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DISSATISFACTION & DISILLUSIONMENT IN UKRAINE: FINDINGS FROM AN IFES 2008 SURVEY



October 2008

This publication was produced by IFES for the U.S. Agency for International Development concerning Associate Award No. 121-A-00-07-00701-00, under Leader Agreement No. DGC-A-00-01-00004-00.





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Findings from an IFES October 2008 Survey**

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Printed in the United States of America.
ISBN 1-931459- 30-4

IFES ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication was made possible through the generous support of the American People through the U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Associate Award No. 121-A-00-07-00701-00, under Leader Agreement No. DGC-A-00-01-00004-00.

IFES would like to recognize the research, editing and publication assistance provided by members of its staff.

SUMMARY OF MAIN SURVEY FINDINGS

General Perceptions of Political Situation and Economy

- Strong majorities of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the political situation in Ukraine (93%) as well as the foreign policy of Ukraine (75%). There is similar pessimism regarding the economic situation in Ukraine with 93% of respondents describing the current economic situation as bad.
- High prices and inflation are considered the most serious problem Ukraine faces as a country (70%), followed by general economic problems (42%), corruption (40%), poverty (39%), political bickering between leaders (39%), political instability/general political problems (36%), unemployment (26%) and problems with Russia (18%).
- Most Ukrainians are worried Ukraine is on a path toward instability and chaos (76%), while only 6% say Ukraine is on the path toward stability and 9% say they do not know.
- Over six in ten (64%) of Ukrainians say they are interested in politics and government, while a majority (60%) say they have at least a fair amount of information and 22% say they have a great deal of information.

Attitudes about Corruption, the Economy, Politics and the Constitution

- An overwhelming 91% of Ukrainians believe corruption is common in Ukraine. Of the major institutions, Ukrainians believe corruption is a serious problem amongst hospitals/medical institutions (81%), the police (78%), courts (77%) and universities/schools (69%).
- Most Ukrainians see a decline, instead of improvement, over the past year in the political situation in Ukraine (89% decline), the economic situation in Ukraine (84% decline), relations with Russia (68%) and the fight against corruption (49%). A plurality of respondents see no change in the unity of Ukrainian citizens (43%), relations with Western countries (41%) or Ukraine's national security (41%).
- Regarding regional, ethnic and ideological divisions in Ukraine, a plurality (30%) predict that over the next 5 years Ukraine will remain divided, while 21% say they will achieve unity, 10% say Ukraine will neither divide nor unify, 9% say Ukraine is not divided and 25% do not know.
- When asked about possible changes to the Constitution that have recently been discussed, over four in ten (43%) would like to see a clearer division of responsibilities between the executive, parliament and the government and make it easier to punish public officials who commit wrongdoing (46%). Nearly four in 10 (38%) of respondents say more power should be given to the parliament, 25% say more power should be given to the president and 12% say the divisions should stay the same if the Constitution were to change the division of powers.

Democracy, Institutions and NGOs

- When asked what defines a democracy, most respondents believe it means the protection of human rights (61%). Respondents also identify fair/consistent enforcement of laws (45%), everybody having work (42%), no official corruption (41%), state support of those unable to work (32%), state support of pensioners (32%) and freedom of speech (31%) as tenets of democracy. A small proportion of respondents (24%) associate democracy with the freedom to vote, freedom of religion (15%) and freedom of association (9%).
- A majority of respondents do not believe Ukraine is a democracy (55%), 15% say it is a democracy, 21% say it is both a democracy and not a democracy and 9% say they do not know.
- Confidence in many institutions is low. Respondents have no or little confidence in President Viktor Yushchenko (84%), the Verkhovna Rada (83%), the Cabinet of Ministers (72%), Former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich (64%), Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (63%) or the Central Election Commission (62%).
- Similar to previous years, nearly six in ten (57%) Ukrainians do not know of any active NGOs in Ukraine, while only 15% are aware of NGOs. Twenty-one percent are not familiar with what NGOs are. Of those who are aware of NGOs, they believe NGOs work on a wide-range of issues in Ukraine, such as financial help for the poor (11%), human rights (9%), work with disabled people (9%), health care (8%), environmental protection (8%), children's rights (6%); however, 37% do not know or refused to answer. Despite a low level of knowledge about NGOs and their work, more Ukrainians say they are necessary (50%) than unnecessary (20%) and 30% say they do not know or refused to answer.
- Similar to the pessimism surrounding the current political and economic situation in Ukraine, most Ukrainians feel that voting does not give people like them an influence in decision-making (78%) and that people like them cannot influence decisions made by the government (85%).
- Dissatisfaction with the representativeness of major political parties is also clear. Nearly half of Ukrainians (47%) believe only some political parties in Ukraine address issues facing the country, while 27% say no party addresses issues, 15% do not know or refused and only 11% believe they do. A strong 56% say political parties only serve their own interests, 19% say they serve business interests, 11% say 'those in power' and a mere 3% say the Ukrainian people.

Opinions on Possible Parliamentary Elections

- A majority of Ukrainians (59%) say they are very or somewhat likely to vote if an election takes place in December 2008. This percentage is significantly lower than the 85% who expressed a likelihood of voting in the September 2007 survey and may reflect voter fatigue among Ukrainians. There is little difference between men and women in terms of their likelihood of voting and there is a similar lack of difference among key age groups.
- Among those who profess a likelihood of voting, BYUT (26%) and the Party of Regions (26%) receive the highest level of support. The Communist Party is supported by 5% while the Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense bloc is supported by only 2%. The Party of Arseniy Yatsenyuk is supported by 2%, All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom' by 1% and the

Socialist Party by 1%. Nineteen percent say they are still undecided about what party they would support if an election is held in December. For coalition support, 13% would like to see a Grand Coalition of Byut, Party of Regions and Our Ukraine, 10% would like to see Byut-Party of Regions, 8% Byut-Regions-Socialists, 19% would like to see other combinations and half of respondents say they do not know or refused to answer.

- While 59% of Ukrainians say they will vote in the election, most Ukrainians in general do not believe the parliament elected in this election will serve its entire term (54%); only 19% believe it will.
- More Ukrainians blame President Yushchenko (37%) for the dissolution of the Orange Coalition on September 16, 2008, than those who blame both President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko (28%) or Tymoshenko alone (10%). Three percent blame Viktor Yanukovich.

EU and NATO Membership

- More Ukrainians say they would vote to join the EU (40%) than those who would vote against (28%). Those who would vote to join cite higher living standards (42%) and economic development/stability (25%) as reasons why they are in favor of EU accession. Those who would vote against say Ukraine is not ready (31%), that there is no point/benefit for Ukraine (12%) or Ukraine should join Russia (11%).
- More Ukrainians know at least a little about NATO (55%) than those who know not much or none at all (37%). Most who have heard about NATO have received their information from Ukrainian TV channels (80%), word of mouth (45%), Ukrainian newspapers (29%) or Russian TV channels (25%).
- Most Ukrainians would vote against joining NATO (58%) while those who would vote in favor represent (23%) of the Ukrainians surveyed, 10% are undecided. Those who would vote in favor cite security and protection of Ukraine as a reason (54%) and those who would vote against do not want Ukrainian troops used for NATO campaigns (24%) or feel that NATO membership is unnecessary for Ukraine (18%). Of those who are undecided, most say they do not favor one side or the other because they lack proper knowledge of NATO (42%).

Current Events

- There has been a great deal of discussion of late regarding Ukraine leasing harbor space on the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Black Sea Fleet until 2017. Nearly half of respondents (47%) say Russia's Black Sea Fleet should withdraw by May 2017 if the agreement is not prolonged, 24% say Russia's Black Sea Fleet should remain permanently based in Crimea and 10% think the fleet should immediately leave. Over four in ten (45%) agree with President Yushchenko's presidential decree that required Russian warships to seek 72-hour advance permission from Ukraine to pass through Ukrainian waters leaving or entering the port, while 24% disagree and 31% are not sure or do not know.
- When asked about the conflict between Georgia and Russia, more respondents blame Georgia (30%) than Russia (18%); however, 27% blame both Georgia and Russia equally. Not surprisingly, more respondents oppose President Yushchenko's participation in the delegation to Georgia and support of Georgia during the crisis

(42%), than those who agree with his position (20%). Still, 39% do not know or refused to answer the question. Those who agree said that they agreed because they feel solidarity with Georgia (58%) or that they feel sympathy with people in trouble (6%). Those who disagree say that they disagreed because Ukraine should keep its neutrality (34%), they do not want confrontation with Russia (20%), they do not trust President Yushchenko (19%) or they believe Georgia was the aggressor (13%).

- Forty percent of Ukrainians believe the conflict between Russia and Georgia means Russia will be more aggressive with Ukraine in the future and only 7% believe it will be less aggressive. Twenty-nine percent believe there will be no change in Russia's relations with Ukraine and 23% do not know or refused to answer the question.

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SURVEY DETAILS

SURVEY PARAMETERS

Sample size: 1,254 respondents representing the voting-age population in Ukraine (18 years+).

Margin of error: $\pm 2.77\%$ within a 95% confidence interval, assuming a pure random sample.

Sample area coverage: All the administrative divisions of Ukraine; 1,189 observations were allocated proportionately at the national level with an over-sample of 65 observations in Kyiv.

Fieldwork dates: October 17 to 28, 2008.

Survey firm: IFES contracted with the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) to conduct fieldwork and data processing for the survey.

Funding for the survey was provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Weights: Following data collection, the data was weighted by age, region and gender to bring the realized sample in line with target population parameters in order to be nationally representative of the adult (18+) population of Ukraine.

CHARTS

For charts and tables where percentages are based on filtered respondents or certain demographic groups, the appropriate unweighted sample base for each percentage is specified in the relevant chart or table (example: n=456). For all other charts or where not otherwise specified, the sample base is the total sample size of 1,254 (n=1,254).

There may be slight variation between numbers presented in the analysis and the data figures or tables due to rounding. This occurred in only a few cases and the difference was never greater than 1 percent.


