Chapter 3: Misleading or Incendiary Discourses About Ukrainian Refugees
Figures 1-6
3.1. Overview
This chapter discusses key misleading or incendiary discourses about refugees in the region. The analysis is based on the IFES Chain of Harm framework,330 which maps the path by which disinformation, misinformation, and dangerous speech (DMDS) move through an information ecosystem, depicting the ways in which directed disinformation commonly amplifies hate speech or other divisive narratives to achieve its aims. The Chain of Harm framework enables researchers and practitioners to map DMDS along five stages, from the initial actors creating DMDS to the ultimate risks that manifest. Breaking down the challenges of DMDS in this way enables researchers and practitioners to identify discrete intervention points where the Chain of Harm can be disrupted to reduce the ultimate harms that would otherwise occur.
The five stages of the Chain of Harm—actor, message, mode of dissemination, interpreter, and risk—are used below to analyse the different aspects of narratives in circulation in the five focus countries.
3.2. Actors spreading misleading or abusive messages
While public discourse in the five countries regarding the influx of Ukrainian refugees has been largely positive, anti-Ukrainian narratives began percolating online soon after the outbreak of the war. Some have gained greater traction as the war has continued.331
Russian and pro-Kremlin propaganda/Kremlin aligned sources (trolls): Russian-aligned stakeholders have been active in spreading disinformation in all five countries. These include anti-Ukraine narratives, for instance ‘blaming Ukraine and NATO for the war and pinning high energy prices on their own government rather than Russia cutting gas supplies’,332 as well as those targeted directly at Ukrainian refugees. The Kremlin ecosystem approach is to spread ‘as many explanations or accusations as possible in order to muddy the waters and to see what sticks’ [in terms of conspiracy theories],333 including with regard to refugees.334
Pro-Russian groups: Pro-Russian groups are present in all countries to varying degrees. Slovakia335 and Moldova336 have the most significant proportions of pro-Russian groups of the five research countries. Pro- Russian public demonstrations have taken place in Bratislava, although there have been more in support of Ukraine.337 In Moldova, pro-Russian political figures have spread messages that Ukrainians are harmful to the community and that they steal and are violent toward Moldovans.338 In other countries, a small proportion of individuals held pro-Russian views339 that have not significantly altered since the war began. For example, in the Czech Republic, one group has been influenced by pro-Russian perspectives and disinformation and often wants a neutral national foreign policy,340 as there is a feeling that it is not worth distinguishing between allies and opponents because ‘all major powers behave badly’.341
Far right and populist parties often have an anti-immigrant and anti-refugee stance. Far-right, ultranationalist, and extremist groups and networks, some linked to Russian actors, have been the most vocal actors spreading misinformation and incendiary narratives regarding refugees.342 Populist parties often appeal to voters who are concerned about the impact of migration on their communities and the economy and may present themselves as the only ones willing to take a strong stance against migration.343 These parties often position themselves as protectors, ‘proper patriots’, and ‘supporters of conservative values and the traditional family’.344
Anti-migration, anti-vaccination, and anti-pandemic restriction activists and influencers:345 The same groups of people who, in recent years, spoke out against migration and/or COVID-19 restrictions can be observed to have switched gradually to the topic of supporting the Russian invasion. In the Czech Republic, according to analyst Roman Máca from the Institute for Politics and Society, this change of focus toward Ukrainian refugees was expected since some participants and speakers at anti-COVID-19 restriction demonstrations openly admitted that they looked up to Russia and the Russian president.346 Individuals have been documented as starting campaigning against Islam and refugees at the time of the migration crisis in 2015; they then focused on COVID- 19 and recently called for demonstrations under the slogan ‘the Czech Republic in the first place’, demanding, among other things, ‘the end of the planned dilution of the nation by Ukrainian refugees’,347
Reasons for spreading misleading or incendiary content
The United Kingdom Government Communications Service has identified a variety of reasons why actors could spread misleading or incendiary content.348 These are applicable to actors spreading misleading or incendiary narratives about Ukrainian refugees in Central European countries:
- Genuine belief in the messages, which might resonate with strongly held personal beliefs. In some instances, the actors sharing messages may recognise they are false or misleading but believe that the sentiment is illustrative of ‘the kind of thing that goes on’.
