different perspectives of various mass media give a more impartial/real picture.

“It is not as dangerous as it used to be. Because there was one influential force in the past, there was no struggle of elites” (gr.7)

“ ...now there is no informational blockade” (gr. 7)

Participants held differing opinions on the level of trust afforded to Ukrainian mass media. Some respondents indicated that they trust Ukrainian sources of information:

“It is clear that if it is on TV, then, there will be no cheating a whole nation” (gr.2)

“Today I trust this information because [they] cover far more things... we did not know during the Soviet times” (gr.2)

“If I read an article, watched some news, then, I trust this information” (gr.4)

“Do not trust mass media means having no trust in yourself” (gr.6)

“It is necessary to trust ... where can we receive the information? To be in course of events we have to trust this information” (gr. 7)

Other participants stated they trusted no information sources:

“I cannot trust anybody” (gr.4)

“I do not even know who to trust, everything is distorted here” (gr.1).

“Any political information is given in reworked kind, in which it have to be given to people” (gr. 3)

“It seems to me that we have not the honest mass media. In any case there is censorship” (gr. 4)

At the same time, the majority of respondents remarked they have ‘partial’ trust in Ukrainian mass sources of information, but stick to the principle: “trust but check”:

“Overall, I trust, but I always check the information I am interested in” (gr. 6).

“Partially I trust, I check myself the received information” (gr. 7)

Answering the question why they trust mass media if they believe it is dangerous for them to provide unbiased information, respondents said they trust mass media to some extent *“not by 100%”*, and they analyze and check independently all information they receive.

A significant level of trust is displayed towards the Internet. Among those who use this source of information, everybody has stated that it is trustworthy:

“ ... because it is not controlled” (gr.8)

“I trust more Internet editions because their informational flow is freer enough” (gr.7)

“ ... I use the Internet mostly and prefer this source of information” (gr. 7)

The majority of respondents are not well informed regarding the ownership of the main TV and radio channels or newspapers. It is noted that a large number of channels receive foreign capital. Respondents also believe that different political parties of Ukraine have their own mass media. Respondents think that information about owners of the sources of information should not be a secret, it should be open:

“There must be no secrecy here; it should be like in Europe, like in a ‘normal state’ ” (gr.3)

3. PARLIAMENTARY AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IN 2002

According to the data of Central electoral commission of Ukraine, 69,5% of Ukrainians participated in the 2002 election to Verhovna Rada and to the local bodies of government.

3.1. Participation in the parliamentary and local elections in 2002

Almost all respondents stated they participated in the parliamentary and local elections in 2002. Among the few who did not participate, the following reasons were mentioned:

“ ... I saw in detail how elections were going on, and I believe that voting is meaningless” (gr. 4)

“At that time the disappointment reached the apogee, so there wasn’t a sense to find a black cat in a black room. I preferred to stay home, to listen the music and to be occupied with my spirituality ” (gr. 7)

“I consider there is no sense to vote” (gr. 7)

The reasons for voting at the parliamentary elections of 2002 were named as follows:

Civic duty: Participants feel it is their duty to take part in elections because they are citizens of the society.

“... everybody must express his/her opinion under any conditions ... duty” (gr. 3)

“I believe that every citizen of our society must express his/her opinion by voting. I never asked myself a question – to vote or not to” (gr. 6)

“It is the direct duty of every citizen” (gr. 2)

“It is necessary to vote, but you can vote not for one person you can vote against everybody. You have to show your position, you can not sit and do nothing ” (p. 7)

Expectations for better life: Participation in the election is based on the wish for change and on the belief that the election will provide such a possibility:

“Suddenly something will change” (gr. 3)

“If you want to change something you have to go and to do something” (gr. 2)

“... I voted for that party the ideas of which were against of that I didn’t like” (gr. 3)

“To change what we have. To vote for that party which appeared. The hope for the better life” (gr. 3)

“... I consider that only owing to my vote I can change the state situation” (gr. 6)

“... it’s obligatory to vote. It’s only one way of the influence” (gr. 4)

“There was a wish to vote for better life in the country” (gr. 4)

Pressure at work: Some participants remarked that they were forced to vote by managers at work.

“We were told at work: you might be late at work but you must vote for this candidate to the local government” (gr. 7)

The desire to use one’s own ballot in order to prevent its misuse by anyone else: One of the factors making the people vote was the fear that dishonest officials would use their ballot in order to falsify the elections results.

“I do not like ‘to give away’ my voice to another candidate” (gr. 6)

“... because I do not like my voice to be lost somewhere” (gr. 5)

“ ...with purpose my personal ballot would not be used by somebody” (gr. 4)

“The main argument was if not voting the vote can be taken” (gr. 7)

Realization of the right to vote:

“ ... I have the right to vote and it should be realized” (gr. 4)

During 2002 electoral campaign there were various events aimed at making voters vote for a certain candidate, raising their awareness about programs of different parties and candidates. Some respondents said they participated in mass political meetings, public events, discussions with candidates and representatives of political parties. They took part because they would like to know what a candidate could say to his/her voters. Almost all participants of those events believe it has been useful for them and helped them make their choice for who to vote:

“It is useful because people ask different questions and it is interesting to note candidate’s reaction to those questions” (gr. 8)

“There is no doubt those meetings were useful. I acquired a faith” (gr. 5)

Some participants of those events believe they were not useful for them:

“Any information should be filtered. Because a candidate tells only about himself. There is nobody to compare with. I think the information was not useful” (gr. 8)

“No, because all of them speak well and practically the same” (gr. 4)

Respondents named the following reasons for not attending those meetings:

Lack of information about such events: There was not enough information about such events and this reduced participation:

“I did not have information about these events. There was no access to such information” (gr. 4)

“I did not know when these meetings were held” (gr. 1)

Lack of interest in such events

“I did not go because there is too much of this stuff on TV, various events... I am fed up with it” (gr. 6)

Mistrust of events and their organizers.