OPINIONS ON THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN UKRAINE

This survey finds Ukrainians in one of the most dissatisfied states of mind observed in IFES surveys in Ukraine since 1994. Both political and economic factors are viewed as causes for the dissatisfaction evidenced in this survey. This survey also sees the largest percentage of Ukrainians, by far, stating that Ukraine is headed in the wrong direction and towards instability. The survey also highlights gaping differences in opinions on key issues between Ukrainian citizens in different regions of the country, which is perhaps a reason why more Ukrainians in this year's survey compared to the 2007 survey say Ukraine is headed toward greater regional and political divisions over the next five years.

UKRAINIANS EXTREMELY DISSATISFIED WITH SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY

More than nine in ten Ukrainians say they are very or somewhat dissatisfied with the economic and political situation in the country. Close to eight in ten also express dissatisfaction with Ukraine's foreign policy. Dissatisfaction with all these issues has increased since the 2007 survey (**Figure 1**).


Ninety-three percent of Ukrainians are very or somewhat dissatisfied with the political and economic situation in the country, an increase from 82% and 83%, respectively, in the 2007 survey. Three-quarters (75%) are also dissatisfied with the foreign policy of Ukraine. Solid majorities in all segments of society express dissatisfaction with these issues.



Probing socio-political issues a little deeper, respondents to the survey were also asked whether there has been an improvement, decline or no change at all in several issues from the previous year. The issues included the economic situation in the country, political stability in the country and relations with Russia and western countries. For many of the issues listed, the majority of Ukrainians believe there has been a decline and very few say that there has been an improvement in the situation over the past year (**Figure 2**).

More than eight in ten Ukrainians believe there has been a decline in the economic situation and political stability in Ukraine over the past years, while less than 10% in each case believe there has been an improvement. Sixty-nine percent also believe relations with Russia have worsened over the past year, with only 6% saying that relations have improved. A majority also believes respect for human rights by authorities has declined, although given the lack of any significant state-sponsored crackdown on rights it is unclear why a majority of Ukrainians hold these opinions. Perhaps this opinion reflects Ukrainians' dissatisfaction with the lack of socio-economic gains over the past few years.

A plurality of Ukrainians also believe there has been a decline in the fight against corruption in Ukraine, and a decline in Ukraine’s national security as well as a decreasing amount of unity among Ukrainian citizens. In the case of relations with western countries, 22% think there has been a decline, 17% think there has been improvement and 41% believe there has been no change.



For most of these issues, there has been an increase since the 2007 IFES survey in the percentage of Ukrainians who say there has been a decline. The percentage of Ukrainians who think there has been a decline in political stability has increased from 63% in 2007 to 89% in this survey. For the economic situation, the percentage citing a decline has increased from 49% to 83% and for relations with Russia the percentage citing decline has increased from 32% to 69%.

ECONOMIC ISSUES TOP LIST OF CONCERNS FOR UKRAINIANS


Economic concerns are a large reason for public dissatisfaction with the current situation in Ukraine. Respondents to the survey were asked to list the most serious problems the country faces today. Economic concerns dominate the list of issues:

- Inflation/high prices (70%)
- General economic problems (42%)
- Corruption (41%)
- Poverty (39%)
- Political bickering between leaders (39%)
- Political instability (35%)
- Unemployment (26%)
- Problems with Russia (18%)
- Ukraine joining NATO (8%)
- Others (9%)

In addition to economic problems, problems with political instability that characterized the country over the past four years and foreign relations issues are also mentioned.

Respondents were also asked about the biggest issues facing ordinary Ukrainians in their day-to-day lives. Again, economic issues dominate with unemployment and inflation receiving a high percentage of mentions. In addition, many respondents also listed low salaries (61%), low pensions (39%) and healthcare (40%) as concerns for ordinary Ukrainians.

Given the concerns cited with economic issues, it is not surprising the vast majority of Ukrainians rate the current economic situation in the country as bad or very bad. The percentage of Ukrainians who assess the current economic situation as bad or very bad (92%) is the highest level ever seen in IFES surveys in Ukraine (**Figure 3**). On another question, 58% describe their family's economic situation as being worse than one year ago, while only 12% describe it as being better. Twenty-eight percent describe their family's economic situation as being the same as a year ago.




MAJORITY CITES SERIOUSNESS OF CORRUPTION IN MAJOR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Corruption is another concern that has been pervasive in Ukraine since independence and which the majority of the Ukrainian people continue to view as being a frequent and serious problem. In this survey 67% of Ukrainians say corruption is very common in Ukraine and another 24% say corruption is somewhat common. Only 2% of Ukrainians say corruption is very rare or somewhat rare. These figures do not differ significantly from previous IFES surveys in Ukraine.

Respondents to the survey were also asked to assess the seriousness or lack of seriousness of corruption in several major public institutions in the country. For each of the public institutions for which respondents were to evaluate the frequency or corruption in these institutions, the majority of Ukrainians stated corruption is very common or somewhat common in these institutions (**Figure 4**).


For each institution listed, 60% or more think corruption is a very or somewhat serious problem. The judicial system and medical systems are felt to be especially impacted by corruption as more than three-quarters cite corruption as a serious problem in hospitals, courts and among the police. The Rada is felt to be corrupt by 69% of respondents while 60% have this opinion of the Cabinet of Ministers.

There is some positive news vis-à-vis corruption when comparing responses on this survey with the 2007 IFES survey. The percentage who cite corruption as a serious problem in several institutions has fallen below 2007 levels. For the courts, the percentage of citizens citing corruption as a serious problem has fallen from 83% in 2007 to 76% in this survey. For the police, these numbers have decreased from 83% to 78% and for universities and schools from 78% to 69%. The most significant decreases have occurred for the customs authorities (down from 75% to 61%) and the tax authorities (76% to 63%).



MAJORITY BELIEVES UKRAINE IS HEADED IN THE WRONG DIRECTION

Given the high levels of dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation in the country as well as the concerns about corruption in public institutions, it is not surprising that the majority of Ukrainians believe that the country is headed in the wrong direction. This opinion has been expressed by more and more Ukrainians since the 2004 presidential elections and now represents the views of the solid majority of the country (Figure 5).




The respondents were asked whether Ukraine is headed in the right direction toward stability or in the wrong direction toward instability. More than three-quarters of Ukrainians (76%) believe Ukraine is headed in the wrong direction versus only 6% who believe it is headed in the right direction. The figure indicates Ukrainians have a decidedly more negative evaluation of where Ukraine is headed in this survey than in any of the previous IFES surveys dating back to February 2005 after the election of President Yushchenko. It contrasts especially meaningfully with data from the February 2005 survey which showed that a plurality of the public thought Ukraine was on the right track.

Regional opinions on this question show that a solid majority of respondents in every region of the country believe Ukraine is on the wrong track. Even in Western Ukraine, normally more positive in evaluations of the country's direction in previous IFES surveys, a solid majority (66%) think Ukraine is on the wrong path and headed toward instability. This opinion is shared by 89% of respondents in the East, 77% in the South and 74% in Kyiv.

AN INCREASE IN UKRAINIANS WHO FEEL THAT UKRAINE WILL BECOME MORE DIVIDED

Accompanying the more negative trend in Ukrainian opinions on key socio-political is a rise in opinions that regional and political divisions will become more prevalent. In this survey, 31% of Ukrainians say Ukraine will become more divided over the next five years (compared to 25% in 2007). Twenty-one percent say Ukraine will become more united, compared to 27% in 2007. The political cleavages now buffeting Ukraine may be one reason for this negative trend (**Figure 6**).


Figure 6: Opinions on future of Ukraine's divisions over next 5 years (% of total)



INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY


CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS AT LOWEST LEVEL IN THREE YEARS

Given the tumultuous political and economic events of the past year in Ukraine, it is not surprising that Ukrainians are expressing low levels of confidence in leading political personalities as well as national and local institutions in Ukraine. Ukrainians express little or no confidence in President Viktor Yushchenko (84%), the Verkhovna Rada (83%), the Cabinet of Ministers (72%), Former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich (64%), Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (63%) and the Central Election Commission (62%) (Figure 7).




Compared to 2007, Ukrainians' level of confidence dropped significantly for every institution, reflecting Ukrainians' increasing frustration over the past year with both national and local institutions. The most drastic drop in confidence is with President Viktor Yushchenko (44% expressing confidence in 2007; 12% 2008) and the Verkhovna Rada (40% 2007; 13% 2008). The drops in confidence for Yushchenko and the Rada and to a smaller extent for Tymoshenko and Yanukovich, can probably be traced to the ongoing dispute between these three leaders on the composition of the government and on the relationship between the President and Parliament and the perceived inability of all players to put aside their disagreements to resolve the serious economic problems facing the country (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Confidence in institutions: % expressing confidence 2007 compared to 2008




Similarly, confidence in the judiciary and law enforcement bodies is low. Only two in ten respondents profess confidence in the Supreme Court (24%), the Constitutional Court (23%), the Appeals Court (23%), Public prosecutor offices (16%), local courts (14%) or the police (15%). Confidence in each of these institutions has also decreased from 2005 and 2007 levels (**Figure 9**).

Figure 9: Trust in judiciary and law enforcement bodies: Percent professing a great deal/fair amount of confidence



FEW UKRAINIANS ARE AWARE OF NGOS, BUT BELIEVE NGOS ARE NECESSARY

Similar to previous years, and similar to a lack of awareness of foreign assistance and USAID, nearly six of ten (57%) of Ukrainians do not know any active NGOs in Ukraine, while only 15% do and 21% do not even know what an NGO is. Of those who are aware of NGOs, they believe they are working on a wide range of issues in Ukraine, such as financial help for the poor (11%), human rights (9%), work with disabled people (9%), health care (8%), environmental protection (8%), and children’s rights (7%); however, 36% do not know or refused to answer. Despite a low level of knowledge about NGOs and their work, more Ukrainians say they are necessary (51%) rather than unnecessary (19%), but 30% say they do not know or refused to answer (Figures 40 & 41).