- Grievances. As inflation rises, for example, some people’s standards of living are deteriorating. Others might have lost their jobs, even though unemployment on the whole has not risen in the past year. Ukrainian refugees might be easy scapegoats for such problems.
- Lack of consequences for promoting misleading messages. Actors may take advantage of the anonymity of online spaces and gain respect within certain online communities.
- Personal or institutional gain by discrediting specific individuals (e.g., politicians) or organisations (e.g., government institutions, businesses, NGOs, multilateral organisations, etc.). This may also be for the purpose of mobilising voters in response to an imagined threat and building support as a result of anti-refugee rhetoric.349
- Contributions to polarisation, aiming to crowd out any differing opinions. For example, research from the International Republican Institute (IRI) notes that refugee-related themes attempt, albeit unsuccessfully to date, to ‘divide Polish society, often by highlighting the cost of maintaining refugees or using historical narratives to fuel conflict between Poles and Ukrainians.’350
- Financial gain, either benefiting from increased traffic to websites to view posts or by selling specific products. For instance, discourses such as those that Ukrainians are driving up the prices, and, rents in particular, might also be propagated by a broader group of actors who might stand to benefit, such as landlords who might choose to raise rents unnecessarily.351
- Geopolitical gain, through which hostile actors aim to destabilise other countries—financially and security-wise. This particularly links to Russian state propaganda activities. The aim of Russian trolling is often to create a sense of chaos and confusion as to what information is true, given the large number of conflicting ‘facts’ being proposed to audiences.352
3.3. Types of messages and approaches
The most common narratives fit within six categories.
1. They’re taking what’s ours, and we are worse off. First, quite universal discourses are found in all five countries that could be summarised by the sentiment that ‘the refugees are taking what is ours, and we’re worse off for that.’ This might refer to kindergarten spots, subsidised housing, jobs, healthcare capacity, or financial support. For example, in the Czech Republic, with the increase in fuel and energy prices and high inflation (15.1 percent),353 discourses have appeared that say, ‘Ukrainian refugees are draining our social system at a time when domestic citizens are being crushed by inflation—money can be found for “foreigners,” while no one will help ‘our people”’.354 In Poland, workshop participants said that the narrative that Ukrainians are taking the places of Poles for healthcare is relatively widespread, regarding both the general healthcare system and special services set up for Ukrainians (e.g., rehabilitation services that Poles cannot use).355 One participant shared that their organisation took down a social media post about a health service being started for Ukrainian refugees, as within an hour, they received 500 negative comments from accounts that the organisation confirmed to be people rather than bots. These included messages such as ‘My wife didn’t get the help she needed because Ukrainians were prioritised’. Another example is the response to a Twitter post from the Polish Ministry of Health (Figure 2), which read, ‘A campaign to promote the vaccination of children from Ukraine in Poland and support for the supply of vaccines – these are the main points of the cooperation agreement signed today by Minister Adam Niedzielski and UNICEF coordinator Rashed Mustafa’.356
There were many negative responses to this post, including (in translation): "Already the Ukry [derogatory term for Ukrainians] are running to get whatever vaccination there is. In Ukraine they don’t do this but for sure they’ll do it listening to the criminal Niezielski. Another waste of public funds.’ Another response reads, ‘5 million Ukrainians entered Polish territory without any health checks (…) Poles are dying and waiting for years for specialist health, and you are helping foreigners."