“I did not attend because they always tell stories there about how they would make better, how bad their opponents are... They can say nothing about themselves, except of what they are going to do...” (gr. 2)

“Practically it has not influence. Simply it’s having to do with raising image of a certain candidate of a certain party” (gr. 1)

Disbelief in their usefulness

“There will be no use of it” (gr. 1)

“ ... I do not need this. The life is short, it is necessary to do much” (gr. 7)

Lack of time: Respondents said they did not have time to attend those meetings.

“Home, family” (gr. 6)

“I work, I am busy, my child is at school, I do not have time to participate” (gr. 1)

3.2. Fairness of the 2002 elections

According to the data of the Committee of the Voter of Ukraine, the main violations noticed during the 2002 elections were the following:

- ✓ Misuse of authority by the chief executives of municipal administrations aimed at the support of certain parties and candidates at the majority voting districts;
- ✓ Administrative pressure on the subjects of electoral process and mass media;
- ✓ Promotion of most candidates by means of free distribution of goods and services or selling them for reduced prices;
- ✓ Use of dirty electoral technologies (black PR) – dissemination of information (agitation) on behalf of a competitor;

Respondents agree that parliamentary and local elections in 2002 were not fair.

“In any case. They could not be fair” (gr. 3)

“There was nothing fair...this the affair of PR-men, administrative resources” (gr. 4)

“They were illegal, not fair” (gr. 8)

Participants indicated the main instances of unfairness in the elections:

The winners were selected beforehand:

“All people are left aside. The results are determined beforehand. The elections were not fair” (gr. 8)

Lack of information about importance of single voices:

“I believe elections were not fair because people could not realize how the people can influence economic and political situation of the country. People did not understand what any person could do. But other people came, talked to them, gave them some gifts and people voted – the candidate seemed good. But there was no real information about how their choice influenced results of the elections. That is why elections were not fair. All the rest –electoral violations, ballot fraud – are just the consequences” (gr. 8)

“I know that people came to my grandmother, gave her a gift, talked to her, supported and she signed something” (gr. 5)

Voting on behalf of deceased persons not excluded from voting lists:

“We came to vote and found that my mother-in-law and father-in-law were in the list although they passed away long time ago. Nobody updated the list” (gr. 3)

“My son has other place of residence during long time. But for some years during the election he is registered not only where he lives now but in the place where he is not registered, in old address. And there, where he is not present, somebody uses his ballot” (gr. 4)

“The person has died some years ago but he/she is registered in the list...” (gr. 2)

Using financial resources by candidates and parties:

“I think when the capital is involved ... there can be nothing clean” (gr. 2)

“The elections were not fair, because there was the redistribution of the property that was accumulated by 52-millions of people” (gr. 8)

Wide use of administrative resources

“...the administrative resource is widely used.... It means deputies, those people who make elections, they use finances not allowed by the state for electoral campaign, i.e. finances from their own enterprises” (gr. 2)

In contrast to the above-mentioned opinions, some felt that the elections were fair precisely because of the capital that contributed to campaigns. This suggests that the concepts of legitimacy and fairness of elections are separated:

“I think they [elections] were not legitimate but fair. Because people came, who, actually, had to come. They bought, they invested money in this business. Whoever invested more – they are elected” (gr. 8)

A large number of respondents were familiar with instances of people being pressured to vote for a certain candidate. The threats are mentioned among the means of pressure:

In cases with students: The threat to increase the tuition fees, or to expel from the university if students did not vote for a certain candidate (groups 2, 4, 8):

“... those students who went to some opposition meeting; the rector told those students who did not attend classes at that time would be expelled from the university. If rector belonging to some party tells students that they must go to the meeting and they would not, the same pressure and so on” (gr. 2)

“And we were gathered by the dean, and he said for whom we had to vote” (gr. 3)

In rural area: Threats by village leaders if people would not vote for a certain candidate (groups 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8)

“The pressure to vote for the candidate happens more often in the province than in the city. The head of the village has an influence and he uses it” (gr. 6)

“My parents live in the village. There the local government forced them to vote” (gr. 3)

At work: the threat to fire those workers who will not vote (gr. 4)

In the army (gr. 1)

The following thoughts were expressed in support of the fairness of 2002 elections:

“I think elections were fair. I cannot imagine how my voice can be transferred to another person. I do not believe the vote can be bought” (gr. 4)

4. 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Almost all participants say they intend to vote in the 2004 presidential elections.