DISSATISFACTION WITH POLITICAL PARTIES & ELECTED OFFICIALS

Dissatisfaction with the agendas and political platforms of major political parties is also clear. Nearly half of Ukrainians (47%) believe only some political parties in Ukraine address issues facing the country, while 27% say no party addresses these issues, 15% do not know or refused to answer and only 12% believe most parties do address issues of national importance. Respondents are also more inclined to say political parties represent their own interests or other interests rather than the interests of the Ukrainian people. A majority of respondents (56%) believe political parties only serve their own interests, 20% say they serve business interests, 11% say they serve the interests of ‘those in power’ and a mere 4% says they serve in the interests of the Ukrainian people. These perceptions are generally unchanged from 2007. (Figures 10 & 11)

Figure 10: “Whose interests do political parties serve?”

Own Interests	56%
Business Interests	20%
Those in power	11%
Depends on the political party	5%
Ukrainian people	4%
DK/NR	5%

Figure 11: "Do major political parties have clear proposals to address the issues facing the country?"





Figure 12: "Agree/Disagree: Elected officials in Ukraine are accountable to the people they serve."




Similar to Ukrainians' belief that political parties only serve their own interests, a majority of Ukrainians (57%) feel that elected officials are not accountable to the people they serve. Less than a third of respondents (31%) agree that elected officials are accountable and 12% do not know or gave no response. The fact that a majority of Ukrainians do not feel that elected officials in Ukraine are accountable to the people they serve points to a perceived weakness in the way legislative democracy is exercised in the country. **(Figure 12)**

Ukrainians were then asked what steps Ukrainian citizens can take to ensure that elected officials who represent them actually listen to the people and are accountable to them. Four in ten responded by saying a way to increase accountability is to contact officials directly or to hold community meetings with elected officials (each mentioned by 40% of respondents). Other less cited ways to increase accountability include contacting the media to address an issue (22%), sponsoring petition drives on important issues (10%) or writing letters/emails to elected officials (8%).

UKRAINIANS DO NOT PERCEIVE UKRAINE AS A DEMOCRACY

Considering Ukrainians' lack of confidence in local, national and judicial institutions, it is not surprising that only 15% of respondents consider Ukraine a democracy. A majority of respondents do not believe Ukraine is a democracy (54%), 21% say it's both a democracy and not a democracy and 9% say they do not know. The percentage of Ukrainians who believe Ukraine is a democracy has steadily declined from the survey conducted in February 2005. Between February 2005 and

Figure 13: Opinions on Ukrainian democracy; trend




October 2008 the already low percentage of Ukrainians who believed Ukraine is a democracy dropped by half (from 30% in February 2005 to 15% in October 2008) (**Figure 13**).

As in previous years, the perception of Ukraine as a democracy varies by region. A majority of Ukrainians in the East say Ukraine is not a democracy (69%). This opinion is also shared by 53% of respondents in Kyiv and 56% in the South. In the other regions, fewer respondents believe Ukraine is not a democracy (West 45%; North 43%, Center 41%).

There is also variation in the perception of Ukraine as a democracy by party support among supporters of the two major political parties (by popular support) in Ukraine. Nearly twice as many respondents who support the Party of Regions say Ukraine is not a democracy (63%) compared to those respondents who support the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (37%).


When asked what defines a democracy, most respondents believe democracy means the protection of human rights (61%). Economic and social welfare issues are also prominently mentioned as a plurality of respondents identify democracy as meaning that everyone has work (41%), that retirees looked after by state (33%) and that the state supports all who cannot work (32%). Thirty-two percent identify freedom of speech as a hallmark of democracy. Only a small proportion of respondents (24%) associate democracy with the freedom to vote, freedom of religion (15%) and freedom of association (9%) (**Figure 14**).



Compared to 2007, there has been a decline in those Ukrainians associating each tenet listed above with democracy. Two notable tenets include the freedom to vote and the protection of human rights. Over the last three years, those who attribute freedom to vote as a tenet of democracy declined by 11%. This is reflective of ordinary Ukrainians' increased disappointment with the effectiveness of voting as a vehicle to a better democracy. Indeed, just one week before our survey was fielded, the second consecutive parliament was dissolved before its entire term has been completed. The protection of human rights,

however, has maintained a relatively strong majority over the past year, showing Ukrainians continued belief in the connection between protection of human rights and democracy.

When asked whether the central government respects certain rights, a plurality of Ukrainians believes certain freedoms are only sometimes respected, such as freedom of the press (42%) and freedom of association (30%). Most Ukrainians believe freedom of religion is at least sometimes respected with a third (36%) of Ukrainians saying it is always respected and 34% saying it is sometimes respected. Ukrainians are split on whether the government respects the freedom of speech and the freedom to vote. Nearly the same proportion of respondents believes that the freedom of speech is sometimes respected (39%) or not respected (38%) and that the freedom to vote is sometimes respected (32%) or not respected at all (36%). Furthermore, a majority of Ukrainians (62%) do not believe that the central government respects human rights and this has increased 10% when compared with the 2007 survey data. Given that there are no widespread abuses of rights and freedoms observed in Ukraine, this response may reflect Ukrainians' general dissatisfaction with economic and political conditions in the country and their belief that this implies a lack of respect for human rights (Figure 15).



BELIEF IN CITIZEN IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT IS LOW

Similar to the pessimism surrounding the status of democracy and the current political and economic situations in Ukraine, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians feel that voting gives people like them an influence in decision-making (79%) or that people like them can influence decisions made by the government (86%). This may be considered a further indication of Ukrainians' disillusionment with the status of democracy in their country, as the belief that citizen participation can influence the government through mechanisms such as voting is a core democratic principle. Furthermore, Ukrainians may have a sense of being powerless in light of the ever-changing political environment in Ukraine (**Figures 16 & 17**).

Figure 16: "Voting gives people like me an influence on decision-making in Ukraine."





Figure 17: "People like me can have influence on decisions made by the government."



Ukrainians' apathy towards citizen participation is also visible in the fact that most Ukrainians have not taken advantage of in a number of methods citizens can use to express their views. Also, Ukrainians' level of citizen participation has not increased from 2005 to 2008, with nearly the same proportion of respondents in the 2005, 2007 and 2008 surveys saying they have not participated in a number of activities to express their opinions. Overwhelming majorities of Ukrainians say they have not written a blog or internet site to express their opinion on a political or social issue (97% 2008; 95% 2007; 97% 2005); have not sent an SMS vote to express their opinion on political or social issues (95% 2008; 93% 2007; 96% 2005); have not contacted a newspaper or magazine to express their opinion on an issue (95% 2008; 94% 2007; 94% 2005); have not called a radio or television talk show to express their opinion on political or social issue (94%); have not signed a written or email petition (94% 2008; 91% never 2007; 95% never 2005); have not contacted or visited a public official at any level of government to express their opinion (84% 2008; 88% 2007; 86% 2005); and they have not taken part in a protest, march or demonstration (84% 2008; 82% 2007; 79% 2005).

Though eight in ten still report they have never contacted or visited a public official at any level of government to express their opinion, nor have they taken part in a protest, march or demonstration, 15% of Ukrainians report doing these two activities either over the past 12 months or earlier. The number of Ukrainians responding that they have contacted or visited a public official either in the last 12 months or earlier has increased from 2005 to 2008 (15% 2008; 10% 2007; 13% 2005). On the other hand, those who say they have taken part in a protest, march or demonstration in the past 12 months or earlier has declined since 2005 (20% 2005; 16% 2007; 15% 2008).

UKRAINIANS RECOMMEND CERTAIN CHANGES TO CONSTITUTION

Over the past year, there have been discussions in parliament and among politicians about possible changes to the Constitution. Respondents were given a list of various changes that have been discussed and asked what changes they would like to see made to the Constitution. Most Ukrainians say they would like to see the Constitution changed to make it easier to punish public officials who commit wrongdoing (46% of cases) and to provide a clearer division of responsibilities between the executive and parliament (43% of cases). Two in ten support changing the Constitution to make reforms to the judicial system (23%), to provide better checks and balances between the executive and parliament (22%) and to provide for a reduction in the powers of the president in comparison to the parliament (21%). These views, especially those pushing to the desire parliament to have more power than the president, may reflect dissatisfaction with the current political environment (**Figure 18**).

Make it easier to punish public officials who commit wrongdoing	46%
Clearer division of responsibilities between the executive and parliament	43%
Reforms to the judicial system	23%
Better checks and balances between the executive and parliament	22%
Reduction in the powers of the president in comparison to parliament	21%
Increase the percentage of votes parties must receive to enter parliament from 3% to 10%	11%
Longer terms for elected officials	6%
A completely new Constitution	5%
Changes to Ukraine's unaligned status	4%
Do not Know/No response	19%
<i>Percentages reflect percent of cases.</i>	

The two most common responses given across party lines is to have a clearer division of responsibilities between the executive and parliament and making it easier to punish public officials who commit wrongdoing. Approximately four in ten BYUT supporters, Our Ukraine supporters and Party of Regions supporters say they would like to see a clearer division of responsibilities between the executive and parliament (39%; 44%; 51% respectively). Another four in ten BYUT supporters would like to make it easier to punish public officials who commit wrongdoing (40%), while a majority of Party of Regions supporters (51%) and Our Ukraine supporters (68%) endorse such a measure.


When respondents were then asked their opinions if the Constitution were to change the division of powers between the president and the parliament, there was a similar support for more power given to parliament (38%), while a quarter of Ukrainians (25%) would like to see more power given to the president, 12% would like to keep as it is and 23% did not know or refused to answer.

When breaking this question down by party choice, a plurality of supporters of BYUT and the Party of Regions say they would like more power given to parliament (42% and 45% respectively). Three-quarters of Communist Party supporters would like more power given to the parliament and as would be expected, three-quarters of the supporters of President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party would like more power given to the president. This shows that across party lines, with the exception of President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Party supporters, respondents say they would like more power given to parliament. This implies that respondents may feel this way based on recent political events rather than a philosophical desire to see more power given to the parliament over the president.