2. They don’t deserve what they get. Second, resonating across all five countries, to varying degrees, are discourses referring to the sentiment that ‘they get more than poor locals’ or ‘they don’t deserve what they get’. Whereas the first category refers to scarcity of finite resources, this one refers to merit in receiving support. For example, the illustration in Figure 3 claims that Ukrainians receive more in various benefits than Czechs, citing details that do not match the official figures.357 Discourses in Moldova compare the circumstances of Ukrainians with Moldovans, often juxtaposing the perceived wealth of refugees against the hardships faced by elderly, unemployed, or disabled Moldovans.358 Popular discourses under this category also claim that refugees don’t want to work359 or that they are economic migrants in the country primarily for work.360 Related to this, workshop participants in all countries discussed narratives about Ukrainians being rich and not needing support; stories of refugees driving expensive cars are abundant.361 This has also been observed online, with sarcastic comments such as the post illustrated in Figure 4 (below): ‘Poor things. Give them food, some rations to put in those 80-litre tanks, and full medical care, and don‘t forget to pin a blue and yellow badge to the lapels of their jackets’.362 Some also claim that refugees do not appreciate the support they receive. Finally, the topic of social benefits, social security, and a person’s economic status is closely connected with ‘merit,’ a feature particularly valued by Slovak363 and Czech364 societies: a belief that a person must earn his or her social and economic status in life and not get it ‘from others.’ Therefore, ideas around the abuse of social benefits and of excessive state support to individuals who do not deserve it can resonate with a wide range of people.365 Messages under this narrative include, ‘Czechs have to work hard to pay for housing/rents, and Ukrainians get it for free’, or ‘Ukrainian refugees live for free’.
3. They’re making the economic situation worse. A third related type of misleading and incendiary discourse identified is more specifically about economic fears and concerns that refugees are making the economic situation in host countries worse.366 For example, in the Czech Republic, posts have appeared linking the two discourses above to making the economic situation worse, such as, ‘Do you understand that they will replace the Czechs? Will they take people’s jobs, kick you out of your apartment (…) That they get everything for free? And that they will make everything more expensive?’.367
4. Ukrainians are making us less secure. Fourth, particularly in Slovakia and Moldova, political discourses relate to the war itself. The ‘peace narrative’ is particularly popular in Slovakia, where a broad range of people claim that Ukraine should not prolong the suffering by continuing to fight but should negotiate and concede on whatever is necessary to stop the humanitarian situation from becoming worse.368 A continuation of Ukraine’s defence can be portrayed as endangering other countries—both economically, through soaring inflation as well as physically, by possibly bringing the war to their doorstep.
5. Discourses in some countries relate to historic grievances. The Volhynia massacre, during which it is estimated that up to 60,000 Polish people were killed between 1943 and 1945,369 is used in particular to stir up historical grievances by characterising Ukrainians as anti-Polish nationalists. Similarly, workshop participants in Moldova noted an emerging discourse about Ukrainian nationals who supported Transnistria in the conflict against the Moldovan state in the 1990s. Narratives ask why Moldovans should provide support to Ukrainians when the Ukrainian state was perceived to have fought against Moldovans’ interests historically.370 In Romania, a narrative draws upon the allegedly poorer treatment of Romanian minorities in Ukraine and political concerns about their rights.371 Participants in the research workshop commented that since the Russian invasion there has been increased coverage of this issue in the national media.372 This narrative has the potential to reduce Romanian support to Ukrainians, leading to apathy or resentment.
6. Discourses in some countries refer to the effects of refugees on culture and ‘social fabric’. In Poland, the ‘Ukrainisation of Poland’ discourse refers to the threat of the disintegration of the fabric of Polish national and cultural identity.373 The narrative includes a range of messages, from focusing on the alleged domination of Ukrainian symbols in public spaces and Ukrainian language to the deterioration and potential dissolution of Polish culture. Some narratives go as far as speculating about the possibility of parts of Ukraine and Poland becoming unified into ‘Ukropolin’,374 ‘Ukropolin’ would involve large planned population resettlements and come ‘at the expense of Polish national identity’.375 The Ukraine Monitor project reported that the term ‘Ukrainisation of Romania’ originally applied to the alleged efforts of the Government of Ukraine to forcibly assimilate Romanians in Ukraine.376 This has also been noted in the Czech Republic, mainly referring to Ukrainian flags that are often displayed on Czech public holidays. These include specific messages such as, ‘the Ukrainization of the Czech Republic continues. The ceremony of awarding the Memory of the Nation in the National Theater on the anniversary of November 17 was accompanied by the Ukrainian anthem’.377 Similar assertions have been noted in Romania alongside the discourse that ‘Russians and Ukrainians are basically the same’. The latter was partly driven by lower levels of interaction and exchanges between Romania and Ukraine than between other neighbouring countries and Ukraine, along with greater linguistic differences.