The reasons for participation in presidential elections coincide with those indicated by respondents as reasons for participation in 2002 parliamentary and local elections:

Civic duty

“For me, it is the question of the civic duty. I will go and vote and, by doing so, contribute to increasing civic consciousness” (gr. 8)

“... it is our hope, our duty” (gr. 2)

“I hope that my vote, though it is a sole one, will be decisive” (gr. 3)

The will to elect trustworthy leader of the country:

“We are the people worth our rulers. I would like to have trustworthy ruler and I will go” (gr. 8)

“To elect trustworthy candidate” (gr. 6)

The wish to change existing power elite:

"I think the force opposing the current power is formed. I will support the new elite" (gr. 7)

"I will hope my voice though the only one will be decisive,, (gr. 3)

Law obedience:

"I will be a law abiding person" (gr. 7)

Insuring the fairness of elections:

"Not letting ballots be lost. In order to avoid cheating" (gr. 2)

"In order to secure the fairness of the elections. Maybe, it is necessary to cross out everybody off the list but it is necessary to vote" (gr. 5)

"With purpose to use own ballot" (gr. 4)

Curiosity:

"I will go to elections. I am curious whether the person I will vote for will win" (gr. 5)

"Just for the sake of curiosity..." (gr. 4)

Exercising one's voting right:

"I will vote, in order to use my voting right" (gr. 4)

Those respondents who say they would not participate in elections do not see any benefits in their participation in elections and do not believe they are able to change anything by voting:

Not willing to vote:

"I grow tired of being law abiding" (gr. 7)

Distrust in the ability to change something for the better:

"When everything is decided on top, there is no sense to go and vote" (gr. 7)

According to the respondents, the most important issues for the presidential candidates to address during their election campaign are as follows:

Economic problems:

"The well-being of the people" (gr. 7)

"It is necessary to pay attention to materialistic side: increasing the salary and reducing the prices" (gr. 4)

"The development of the economy is obligatory; social policy, foreign policy and image of Ukraine are built upon it" (gr. 6)

Restoration of the industry:

"First of all, factories and plants should work, people should be able to work; there will be nothing without it" (gr. 2)

"Restoration of our ruined industry should be a compulsory condition. It is not possible to thrive ... without our agriculture, science, industry. I will pay my attention to this, first of all" (gr. 6)

The issues of morality:

"Moral education of our youth" (gr. 7)

"I am concerned very much with our future, our moral education. Our children are on the street because there is not morality (spirituality) in the society" (gr. 5)

Legislation:

"The second chapter of the Constitution¹¹. Nothing else is needed" (gr. 8)

"The laws for the life should be in our state; they should regulate everything" (gr. 3)

"I think that the most important are the laws. The presidential candidate should first of all ascertain what laws he will adopt after the victory" (gr. 4)

The issue of state language:

"The official language problem should become stabilized. Let Russian language be state language, too" (gr. 8)

The issues of the foreign policy:

"... the main emphasis should be put on the integration with the West or with the East, Russia. This integration choice should be based on the opinion of the citizens of Ukraine" (gr. 8)

"It is necessary to decide in what direction will we go – to the West or to the East" (gr. 5)

"... on questions of foreign policy. There is no a need in such situations as with Tuzla for, example. Ukraine must have its authority in the world" (gr. 1)

Foundation of a national idea:

"I would like the president to create some national idea..." (gr. 8)

Agriculture

"Agricultural sector of our state. First of all, the question is about the land, payment for it, its transfer into the private ownership, it should be carefully watched about. We cannot live only relying on the capital" (gr. 3)

Control and order in the state

"There should be control and the order ... The order should be in everything, the laws, some norms should be adhered to" (gr. 3)

Social security issues:

"It is desirable for the program of each candidate to have precise programs about education, health care" (gr. 5)

"The life in the social sphere..." (gr. 6)

"Medicine... it should be accessible and not expensive" (gr. 2)

"Medicine, education. Medicine is in such a horrible situation that God forbid to anyone..." (gr. 1)

Assessing the Fairness of 2004 Elections

The respondents will assess the fairness of the 2004 presidential elections by the following criteria:

Winner's relationship to existing power: It is believed that if the winner of the presidential elections belongs to political force holding power today, then, one may conclude that elections were unfair. It is

¹¹The second chapter of the Constitution of Ukraine contains articles under the heading "Rights, freedoms and obligations of the citizen "

clear that there is mistrust towards current power holders and the presidential candidates belonging to this political camp.

“If representatives of the power will win, then, elections will not be fair” (gr. 7)

Information from the people working in polling stations: The respondents point to higher level of trust in their friends and colleagues than to any other sources of information:

“I will talk about this with my closest friends who are involved into the electoral process” (gr. 8)

Information in mass media: Information received from mass media will also serve as a criteria for assessing the fairness of elections.

“What press think about it” (gr. 5)

“I will compare information received from these sources [mass media, the Internet, in particular] with official information – rating, candidates’ programs and promises... and by doing so, I will have an opinion about honesty of elections” (gr. 8)

Comparison of sociological polls to the electoral results: Some respondents said they trust results from sociological studies conducted before elections more than official electoral results.

“There are sociological polls conducted before elections which give indicators of the support to be given to this or that candidate. If these indicators will differ from official ones, I will understand that elections were falsified” (gr. 6)

5. VOTING PROCESS

The majority of participants mentioned that voting does not allow them to influence decision-making by state bodies. The distrust in the fairness of elections has been the main explanation of this attitude.