OPINIONS ON POSSIBLE RADA ELECTION


UKRAINIANS EXPRESS VOTER FATIGUE

This survey was fielded one week after President Viktor Yushchenko signed an order on October 8 to dissolve parliament and hold snap elections on December 7. In late November, President Yushchenko announced that the snap election would be postponed until early 2009. Then on December 9, the Orange Coalition was announced to be reinstated after months of deadlock. At the time of survey fieldwork, the early election was still scheduled for December and it was not known that former Orange Revolution allies turned rivals, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, would reach an agreement that would reinstate Tymoshenko as prime minister and call off the early election for now. As such, our survey included several questions about the early election that are analyzed in the rest of this section.



Survey respondents were asked how likely they would be to vote in this early election. Survey results convey voter fatigue as fewer Ukrainians showed a willingness to vote in this election when compared with previous elections. Given the fact that Ukraine has held 3 elections in 3 years this is not surprising (**Figure 19**).


While a majority of Ukrainians (59%) say they are very (35%) or somewhat (25%) likely to vote if an early election took place, this percentage is significantly lower than the 85% who expressed a likelihood of voting in the September 2007 survey (**Figure 20**). Indeed, if we track this same question over the past four surveys, we notice that respondents' declared willingness to vote is at its lowest level this year. This year, one third of respondents say they are somewhat (12%) or very (21%) unlikely to vote. In previous surveys, those saying they were unlikely to vote never exceeded the 10% threshold. This may indicate that the continued political infighting in Ukraine may be leading to a sense of disillusionment with political participation among ordinary citizens.



It is worth mentioning that, in general, it tends to be the case that more people report a willingness to vote than those who end up turning out to vote on Election Day. This is the case when we compare the percentage of those who said they were very or somewhat likely to vote in our pre-election survey in September 2007 (85%) to the actual voter turnout (60%). This also holds when comparing results from our pre-election survey in November 2005 (85% likelihood to vote) to the actual voter turnout in the March 2006 election (67%).

Respondents were also asked if they thought the previous Verkhovna Rada elections of September 2007 and March 2006 were fair. Opinions were relatively split with 47% saying the March 2006 election was fair and 38% saying it was unfair. Similarly, 46% said the September 2007 election was fair versus 39% who said it was unfair. The rest did not know or refused to answer.

Kyiv residents were asked about the fairness of the Mayoral and City Council election of May 25, 2008. This election was called by parliament after a campaign led by Prime Minister Tymoshenko accused the Kyiv Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky of corruption and called for his ouster. Yet the incumbent Mayor still won the election while the BYUT nominee came in second. Half the respondents in Kyiv said the local election was somewhat (31%) or completely unfair (19%) compared with 31% who thought it was completely (16%) or somewhat (16%) fair. It is not surprising that more respondents thought the election was unfair rather than fair as there were allegations that the election was marred by vote buying (**Figure 21**).



It is worth noting, however, that Kyiv residents seem to be generally more critical about the fairness of previous elections than the opinions of all Ukrainians taken together. Indeed, when filtering opinions by Kyiv respondents, 55% said the September 2007 Rada election was unfair (compared to 39% nationwide) and 50% said the March 2006 election was unfair (38% nationwide).


BYUT & THE PARTY OF REGIONS RECEIVE HIGHEST SUPPORT

Among those who professed a likelihood of voting, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYUT) (26%) and the Party of Regions (26%) received the highest level of support. This is according to answers to the question asking respondents which party or bloc they would likely vote for in the event of an early election. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc, which got the support of 11% of respondents in the IFES 2007 survey, garnered only 2% support in the current 2008 survey. Five percent said they would vote for the Communist Party, the Party of Arseniy Yatsenuk was supported by 2%, The All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom' by 1% and the Socialist Party by 1%. Nineteen percent said they were still undecided about what party they would support if an early election was held and 9% said they were against all parties.

Figure 22: Which party or bloc would you likely vote for if an early election takes place?
(% of likely voters; n=894)



Figure 23: Support for parties by motivation to vote
(% of each party's supporters - BYUT n=230; Party of Regions n=227)



Since BYUT and the Party of Regions received relatively equal support from respondents, we analyzed the profile of each party's supporters according to their level of motivation in politics and voting behavior¹. A slightly greater number of BYUT supporters appear to be highly motivated to vote when compared to supporters of the Party of Regions (**Figure 23**). Eighteen percent of those who declared they

¹ The typology for the motivated voter is developed by combining five indicators and adding up scores according to responses. The five indicators are the following: (1) Level of interest in politics, (2) level of information about political developments in Ukraine, (3) whether voted or not in 2007 and 2006 elections, (4) agreement on whether voting gives people a chance to influence decision-making and (5) likelihood to vote in the next early elections.


would vote for BYUT in the next election are highly motivated to vote as compared with 8% of Party of Regions supporters. Forty percent of the Party of Regions supporters are motivated to vote compared with a similar 39% among BYUT supporters. Meanwhile, a higher share of the Party of Regions supporters (52%) are either less motivated or indifferent to voting compared with 43% of BYUT supporters. This shows that while the level of support for these two parties is generally similar, more of BYUT supporters are likely to turn out and vote on Election Day than supporters of the Party of Regions.

Parties that are likely to attain the needed 3% threshold in the next election include the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Bloc of Volodymyr Lytvyn and the Our Ukraine Bloc, especially since Anseniy Yatsenuk was unable to form a bloc of his own. Also likely to reach the 3% threshold is the All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom', the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Bloc of Leonid Chernovetskiy.

When looking at political party support in the principal regions of Ukraine, the well-known cleavages between the Russia-oriented eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and the Western-oriented western and central regions persist. Indeed, support for the Party of Regions is highest in the East and the South where 45% and 35% of respondents respectively said they would vote for the Party of Regions in the next election. Meanwhile, support for BYUT is highest in the West and Center with 45% and 41% of respondents respectively saying they would vote for BYUT in the early election. More respondents in the North said they would vote for BYUT (38%) rather than the Party of Regions (18%). In Kyiv, respondents were split with BYUT (22%) and the Party of Regions (20%) getting a relatively similar level of support. Support for the Communist Party is highest in the North (8%), East and South (both at 7%). It is worth mentioning that the western region has the highest level of undecided voters (28%). These are more likely to swing to BYUT, the Our Ukraine Bloc or the All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom' party with its pro-ethnic Ukrainian platform. Undecided voters in the West are much less likely to vote for the Party of Regions in the next election (**Figure 24**).

Figure 24: Support for political parties by region

(% of likely voters in different regions: Kyiv n=86; North n=98; Center n=107; South n=141; East n=277; West n=185)



When asked what party they had voted for in the September 2007 parliamentary election, survey results roughly reflected actual election results. Among those who voted in the election and gave an answer to the survey question, 36.6% said they had voted for the Party of Regions, 34.9% for BYUT, 16.3% for Our Ukraine Bloc, 4.6% for the Communist Party of Ukraine and 3.4% for Lytvyn's Bloc. See actual election results in Figure 25.

Figure 25	What party you voted in the Sep 07 election?	Actual Sep 07 election results
Political parties	<i>(% of those who voted & gave an answer: n=970)</i>	
Party of Regions	36.6%	34.4%
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko	34.9%	30.7%
Bloc Our Ukraine	16.3%	14.2%
Communist Party of Ukraine	4.6%	5.4%
Lytvyn's Bloc	3.4%	4.0%

Respondents who had voted for the Our Ukraine Bloc in the September 2007 election are not likely to vote for the same bloc again in the early election: only 15% said they would vote for the Our Ukraine bloc in the next election. A plurality of them (35%) said they would vote for BYUT while a sizable 31% said they were undecided. As for those who had voted for BYUT in the previous election, 64% of them said they would again vote for the same bloc whereas 17% were undecided. With regards to those who had voted for the Party of Regions in the previous election, 70% said they would vote for the same party in the early election while 16% were undecided.

The dwindling support for Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc may be partly explained by the widespread opinion that Yushchenko is most to blame for the dissolution of the Orange coalition on 16 September². Some 37% of respondents say that President Yushchenko was primarily to blame for the dissolution of the Orange coalition in parliament. Twenty-eight percent voluntarily said that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko are equally to blame for the dissolution of the coalition whereas 10% said Tymoshenko is most to blame for that.


² In the days following the incursion by Russian forces into South Ossetia, Yushchenko asked the government to fiercely condemn Russia's actions in Georgia, but Tymoshenko refused to take a strong stance against Russia. Yushchenko left the coalition as a result.

OPINIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

A PLURALITY WOULD VOTE FOR JOINING THE EU

Following the armed conflict in August between Georgia and Russia, the debate over Ukraine's prospects for joining the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gained more resonance in Ukraine. Since a prospective NATO membership for Ukraine is seen by some European NATO members to be premature, especially given Russia's fierce opposition to it, there is a case for supposing that the EU may be a better-suited vehicle for those interested in Ukraine becoming more integrated into European regional bodies. In September 2008, the Ukraine-EU summit was concluded with the EU promising a deeper relationship and the conclusion of an association agreement by March 2009. The communiqué did not, however, offer Ukraine a prospect of membership. Our survey thus aimed to examine how Ukrainians feel about joining the EU.


Figure 26: Would you vote in favor or against Ukraine joining the EU? (% of total)



A 41% plurality said they would vote in favor of Ukraine joining the EU should a national referendum be held today about this question. Twenty-eight percent said they would vote against and 31% did not know or refused to answer (**Figure 26**).


Supporters of BYUT are quite enthusiastic about such prospects with 58% saying they would vote for joining the EU, 13% saying they would vote against and 28% not knowing or refusing to answer.

Figure 27: Would you vote in favor or against Ukraine joining the EU? (% of total & region & party support: Kyiv n=130; North n=141; Center n=150; South n=178; East n=387; West n=268 - BYUT n= 230; Party of Regions n=227)




Among Party of Regions supporters, a plurality (45%) would vote against joining the EU but a sizable percentage—almost a third (32%)—would vote in favor, while 24% didn't know or refused to answer. In terms of regional divisions, majorities in the West (57%) and in the North (61%) would vote in favor of joining the EU compared with pluralities in the East (42%) and South (34%) who would vote against. In both the Center and in Kyiv, pluralities would vote in favor of joining the EU (39% and 41% respectively). Interestingly, in Kyiv, we find the highest percentage of uncertain respondents (46%) who didn't know or refused to answer (**Figure 27**).