Considerations for Countering Anti-Refugee Messaging
As much as possible, counter-narratives should be targeted at specific audiences and the fora with which they engage, and should be tailored based on these audiences’ attitudes, perceptions, values, and norms.
It is also important to use emotionally evocative language to capture attention and increase recall of the messages shared,378 and to build on the target audience’s values379—for example, aligning with patriotic ideals and showing how Ukrainians are fighting for all of Europe. Correcting facts alone is unlikely to be effective when attempting to change attitudes regarding sensitive issues tied to people’s values, social norms, and beliefs.
This approach should be combined with a messaging strategy that seeks to assure as much as it seeks to convince. This means including messaging such as, ‘There’s enough to go around’, or ‘We’re in this together’.
Finally, as much as possible, counternarratives should not be tied to the state of politics so as not to let far-right voters believe that this may be a political campaign of the opposing camp.
The table below summarises the discourses about refugees that were identified in the workshops and through research by third parties and triangulated through CrowdTangle. The top five discourses in each country are categorised as relatively ‘low risk’, ‘medium risk’, or ‘high risk’, depending on their potential to affect community cohesion in the country in the medium term and taking into account the prevalence of the narratives and the likely severity of impact of the narratives on community cohesion. It is important to stress the ‘relative’ aspect of the risk: this is in relation to other discourses in the country. A discourse noted as ‘relatively high risk’ may still be niche and not likely to create tension for the majority of society, but it can be a much higher risk than other discourses in that country.
3.4. Modes of dissemination
Social media, websites, and messaging apps: Social networks have so far been only a minimally regulated environment, serving as relatively cheap and fast platforms to create disinformation campaigns that can reach a large audience.380 A multitude of right-leaning groups, political parties, and extremist groups operating on social media, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, have been sharing misleading and incendiary messages about refugees.381 Slovakia, for example, has an extremely active and powerful interlinked online disinformation space with a network of over 1,800 Facebook pages and groups that spread various DMDS.382 Comments enable individuals and groups to perpetuate disinformation by engaging directly with politicians and political groups. Anonymous social media accounts and fake accounts created by the Russian propaganda machine (trolls) are also used to spread discourses. In addition, some websites, such as the Kancelaria Lega Artis in Poland, share ‘fake news’ regarding refugees.383 In Moldova, Russian language websites may be more likely to spread such discourse. Chisinau workshop participants noted OK.Ru, as a mode of dissemination, for example.384 The Chisinau Institute for Public Policy reports that pro-Russian voices play a major role on OK.Ru, for example by perpetuating Russian propaganda, including overtly pro-Russian messaging.385 In the Czech Republic, disinformation spread in these groups usually originates from pro-Kremlin media outlets with a Czech web presence, such as Sputnik News, Aeronet, and První zprávy.386 The websites continue longstanding anti-immigration narratives that feed fears about newcomers, even those from a relatively similar cultural background.387 Interestingly, much anti-Ukrainian refugee messaging on social media has been published by accounts and profiles that previously shared anti-vaccine disinformation in the context of the COVID- 19 pandemic.388
The most common way to propagate desired messages is through image- and video-based content.389 Images and videos are ideal for manipulating public opinion because they are easily consumed through social media or other digital platforms and can have a powerful emotional impact.390 They can evoke feelings of fear, anger, or empathy, which can make them more persuasive and memorable. They can also be edited in ways that change their meaning or impact or be used out of context. One common practice is using old photos and attributing their content to the present.391