“If our elections were fair, then, we might have influence; there is no influence if elections are unfair” (gr. 4)

The opinion has been also expressed that if voting cannot influence the decision-making process, results can be achieved by using other means:

“...some strikes, mass events may influence” (gr. 2)

There were very few participants who believed the voting could influence the decision-making of the state bodies:

“We do exercise certain influence because we elect some candidate and support his policies. By electing him we choose his policies” (gr. 6)

“We elect those who later will adopt the laws for us” (gr. 3)

Meanwhile, it was noted that local elections give wider opportunities for making influence than national elections.

“I would say ‘yes’ – at local level. It is easier to influence local authorities” (gr. 5)

Respondents explain their participation (even if they do not trust their participation will influence the decision making by officials) by the following reasons:

The hope for changes during voting:

“When I vote I put my hopes on this person” (gr. 3)

“Because a human being lives by hopes” (gr. 2)

“Every time during deputy election, I want to believe that he/she is that person we need” (gr. 3)

Ensuring fairness of elections:

“The share of the influence depends upon the share of the fairness, and the share of fairness depends upon voter turnout” (gr. 5)

Ensuring the right direction of internal politics:

“I vote because I choose the direction” (gr. 6)

Tradition of voting / Habit:

“We do not know. We are used to doing so” (gr. 1)

6. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE

In March – November 2003 several draft laws on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine were submitted to Verkhovna Rada. These include: direct election of President by Parliament, fully proportional elections to Verkhovna Rada, extension of presidential term, and creation of a two-chamber parliament.

6.1. Elections of President of Ukraine

One of the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine proposed to change the system of presidential election. Currently, the President is elected by the people; the last proposition allows for future presidential election by the members of the Parliament. This proposition is one of the most controversial of the proposed amendments.

The overwhelming majority of participants said that the President of Ukraine should be elected by the people, not Verkhovna Rada:

“We cannot trust Verkhovna Rada in this issue” (gr. 5)

“In such a way the principle of democracy is better realized. Because our Parliament is not perfect” (gr. 4)

“It is easier to pressure 450 people than 35 million voters” (gr. 2)

“...if the Parliament elects, they [people’s deputies] will take away some of our rights as voters...the rights will be taken by the people we do not trust. Because majority of population do not trust Verkhovna Rada” (gr. 2)

“I consider that Verkhovna rada is elected by the people. But is it has possibilities to realize all hopes and needs of the people in full. No. So, can such Verkhovna Vlada elect the President?” (gr. 4)

“Only the people, because we can not trust the Parliament now” (gr. 1)

Participants in the focus groups prefer direct voting for the president because it places responsibility on them for their choice.

“We bear responsibility for the person we elect. The people would like to see the President the person which people elects” (gr. 5)

“If we elect somebody and make mistakes, then, it is about all of us. But in this situation we elect the people’s deputy. We made mistake but he elects somebody and makes mistake, too. Moral silence...” (gr. 3)

“I am absolutely against election of the President by the parliament. If I made a mistake when I elected my people’s deputy, then, I would be deprived of the right to elect the President” (gr. 8)

Among the few who believe that the President should be elected by the parliament a main reason was that it would cause people to be more careful in the election of Members of Parliament, and, consequently, in the elections of the President. Besides that, it is noted that political system of Ukraine is in crisis and should be reformed.

“Today this mode of elections proved its low potential. I think parliament should elect but under condition it will have two chambers and elections will be based on proportional system” (gr. 8)

“The President should be elected by the parliament. First of all, it will force people to pay more attention to election of people’s deputies, i.e. elect those in whom they can trust. Second, I think presidential rule is in crisis in our country and I am against it” (gr. 8)

Some respondents said they did not know what is better – elections of the President by the Parliament or by the people. Or they believe it does not matter:

“It does not matter – who. From my point of view, there is no real choice of the President. Everything is decided and known before elections” (gr. 8)

“There are pros and cons here. They [people’s deputies] know better the person. We do not know the person at all” (gr. 2)

6.2. Evaluation of other amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine

6.2.1. Awareness of proposed amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine

Participants showed the ability able to name only the following amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine:

- ✓ Two-chamber parliament (gr. 1, 4, 5)
- ✓ Changes in the system of MPs elections (gr. 1, 2, 5, 8)
- ✓ Reducing MP’s seats (gr. 2, 5)
- ✓ Extension of presidential term in office (gr. 2, 3, 6, 7)
- ✓ Annulment of MP’s (people’s deputies) legal immunity (gr. 6)
- ✓ Conducting parliamentary and presidential elections at the same time (gr. 6, 7)

Respondents feel that it is difficult for an average person to understand all the changes proposed.

This lack of comprehension can be attributed to the fact that there were several amendments proposed in a short period of time, and that the various amendments contained contradicting proposals that could easily confuse the average person.

6.2.2. Proportional elections to Verkhovna Rada

One of the proposed amendments addressed the voting system. Currently, election of people's deputies (MPs) to Verkhovna Rada is based upon a mixed voting system: one half of the seats are chosen according to the party lists and another half according to majority system. The newly proposed voting system calls for elections based only on party lists.

Some respondents state they do not understand this proposal (groups 1, 2, 8).