Respondents who would vote in favor of joining the EU were asked for the reasons why they would do so. Most of them (42%) cited higher living standards as the main reason why they favor Ukraine joining the EU. A quarter cited economic development as the main reason for joining the EU. Eleven percent mentioned freedom of movement in the EU, most likely referring to labor mobility and closer relations with European countries (5%). Fewer respondents (6%) mentioned political stability and order or democracy (5%) as one of the main motives for favoring an EU membership (**Figure 28**).



Respondents who would vote against joining the EU explained that they would do so because they believe Ukraine is not ready as it is too early for it to seek an EU membership; this was cited by 30% of respondents. Twelve percent believe it is useless to join the EU. A few respondents seemed concerned about the impact this would have on Ukraine's relations with Russia as 11% said Ukraine should join Russia instead and 3% said they expect an EU membership to worsen relations with Russia. Eight percent simply said Ukraine does not need to join any unions. Others seemed concerned about economic results with 7% saying they



would vote against EU membership because the Ukrainian economy would collapse and 5% cited the uncompetitiveness of Ukrainian producers should Ukraine become a member. Similarly, some were worried about worsening living conditions (5%) or a rise in prices (3%) should Ukraine join the EU (**Figure 29**).

FIFTY-SEVEN PERCENT WOULD VOTE AGAINST JOINING NATO

In a NATO summit in April 2008, NATO leaders promised Ukraine and Georgia they would one day join NATO but stopped short of offering them the formal path towards membership—a Membership Action Plan. France and Germany opposed putting them on such a path while the U.S. supported it. Since the Georgia-Russia conflict in August, European opposition to having Ukraine and Georgia become NATO members has grown even more. Our survey aimed to examine how ordinary Ukrainians themselves feel about the prospects of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO.


First, respondents were asked how much they had heard or read about NATO. Nineteen percent said they knew a lot and 36% said they knew a little whereas 25% said they did not know much about it and 20% said they knew nothing at all or refused to answer. Those who are at least familiar with NATO (80%) were then shown a list of possible information sources and asked what their primary sources in learning about NATO were. Eight in ten said they depended on Ukrainian TV channels to learn about NATO and 44% said they mainly learn about it through word of mouth (friends, family and acquaintances). Some 28% said they used Ukrainian newspapers and 25% said they followed Russian TV channels to learn about NATO. Other less used information sources included Ukrainian radio stations (16%), the internet (7%), Russian newspapers (5%), Russian radio stations (3%) and international media sources (3%).

Respondents were then asked if they would vote in favor or against Ukraine joining NATO should a national referendum be held today about this question. Unlike the question of Ukraine joining the EU, joining NATO is much less popular among Ukrainians. Less than a quarter of Ukrainians (23%) said they would vote in favor of that and a majority of 57% said they would vote against it. Ten percent said they were indecisive and another 10% did not know or refused to answer (**Figure 30**).


When breaking down these results by main political party supporters, we find a plurality (46%) of BYUT supporters saying they would vote in favor of joining NATO compared with 31% who would vote against. As for Party of Regions supporters, opposition to a NATO membership is quite pronounced with a significant majority of them (85%) saying they would vote against and only 8% saying they would vote in favor.

In terms of regional groupings, only in the North and West do we find pluralities (46% and 45% respectively) who say they would vote in favor of Ukraine joining NATO compared with 32% and 30% respectively who would vote against. In all other regions, majorities say they would vote against Ukraine joining NATO with more opposition in the East (80% to vote against; 7% in favor) and the South (73% against; 6% in favor) and


Figure 30: Would you vote in favor or against Ukraine joining NATO?
(% of those who are familiar with NATO: n=996)



slim majorities voting against in Kyiv (52%) and in the Center (51%) compared with 14% and 28% respectively who would vote in favor of NATO membership (**Figure 31**).




For those who would vote in favor of joining NATO, the main reason for their support is their belief that a NATO membership would provide Ukraine with the security and protection it needs since Ukraine is unable to protect itself; this was mentioned by 54% of respondents who would vote in favor. Eleven percent said they would vote in favor because joining the alliance would improve the Ukrainian army. A similar proportion (11%) expects a NATO membership to improve the economy and to be an overall improvement for the country as a whole and the Ukrainian people. Five percent said if Ukraine wants to join the EU, then it should join NATO as well (**Figure 32**).



Respondents who would vote against Ukraine joining NATO also gave several reasons for this choice. Nearly a quarter of respondents (24%) who would vote against a NATO membership said they would do so because they do not want Ukrainian troops to be used in NATO campaigns. Seventeen percent said Ukraine does not need a NATO membership; it is useless. Meanwhile, 12% said they would vote against a NATO membership because it would worsen Ukraine's relations with Russia. Some 9% said Ukraine is not ready to join NATO; it is unable to meet NATO standards. Other reasons for opposing a NATO membership include the aggressiveness of NATO and the need for Ukraine to be neutral (both cited by 7%) and a belief that a NATO membership would render Ukraine dependent on the USA and NATO's policy (5%). Four percent said they opposed a NATO membership as NATO would just use Ukraine to get closer to Russia. And finally, 3% said they opposed it because Ukraine should join Russia rather than join NATO (**Figure 33**).


Figure 33: Why would you vote against joining NATO?
(% of those who would vote against: n=567)



PLURALITY SUPPORTS RUSSIA'S BLACK SEA FLEET'S WITHDRAWAL FROM CRIMEA BY 2017

After last summer's Russia-Georgia conflict, eyes turned to the Crimean peninsula as the next possible hot spot in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. Crimea, a southern province of Ukraine, is majority-Russian and was transferred from Russia to Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954. Crimea hosts the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, under a lease agreement that is due to expire in 2017. Our survey aimed to elicit respondents' views on what should happen to the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet there.

Asked which scenario they supported regarding Russia's Black Sea Fleet that is currently stationed in Crimea, a plurality of respondents (47%) said the fleet should withdraw by May 2017 if the agreement is not prolonged (**Figure 34**). A quarter of respondents said Russia's Black Sea Fleet should remain permanently based in Sevastopol and 10% said Russia's Black Sea Fleet should immediately leave Sevastopol. Not surprisingly, the majority of ethnic Russians (53%) would like to see Russia's Black Sea Fleet to remain permanently based in Sevastopol whereas the majority of ethnic Ukrainians (51%) would like to see the fleet withdraw by May 2017 if the agreement is not prolonged. Twelve percent of ethnic Ukrainians would like Russia's Black Sea Fleet to leave Sevastopol immediately compared with only 1% of ethnic Russians.



Respondents were next asked if they supported President Yushchenko's presidential decree requiring any Russian warship fleets seeking movement to the Black Sea to give 72 hours advance notice to Ukrainian authorities. A plurality of respondents (45%) said yes, they supported this decree and 24% said no, they opposed it, while 31% were either not sure or refused to answer. A similar split of opinions is depicted when breaking down these findings by ethnicity: 51% of ethnic Ukrainians support the presidential decree and 17% oppose it while only 26% of ethnic Russians support it and 47% oppose it.


A PLURALITY BLAMES GEORGIA FOR THE STANDOFF WITH RUSSIA

On August 8, 2008, Russian military forces poured into the pro-Russian breakaway enclave of South Ossetia in Georgia in response to Georgia's military offensive on separatists in the enclave's capital, Tskhinvali. Russian troops advanced further into another enclave—Abkhazia—to support the Abkhazian separatists' offensive and the fighting continued for several days and widened to include cities inside Georgia itself. This forced Georgian forces to retreat quickly from breakaway provinces and from the Eastern town of Gori. After intense international mediation, a ceasefire deal was signed a week later and on August 26, Russia declared its recognition of the independence of the two enclaves. The conflict sent shockwaves across the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union and raised questions about Russia's aspirations in the region and its future relations with the West. In Ukraine, the conflict triggered concerns over the future of the pro-Russian Crimea region and whether a potential dispute over Russia's Black Sea Fleet there might escalate into a similar conflict.

In this survey, we examined respondents' opinions of the Georgia-Russia conflict. Respondents were asked which country they thought should get the larger blame for the conflict escalating to the point it did in Georgia. A plurality of Ukrainians (30%) said Georgia should get the larger blame and 27% said both were equally responsible whereas only 18% said Russia should get the larger blame for it. (Figure 35)

Opinions are radically different among supporters of the two most popular parties. One third of BYUT supporters blame both sides equally for the escalation of the conflict and 31% blame mostly Russia. Some 14% of them put the larger blame on Georgia. The picture is quite different among Party of Regions supporters with a 55% majority putting the larger blame on Georgia and 22% blaming both sides equally while only 7% put the larger blame on Russia. When breaking out these same results by ethnicity we find a 56% majority among ethnic Russians who blame Georgia mostly for the escalation of the conflict, 17% blaming both sides equally and a tiny 4% blaming Russia mostly for the conflict. Among ethnic Ukrainians, 30% blame both sides equally, 24% put the larger blame on Georgia and 22% on Russia.


Figure 35: Who deserves the larger blame for the conflict escalating to the point it did?
(% of total & ethnic groups & party support: ethnic Ukrainian: n=992; ethnic Russian n=206; BYUT n=230; Party of Regions n=227)



Next, respondents were asked if they supported President Yushchenko taking part in a delegation to Georgia, including Poland and the Baltic states which supported Georgia during this crisis. More Ukrainians opposed (42%) rather than supported (20%) Yushchenko's participation in the delegation. Nearly 39% did not know or refused to answer the question. Those who opposed Yushchenko's support

for Georgia where asked to explain their position: about a third of them (34%) said Ukraine should maintain its neutrality and 19% said they do not trust Yushchenko. Twenty percent said such a move would lead to a confrontation with Russia and 13% said they opposed it because they think Georgia is the aggressor. The majority (58%) of those who supported Yushchenko's move said they did so because they have a sense of solidarity with Georgia.