Email has been used for anti-refugee messaging. According to research by the Ipsos agency, almost four out of 10 Czechs receive chain email messages from acquaintances, and 460,000 of those people forward the chain emails on.392 Experts also noted that chain emails often include a mix of information that may have a basis in reality—but it is taken out of context or the meaning is greatly inflated.393 Participants in the research workshop noted that seniors might be a particular target for chain email messages and are most likely to share them.394 Seniors often do not have the skills to verify information because of their lower digital literacy and thus can become easy targets. In April 2022, Poland saw a large troll attack aimed at diverting attention from Russian war crimes by focusing on the Volhynia massacre and accusing ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ of war crimes. The attack involved threatening emails sent to Polish politicians, email spam to Polish media, and mass postings on Twitter.395
Traditional media: Television and radio are also modes for disseminating harmful narratives; media produced in Russia and by pro-Russian groups has a higher propensity to perpetuate anti-refugee rhetoric396 and is often hostile to Ukraine.397 The Moldovan government’s decision to ban news and political analysis produced in Russia, as well as some domestic television channels in the country, has limited Russia’s ability to push disinformation through traditional media. However, this has led to accusations of bias against Russia in censorship laws.398 The ban applies to analysis from countries that have not ratified the Convention on Transfrontier Television.399 More broadly, mainstream TV channels have been reported to propagate disinformation and fake news accidentally or intentionally, targeting both Romanians and Ukrainian refugees.400
Politicians during campaigns: Populist politicians exploit themes associated with refugees to strengthen their own voter preferences through deflection, misinterpretation, and placing information in a different context.401
Events and public announcements: Politicians from right-wing, conservative parties have made public statements that align with some of these discourses on the news and in public discussions. Cases include a local politician using his platform to suggest that supporting refugees comes at the cost of local citizens402 and a party moderator using his platform to repeatedly suggest that Ukrainians were robbing local businesses.403 These discourses reach a wide audience and may be repeated without fact-checking, in part due to the status of the messenger.
Sometimes a traditional form of information dissemination is used, as exemplified by the situation in 2018 in Zyrardow, before the Russian invasion. The city was blanketed with hundreds of leaflets by the so-called Stormtroopers, a nationalist faction of the extreme right (see Figure 5). The leaflets read: ‘Pole [woman]! Pole [man]! Find out who is taking your job! Employers are bringing workers from Ukraine, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, or Moldova en masse. By attracting migrant workers to Poland our salaries are decreasing and jobs are being taken by foreigners! Do not consent to this! Protest!’ The influx of Ukrainian refugees gives those who believe such ideas additional motivation to spread such narratives.404
Word of mouth: Some discourses spread through regular conversations between individuals, including narratives that people first came across online, particularly where discourses relate to increasing financial pressures or other ways in which refugees may be impacting people’s quality of life.405
Considerations for Countering Anti-Refugee Messaging:
Social media campaigns could be aimed at the groups most likely to be swayed by the economic migrant narratives, engaging influencers for these groups. Social media, especially in the form of engaging videos and visuals, could also provide guidance on how to talk to friends and family members who say incendiary things about refugees.
Media organisations could help identify refugees who can be called on for quotes in the media or appear on TV and news shows as commentators to increase the representation of refugee voices.
3.5. Host community reactions (interpreters)
The European Digital Media Observatory found that disinformation about refugees was directed at three groups:406
- Racist-minded individuals who already had negative attitudes toward refugees;
- Supporters of conspiracy theories; and
- Average concerned citizens—this might refer to rising costs of living, and longer queues for healthcare and education.