Respondents who do not agree to this proposal say that, under the majority voting system, they vote for the person they know:

"... there are people whom we personally know, in whom we can trust... Who will be those people under new system?" (gr. 2)

It is also noted that people's deputies elected by majority voting improve municipal services in the districts they run during electoral campaign, and provide material assistance to residents, etc. If the proportional system is introduced, people would not be able to get these benefits:

"Our society, I think, is not ready to vote by party lists. An election is the time when the society can obtain some social and material benefits: it is possible to get the gas pipe, to build a road, etc. If people will vote for the parties, average Ukrainian will be deprived of such opportunity. That is why voting by party lists is not acceptable" (gr. 8)

Those who supported this proposal were, as a rule, not able to explain their choice.

Some respondents supported mixed system:

"... it is more objective when there is mixed system" (gr. 6)

"I am inclined to support mixed system of people's deputies elections" (gr. 8)

6.2.3. Extension of the presidential term in office

Respondents' opinion on that issue divided into two categories. Some believe this amendment should be rejected. Distrust in the acting President is clearly visible:

"If he is good enough during 4 years, he will be reelected for another term. If he failed to do it in 4 years, he would not in 5" (gr. 1)

Some respondents support it due to the possibility of simultaneous elections of the President, parliament and local councils:

"The same term should be for the President" (gr. 6)

6.2.4. Two-chamber Parliament

A few respondents support this amendment to the Constitution of Ukraine:

"Yes, because governors in the lower chamber will pursue the interests of the regions" (gr. 8)

The main reason respondents do not support this proposal is the generally poor perception of the Verkhovna Rada.

"It will be even bigger chaos! There is no order in one chamber, and then what would be in two...!" (gr. 1)

"Look at what's going on now, what it would look like with two chambers?" (gr. 2)

Besides that, other people noted that Ukraine is not ready for such a political transformation today:

“At this stage of the development of Ukraine – no. It might be possible in the future. Today Ukraine is not in the economic and political situation which is necessary for two-chamber parliament” (gr. 4)

“I think that two-chamber parliament is unnecessary at this stage of the development of Ukraine” (gr. 8)

Participants also do not support this amendment because they believe the changes it leads to will take too much time which in turn will impede the solution of other problems:

“It is so much time necessary for changes” (gr. 5)

“The development of Labor and Civic codes is going on now; if the reform of the Parliament starts, then... there will be no good out of it...” (gr. 4)

6.2.5. Appointment of the Cabinet of Ministers by the Parliamentary majority

In general, focus-group participants support this amendment to the Constitution. They feel this amendment will make parliament bear responsibility for the work of government:

“ ... parliamentary majority will be responsible for what government does. Responsible before the people. But today as I remember ministers are elected by the Parliament after submission of the President. So, who is responsible – Parliament or President? – for what the minister did” (gr.2)

Besides that, it was mentioned that appointment of the government by the Parliament reduces the presidential influence on the government:

“Government appointed by the President is his puppet. I gave birth to you, I will kill you” (gr.6)

Argument against this amendment is based on the thought that legislation of Ukraine is not ready to ensure adequate functioning of this proposal:

“We do not have yet precise laws on majority, parliamentary opinion(position), etc... what does “parliamentary majority” mean? And opposition? We do not have such laws. It is not clear” (gr. 4)

Respondents opposing this amendment thought that it would serve the interests of the majority:

“I am against it. Cabinet should have people elected by the whole Parliament. They must be people capable to solve problems not only of the majority” (gr.8)

6.2.6. Cessation of the powers of Parliament if the Cabinet of Ministers is not elected within 60 days after the beginning of parliamentary sessions

Most respondents do not clearly understand this amendment. Non-support of this amendment is explained by the argument that it will allow the President to influence parliament and its decisions.

“The negative thing is that the President can submit the composition of the Cabinet and pressure the Parliament. If they do not approve, he dismiss them. It would be better to prolong the term – three months...” (gr.2)

Support for the amendment is based on the belief it will intensify the work of the parliament.

Some suggested shortening the 60 day term:

“There is no need to wait two months... one month” (gr. 1)

7. POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

7.1. Participation in public actions

Many of the respondents in the focus groups indicate participation in mass political meetings, protests, pickets. But they also note that this participation is very often spontaneous.

One of the reasons for participation in above mentioned actions is pressure from superiors:

“I participated when we were forced to do it” (gr. 8)

Signing letters and petitions is considered to be an ineffective way of expressing opinion. Participants told stories when writing letters did not bring results and they got disappointed with it.

People do not perceive these actions as serious – they often reported signing a petition without understanding what it was for:

“I signed something during elections to Kyiv city council but I do not remember what exactly...” (gr. 5)

The majority of respondents who contacted officials said they contacted local officials (gr. 8, 3). Professional contacts were the most frequently mentioned reason for such communication (gr. 3). Apart from this it was mentioned that getting in touch with an official is extremely difficult and requires too much time:

“We – the residents of the house – went to the people’s deputy of Verkhovna Rada. We had big problems. We went 15 times ... he did not receive us .. he did not show up ... he’s been late .. he postponed till tomorrow” (gr. 1).

Indifference toward public activities is explained by lack of interest or by the belief that they are not useful:

“I was not interested” (gr. 8)

“Because I was not invited. No interest. For what?” (gr. 5)

“I believe it will have no results” (gr. 5).