Most Ukrainians believe Russia will become more aggressive in its relations with Ukraine in the future. Indeed, when asked about their opinion on what Russia's actions in Georgia mean for relations between Ukraine and Russia, 40% said Russia will be much more (11%) or slightly more (29%) aggressive versus 29% who said there will be no change in Russia's relations with Ukraine. Some 8% said it will become less aggressive and 23% did not know or refused to answer (**Figure 36**).



CONCLUSION

The period immediately following the 2004 presidential elections was a period of heady optimism in Ukraine as many Ukrainians held hope that their country had finally embarked on a the path towards the fulfillment of the promise made to them at the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The years since have been a rude awakening as Ukrainians have seen political brinksmanship and crass political calculations by their political leaders lead to a situation where key challenges facing the country have gone unanswered. It is little wonder then that public opinion during this period has reflected a consistent deterioration in the assessments of the current state of affairs as well as confidence in political institutions and leaders in the country. The data in this survey confirms that public opinion in Ukraine on important issues has reached a low in pessimism that has not been observed since Ukrainian independence in 1991.

The vast majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with both the economic and political situation in the country, believe the country is on the wrong path, and lack confidence in prominent leaders and institutions. These attitudes not only reflect pessimism on the current state of affairs in Ukraine, but also permeate attitudes on more intrinsic elements of a liberal political order. Many Ukrainians have increasingly lost faith since 2005 that their country is a democracy, are not motivated to participate in elections, and do not believe that ordinary citizens can influence politics and decision-making in the country. In the long run, attitudes on these issues are important indicators of support for a system of democratic governance, support which may be threatened as Ukrainians compare their polity to that of their neighbor with a less liberal political order but greater perceived socio-economic stability. The fact that Ukraine is a country divided on important questions of state and policy, only adds to the sense of uncertainty that currently envelopes the country.

With the recent announcement of the formation of a government essentially composed of the original Orange actors, the political system may have been given a reprieve from the shock of an election in which a significant percentage of the population may not have participated (indeed, the planned snap election may not have met the threshold for a valid election). As Ukraine looks forward to presidential elections in late 2009, the actions of this government as well as of the political class as a whole will likely be closely watched by Ukrainians to determine if these leaders can deliver solutions to the myriad problems currently affecting the country. If this survey is a guide, the Ukrainian people will be looking to their leaders for concrete actions to address these problems but will be resigned to the likelihood that they will not.

DATA TABLES

1. How interested are you in matters of politics and government -- are you very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not at all interested?

Very interested	22%
Somewhat interested	43%
Not too interested	20%
Not at all interested	14%
Don't know	2%
Refused	0%

2. And how much information do you feel you have about political developments in Ukraine -- a great deal, fair amount, not very much, or none at all?

Great deal	21%
Fair amount	61%
Not very much	15%
None at all	1%
Don't know	2%
Refused	0%

3. From which of the following sources do you get most of your information about issues affecting Ukraine? [Show Card; Multiple responses allowed]

	% of mentions	% of cases
National TV	38%	95%
National Radio	16%	41%
National Newspapers	18%	46%
National Magazines	2%	6%
Specialized publications	1%	2%
Internet	4%	10%
Local media	7%	17%
Workplace	3%	7%
Relatives, friends, or neighbors	9%	22%
Educational institutions	1%	1%
Other	1%	2%
Don't know	%	1%
Refused	%	%

3b. Which of the following media sources do you trust the most to provide you with accurate information?

National TV	51%
National Radio	3%
National Newspapers	6%
National Magazines	0%
Specialized publications	1%
Internet	3%
Local media	1%
Other media sources	3%
None	23%
Don't know	9%
Refused	1%

4. Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with each of the following? Political situation in Ukraine today

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	DK	Refused
A. Political situation in Ukraine today	1%	4%	26%	67%	2%	0%
B. Foreign policy of Ukraine	1%	11%	29%	46%	12%	1%
C. Economic situation in Ukraine	1%	4%	24%	69%	2%	0%

5. How would you describe the economic situation in Ukraine today? Is it...

Very good	0%
Somewhat good	5%
Somewhat bad	30%
Very bad	63%
Don't know	3%
Refused	0%

6. Is your family's current economic situation better or worse than one year ago?

Better	12%
Worse	58%
Same	28%
Don't know	1%
Refused	0%

7a. What are in your view the most serious problems that Ukraine as a country faces today? [Open ended; Multiple responses accepted; Questions not read to respondents]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Corruption	12%	41%
General economic problems	13%	42%
High prices/ inflation	21%	70%
External debt	1%	5%
Political bickering between leaders	12%	39%
Political instability/ general political problems	11%	35%
Poverty	12%	39%
Problems with Russia	6%	18%
Problems with Western countries	1%	2%
Prospects of Ukraine joining NATO	2%	8%
Unemployment	8%	26%
Other, specify	1%	2%
Don't know	%	1%
Refused	%	%

7b. Thinking about ordinary Ukrainians in their day-to-day lives, what are the most serious problems they face today? [Open ended; Multiple responses; Do not read pre-code list]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Employment/Unemployment	13%	41%
Low salaries	19%	61%
Healthcare	12%	40%
Good education	3%	11%
Family welfare	9%	27%
Politics	4%	14%
Security/Crime	3%	11%
Low pensions	12%	39%
High prices	22%	70%
Other	1%	4%
Don't know	1%	2%
No response	%	%

8. Do you think Ukraine is on the right track toward stability and prosperity in the future, or do you think Ukraine is on a path toward instability and chaos?

Stability	6%
Instability	76%
Neither [Volunteered]	8%
Don't know	9%
Refused	0%

9. Listed on this card are several statements. Please pick any statement or statements that you think accurately define what it means for a country to be a democracy. You can choose up to five responses. [Show Card; Mark all mentioned]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Freedom of association	2%	9%
Freedom of religion	4%	15%
Freedom to vote	6%	24%
Everyone has work	11%	41%
Freedom of speech	8%	32%
Protection of human rights	16%	61%
State support of those unable to work	8%	32%
State support of pensioners	9%	33%
System of checks and balances between executive, legislative	7%	27%
No official corruption	11%	41%
Freedom of press	3%	12%
Fair and consistent enforcement of laws	12%	45%
Don't know	2%	7%
Refused	%	%

10. Is Ukraine a democracy?

Yes	15%
No	54%
Both [Volunteered]	21%
Don't know	9%
Refused	1%

11. In your opinion, does the central government respect the following rights and freedoms?

	Always	Sometimes	Does not respect	Don't Know	Refused
A. Freedom of speech	10%	39%	38%	11%	1%
B. Freedom of religion	36%	34%	15%	14%	1%
C. Freedom to vote	20%	32%	36%	11%	1%
D. Human rights	6%	23%	62%	8%	1%
E. Freedom of press	12%	42%	28%	16%	2%
F. Freedom of association	16%	30%	24%	28%	2%

12. Please tell me how much confidence you have in the following institutions and leaders.

	Great Deal	Fair Amount	Not Very Much	None At All	Don't Know	Refused
A. The Verhovna Rada	2%	11%	26%	56%	4%	0%
B. The Cabinet of Ministers	4%	17%	26%	46%	7%	1%
C. President Viktor Yushchenko	3%	9%	22%	63%	3%	0%
D. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko	10%	22%	18%	45%	4%	0%
E. Former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich	9%	20%	21%	42%	6%	1%
F. Ministry of Justice	3%	15%	24%	37%	21%	1%
G. Ukraine's military forces	9%	31%	17%	23%	18%	1%
H. The Central Election Commission	4%	17%	23%	38%	16%	1%
I. You City/Village council	11%	25%	21%	30%	12%	1%
J. Mayor of your city/village local self-government	16%	25%	20%	28%	10%	1%
K. Your Raion administrator	9%	18%	18%	26%	28%	2%
L. Your Oblast governor	7%	18%	17%	23%	33%	2%
M. The media in Ukraine	7%	38%	20%	24%	11%	1%

13. I will now provide you with a list of services provided by your city/village local self-government. For each, please tell me if the quality of the service has improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated over the past year?

	Improvement	No Change	Deterioration	Don't Know	Refused	N/A
A. Water supply	7%	46%	17%	1%	0%	28%
B. District heating	8%	27%	20%	2%	0%	43%
C. Housing maintenance	4%	23%	27%	3%	1%	43%

14. Can you tell me whether you are a member of any of the different types of civic organizations listed on this card? [Show Card; Multiple response accepted]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Trade unions	13%	13%
Political parties	2%	2%
Religious groups	1%	1%
NGOs	%	%
Artist unions/Scientist Unions	%	%
Local self-governance institutions	1%	1%
Other, specify	1%	1%
None of these	78%	79%
Don't know	3%	3%
Refused	%	%

15. Do you know of any Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are active in Ukraine?

Yes	15%
No	58%
Don't know what NGO is	21%
Don't know	5%
Refused	1%

16. [IF ANSWERED 1 to Q15] What issues are these NGOs working on in Ukraine? [Open Ended; Multiple Responses Allowed]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Health care	6%	8%
HIV/AIDS	3%	5%
Tuberculosis	%	%
Drug abuse	%	1%
Ecology (pollution of the environment, animal protection etc)	6%	8%
Human rights	6%	8%
Children's rights (homeless children / orphans etc.)	5%	7%
Women's organizations	2%	3%
Consumers' rights	2%	2%
Trade unions	3%	4%
Legal information, consulting	2%	3%
Civil society, establishing public control	1%	1%
Corruption	1%	1%
Financial / material help to poor people	8%	11%
Chernobyl	1%	2%
Youth organizations	2%	3%
Religious unions and organizations	1%	2%
Cultural / creative unions (supporting and promoting language)	5%	6%
Veterans	4%	6%
Human traffic	%	1%
City improvement and beautification; public services	3%	4%
Social work with disabled people / helping disabled people	7%	9%
Professional unions of mutual help	%	1%
Other	4%	5%
Don't know	22%	31%
Refused	4%	6%

17. How necessary are non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, for Ukraine -- essential, necessary, not very necessary, or not at all necessary?