Right-wing, anti-immigrant nationalist sentiments were present in some parts of host country societies before the Russian invasion,407 and individuals holding such views are more likely to share anti-Ukrainian refugee rhetoric—in particular, as fatigue with the war grows. Nationalistic slogans such as ‘Polska dla Polaków’ (‘Poland for Poles’) are used to promote the idea that the country, including its resources, should be reserved for Polish citizens. In the example shown in Figure 6, a member of the public is replying to a post by the politician Pawel Szefernaker, which explains that train stations now have information points for refugees from Ukraine. The reply reads: ‘Poles will give you hell for the privileges granted to Ukrainians. Traitors.’ The main audience of anti-refugee rhetoric is far-right and nationalist supporters ‘which are a small, but not insignificant proportion of the population’.408 Slovakia reports the greatest fear toward ‘other groups’ (migrants and Western societies) in the region related to threats to values and identity.409 Concurrently, Slovakia has consistently demonstrated greater sympathy for Russia than seen in comparable EU countries.410 According to IRI’s analysis, narratives on Ukrainian refugees being used as political tools—puppets of NATO or the West, or part of an extremist liberal agenda—were particularly prevalent in Slovakia, largely for an audience of far-right supporters and, to some extent, the general public due to concerns around the economy.411
Many people might lack the skills to identify and address disinformation. According to research from 2019, only one-sixth of Czechs have the skills to fight disinformation.412 In addition, a survey from July 2022 by Ipsos showed that Czechs with only primary education (14 percent) were the most likely to never check the veracity of information, even if they suspect it is disinformation, and then pass it on.413 The survey also pointed out that fewer than 48 percent of Czechs can easily recognise disinformation. Slovakia is one of the countries in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region most prone to believing in various conspiracy theories.414 This provides a context in which disinformation regarding Ukrainian refugees is likely to flourish.
The third group can be quite broad, as high numbers of people are under significant financial strain due to rising inflation, and there are real challenges related to a strained healthcare system, as discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, some messages that refer to matters affecting people’s day-to-day lives may increasingly resonate with members of host communities. The financially worse-off segments of a host population, particularly in regions with higher unemployment rates, may see Ukrainian migrants as a threat to their own economic wellbeing and jobs.415 According to IRI’s analysis, narratives on Ukrainian refugees receiving treatment that is preferential to that given to Romanians were found to resonate most online, largely for an audience of far-right and nationalist supporters.416 People looking to rent apartments may be more receptive to discourses regarding Ukrainians’ role in rising housing prices.417 People who have little first-hand experience interacting with Ukrainian refugees are also more likely to believe generalisations and misinformation about the refugee community.418 Messages that incorporate a ‘personal touch’ with which the audience can easily identify could resonate more with such groups.
Finally, people who are disillusioned with the current state of politics might be more likely to believe and pass on misleading and incendiary discourses, if these are critical of the current government. According to the NGO Czech Elves, which conducts long-term monitoring of the disinformation scene in the Czech Republic, the war in Ukraine confirmed the hypothesis that ‘a part of society that is extremely dissatisfied with the state of public affairs and is therefore highly distrustful of the authorities, for whatever reasons, is vulnerable to almost any narrative associated with criticism of the current political arrangement’.419
Considerations for Countering Anti-Refugee Messaging:
Nudges for people to look at different sources of information could be considered. The Redirect Method is a way to do this online: when an internet user enters keywords ‘that indicate an interest in extremist propaganda’, a pop-up ad directs them to more information on the topic, redirecting to content that counters the extremist messaging. This could be set up through a partnership with social media platforms or search engines such as Google.420
Another strategy is using social media platforms to promote counternarratives and help individuals identify misleading narratives in the news. These could include Google’s (GOOGL.O) Jigsaw subsidiary’s initiative, which runs ads on YouTube, Twitter, TikTok, and Meta to educate people on disinformation.421 Helping seniors navigate the complex internet environment is the aim of several NGOs, such as Život 90 or Elpida.422 Such initiatives should be supported and expanded.