“There were not the special reasons and needs” (gr. 7)

Many participants believe the leaders react to such public activities if they find it beneficial for them or if sufficiently large numbers of people are active:

“Only for their own interests... if it is beneficial for them – he will support. If not, nobody will support it” (gr. 1)

“They react only before elections, just for the sake of their interests” (gr. 4)

“ ... when there are 10000 people willing to kick you out of the chair or some riot ... they usually react” (gr. 2)

Some respondents also indicated that our leaders will react only in case of such conflict growing:

“ ... only under condition citizens have weapons in their hands. Peaceful actions will bring no results” (gr. 8)

“People do not believe... they do not care ... or they follow those who will lead them to barricades” (gr. 8)

“...or, perhaps, armed riot is better?” (gr. 3)

The majority of respondents think that the lack of official response dampens public activity, and people are less prone to protect their interests:

“...those meetings show that, earlier, number of participants was greater than it is today...” (gr. 1)

“... what for to waste your efforts if there will be no results” (gr. 2)

“When we write we hope on the reaction. If the person writes ... once, twice, the third time and sees that nothing changed ... there is no more any wishes. What for to waste the energy, health and nerves.” (gr. 1)

It is stated that it is easier to get official response at the local level.

7.2. Political parties

Two respondents said they were members of political parties. Two more indicated they were members of political parties in the past but the membership was terminated. One participant's party (“Hromada”) ceased to exist, while another had been forced to leave his party:

Several reasons were mentioned for such low level of involvement with political parties:

Distrust in political parties: Participants distrust political parties; they do not believe these organizations are honest.

“There is no such party one could trust” (gr. 3)

“I simply do not trust any parties” (gr. 5)

“I’ve got friends who work for the party of Moroz. They are often cheated, they are just used” (gr. 5)

“People do not see any reason to be a member of a party. People do not see parties can solve some of their problems” (gr. 6)

“I was a member of a party ... is there is any sense?” (gr. 3)

Other activities more important: Participants think political parties cannot influence the situation in the country, or change something for better. Instead of party membership, participants prefer solving other, more urgent problems:

“Do I need it? I’ve got work, study, some problems. If the person is not connected to it, he or she does not need it” (gr. 3)

“... low people’s interest for the politics – the people have other more urgent issues...” (gr. 4)

Lack of ideology: The lack of a strong ideology which could have attracted people’s attention is one of the reasons for low levels of involvement in party activity:

“ ... there is no ideological direction. All parties are ideologically mute. The party is perceived as the group formed to lobby some small issue...” (gr. 2)

Parties are incapable of satisfying public interests: It is widely believed that political parties cannot meet the interests of the citizens.

“There is no sense to enter parties today. It is just a formality – not a real force... I cannot address now the executive committee of the party and get their help for solving this or that problem” (gr. 8)

“With purpose to be a member, I must have an idea which corresponds to the idea of the party” (gr. 7)

Lack of information about party office: Respondents said that they do not have information about the location of party offices. So if a person decides to enter the party, he or she will not know where to go.

“Many people do not know where to go to join the party of their choice” (gr. 3)

“People do not know whom and where to address” (gr. 2)

Parties are not interested in new members: Average people feel parties are not interested in them.

“Does it need me?” (gr. 3)

“Nobody invites to join the party” (gr. 5)

Too many parties to differentiate between them: According to the Ministry of Justice, 124 political parties were registered in Ukraine as of 12 February, 2003. Some participants believe that the large number of parties in Ukraine makes it difficult for the average Ukrainian to determine the party he or she likes.

Little difference between parties: Besides the great number of parties in Ukraine, people also indicate another factor: these parties do not have significant differences in their programs, which complicates the choice between them.

“ ... programs of the majority of parties are the same” (gr. 6)

“ ... all of them promised something, the same promises but different ways of achievement but they do nothing” (gr. 1)

Lack of funds: Participation in the political party activity is connected with financial expenses. Because a great number of people are limited in their finances, the citizens do not see any possibility for participation in party activity.

“...on the basis of what resources do parties exist? Any party is sustained by certain donations. And those contributions are not small” (gr. 1)

Respondents might be encouraged to join a party if the party conducted real actions, leading to changes in the country. Trust in a party can also become a stimulus:

“When you are able to do something for the society, then, there is sense to join the party” (gr. 5)

“I will join when parties will protect interests of their members” (gr. 8)

“One should look at what the party wants and it has already achieved” (gr. 2)

Besides that, a strong leader can attract people and encourage membership.

“If the party will have new dynamic leader. We need a leader! Until there is no such leader, no party attract me!” (gr. 8)

“There are no interesting leaders, not just charismatic figures, but those who could propose interesting ideas, unite people around them, show the light at the end of the tunnel. I would join the party with such a leader” (gr. 2)

Joining the party can be driven by personal interest (financial benefits, career advancement)

“Personal interests. Everybody knows that the main incentive to become a People’s Deputy is to secure one’s old age status” (gr. 5)

“Rather a career ...” (gr. 4)

“Financial interests should be there” (gr.1)

Respondents find it difficult to get a general impression about political parties in Ukraine because there are too many parties and it is often difficult to understand differences between their programs. The general opinion is that political parties in Ukraine do not have real actions and their multitude is based upon their desire to earn money.