Essential	22%
Necessary	29%
Not very necessary	12%
Not at all necessary	7%
Don't know	28%
Refused	2%

18. Did you vote in the following elections:

	Voted	Did not vote	Too young [Volunteered]	DK	Refused
A. Parliamentary elections on March 26, 2006	86%	9%	4%	1%	1%
B. Parliamentary elections on Sep. 30, 2007	85%	12%	2%	0%	1%
C. Mayoral and City Council Elections on May 25, 2008 [KIEV RESIDENTS ONLY]	87%	11%	1%	1%	1%

19. In your opinion, how fair were each of the following elections?

	Completely fair	Somewhat fair	Somewhat unfair	Completely unfair	DK	Refused
A. Parliamentary elections on March 26, 2006	16%	31%	23%	15%	14%	1%
B. Parliamentary elections on Sep. 30, 2007	16%	30%	23%	16%	14%	1%
C. Mayoral and City Council Elections on May 25, 2008 [KIEV RESIDENTS ONLY]	16%	16%	31%	19%	16%	2%

20. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	Refused
A. Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country.	4%	14%	29%	50%	4%	0%
B. People like you can have influence on decisions made by the government.	4%	8%	25%	61%	2%	0%
C. Politicians elected to the Rada on a particular party's list should be allowed to change parties once they are in the Rada.	8%	9%	19%	42%	20%	2%

21. Have you done any of the following to express your views? [If yes, ask if individual has done this activity within the last 12 months.]

	YES, Over past 12 months	YES, Earlier	No	DK	Refused
A. Contacted or visited a public official – at any level of government – to express your opinion?	4%	11%	84%	1%	0%
B. Called in to a radio or television talk show to express your opinion on a political or social issue, even if you did not get on the air?	2%	3%	94%	1%	0%
C. Contacted a newspaper or magazine to express your opinion on an issue?	1%	3%	95%	1%	0%
D. Sent in an SMS vote to express your opinion on a political or social issue?	2%	3%	95%	1%	0%
E. Signed a written or email petition	2%	3%	94%	0%	0%
F. Taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration?	2%	13%	84%	1%	0%
G. Written on a blog or internet site to express your opinion on a political or social issue?	1%	1%	97%	1%	0%

22. In your opinion, do the major political parties in Ukraine have clear proposals to address the issues facing the country?

Yes, most do address issues	12%
No, only some address issues	47%
No, none address issues [Volunteered]	26%
Don't know	14%
Refused	1%

23. [Show Card] In your opinion, whose interests do political parties serve: the interests of the Ukrainian people, the interests of those in power, business interests, their own interests, or some other interests?

Ukrainian people	3%
Those in power	11%
Business interests	20%
Own interests	56%
Depends on the political party [Volunteered]	5%
Other	0%
Don't know	4%
Refused	1%

24. Do you think that political parties in Ukraine should be required to publicly disclose the sources of funding they use to finance their operations and activities?

Definitely	74%
Maybe	18%
No	2%
Don't know	6%
Refused	1%

25. I will now read to you two statements. Please tell me the statement with which you most agree.

A. "In order to increase openness in politics in Ukraine, senior government officials and elected leaders in Ukraine should be required to publicly disclose their incomes and assets on an annual basis."

B. "Senior government officials and elected leaders have as much a right to privacy as any other Ukrainian and should not be required to publicly disclose their incomes and assets."

Strongly agree with A	70%
Somewhat agree with A	16%
Somewhat agree with B	4%
Strongly agree with B	1%
Don't know	7%
Refused	1%

26. In your opinion, how common or rare is corruption in Ukraine? Is it very common, somewhat common, somewhat rare, or very rare?

Very common	67%
Somewhat common	24%
Somewhat rare	1%
Very rare	0%
Don't know	6%
Refused	0%

27. In your opinion, how serious is the problem of corruption at each of the following institutions

	Very Serious	Somewhat Serious	Not Very Serious	Not At All Serious	Don't Know	Refused
A. Universities/Schools	35%	34%	13%	3%	14%	1%
B. Hospitals (Medical Institutions)	45%	35%	10%	2%	7%	1%
C. Police	49%	29%	8%	1%	12%	1%
D. Courts	48%	29%	5%	0%	16%	1%
E. Customs authorities	35%	26%	6%	1%	30%	2%
F. Tax authorities	38%	25%	7%	1%	28%	2%
G. Verkhovna Rada	43%	26%	5%	1%	24%	2%
H. Cabinet of Ministers	36%	24%	7%	2%	29%	2%
I. Presidential administration (secretariat)	36%	23%	5%	2%	32%	2%

28. How much do you trust each of the following judiciary and law enforcement bodies?

	Great Deal	Fair Amount	Not Very Much	None At All	Don't Know	Refused
A. Constitutional Court	4%	19%	23%	28%	25%	2%
B. Supreme Court	4%	21%	22%	27%	25%	1%
C. Appeals Court	3%	20%	22%	27%	26%	1%
D. Local Courts	3%	11%	31%	37%	18%	0%
E. The public prosecutors' Office	3%	13%	29%	36%	19%	1%
F. The police	3%	11%	28%	42%	15%	0%

29. I will now read to you a list of important issues for Ukraine. Please tell me whether there has been an improvement, decline, or no change in each of these issues over the past year.

	Great Improvement	Slight Improvement	No Change	Slight Decline	Great Decline	DK	Refused
A. Economic situation in the country.	2%	5%	8%	28%	55%	2%	0%
B. Political stability in the country.	1%	2%	6%	25%	64%	2%	0%
C. Respect for human rights by the authorities	2%	3%	29%	26%	35%	5%	0%
D. Unity of Ukrainian citizens	2%	7%	43%	22%	19%	8%	1%
E. The fight against corruption	1%	4%	38%	20%	29%	8%	0%
F. Relations with Russia	2%	4%	18%	41%	28%	7%	1%
G. Relations with Western countries	2%	14%	41%	14%	9%	19%	1%
H. Ukraine's national security	2%	4%	40%	19%	14%	20%	1%

30. As you may know, some say that Ukraine is a country that is critically divided along regional, ethnic, and ideological basis. Looking ahead to the next 5 years in Ukraine, do you think these divisions are likely to continue to characterize the situation in Ukraine? Or do you think that Ukrainians will find a way over the next five years to downplay these differences and work toward greater unity?

Divided	31%
Unity	21%
Neither [Volunteered]	10%
Both [Volunteered]	3%
Ukraine is not divided [Volunteered]	9%
Don't know	25%
Refused	2%

31. As you may know, there have been discussions in parliament and among politicians about possible changes to the constitution. Listed below are some changes to the constitution that have been discussed. Of these, what changes would you like to see in the Ukrainian constitution? [Read response categories; ROTATE RESPONSES; Multiple response accepted; Accept up to three responses but do not prompt for more than one]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Reduction in the powers of the president in comparison to parliament	10%	21%
Clearer division of responsibilities between the executive,	21%	43%
Longer terms for elected officials	3%	6%
Better checks and balances between the executive, parliament	11%	22%
Make it easier to punish public officials who commit wrongdoing	23%	46%
Reforms to the judicial system	11%	23%
Changes to Ukraine's unaligned status	2%	4%
Increase the percentage of votes parties must receive to enter parliament from 3% to 10%	6%	11%
A completely new constitution [Volunteered]	3%	5%
Other	1%	2%
Don't know	9%	17%
Refused	1%	2%

32. If the Ukrainian constitution were to change the division of powers between the president and the parliament, would you support more power given to the president, or more power given to the parliament?

More power to the president	25%
More power to the parliament	38%
Keep the division of powers as it is [Volunteered]	12%
Other, specify	2%
Don't know	21%
Refused	2%

33. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: 'Elected officials in Ukraine are accountable to the people they serve.'

Strongly agree	17%
Somewhat agree	14%
Somewhat disagree	21%
Strongly disagree	37%
Don't know	10%
Refused	2%

34. In your opinion, what steps or actions can Ukrainian citizens take to ensure that the elected officials that represent them actually listen to the people and are accountable to them? [Open end; pre-code]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Contact officials directly	26%	40%
Write letters/emails to elected officials	6%	8%
Hold community meetings with elected official	27%	40%
Contact the media to address an issue	15%	22%
Sponsor petition drives on important issues	6%	10%
Other	3%	5%
Don't know	15%	23%
Refused	2%	3%

35. As you may know, there has been some discussion about the possibility of Ukraine joining the European Union (EU). If a national referendum were to be held today about whether Ukraine should become a member of the EU; would you vote in favor

Would vote in favor	41%
Would vote against	28%
Don't know	29%
Refused	2%

36. Could you tell me why you would vote in favor of Ukraine joining the EU? [Open-ended; Multiple response accepted; Accept up to three responses but do not prompt for more than one]

	% of mentions	% of cases
living standards, higher quality of life	33%	42%
work places	3%	4%
higher incomes	3%	4%
economic development / stability	19%	25%
simplification of visa system, freedom of movement within EU	8%	11%
European identity (feel themselves as Europeans)	2%	2%
political stability and order	5%	6%
democracy, protection of human rights	4%	5%
cultural advance	3%	4%
protection and support from EU	3%	3%
Ukraine have to make a choice, and EU is better than Russia	%	1%
to be respected and recognized in the world	1%	1%
Ukraine could learn a lesson from other European countries	2%	3%
free ourselves from Russia's influence	1%	1%
closer relations with European countries, friendship and cooperation	4%	5%
other	2%	3%
Don't know	7%	9%
Refused	1%	2%

37. Could you tell me why you would vote against Ukraine joining the EU? [Open-ended; Multiple response accepted; Accept up to three responses but do not prompt for more than one]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Ukraine is not ready / too early	27%	30%
Ukraine does not need joining any unions	7%	8%
That would give nothing/No use	11%	12%
worsening relations w/ Russia	2%	3%
Ukraine should join Russia	10%	11%
fear that Ukraine would be used as a source of a cheap labor	1%	2%
fear that Ukraine would be used as a dumping place for waste	1%	1%
fear that Ukraine would be used as a source of raw materials	%	%
fear that Ukraine would be filled with low-quality goods	1%	1%
Uncompetitiveness of Ukrainian producers	4%	5%
rise of prices	2%	3%
worsening of living conditions, destitution	4%	5%
fear that Ukraine would be ruled by Americans	1%	1%
collapse of economy	6%	7%
Other	3%	3%
Don't know	11%	12%
Refused	8%	9%

38. Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. How much have you heard or read about NATO? Have you heard a lot, a little, not much or nothing at all about NATO?