Accuracy prompts are reminders that ‘most people want to share accurate information’ which can be used online; for example, as promoted posts on social media platforms. Such non-political and non-ideological prompts have been shown to reduce the spread of misinformation.423
To support more critical assessments of information spread by the media, another approach is to work with schools to organise activities for youth to promote critical thinking, debating skills, and understanding history from different perspectives.
Events and activities to help Ukrainians and Slovaks meet and get to know one another could help Slovak communities better understand the refugee experience. More educational activities in form of books, events, and theatre performances to explain the diversity of Ukrainian refugee experiences should be promoted.
3.6. Risks
Incendiary and misleading discourses about refugees present risks on various levels. First, there are risks to Ukrainian refugees, particularly in relation to discrimination and increased challenges in accessing services, especially for the more vulnerable refugee groups, such as those on lower incomes, women with children, and people with disabilities. Discourses in relation to Ukrainians abusing or unduly straining the healthcare system or could impact their access if some working in the sector internalise such beliefs. As this discourse relates to a sector with which most (if not all) of the host society interacts, increasing strains on the system that are perceived as caused by the influx of refugees can create tensions between the host community and Ukrainians.
Micro-aggression and more overt aggression from host communities toward refugees may develop due to growing frustrations regarding the perceived unfairness of Ukrainians receiving state support. All discourses risk moving from the online and verbal space into tangible actions. This has been observed. Media reported that in Slovakia, during the period of free public travel for refugees, some bus drivers refused access to refugees without payment.424 As early as May 2022, Euractiv noted that a ‘Ukrainian family’s car in Slovakia was sprayed with the Russian Z symbol’.425
Highly skilled professionals may also be affected by negative discourses labelling them as economic migrants and accusing them of accessing benefits they are not entitled to. Ukrainian professionals may be discriminated against in the Polish labour market given that, before the war, Ukrainian workers—particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic—worked largely in low-skilled jobs.426 Should employers believe that Ukrainians do not want to work, this may lead to greater discrimination in the job market. A perception may also grow that Ukrainians are not competent to work in certain professions.
Should the economic situation in the five countries worsen, discourses about refugees driving prices up, deepening economic challenges, or taking locals’ jobs could become much more prevalent, fuelling resentment toward Ukrainians by the host community. Ukrainian refugees could be used as scapegoats for economic problems such as inflation, rising costs of living, housing shortages, and high costs.427
Such discourses present risks to community cohesion more broadly. There may be increased distrust and polarisation among the host and Ukrainian communities, which could in some cases manifest in instances of physical and verbal abuse, particularly around specific dates such as, in Poland, the anniversary of the Volhynia massacre.428 Tensions between polarised parts of host society can lead to protests, clashes between opposing politicians on news channels, and fiery, often aggressive comments and discussions on social media channels
between groups with opposing values. The spread of negative narratives relating to Ukrainian refugees is likely to impede integration efforts by NGOs, foundations, and agencies. In addition, narratives such as ‘Ukrainians are threatening the Polish national identity’ can exacerbate sentiments of isolation Ukrainians in the host country, making them feel unwelcome.429
Finally, this could have an effect on politics. In Slovakia, due to high levels of belief in conspiracy theories and disinformation, as well as latent sympathy for Russia,430 these discourses risk gaining a hold on the country’s political situation. This is a potentially serious issue, taking into account the upcoming Slovak election in September 2023 that in turn can have an effect on the host community’s support for refugees. In 2022, 56 percent of Slovaks believed that NATO deliberately provoked Russia by surrounding it with its own military bases,431 and 68 percent (particularly in households that do not believe Russia is responsible for the war) agreed that support to Ukrainian refugees should be decreased.432 This highlights how existing political perceptions directly impact perceptions and opinions of Ukrainian refugees and provides a fertile ground for DMDS to be believed and spread.
Considerations for Countering Anti-Refugee Messaging:
Continue to monitor and analyse discourses around refugees to understand trends regarding their prevalence and acceptance by the public, as well as their impact on community cohesion.
TABLE 3. Misleading or incendiary discourses about refugees in the region