A few participants do list some positive outcomes of party activities:

Their activity can change something:

“Party is a tool which can change something” (gr. 6)

Parties lead to the political development of Ukraine:

“ ... there is an evolution of political movement in Ukraine ... it is positive... Finally, we will have situation with two real political parties which will make politics” (gr. 8)

Parties carry out charitable activities:

“There are charitable events when a certain party grants toys etc to children’ house. Within the great country they fulfil a small but very good thing” (gr. 2)

Party membership gives a feeling of unity

“This is a feeling of citizenship and unity...” (gr. 2)

Active parties are a sign of democracy

“ ... we have multi-party system as an element of democracy” (gr. 1)

7.3. Local authorities

Based upon their own experience, respondents conclude that their inquiries to local authorities bring no results. Respondents displayed the same lack of trust to elected as well as appointed officials. A significant number of respondents prefer to solve their problems through personal contacts:

“ ... it is the waste of time. I will look for some compromise. I will go another way” (gr. 1)

“I would address some person I know... the person I know will help me” (gr. 2)

Respondents also indicated difficulties accessing officials as one of the reasons they would rather address their friends and people they know:

“Try to get reception” (gr. 3)

“Try to get the officials. You spend two months” (gr. 1)

Choosing between appointed and elected representatives of local authorities, a majority of respondents are likely to address elected ones:

“They know better what’s going on” (gr. 8)

“I will address elected representative because I can tell him: “I elected you, and you have to care of my issue” (gr. 5)

“Address to elected, because the elected representative – is elected by the people” (gr. 4)

Those who would address appointed officials (just a few respondents chose this option) explain their decision by saying that an appointed official has more power to solve problems:

“Appointed has more power. I would address appointed” (gr. 4)

Besides that, it was said that one should look at personal characteristics of the person one would like to address:

“Everything depends on the person, his qualities” (gr. 8)

More trust is displayed towards a city mayor / village head than towards appointed heads of the state administration:

“Because you know the person you elected” (gr. 1)

“Because I elected him and he bears responsibility before me. If he violates my right, he violates not only the law about state service but the law about corruption, too” (gr. 8)

It is noted that the city mayor or the head of village council performs better just before elections. Actions improving the situation in the community are aimed at attracting the support of voters.

Respondents said that the main duties of a city mayor or village head are to ensure the well being and the order in the community, and to provide municipal services.

7.4. Non-governmental organizations

In general respondents' awareness about NGOs and their activity is low. Some even said they did not know what NGO means.

A few respondents said they have contacted NGOs. The following NGOs were named:

- ✓ Committee of Voters of Ukraine
- ✓ “Liga”
- ✓ Red Cross
- ✓ Chornobyl fund
- ✓ “Oblycham do istyny”
- ✓ The Center for civic initiatives
- ✓ Charity fund “Civic initiatives”
- ✓ “Anti-mafia”
- ✓ Fund “Vidrodzhennya”
- ✓ The Committee of soldiers' mothers
- ✓ Women organization “Hope”
- ✓ Women organization “Promin”
- ✓ Lviv oblast league of intellectual creativity
- ✓ Association “Prosvita”
- ✓ Association named after T. Shevchenko
- ✓ Malta assistance service
- ✓ “Homeless animals”
- ✓ Trade unions
- ✓ Environmental organizations
- ✓ Veterans' organizations
- ✓ Youth organizations.

Some participants turned out to be members of NGOs. They note that activity in such organizations is often not paid but participation in NGOs gives the opportunity to help others:

“I am a member of veterans’ organization. I get nothing from them, I simply help, it is the desire of my heart” (gr. 7)

Overall, participants’ attitude towards NGOs is positive:

“It would be good if there were more NGOs, then, each person could find that organization in which he or she can satisfy interests” (gr. 2)

“Positive [attitude]. This is a ground to public society. And they have to develop” (gr. 4)

“It’s good that there are the funds, the funds for children, the fund for old persons, social fund ...they are financed by somebody ... there are some results. It’s good” (gr. 2)

It is noted that public organizations form the foundation of civil society, and that is why their activity is useful. Respondents say NGOs conduct significant work in different spheres of social life. The most effective activity of NGOs is thought to be in the following spheres: socio-political, social advertisement, protection of human rights, support of democracy, education, religion.

There were some respondents who displayed a negative attitude towards activity of public organizations. They explained their belief by saying that these organizations pursue selfish interests, and material benefits for their own profit, and not the interests of citizens.

“To my mind, the majority of these organization do nothing. They are created with the only purpose to get money through different projects, just for themselves” (gr. 8)

“There are 2 500 public organizations in Kharkiv oblast. 50-60 conduct real work. The rest are the “grant eaters” - just earn grants” (gr.8)

One respondent who works for a public organization (charity fund) said the effectiveness of NGO activity in Ukraine is impeded by some obstacles such as legislation, and insufficient financial resources.

Respondents felt that the lack of contact between citizens and public organizations is explained by the lack of information about NGO activity:

“Activity of these organizations is not widely covered, we are not aware about their tasks” (gr.7)

A few respondents said they work as volunteers or they volunteered before for public organizations. They were driven by the desire to help somebody.