A lot	19%
A little	36%
Not much	25%
Nothing at all	12%
Don't know	7%
Refused	1%

39. [Show card] What have been your primary sources of information in learning about NATO?

	% of mentions	% of cases
Word of mouth (friends, family, acquaintances)	21%	44%
Ukrainian TV channels	37%	80%
Russian TV channels	12%	25%
Ukrainian radio stations	8%	16%
Russian radio stations	1%	3%
Ukrainian newspapers	13%	28%
Russian newspapers	2%	5%
Internet	3%	7%
International media sources (TV, internet, and/or newspaper)	1%	3%
Other, specify	1%	2%
Don't know	1%	2%
Refused	%	%

40. Some people in Ukraine believe that Ukraine should apply to join NATO. If a national referendum were to be held today about whether Ukraine should become a member of NATO; would you vote in favor of Ukraine joining NATO or against Ukraine

Would vote in favor	23%
Would vote against	57%
I am indecisive	10%
Don't know	9%
Refused	1%

41. Could you tell me why you would vote in favor of Ukraine joining NATO? [Open-ended; Multiple response accepted; Accept up to three responses but do not prompt for more than one]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Security, protection (Ukraine is not able to protect itself)	52%	54%
If Ukraine wants to join EU, it has to join NATO	5%	5%
Improvement of Ukrainian army	11%	11%
Economic improvement, better for people and country	10%	11%
Other	2%	2%
Don't know	16%	17%
Refused	3%	3%

42. Could you tell me why you would vote against Ukraine joining NATO? [Open-ended; Multiple response accepted; Accept up to three responses but do not prompt for more than one]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Ukraine do not have enough money to re-equip its army	9%	9%
Ukraine should be neutral	6%	7%
Ukraine does not need it / No use	16%	17%
aggressiveness of NATO	7%	7%
"unfair deeds" in Yugoslavia, Iraq etc.	0%	0%
fear that Ukrainian citizens would be used as cannon fodder	22%	24%
worsening of relations with Russia	11%	12%
fear that NATO could bomb Ukraine if "something would go wrong"	0%	0%
suspect that NATO would use Ukraine just to get closer to Russia	4%	4%
Ukraine should join Russia	3%	3%
Ukraine would be dependent on USA and NATO's policy	5%	5%
lack of proper knowledge on NATO	2%	2%
other	1%	1%
Don't know	8%	9%
Refused	6%	6%

43. Could you tell me why you do not favor one side or the other? [Open-ended; Multiple response accepted; Accept up to three responses but do not prompt for more than one]

	% of mentions	% of cases
Lack of proper knowledge	41%	42%
Feel that NATO could protect Ukraine "if things went wrong"	9%	9%
Feel that NATO could protect Ukraine "if things went wrong"	2%	2%
Ukraine is not ready to join NATO	5%	5%
No use for Ukraine	8%	8%
Worsening of relations with Russia	2%	2%
Other	3%	3%
Don't know	26%	27%
Refused	5%	5%

44. As you may know, under a 1997 agreement Ukraine agreed to lease harbor space in the Crimea Peninsula base of Sevastopol until 2017 to Russian warships. In your view, which of the following scenarios should apply to Russia's Black Sea Fleet

Russia's Black Sea Fleet should withdraw by May 2017 if agreement not prolonged	47%
Russia's Black Sea Fleet should remain permanently based in Sevastopol	25%
Russia's Black Sea Fleet should immediately leave Sevastopol	10%
Other, specify	1%
Don't know	16%
Refused	2%

45. In August 2008, President Yushchenko issued a presidential decree requiring any Russian warship fleets seeking movement to the Black Sea to give 72 hours advance notice to Ukrainian authorities. Do you support this decision by President Yushchenko?

Yes	45%
No	24%
Not sure (Volunteered)	11%
Don't know	20%
Refused	1%

46. Now, I'd like to find out your opinion on the recent conflict that took place in Georgia between Georgian and Russian forces. Considering the actions of both Georgia and Russia, which country do you think should get the larger blame for the conflict escalating to the point it did? [Do not read responses]

Russia	18%
Georgia	30%
Both equally	27%
Not sure	6%
Other (specify)	1%
Don't know	17%
Refused	1%

47. As you may know, President Yushchenko was part of a delegation to Georgia, along with Poland and the Baltic states, in order to support Georgia during this crisis. Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose his participation in this delegation?

Strongly support	9%
Somewhat support	11%
Somewhat oppose	15%
Strongly oppose	27%
Don't know	36%
Refused	3%

48. Why or why not? [Open-ended; Multiple responses accepted; Accept up to three responses but do not prompt for more than one]

Reasons for supporting decision

Feel solidarity with Georgia	58%
Feel sympathy / solidarity with people in trouble	6%
To see what is happening there	1%
Support Yuschenko	0%
See nothing bad in that / it was an ordinary diplomatic move	0%

Reasons for opposing decision

Ukraine should keep neutrality	34%
Confrontation with Russia	20%
Do not trust Yuschenko	19%
Georgia was an aggressor	13%

49. What is your opinion on what Russia's actions in Georgia mean for relations between Ukraine and Russia. Do you think Russia's actions in Georgia indicate that Russia will be more or less aggressive in its relations with Ukraine in the future? [Probe intensity]

Much more aggressive	11%
Slightly more aggressive	29%
Slightly less aggressive	4%
Much less aggressive	3%
No change in Russia's relations with Ukraine [Volunteered]	29%
Don't know	22%
Refused	1%

50. Are you aware of foreign assistance being provided to Ukraine by other countries?

Yes	34%
No	58%
Don't know	7%
Refused	0%

51. [IF YES] In your opinion, how effective is this foreign assistance?

Very effective	15%
Somewhat effective	20%
Not very effective	26%
No effective at all	20%
Don't know	15%
Refused	2%

52. To the best of your knowledge, which countries have given foreign assistance to Ukraine? (Open end; multiple responses accepted)

	% of mentions	% of cases
Bulgaria	.3%	.4%
Belarus	.5%	.6%
Canada	2.0%	2.8%
China	.4%	.6%
Czech Republic	.4%	.6%
EU, European countries (not specified)	6.5%	9.3%
France	3.9%	5.6%
Georgia	.3%	.4%
Germany	7.5%	10.8%
Great Britain	2.5%	3.5%
Hungary	.6%	.8%
Israel	.6%	.8%
Italy	.9%	1.3%
Japan	1.2%	1.7%
Poland	4.2%	6.1%
Portugal	.3%	.4%
Russia	4.6%	6.6%
Slovakia	.2%	.3%
USA	34.4%	49.2%
Other	1.0%	1.5%
Don't know	27.7%	39.7%

53. Would you say you support or oppose Ukraine receiving assistance from international donors in the following areas? A. Democracy and governance

	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat Oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	Refused
A. Democracy and governance	28%	26%	10%	18%	17%	1%
B. Economic development	47%	27%	6%	7%	12%	1%
C. Health and social development	55%	26%	4%	4%	11%	1%

54. Can you tell me what party you voted for in the September 2007 Parliamentary elections?

Lytvyn's Block	2.6%
Block of Yulia Tymoshenko	26.7%
Block Our Ukraine - Peoples' Self-Defence	12.5%
All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom'	0.4%
Communist Party of Ukraine	3.5%
Party of Regions	28.1%
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	0.7%
Socialist Party of Ukraine	1.4%
Other	0.7%
Against all	2.2%
Can't recall (Volunteered)	4.8%
Did not vote (Volunteered)	14.3%
Refused	2.2%

55. As you know, the Orange coalition in parliament was dissolved on 16 September. In your opinion, who is primarily to blame for the dissolution of the Orange coalition?

President Yushchenko	37%
Prime Minister Tymoshenko	10%
Viktor Yanukovich	3%
Russia (Volunteered response)	1%
Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko [Volunteered]	28%
Other (specify)	5%
Don't know	15%
Refused	2%

56. On October 8, President Yushchenko dissolved parliament and called for early elections for the Rada on December (1)7. How likely is it that you will vote in these early elections?

Very Likely	35%
Somewhat Likely	25%
Somewhat unlikely	12%
Very unlikely	21%
Don't know	7%
Refused	1%

57. Which party or bloc would you likely vote for in these elections?

Block of Volodymyr Lytvyn	3.2%
Block of Leonid Chernovetskiy	1.0%
Block 'Peoples' Self-Defence' (Yuriy Lutsenko)	0.5%
Block 'Our Ukraine' (V.Kyrylenko)	2.0%
Block of Yulia Tymoshenko	26.4%
All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom'	1.1%
Communist party of Ukraine	4.8%
Party of Arseniy Yatsenuk	2.2%
Party of regions	25.6%
Party United Centre (I.Kiril')	0.1%
Progressive socialist party of Ukraine	0.6%
Socialist party of Ukraine	1.1%
Other	0.9%
Against all	9.0%
Don't know / Undecided	19.1%
Refused	2.3%

58. It is likely that after these early elections take place, a coalition of parties or blocs will have to form the next government. What parties or blocs would you like to see form a majority coalition in the next parliamentary term?

Grand coalition of Byut, Regions, and Our Ukraine	13%
Byut-Regions	11%
Byut-Regions-Socialists	8%
Other, please specify	19%
Don't know	44%
Refused	5%

59. As you may know, this is the second consecutive parliament that has been dissolved before its entire term has been completed. How confident or not confident are you that the parliament that will be elected in the early elections will be able to serve its full term?

Very confident	5%
Somewhat confident	14%
Not very confident	34%
Not confident at all	20%
Don't know	24%
Refused	3%



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