On the other hand, it was said there are cases when people working for NGOs are cheated:

“I have been the volunteer in children public organizations. We worked, cared about children, conducted trainings, taught them to use computers. At some point I found information in which our salary was indicated. Though we received nothing, somebody took this money” (gr.8)

Respondents expressed their desire to work as volunteers for public organizations that work on issues of democracy, human rights or focus on increasing the level of well-being of the community. The following factors may also attract respondents to work for public organizations:

Personal connections, opportunity to help relatives, friends:

“Something with the family, friendly relations” (gr.3)

“If a child is sick” (gr.5)

Connection with the main sphere of activity:

“If it is connected with the business you do, if you can do it while working” (gr.3)

Assuredness in the direction of organization’s activity, trust in it:

“It depends on a situation. If I know my activity will bring benefits to people, not to oligarchs” (gr. 4)

Coincidence of one’s personal interests with the interests of NGO:

“If my interests will be the same as interests of NGO. Only in such a case” (gr. 6)

The main obstacles preventing volunteerism with public organizations are the lack of time and of additional resources:

“Those people are engaged in this activity who have enough money to eat and do not bother about how to get food for their family. Individual should be a bit well off, in order not think about those problems but to care about problems of the society. There is no enough time just to work there” (gr. 3)

Opinions regarding whose interests public organizations represent were split. The majority believe NGOs represent public interests:

“For example, our organization reflects the interest of people” (gr.5)

Others think they follow the interests of target groups:

“ ... if it is women’s organization, then – interests of women, if organization of disabled and pensioners, then – their interests” (gr. 6)

Some respondents think NGOs express the interests of political forces because the majority of them are affiliated with such forces:

“It is just a subsidiary of some larger force or party ... if organization is large and powerful, then, it is likely to be subsidiary of somebody” (gr. 7)

Besides that, it was said NGOs express their own interests, the interests of their members:

“ ... they should reflect, first of all, interests of their members” (gr. 6)

It was also mentioned that NGOs are sometimes created to hide criminal activity:

“NGOs are very often used for money laundering” (gr. 4)

8. THE ECONOMY

Respondents associate the term “market economy” with the following:

Free pricing.

“Price liberalism. There are no state restrictions regulating the prices” (gr. 8)

“It is free development of prices” (gr. 6)

“It is about increasing prices” (gr. 5) (It should be noted that increasing prices as the main characteristic of market economy was mainly mentioned by aged people)

“The market regulates the prices” (gr. 2)

Competition leading to improving quality of goods.

“Market economy creates competition between producers” (gr. 1)

“It is competition which should lead to improving the quality of goods” (gr. 1)

“Monopolies are excluded. The stimulus for the development of market is given. The more supply is, the more choice people will have” (gr. 6)

“It is competition; as a result, the quality of goods should improve” (gr. 7)

Development of small and medium businesses.

“ ... opportunity for those inclined to conduct their own business” (gr. 2)

“It is an economy without state governance, it depends upon small and medium business” (gr. 8)

Resources flow to non-budgetary sphere.

“ ... the resources flow not to the state budget, it happens somehow...” (gr.8)

High living standards.

Equal opportunities.

Equality of all forms of ownership

Free regulation of demand and supply:

“Persons, enterprises are sailing freely in the ocean of demand and supply. There is no strict restriction of this movement” (gr. 4)

“When demand and supply are regulated by the consumer and not the state” (gr. 4)

“Demand generates the supply” (gr. 8)

“The proposition and the need is not regulated by the state but the market. They have to be balanced” (gr. 6)

Paid services in the social sphere

“It is, for example, what we pay for medicine” (gr. 3)

Some felt that an economy controlled / regulated by the state could counterbalance the economy controlled by criminal entities:

“ ... it is better if it is controlled by the state than by mafia” (gr. 1)

“As an ideal, it should be regulated by the state. I think, first, there should be transformation of the state and then the state must regulate economic processes” (gr. 7)

However, the majority of respondents favor a market economy in the country.

“... market economy gives incentives for the person to earn money” (gr. 1)

“In Ukraine the economy has to be the market type. But the government has to report about money spent ” (gr. 8)

Although respondents believe there should be a market economy in Ukraine, they believe that the main spheres of industry should be controlled by the state. Respondents believe that this will guarantee a correlation between salaries, pensions, and prices in this sphere of economy:

“ ... if the state will not control these issues, what pensioners will do with this market economy? Pensions are regulated. But prices are free” (gr. 1)

Privatization of large sectors of the economy is perceived as robbery of the people:

“It is cynical and rude robbery of the people” (gr. 8)

“The main source of profit in market economy is natural resources and they should belong to the people. Consequently, most part of profits should go to the state budget” (gr. 6)

“All of it should belong to the state. Because it is not right when one person disposes of the natural resources” (gr. 7)

“In our country the privatization – is the legalized banditry” (gr. 7)

Some of the opposition to the privatization of these sectors of economy, especially, of coal mining, is explained by its ineffectiveness.

“I think that privatization of coal mining will bring only losses. It is not effective” (gr. 4)

Those respondents who support privatization in such sectors as coal mining, communications believe that it will give the possibility for further development of such sectors:

“Any production will be effective if it is privately owned. State directors steal and their enterprises incur losses. That is why everything that can be privatized should be privatized” (gr. 8)

